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SPECIAL EDITION
3 (15) | 2019
ISSN 2084-8250
Scenarios for cohesive growth
IN COOPERATION WITH
EUROPEAN
#FUTURES
e Visegrad/Insight is
the main platform of
debate and analysis on
Central Europe.
is report has been
developed in cooperation
with the Centre for
European Policy Studies
(CEPS).
This report has been supported by the International Visegrad Fund.
It does not necessarily refl ect the offi cial policy or position of the
Visegrad Group or the International Visegrad Fund
organiser: main partner: partners:
funded by:
REPORT
LAUNCH
1 October 2019
Brussels, Belgium
www.futuresforum.eu
#Futures
European
Forum
T
his year the negotiations about the next Multiannual Financial Framework
(MFF) will enter a critical moment. In the face of an imminent Brexit and the
fallout from global turmoil, the EU has to reflect on its guiding principles and
take decisions to fulfil the promise of a united Europe.
For the last 30 years, the EU has been delivering an unprecedented degree of
liberty and prosperity to all the nations on the continent. Yet, complacent optimism
about the next decade would be largely misplaced. e block needs to find strategies
for uncertain times concerning the liberal world order, the climate crisis, the digital
age and social solidarity.
In the European #Futures series, we are looking at scenarios that go beyond the
current status quo. In November 2018 the first Central European Futures report was
released jointly with the German Marshall Fund of the U.S. e report explained how
global trends, amplified in the region, could play out and define the future shape of
Europe.
Fostering cohesion is one of the main aims of the European Union. A notable part
of the EU’s budget is thus devoted to Structural Funds, the purpose of which it is to
provide poorer regions and countries with the means to catch up with others.
New Europe has benefitted from substantial allocations of Structural Funds since
they joined in 2004 and 2007. is applies in particular to the Visegrad Four (Czechia,
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) which have received between two and three per cent
of their GDP in cohesion funds. is allocation has contributed greatly to the catch-
up process.
In principle, EU regional support is destined mainly for “lagging regions”, defined
as those with a GDP per capita at PPP below 75 per cent of the EU average. Transition
regions, with a GDP per capita between 75 and 90 per cent of the EU average, can also
benefit but not to the same degree.
e strong growth performance of the Visegrad Four (V4) has already ensured
that for two of them, Czechia and the Slovak Republic, the national average is above 75
per cent (80 for SK and 90 for CZ). is implies that most of the regions inside these
countries are, or soon will become transition regions. By contrast, the GDP per capita
of Poland and Hungary is still somewhat below the 75 per cent threshold, although the
capital cities are already above.
e budget of the European Union is determined by two major mechanisms,
which give a differing, and at times contradictory, picture. e starting point is the
MFF which, in principle, provides an overall cap to spending (usually expressed as a
per cent of EU GDP) for the next seven years and indications of the spending by broad
overall categories.
However, actual spending is then determined by the annual budgets, which
sometimes diverge substantially from the patterns laid down in the MFF some years
earlier. is has been the case over the last couple of years when emergencies led to
a redirection of funds not yet spent from the 2014-2020 MFF, which is still in force.
EUROPE
Whole and Free
DANIEL GROS
Centre for European Policy Studies
WOJCIECH PRZYBYLSKI
Visegrad Insight
TOMASZ KASPROWICZ
Visegrad Insight
2 VISEGRAD INSIGHT SPECIAL EDITION 3 (15) | 2019
e variability of actual spending relative to the one foreseen in the MFF is par-
ticularly pronounced for the Structural Funds or, more generally, for cohesion spend-
ing. e reason for this is that disbursement under the Structural Funds requires the
presentation of detailed projects followed by the implementation at the regional level.
However, the planning, approval and implementation of projects take years to accom-
plish. EU budget expenditures are authorised only at the very end.
is implies that actual cohesion spending is rather variable and often extends
beyond the end of the MFF. Under the so-called N+2 rule funds can be disbursed up
to two years later.
Actual cohesion spending has increased from about 25 billion euros per annum
in the early 2000s – just before enlargement – to about a peak of close to 60 billion
euros in 2012-2013 but has since fallen back to below 30 billion euros in 2017, the last
year with comparable data available. However, these absolute values are misleading
since the budget has increased and the EU has enlarged from 15 to 28 members.
e chart below provides an overall view in terms of the shares of EU spending
(not the sums allocated under the MFF). It shows that the share of spending on agri-
culture has declined over the last decades from about 50 to 40 per cent of the total,
whereas spending on Research and Development has increased from 4 to 8 per cent
of the total.
EU expediture on R&D
: CEPS based on European Commission data
Agriculture (CAP)
Structural Funds
R&D
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2 011 2012 2 013 2014 2 015 2016 2 017
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Cohesion spending has been more volatile. For about the first ten years (2000-
2011) it remained roughly constant at slightly above 30 per cent of total EU spending.
is was followed by a peak towards the end of the last MFF (2013) when cohesion
spending reached 40 per cent of the total, and then a fall to below 30 in 2017. It remains
to be seen whether cohesion spending will pick up towards the end of the current
MFF (2020).
e 2014-20 MFF had foreseen that each year between 2014 and 2017 the com-
mitment appropriations should be higher for cohesion spending than for agriculture.
However, this has not materialised so far.
Overall, if one analyses actual spending as opposed to official plans, it appears
that cohesion funding has de facto maintained a roughly constant share of total EU
spending (a bit below one third).
e decline in the share of agriculture has been matched by an increase in other
areas. R&D spending has roughly doubled its share, but it remains, at below one-tenth,
much smaller than cohesion spending.
With this background in mind, we may consider the scenarios developed below.
3
Cohesion
with an expiry date
Setting a potential expiry date on cohesion funds
for regions that are lagging behind would mobilise
both the EU Commission and the member states to
innovate and find new ways to help convergence.
page 6
Paving
the green ways
While the EU sets its eyes on the urgent goal of
zero emissions, it must acknowledge a diversified
paths along geographical and industrial differences.
page 8
4 SCENARIOS
for Europe
4 VISEGRAD INSIGHT SPECIAL EDITION 3 (15) | 2019
Leapfrogging
to smart R&D
The aim is not an immediate increase in R&D
spending, but rather building modern research
institutions, which can bypass legacy problems
and are competitive at a global level.
page 10
From Venus
to Mars
While the EU is making first steps in the right
direction towards building up its defence
collaboration, there needs to be more focus on
common procurement, a diversity of partnerships
and an increase of funds to incentivise real change
page 12
POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS
Main Takeaways
page 14
TRENDS
Supporting data
page 19
5
EuropEan #FuturEs
T
he Brexit crisis has amplified
the funding dilemma in the EU.
Regardless of promises for in-
creased support from countries
like Germany, the total budget for cohe-
sion spending will decrease, and all the
member states are forced to accept the
reality on the ground.
A decrease will especially hit the
V4 as cohesion spending is principally
aimed at the so-called “lagging” regions
(i.e., those with a GDP per capita below
75 per cent of the EU average). e na-
tional averages of the V4 countries have
already passed or are very close to pass-
ing this threshold.
At present, Hungary records some
of the highest growth rates, but it is still
only at 70 per cent of the EU average
although some time ago it had a high-
er income than Poland and Slovakia.
However, all of the V4, along with the
majority of New Europe overall have
higher growth rates than the EU aver-
age and thus can be expected to contin-
ue catching up with the Union’s average.
In this sense, enlargement is viewed as
a success.
By contrast, the South has wit-
nessed a divergence from a previously
superior position (over 83 per cent of
the EU average in 2000 to below 70 in
2017, and thus below the current level
of the V4).
e narrative behind the Structural
Funds has been simple, from their in-
ception in the 1990s. Lagging regions
are held to be poorer because they do
not have the appropriate infrastruc-
ture. It should thus be sufficient to build
enough roads, ports, or airports to en-
sure that these areas can catch up to the
level of the rest of the Union. e sup-
port for infrastructure has been massive.
In the V4 countries, the EU has financed
around one half of all public spending on
infrastructure under cohesion funding.
e effectiveness of EU cohesion
spending to foster growth in lagging
regions was a hotly contested issue
for a long time, mostly with regard to
spending in the EU-15. Many regions in
old member states have been receiving
Structural Funds for a long period (25
Cohesion funding has been a point of contention for years and will reach fever pitch
with the new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). The net contributors have ex-
pressed concerns about funding new member states, who have made considerable
strides in convergence; especially since there are regions in net contributor countries
which have slipped below the cohesion threshold, and their domestic governments
would rather allocate funding to them than to the greater European pot. The situation
is exacerbated by Brexit, which will reduce the available total for the EU budget. This
emboldens Eurosceptic politicians from across the continent to question the benefits
of European Union membership. What would happen if the EU reconsiders its stance
and introduces a more hands-on approach to cohesion funding?
Cohesion
with an expiry date
1
6 VISEGRAD INSIGHT SPECIAL EDITION 3 (15) | 2019
and more years) but did not manage to
converge as documented above. is is
particularly the case in countries which
have experienced an overall crisis; for
example, Greece has fallen back from a
GDP per capita of over 85 per cent of the
EU average to about 67 today. Portugal
has also fallen back.
At the present speed of conver-
gence, most of New Europe (and all of
the V4) would enter the transitional re-
gime (between 75 and 100 per cent of
the EU average) during the next MFF
based on their national averages. But
some of their regions as well as those in
old member states seem set to continue
to qualify for support.
is reversal of fortunes has
brought to the EU a solemn realisation
that cohesion funding can be used either
for catching up or for preserving ineffi-
cient economic models. e question is:
should cohesion support continue indef-
initely, even when there is no evidence
that it always has led to convergence?
e Commission noted that “e
potential of the EU budget can only
be fully unleashed if the economic,
regulatory and administrative envi-
ronment in the Member States is sup-
portive. is is why, under the current
Multiannual Financial Framework, all
Member States and beneficiaries are
required to show that the regulatory
framework for financial management
is robust, that the relevant EU regu-
lation is being implemented correctly,
and that the necessary administrative
and institutional capacity exists to
make EU funding a success.”
ese are several of many factors
deciding whether funding is effective or
not. In fact, most of them are hard to
quantify and control by the EU at a cen-
tral level. However, the EU has decided
that access to cohesion spending should
be subject to member states following
sensible macroeconomic policies and
providing a supportive administrative
and regulatory environment. An even
more important move was to shift the
responsibility for the effectiveness of
spending to the local communities.
e real long-term issue for co-
hesion spending is rather what to do
with regions that despite large transfers
do not catch up with the EU average.
Continued financing does not make
sense in these cases. erefore, a tempo-
rary limitation for cohesion funding has
been introduced. It is based on the time
it takes a region to reach 75 per cent of
EU GDP per capita based on a normal
convergence scenario.
So far, the experience with the new
member states confirms that conver-
gence proceeds at about 2.5 percentage
point per annum (i.e. the difference be-
tween starting GDP per capita and that
of the EU average is reduced each year by
about 2.5 per cent). Based on this regu-
lar pattern, which has also been found to
hold for the US until the 1990s, one can
estimate the time it would take to reach
75 per cent of EU GDP per capita for re-
gions, which are still below this threshold
today. A country or region which stands
at the beginning of the evaluation period
at 70 per cent of the EU average, should
need only about seven years, or one full
MFF period, to reach 75 per cent. A re-
gion starting at 63 per cent today would
be expected to need 14 years, or two MFF
periods to reach 75 per cent.
When a region or country fails to
catch up on time, the Commission com-
mences a closer investigation of the rea-
sons for the underperformance. It may
extend the catch-up period up to 50 per
cent if the cohesion funding has been
properly spent or in case there exist
additional factors, which could explain
the under-performance and justify con-
tinued EU support. Otherwise, access to
funding is first limited and then stopped
altogether, under a moratorium, until
access can be reconsidered on the basis
of a repair plan put forward by the local
authorities.
e V4 countries had few prob-
lems with this approach and the path of
gradual cohesion continues, with sub-
stantial support from the EU budget. It
will progress at about the present rate
for the next MFF, but then will dimin-
ish gradually as more and more regions
cross the 75 per cent threshold. Falling
cohesion spending in the V4 should not
be considered as a failure, but rather as
a sign of success.
With such rules in place, cohesion
spending fell on two accounts over time.
e still robust catch-up process of the
new member states in general, and the
V4 countries in particular, brought them
above the threshold of lagging regions.
Moreover, in other regions that have not
shown any growth effects despite dec-
ades of support, the usefulness of con-
tinuing cohesion spending was reduced.
is development freed up resources for
other types of EU spending.
However, this created disturbances
in the regions that were failing to catch
up. Cohesion spending remained an
important factor in their financing. e
political pressure on the Commission
resulted in long extensions. Efficiency
gains were much slower than anticipat-
ed. Eventually, some of the lagging re-
gions were forced to adapt.
Setting a potential expiry date on cohesion funds
for regions that are lagging behind would mobilise
both the EU Commission and the member states to
innovate and find new ways to help convergence.
Take-aways from this policy recommendation on
page 14
7
EuropEan #FuturEs
T
he new Commission President
follows through with her prom-
ise to work towards the EU be-
coming the first major area with
zero emissions. However, this goal is not
shared by all member states, especially
by some from New Europe. Since the V4
had already expressed their reservations
to the European Council the last time
it discussed a tightening of the emis-
sion reduction targets for 2030, there
is an increased danger of developing an
East-West divide over the topic. is a
worrying sign, since the EU has staked
much of its global reputation on being
a thought leader and taking decisive ac-
tion concerning the climate crisis.
Four member states have object-
ed to a tightening of the EU’s inter-
mediate climate goals, especially those
for 2030, which becomes immediately
relevant for the next MFF. These coun-
tries are also the ones with the highest
emission intensity (CO2 emissions per
unit of GDP).
e objecting member states ar-
gue that more ambitious climate goals
would put an undue burden on them,
taking into account their high emission
intensities and their (still lower) income.
ey fear high costs of new technology
that would impose relatively high costs
– impairing their ability to catch up their
western counterparts. Although CEE
countries would have higher economic
costs in the short run, the overall costs
of the adjustment would need to be re-
duced. Moreover, the member states
with the most stringent environmental
standards might also gain technological
leadership in key sectors, while those
failing to adapt will fall further behind if
they cling to their old industries.
To avoid this East-West clash on
climate policy, the EU decides to reshape
cohesion spending in order to help the
most emission dependent countries re-
orient their economies in exchange for
an agreement to speed up their transition
towards zero emissions.
Experience suggests that the cost of
reducing emissions is lower in what are
currently high emission industries and
countries. Given the high starting point
in terms of emission intensity, industry
in the V4 should have a lower cost of
abatement compared with other areas of
Europe. e V4 are, therefore, regarded
as low cost producers of emission reduc-
tions rather than high volume emitters;
The majority of EU countries recognise the need to address the ever worsening cli-
mate crisis and support the goal of a Europe with zero emissions by 2050. A few
notable holdouts feel the transformation would be too costly for their economies
and populations in the short term. However, these countries were to persist in this
opposition they would be left behind by the new industries and technologies neces-
sary to be developed during this “green” transformation. Thus, to avoid a divergence
along old, familiar lines policies must be forward, not backward-looking.
Paving
the green ways
2
8 VISEGRAD INSIGHT SPECIAL EDITION 3 (15) | 2019
a distinction that allows them profit from
EU climate policy mechanism.
Industrial emissions represent an
area where the relative cost of abatement
plays the biggest role. Before the change
in cohesion funding, the main focus
was on the European Emission Trading
System (ETS), which covers the power
sector and industry and accounts for
about 40 per cent of all emissions. is is
a truly EU policy instrument with a EU-
wide cap and EU-wide annual reduction
goals. e established goal already fore-
sees zero allowances by 2050, meaning
that, for these two sectors, a path has al-
ready been set towards carbon neutrality.
But the ETS is also a very decen-
tralised policy, since it mainly works
through a price signal and it allows for
national specific situation in terms of the
allocation of free allowances and other
mechanisms.
Importantly, the new cohesion
funding funnelled into switching to
greener energy sources is just a part of the
approach adopted by the Commission.
Brussels accepts that a total switch to
green technology is not always possible
or feasible in the short run. e fate of old
installations is not decided in Brussels,
but by a market mechanism. Some in-
stallation with “dirty” coal technology
might continue for some time. But the
owners of other installations might close
them down because they get more from
selling the allowances than by operating
old, inefficient plants.
e V4 governments realise that
early action is less costly than attempt-
ing to keep old, inefficient, industrial
structures alive as long as possible. A
combination of Structural Funds and
auction revenues is redirected to sup-
port the rapid reduction of carbon
emissions in heavy industries towards
higher energy efficiency and wholesale
restructuring towards greener industrial
structures.
Coal mines represent another
challenge. Regions where employment
used to depend heavily on the mining
of coal are awarded special assistance
for the requalification of the miners and
a restructuring of the local industry.
Fortunately, total employment in the
industry is rather limited (less than 200
thousand for the EU), so the transforma-
tion of these regions is performed quite
easily despite the political tensions aris-
ing from coal legacy.
After contending with these spe-
cific sectors, the biggest sources of
emissions are transport and household
heating. Transport is a priority for dras-
tic reductions via the advent of electric
cars, which are increasingly competitive
and can be complemented by smarter
approaches to mass transport. e latter
will be massively supported by new co-
hesion funds and benefits from the fact
that it is much cheaper to build a low car-
bon mass transport infrastructure from
scratch, rather than trying to reshape
existing one.
is leaves household heating,
which is very much linked to the places
where people work and live. With a fo-
cus on the 2050 goal, household heating
might represent a more difficult chal-
lenge because of seasonal variations in
heating demand. Partially, it has been
addressed by cohesion funds directed
at thermo-modernisation of households
and replacement of ineffective heating
systems. Following the logic that the
funds should go where the cost is highest,
these funds were allocated by objective
factors, such as the average temperature
or the number of days in the year requir-
ing heating. Nevertheless, heating – es-
pecially in the north – is a difficult issue,
and there is only so much that can be
done to limit emissions. Some emissions
are bound to remain.
e solution to reach zero emis-
sions for the EU overall is achieved by
allowing emissions related to household
heating to be created in certain coun-
tries or regions which are then offset
by negative emissions or “sinks” in oth-
er parts. In concrete terms, the heating
necessary in the northern part of the EU
(which still requires limited emissions)
is offset by carbon sinks fed by solar in-
stallations in the south. For the planet, all
that matters is the EU total. at is why
the new cohesion policy also takes into
consideration such regional perspectives
and only funds renewables where they
are most efficient. Since national targets
have been eliminated, the EU no longer
tries to force renewable installations in
suboptimal regions.
ese approaches have several ef-
fects on the EU as a whole. In the first
place, it helps to alleviate the political
tension between old and new member
states. e new cohesion policy makes
sure that the cost of the green transfor-
mation was distributed in a fair fashion.
is smart and flexible approach allowed
the EU to create a broad policy that plays
on regional strengths. Unavoidable or
hard-to-immediately-reduce emissions
were offset by sinks, such as efficient re-
newable installations where conditions
are most favourable and large, wide-
spread forestation efforts. At the same
time, this pragmatic approach recog-
nised cases in which the immediate de-
parture from coal was not feasible and in
such cases funding was directed towards
increasing efficiency which yielded fast
emission reductions where they were
easiest to reap. is applied mostly to the
highly coal dependent V4 industry.
A focus on climate change and
emissions does not have to leave the
poorest regions unhappy. On the contra-
ry, they might benefit from new cohesion
funding with a high quality, low carbon
economy and infrastructure. It is only
in those areas where these opportuni-
ties are not seen and used that a surge in
support for populist parties is witnessed.
While the EU sets its eyes on the urgent goal of
zero emissions, it must acknowledge a diversified
paths along geographical and industrial differenc-
es. See main points summarising the proposal on
PAGE 15
9
EuropEan #FuturEs
T
here remains a large East-West
gap in research and technolo-
gy, which has created a feeling
of “technological colonialism”.
Various regions of New Europe have
witnessed cases of unfair competition
with big research institutions from old
member states, to attract funds and
hire the best performing scientists. As a
consequence, there are calls to redirect
EU spending to promote research excel-
lence and technological development in
the new member states.
While the V4 countries do receive
approximately 2-3 per cent of their GDP
in cohesion funding support, very little
of the EU spending on R&D goes to New
Europe.
e new member states lag in na-
tional spending on R&D – currently
amounting to approximately 1 per cent
of GDP on average for the V4, which is
about one half of the EU average of 2.1
per cent of GDP and way below the EU
target of 3 per cent. Moreover, less than
one-fifth of the funds come from public
(national) R&D spending (i.e., less than
0.2 per cent of GDP).
erefore, even a modest section
of cohesion support redirected towards
R&D translates into a very significant
boost to public spending on R&D.
However, a unique component to
EU funding for R&D is that it is one of
the few budget items which does not
have a national “flag” attached. is is es-
sential given that all major EU research
programmes like Horizon 2020 or the
European Research Council work on a
competitive basis. is means that the
only criterion whether to fund a project
or a researcher is scientific excellence,
not the nationality of the researcher or
the country where the project should
take place.
Due to this competitive allocation
of EU funds for research, it is unavoida-
ble that researchers or research institu-
tions in some countries receive a larger
share than others. New Europe, in par-
ticular, does not seem to be able to com-
pete strictly on the criterion of scientific
excellence.
Part of the reason for these signi-
ficant disproportions between the best
and worst performers is not necessarily
the level of funding or available talent
but rather infrastructural deficiencies.
Since the 2004 enlargement and beyond, New Europe has been on a solid path of
convergence with its western counterpart. There has been success in many sectors,
but these central and eastern regions have struggled to catch up in the area of
technology, including research and development (R&D). While the national govern-
ments of new member states systematically underfund R&D, their researchers feel
that they do not do well and suffer from imbalances in the competitive nature of EU
grants. If this trend continues, the division between old and new member states will
be prolonged perpetually, causing further divisions to develop and swell.
Leapfrogging
to smart R&D
3
10 VISEGRAD INSIGHT SPECIAL EDITION 3 (15) | 2019
Of course, all EU countries have a net
-
work of universities and other tertiary
education institutions. However, in
many countries – especially in the new
member states – they are plagued by
a swarm of legacy problems resulting
often in low levels of teaching and re-
search capabilities, not to mention an
inability to cooperate with the private
business sector.
All the V4 countries have made
some progress in terms of business R&D.
e level remains below the EU average
of (now) 1.4 per cent, but Czechia and
Hungary are not far behind. In Poland,
business R&D is at 0.7 per cent of GDP,
half of the EU average, but it has in-
creased more than three-fold over the
last 10 years. If that growth continues,
Poland would reach the EU average by
about 2025. e available data thus sug-
gest that R&D investment by the private
business sector is still low, but will in-
crease in the next years.
is has led to calls to foster more
indigenous research. One important
indicator on which the new member
states are still lagging is that of having
top universities. For example, in the
Times Higher Education global ranking
of 2019, there are 224 universities from
EU countries among the top 500 places,
which is over 40 per cent of the global to-
tal, attesting to the strength of the EU in
higher education. Yet, only one of these
is from the V4 (Semmelweis University
in Budapest). In other words, universi-
ties in New Europe would appear at the
very bottom of any European ranking.
ere have been voices the
European Parliament arguing that the
“imbalance” in EU R&D spending should
be addressed, perhaps by adding some
cohesion element into the EU research
programmes. However, this creates a se-
vere conflict with other member states
who feel that their researchers won by
means of a fair competition. Moreover,
it would risk a devaluation of these EU
research programmes because the qual-
ity of output is likely to suffer if scientific
excellence is no longer the sole criterion.
Recipient countries or regions can
of course redirect part of the funds they
receive towards universities and research
centers. Under present rules, member
states have to create smart specialisation
strategies and the cohesion funds have
to finance the development of addition-
al research capacity. However, in reality
this has resulted chiefly in spending on
new buildings rather than on attracting
the best talent.
Formally, this builds capacity in
physical terms, but in reality, it is not
clear whether this type of financial
support is supplementary or wheth-
er the Structural Funds merely finance
expenditure which would have taken
place anyway. e same problem applies
to funding for training and education or
innovation investment supported by the
European Investment Fund. e glob-
al university ranking mentioned above
suggests that so far little improvement
has materialised.
A majority in the European
Parliament recognises that if nothing
immediately changes, the imbalance will
become more pronounced and would be
a point of contention that Eurosceptic
parties could use to drum up support.
To counter this inert “develop-
ment”, a new funding policy is set up that
is different from Horizon 2020 and oth-
er funding programmes. Funding from
R&D cohesion funds now targets the
construction of modern research insti-
tutions mostly independent of existing
legacy institutions. In principle, these
new organisations are supposed to be
specialised in particular areas vital to
the economy or problems of a particular
country.
e goal is to build excellence
centres capable of competing with old
member states research centres for R&D
grants. Importantly, domestic authori-
ties have accepted that if the aim is to
establish high quality R&D centres on
their territories, most of the personnel
would come from abroad.
As mentioned previously, this is
not because there are no high-level sci-
entists in New Europe. e key reason is
simple: high quality science is by its na-
ture global. Even in the US, the majority
of the faculty of the best universities are
not US-born.
High quality research centres can
be established in the V4 countries only
if they hire the best people and not
the ones appointed through nepotism.
is allows the institutions to bring
quality research and smart innovation
that attracts high tech industries for
collaboration.
is approach instigates a conflict
with other member states who feel that
their researchers won through a fair
competition and claim that these new
institutions supported by EU cohesion
funds are making future grants harder to
obtain. is complaint was only partial-
ly true as the competition was not really
“fair”, since applications from new mem-
ber states suffered from the handicap of
inefficient and rigid institutions that
often suppressed innovative ideas and
competition from young scientists in
order to secure a position of entrenched
professors. A truly fair competition was
only possible after the appearance of
new institutions.
Despite the initial protests from
the old member states, these policy
shifts also turned out to be beneficial to
them. e fiercer competition forced old
member states to evaluate and improve
their own approach to scientific excel-
lence and technological development.
As a result, the quality of research out-
put increased across the entire EU.
The aim is not an immediate increase in R&D
spending, but rather building modern research in-
stitutions which can bypass legacy problems and
are competitive at a global level. Read what “smart
open innovation strategy” would bring along with
new EU budgetary perspective on PAGE 16
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M
ember states reach a polit-
ical consensus regarding
the benefits of EU action
on security. e rationale
for such a decision stems from the un-
equal exposure to threats among mem-
ber states, which requires joint action
and EU wide solidarity so that the bur-
den does not fall mainly on the border
countries – which have become de facto
protectors of the whole EU.
Subsequently, the EU decides a
series of concrete action targeted at im-
proving overall security and equalising
the burden of security provision for all
member states. ese initiatives includ-
ed various aspects: general defence, cy-
ber security and border control.
In terms of defence, the EU accepts
that the current budget cannot finance a
“European army” but there are areas of
defence spending where the EU decides
to refocus its attention to make impor-
tant contributions.
e EU budget amounts to about
1 per cent of GDP. By comparison, the
average defence spending of the 28
Member States is now around 1.5 per
cent of GDP (against a NATO commit-
ment of 2 per cent of GDP). However,
most of the military expenditure goes on
personnel, only about one fifth of mili-
tary spending, worth about 0.3 per cent
of GDP goes towards equipment. To off-
set this, the EU invests in common pro-
curement that buttresses the domestic
security forces and increases the level of
cohesion across the militaries of Europe.
However, one of the weakest points
in Europe remains defence-related R&D.
According to the European Parliament,
the total annual defence R&D spending
in the EU-28 does not even reach six bil-
lion euros, a fraction of the US spending
level. Moreover, one half of the EU-28
total is in the UK, and over three-fourths
of the remaining three billion euros are
undertaken by France and Germany
(with around 1.2 billion euros each).
ere is very little defence R&D in
the new member states. Poland is the
only country among the V4 which un-
dertakes at least some defence R&D, but
at a much lower scale, around 50 million
euros (per annum).
One of the key challenges for the European Union is the protection of its citizens.
While security issues are still the main responsibility of individual member states,
those on the border bear the brunt while those inland enjoy protection without hav-
ing to endure the personal, economic and societal costs. At the same time, feelings
of insecurity are on the rise across the Union, and these are strengthened by fringe
and extremist groups, which are gaining in popularity, and lead to greater political
instability. With Brexit, the EU is losing a member state that contributed half of the
overall funding on defence R&D. If nothing is done to reverse this trend, the bonds
between the member states will become ever more tenuous.
From Venus
to Mars
4
12 VISEGRAD INSIGHT SPECIAL EDITION 3 (15) | 2019
e Commission proposes that
part of the EU budget to be redirected
into joint R&D defence-related projects.
e proposed amount of 13 billion euros
is negligible relative to the EU economy,
amounting to only two billion each year
of the coming MFF. But this is still a sub-
stantial sum, given that annual defence
R&D in the remaining EU27 amounts to
only six billion euros.
During negotiations, MEPs from
border states stress that where the de-
fence R&D spending takes place should
not be the main concern; it is more im-
portant to increase security for all EU
members through the availability of bet-
ter and more efficient weapons systems.
e new EU spending on R&D will
be tendered competitively. Initially the
incumbents in the three largest Member
States take a lion’s share of this. But over
time competition kicks in and firms
in all member states, including the V4
can get a growing share of the pie. e
smaller and more exposed countries
thus end up with a “double dividend”:
their industries can participate in a mar-
ket until now closed to them and their
citizens benefit from improved security.
EU spending on defence R&D will
presumably not be on developing the
next heavy tank, but on future oriented
projects which integrate new technol-
ogies, such as AI or nanotechnology in
defence.
Cyber security is another impor-
tant area for closer coordination. Cyber-
attacks continue to increase in frequency
and severity, threatening the operation
of critical European infrastructure. e
power grid, the transport network and
information and communication sys-
tems are all essential to maintain basic
societal functions.
It also seems that foreign (mostly
Russian) intervention is now based on
digital means. Promoting fringe and ex-
tremist groups, sowing discontent, fear
and general unrest are the main strate-
gies used to weaken the EU. Both Brexit
and the success of anti-EU parties are
attributed to direct actions of foreign
governments, which are not limited to
funding but also involve advanced so-
cio-technology implemented by farms
of Internet trolls.
e importance of cyber secu-
rity has been recognised at all politi-
cal levels. However, action within the
EU has been insufficient. e recent
Network and Information Systems (NIS)
Directive has reaffirmed the primacy of
national responsibility and action, allo-
cating only a slightly increased role (and
budget) for the existing European Union
Agency for Network and Information
Security (ENISA), which will hence-
forth be known as “the EU Agency for
Cybersecurity”.
e EU contribution to Cyber
Security is too limited. A recent report
“Strengthening the EU’s cyber defence
capabilities” notes that the main limita-
tion of the current EU cyber defence set-
up is that it is an advisor, not an actor.
ENISA does not have any operational
competences and its budget is less than
20 million euros.
To make matters worse, fragmen-
tation of competences among the mem-
ber states is accompanied by serious
concerns over staffing and resources at
the EU level. For example, the European
Cybercrime Centre (EC3) has a success-
ful track record on cybercrime, but it
currently has a staff of only 52 people.
e European External Action Service
(EEAS) and European Defence Agency
(EDA) combined currently have 12 peo-
ple focusing on this area, while ENISA
has a staff of 65 and CERT-EU has a
staff of 30. In all of these organisations
combined, the EU has a current staff of
159 individuals tasked with cyber secu-
rity. e total might increase towards
200 with the recent budget increases for
ENISA, but EU resources remain clear-
ly insufficient compared to those of the
US, for example.
In the case of the US, the staff of just
one of the institutions tasked with cyber
security and defence – the US Cyber
Command’s (USCYBERCOM) Cyber
National Mission Force Headquarters
(CNMF-HQ) – is close to 2,000. e
corresponding 133 Cyber Mission Force
(CMF) teams have now over 6,000.
e EU decides to reach a similar
degree of cyber security, which means
that the resources dedicated to cyber
security are increased by a factor of 30.
A force of about one thousand special-
ists became the initial starting point
at a cost of around 200 million euros
per annum, or less than one euro per
inhabitant.
After this newly invested insti-
tution thwarts an attempt to disrupt
the rail service in Poland, funds are in-
creased yet again and regional command
centres are built in Madrid, Warsaw and
Copenhagen.
e control of borders is anoth-
er area where the EU shifts funding to
make an important contribution. e
central problem is with sea “borders”,
which are difficult to secure as the expe-
rience with the Mediterranean contin-
ues to show.
After the refugee crisis of 2015, the
EU has set up what is called a Common
Coast and Border Guard in the form of a
substantially beefed up Frontex, based in
Warsaw, which is scheduled to achieve
a staff of several thousands of people
over the next few years. e budget of
Frontex amounts now to somewhat
more than 300 million euros. A multiple
of that is spent on cyber security in the
form of ENISA; this still represents only
a fraction of one percent of the overall
budget.
As the number of migrants is
bound to increase from the ongoing ef-
fects of the climate crisis, border securi-
ty is just a part of a bigger story.
e need for border infrastructure
to detain, process and potentially settle
migrants cannot be the sole responsibil-
ity of the southern countries. erefore,
the EU decided to redirect funding into
promoting the voluntary participation
of member states in common migration
policies, after the previous relocation
plan clearly was a failure.
While the EU is making first steps in the right direc-
tion towards building up its defence collaboration,
there needs to be more focus on common procure-
ment, a diversity of partnerships and an increase
of funds to incentivise real change. Main points
explained on page 17
13
EuropEan #FuturEs
POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS
Main Takeaways
Scenario 1
Cohesion
with an expiry date
1 The European Commission should assess each region
regularly on an individual basis, highlighting all the factors
that affect lagging regions, such as corruption and ossified
institutions.
2 When a region is identified as underperforming,
the Commission provides management and assistance to
improve the region’s administrative and institutional capacity.
3 If regions are unable to improve their economic
standing due to institutional flaws or inadequate
macroeconomic planning, the cohesion funding should
be suspended. When the issues persist or the provided
guidance is ignored, a moratorium on future funding ought to
be considered.
14 VISEGRAD INSIGHT SPECIAL EDITION 3 (15) | 2019
Scenario 2
Paving the green ways
1 An important part of the cohesion funds should go to
regional programmes that are focused on the transformation
to green means of technology and energy production.
2 High emission countries working towards a green
transformation should not be penalised for their old
industrial structures and current inefficiencies. Instead, these
countries preferably would be incentivised to retrofit their
current power generation plants to reach the highest levels of
efficiency possible until the transformation is complete.
3 Regional and environmental differences should be
taken into account. The Commission needs to consider that
areas in the north will be higher emitters during the winter
months while areas in the south can act as “sinks” to absorb
the addition of carbon emissions.
4 Greater reliance of market-based incentives can help
to reduce the cost of reductions in carbon emissions. This
applies also to private transport where the old member
states heavily subsidise electric cars, which they want to
produce. The race for low carbon transport should remain
open to new technologies.
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Scenario 3
Leapfrogging to smart R&D
1 Part of the cohesion funds should be allocated to the
set-up of modern and independent research institutions
in the various regions of New Europe. These institutions
should not be staffed primarily with locals and should focus
on specific areas where it is possible to foster research
excellence rather than broad-spectrum science projects.
2 Closer cooperation between research institutions and
the private business sector must be encouraged. Cohesion
support helps to boost public spending on R&D but should
also focus on overcoming infrastructural deficiencies that
hinder cooperation with businesses.
3 It would be wise for the Commission to engage in a
robust campaign to convince the old member states how this
funding will encourage competition and raise the overall level
of excellence across the Union.
16 VISEGRAD INSIGHT SPECIAL EDITION 3 (15) | 2019
Scenario 4
From Venus to Mars
1 The EU needs to invest in common procurement which
will improve domestic security forces as well as strengthen
the degree of European cohesion in the areas of security and
defence.
2 Additional funding from the EU budget should target
defence R&D, which today is performed almost exclusively
in large Member States. EU funding, will, over time, lead to
a greater geographical spread of capabilities in these areas.
3 The current funding levels for cybersecurity must be
dramatically increased to approach the levels of investment
in the US and in Asia.
4 In the area of border controls, funding can be allocated
to promote the voluntary participation of member states in
common migration policies, such as an acceptable relocation
plan.
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18 VISEGRAD INSIGHT SPECIAL EDITION 3 (15) | 2019
Trends
Currently, three of the four Visegrad countries have already passed, or are very close to passing the
cohesion threshold. Only Hungary is still at 70 per cent of the EU average although some time ago
it had a higher income than Poland or the Slovak Republic.
Although the national averages of the V4 countries are above or close to the cohesion threshold, they
will continue to benefit from cohesion spending as most of their regions remain below the threshold. e
relative success of the V4 countries is illustrated in the figure below, which shows a jump of 20 percentage
points (from 55 to 75 per cent of the EU GDP per capita average) made by these countries since 2000.
e support for infrastructure has been massive. In the V4 countries the EU has financed around one half of
all public spending on infrastructure under cohesion funding. In Poland, this ratio was even somewhat above
60 per cent, for the Czech Republic it is still above 40 (although one has to keep in mind that these figures also
contain a fraction that is co-financed by country itself ). Most of New Europe has benefited considerably; but
they are not the only ones, as the highest relative contribution to public sector infrastructure is in Portugal.
100
80
60
40
20
0Old South
83.3
55.8
V4
75.8 63.3
GDP per capita (at PPP) as per cent
of the EU average, the V4
compared to the South’
: Commission, AMECO database, V4 = average of PL, CZ, HU
and SK
2000
2017
19
EuropEan #FuturEs
e effectiveness of EU cohesion spending to foster growth in lagging regions was for a long time a hotly con-
tested issue, at least among the EU-15. Many regions in the old member states have received Structural Funds
for a long time, but have not converged. is is particularly the case in countries, which have experienced an
overall crisis, like Greece, which has fallen back from a GDP per capita of over 85 per cent of the EU average
to about 67 per cent today. Portugal has also fallen back, but by a much smaller amount. By contrast, all of
New Europe has achieved some degree of success at approaching the European average.
At the present speed of convergence, most of New Europe (and all of the V4) would enter the transitional
regime (between 75 and 100 per cent of the EU average) during the next MFF based on their national averages.
But some of their regions and a number of regions in old member states seem set to continue to qualify for
support for a number of lagging regions.
Individual concerns
Brexit, however it finally materialises, has already exacerbated the funding issues with the MFF. It is reminis-
cent of Rahm Emanuel’s oft-quoted witticism, “you never want a serious crisis to go to waste”, and Brexit has
sparked fundamental questions over how funding is deployed within the bloc, and who exactly deserves – or
needs – to benefit over the next cycle.
ough the Commission President and Budget Commissioner want to promote an MFF which can
actively target areas of social concern in line with EU policy, the “frugal four” (Austria, the Netherlands,
Denmark and Sweden) are loath to agree, considering a smaller EU as automatically resulting in a smaller
budget. e V4, meanwhile, think member states should contribute more.
Initially inconspicuous tensions are beginning to come to the surface in this season’s budget: in July, it
was reported that southern EU nations wanted to prioritise stabilisation in the MFF, whereas their northern
counterparts saw structural reform as its central tenet. As ever, the EU has to negotiate the national interests
of each individual member – which is always a daunting task.
is was only amplified with a French push for a eurozone budget within the MFF – a situation made
even worse when the EU introduced a fiscal policy bearing more than a passing resemblance to Macron’s
dream, a “budgetary instrument for convergence and competitiveness for the euro area”. Of course, this
threatens to isolate those countries which have not adopted the single currency, though soft loans are a sug-
gestion to ameliorate segregation.
And, as commentators have noted, it is the contributions of and impact for individual nations, rather
than any bloc-based spending, which leaches from public dialogue. e MFF may be, realistically, a supple
groundwork to EU strategy in the coming years, posing only 1 per cent of GDP across member states and
leaving much of the scaffolding of financial decision-making to national governments, but it certainly has
tangible effects. For the previous MFF, policies were actually put in place to enable further flexibility for
budgeting, allowing finances to be moved to critical areas.
20 40 60 80
Share of Cohesion Fund in total public
spending on infrastructure
: CEPS based on European Commission data
2015-2017, in per cent
PORTUGAL 84.20
CROATIA 79.61
LITHUANIA 74.36
POLAND 61.17
LATVIA 59.91
HUNGARY 55.46
SLOVAKIA 54.59
BULGARIA 48.54
ROMANIA 44.86
ESTONIA 44.84
CZECHIA 42.52
20 VISEGRAD INSIGHT SPECIAL EDITION 3 (15) | 2019
R&D
One of the major priorities for increased funding in the upcoming MFF is Research and Development (R&D).
e darling of European R&D is the Horizon 2020 programme, which intends to close the “innovation gap”
by supporting innovative development – it constituted 7 per cent of the seven-year budget framework over
the last cycle. Part of its work, the European Research Council, found last year that nearly one in five funded
projects resulted in a scientific breakthrough.
But other pioneering work in R&D across the EU is also being supported by the MFF – with the adjunct
that, as funding is EU-wide, competition between different projects within the bloc is fostered. National
funding, by contrast, consists of smaller amounts; constrained to domestic projects and institutions, a de-
veloping European – and global – research scene is unsupported. With the EU looking towards selecting
valuable projects to invest a potentially smaller sum of funding towards, R&D offers bountiful opportunities:
some even argue that the EU should be seeking more risky enterprises, in order to make headway with in-
ternational-level development.
is, however, raises an obvious question: where would the EU place a risky portfolio? If the European
Research Council’s progress is anything to go by, a high risk usually equates to a high return, with only 10 per
cent of the aforementioned breakthrough projects having a low risk, and that more than 50 per cent of pro-
jects also boasted a social impact. is may be a reason behind experts’ calls for MMF budgeting to support
scientific interconnection across Europe.
R&D cannot be limited to domestic growth – it, of course, requires qualified scientists. As, across the
EU, there is a disparity between prioritising university education or more vocational careers, and with conver-
gence in education levels still incomplete, the need to develop global R&D connections is vital. Investment to
encourage high-quality researchers to come to less-developed areas may catalyse technology improvements
and collaborative opportunities, which in turn spurs domestic R&D climates. One prominent EU scheme pro-
moting such international networks is the Erasmus programme – which supports the EU’s policy to achieve
20 per cent student mobility by 2020.
Yet generalised schemes are sometimes not as lucrative as they first appear. ough national govern-
ments may support these networking initiatives, difficulties – particularly across the V4 – on a social or
governmental level threaten to disrupt the progress instigated by EU investment, and include the imminent
consequences of an ageing population and low rates of continued education. Poland, for example, may have
risen through the ranks of the Global Innovation Index in previous years, ranking 39th in 2019, but still fails
to taste the success and reputation which are the norm for countries like first-place Switzerland.
Lacking technological know-how or even basic skills, boasting few incentives and little capital, and with
an impenetrable bureaucracy, it will take many years for the Polish – or even Visegrad – economy to feel the
impacts of improved R&D, even if more funding is tapped towards those nations in the next cycle.
Administrative concerns aside, schemes like Horizon 2020 are beneficial because they do not pre-allo-
cate spending to countries or regions, but if more money is propelled into struggling countries, it often only
impacts cities or capital cities. Last year, human resources in science and technology in Poland’s Mazowieckie
district had a 52.2 per cent share of the economically active population, considerably higher than any other
EU expediture on R&D
: CEPS based on European Commission data
per cent of GNI,
average 2013-2017
EU 0.0680
IT 0.0386
CZ 0.0339
HU 0.1104
PL 0.0144
SK 0.0151
EL 0.0918
ES 0.0655
PT 0.0551
0.0250 0.0500 0.0750 0.1000 0.1250
21
EuropEan #FuturEs
Polish region; whilst Hungary’s central region displayed R&D researcher statistics at a 1.3 per cent share
of the total number of persons employed, over double the statistics from any other area. ough regional
variants occur across Europe – and across the world – the V4 countries are additionally impacted by the
country-wide levels of lower socio-economic development, and political consternation over regional ine-
quality is increasing.
ough recipient countries can redirect some of the EU funds they receive towards their own institutes
of higher education or research, this frequently translates into spending on new buildings, rather than invest-
ing in regional support or supporting a network of talent. When cohesion funds are used to expand curricula,
progress is too slow. Poland has two universities in the Academic Ranking of World Universities; whilst the
Czech Republic has one. Hungary and Slovakia possess zero. Statistics also show that university openness and
student satisfaction correlate with research potential – and for the V4, results are disappointing.
Over the last five years the share of EU spending on Research and Development going to the V4 has
been only around 3 per cent of the total, while these countries account for over 6 per cent of the GDP of the
EU (and thus 6 per cent of the contributions to the EU budget) and of course a much higher share of the
population of the EU.
e chart below shows also that there is a considerable variation in the relative performance of the in-
dividual V4 countries. For Poland the share in EU Research funding is only 0.6 per cent, less than one fourth
of its contribution to the EU economy. By contrast, Hungary is the only one among the V4 where the relative
success in EU Research funding (1.27 per cent of the total) is higher than the share in the EU economy (and
budgetary contributions).
Securing borders, securing identities
Another EU priority – heavily connected with R&D development – is that of modern security, particularly in
the digital realm. ough the MFF budget, this time round, has already been successful in planning funding
for sectoral programmes including Digital Europe, which will be launched in 2021 to support the digitalisa-
tion of communities across the bloc, discussions are still being held as to whether Digital Europe can support
an increased focus on cyber security and digital protection. A recent report from CEPS notes the current EU
cyber defence set-up is limited through fragmentation and infrequent active work.
With polls showing that terrorism and immigration are now European citizens’ most pressing concerns,
an emphasis on border security is an urgent issue for the MFF. Migrants may offer benefits to EU economies,
with social mobility allowing for cheaper salaries, but this is tied in with political fears of foreign intervention,
as well as concerns on a social or human level regarding subjugation and exploitation.
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0,5
0.0 CZ HU PL SK
Share of contribution to R&D and GNI
of the EU
: CEPS based on European Commission data
Share in EU GNI
Share in EU R&D
0.552 1.099 1.266 0.7407 0.608 2.7953 0.117 0.5369
22 VISEGRAD INSIGHT SPECIAL EDITION 3 (15) | 2019
Delays in past defence strategies have meant savings with security are hard to come by; an issue which
again finds itself divided along geographical lines, with large companies having a monopoly over defence
production, and smaller states, like the V4, losing out.
One of the most pressing concerns, however, are sea “borders”: as the recent refugee crisis demonstrat-
ed, sea boundaries are often difficult to police – of course with the parallel threat of tragedy for any refugees
who attempt the crossing. e EU has poured additional funding into its European Border and Coast Guard
Agency, or Frontex, based in Warsaw – but it remains to be seen what impact this these additional resources
will have as well as which other strategies might be put in place on national or European levels.
Disasters and decisions
e EU is contending with one of the largest challenges in history and is often perceived as a threat beyond
human proportions: climate change. With eco-friendly living sweeping across Europe, one might imagine
that the MFF would face a smooth road to investing in and committing to reducing emissions and scaling
back the danger of a climate emergency.
Politically, however, it is a different story. In June, an EU-wide zero carbon goal was advised by various
western EU leaders, pushed back to 2050 in an attempt to quell Central European scepticism about climate
change. Poland, Hungary and Czechia still vetoed the suggestion. Some of their more activist western coun-
terparts also rejected the idea, citing claims it was too vague to enact real change.
Climate change may be becoming increasingly evident across the continent and the world, but Europe
is certainly not posing a united front against future damage. Convergence funds may have been redirected
towards the goal of 2050 zero carbon emissions, with suggestions that 25 per cent of the upcoming budget
should sponsor projects fighting climate change, but some nations are reluctant. Just as R&D and the growth
of infrastructure straddled a fine line between individual domestic policy and general EU strategy, environ-
mental policy also highlights internal divisions, split along two fronts.
e centralised European Emission Trading System (ETS) covers the power sector and industry and
includes around 40 per cent of all emissions, with EU-wide annual goals. en there are national policies
about climate change, and tensions between EU policies and individual nations go even deeper. For countries
like Poland, for example, whose reliance on the coal industry is a matter of heritage and legacy, it is not merely
a matter of costs – probably larger than cohesion funds could cover – which discourage changes to be put
in place. Industry representatives have estimated that it would take years for coal mines to be closed down
fully, with restructuring of local industry needed to plug the gap; family or community ties to the mines also
mean that it would be a difficult choice for many to allow the mines to disappear. Poland perceives the coal
threat in remarkably more compassionate terms than in the West.
e Common Agricultural Policy is the largest element of the EU budget, though spending is set to
decrease in this cycle. New plans have been aired, offering national governments increased control of agri-
cultural policy, with the Commission having the ultimate say to avoid, for example, environmental damage
– but this threatens to catalyse in-fighting between different EU nations, all of whom will be pushing for their
farmers’ success alone.
In addition, there are legal queries regarding who exactly would be officialising policy, and whether the
environment could be satisfactorily protected. Competition and innovation are important for driving the
European economy, but the EU may still wield authority over areas in which changes must be implemented.
Even with appropriate levels of funding in this cycle, the traditional pastures of EU agricultural policy make up
a long-term commitment, which funding must consistently – and comprehensively – support. Only cohesive
agricultural strategies enable the internal market to benefit.
In terms of targeting climate concerns more explicitly, there is still hope: experts have concluded that
sustainable energy leads to economic growth, particularly in the case of currently high-emission countries,
which will ultimately face low costs of reducing emissions.
ese trends – real and EU-cultivated – are difficult to ignore. ough they threaten to burn through
the ties holding the bloc together, if tackled correctly, they could be the very bonds that maintain the EU for
years to come.
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EuropEan #FuturEs
Special edition 3 (15) | 2019
editors of the special edition
Daniel Gros, Director of CEPS
danielg@ceps.eu
twitter: @DanielGrosCEPS
Tomasz Kasprowicz,
Vice-President of Res Publica
t.kasprowicz@res.publica.pl
twitter: KasprowiczT
editor-in-chief
Wojciech Przybylski
w.przybylski@res.publica.pl
twitter: @WPrzybylski
vice-president of res publica
Magda Jakubowska
m.jakubowska@visegradinsight.eu
twitter: @_MJakubowska
managing editor
Galan Dall
g.dall@res.publica.pl
deputy managing editor
Quincy Cloet
q.cloet@res.publica.pl
twitter: @QuincyCloet
supporting editor
Gabriela Rogowska
g.rogowska@res.publica.pl
senior associate
Marcin Zaborowski
twitter: @MaZaborowski
assistant
Anhelina Pryimak
a.pryimak@res.publica.pl
intern
Juliette Bretan
illustrations and cover
Paweł Kuczyński
graphic design
The Visegrad/Insight is the main platform of debate and analysis on Central Europe,
that generates future policy directions for Europe from the region. It was established in
2012 by the Res Publica Foundation – an independent think tank in Warsaw with its
flagship Polish language publication Res Publica Nowa and the New Europe 100,
a network of tomorrow’s leaders.
e Visegrad/Insight is
the main platform of
debate and analysis on
Central Europe.
is report has been
developed in cooperation
with the Centre for
European Policy Studies
(CEPS).
This report has been supported by the International Visegrad Fund.
It does not necessarily refl ect the offi cial policy or position of the
Visegrad Group or the International Visegrad Fund
organiser: main partner: partners:
funded by:
REPORT
LAUNCH
1 October 2019
Brussels, Belgium
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SPECIAL EDITION
3 (15) | 2019
ISSN 2084-8250
Scenarios for cohesive growth IN COOPERATION WITH
EUROPEAN
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