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An Actor-oriented Assessment of Guinea’s Local Content Policies (LCP): Opportunities
and obstacles for the government, mining companies and civil society
Cindy Wilhelm, University of Bath. MRes Dissertation Summary
September 2019. C.Wilhelm@uea.ac.uk
1 | P a g e
ABSTRACT
Resource-abundant countries have begun to fight the
Resource Curse to make the most of their resource
wealth and to create linkages to diversify their
economies. Guinea, with its immense bauxite wealth
has joined the trend of Local Content Policies (LCP)
in its attempt to create more inclusive development
impacts, particularly employment. Through the
introduction of the new Mining Code in 2013 and
numerous new initiatives which have been
following, the current administration is continuously
increasing its efforts. So far, Guinea has not been
included in LCP studies. Utilizing Long’s actor-
oriented approach (Long, 1977; 1989; 2001; Long
and Long, 1992), this project investigates how LCP
in Guinea’s bauxite sector can be evaluated
considering the actors involved and power issues at
play. 31 semi-structured Key Informant interviews
with representatives of the national government,
civil society actors, and the mining industry (notably
GAC, CBG and Alufer) were conducted between
May and July 2019 in Conakry and Boffa. The
results show that a variety of LCP implementation
obstacles are faced, stretching from economic to
institutional difficulties, including problems
provoked by a challenging business environment. A
fundamental obstacle are power issues, which are
observed on numerous levels, with especially
corruption being of major concern. These obstacles
explain the reaction of the mining companies and
their attitude for the government’s LCP efforts,
consisting of openness and curiosity, but also
suspicion. Hence, it has to be emphasized that the
government is advised to tackle the outlined
obstacles, and to particularly ensure transparency at
all levels to strengthen trust with mining companies,
as they are needed to support and implement LCP.
More research is thus required to evaluate the future
impacts of Guinea’s LCP which will continue to
unfold, and special attention should be paid to
existing power dynamics among the various actors.
KEY WORDS: Local Content Policies (LCP),
Linkages, Guinea, Actors, Bauxite
INTRODUCTION
By 2025, Guinea aims to be the global capital of
bauxite and alumina. Guinean bauxite mining began
in 1973 with the Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée
(CBG) which dominated the domestic bauxite scene.
Recently, more international players have emerged
with new megaprojects, including the Anglo-Saxon
Multinational company Alufer with its Bel Air Mine
in Boffa, as well as Guinea Alumina Corporation
(GAC) from the UAE, and the new big Chinese
company Société des Bauxites de Guinée (SMB).
Despite its vast wealth of high quality bauxite
deposits located in the Boké region, Guinea
continues to be among the least developed countries
and has been unable to benefit adequately from its
resource abundance. Promises to boost domestic
employment, local Small and Medium Sized
Enterprises (SMEs), and a diversification of the
bauxite industry have proven to be unsuccessful in
the past. It can thus be argued whether Guinea is a
typical case of a resource-rich country which is
confronted by the Resource Curse and enclave risk
of resource-based development (Ferguson, 2006;
Korten, 1996; Emerson, 1982).
The demands of the local population to benefit from
the bauxite boom are considerable, and mining areas
are occasionally confronted with tensions through
protests. Youth unemployment and migration are
particular issues.
Since the arrival of the president Alpha Condé in
2010, Guinea has changed its course of direction and
implemented numerous reforms and policies to
make the country benefit more from its bauxite
boom, particularly in terms of employment. This is
in line with a general trend toward mining sector
reforms and LCP across resource-rich countries in
Sub-Saharan Africa.
In 2011, and with revisions in 2013, the new Code
Minier (Mining Code) was introduced. At the heart
of the new mining code is the Politique du Contenu
Local (LCP) which requires mining companies to
employ local Guineans directly and indirectly
through fixed quotas, and to strengthen the skills of
domestic SMEs which should be used as suppliers
and contractors. This also includes tax reforms in
which mining tax revenues are distributed by the
government to municipalities in order to boost
development efforts, including LCP through the
FODEL and FNDL funds.
Through LCP, Guinea is eager to create linkages to
diversify its bauxite industry and to boost
employment, to increase captured value from further
processing such as the refinery and export of bauxite
and alumina, as well as diversification beyond the
mining sector.
The idea of LCP is not new in Guinea. Mining
companies such as CBG and GAC have been
committed to community development and the
support of direct and indirect local employment
following Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR),
Corporate Citizenship (CC), as well as Community
Development Agreement (CDA) obligations.
Through their own voluntary projects and initiatives,
mining companies have thus developed their own
LCP over the years. How does this fit with the new
government efforts?
An Actor-oriented Assessment of Guinea’s Local Content Policies (LCP): Opportunities
and obstacles for the government, mining companies and civil society
Cindy Wilhelm, University of Bath. MRes Dissertation Summary
September 2019. C.Wilhelm@uea.ac.uk
2 | P a g e
Utilizing Long’s actor-oriented approach, special
attention will be paid in this project on the
involvement of the various actors in LCP and
potential power issues which may be identified and
which might be serious impediments for successful
LCP implementation. The objectives of this study
are to provide insight for all involved stakeholders
and the academic circle on Guinea’s LCP
development and potential recommendations.
METHODOLOGY
Using qualitative methods, 31 semi-structured Key
Informant Interviews in person in Conakry and
Boffa, as well as via e-mail and Skype were carried
out between May and July 2019. Representatives of
the government, in particular the Ministère des
Mines et de la Géologie (MMG), as well as Civil
Society actors including Guinean and international
NGOs and Hybrid actors like UNDP programmes
were included. Moreover, representatives of mining
companies notably GAC, CBG, Alufer and the
Chambre des Mines were consulted. This provides a
macro-perspective of the national LCP actors, who
also cooperate closely with local administration and
can hence provide valuable insight. Limitations due
to time and capacity constraints were considered.
Ethical Approval was obtained by the University of
Bath’s SSREC (S19-030), and issues of consent,
participant protection, data storage, as well as
reflexivity and positionality of the researcher were
taken into account. The interviews were recorded,
transcribed, anonymized, and thematic analysis
through inductive coding utilizing the NVivo
software was carried out.
LCP IN GUINEA: CONTEXT
Analysing these two established LCP pillars which
have translated in numerous initiatives and laws
since 2013, the government’s motivation to take
charge of LCP can be noticed. Issues surrounding
monitoring and evaluations are also considered,
despite LCP quotas being voluntary. The
government also defines its role through the
following obligations (Rép. De Guinée 2017):
•Deliver a favourable macroeconomic, social, legal
and political framework to enable the creation of
adequate employment and commercial perspectives
•Eliminate political and judicial obstacles which
may confront and hinder local suppliers
•Work on programs for the education and support of
companies
•Work on special structures which shall improve the
productivity and competitiveness of the private
sector
While at the same time it defines its demands from
the mining companies:
•Determine a representative for the implementation
and monitoring of LCP
•Publish the information of their employment
policies, supply of goods and services and
contribution to local development
•Communicate social strategy of the company to the
government
•Participate in the BSTP
OPPORTUNITIES, LIMITS AND
OBSTACLES TO THE GOVERNMENT’S LCP
INITIATIVE: GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL
SOCIETY PERSPECTIVE
Hope and Optimism can be felt throughout the
interviews which is expressed in the following ways:
A ‘revolutionary’ achievement in terms of legal
frameworks created compared to past
administrations
Promising opportunities in terms of employment
if the bauxite sector manages to diversify and
create linkages
However, a variety of obstacles are expressed
throughout the interviews:
Economic
Mining industry is capital-
intensive, not labour-intensive.
It cannot absorb everyone, does
An Actor-oriented Assessment of Guinea’s Local Content Policies (LCP): Opportunities
and obstacles for the government, mining companies and civil society
Cindy Wilhelm, University of Bath. MRes Dissertation Summary
September 2019. C.Wilhelm@uea.ac.uk
3 | P a g e
not meet the disproportionate
demands -> tensions
Low economic growth & lack
of dynamic economy
Institutional
Legislative issues: long
duration of formulation and
implementation of laws and
specifications. Dual character
of LCP, as the new legislations
are not retroactive. Voluntary
nature of LCP, questions of
monitoring and evaluations
(logistics, illiteracy and lack of
education of local
administrators)
Business
Environment
Individuals and SMEs lack
needed capacities. Mining
sector is complex with high
demands, standards and
qualifications. Technical,
financial and infrastructure
opportunities (electricity &
internet) are missing.
Education quality is not in line
with the demands of the labour
market
Entrepreneurial spirit
inadequate: SMEs suffer from
tax disadvantages which make
their services and products in
some cases more expensive.
Financial means missing, but
more structurally, business
culture in Guinea is difficult
(quality, norms, delivery times)
Employment concerns
regarding conditions and types
of contracts.
Power issues at play can be observed in the
interviews:
Corruption
Fear of national level
corruption. Questions of power,
hierarchy, structures
surrounding LCP and
distribution of mining tax
revenues
Lack of monitoring of anti-
corruption law
A chain of corruption, from the
mayor via governor, préfet,
minister, is expressed
This is shown by the
government actors and civil
society representatives
Fight against corruption with
transparency. But is this
feasible, also on the local level?
Problems surrounding power
vacuums and transition periods
Conakry
vs. local
municipalities
To what extent are national
administrators even able to
exercise power? Issues
surrounding local
administrators who do not
respect the national LCP
legislations, refuse to comply.
Questions surrounding local
power hierarchies, a local vs.
national power dynamic,
conflict of interests
A ‘hierarchy of companies’:
SMEs in the Boké region feel
disadvantaged compared to the
big companies in Conakry.
Unfair competition, capacities,
means (financial, technical,
material, etc.). To what extent
will the BSTP help these
companies?
Corruption &
Favouritism
Corrupt recruitment process.
Favouritism and issues of
ownership need to be
considered. Is there a power
chain? What determines the
recruitment process and these
relationships?
Despite the government’s efforts to fight and
acknowledge these issues with transparency, it
needs to be ensured that transparency is
implemented from the national down to the local
level, and monitored regularly through independent
actors, such as civil society. Will the capacities of
ANAFIC and BSTP prove efficient enough as tools
to monitor these dynamics? Power issues seem to be
fundamental possible threats to successful LCP
implementation.
MINING COMPANIES’ RESPONSE TO LCP:
BETWEEN CURIOSITY, OPTIMISM AND
SUSPICION
All three interviewed mining companies have a
(long) history of commitment regarding CSR and
LCP initiatives which are independent from the
government’s activities. These are mainly launched
to meet the enormous demands by the local
municipalities, administrators and individuals and to
alleviate social tensions and conflicts.
The same variety of obstacles as observed by the
government and civil society actors are expressed by
the mining companies. Difficulties regarding
capacities, business environment, and the long
An Actor-oriented Assessment of Guinea’s Local Content Policies (LCP): Opportunities
and obstacles for the government, mining companies and civil society
Cindy Wilhelm, University of Bath. MRes Dissertation Summary
September 2019. C.Wilhelm@uea.ac.uk
4 | P a g e
implementation procedure are shared. These
difficulties are outlined from the mining companies’
perspective and conflict of interests where they face
the dilemma of increasing profit margins clashing
with their commitment to LCP. Examples are named
where services and products by local SMEs do not
respond to their quality or safety standards. If they
do, some are significantly more expensive than
imported products. Another observed concern is the
fact that national LCP, such as the BSTP creation is
problematic, as every mining company has different
demands and procedures in place. This shows that
despite each companies’ commitments to CSR and
LCP, there are the realities of the private sector
which put LCP in conflict if the conditions are not
economically favourable.
All three companies talk about power issues. Alufer
notices a changing political dynamic in the local
administrations in Boffa with political transitions.
Although Alufer itself views this in a pragmatic and
objective way, this might impact LCP
implementation from a political standpoint. CBG
criticizes local authorities which want to take too
much power and take charge of CBG’s individual
CSR commitments in terms of budget and finances.
Similar to the governments’ and civil society
observations, Alufer also notes a certain unequal
power dynamic considering competition between
local and Conakry-based SMEs which it views with
concern. This is in line with worries about
corruption that are expressed by Alufer and GAC.
Not only the FNDL and FODEL are questioned in
terms of corruption, also the BSTP is viewed
critically by Alufer. They worry that confidential
company information may be transferred or copied
which may harm SMEs. But also that the structure
itself will not operate transparently.
Their attitude can thus be viewed in a mix of
suspicion, but openness and curiosity to some
extent. Alufer is waiting for the FODEL to take off
and is ready to assist the municipalities and
administrators in their choices of FODEL and FNDL
use. GAC welcomes the initiatives of FNDL and
FODEL, but notes that it is firstly important to wait
and see how the funds will be spent. CBG’s stance
varies, as it does not mention any of the new LCP
initiatives itself, and when asked about the FODEL
they only respond that they would continue their
specific conventions regarding any royalty
payments. As CBG is the oldest company, it is the
most prominent example of the outlined legal issues
considering the duality of LCP legislation. It is thus
unclear if and to what extent CBG will be included
in the FODEL, and when it will join the BSTP.
What is clearly expressed in all three interviews is
the motivation to continue their own CSR and
LCP initiatives, regardless of the success or
challenges of the government’s LCP initiatives.
How will this continue, considering this potential
parallelism between mining companies and
government initiatives, as well as the increasing
arrival of more actors? Alufer and GAC express
their openness to cooperate more with other mining
companies to establish common projects or more
universal CSR frameworks. This will still need to be
analysed in the future.
DISCUSSION
Guinea fits other examples of LCP implementation
cases where various types of LCP implementation
and a variety of obstacles, particularly in terms of
power dynamics and corruption can be observed
(Hansen, 2014; Kalyuzhnova et al., 2016; Calignano
and Vaaland, 2018; Vaaland, 2015; Macatangay,
2016; Lange and Kinyondo, 2016; Nwapi, 2015). It
can be seen that LCP in Guinea consists of a
dilemma, with the central government being eager to
take charge, but where the mining companies are
needed to be on board to exercise LCP. But how
strict should the Guinean government be? In order to
avoid a ‘Nigeria effect’ of too strict implementation
(Kalyuzhnova et al., 2016; Ramdoo, 2015), the
choice was made to leave it to a voluntary effort and
rather trust in the PR effects of LCP. Mining
companies in Guinea are powerful, as their
investments are desperately needed. How can the
Guinean government negotiate with them and
convince them to implement and comply with their
LCP initiatives? It is a difficult position, where the
government should be strong and decisive, but
where the relationship with mining companies
should not be harmed. These possible obstacles are
major concerns for mining companies which explain
their ‘wait and see-’ attitude as their future
involvement will most likely be contingent on the
results of the upcoming years. It will need to be
assessed how the monitoring mechanisms of
ANAFIC, FODEL and BSTP will work. If the next
upcoming years might be successful, trust can be
built and the commitment of mining companies for
LCP initiatives may grow, and the duality of LCP
such as in the case of FODEL may be tackled.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Firstly, Guinea’s effort for transparency and their
energy for LCP and improvements need to be
recognized. However, the question is now how this
national effort for transparency will translate into the
local municipalities who are the main
implementation motor of LCP. It is crucial for an
establishment of trust for the government actors, but
also mining companies who need to commit to LCP
to see that full transparency will be granted using a
multi-stakeholder approach including civil society
An Actor-oriented Assessment of Guinea’s Local Content Policies (LCP): Opportunities
and obstacles for the government, mining companies and civil society
Cindy Wilhelm, University of Bath. MRes Dissertation Summary
September 2019. C.Wilhelm@uea.ac.uk
5 | P a g e
actors to monitor LCP implementation and
particularly watch out for corruption and power
dynamics. Public consequences for non-compliance
need to be considered to underline the seriousness of
LCP.
Secondly, considering the power issues which give
the impression to civil society and mining company
actors that local individuals and SMEs might be
disadvantaged, it needs to be ensured that LCP
effects will not predominantly be felt for the
perceived Conakry-based ‘elite.’ The Conakry vs.
Boké dynamic needs to be acknowledged, and it
should be considered whether and to what extent
special support and assistance for local, small SMEs
might be an option. The government, including the
BSTP, should consider the debate surrounding
protectionism and protection of infant industries
(Bradley, 1996; Deardorff, 1987; Feenstra and
Lewis, 1991; Mill, 1848). This also includes an
assessment of possible factors of unequal
advantages, including tax issues. Why is this issue
important? Due to the high demands of the Guinean
population in local mining municipalities, especially
with the widely shared optimism and expectations
for LCP, tensions may arise if LCP will not feel
inclusive. There is much at stake, and hence these
issues need to be considered.
Thirdly, the multi-stakeholder approach should be
continued in the implementation but also monitoring
of LCP. Mining companies, in many cases having
built trust and relationships with their local actors,
could be utilized as consultants for local
administrators in their FODEL and FNDL use,
which could increase trust of the mining companies
to these new initiatives, as well as convince other
mining companies to join, and also to bridge the
capacities and knowledge gap of the administrators.
Paired with civil society actors, this will maximize
LCP efficiency. This shows again Long’s relevance
of actor-oriented approaches given the complexities
and advantages of actors in any development
policies (Long and Long, 1992).
Lastly, the Guinean government should continue to
translate the acknowledged limitations of mining
industry capacities regarding LCP into a widening
scope of LCP beyond the mining sector. The BSTP
should be opened to other sectors to create linkages
beyond capital-intensive industries in order to
effectively fight the resource curse (Greenwald and
Stiglitz, 2006; Hirschman, 1958; 2013; Sachs and
Warner, 2001; Auty, 1990).
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This project, due to limitations in time and capacity,
does not include all major bauxite mining
companies. It is suggested in some interviews that
particularly the Chinese actors have a completely
different view for LCP, hence it will be important in
the future to obtain access to the major player SMB.
Furthermore, with LCP being newly established, the
effects remain yet to be seen. This project relies on
observed and anticipated obstacles. Long term
studies considering the observed future effects will
need to be conducted. Moreover, local perspectives
including individuals, municipal administrators, as
well as affected SMEs will need to be included to
move away from the macro perspective which this
project provides. But generally, utilizing Long’s
actor-oriented approach proves to be fruitful,
particularly given the identification of power
dynamics which can be considered to be
fundamental impediments for LCP implementation.
CONCLUSION
How can LCP in Guinea’s bauxite sector be
evaluated considering the actors involved and power
issues at play? Despite the government’s ambitious
efforts to implement transparent LCP, various
obstacles of institutional, economic and business
environment-related nature remain. Power issues
surrounding corruption on various levels are
especially problematic. The interviewed mining
companies also express their concerns and
suspicions, yet remain in a ‘wait and see-’ attitude
combining openness and curiosity. CBG seems to be
a special case with its distinct conventions fitting the
issue of the duality of the legislations. All three will
continue their own CSR and LCP efforts. The
government is in a difficult position, where on the
one hand it depends on the mining companies for
their investments and also for their LCP
implementation. But on the other hand, it also wants
to be respected and gain support for its mining sector
reforms. A fruitful relationship is crucial, and the
government will need to work on the outlined
concerns of LCP implementation to prove the
success of their initiatives to gain trust of the mining
companies to implement LCP, but also to convince
other mining companies which might be more
reserved to also join the initiatives in cases of legal
dualities. Civil society actors could be used to
facilitate monitoring and evaluation processes to
assist this development.
If the government of Guinea continues to follow its
energy for transparent LCP implementation, and if it
manages to ensure that power issues will be
addressed on all levels, Guinea might be steering
towards a brighter future becoming the ‘2025 global
capital of bauxite ’ by linking its bauxite sector to
more labour-intensive industries (MMG, 2018).
This will provide more employment and tackle
Guinea’s unemployment problem, as well as
utilizing linkages to avoid the Resource Curse,
bauxite dependence and enclave effects.
An Actor-oriented Assessment of Guinea’s Local Content Policies (LCP): Opportunities
and obstacles for the government, mining companies and civil society
Cindy Wilhelm, University of Bath. MRes Dissertation Summary
September 2019. C.Wilhelm@uea.ac.uk
6 | P a g e
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Cindy Wilhelm holds a BA in Economic History
from Erasmus University Rotterdam with honours.
This project was part of her MRes in International
Development at the University of Bath under
supervision of Dr. Roy Maconachie specializing in
resource-based development. She obtained funding
from the University of East Anglia to continue her
project as a PhD candidate under the supervision of
Dr. Emma Gilberthorpe and Dr. Gareth Edwards
from October 2019 onward. You can follow Cindy’s
work on ResearchGate and LinkedIn or contact her
via email: C.Wilhelm@uea.ac.uk
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