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Protestors, terrorists or something else? How to think about dissident groups
Abstract
Many scholars of contentious politics claim there is no such thing as a group that uses only one tactic, yet scholars, pundits, and the public routinely use single-minded terms like protestors, dissidents, and terrorists. Other scholars and research programs suggest that some groups are specialists who tend to stick to a single tactic to achieve their goals, such as non-violence, violence, or specific kinds of violence, like terror. We make the claim that both sides of the debate are empirically valid and that both types of group exist. That is, some groups tend to specialize in a single tactic while others use a variety of tactics. This paper examines the empirical distribution of group types by examining the mix of tactics that groups employ. The analysis helps resolve part of the debate and pushes scholarly thinking in new directions about how often, why, and when groups operate across this spectrum.
... Exclusive definitions also emphasise that a group must predominantly use terrorist tactics as opposed to peaceful activities, such as protests, or other forms of political violence, such as insurgencies, riot, and coup d'états. 7 The notion that terrorism is a single tactic, rather than a defining characteristic, is taken up by other scholars such as Young and Shellman, 8 who explore this debate in greater detail. They argue that the landscape of dissident tactics is not homogenous; some groups specialise in a single tactic, such as terrorism, while others adopt a mix of tactics. ...
Our research juxtaposes terrorism with intrastate wars. We start from the assumption that terrorism is politically motivated and examine the persistence of these motivations following one-sided civil war victories. Using a difference-indifference (DID) model and benchmark sensitivity analysis, we analyse over 70 terrorist groups active during civil wars from 1970-2014. We find that one-sided insurgent victories are both less frequent and less stable than one-sided incumbent wins. Post-conflict terrorism is purposeful in the sense that actors employ this form of violence to express dissatisfaction with war outcomes. In general, terrorism by pro-government actors drops off sharply in the post-conflict period; yet terrorism by anti-government actors tends to increase. This increase is particularly noteworthy following one-sided insurgent victories; the regime change inherent in such victories does little to quell the motivation for terrorist violence among ancillary nonstate actors in the postwar period.
What effects do economic sanctions have on the volume of domestic terrorism within target states and transnational terrorism directed toward Americans by targeted nationals? In this article, we theorize that sanctions imposed by the United States increase the likelihood of domestic and transnational terrorism, but the suggested effect is conditioned by the freedom of expression in sanctioned states. When media freedom and other information freedoms are high, we posit that citizens are more likely to direct their grievances against their own government, leading to an increase in domestic terrorism as time under economic sanction increases. When freedom of expression is low, however, leaders of sanctioned states may be able to exploit sanctions to channel hostility away from the home regime via transnational terrorism exported from the sanctioned state. Results from a time-series, cross-national data analysis lend support to our argument on domestic terrorism in the sanctioned state while showing no statistical support for the hypothesis concerning transnational terrorism.
Why do some governments negotiate with insurgent organizations while others use force? This study examines the factors that influence these strategic government approaches to insurgencies using an original data set of state actions toward 140 insurgent groups between 1998 and 2012. We develop a simple model to explain government policy choice and test on these original data. After accounting for ideological differences and insurgent organization alliances, our findings suggest that the size of the insurgent group, the extent of previous lethal violence, and previous government decisions all influence government selection of conciliatory, repressive, mixed, and non-response strategies. We conclude by discussing the implications for how governments make counterterrorism/counterinsurgency strategy.
This article presents an eclectic review of the analytical study of terrorism that views all agents as rational decisionmakers. This analytical literature began in earnest with the seminal study of US skyjackings by William Landes in 1978. After 11 September 2001, the analytical literature on terrorism grew rapidly. Based on policy relevance, my survey article identifies five key areas of intense research interests. These include analyses of terrorist attack trends, the economic consequences of terrorism, the study of counterterrorism effectiveness, the causes of terrorism, and the relationship of terrorism and liberal democracies. New developments in the field focused on distinguishing key differences between domestic and transnational terrorism. Additionally, recent game-theoretic advances permitted more active agents and stages to the games. Other major developments involved the study of networked terrorists and the role of counterterrorism foreign aid. Fruitful future directions include using advanced econometric methods to discern the true impact of terrorism on growth, applying spatial econometrics to the study of terrorism, ascertaining the determinants of terrorist groups’ longevity, and learning how to foster international counterterrorism cooperation.
Researchers increasingly conduct quantitative studies of terrorist groups, which is an important advance in the literature. However, there has been little discussion of what constitutes a “terrorist group,” regarding conceptualization or measurement. Many studies of terrorist groups do not define the term, and among those that do, definitions vary considerably. The lack of clarity leads to conceptual confusion as well as sample selection issues, which can affect inferences. To address these issues, this article offers an in-depth analysis of the term and its use. It explores definitions in the literature, and then discusses different samples used. Empirically, the article demonstrates how sample selection can affect variable values. It also shows that a non-representative sample, such as the U.S. Foreign Terrorist Organization list, can lead to inaccurate generalizations. Ultimately, I present a straightforward “inclusive” definition, and argue for its practicality. Other suggestions are made for a more effective and cohesive research program.
Why do some terrorist groups survive considerably longer than others? The literature is just beginning to address this important question in a systematic manner. Additionally, and as with most studies of terrorism, longevity studies have ignored the possibility of interactions between terrorist groups. This article attempts to address these two gaps in the literature: the incomplete understanding of terrorist group survival and the tendency to assume that terrorist groups act independently. In spite of risks associated with cooperation, I argue that it should help involved terrorist groups mitigate mobilization concerns. More importantly, the impact of cooperation is conditioned by attributes of the country in which a terrorist group operates. Using new global data on terrorist groups between 1987 and 2005, I show that cooperation has the strongest effect on longevity in states where groups should have a harder time operating—more capable states and less democratic states. Interestingly, a group's number of relationships is more important than to whom the group is connected.
The prevailing scholarly wisdom is that weak states, or resource-poor states, are the most prone to civil war. Yet many weak states never experience civil war. Why then are some weak states prone to civil war while others are not? The author offers a theory that explains how dissidents and states interact to jointly produce civil war. In sum, states that repress their citizens are the most likely to kill citizens and to generate dissident violence. This insight resolves an academic puzzle and when tested provides a model with better predictive ability than previous models.
Does respect for human rights check or promote terrorism? This question is hotly debated within policy circles. Some hold that restricting human rights is a necessary if unfortunate cost of preventing terrorism. Others conclude that such abuses aggravate political grievances that contribute to terror. The authors demonstrate that theory and data support the latter position. They hypothesize that abuse of the subset of rights known as physical integrity rights fuels terrorism by making it more difficult for government authorities to collect intelligence on terrorists and by undermining domestic and international support for their counterterrorism efforts. They test this hypothesis using a data set that includes measures of both domestic and transnational terrorist attacks and find that respect for physical integrity rights is consistently associated with fewer terrorist attacks. This suggests that those interested in curtailing terrorism should press governments to more carefully respect physical integrity rights.
Competing hypotheses on the relationship between government and dissident behavior emerge from both formal and empirical models. Yet, the current literature lacks a comprehensive theoretical account of such contradictory effects. This study develops a theory to account for a large number of competing hypotheses within a single framework. The theory explains various government and dissident tactical choices over the course of an internal political struggle by focusing on leaders, their motivations, and the link between their motivations and actions. The theory gives rise to a process model of sequential government-dissident interactions that is used to test several implied hypotheses. Empirical sequential time-series models of government and dissident behavior find support for most of the theory's implied hypotheses in Israel (1979–2002) and Afghanistan (1990–99).
Theory: Regimes respond to domestic threats with political repression. The precise nature of the domestic threat itself, however, is subject to discussion. Hypothesis: State repression is a function of either a unidimensional conception of domestic threats (i.e., where there is one attribute of political conflict considered by the regime) or one that is multidimensional in character (i.e., where there are several attributes considered), conditioned by certain political-economic characteristics: democracy, economic development, coercive capacity, dependency and lagged repression. Methods: A pooled cross-sectional time series analysis of 53 countries from 1948 to 1982. Results: Three different aspects of political conflict (conflict frequency, strategic variety, and deviance from cultural norm) are statistically significant in their relationship to repression, supporting the multidimensional conception of domestic threats. Additionally,,the degree to which the government is democratic significantly alters the pattern of relationships between political conflict and repressive behavior.
This article studies the various mechanisms by which democracy affects transnational terrorism. New theoretical mechanisms are identified that either complement or encompass existing arguments. Different effects of democracy on transnational terrorism are assessed for a sample of about 119 countries from 1975 to 1997. Results show that democratic participation reduces transnational terrorist incidents in a country, while government constraints increase the number of those incidents, subsuming the effect of press freedom. The proportional representation system experiences fewer transnational terrorist incidents than either the majoritarian or the mixed system.
Why would people abandon their homes in favor of an uncertain life elsewhere? The short answer, of course, is violence. More specifically, the authors contend that people monitor the violent behavior of both the government and dissidents and assess the threat such behavior poses to their lives, physical person, and liberty. The greater the threat posed by the behavior of the government and dissidents, the larger the number of forced migrants a country will produce. To test hypotheses drawn from this argument the authors use a global sample of countries over more than forty years. Their findings are held to be consistent with their argument, showing that violent behavior has a substantially larger impact on forced migration than variables such as the type of political institution or the average size of the economy.
When revolutionaries or insurgents, broadly defined, indiscriminately attack civilians, they generally attack "complicitous civilians," i.e., those categories of noncombatants which the revolutionaries see as benefiting from, supporting and/or having a substantial capacity to influence the states that the revolutionaries are attempting to displace or overthrow. Such "categorical" terrorism will be most extensive when revolutionaries view these states (or complicitous civilians themselves) as perpetrators of extensive, indiscriminate violence against the revolutionaries and their constituents. However, if significant numbers of complicitous civilians are seen by rebel groups as potential supporters (or as capable of being influenced by nonviolent appeals or protests), then they will not be indiscriminately attacked. Whether specific categories of civilians will be perceived as potential allies by revolutionaries depends mainly on the prior history of political interaction and cooperation between these civilians and the revolutionaries. Categorical terrorism is most likely where there has been little such interaction or cooperation, resulting in weak political alliances between the revolutionaries and complicitous civilians – for example, where the revolutionaries and complicitous civilians speak different languages, practice different religions, claim the same land, and/or are territorially segregated.
Why are some terrorist organizations so much more deadly then others? This article examines organizational characteristics such as ideology, size, age, state sponsorship, alliance connections, and control of territory while controlling for factors that may also influence lethality, including the political system and relative wealth of the country in which the organization is based. Using data from the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism's Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB), we use a negative binomial model of organizational lethality, finding that organizational size, ideology, territorial control, and connectedness are important predictors of lethality while state sponsorship, organizational age, and host country characteristics are not.
This chapter addresses the question of how people build social and political power from below, how civil resistance succeeds, and whether there are conditions under which civil resistance is impossible. It emphasizes the crucial point that civil resistance campaigns succeed when they become large and diverse enough to reflect a serious challenge to the status quo and when they begin to create defections from their opponent's side. It explains why nonviolent revolutions have succeeded more often than violent revolutions. The chapter shows why mass participation, defections, tactical innovation, and resilience against repression have helped people to overcome long odds and succeed using civil resistance. It elaborates how nonviolent movements succeed, and whether there are situations in which nonviolent resistance is impossible.
Our knowledge of the set of concepts that influence the number of terror attacks experienced by different countries is rudimentary. Existing work on the incidence of terror focuses upon the structural characteristics of polities, economies, and societies, and fails to place competition between dissidents and states center stage. It also tends to treat terror as isolated from other tactics that dissident groups might use to pressure the state. This study addresses these shortcomings by placing government and dissident group behavior at the center of the analysis. Drawing on arguments from the larger literature on dissent and repression, we argue that government behavior and dissident behavior are likely to be more important determinants of terror attacks than structural factors. We scour the literature for existing arguments to round out our model specification, and evaluate hypotheses using Bayesian statistical techniques and a broad scope of relevant data. For many of our independent variables we construct indices using measurement models that are able to account for measurement error and missing data, resulting in a more comprehensive set of data than previous studies. The results demonstrate that measures of government and dissident behavior have more explanatory power than measures of the concepts that populate existing research.
This article describes a substitution model of states' responses to dissident behavior and a statistical test of some sequential hypotheses that are derived from the model. It is motivated by an interest in understanding the sequential response of states to dissident activity. That is, if dissidents protest, what will the state do next? Similarly, if dissidents are cooperative, what will the state do next? The author argues that the answer to both of these questions depends on the interaction of the state's most recent behavior (i.e., repression or accommodation) and the dissident's response. The model produces the hypothesis that states substitute repression for accommodation, and vice versa, in response to dissident protest. Statistical analysis of evidence from Peru and Sri Lanka, 1955 to 1991, suggests that the model captures well the sequential responses of the Peruvian and Sri Lankan governments to dissident behavior during that period.
The Ill-Treatment and Torture (ITT) Data Collection Project uses content analysis to measure a number of variables on more than 15,000 public allegations of government ill-treatment and torture made by Amnesty International (AI) from 1995 to 2005. The ITT specific allegation (SA) event data use the torture allegation as the unit of observation, thus permitting users to manipulate them for a wide variety of purposes. In this article, we introduce the ITT SA data. We first describe the key variables in the SA data and report a number of bivariate descriptive statistics to illustrate some of the research questions that might be usefully investigated with the data. We then discuss how we believe the ITT SA data can be used to study not only AI's naming and shaming behavior, but also states' (lack of) compliance with the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). We conclude with an empirical analysis using the SA data that investigates the effect of domestic political institutions on formal complaints, investigations, and adjudication of torture allegations. We show that legislative checks are positively associated with complaints, investigations, and trials; elections and freedom of speech are positively associated with investigations and trials; and powerful judiciaries are associated only with investigations.
Peace scientists such as Kenneth Boulding, Ted Gurr, Thomas Schelling, and Charles Tilly were fastidious in their use of abstract concepts free of the political baggage that politicians, policymakers, and pundits necessarily foist upon the terms in the rough and tumble world of politics. Too much contemporary peace science fails to follow their lead. This essay describes this problem and proposes a useful heuristic to help us improve.
We investigate the causes of civil war, using a new data set of wars during 1960-99. Rebellion may be explained by atypically severe grievances, such as high inequality, a lack of political rights, or ethnic and religious divisions in society. Alternatively, it might be explained by atypical opportunities for building a rebel organization. While it is difficult to find proxies for grievances and opportunities, we find that political and social variables that are most obviously related to grievances have little explanatory power. By contrast, economic variables, which could proxy some grievances but are perhaps more obviously related to the viability of rebellion, provide considerably more explanatory power.
Theory: A synthetic theoretical model built on both deprivation and resource mobilization arguments is constructed to explain ethnopolitical rebellion for the 1980s and to provide risk assessments for the early 1990s. Hypotheses: We hypothesize that ethnopolitical groups which produce residuals well below the regression line will likely exhibit rebellious behavior in the early 1990s. Methods: We use a three stage least squares estimator, analyze the coefficients and their standard errors, and also examine the residuals. Results: We find broad support for the theoretical synthesis, but focus attention on the risk assessments. In addition to identifying ethnopolitical groups that did resort to greater violence in the early 1990s, the theoretical model helps us explain why a number of groups that the analysis suggested would rebel in the early 1990s have not in fact done so.
Theory: Two expected utility theories and one psychological/resource mobilization theory of the impact of repression on dissent are tested in this study. Hypotheses: Lichbach (1987) hypothesizes that dissidents will substitute violent protest for nonviolent protest behavior (and vice versa) when confronted with repression. Gupta, Singh, and Sprague (1993) put forth a contextual argument: repression spurs violence in democracies, but high levels of repression are effective in authoritarian regimes. Rasler (1996) contends that timing matters: repression is effective in the short run, but spurs pro-test in the long run. Methods: Sequential tests of events data are used to test the hypotheses. Results: Lichbach's theory is supported by the evidence, but neither Gupta, Singh, and Sprague's nor Rasler's theories receives support.
Why does a dissident group go through phases of violence and nonviolence? Many studies of states and dissidents examine related issues by focusing on structural or rarely changing factors. In contrast, some more recent work focuses on dynamic interaction of participants. We suggest forecasting state–dissident interaction using insights from this dynamic approach while also incorporating structural factors. We explore this question by offering new data on the behavior of groups and governments collected using automated natural language processing techniques. These data provide information on who is doing what to whom at a directed-dyadic level. We also collected new data on the attitudes or sentiment of the masses using novel automated techniques. Since obtaining valid and reliable time-series public opinion data on mass attitudes towards a dissident group is extremely difficult, we have created automated sentiment data by scraping publicly available information written by members of the population and aggregating this information to create a pollof opinion at a discrete time period. We model the violence and nonviolence perpetrated by two groups: the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines. We find encouraging results for predicting future phase shifts in violence when accounting for behaviors modeled with our data as opposed to models based solely on structural factors.
This article explores those factors that shape a political organization’s choice of tactics in political mobilization with a particular focus on the influence of gender ideology on the choice of different type of contentious action. To understand why political organizations engaging in contentious politics choose to employ violent tactics, nonviolent tactics, or a mixture of both, current scholarship has tended to focus on factors such as relationship with the government, external support, and religious or leftist ideology. Far less attention has been given to the role of an organization’s ideology relating to gender when predicting its behavior. In addition, much of the analysis of contentious activity has analyzed the use of violence or protest separately and rarely examines the choice of a mixed strategy. We employ a time-series multinomial logistic regression analysis to examine the Middle East Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior dataset (MAROB), including data over 24 years on 104 ethno-political organizations that have used a range of tactics including protest, violence, and/or a mix of the two, to investigate organizational and state-level variables that lead organizations to choose different strategies. We find that a number of variables can influence a movement’s choice to engage in one strategy over another. Gender-inclusive ideology makes an organization more likely to engage in protest and less likely to choose a violent or mixed strategy.
The project focuses on the interrelationship between both government and dissident leaders’ “micromotives” and the regime’s/group’s “macrobehavior” (Schelling 1978). That is, I explain how dissident and government leaders’ individual motives transpire into events such as the clashes with riot police, cooperative agreements, and terrorist activities we observe in Chile, Venezuela, Afghanistan, and Israel. In contentious political struggles between the government and an opposition group, how does a state’s choice among tactics (e.g., violence versus negotiation) influence an opposition group’s choice among tactics? Conversely, how does an opposition group’s choice among tactics influence a state’s choice among tactics? This project proposes a theory to answer these questions and posits a research design to test the theory's implications.
The theory restricts attention to a two actor world composed of a government and a dissident group, in which the government implements policies and defends those policies and dissidents challenge those policies and the government's authority to rule. Thus, the government and the dissidents are viewed as opponents of one another. Suppose further that each entity is controlled by a rational leader and that each leader gets utility from maintaining their tenure. To protect their positions of authority, leaders direct actions towards one another. Each leader’s choice of action is influenced by three factors: internal threat, external threat, and resource pools.
First, each leader faces threats from his or her coalition of supporters (internal threat). For leaders to remain in power, they must have a coalition of followers that support them. The likelihood of a leader maintaining power decreases, as his or her support erodes. In this simplified world, a leader’s coalition of supporters judges the leader’s performance in office based on the successes and failures he or she has in interactions with the opponent. Thus, one’s actions are a function of previous outcomes in interactions with the opponent.
Second, leaders face threats from the opponent itself (external threat) such as assassination, imprisonment, exile, revolution, and coup d'état. Thus, leaders must prevent violent backlash and upheaval. As a result, a leader’s action is a function of past opponent behavior.
However, each action is costly and under certain conditions, resource pools constrain leaders’ tactical choices. Leaders’ motives compel them to monitor the levels of internal and external threat in their environment and the availability of resources when choosing actions to direct at their opponent. Each leader chooses from an action set containing hostile and cooperative means. The theoretical implies the ways in which leaders behave towards one another in different decision-making contexts.
To capture the argument, the author specifies a system of equations that s state and dissident leaders' choices in sequential response to one. Using a most-different-systems design, the author performs empirical tests of the theoretical in the countries of Chile, Venezuela, Israel, and Afghanistan using event data and time series econometric techniques. The data come from the Intranational Political Interactions (IPI) project and the Kansas Event Data Systems (KEDS) project. The results show strong support for the hypotheses in most countries and weaker support in others.
We introduce the contributions to this special issue on “Disaggregating Civil War.” We review the problems arising from excessive aggregation in studies of civil war, and outline how disaggregation promises to provide better insights into the causes and dynamics of civil wars, using the articles in this special issue as examples. We comment on the issue of the appropriate level of disaggregation, lessons learned from these articles, and issues for further research.
This article describes a substitution model of states' responses to dissident behavior and a statistical test of some sequential hypotheses that are derived from the model. It is motivated by an interest in understanding the sequential response of states to dissident activity. That is, if dissidents protest, what will the state do next? Similarly, if dissidents are cooperative, what will the state do next? The author argues that the answer to both of these questions depends on the interaction of the state's most recent behavior (i.e., repression or accommodation) and the dissident's response. The model produces the hypothesis that states substitute repression for accommodation, and vice versa, in response to dissident protest. Statistical analysis of evidence from Peru and Sri Lanka, 1955 to 1991, suggests that the model captures well the sequential responses of the Peruvian and Sri Lankan governments to dissident behavior during that period.
In this article, the author makes a case for expanding our focus from national-attribute studies of intranational conflict toward strategic behavior studies of intranational conflict. One payoff of such a move is that it enables us to specify a linkage between the strategic behavior of both domestic and international actors and thus address the often theorized, but rarely established, intranational-international conflict nexus. Further, the author takes a synthetic approach to the recent debate between action-reaction and rational expectations models of international conflict behavior and derives hypotheses concerning the behavior of both domestic and international parties to an armed intranational conflict. The hypotheses are then tested in a time-series case study design using the Rhodesian/Zimbabwean case for the period from 1957 to 1979. The results demonstrate that there existed an intranational-international conflict nexus in this case and highlight the utility of adopting a strategic behavior approach to studying armed intranational conflict.
Are there any commonalities between such phenomena as soccer hooliganism, sabotage by peasants of landlords' property, road rage, and even the events of September 11? With striking historical scope and command of the literature of many disciplines, this book seeks the common causes of these events in collective violence. In collective violence, social interaction immediately inflicts physical damage, involves at least two perpetrators of damage, and results in part from coordination among the persons who perform the damaging acts. Charles Tilly argues that collective violence is complicated, changeable, and unpredictable in some regards, yet also results from similar causes variously combined in different times and places. Pinpointing the causes, combinations, and settings helps to explain collective violence and also helps to identify the best ways to mitigate violence and create democracies with a minimum of damage to persons and property. Charles Tilly is the Joseph L. Buttenwieser Professor of Social Science at Columbia University. He has published more than twenty scholarly books, including twenty specialized monographs and edited volumes on political processes, inequality, population change and European history.
This study posits a theory to explain government and dissident sequential responses to one another and develops a statistical model to test the implied hypotheses. While competing hypotheses emerge from both formal and empirical models, the current literature lacks a single, coherent, theoretical, and empirically corroborated model of the interactive relationship between dissident and government behavior. The study seeks to fill this lacuna in the literature by developing a comprehensive theory to account for a large number of competing hypotheses within a single framework. The subsequent empirical tests enable one to find support for the various competing hypotheses under different sets of conditions. The analyses of Chile (1983—1992) and Venezuela (1987— 1992) provide evidence that the model captures well the sequential responses of Chilean and Venezuelan governments and dissidents.
Aggregate data studies of domestic political conflict have used an Action-Reaction (AR) model that has produced contradictory findings about the repression/dissent nexus: Repression by regimes may either increase or decrease dissent by opposition groups. To clarify these findings I propose an alternative Rational Actor (RA) model from which are derived three propositions. (1) An increase in a government's repression of nonviolence will reduce the nonviolent activities of an opposition group but increase its violent activities. (2) The balance of effects, that is, whether an increase in the regime's repression increases or decreases the opposition group's total dissident activities, depends upon the government's accommodative policy to the group. (3) Consistent government accommodative and repressive policies reduce dissent; inconsistent policies increase dissent. The RA model thus accounts for the contradictory findings produced by the AR-based aggregate data studies of repression and dissent.
An important type of medical study seeks to establish the risk factors for contracting various diseases. A similar, but very small, vein of research exists in peace and conflict studies, and we seek to contribute to it. Our study evaluates whether variables shown to explain variance in numbers of forced migrants can serve as risk factors that might aid contingency planning for such humanitarian crises. We study a cross-national sample of cases over the period from 1985 through 1994. Our findings indicate that annual, country-level indicators of civil war, a forced migrant episode, and human rights violations are candidate risk factors for forced migration in the following year. Interestingly, when using country-years as the unit of observation genocide is not a useful risk factor for forced migration.
By analytically decoupling war and violence, this book explores the causes and dynamics of violence in civil war. Against the prevailing view that such violence is an instance of impenetrable madness, the book demonstrates that there is logic to it and that it has much less to do with collective emotions, ideologies, and cultures than currently believed. Kalyvas specifies a novel theory of selective violence: it is jointly produced by political actors seeking information and individual civilians trying to avoid the worst but also grabbing what opportunities their predicament affords them. Violence, he finds, is never a simple reflection of the optimal strategy of its users; its profoundly interactive character defeats simple maximization logics while producing surprising outcomes, such as relative nonviolence in the 'frontlines' of civil war.
Terrorism is designed to change minds by destroying bodies; it is a form of costly signaling. Terrorists employ five primary strategies of costly signaling: attrition, intimidation, provocation, spoiling, and outbidding. The main targets of persuasion are the enemy and the population that the terrorists hope to represent or control. Terrorists wish to signal that they have the strength and will to impose costs on those who oppose them, and that the enemy and moderate groups on the terrorists' side cannot be trusted and should not be supported. Each strategy works well under certain conditions and poorly under others. State responses to one strategy may be inappropriate for other strategies. In some cases, however, terrorists are pursuing a combination of strategies, and the response must also work well against this combination.
States whose agents engage in torture in a given year have a 93 percent chance of continuing to torture in the following year. What leads governments to stop the use of torture? We focus on the principal–agent relationship between the executive and the individuals responsible for supervising and interrogating state prisoners. We argue that some liberal democratic institutions change the probability that leaders support the creation of institutions that discourage jailers and interrogators from engaging in torture, thus increasing the probability of a state terminating its use of torture. These relationships are strongly conditioned by the presence of violent dissent; states rarely terminate the use of torture when they face a threat. Once campaigns of violent dissent stop, however, states with popular suffrage and a free press are considerably more likely to terminate their use of torture. Also given the end of violent dissent, the greater the number of veto points in government, the lower the likelihood that a state terminates its use of torture.
When they conduct statistical tests of their hypotheses about the conflict behavior of states students of peace science generally employ the Correlates of War project's data on war and militarized interstate disputes. This essay contends that this practice has a dark side: an opportunity cost in questions not asked. It first distinguishes holistic from particularistic conceptualization, and then contends that the COW project adopts the latter. That scholars adopt particularistic conceptualization is not—of itself—a problem. The problem arises when the vast majority of scholars studying a phenomenon do so.
Why would people abandon their homes in favor of an uncertain life elsewhere? The short answer, of course, is violence. More specifically, we contend that people monitor the violent behavior of both the government and dissidents and assess the threat such behavior poses to their lives, physical person, and liberty. The greater the threat posed by the behavior of the government and dissidents, the larger the number of forced migrants a country will produce. To test hypotheses drawn from our argument we use a global sample of countries over more than forty years. Our findings are consistent with our argument, and we are able to show that violent behavior has a substantially larger impact on forced migration than variables such as the type of political institutions or the average size of the economy.
This study investigates the circumstances that lead some countries to produce a large number of refugees and relatively few internally displaced persons (IDPs) as opposed to a large number of IDPs and relatively few refugees. We develop the hypothesis that refugee flows are greater in the face of state (sponsored) genocide/politicide than they are in response to other state coercion, dissident campaigns of violence, or civil wars. We also argue that countries surrounded by poor, authoritarian regimes will produce fewer refugees (relative to IDPs) than those surrounded by wealthy, democratic neighbors. We employ a sample selection model to conduct statistical analyses using data on a global sample of countries for the period 1976-1995. Our results support many of our hypotheses and suggest that the choice-centered approach produces useful answers to new questions that other scholars have yet to ask.
What explains the variation in terrorism within and across political regimes? We contend that terrorism is most likely to occur in contexts in which governments cannot credibly restrain themselves from abusing their power in the future. We consider a specific institutional arrangement, whether a state has an independent judiciary, and hypothesize that independent judiciaries make government commitments more credible, thereby providing less incentive for the use of terrorism. Using a recently released database that includes transnational and domestic terrorist events from 1970 to 1997, we estimate a set of statistical analyses appropriate for the challenges of terrorism data and then examine the robustness of the results. The results provide support for the credible commitment logic and offer insights into the different ways that political institutions increase or decrease terrorism.
The terms terror, terrorism, and terrorist do not identify causally coherent and distinct social phenomena but strategies that recur across a wide variety of actors and political situations. Social scientists who reify the terms confuse themselves and render a disservice to public discussion. The U.S. government's own catalogs of terrorist events actually support both claims.
A common public perception in OECD countries suggests that refugees are mostly “economic migrants” in search of a better standard of living. Does the empirical record belie this belief? The authors explore that question within a rationalist approach using aggregate-level data that allow them to explore a variety of other covariates of the choice to seek refuge in one country relative to another. In addition to wages, they consider fear of persecution, culture, and the costs of relocation. The results are at odds with the “bogus refugees” image: the effect of average wages is mediated by proximity such that higher average wages are associated with fewer refugees, except among bordering countries. In addition, refugees seek asylum in neighboring countries, especially those at war with their own country or those experiencing a civil war. Those who seek refuge in countries other than their neighbors follow colonial ties.
Using a database of recent articles published in prominent political science journals, we show the rapid increase in terrorism research. Given this increased awareness and attention, we identify several problems that still plague the study of political terrorism including definitional problems that lack empirical tests, not distinguishing among different types of terrorism, and using the wrong unit of analysis when designing research. After identifying these problems—especially as they relate to the quantitative study of terrorism—we suggest some solutions. We then apply these suggestions to investigate whether changing the definition of terrorism, different types of terrorism, or changing the unit of analysis affects key predictors of terror events cross-nationally. One of our tests consists of varying the unit of observation to include directed dyads, which offers the potential to test some of the many strategic models of terrorism. Our analysis suggests that varying definitions of terrorism, such as military vs. non-military targets, might not be that consequential, whereas different types of terrorism, such as domestic vs. transnational, could be driven by fundamentally different processes. We also conclude that modeling transnational terrorism differently using directed dyads yields new and interesting insights into the process of terrorism.
The Political Economy of Terrorism, first published in 2006, presents a widely accessible approach to the study of terrorism that combines economic methods with political analysis and realities. It applies economic methodology - theoretical and empirical - with political analysis to the study of domestic and transnational terrorism. Included in the treatment are historical aspects of the phenomenon, a discussion of watershed events, the rise of modern-day terrorism, examination of current trends, the dilemma of liberal democracies, evaluation of counterterrorism, and analysis of hostage incidents. Rational-actor models of terrorist and government behavior and game-theoretic analysis are presented for readers with no prior theoretical training. Where relevant, the authors display graphs using the data set International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE), and other data sets.
This article demonstrates how the selection of cases for study on the basis of outcomes on the dependent variable biases conclusions.
It first lays out the logic of explanation and shows how it is violated when only cases that have achieved the outcome of
interest are studied. It then examines three well-known and highly regarded studies in the field of comparative politics,
comparing the conclusions reached in the original work with a test of the arguments on cases selected without regard for their
position on the dependent variable. In each instance, conclusions based on the uncorrelated sample differ from the original
conclusions.