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A comparative safety assessment for Direct Current and Direct Current with hybrid supply power systems in a windfarm Service Operation Vessel using System- Theoretic Process Analysis

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As windfarms are moving further offshore, their maintenance has to be supported by the new generation Service Operation Vessels (SOV) with Dynamic Positioning capabilities. For the SOV safe operations it is crucial that any hazardous scenario is properly controlled. Whilst international regulations require the implementation of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) for SOV power systems, FMEA has been criticised for not addressing properly failures in control systems. In this study, System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) is employed for identifying the hazardous scenarios in terms of Unsafe Control Actions (UCAs) in Direct Current (DC) and DC with batteries power systems. Then the identified UCAs are ranked based on their risk. The results demonstrate that the number of hazardous scenarios derived by the STPA increases in a power system with batteries in comparison to a conventional DC power system, thus depicting higher complexity of this system. However, the increase in overall risk is small and within acceptable limits, whilst the risk reduces for a number of UCAs leading to Diesel Generator overload sub-hazard.
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7th European STAMP Workshop & Conference
18 - 20 September 2019, Helsinki
1
A comparative safety assessment for Direct Current and
Direct Current with hybrid supply power systems in a
windfarm Service Operation Vessel using System-
Theoretic Process Analysis
Victor Bolbot1*, Romanas Puisa1, Gerasimos Theotokatos1, Evangelos Boulougouris1
and Dracos Vassalos1
1 Maritime Safety Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, UK
ABSTRACT
As windfarms are moving further offshore, their maintenance has to be supported by the new
generation Service Operation Vessels (SOV) with Dynamic Positioning capabilities. For the SOV
safe operations it is crucial that any hazardous scenario is properly controlled. Whilst international
regulations require the implementation of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) for SOV power
systems, FMEA has been criticised for not addressing properly failures in control systems. In this
study, System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) is employed for identifying the hazardous
scenarios in terms of Unsafe Control Actions (UCAs) in Direct Current (DC) and DC with batteries
power systems. Then the identified UCAs are ranked based on their risk. The results demonstrate
that the number of hazardous scenarios derived by the STPA increases in a power system with
batteries in comparison to a conventional DC power system, thus depicting higher complexity of this
system. However, the increase in overall risk is small and within acceptable limits, whilst the risk
reduces for a number of UCAs leading to Diesel Generator overload sub-hazard.
Keywords: Windfarm Service Operation Vessels, Safety, Blackouts, Diesel-Electric Propulsion,
Hybrid Diesel-Electric Propulsion
1 INTRODUCTION
Offshore wind-faming is becoming a major source of the renewable energy in many countries.
However, the offshore wind farms maintenance cost currently impacts on the competitiveness of the
electricity produced. Present safety requirements and needs of the service personnel influence wind
farm locations and operational flexibility. Consequently, future Service Operation Vessels (SOVs)
need to be more efficient and safer in order to meet future demands. Next generation support vessels
providing safe and more efficient offshore wind farm servicing (the EU-funded NEXUS project) is
aiming to deliver an advanced SOV design optimised for efficiency, performance, safety, and
working environment whilst minimising costs throughout the life-cycle by 20% compared to the
current state of the art vessels (EC, 2019). As wind farms are moving further from the coast,
significant innovations in the SOV design are required. This, together with stringer emission
regulations and fluidity in the fuel market prices, render attractive the use of alternative fuels and
power generation systems, including hybrid power supply, where diesel-generators and batteries
are used to cover ship energy needs.
The incorporation of batteries achieves fuel consumption reduction by running Diesel
Generator (D/G) sets at optimum load by peak load shaving and functioning as a spinning reserve
* Corresponding author: tel. +447706578021 email: victor.bolbot@strath.ac.uk
2
(Brandsaeter, Valoen, Mollestad, & Haugom, 2015; Geertsma, Negenborn, Visser, & Hopman, 2017;
Räsänen, 2017). Implementation of batteries support the D/G sets downsizing, which results in the
D/G sets operation at their most efficient load ranges (Brandsaeter et al., 2015). Other advantages
include higher redundancy in the system and lower emissions due to the batteries charging from the
local grid in harbour (Brandsaeter et al., 2015; Geertsma et al., 2017). On the SOV, due to the
Dynamic Positioning (DP) power requirements, the D/G sets are often oversized or pushed to
operate at lower loads to be able to withstand a sudden loss of a D/G set in adverse weather
conditions. Therefore, incorporation of batteries to provide the necessary spinning reserve during
faulty conditions or power during power peaks on SOV can provide substantial benefits in terms of
fuel savings during DP and other operations. Batteries disadvantages include relatively high
procurement cost (Brandsaeter et al., 2015; Geertsma et al., 2017), large batteries size and weight
(Räsänen, 2017), limited number of recharging cycles (Räsänen, 2017) and addition of new
hazardous scenarios to the system (Bolbot, Theotokatos, Boulougouris, & Vassalos, 2019;
Brandsaeter et al., 2015).
On the next generation SOV, with increased technicians and crew numbers, ensuring safety
of power generation system is paramount as any malfunctions such as blackout or brownout may
lead to contact/collision/grounding. These accidents in turn can result in ships progressive flooding
and capsize with crew and technicians getting drown (Vassalos et al., 2019). In addition, the
introduction of batteries increases hazardous scenarios number resulting in fire, explosion and crew
intoxication (Brandsaeter et al., 2015), e.g., a fire on hybrid-electric tugboat occurred due to
malfunction of Battery Management System (Hill, Agarwal, & Gully, 2015), whilst a number of similar
incidences have been reported in other industries (Hill et al., 2015). In this respect, it is crucial to
ensure that all these scenarios are identified and properly addressed during the system design.
The primary reference for designing safe power generation systems is the IMO regulations
(Organization, 2014) and classification society rules (DNVGL, 2015). Currently, the main hazard
identification method in the DP systems is the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), which is
applied to ensure adequate system components redundancy (DNVGL, 2015; IMCA, 2015). In
previous studies, a high-level FMEA has been used for comparative safety analysis of different
propulsion systems, including power system with batteries in other ships, for example a Ferry boat
in (Jeong, Oguz, Wang, & Zhou, 2018). However, FMEA has been criticised for not addressing
properly the automation functions in the system (Bolbot, Theotokatos, Bujorianu, Boulougouris, &
Vassalos, 2019; Rokseth, Utne, & Vinnem, 2017; Sulaman, Beer, Felderer, & Höst, 2017; Thomas,
2013). On the other hand, control and automation functions have an important role for power
generation on DP vessels (United Kingdom Protection & Indemnity Club, 2015). Considering this,
System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) has been proposed to be used to address the
complexity in interactions between the control systems and physical processes (N. G. Leveson,
2011). In (Bolbot, Theotokatos, Boulougouris, et al., 2019) the safety of hybrid-electric propulsion
system and classical propulsion system using Alternate Current for electrical power distribution has
been compared using STPA on a cruise ship vessel. Other studies have referred to potential safety
issues on ship power systems with batteries but they did not follow a hazard identification method
for their analysis (Hill et al., 2015).
Pertinent literature reveals a number of research gaps: (a) hazard analysis of power systems
with Direct Current (DC) power network and DC power with batteries system on SOV using STPA
and (b) incorporation of risk as a measure in STPA to compare different designs. The research gap
leads to the aim of this study, which is to analyse the safety of power systems on SOV with batteries
using STPA and to compare it with standard DC power systems in terms of risk.
This paper is organised as follows: in section two, the methodology steps are presented; in
section three, a short description of the analysed system is provided; in section four, the analysis
results and safety recommendations are given; finally, in section five, the main findings of this study
are summarised.
3
2 METHODOLOGY
As it has been referred in the introduction, STPA has been selected in this study to identify the
hazardous scenarios. However STPA has been criticised for not allowing risk estimation and
criticality analysis (Dawson et al., 2015); for this reason the STPA method has been enhanced. The
method steps are presented in Figure 1 and described in more detail below.
STPA defines the accident as: “an undesired and unplanned event that results in loss,
including loss of human life or human injury, property damage, environmental pollution, mission loss,
financial loss, etc.” (Leveson & Thomas, 2018). The hazards in the STPA framework are understood
as: “system states or set of conditions that together with a worst-case set of environmental
conditions, will lead to an accident” (Leveson & Thomas, 2018). The hazards in STPA are viewed
on a system level, so they go beyond the single failures that may occur in the system and should be
referred to a specific state of the system. Sub-hazards are considered states in a worst-case
scenario leading to hazard realisation. Generic requirements can be specified, based on the hazards
and sub hazards.
The development of a functional control structure is one of the differentiating points of the
STPA analysis, compared with the other methods (Leveson & Thomas, 2018). Usually, it starts with
a high-level abstraction of the system and proceeds to a more detailed system description. The initial
control structure consists of the high-level controller, the human operator and the controlled process
with the basic control, feedback and communication links. A more detailed description would
incorporate a hierarchy of controllers. Both high-level and detailed control structure can be used for
the safety analysis at different system design stages. After the development of the basic control
structure, the next step is its refinement. The required actions include a) the identification of each
controller responsibilities; b) the process model with process variables and potential process variable
values; c) the control actions; d) the behaviour of the actuators; e) the information from the sensors;
f) the information from the other controllers.
The actual hazards identification starts by finding the Unsafe Control Actions (UCAs). The
possible ways to proceed are either by using the control actions types as initially proposed for the
STPA (N. Leveson, 2011) or by using the context tables as proposed in Thomas (2013). Herein, the
second of the two approaches has been selected. According to both approaches, the possible UCAs
can be of the following seven types (Leveson & Thomas, 2018):
Not providing the action leads to a hazard.
Providing of a UCA that leads to a hazard.
Providing the control action too late.
Figure 1 STPA steps.
4
Providing the control action too early.
Providing the control action out of sequence.
Control action is stopped too soon
Control action is applied for too long.
According to the STPA, there is also another type of UCA, when the safe control action is
provided but is not followed. This type of failure mode is addressed during the identification of causal
factors in the second step of the method. Similarly, with the system hazards, safety constraints can
be derived for the UCAs, aiding the identification of possible safety barriers.
The second step in the hazard identification of the STPA has the purpose of determining all
the scenarios and causal factors leading to the UCAs. This is done by examining the hazardous
scenarios, including software and physical failures as well as design errors. There are several ways
to organise the results of the hazardous scenarios by using tables or lists. In this work, the process
was augmented by a checklist, developed on the basis of previous studies (Becker & Van Eikema
Hommes, 2014; Blandine, 2013). The main categories of causal factors are:
Inappropriate control input
Hardware failure
Software faulty implementation
Software faulty design
Erroneous or missing input
Inadequate control command transmission
Flawed execution due to failures in actuator or physical process
Conflicting control actions
The systemic and contributory causal factors (Puisa, Lin, Bolbot, & Vassalos, 2018) have not
been considered during identification of the causal factors, as the implementations of proper training
for system operator and maintenance is out of the scope of system designer. The aim of the designer
is to ensure the adequate reliability and availability of system functions. Therefore, the aim of the
analysis is to rank the different hazardous scenarios identified by the STPA to allow better allocation
of resources to specific controllers; hence the different scenarios (UCAs) risk is estimated.
The new part of the STPA in the presented methodology is the risk estimation for the identified
UCAs. The basic assumption behind the estimation is that UCA can be considered as the central
undesired event in the system, thus being in the centre of the Bow Tie as depicted in Figure 2. Then
the total risk can be estimated as aggregation of individual UCAs risks. In a similar way with Level
of Protection Analysis method (BSI, 2004), the risk of an UCA is considered dependent on its causal
factors, the effectiveness of mitigation barriers, and coincidence with inadvertent environmental
factors. If the causal factors likelihood, the accident severity, the mitigation barriers/measures
effectiveness and relevant inadvertent environmental factors are quantified, the risk for each UCA
can be estimated.
For the analysis presented in the methodology herein, with the exception of the above, the
following additional assumptions have been made:
The UCAs causal factors are independent (Blandine, 2013) as the systemic and contributory
factors (Puisa et al., 2018) are omitted as the focus is on the system design.
If UCA leads to more than two hazards, then paths with the smaller risk can be ignored.
Similarly, if multiple causal factors result in UCAs, the causal factors with smaller likelihood can
be ignored for estimations.
The overall risk can be aggregated and calculated for the system based on individual UCAs risk.
Each mitigation barrier can mitigate the 90% of relevant hazardous conditions. This is rather a
conservative assumption with regard to effectiveness of mitigation barriers (BSI, 2004).
The UCA causal factors frequency and the UCA context factors frequency are independent from
each other.
5
The UCA causal factors frequency is estimated by considering it together with the relevant UCAs
preventative barriers effectiveness.
Accidents are considered as disjoint and independent.
If UCAs are caused by other UCAs (they are practically their causal factors), then these causal
UCAs are omitted for estimation of risk for UCAs. Instead, these causal UCAs are considered to
contribute to risk independently from other UCAs.
Causal factors resulting in multiple UCAs occurring are repeated for each UCA risk estimation,
as this assumption has no influence on estimation of the total risk.
The Potential Loss of Life () is one of the expressions of Societal Risk (International
Maritime Organisation, 2013) and is defined as expected value of the number of fatalities per year
(International Maritime Organisation, 2013; Vinnem, 2014):
 = ∑ ∑  (1)
Where  is the annual frequency of accidental scenario (event tree terminal event) with
personal consequences and  is expected number of fatalities in each accidental scenario (event
tree terminal event) with personal consequences .
The  is connected to the Individual Risk (IR) according to the following equation (Johansen
& Rausand, 2012), where N is the number of people in population exposed to risk:
 =   (2)
Based on the assumptions above, the  can be approximated as sum of risk of individual
UCAs as follows:
 =
(3)
Now the risk for each UCA using frequency of accidental scenario and consequence
of accidental scenario expressed in fatalities per year is estimated as follows:
Figure 2 The simplified Bow Tie
6
=  ×  [fatalities per ship-year] (4)
The frequency of each accidental scenario is estimated using UCA frequency ,
effectiveness of mitigation controls and probability of inadvertent environmental context as in
eq. (5) and the severity of each accidental scenario is estimated as in eq.(6):
= ×  ×  =  × 10 × 10 [events per ship-year] (5)
= 10 [fatalities per events] (6)
The ranking for effectiveness of mitigation measures is implemented according to Table 1.
For the ranking of available mitigating barriers, different mitigating barriers type are considered
namely a) the presence of redundant component implementing the same function with the faulty
one, b) available safety or reconfiguration functions c) humans operators rectification actions. The
ranking of inadvertent environmental factors () is implemented as in Table 3. The Severity Index
for accident () is selected according to Table 2 retrieved from Formal Safety Assessment
Guidelines (International Maritime Organisation, 2013).
The UCA is described by referring to the controller, the control action, the control action failure
type, the context and the link to the hazard (Leveson & Thomas, 2018). Practically though, an UCA
will occur if specific control action failure mode is realised in specific context. In case of a Fault Tree
this relationship would be represented using AND gate, hence multiplication between frequency of
control action failure mode and probability of specific context is required. However, the control action
failure mode can be attributed to the specific causal factors, identified previously, which can be
connected using OR gate to the UCA (Blandine, 2013). Wrong execution practically refers to one of
the UCAs types (Leveson & Thomas, 2018) and has been already included in identification of causal
factors. Therefore, the UCAs frequency () is estimated as in eq.(7) using frequency of causal
factors leading to relevant control action failure mode, the number of controllers in system,
which can implement the specific UCA and the probability of the UCA context:
 =  × × 10 [events per ship-year] (7)
The  is ranked using Table 4, retrieved from Formal Safety Assessment Guidelines
(International Maritime Organisation, 2013) and is estimated as in eq.(8), whilst  ranking used
for estimating the probability of UCA context is based on Table 5.
 = 10 [events per ship-year] (8)
Table 1 Ranking for availability of UCAs mitigation measures
Ranking (
) Definition Unavailability of mitigation
measures
6 No controls provided 10
-0
5 Some mitigation controls availability
(One control barrier)
10
-1
4 Adequate mitigation controls availability
(Two control barriers)
10
-2
3 Rare mitigation controls unavailability
(Three control barriers)
10
-3
2 Remote mitigations controls unavailability
(Four control barriers)
10
-4
1 Extremely remote mitigations controls unavailability
(Five control barriers and above)
10
-5
7
Table 2 Ranking for severity of UCAs hazards/accidents (International Maritime
Organisation, 2013).
Ranking
(
)
Definition Effects on human
Safety
Effects on
ship
Oil spillage Equivalent
fatalities
4 Catastrophic Multiple fatalities Total loss Oil spill size between
< 100 - 1000 tonnes
10
3 Severe Single fatality or
multiple severe
injuries
Severe
damage
Oil spill size between
< 10 - 100 tonnes
10
-0
2 Significant Multiple or severe
injuries
Non-severe
ship damage
Oil spill size between
< 1 - 10 tonnes
10
-1
1 Minor Single or minor
injuries
Local
equipment
damage
Oil spill size < 1
tonne
10
-2
Table 3 Ranking for inadvertent environmental factors.
Ranking (
) Definition Probability of inadvertent
environmental factors
3 Uncontrolled UCA will always lead to accident 10
-0
2 Uncontrolled UCA will sometimes lead to accident 10
-1
1 Uncontrolled UCA will rarely lead to accident 10
-2
Table 4 Ranking for causal factors frequency (International Maritime Organisation, 2013).
Ranking
(

)
Definition F
(per ship
year)
F
(per ship
hour)
7 Likely to occur once per month on one ship
10 1.14 10
-3
5 Likely to occur once per year in a fleet of 10 ships, i.e. likely to
occur a few times during the ship's life
10
-1
1.14 10
-5
3 Likely to occur once per year in a fleet of 1,000 ships, i.e. likely
to occur in the total life of several similar ships
10
-3
1.14 10
-7
1 Likely to occur once in the lifetime (20 years) of a world fleet
of 5,000 ships
10
-5
1.14 10
-9
Table 5 Probability of UCA context.
Ranking (

) Definition Probability of inadvertent
environmental factors
4 Always 10
-0
3 Sometimes 10
-1
2 Rarely 10
-2
1 Remotely 10
-3
3 CASE STUDY DESCRIPTION
The initial power system and hybrid-electric power system single line diagram are presented
in Figure 4 whilst the functional control structure for both systems is given in Figure 3. Two
switchboards and engine rooms are required to comply with the DP requirements. The power
network is of the Direct Current type. Power Management System (PMS) starts/stops the engines
based on the ship consumers electric load demand. Switchover between the plant Diesel Generators
(D/G) is implemented based on the D/G sets running hours. The PMS can implement a fast-electrical
load reduction for the propulsion motors and bow thrusters as well as preferential tripping functions
(fast load reduction) by tripping electrical consumers. The D/G sets can operate in the variable speed
8
mode and their power output is regulated by speed governor (ECU 7) and Automatic Voltage
Regulator (AVR) whilst delivered power to network through converters is controlled by the Generator
Control Unit (GCU). A number of other smaller functions are supported by EIM and EMU units on
the D/G sets. Power transferred between sections is controlled by Bus Tie Unit (BTU). Several safety
systems are used to trip the D/G sets and the propulsion motors if a fault had been observed.
In the investigated hybrid-electric power system, in addition to the initial system components,
one battery pack per switchboard is installed. The battery output and condition are controlled by a
dedicated Battery Management System (BMS), which monitors the actual battery health state, the
battery and cell capacity and controls the battery cells charge status, the discharging/charging rate,
the power output and the battery auxiliary systems. The BMS communicates with PMS to determine
the actual power status and power demand implementing in this way the Energy Management
System functions. The BMS also communicates with fire-fighting systems to ensure the firefighting
Figure 4 Power network layout diagram
Figure 3 Power network control structure
9
actions operation. Battery capacity is considered adequate to cover the whole ship power demand
for a limited period. The considered battery is of Li-Ion type.
The following has been assummed with respect to the systems operation:
The power system control network is isolated from other networks, so no hazardous scenarios
are developed in the system because of cyber-attacks.
The human operator does not introduce new hazards, only mitigates them.
Power plant operates with the bus-tie circuit breaker disconnected.
Power can be transferred from switchboard to a switchboard using converters at Bow thruster
motor 3.
With respect to the case study it has assumed that the  for each UCA is either 2 (Significant)
or 3 (Severe). In addition the number of people on the ship, including crew and technicians has been
estimated as 60.
4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Based on previous Formal Safety Assessment studies, the following causality scenarios can
be considered as accidents (IMO, 2008):
Collision [A-1]
Contact [A-2]
Grounding [A-3]
Fire [A-4]
Explosion [A-5]
Machinery damage [A-6]
Foundering [A-7]
Operating personnel injury or death [A-8]
These accidents are not fully disjoint, as a fire can lead to collision and vice versa (Hamann,
Papanikolaou, Eliopoulou, & Golyshev, 2013). In addition, numerous hazards can be connected to
the accidents on a cruise ship and there can be interactions between different hazards. Herein, the
most important and those related to the system under analysis are referred (Bolbot, Theotokatos, &
Vassalos, 2018; IMO, 2008):
Propulsion loss [H-1] leading to collision, contact and grounding accidents. The propulsion loss
can be further developed into the following sub-hazards:
o D/G sets overload [H-1-1].
o Transients [H-1-2].
o Imbalanced power generation [H-1-3]
o D/G sets unavailability [H-1-4]
o Batteries unavailability [H-1-5]
o Propulsion motors unavailability [H-1-6]
Conditions contributing to fire in the engine room [H-2].
Uncontrolled electrical faults in equipment leading to [H-3] fire and explosions in system
components or blackout (propulsion loss).
Toxic/flammable atmosphere in battery room leading to crew intoxication and/or fire [H-4].
Anomalous conditions in batteries leading to fire and its expansion [H-5].
Arson – deliberate act resulting in fire [H-6].
Human erroneous operation [H-7]
Cyber-attack leading to any of previous hazards [H-8].
Water ingress [H-9]
10
Although, it is acknowledged that there is contribution from hazards [H-6]-[H-9] to the overall
system risk, these hazards can be considered as external to the system presented in Figure 4 and
Figure 3 and thus their analysis has been omitted. The interconnection between hazards and
accidents is schematically shown in Figure 5.
The developed control structure has been already provided in Figure 3. The difference
between the two power systems can be found in the presence of Battery Management System and
additional interactions between the fire-fighting system and the power system. The description of
responsibilities of each controller and their control actions, although necessary and used for the
analysis, have been omitted for brevity and confidentiality purposes.
The results of applying STPA and risk analysis and comparing the different results are
presented in Table 7, Table 8, Figure 6 and Figure 7. A guiding example of application of the method
is provided in Table 6. As it can be observed from Table 7, the number of the UCAs and the
associated causal factors is significantly higher in the system with batteries. This is owed to the
increased number of interactions between the control systems and the physical processes in a power
system with batteries. However, the estimated risk is only slightly higher in the power system with
batteries. The estimated individual risk for different Severity Indexes is smaller than negligible 10-6
and in every case smaller than the maximum tolerable risk for the crew 10-3 and maximum tolerable
risk for passengers 10-4 (International Maritime Organisation, 2013). So it can be considered as
acceptable. However, it should be noted that the estimated risk includes only failures in control
systems, whilst some scenarios that could be potentially identified with FMEA have not been
addressed. Consequently, the estimated risk would be greater, if FMEA related accidental scenarios
have been incorporated. It should be also noted, that there is a specific subjectivity in the analysis,
as a) uncertainty in the estimated frequencies and probabilities has not been incorporated and b)
there are numerical approximations in calculations due to the use of tables with rankings.
Consequently, the estimated risk must be taken with precaution. The subjectivity that exists in the
risk assessments is one of its major weaknesses (Aven, 2016; Goerlandt, Khakzad, & Reniers,
2016). Last, but not least the risk is estimated for a system and not the whole vessel, so it can be
used for comparison with acceptable values with precaution; it can be used though for comparison
of different systems and scenarios.
As it can be observed from the Table 8, the incorporation of batteries reduces the risk in all the
controllers but BMS. In addition, from the Figure 6, it can be observed that the contribution of the
D/G sets overload [H-1-1] sub-hazard to risk is smaller in the system with batteries than in the initial
system design. This can be attributed to the fact that batteries act as an additional barrier to the
overload sub-hazard. However, despite this, the total fire risk (including H-2 and H-5 hazards) as
can be observed is significantly higher in the system with batteries, as the batteries themselves are
a new potential source of fire.
Comparing Figure 6 with Figure 7, it can be observed that the relative contribution to the total
risk of the UCAs related to [H-1-1] sub-hazard (48%) is double of the relative contribution of the
UCAs number associated with [H-1-1] sub-hazard to the total (24% in the initial design). Similarly,
the number of the UCAs contributing to H-1-4 sub-hazard is 34% of the total contribution number,
yet their risk is only 11% of the total. This is due to the abundancy of barriers tackling the problem
of the D/G sets unavailability (sub-hazard [H-1-4]), compared to the other hazards, such as
redundancy in available D/G sets, whilst D/G set overload condition (sub-hazard [H-1-1]) can lead
to a hazardous condition if few barriers are faulty. Therefore, the scenario number can be considered
as inappropriate metric for safety comparison of different systems.
7th European STAMP Workshop & Conference
18 - 20 September 2019, Helsinki
11
Table 6 Example of application of the method.
Controller Controlee
Control
action
Failure
mode Context Assumption
Hazar
d /Sub
hazard Accident
Causal
factor
Mitigating
barriers
Environmental
factors m



Risk
Fire
Fighting
control DG sets
Disconnec
t energy
supply
Providing
causes
hazards
Power
demand
status is
HIGH and
Operating
status is
ENGAGE
D
Loss of power
generation for
several D/G
sets
simultaneousl
y H-1-1
Collision/
Contact/
Grounding
[A-1],[A-2],
[A-3]
Wrong
softwar
e rules
A) Engine
room crew
restoring
normal
provision of
fuel to the D/G
sets
B) Propulsion
motors power
reduction
systems
A) Other
vessels in
proximity
B) Inadequate
communicatio
n between
vessels crew
C) Bad
weather
conditions 4 3 4 3 1 3
4x10
-7
Figure 5 Interconnection between hazards and accidents.
12
Some critical UCAs are provided in Table 7. As it can be observed, failures in the power
reduction functions applied during hazardous conditions are considered as the most critical in both
systems, as they constitute the last safety barrier before blackout in the systems. Another critical
failure is the faulty tripping of the D/G sets by the firefighting system in an engine room, as in this
case more than one D/G set can be disconnected from the network, leading to D/G sets overload
conditions. In a power system with batteries, the batteries failures management is also considered
as critical, as it can lead to fire with a reduced mitigation measures number. Hence, proper design
and testing of these functions shall be ensured in the power system.
Table 7 Comparison between initial and system with batteries.
STPA results Initial design Batteries included
UCA number 215 300 (+40%)
Causal factors
number
2247 3228 (+43%)
Estimated risk PLL
[fatalities/year]
6.19 10
-7
(SI=2) –
6.19 10
-6
(SI=3) 7.17 10
-7
(SI=2) –
7.17 10
-6
(SI=3) (+16%)
Estimated risk
IR
[fatalities/year]
1.03 10
-8
(SI=2) –
1.03 10
-7
(SI=3) 1.20 10
-8
(SI=2) – 1.20 10
-7
(SI=3)
Sample of most
critical UCAs
- Firefighting system falsely
activates quick closing fuel valve
- Power Management System
(PMS) disconnects consumers
necessary for power generation
functions, during overload
conditions
- PMS falsely reduces the
propulsion motors and bow
thrusters speed (and hence load)
- PMS trying to disconnect the
already disconnected heavy
consumers, hence not allowing
the implementation of power
reduction function on propulsion
motors and thrusters.
- PMS failing to reduce thrusters
load
- Battery management system not
disconnecting the batteries from the
network during electrical fault
- Battery management system not
increasing the cooling during electrical
fault conditions.
- Firefighting system falsely activates
quick closing fuel valve
- PMS falsely reduces the propulsion
motors and the bow thrusters speed (and
hence load)
- PMS trying to disconnect the
already disconnected heavy consumers,
hence not allowing the implementation of
power reduction function on propulsion
motors and the thrusters.
Table 8 Distribution of risks for initial and system with batteries.
Controller Initial PLL Hybrid PLL
AVR 4.80E-07 4.80E-07
BMS 0.00E+00 1.90E-06
Bus-tie controller 1.10E-07 1.10E-07
ECU 7 controller 4.53E-07 3.41E-07
EIM controller 3.57E-07 1.30E-07
Firefighting controller 1.08E-06 1.08E-06
GCU 1.08E-06 9.67E-07
PMS 2.62E-06 2.15E-06
Sea Water Cooling Pump controller 1.60E-08 1.42E-08
Thermostat 1.60E-09 1.42E-09
Total 6.19E-06 7.17E-06
13
As it can be observed from the results, the method allowed a rough estimation of the risk
metrics for different hazardous scenarios, the overall risk for the system and comparison of risk for
different systems. It was also possible to estimate the risk for different hazards and controllers.
Furthermore, the most critical controllers and scenarios in each system were highlighted. However
the estimated risk was not for the whole ship but for a specific system which complicated the
comparison with IMO acceptable values. In additions for the system risk estimation, some failure
driven scenarios have not been included. Further guidance on how to estimate the UCA
consequences and inadvertent environmental factors probability would be also beneficial for this
approach. Last, but not least there are several numerical approximations in the methods.
H-1-1
48%
H-1-2
1%
H-1-3
32%
H-1-4
11%
H-1-5
0%
H-1-6
6%
H-2
1%
H-3
1% H-4
0% H-5
0%
H-1-1
23%
H-1-2
0%
H-1-3
28%
H-1-4
10%
H-1-5
7%
H-1-6
5%
H-2
1%
H-3
14%
H-4
2%
H-5
10%
Figure 6 Distribution of estimated risk per hazards a) for initial power system b) for power
system with batteries.
a) b)
H-1-1
24%
H-1-2
1%
H-1-3
38%
H-1-4
34%
H-1-5
0%
H-1-6
1%
H-2
2%
H-3
0%
H-4
0%
H-5
0%
H-1-1
21% H-1-2
0%
H-1-3
29%
H-1-4
25%
H-1-5
7%
H-1-6
1%
H-2
2%
H-3
2% H-4
2%
H-5
11%
Figure 7 Distribution of identified UCAs per hazard a) for the initial system b) for the system
with batteries.
a) b)
14
5 CONCLUSIONS
In this study, a new approach for estimating risk metrics in a system based on the STPA has
been presented. The proposed approach was applied for comparison of Direct Current power system
with Direct Current power system with batteries on an SOV vessel.
The main findings of this study can be summarised as follows:
The new method allowed risk metrics estimation and comparison for different systems as well as
ranking of different scenarios.
The estimated risk for the failures in control systems, for both systems, is in tolerable regions,
according to criteria set by the method.
The risk, in the power system with batteries may slightly increase due to the increase in the
number of scenarios leading to fire
The risk due to D/G sets overload reduces in system with batteries as batteries act as an
additional barrier to the propulsion loss hazard.
Comparing the number of hazardous scenarios for two systems can lead to wrong conclusions.
Still the hazardous scenarios number can be used for comparison of systems complexity.
The new approach can be used as basis for development of a method for safety comparison
between cyber-physical systems.
Whilst the applied methodology was useful for identifying the critical UCAs and comparing risk
metrics failures for different systems, still it can be considered as a premature. The methodology
could be enhanced by incorporating uncertainty analysis or by integrating it with other methods. The
approach could also be enhanced by incorporating multiple experts ranking. However, all these
constitute suggestions for future research.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The work described in this paper was produced in research project NEXUS. The project has
received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme
under agreement No 774519. Kongsberg Maritime CM AS is kindly acknowledged for provision of
the relevant system information. The authors greatly acknowledge the funding from DNV GL AS and
RCCL for the MSRC establishment and operation. The opinions expressed herein are those of the
authors and should not be construed to reflect the views of EU, DNV GL AS and RCCL.
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ABRREVIATIONS LIST
AVR Automatic Voltage Regulator
BMS Battery Management System
BTU Bus Tie Unit
D/G Diesel Generator
DC Direct Current
FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
IMO International Maritime Organisation
SOV Service Operation Vessels
STPA System-Theoretic Process Analysis
PMS Power Management System
PLL Potential Loss of Life
UCA Unsafe Control Actions
... The interactions between these systems were included in the presented analysis, however PMS hierarchy and other systems were analysed in a separate study also presented in this conference (V. Bolbot et al., 2019). ...
... The interactions between these systems were included in the presented analysis, however PMS hierarchy and other systems were analysed in a separate study also presented in this conference (V. Bolbot et al., 2019). ...
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