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RESEARCH ARTICLE
Economic sanctions and academia:
Overlooked impact and long-term
consequences
Louise BezuidenhoutID
1
*, Ola Karrar
2
, Javier Lezaun
1
, Andy NobesID
3
1Institute for Science, Innovation and Society, University of Oxford, Oxford, England, United Kingdom,
2Department of Statistics, University of Khartoum, Khartoum, Sudan, 3INASP, Oxford, England, United
Kingdom
*louise.bezuidenhout@insis.ox.ac.uk
Abstract
Financial sanctions are often thought of as the “soft alternative” to armed conflict and are
widely used in the 21
st
century. Nonetheless, sanctions are often criticized for being non-
specific in their action, and having impact beyond their intended remit. One often-overlooked
area affected by sanctions are academic systems of research and education. Sanctions
place “invisible barriers” for research in these countries by limiting access to necessary
resources and curtailing their effective use. In this paper we present a national survey of
Sudanese academics focused on the impact of 20 years of economic sanctions on their
work. It identifies key areas of academic research and education that have been impacted
by international sanctions. Moreover, these data highlight how the impact of sanctions on
academia is likely to persist long after they are formally lifted. The paper concludes by pro-
blematising the current interpretation of jus post bellum, or moral behaviour after conflict. It
suggests that the responsibility to make reparations in the form of support for academic sys-
tems applies to countries who impose economic sanctions.
Introduction
This study examines the impact of financial sanctions on higher education and academic
research. The introduction briefly introduces the concept of sanctions to the reader, and out-
lines why they are an object of concern for robust academic infrastructures.
Sanctions as an alternative to war
Since World War I, sanctions have become increasingly viewed as a liberal alternative to war
[1]. Modern sanctions can be largely grouped into two different areas: weapons-trade restric-
tions and economic restrictions. Economic sanctions, the focus of this paper, can be imple-
mented with varying intensity and scope. For example, the entire opposing economy may be
targeted or just one critical sector [1]. Regardless of the type and style of implementation, eco-
nomic sanctions may be best understood as actions aiming to lower the aggregate economic
welfare of a target state through a reduction in international trade.
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OPEN ACCESS
Citation: Bezuidenhout L, Karrar O, Lezaun J,
Nobes A (2019) Economic sanctions and
academia: Overlooked impact and long-term
consequences. PLoS ONE 14(10): e0222669.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0222669
Editor: Andrew Carl Miller, East Carolina University
Brody School of Medicine, UNITED STATES
Received: May 18, 2019
Accepted: September 4, 2019
Published: October 1, 2019
Copyright: ©2019 Bezuidenhout et al. This is an
open access article distributed under the terms of
the Creative Commons Attribution License, which
permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original
author and source are credited.
Data Availability Statement: Dataset available at
https://osf.io/9tw7x/.
Funding: This study was funded by the Africa
Oxford Initiative through a travel grant held by LB
and OK.
Competing interests: The authors have declared
that no competing interests exist.
Since the end of the Cold War the use of sanctions has risen considerably, and the tendency
has become even more marked since the turn of the century. For instance, as quoted in Drezner,
“between February 2014 and February 2015, the US introduced or amended twenty different
sanctions programmes” [2]. While there have recently been fewer comprehensive, multilateral
sanctions introduced, states still engage in unilateral or bilateral broad sanctions and multilat-
eral, “targeted” sanctions [3]. The latter could include asset freezes, travel bans and smart trade
sanctions.
The US Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC), for example, interprets comprehensive
sanctions as prohibiting all transactions between the sanctioned country and the US (except in
special circumstances where a license is granted by OFAC). This means that there can be no
imports, exports, financing of goods, distribution of technology and services, or trade broker-
ing between American citizens and the sanctioned country [4]. Countries currently under
comprehensive, multilateral sanctions include the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
Iran, Cuba, and Syria. Until recently, this list also included Sudan. The US also maintains
other, more “targeted” (i.e. counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics) sanctions against specific
individuals and entities. These programs may encompass broad prohibitions at the country
level as well as targeted sanctions [5].
Sanctions as indiscriminate tools
Despite their widespread use, sanctions are often criticized for failing to realize their policy
goals [1], [3]. In a review of sanctions literature, Mack and Khan write that “the only real dis-
agreement in the contemporary sanctions literature relates to the degree to which sanctions
fail as an instrument for coercing changes in the behaviour of targeted states. No study argues
that sanctions are in general an effective means of coercion, although individual sanction
regimes can and sometimes do succeed” [6]. They rarely lead to regime changes or reform [7].
The sanctions regime used against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, in particular, have been subject to
widespread criticism. It has been noted that “nearly everything for Iraq’s entire infrastructure
—electricity, roads, telephones, water treatment—as well as much of the equipment and sup-
plies related to food and medicine has been subject to Security Council review” [8]. Indeed,
Gordon highlights how the US definitions of “dual use” and “weapons of mass destruction”
led to the argument that everything, from water pipes to laundry detergent or children vac-
cines, could be used to produce weapons. This understanding enabled the US to prevented
critical humanitarian goods from entering Iraq [9].
The potential of sanctions to trigger broad humanitarian crises relates not only to an expan-
sive interpretation of security, but also to the generally indiscriminate nature of economic
sanctions. The difficulty of limiting economic impact to a single locus means that the effect of
sanctions can spread far beyond their intended reach, leading to widespread suffering [3],
[10]. It has been observed that sanctions often lead to an increase in inequality in the targeted
county, often harming rural and non-industrialized areas disproportionally, and that they
often thwart humanitarian and aid efforts unrelated to the targeted state’s political behavior.
Moreover, the effects of sanctions persist after they are lifted, as they can have a negative
impact on the cost of reconstruction and development.
Sanctions and academia: Why the concern?
The indiscriminate effects of sanctions on national infrastructures has been noted in many sit-
uations. However, as the world becomes increasingly interconnected and interdependent, it is
easy to see how economic sanctions can have widespread impact on areas not traditionally
Sanctions and Sudanese academia
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associated with economic activity. In this paper we consider the impact of economic sanctions
on one such area—academic research and education.
Modern academic research and education is reliant on an international network of collabo-
rators, online information, equipment and reagent suppliers, and international travel. More-
over, as national actors increasingly promote research, development and innovation (RDI),
the boundaries between research and commercial ventures, public, private, and state activities,
or education and innovation (in terms of activities, equipment utilized and research outputs),
are increasingly blurred. This blurring has been epitomized by the “triple helix” model of uni-
versity-industry-government relations proposed by Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff [11]. Govern-
ments, they suggest, “are offering incentives, on the one hand, and pressing academic
institutions, on the other, to go beyond performing the traditional functions of cultural mem-
ory, education and research, and make a more direct contribution to "wealth creation. More-
over, multi-national institutions such as the European Union, the World Bank and the U.N.
are also “moving to embrace concepts of knowledge based economic development that bring
the knowledge, productive and regulatory spheres of society into new configurations” [11].
The embeddedness of modern academia within the national and international economic
exchange necessarily raises concerns about the imposition of sanctions. Such concerns must
extend beyond recognizing the restrictions on importing equipment or finances from abroad.
Indeed, modern sanctions do not only control physical trade, but also online activity. Thus,
the same sanctions that stop academics from purchasing laboratory equipment may also be
responsible for limiting their access to online data, if the company hosting that data is based in
a country that is imposing sanctions. Similarly, some academic publishers in the US are
known to have refused submissions from Iranian and Sudanese authors due to by threats of
fines of up to $1 million and imprisonment of up to 10 years by the US treasury. Even after
legal action caused a revision of these rules, the vagueness of the existing policies have still led
to some reluctance on behalf of publishers to accept papers from authors in countries under
sanctions [12]. In this way, the reach of sanctions insidiously extends beyond the intended tar-
get to affect all areas of academia.
By introducing barriers in many areas of academic activity, sanctions can be seen to influ-
ence what research is done, how it is disseminated, and how students are educated. As many of
the countries under long-term sanctions have relatively small and fragile academic communi-
ties and low rates of investment in STEM, the impact of sanctions can be devastating. One of
the major difficulties in raising these concerns is the lack of evidence from academic commu-
nities under sanctions about the impact of these restrictions on their academic activities.
Within the literature on sanctions, there are only a handful of references to the impact of
sanctions on academic systems. For example, the aforementioned sanctions on Iraq which had
impacted on all areas of Iraqi life and infrastructure, also profoundly affected education at pri-
mary, secondary and higher levels, which had previously seen unprecedented improvement
before the sanctions [13]. This has inevitably had a knock-on effect on research capacity and
post-conflict research and reconstruction, for example childhood trauma research [14].
In Iran, US sanctions are known to have harmed scholarly and scientific activities on several
levels: restricting international collaborations; travel opportunities for conferences and work-
shops; and international collaborations, inevitably reducing scientific output [15]. Some
researchers have reported problems publishing in international journals for political, not sci-
entific reasons [16], [17], in some cases because of confusion over the authors’ employment by
the government [18]. Scientists have also experienced problems with paying for society sub-
scription and event registration [16]. Whilst there is some evidence of growth in scientific out-
put since sanctions were relaxed, this may be partly down to the investment and growth into
Iranian-published scientific journals [19].
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Serbian and South African academics who worked during periods of sanctions (1992–2001
and 1960–1990 respectively) report not only severe restrictions on travel, international collab-
oration, access to resources and inability to publish, but also notable psychological effects of
isolation [20–23]. Post-sanction recovery in these countries didn’t occur immediately, but was
driven by transition into a free market global economy. In the case of Serbia, external support
was particularly vital as academics had largely missed out on the digital information revolution
[20], [24], as well as suffering the effects of hyperinflation and brain drain [21]. Similar to Iran,
research output has been partially improved by the growth in national publishing outlets and
government incentivising of publication outputs [21].
The literature on the long-term impact of sanctions on the growth trajectory of academia
after sanctions are lifted is thus very limited and requires further investigation. The coming
section empirically addresses these issues, using a survey conducted amongst Sudanese acade-
mia as a case study.
Study objectives
While there has been anecdotal discussion about the impact of sanctions on Sudanese acade-
mia, there is a paucity of empirical evidence on the subject. This study aimed rectify this over-
sight by surveying Sudanese academia regarding their perceptions of the impact of sanctions
on their work. It is important to highlight that while the survey responses are are self-reported
perceptions of impact, they nonetheless provide insight into the impact of sanctions on daily
research and educational activities.
Methodology
Selection of case study
Sudan is one of the few countries that have been subjected to a long-running system of com-
prehensive sanctions. In 1993 Sudan was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism, leading to
a suspension of United States (US) Embassy operations in 1996. In 1997 the US imposed com-
prehensive economic, trade, and financial sanctions against the country [25]. The sanctions
included a fairly comprehensive trade embargo, a freeze on government assets, and tight
restrictions on financial institutions dealing with Sudan. The sanctions prohibited any transac-
tions using US currency or products, and stopped any business which operated in the US from
trading with Sudan. This ban covered everything from airplanes to vital health equipment.
Similar measures were subsequently introduced by, amongst others, the European Union and
the United Kingdom. Moreover, in 2005 the United Nations Security Council passed Resolu-
tion 1591 in response to the conflict in Darfur, imposing an embargo on the sale or supply of
arms ‘and related material,’ as well as a travel ban and asset freeze on several individuals.
Studies on Sudan show evidence of widespread impact of sanctions on areas integral to
national development and economic recovery. These include social entrepreneurship initia-
tives, domestic education, medical industry, civil infrastructure, personal and family finances
and local businesses [25]. Moreover, there is increasing evidence that sanctions have also had
an impact on the international recognition of Sudanese certifications. Malik notes, for
instance, that “required [computing] certifications necessary to advance careers and establish
legitimacy are not available in Sudan—Google does not allow their certifications to be received
in the country. As a result, researchers and students are forced to either work uncertified, or
travel outside of the country to receive the certification” [25], [26].
In 2017 the sanctions against Sudan were partially lifted by the US. Nonetheless, it is likely
that Sudanese academia will experience the same long-term impact of the international sanc-
tions as discussed above. The lack of a comprehensive understanding of the impact of over 20
Sanctions and Sudanese academia
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years of sanctions on the academic regime also makes it difficult to highlight key areas requir-
ing targeted intervention, funding and capacity building.
Limitations of study
This study was carried out in 2018 while President Bashir was still in power, but after the US
started to lift the sanctions in 2017. The political situation in Sudan has changed dramatically
since this study was conducted, more of which will be discussed below.
The effects of political instability and sanctions are, of course, very difficult to disentangle,
and a significant overlap in both action and effect is to be expected. However, sanctions can be
seen as uniquely contributing to academic interactions beyond borders. It is this area that the
rest of the paper will focus on, namely how sanctions have affected and continue to affect the
ability of Sudanese academics to engage with the global science system.
Methodology
Ethics and piloting. In order to gather data around this topic, we designed and dissemi-
nated a survey with questions relating to daily research practices, access to online resources
and engagement with online resources. The survey was originally developed in English and
translated into Arabic. Ethical approval for the dissemination of the survey was granted by the
School of Anthropology and Museum Ethnography Research Ethics Committee at the Univer-
sity of Oxford (Ref No.: SAME_C1A_17_103).
The survey was hosted on SurveyMonkey and distributed electronically to teaching staff via
institutional emails. A link for the questionnaire was also shared through a number of scien-
tific and academic Sudanese networks in social media websites, mainly Facebook and Twitter,
recommended by number of active researchers to involve young researchers who are actively
interacting through these platforms. The purpose of the survey was clearly outlined on the sur-
vey landing page, together with details of data protection and re-use. Potential participants
were informed that participation in the survey was entirely voluntary and anonymous. This
introductory page also stated that participation in the survey was taken as consent for the use
of the data as outlined.
The survey was piloted at the University of Khartoum with 15 academics representing a
diversity of gender, age and discipline. Comments from the pilot were incorporated into the
final survey design.
Inclusion criteria and dissemination. To determine a roll-out strategy, consultations were
held with the director of research in the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research
(HESR) and his deputy, and with a group of senior professors in different research domains.
According to their advice, we targeted the three top-ranked universities in Sudan as well as
research institutes with active research groups and well reputed research leadership and network-
ing. These universities and institutes contain the majorities of senior professors contributing to
scientific publication and training of younger generation of master and PhD students.
The survey had very broad inclusion criteria, and was open to any individual who was
employed as full/part-time academic staff (postdoctoral researchers, lecturer or higher aca-
demic grade) at a Sudanese academic institution. It was also open to full/part-time postgradu-
ate students (Masters or PhD at Sudanese universities) and individuals working in
governmental/commercial institutions who are involved in research activity in Sudan. Exclu-
sion criteria were individuals not currently engaged in research activities, not currently
employed in Sudan, or engaged only in undergraduate studies. Demographic data was col-
lected about age, gender, discipline, years of research activity and research institution so as to
allow selected analyses.
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The voluntary survey was live for a three-month period between November 2017 and Feb-
ruary 2018. The survey had broad inclusion criteria, requiring participants to be employed by
an academic institute, resident in Sudan and in possession of at least an undergraduate degree.
In total, 328 completed responses were collected. The major research groups represented were
in the fields of health sciences, life sciences, natural sciences, social science, engineering and
business. The demographics of the study population are presented schematically below.
Data management. All data from the survey was fully anonymised at point of collection.
The data was stored securely on a password-protected cloud storage facility and backed up on
the password protected University of Oxford server. Only the authors of the study had access
to the raw data. In keeping with the agreed project outline, a summary of the survey data has
been archived at the Open Science Foundation (https://osf.io/9tw7x/), and the raw data will be
destroyed 2 years after the completion of the project publications.
Results and discussion
Demographics
The respondents were predominantly male (61.5%) (Fig 1), and relatively young, with 42%
under 35 age bracket, a further 27% in the 35–44 age bracket and the remaining 31% were over
45 (Fig 2). In terms of experience, 26% had spent less than 5 years in academia, 19% between 5
and 10 years, and the remaining 54% had over 10 years of experience (Fig 3). Those with a doc-
torate made up 43% of participants, with 38% having achieved a Master’s and 15% a Bachelor’s
degree (Fig 4).
Fig 1. Gender of respondents.
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The survey questions were grouped into two main sections. The first aimed to examine the
perceived impact of 20 years of sanctions on all areas of academic activity. The second section
asked respondents to identify areas that needed further investment in order to facilitate the
effective growth of Sudanese academia in the post-sanction era.
One of the first questions on the survey was whether respondents felt that sanctions had
impacted their ability to function as an academic and researcher. As Fig 5 demonstrates, a
compelling 98.67% of respondents answered “yes,” unequivocally supporting our assumption
that the impact of sanctions was significant and worthy of detailed study.
The impact of sanctions on Sudanese academia
Academia and the economic climate under sanctions. When the survey was designed, it
was recognized that separating out the impact of sanctions and the general economic climate
would be very difficult. Indeed, as the sanctions were intended to cause economic downturn,
sometimes these “cause and effect” assignations were one and the same. Indeed, it is highly
likely that the imposition of sanctions and the resultant economic downturn led to curtailed
budgets for academia and less investment in academic infrastructures. In consequence, some
of our results will be similar to reports from other low/middle-income countries that are not
necessarily under sanction. The issue of how limited financial investment in academia leads to
lack of equipment, reagents and research infrastructures across LMICs has been researched
and discussed widely (10,11).
Fig 2. Age of respondents.
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Readers might therefore be tempted to dismiss the reported concerns about economics as
“general problems for LMICs”. Nonetheless, countries subjected to extensive sanctions differ
from other LMIC economies in several respects:
- Inability to access currency: banking restrictions curtail purchasing with foreign currency as
well as access to funds held abroad;
- Lack of equipment and reagents: funds are not necessarily absent, but are difficult to spend
- Purchasing power: sanctioned economies such as Sudan may experience hyper-inflation that
can lead to currency devaluation and lower purchasing power
- Addressing inequalities: researchers may not be eligible for funds or support to address
resource shortages
These distinctions were evident in the responses for the question: “select the top three chal-
lenges you experience while managing a research grant under sanctions”. The most frequent
response (65.22%) was “banking restrictions complicate research-related purposes”. The next
two responses were “distributing the grant funds to cover necessary core purchases such as
hardware and software” (45.7%) and “accessing funds from funding bodies” (39.1%). These
responses clearly show that researchers operating in sanctioned economies face difficulties in
mobilizing and utilizing available funds.
Funding under sanctions. Only 1/3 of respondents said that they had received research
funds in the period between 1993 and 2017. The majority of respondents who said that they
Fig 3. Years of experience in academia.
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had received funding were recipients of national funding under $10000. This would suggest
that most of the research projects would be short/medium length and collect smaller datasets.
This has widespread complications that are often under-recognized that shape research prac-
tices. Necessitating academics to commit to short, relatively small research projects often
causes difficulties for the individual researcher in forging a coherent body of research and
data. This can cause them to be excluded from future collaborations and from contributing
high-impact publications to their field (12).
It is also likely that lack of access to international funds and funded research networks has
long-term impacts on the diversity of the research landscape. This survey data highlights the
need for a comprehensive review of Sudanese publications and funding in the sanctioned
period. This will enable the government and international funding community to identify
areas that are critically under-funded and under-represented within the Sudanese academic
landscape.
Access to equipment, hardware/software under sanctions. Academic research and edu-
cation are increasingly reliant on hard/software and other equipment, much of which is made
in the Global North. It can become very difficult to procure the necessary equipment from
countries under sanction, meaning that the sanctions can have significant impact on the style,
content and continuation of academic research and education. Moreover, as the rate of tech-
nological innovations speeds up, sustained periods of sanctions can leave academic communi-
ties considerably out of date.
When asked respondents to rank the areas in which sanctions had most affected their aca-
demic activities, the responses showed considerable diversity (Fig 6). This suggested that the
Fig 4. Highest degree obtained.
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sanctions had wide-reaching and pervasive influence. Of all options, however, “access to
equipment and reagents” was ranked the most impacted, while “access to peer-reviewed publi-
cations” was the lowest.
The challenges of acquiring laboratory equipment and reagents is readily understandable
given the import bans imposed by the sanctions regimes. In contrast, however, the challenges
experienced in accessing information and communication technology (ICT) software are per-
haps more surprising. In response to the question: what challenges do you face with regards to
computing hardware and software in your research environment, the responses suggested
widespread challenges (Fig 7).
Interestingly, however, the two highest ranking statements were lack of access to software
and lack of access to software updates (Fig 8). As Sudanese academics are currently unable to
access products such as Kaggle due to the location of the owner company (Google), this is per-
haps unsurprising. In the following question respondents admitted using software from a vari-
ety of sources, including free and open source software (FOSS) (64% agree/strongly agree),
copies of proprietary software that they did not purchase (65% agree/strongly agree), or soft-
ware sent from colleagues overseas (42% agree/strongly agree).
Based on these results it would appear that a significant number of participants were using
pirated or unlicensed proprietary software. To a greater extent, this would therefore explain
their reported inability to get software updates. Nonetheless, such results seem incompatible
with the 64% of respondents claiming to use FOSS. It is, of course, possible that the term FOSS
was not familiar to respondents, and that they took it to mean “free” rather than “open source”
software (13). In order to probe this further, one of the authors based in Sudan (OK) attempted
Fig 5. Did sanctions impact on respondents ability to function as an academic and researcher?
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to download a commonly-used FOSS, R Studio. Without using a VPN she was unable to do so.
Such experiences suggest that the access to FOSS is extremely problematic within Sudan.
Availability of data and papers under sanctions. As many publishers are commercial
entities, they are subject to the same expectations of compliance as any other company. The
vast majority of academic publishers are located in Europe and the US, causing the dissemina-
tion of research outputs from countries under sanction to also be problematic. This—particu-
larly for those requiring an Article Processing Charge (APC)—can make them unwilling or
unable to accept submissions from academics based in countries under sanction.
Probing further into the difficulties experienced by Sudanese researchers in accessing data
online, respondents were asked to select statements that reflected their own personal experi-
ences. 85.9% said they “struggled to pay membership fees to access data sites”. These difficul-
ties came not only from a lack of research funds to cover such costs, but also due to the
difficulty of making online financial transactions using Sudanese credit cards. Under sanc-
tions, companies based in countries imposing sanctions on Sudan were not allowed to accept
transactions from Sudanese accounts (Executive order 13067 [27]). It is important to recognize
that this ban not only affected commercial institutions, but also include any academic network,
databases or organization that banks or operates within a country imposing sanctions.
Another key challenge for Sudanese academics was IP blocking. 78.4% of respondents
reported having “access blocked from certain sites because of their Sudanese IP address”. This
practice has significant implications for access to online data, as seemingly open data resources
because inaccessible due to the location of the researcher attempting to access them.
Fig 6. What areas of academic activity have been most impacted by international sanctions?
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In addition, 62.31% of respondents reported not having “access to the software necessary to
download the data” (Fig 9). Similar to the issues relating to membership fees described above,
many Sudanese researchers struggle to purchase research software due to the difficulties of
making international/online purchases. This can lead to situations in which they are unable to
analyse the data they are able to gather due to the lack of appropriate software.
Risk averseness and collaborations under sanctions. It is important to recognize that
many sanctions scenarios make specific exemption for certain areas deemed vital to the popula-
tion, such as healthcare. Since 2013, the areas of exemption in the Sudanese sanctions have also
explicitly included academic activities [28]. Nonetheless, changing sanctions regimes are not nec-
essarily communicated to individual businesses—or indeed academic institutions. This can lead
to lags in demonstrable changes [26]. Within our own collaboration, we experienced consider-
able difficulty making financial transactions between our universities in the UK and Sudan.
Perhaps even more problematic is that boundaries between research/commercial ventures,
public/private/state activities, and education/innovation (in terms of activities, equipment uti-
lized and research outputs) are increasingly blurred. This can mean that foreign businesses,
collaborators and universities are unwilling to take the risk of possibly violating sanctions and
preferentially avoid interacting with academics from countries under sanction. This “voluntary
isolationism” extends beyond sharing/selling equipment, reagents, samples and hard/software
and includes endorsing academic travel, collaboration, international networks and the acquisi-
tion of international research grants [12], [29].
No doubt in part due to lack of awareness and risk-averseness, many Sudanese academics
reported having problems accessing international research funding, networks and
Fig 7. What computing hardware and software challenges are currently experienced by Sudanese academics?
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collaboration. Respondents were asked to order statements about how they perceived sanc-
tions to impact on their ability to interact with the global scientific community (Fig 10). The
statement receiving the highest score was “sanctions affect my ability to access international
research funds”. This observation is reinforced by the anecdotal evidence and weblinks offered
by a number of respondents where funders explicitly stated that researchers from Sudan were
ineligible to apply. These responses correspond to a later question about international funding,
where only 12% of respondents said that they had received international funding. The second
highest scoring statement was “sanctions affect my ability to form and sustain international
collaborations”.
Areas requiring further investment in order to facilitate the effective
growth of Sudanese academia in the post-sanction era
The previous section outlines some of the (many) areas in which sanctions have impacted on
Sudanese academia. The survey data strongly suggests that sanctions have had a marked, nega-
tive effect on the ability of Sudanese academia to develop along a similar trajectory as compara-
ble, un-sanctioned countries. The data also suggests that Sudanese academia is not necessarily
in the position to immediately take advantage of the recent changes in sanctions.
Relying on the resilience of systems is not sufficient. In the 20 years of economic sanc-
tions, the Sudanese government has made efforts to sustain their academic community
through targeted funding. This was evident in the responses to a range of questions. For
instance, 50% of respondents agreed that they had “received some kind of fund/grant for your
Fig 8. How do Sudanese academics currently overcome software challenges?
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study or research during the period between 1993 and 2017”. Of these respondents, 73% of
respondents agreed that they had the “opportunity to study for a postgraduate degree outside
of Sudan”, and 40% said that they had received “national funding for the studies abroad”.
Similarly, as discussed above, 40.7% of respondents confirmed that they had received fund-
ing for research projects. Of those that had received funding between 1993 and 2017, 47.8%
had received small national grants of under $10000. Larger grants were relatively scarce, with
only 10.9% receiving national funding over $10000 and 17.4% international grants of the simi-
lar sizes. 58% of respondents said that they had “published a paper in a peer-reviewed journal”,
but less than half of respondents had published more than 5 papers in the last 5 years.
These low levels of research outputs are also reflected in national data on publications. Sco-
pus data suggests that following the start of sanctions in 1997, there was a visible dip in publi-
cations, including international co-authorships. The number of publications has risen tenfold
since, most notably in the area of medicine, but in line with global averages since the explosion
of the internet era. It is currently too soon to consider publication data since the end of sanc-
tions in 2017—however, some preliminary data from Scopus suggests a significant rise in pub-
lications in computer science, engineering and mathematics. (Scimago Journal and Country
Rank: Sudan, 2019, https://www.scimagojr.com/countrysearch.php?country=sd, accessed 26th
July 2019)
In comparision, neighbouring countries such as Uganda and Ethiopia have experienced sig-
nificantly more growth during the same time period. This suggests that sanctions have left a
lasting mark on Sudanese academia, requiring Sudanese scientists to now play ‘catch up’ to
their neighbours [29]. While the efforts of the Sudanese government to sustain the academic
Fig 9. Problems of accessing publications and data experienced by Sudanese academics.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0222669.g009
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community are important, it is inappropriate to assume that these efforts have been sufficient
to enable the national academic community to seamlessly re-integrate with global academia.
Major investments are needed. In response to an open question on the current issues
relating to sharing and accessing research data online, one respondent said: Most of the Suda-
nese community (including myself) is so behind on data usage and technology that even if it were
open we wouldn't know how to use it efficiently. This comment was representative of the 42
responses to the open question, suggesting a pervasive negativity regarding the current state of
Sudanese academia. The idea that one “does not know what one does not know” encapsulates
the feeling of being “left behind” by the international research community. The comments sug-
gested that considerable investment in academic infrastructures were perceived as urgent.
In recent years there has been a rise in investments in African academia. Many funding
bodies, such as the Wellcome Trust and the Gates Foundation, have earmarked considerable
funds for funding African research projects. As the sanction regimes against Sudan dissipate,
the eligibility of Sudanese academics for these funds can be expected. While this, of course,
represents an important opportunity for research capacity building in Sudan, it must be recog-
nized that such funding structures will not necessarily address the massive research technology
deficit in the country. The majority of these funding initiatives offer project-specific funds that
only allow project-related equipment purchases. They do not fund “core” laboratory equip-
ment or other non-essential items [30]. While there are a small number of equipment broker-
age and/or donation schemes, such as Seeding Labs and TReND in Africa, they are not large
enough to be able to counter country-wide deficits immediately. If Sudan is to rely solely on
Fig 10. Difficulties experienced by Sudanese academics in engaging with the international researchcommunity.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0222669.g010
Sanctions and Sudanese academia
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these funding models, it is unlikely that infrastructural deficit will be quickly or efficiently
addressed.
An additional complication of the sustained technological deficit relates to the “not know-
ing what one does not know” referred to above. For 20 years Sudanese academics have been
marginalized from technological developments in their fields of research. This has left many
without experience in the use of many of the research technologies currently in use. Effectively
addressing the technological deficit thus also requires training for researchers in the use of the
equipment they acquire. Moreover, there is a critical need for training for the support staff and
technicians that will be responsible for the maintenance, calibration and repair of the research
equipment.
Lack of contacts, networks and social capital. In a final open question, respondents were
invited to identify “any other key issues challenging Sudanese academia”. Amongst other
things, responses included language barriers/training in English communication (5 responses),
learning how to collaborate (6 responses) and network at conferences (3 responses) as skills
needed by Sudanese academics. These responses point to the perceived need for training in the
soft skills that play an increasingly important role in modern academia. In particular, the
responses highlighted the skills associated with direct communication with the international
academic community.
The difficulties of international travel have left a lasting legacy for Sudanese academia. In
the past 20 years, academics have struggled to attend international conferences and workshops.
In addition to losing the opportunity to present their work and gain feedback on their
research, academics have lost the chance to network amongst their peers. Such networking
leads to greater research visibility, and often results in international collaborations.
Sudanese academics are thus placed in a difficult position. Sustained travel-related isolation
means that many have few international contacts and active research networks. Moreover,
lack of training in the “academic soft skills” can make them apprehensive of their future net-
working successes. Viewed collectively, it may be suggested that Sudanese academia currently
experiences a deficit in “social capital”. As defined by Pierre Bourdieu (1983), this refers to
"the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable
network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recogni-
tion” [31]. It is clear that efforts are needed to address this deficit in social capital through skill
enhancement and increased travel, although clear strategies on how this could be done remain
problematic. Indeed, increasing social capital cannot be reduced to increased opportunities to
network, but the mutual adoption of a shared identity and understanding, norms and values,
as well as shared trust, cooperation and reciprocity.
Skill shortages. In a number of questions, the survey respondents identified key skill
shortages that they felt would impact Sudanese academia’s ability to benefit from the changing
sanction regimes. Respondents were asked to rank statements in response to the question: “as
sanctions are lifting, Sudanese academics will have increasing opportunities to engage with the
international academic community. Do you feel that there are skill/resource gaps that you
would like assistance with?”
All the statements offered (Fig 11) received very similar weightings, indicating that respon-
dents perceived the need for a range of interventions. Nonetheless, of all the statements the
highest ranked was the need for “training in the use of online resources, such as collections of
articles, data and FOSS”.
Similarly, when asked about communicating research to the global scientific community,
the respondents selected “assistance in learning publishing/peer review processes” as the most
important. Similarly, a question on research data had the need for “training in data manage-
ment skills” as the most critical requirement. Together these responses suggest that the
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sustained isolation of the Sudanese academic community has left skill gaps in the ability to not
only communicate research findings, but to make use of the research findings of others.
The survey concluded with an open question where respondents were invited to add any
other issues they viewed as currently challenging Sudanese academics. Respondents (73
respondents) identified language barriers/training in English communication (5 responses), as
well as training in “scientific thinking” (4 responses), writing papers (10 responses), and ethics
training (4 responses) as of importance. Respondents also identified the need to learn how to
collaborate (6 responses) and to network at conferences (3 responses) as skills needed by Suda-
nese academics. From the responses it is evident that the respondents considered a range of
the so-called “soft skills” as vital for academic careers. In particular, skills associated with direct
communication were deemed as lacking, undoubtedly linked to the impact that travel bans
have had on international conference attendance and collaborations.
Discussion
A rapidly changing milieu
In January 2017, the US began to lift economic and trade sanctions on Sudan, due to coopera-
tion from the Sudanese government in fighting terrorism, reducing conflict, and denying safe
haven to South Sudanese rebels, as well as improving humanitarian access to people in need.
In October 2017 the US permanently lifted all 1997 sanctions after Sudan cut all ties with the
North Korean regime of Kim Jong Un [32]. While other countries maintain weapons embar-
goes against Sudan, many have similarly adjusted their economic sanctions. The sanctions
Fig 11. What skills are most necessary for Sudanese academics?
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0222669.g011
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imposed by the United Nations Security Council in relation to the Darfur conflict remain in
place [33].
While the lifting of US sanctions was met with optimism, the hoped-for economic regener-
ation remained absent. Indeed, since 2017 the Sudanese economy has been plagued by sluggish
growth and hyper-inflation. Moreover, Sudanese citizens continued to report continued diffi-
culties accessing foreign goods and services. According to a recent news report, “Sudanese offi-
cials blame the US—suggesting that Washington has not properly spread the word that there is
no longer any risk involved in doing business in Sudan. Others, though, feel that the Sudanese
government used the sanctions to mask its own responsibility for the deteriorating living stan-
dards” [33].
In December 2018 a series of demonstrations broke out in a number of Sudanese cities, due
at least in part due to the rising cost of living and the national economic [34]. These protests
rapidly turned into a nation-wide movement demanding the resignation of President Omar
al-Bashir. In April the military removed al-Bashir from power, but failed to implement a civil-
ian-led transitional government [35]. Following almost 7 months of extreme unrest a deal was
agreed between the military and civilian protesters and a period of transition was entered lead-
ing to elections in 2022 [36].
Going forward
Sudanese academia seems at an impasse. 20 years of sanctions have had a marked effect on the
academic community, research infrastructures and practices, but the recent lifting of these
sanctions will not return the situation of “business as usual”. This survey demonstrated that
the imposition of sanctions will have long-term effects far into the sanction-free future. The
sanctions have isolated, and will continue to isolate, Sudanese researchers.
While Sudan is gradually being included on funding schemes (such as the UK Global Chal-
lenges Research Fund), there is a pervasive silence about whether national governments (and
the research communities in these countries) owe Sudanese academia some kind of reparative
investment. Our survey clearly shows that assuming the Sudanese academic community will
seamlessly be able to re-integrate and be instantly globally competitive are both naive and lazy.
The first set of results presented data about the long-term effect of sanctions on academic
growth. The second set of results flagged areas urgently needing attention, such as investments
in technological infrastructures, up-skilling activities and networking opportunities. While
these suggestions are very similar to other capacity building activities on the African continent,
they differ in terms of chronology and moral justification. The former highlights the urgent
need for these interventions to ensure that the negative long-term impacts of sanctions are
minimized as soon as possible. Ensuring a timeous response will enable academic systems to
recover effectively from the enforced isolation.
The latter difference refers to the reason why such activities should be undertaken. Capacity
building activities amongst LMIC academia are normally presented according to the more
general justifications for aid [37], whereby both contributors and recipients derive benefit
from the interaction through good-will, mutual collaborations and a broader community of
expertise. In addition to these humanitarian and distributive justice arguments, the responsi-
bility for post-sanction activities must be recognized to carry another form of moral duty as
sanctions are understood as a form of aggression.
Jus post poenas
In modern warfare the concept of jus post bellum refers to the post-battle activities aimed at
building a “just and lasting peace” [38]. Scholars such as Brian Orend have proposed a
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deontological underpinning for a three-pronged approach to the morality of armed conflict
[39]. Appropriate post-war actions include a range of activities that focus on stabilising and
rebuilding war-torn societies and restoring/implementing democratic governance [38], [40],
[41]. These activities are not only recognized as vital for sustaining the peace within the
affected country, but an important aspect of the victor’s just war defence for military
intervention.
Despite economic sanctions being viewed as the liberal alternative to war [1], there has
been little systematic discussion on what would constitute peace-building activities for sus-
tained economic sanctions would constitute. To paraphrase the terminology above, what
would be a jus post poenas (we use the Latin term poena to refer to sanctions, which demotes a
punishment, penalty, or “to pay the price”). As a result, there is little systematic evidence
detailing the types of support offered to nations recently emerging from sanctions. Nonethe-
less, it is important to recognize that the lifting of sanctions does not guarantee that countries
automatically return to “business as usual”. Particularly in the case of long-term, widespread
sanctions there could be extremely significant and long-lived implications. In addition to the
obvious impact on the national economy, these could include:
- Social systems needing to realign with global trends
- Outmoded systems of technology
- Lack of international trade/collaboration
This lack of post-sanctions peacebuilding activities is exacerbated by the highly variable
response from the international business community. The lifting of economic sanctions is
unevenly publicized, and the implementation largely up to the individual company. Many
businesses will thus delay updating sanction information—either from lack of knowledge, apa-
thy or excessive caution. As a result, the impact of sanctions can be perpetuated beyond their
legitimate end as companies neglect to update their financial practices [42].
All of these issues have significant implications for the academic community. Indeed, lifting
sanctions cannot be seen as automatic reintegration into the international science community.
Depending on the length and severity of a regime of sanctions, academic systems could face
long-term physical, social and regulatory challenges. Physical challenges could include out-
dated research infrastructures that require considerable financial investment to modernize.
Social challenges could include a dearth of international collaboration, lack of international
recognition for existing research, lack of engagement with current research trends, and a scar-
city of key skills (such as data science) that are defining modern research. Regulatory compli-
cations could arise from a lack of alignment between in-country regulations governing
research (such as biosafety and biosecurity) and international standards, which could hamper
future funding and collaboration relationships. Moreover, as mentioned above, widespread
tardiness within commercial companies to remove sanction-related restrictions in their finan-
cial systems could mean that academics continue to face challenges in making international/
online purchases for reagents and equipment.
Recognizing these multifaceted challenges raises important questions. Most broadly, it
necessitates that we question what jus post poenas should mean for situations of sanctions—
both for those imposing the sanctions, and for those receiving them. In such cases, if educa-
tion, research and innovation are recognized as important elements of economic growth, is
there an expectation that jus post poenas activities extend to supporting the reintegration of
previously-sanctioned academics into the international academic community. If so, does the
responsibility lie solely at a national level, or does the international academic community bear
some responsibility towards supporting academic re-integration? This section briefly
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considers four questions relating to developing a jus post poenas for academia recovering from
sanction regimes. The relative silence about how to re-integrate the Sudanese academic com-
munity—and who is responsible–must be seen as symptomatic of a broader problem with eco-
nomic sanctions, namely the lack of jus post poenas in addressing the aftermath of sanction
regimes.
Responsibility: Finding where the “buck stops”
One of the most obvious problems of assigning a jus post poenas responsibility for sanctions is
the nebulous nature of both the implementer and the recipient. In large part, this is due to the
pervasive and non-specific effect of economic sanctions. Indeed, as we highlight in this paper,
the academic community was not the explicit target of the sanctions imposed on Sudan (and,
indeed, since 2013 were explicitly exempted from these sanctions). Petitioning implementer
nations for financial investments in academic capacity building are likely to be fraught with
attempts to assign, or shift, blame.
Another key problem relating to the non-specific impact of economic sanctions involves
the inevitable “prioritisation” of development targets that would guide any jus post poenas
activities. If any money is dedicated, it is likely that this will be directed to peace-building activ-
ities, reinvigorating manufacturing or developing structures to support democracy. Such pri-
oritization reflects the close relationship between the security and peace building communities
[43], from which academia is largely absent. This is not to say, however, that this exclusion is
inevitable. The prominent role that RDI play in national development strategies [44] suggest
that future conversations are possible . . . but they do not occur yet.
Who, then, bears the responsibility for addressing both the immediate and long-term
impact? If, as suggested, it is unlikely that there will be considerable traction from national
governments, where should pressure be applied? We suggest that the responsibility lies with
the global academic community—researchers, funders and related stakeholders. The modern
milieu of research is characterised by the Open Science movement that priorises the free and
open sharing of scientific resources in a manner uninhibited by borders, disciplines or societal
positions [45]. Open Science is underpinned—and dependent on—by a commitment to egali-
tarianism. Highlighting that sanctions thwart this egalitarian ideal should place the responsi-
bility for jus post bellum firmly at the feet of the global science community, and places a moral
duty not to ignore the insidious barriers that sanctions erect in the seemingly open world.
Activism: Addressing the “transformation lag”
One of the difficulties of addressing the long-term impacts of economic sanctions is the
uneven way in which information about the lifting of sanctions is disseminated to commercial
(and non-commercial) entities. Indeed, Sudanese officials suggest that the US has not properly
spread the word that there is no longer any risk involved in doing business in Sudan [42].
Anecdotal evidence from Sudanese academics suggest that many of the companies they inter-
act with maintain the trade restrictions they utilized during the sanction period. A key element
of effective jus post poenas would thus involve ensuring that companies providing academic
resources are cognizant of sanction changes.
For countries such as Sudan, motivating companies to update, change or refresh their cur-
rent business strategies in their favour is complicated by the relative size of the Sudanese aca-
demic market. As it continues to represent a very small portion of the global research market,
there is little incentive for these companies to invest time and financial resources in overhaul-
ing their business practices. Nonetheless, the ideology of the global (Open) academic
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community recognizes that academic communities around the world deserve the same oppor-
tunities to flourish as academics, regardless of context.
Empathy: Committing beyond sanctions
In many cases, sanctions are symptomatic of broader national challenges. Indeed, the removal
of sanctions does not automatically guarantee that researchers will be working in stable and
flourishing national contexts. In many cases the imposition of sanctions is not solely about
ideological differences, but symptomatic of activities resulting from poor governance, lawless-
ness and state mismanagement.
Such is undoubtedly the case in Sudan, a nation that has recently experienced extreme
political turmoil. In situations such as this, it is unlikely that the academic system will receive
the necessary support needed for rejuvenation in the near future. This observation is sup-
ported by survey responses, where respondents ranked political instability as equally disruptive
to their work as academics (Fig 12). It is highly likely that they will continue to face consider-
able challenges in the post-sanction future. Such challenges, unfortunately, do not necessarily
go away overnight.
Further compounding the post-sanction challenges of Sudanese academics is the continued
hyper-inflation and economic instability [46]. The currency has gone through a period of
rapid devaluing and Sudanese academics—regardless of their new ability to apply for interna-
tional grants—will struggle with problems of budgeting and international purchasing (due to
lack of forex). Such situations significantly complicate efforts to build research capacity. This
Fig 12. Political instability is as impactful as sanctions on Sudanese academia.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0222669.g012
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financial uncertainty undoubtedly contributes to the persistent “brain drain” experienced by
Sudan, that is similarly undermines other fragile academic systems. The 2016 UNESCO Sci-
ence Report: Towards 2030 drew attention to the impact of conflict and brain drain on devel-
opment. It pointed out that between 2002 and 2014, Sudan lost more than 3,000 junior and
senior researchers to migration.
Asking the global academic community to engage in jus post poenas activities—in Sudan
and in other countries—is thus not likely to be straightforward. The challenges associated with
conducting research/networking/educational activities in unstable states are well recognized.
In order to ensure interventions that are effective and have longevity thus requires a firm
moral commitment, practical support and pragmatic experience sharing. Effective jus post poe-
nas needs to be a long-term strategy, and cannot be thought of as once-off activities or a brief
financial commitment.
Concluding comments
We recognize that sanctions are a difficult topic to address. They sit at the nexus between secu-
rity, national identity and social values and raise uncomfortable tensions between individual
and academic identities. These tensions should not be minimized, and the individual interpre-
tations of what constitutes “right action” should be respected. Nonetheless, the immediate and
long-term impact of economic sanctions have the potential to damage present and future aca-
demic research in affected countries. In turn, this has widespread implications for economic
and social development. We therefore advocate strongly for discussions about how jus post
poenas activities could be developed to ensure that the impact on academia is minimized.
Acknowledgments
LB would like to thank Clare Weightman for her suggestion for the term jus post poenas.
Author Contributions
Conceptualization: Louise Bezuidenhout, Ola Karrar, Andy Nobes.
Data curation: Louise Bezuidenhout, Ola Karrar.
Formal analysis: Louise Bezuidenhout, Ola Karrar, Andy Nobes.
Funding acquisition: Louise Bezuidenhout, Ola Karrar, Javier Lezaun.
Investigation: Louise Bezuidenhout, Ola Karrar.
Methodology: Louise Bezuidenhout, Ola Karrar, Andy Nobes.
Project administration: Louise Bezuidenhout, Ola Karrar.
Resources: Louise Bezuidenhout, Ola Karrar, Andy Nobes.
Software: Louise Bezuidenhout, Ola Karrar.
Supervision: Louise Bezuidenhout, Ola Karrar.
Validation: Louise Bezuidenhout, Ola Karrar.
Visualization: Louise Bezuidenhout, Ola Karrar.
Writing – original draft: Louise Bezuidenhout, Ola Karrar, Javier Lezaun, Andy Nobes.
Writing – review & editing: Louise Bezuidenhout, Javier Lezaun, Andy Nobes.
Sanctions and Sudanese academia
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0222669 October 1, 2019 22 / 24
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