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Against Sovereignty in Cyberspace
Abstract
In discussing the historical origins of sovereignty, Jens Bartelson (2018, 510) wrote, “Making sense of sovereignty . . . entails making sense of its component terms—supreme authority and territory—and how these terms were forged together into a concept.” The question of sovereignty in cyberspace, however, inverts this historical “forging together,” as territoriality and authority are sundered in cyberspace. This paper argues that attempts to apply sovereignty to cyberspace governance are inappropriate to the domain. It develops a technically grounded definition of “cyberspace” and examines its characteristics as a distinct domain for action, conflict, and governance, while clarifying its relationship to territoriality. It reviews the literature on cyberspace and sovereignty since the early 1990s, showing the emergence of explicitly pro-sovereigntist ideas and practices in the last ten years. The cyber-sovereignty debate is linked to IR research on the historical emergence of sovereignty, demonstrating how technologies routinely change the basis of international order and challenging the presumption that territorial sovereignty is a stable and uniform principle of international organization that can be presumptively applied to the internet. The paper also links the conceptual debate over cyber-sovereignty to the real-world geopolitical struggle over the governance of the internet, showing how different conceptions of sovereignty serve the interests of different powers, notably the United States, Russia, and China. The paper explores the relevance of an alternative governance model for cyberspace based on the global commons concept. It refutes the arguments made against that model and then explains what difference it might make to governance if we conceive of cyberspace in that way.
... For long, the promotion of sovereignty seemed to be at odds with widely acknowledged core principles of a global, '"free"' Internet' (Mansell, 2011, p. 27) or the 'global information society' (Garnham, 1997), with authoritarian governments using the term as a Trojan Horse for restricting freedom of expression and opinion rights online (Flonk et al., 2020;Mueller, 2020). However, in the wake of growing concerns about issues such as disinformation (Howard, 2020), surveillance (Zuboff, 2019) and excessive market power (Khan, 2016), a (perceived) 'sovereignty gap' (Timmers, 2024, p. 572) has emerged. ...
... The academic literature has made substantial inroads into understanding the EU's discursive pivot from the language of the open and global information society to the language of digital sovereignty, approaching it from three different angles. One strand of literature discusses digital sovereignty as a policy concept, trying to assess its political usefulness and normative desirability (Mueller, 2020;Obendiek, 2021), while others have focused on a mapping of the different uses or understandings of digital sovereignty (Couture & Toupin, 2019;Hummel et al., 2021;Pohle & Thiel, 2020;Roberts et al., 2021). Another strand of literature has zeroed in on the political role or function of digital sovereignty, seeking to 'understand what sovereignty "does"' (Barrinha & Christou, 2022, p. 361), i.e., how digital sovereignty influences the politics of digital policymaking (Bellanova et al., 2022;Broeders et al., 2023;Lambach & Oppermann, 2022). ...
... Digital sovereignty is an inherently ambiguous concept that different actors use in various ways (Couture & Toupin, 2019;Mueller, 2020;Pohle & Thiel, 2020;Roberts et al., 2021;. However, frequent usages of digital sovereignty share some core characteristics, around which various actors layer different interpretations. ...
... A dynamic that may emerge from this calls for a clearer understanding of the nature of cyberspace in politics and emphasises the need for appropriate regulation or at least a common understanding. While cyberspace can be conceptualised as anarchy without any state norm, rule or ethics, as in the origins of the internet [12] which is still being discussed in some cases today ( [13], 780 ff.); however, this anarchy would lead to chaos. ...
... The Pearson and Spearman coefficients of approximately 0.071 and 0.048 also show very weak positive correlations. Those countries with a high NCSI ranking, such as Belgium, Estonia, Latvia, the Czech Republic or Germany, are in the midfield of the digital sovereignty index [13,16,23,33,30]. In contrast, the USA, the leading country in the DSI, is ranked 42nd in the NCSI, while Russia and China are in the middle of the field in both indices, although both countries play a major role in cyber attacks. ...
... It embodies the notion of self-determination in the digital realm, enabling nations to make independent and strategic decisions that safeguard their sovereignty and protect against external interference. In an age where cyberspace knows no borders, digital sovereignty serves as a bulwark against cyber espionage, data breaches and other forms of digital manipulation, empowering nations to uphold their values and interests in an interconnected world [13]. ...
As our world becomes more digitally entwined, the concept of digital sovereignty has emerged as a critical determinant in international diplomacy. This chapter scrutinises the significance of digital sovereignty amidst rising cyber conflicts, showcasing its dual nature as both a defensive strategy and a diplomatic instrument. By exploring the interplay between traditional diplomatic practices and the evolving digital threat landscape, it sheds light on the intricate challenges and opportunities faced by nations. As states grapple with the complexities of safeguarding their digital borders while navigating diplomatic engagements, understanding the nuances of digital sovereignty becomes paramount in maintaining geopolitical stability and security in an increasingly interconnected global arena.
... The sovereignty that EU DS discourses reference is about more than just authority and power, infrequent references to Jean Bodin in academic treatises notwithstanding (for example in Mueller, 2020;Pohle and Thiel, 2020). While a sovereign ideal of the state being the final legal authority over digital matters features in parts of the debate, this is only one concern among several, and possibly not even the most prominent in EU DS discourses. ...
... European attempts to regulate these platforms and support home-grown digital industries have had little impact. The concept of 'digital sovereignty' is an attempt to navigate a course through this bundle of challenges. 1 Arguments for digital sovereignty typically hinge on safeguarding the self-determination of European societies in the digital age, to make digital industries globally competitive and to protect citizens from crime, surveillance and the unauthorised use of their data (Zeng et al, 2017;Mueller, 2020;Sahin and Barker, 2021: 11). ...
... Milton Mueller, in particular, has been highly critical of this line of thinking. He argues that attempts to impose state authority over the Internet are incompatible with the network character of the technological infrastructure (Mueller, 2020). On a more practical level, imposing legal authority over internet activities has proven to be challenging. ...
Digital Sovereignty is core to many contemporary debates on the regulation of digital technology, securing supply chains and strengthening the digital economy. In this paper, we focus on the European debates and policies around this project. We argue that the notion of digital sovereignty should be understood more as an overarching economic, societal and geopolitical project, rather than a project aimed at achieving any kind of political sovereignty or autarky in the digital sector. We arrive at this conclusion by analysing European policy documents and commentaries from various stakeholders for two cases: platform governance and semiconductors. The case of platform governance shows how the EU and its member states struggle to extend their regulatory power over the ‘data monopolies’ of the major Silicon Valley companies. The other is semiconductors, where the EU has kick-started several projects to improve the competitiveness of European manufacturers in a highly integrated global market. These examples demonstrate two things: a) that the pursuit of digital sovereignty does have some impact on the Internet (platform regulation) but also extends to other technological fields beyond it (semiconductors) and b) that digital sovereignty is not only a regulatory or technological project but also an economic, societal and geopolitical one.
... Contrastingly, scholars such as Liaropoulos (2017) and Mueller (2020) conceptualise cyberspace as a global commons where there must be a balance between state sovereignty and the fragmentation of cyberspace through the establishment of norms. In Mueller's (2020) view, "attempts to apply sovereignty to cyberspace governance are inappropriate to the domain," and it is thus important to develop "a technically grounded definition of "cyberspace" and examine its characteristics as a distinct domain for action, conflict, and governance while clarifying its relationship to territoriality" (p.779). Based on a review of the literature on cyberspace and sovereignty, Mueller (2020) criticises the IR debate on how technology has changed the basis of the existing international order and territorial sovereignty, arguing that the concept of territorial sovereignty does not apply to this domain. ...
... Based on a review of the literature on cyberspace and sovereignty, Mueller (2020) criticises the IR debate on how technology has changed the basis of the existing international order and territorial sovereignty, arguing that the concept of territorial sovereignty does not apply to this domain. Mueller (2020) consequently proposes an alternative governance model for cyberspace that is predicated on the concept of the global commons. In doing so, it rejects arguments made against this model, illustrating its potential utility for the governance of cyberspace. ...
Cyber politics and International Relations Theories in Cyber Age
... Contrastingly, scholars such as Liaropoulos (2017) and Mueller (2020) conceptualise cyberspace as a global commons where there must be a balance between state sovereignty and the fragmentation of cyberspace through the establishment of norms. In Mueller's (2020) view, "attempts to apply sovereignty to cyberspace governance are inappropriate to the domain," and it is thus important to develop "a technically grounded definition of "cyberspace" and examine its characteristics as a distinct domain for action, conflict, and governance while clarifying its relationship to territoriality" (p.779). Based on a review of the literature on cyberspace and sovereignty, Mueller (2020) criticises the IR debate on how technology has changed the basis of the existing international order and territorial sovereignty, arguing that the concept of territorial sovereignty does not apply to this domain. ...
... Based on a review of the literature on cyberspace and sovereignty, Mueller (2020) criticises the IR debate on how technology has changed the basis of the existing international order and territorial sovereignty, arguing that the concept of territorial sovereignty does not apply to this domain. Mueller (2020) consequently proposes an alternative governance model for cyberspace that is predicated on the concept of the global commons. In doing so, it rejects arguments made against this model, illustrating its potential utility for the governance of cyberspace. ...
A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW ON: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS CONCEPTS AND THEORIES IN CYBER AGE.
... Nevertheless, the ability to remotely create, access, or interact within cyberspace creates an enabling environment whereby actions are not limited by geographic proximity or national jurisdiction. This transnational environment muddies traditional notions of national sovereignty (Lambach, 2020;Mueller, 2020) and emphasizes the salience of TPCs since cyber operations can be conducted within the digital infrastructure of TPCs without either combatant being physically present. In the parlance of cyber operations, the entirety of the digital arena outside of one's own networks (blue space) and those controlled by the enemy (red space) is known as gray space. ...
... It is unclear if this ferment would manifest within TPCs. Interconnectivity is a founding principle of the Internet (Mueller, 2020), and populations may not assert the same expectations of sovereignty to the digital domain that they accord to their country's physical territory. Furthermore, given the pervasive malfeasance online and the already dim view of cybersecurity (Kostyuk and Wayne, 2021), the expectation that foreign actors operate within their digital space may be baked into citizen expectations. ...
The transnational nature of cyberspace alters the role of third-party countries (TPCs) in international conflict. In the conventional environment, military operations are primarily confined to the boundaries of the combatants or a designated war zone. However, during cyber conflicts, operations may occur on the digital infrastructure of states not otherwise involved in the dispute. Nevertheless, within the cyber conflict literature, little is said about TPCs who, by virtue of interconnectivity, may find themselves involved in a conflict not of their own making. Consequently, we examine the political and diplomatic hazards of cyber operations involving these actors. Through survey experiments involving participants from the United Kingdom and Canada, we assess the public opinion impact of an offensive cyber operation’s revelation on a TPC population. We find that while these incidents are viewed negatively, prior authorization and the involvement of an ally reduces this tendency. Such conditions lead the public to perceive these operations as corresponding with their national interest while suppressing fears of the possible consequences following their indirect involvement.
... In this state-centric model, states have mutually recognized supreme authorities over cyber infrastructure and activities within their territories ( Demchak and Dombrowski 2011 ). It challenges the traditional default standard for Internet governance that features open, minimalist, and decentralized design ( Deibert 2003 ;Mueller 2020 ). As one of the champions of the cyber sovereignty principle, China has not only practiced it within its borders but has been actively pushing forward this purportedly "fairer" and "more reasonable" model of Internet governance through the China-initiated World Internet Conference and a variety of multilateral mechanisms ( Zeng, Stevens, and Chen 2017 ;Cai 2018 ;McKune and Ahmed 2018 ). ...
... Some countries and experts have raised concerns that excessive control over data may negatively impact competition, investment, and eventually growth. Internet traffic control through service providers, for example, can also create higher production costs due to their inability to choose the least costly routing path ( Mueller 2020 ;Dewaranu 2021 ). Besides, working out the appropriate relationship between government-and nongovernment actors as well as between national security and individual rights remains a key axis of contention between China and developed countries. ...
This research probes the boundary-work of Communities of Practice (CoP) by examining China’s active efforts in advancing a state-centric approach in managing cyberspace in the international arena. Boundaries separating the Global North and South are reproduced in the expansion of what I call the “community of cyber sovereignty.” This phenomenon points to the CoP literature’s omission of the proactive aspects of boundary-work undertaken by core members and its surrounding and confounding historical contexts. I argue that boundary reproduction arises from both deliberate and unreflective moves in cultivating CoP. First, emerging from reflexivity in interacting with the external environment, practitioners in CoPs that are vigorously contested will likely replicate historically successful boundary drawing to acquire or maintain credibility. Second, CoP members engage in the habitual selection of strategies, anchoring the community toward sustaining relationships with actors that its members traditionally associate with. These proactive boundary-work dynamics are enabled by inclusive and exclusive mechanisms such as “brokering” varied practices to include potential members and “gatekeeping” others. My analysis suggests that scholarship must attend to actors’ proactive efforts to establish communities preferentially as well as their linkages with prevailing social structures.
... Some emphasize the necessity of a postterritorial notion of sovereignty (Tsagourias, 2015). Others insist that even though 6 Many conceptualisations of digital sovereignty (Couture and Toupin, 2019;Mueller, 2020) overlap with neighbouring concepts such as 'technological sovereignty', 'data sovereignty', or 'virtual sovereignty' (Lambach and Oppermann, 2022). They all embrace notions of control, but their articulations are shaped by distinct histories. ...
... 23 The cybersecurity approach to digital sovereignty sees territorialization as a threat to the integrity of data flows. Arguably, Gaia-X -as an autonomous, territorially exclusive cloud system -risks preventing Europe from working efficiently with its most important allies, including the US (Mueller, 2020). ...
This article explores the struggle for 'digital sovereignty' in the European Union. A seeming contradiction -the internet, after all, spans the globe - digital sovereignty is portrayed as the winning geo-economic formula to keep the EU secure, competitive , and democratic in the digital future. Approaching digital sovereignty as a discursive claim and analysing it through a case study of the European cloud project Gaia-X, we show that there is no singular understanding of digital sovereignty in the EU. Instead, we identify six markedly different conceptions across the domains of security, economy and rights. The article outlines three scenarios for how the digital sovereignty agenda may develop and thus shape the EU's digital policy and the EU's relations with the rest of the world: constitutional tolerance (where the conceptions co-exist), hegemony (where one conception dominates), or collapse (where the agenda falls apart due to inbuilt conceptual contradictions).
... Technical solutions to decrease dependence on foreign actors and infrastructuresor even to just demarcate national boundaries on the global infrastructure of the Internethave been debated for a long time. Ranging from proposals to superimpose 'Westphalian borders' onto the Internet (Demchak & Dombrowski, 2013) to arguments against imposing (any) state sovereignty on the Internet, warning against splintering the Internet and the disruption of Internet governance as it currently functions (Mueller, 2017(Mueller, , 2020. One of the often-heard technical arguments against sovereignty on the Internet is that the distributed architecture of the Internet and the logic of BGP routing is not equipped to deal with imposing sovereign concerns. ...
... A related debate is that on 'cyber westphalia' and the question whether the international state system can be superimposed on the global Internet. This debate is partially technical in nature, i.e., can this be done, but mostly political in nature, i.e., should it be done, with some in favor (Demchak & Dombrowski, 2013) and some vehemently against (Mueller, 2020). These debates are linked with the territorial dimension of sovereignty and ultimately ask the question if cyberspace can be 'bordered' along the borders of sovereign states. ...
... The ambiguity of digital sovereignty arises from the polysemy of key terms such as "control," "infrastructures," and "autonomy," which encompass a wide range of policies, practices, and technological components. Defining which digital technologies should be subject to control is particularly challenging, with many scholars referring vaguely to "cyberspace" or "the digital" (Couture & Toupin, 2019;Mueller, 2020), complicating the scope of state interventions. Moreover, both democratic and authoritarian states have embraced digital sovereignty, shifting the focus from the legitimacy of power to various forms of power assertion (Roberts, 2024). ...
This study examines the evolving landscape of digital sovereignty through the lens of Threema, a Swiss privacy-centered platform, and the largest European messaging app. Drawing on Science and Technology Studies, it challenges the conventional view of digital sovereignty as a purely legal or policy-driven achievement, instead demonstrating how sovereignty is co-constructed through interactions between technical infrastructures, institutional practices, and socio-cultural discourses. While digital sovereignty is often framed as a top-down state initiative, this research highlights the role of bottom-up innovations in fostering autonomy and reducing foreign dependencies without direct government intervention. Threema's strategic use of privacy-oriented infrastructures, regulatory compliance, and its Swiss identity positions it as a compelling case of digital sovereignty in practice. The study introduces the concept of friction to analyze the tensions-privacy, seclusion, and territorialism-that shape Threema's development and its alignment with sovereignty concerns. By resisting mass surveillance and foreign jurisdictions, Threema provides Swiss institutions with a secure alternative to dominant global messaging services. Furthermore, this research contributes to broader debates on European digital autonomy, illustrating how small, innovative actors can influence sovereignty agendas. The case of Threema underscores the need for a more nuanced understanding of digital sovereignty-one that moves beyond the dichotomy of neoliberalism versus authoritarianism and accounts for decentralized, non-hegemonic assemblages. Ultimately, this study argues that digital sovereignty is not solely dictated by states but emerges from complex sociotechnical negotiations that balance innovation, regulation, and cultural practices.
... Digital sovereignty is a complex and dynamic concept that encompasses several different elements (Couture and Toupin, 2019;Mueller, 2020;Pohle and Thiel, 2020;Roberts et al., 2021;Schmitz et al., 2023). Digital sovereignty is broadly defined as the ability of a country or region to exercise control over its own digital infrastructure, data use and technological developments, independent of external influence (Chander and Sun, 2021;Floridi, 2020;Sheikh, 2022). ...
In recent years, the resistance of member states to the strengthening of the European Union and its ambition to extend the powers of nation states has become a dominant political element, especially in the countries of the Central and Eastern European region. At the same time, both nation states and the EU are facing a number of global challenges, one of the most significant of which, alongside climate change, is digitalization. At the dawn of the digital age, technological innovation and the free flow of information promised unprecedented opportunities. However, as digital technologies have increasingly permeated all aspects of economic, social and political life, they have created new crises and challenges, particularly with regard to digital sovereignty. This research explores the complex and interdisciplinary nature of digital sovereignty, with a particular focus on the crises that digitalization has triggered and caused. These crises manifest themselves in various forms, including cybersecurity threats, privacy issues and the economic dominance of global technology companies. The European Union’s legislative initiatives, including the Digital Services (DSA), Digital Markets (DMA) and European Media Freedom (EMFA) regulations, as well as the efforts to regulate artificial intelligence, are designed to address the crises inherent in the digital age, while at the same time posing new challenges to the sovereignty and perception of sovereignty of individual states. The research examines the EU’s legislative efforts in navigating the politics of digital crises. It sheds light on the interplay between national self-determination and the EU’s overall regulatory framework, highlighting the ongoing struggle to balance control and cooperation in a rapidly changing digital environment. The analysis will provide a deeper understanding of how digital sovereignty is shaped by and responds to crisis policy, and insights into the future of digital governance in an increasingly interconnected world. It also seeks to assess the extent to which recently introduced EU legislation can be harmonized with the policy objective of strengthening the autonomy of nation states. This is particularly important in the context of the legislation and practices observed in countries with relatively small populations, such as Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic.
... Deep but narrow conceptions of digital sovereignty emerged in response to the new challenges and complexities introduced by digital technologies and the internet, with respect to a state's supreme authority over its territory (Mueller, 2019). By design, the internet facilitates the free flow of information and compresses time-space, making connectivity ubiquitous and communication instantaneous in a manner that does not respect traditional state borders (though the internet of course relies on a considerable amount of physical infrastructure on land and undersea) (Ganz et al., 2024). ...
Digital sovereignty is a term increasingly used by academics and policymakers to describe efforts by states, private companies, and citizen groups to assert control over digital technologies. This descriptive conception of digital sovereignty is normatively deficient as it centres discussion on how power is being asserted rather than evaluating whether actions are legitimate. In this article, I argue that digital sovereignty should be understood as a normative concept that centres on authority (i.e., legitimate control). A normative approach to digital sovereignty is beneficial as it supports critical discourse about the desirability of actors’ assertions of control. It is also more closely aligned with traditional definitions of sovereignty that are grounded in ideas of sovereign authority. To operationalise this normative approach to digital sovereignty and demonstrate the deficiencies of a descriptive approach, the role that “Big Tech” companies are playing in controlling artificial intelligence is considered from both perspectives. Through this case study, it is highlighted that Big Tech companies assert a high degree of control (i.e., descriptive digital sovereignty), but that they lack strong input legitimacy and have a questionable amount of output legitimacy. For this reason, it is argued that Big Tech companies should only be considered quasi-sovereigns over AI.
... In this institutionalisation of governance, it is conceivable that opportunities would emerge to favour norms and practices consistent with public or collective interests, thereby bringing platform provision into closer alignment with democratic values and fundamental rights. However, since contemporary efforts by states to grant digital freedoms often conflict with the values of authoritarianism (Schlesinger, 2022), at present, there seems little scope for an upswing in commons-based governance approaches to platforms (Mueller, 2020). Nevertheless, it is argued that if stakeholders engage in ethical deliberation and learn to put "guardrails" in place consistent with desirable digital market outcomes, then a realignment of economic and other values could be achieved (Bauer, 2022). ...
... Studies of governance (and regulation) of the underlying communication infrastructure were, until recently, often conducted separately from the study of media (content) (Mansell, 1996(Mansell, , 2012Melody, 1987Melody, , 2013Mueller, 2010Mueller, , 2020Rosenau & Singh, 2002). Nevertheless, much of this research is concerned with a variety of institutionalized forms of governance and their consequences. ...
... También se reere al funcionamiento de instituciones de múltiples partes interesadas (multistakeholder) y ciudadanos en el centro de la gobernanza del internet. Tales cuestiones han chocado con los argumentos libertarios sobre cómo el internet volvió obsoletas las nociones modernas de Estado y territorio, así como con críticas más recientes (Mueller, 2020) sobre los problemas de invocar la soberanía para reclamar el control sobre la política de comunicación e información. Como narrativa política para justicar ciertas posiciones y decisiones, la soberanía ha sido utilizada de manera diferente por las potencias mundiales -a saber, Estados Unidos, la Unión Europea, China, Rusia e India-, en sus luchas por la primacía y el poder del internet. ...
En este trabajo examinamos los factores que impulsan el cibernacionalismo y la llamada gobernanza digital en las políticas de medios. La curiosa ausencia de debates y fuertes esfuerzos para regular las plataformas digitales en la región contrasta con las tendencias observadas en EEUU, Europa, China e India. Durante las últimas dos décadas, la región latinoamericana ha adoptado en gran medida un enfoque desregulador de laissez-faire en cuestiones fundamentales sobre la estructura y el funcionamiento de Internet, incluido el desempeño de los conglomerados dueños de las plataformas digitales globales, la moderación y edición de discursos, el tráfico de contenidos, los datos personales de los usuarios, la propiedad de las infraestructuras, su acceso, y la tributación económica del sector. Ese es el foco de análisis del presente artículo.
... Kamu malları kavramı, hem ulusal (milli servet) hem de uluslararası (evrensel servet) seviyede büyük bir maddi değere sahiptir. Denizler, uzay ve çevre gibi ortak kullanım alanlarında, uluslararası hukuk kamu mallarının sürdürülebilir bir şekilde kullanılmasını ve korunmasını sağlamak amacıyla çeşitli anlaşmalar ve sözleşmeler içerir (Mueller, 2020). ...
IJESOS publishes articles dealing with various aspects of the Educational and Social Sciences. Seeing lifelong learning as an interdisciplinary field of study, it invites and welcomes contributions from anthropology, social science, demography, education, linguistics, translation studies, epidemiology, gerontology, economics, econometrics, management and organization science, policy studies, psychology, statistics, sociology and research methodology. Original empirical analyses, theoretical contributions, methodological studies, and reviews that are accessible to a broad set of readers are welcomed. Articles might focus on specific events and policy implications including their determinants and consequences or discuss segments of the life course, human behavior, social relationships, and society without restrictions over time and space.
... By the way, we are not here to deny the benefits of the multistakeholder principle advocated by WSIS in 2003, because the decision to take the Internet as a global and public facility undoubtedly makes at least one thing more possible, it is open to innovation widely. That could also be seen as one reason for supporters of the global public domain theory (Mueller 2020) 4 . ...
This paper addresses the ambiguous legal boundaries surrounding the Internet, a persistent concern for legal researchers. As a new frontier for legal researchers, issues related to the Internet or cyber matters within the legal context have persisted for decades, with some aspects consistently in a state of obscurity and fragmentation. Moreover, there is a phenomenon of overlooking the comprehensive development of a legal narrative, leaving this branch in a state of isolation. To enhance clarity, the paper narrows its focus to three key institutions that regulate the Internet under the UN system, this paper obtains its breakthrough points from the angle of organs, and then of basic concepts embraced by the organs. Upon reviewing the core elements at play in the Internet governance system, the multistakeholder model emerges as a key player in Internet governance within the UN system. In summary, employing the methodologies of textual, historical, and normative analysis allows us to explore the underlying questions and outline a foundational map of Internet regulation within the UN system.
... The Internet's private sector has also engaged with data governance bodies with global implications, such as the Facebook Oversight Board for content moderation controversies over the plat form. While the content layer or data layer have historically challenged the norms and practices that have driven global Internet interoperability, its unity, and the central normative component of the Internet protocol suite (TCP/IP), these two have coexisted and struggled with this network's characteristics (Goldsmith & Wu, 2006;Mueller, 2019). ...
... In secondo luogo, la natura delle tecnologie e dei mercati che sono oggetto di regolazione rende ancor più interessante questo tema. Infatti, lo spazio digitale è per certi versi incompatibile con l'idea stessa di sovranità e delle sue implicazioni istituzionali, o lo è a patto di accettare assetti/esiti subottimali (Mueller, 2020). Questo implica che le relazioni fra governi ed attori del mercato sono ancor più equilibrate di quanto non potessero essere in passato per la rilevanza relativa che le risorse di potere di tipo conoscitivo e operativo acquisiscono rispetto a quelle di tipo coercitivo. ...
... Необхідність більш чіткої концептуалізації цифрового суверенітету в площині політичної науки постала після публікації двох наукових статей -М. Мюллера [31] та К. Хеллера [22], основні ідеї яких можна означити як формування системи аргументів на підтримку цифрового суверенітету (К. Хеллер) і проти (М. ...
У статті визначено та досліджено особливості концептуалізації ідеї цифрового суверенітету держави в сучасній політичній науці. Предметне вивчення наукових дискусій і політичного дискурсу цифрового сувереніте- ту дало змогу визначити низку характерних ознак концептуалізації цього явища в дослідницькому просторі політичної науки. Доведено, спроби прямого порівняння суверенітету держави й цифрового суверенітету держави у вимірі лінійної еволюції понять указують на необхідність пошуків інших принципів визначення залежності ними та механізмів взаємодії між двома цими явищами в площині реальної політики. Важли- вим вектором наукових пошуків сталих маркерів цифрового суверенітету є площина співвідношення цифрового суверенітету національної держави- члена ЄС і цифрового суверенітету ЄС загалом, у якій відображено реальні політичні кроки всіх зацікавлених суб’єктів. Цей контекст потребує відходу від державоцентричного розуміння суверенітету як передумови здійснення влади на певній території й еволюції в напрямі означення цифрового суверенітету як упорядкованого, орієнтованого на цінності, регульованого та безпечного цифрового простору, сформованого через індивідуальне самовизначення громадян держави/ЄС. Обгрунтовано ідею формування можливості й здатності національної держави (об’єднання держав) самостійно приймати рішення, якими регулюються цифрова інфраструктура та використання відповідних технологій в обмеженому суверенітетом просторі є відображенням зміни сталих моделей відносин влади під впливом цифрових трансформацій. Публічні дебати про межі цифрового суверенітету, технологічного суверенітету, суверенітету даних і стратегічну автономію артикулювали низку проблем суверенітету громадян, держав та ЄС у вимірі характеру їх (гео)політичної суб’єктності. Установлено, що концептуалізація цифрового суверенітету держави в сучасній політичній науці розгорталася довкола проблеми мотивації його проголошення та використання як інструменту досягнення політичних цілей. У політичній практиці ця ідея відображена у формуванні контрольованого політичного простору кіберсуверенітету в авторитарних державах (Китай і росія) та простору безпекової архітектури контролю за цифровою інфраструктурою в європейських ліберальних демократіях.
... 48 In contrast, Mueller has argued that the nature of the technology renders such developments both impractical and unwise. 49 Most studies focus on the relationship between the state military use of information technology and patterns of war and peace, which have been central concerns for IR scholars since the founding of the field. As I will argue below, the focus on strategic military stability is myopic and risks occluding important effects of the global adoption of internet technologies on the stability of the international system, like the ones outlined in the previous section of this chapter. ...
... Mueller argues that the global commons of cyberspace is a "virtual space for interaction" arising from the shared deployment of global protocols and standards, themselves "global public goods" on account of their unrestricted availability to all. 68 As the latter precede and enable cyberspace itself, any sovereign claims to "national" fractions of this environment are post hoc and lack legitimacy. Furthermore, amongst the global public goods enabled by the global commons, we may number security and stability in general, cyber or otherwise. ...
... Cyberspace, a network of networks without national borders, is one example of a global commons that illustrates the difficulties of devising fair and equitable solutions at the international level. The supply of internet services by private actors internalizes many of the costs and benefits of cyberspace (Mueller, 2020). The relative success of cyberspace as a global commons is dependent on the creation and adoption of protocols and standards that enable it to connect various components functionally in cyberspace. ...
... Since as early as the 1990s, policymakers in different countries have begun to use terms such as "digital sovereignty", "cyber sovereignty", and "data sovereignty" to connote some idea of state control over technology (Mueller 2019). 2 Following the 2013 Snowden revelations, the idea began to gain international traction, with China and other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation promoting the idea of "internet sovereignty" as control over content within a particular jurisdiction (McKune and Ahmed 2018). ...
In recent years, policymakers, academics, and practitioners have increasingly called for the development of global governance mechanisms for artificial intelligence (AI). This paper considers the prospects for these calls in light of two other geopolitical trends: digital sovereignty and digital expansionism. While calls for global AI governance promote the surrender of some state sovereignty over AI, digital sovereignty and expansionism seek to secure greater state control over digital technologies. To demystify the tensions between these trends and their potential consequences, we undertake a case analysis of digital sovereignty and digital expansionism in China, the European Union, and the United States. We argue that the extraterritoriality embedded in these three actors’ policies and escalatory competitive narratives, particularly those from the US, will likely undermine substantive global AI governance cooperation. However, nascent areas of alignment or compromise, notably in data governance and technical standards, could prove fruitful starting points for building trust in multilateral fora, such as the G20 or United Nations.
This opening paper for the topical collection on digital sovereignty explores the theoretical underpinnings and practical applications of the concept. The paper gives a brief overview of the traditional concept of sovereignty, discussing its applications to the digital. Moreover, it examines the tension between the borderless nature of cyberspace and the territorial basis of traditional sovereignty. The analysis highlights different perspectives on digital sovereignty, from state-led strategies aimed at controlling data and infrastructures to Indigenous approaches emphasizing self-determination and sovereignty over data. It further investigates the application of the concept to the infrastructural components of cyberspace, including submarine cables and cross-border data flows. The possibility of entrenching rules in the code of cyberspace is analysed highlighting regulatory ambitions and digital policies from China, Russia and the EU. This paper provides a foundational framework for the topical collection, proposing interdisciplinary approaches to address the complexities of digital sovereignty and its implications for global governance and politics.
In recent years, the contradiction between the need for collaborative global cybersecurity governance and the fragmentation of the cybersecurity governance system has become particularly prominent. How can we understand the fragmentation of the global cybersecurity governance structure? Based on the assumption that international cybersecurity is a quasi-public good, this article attempts to analyse the fragmentation of cybersecurity governance and its causes from the perspectives of supply and consumption of cybersecurity products by drawing on theories about quasi-public goods and using comparative analysis and case studies. From the supply perspective, the two main cybersecurity supply models, mainly sovereign states and international organisations, are fragmented to a certain extent in terms of governance concepts, governance models, governance rules and governance institutions, respectively. From the perspective of consumers, in the process of global cybersecurity supply, the unreasonable price structure, distribution structure and the disproportion between the distribution structure and price are the main reasons for the emergence of the fragmentation problem, which is manifested in the variability of interests and demands of multiple cybersecurity governance subjects, the insufficient effectiveness of the global cyber governance mechanism, the high participation cost brought about by cyber hegemony, and the deficiency of democratic legitimacy and representation in the current global cybersecurity governance. The fragmentation of global cyber governance is precisely a response to global governance failure triggered by the imbalance between supply and demand of international cybersecurity as a quasi-public good.
Este libro es el resultado directo del Primer Congreso Universitario de Inteligencia Artificial y Transhumanismo, un espacio de encuentro y reflexión
que nos permitió explorar juntos el impacto de la inteligencia artificial y
el transhumanismo en nuestras vidas. En este congreso, reunimos voces y
conocimientos de académicos, estudiantes, expertos y líderes de distintos
sectores, todos impulsados por un mismo propósito: entender y anticipar
cómo estas tecnologías están cambiando nuestra sociedad y lo que eso
significa para cada uno de nosotros. Las páginas de este libro recogen
las ideas y perspectivas compartidas en las mesas de trabajo y conferencias, construyendo un diálogo interdisciplinario que invita a todo lector a
reflexionar sobre el mundo que estamos creando. Cada capítulo explora temas
que van desde los derechos humanos y la ética en el uso de la tecnología
hasta su influencia en campos tan diversos como la medicina y la economía.
El propósito de este capítulo fue abordar el impacto de las concepciones transhumanistas y posthumanistas en la definición y protección de la dignidad humana, en un contexto marcado por los avances científicos y tecnológicos. La metodología se basó en un análisis reflexivo que respondió a cuatro preguntas centrales: ¿Cómo afectan las mejoras o alteraciones tecnológicas a la naturaleza biológica humana en la concepción de la dignidad humana?, ¿cuál es el futuro de la humanidad considerando estos avances?, ¿qué tipo de humanos aspiramos a ser?, ¿seguirá siendo relevante el concepto de dignidad humana en un futuro?
Se llevó a cabo una revisión exhaustiva y crítica de fuentes académicas, literatura filosófica y estudios interdisciplinarios sobre ética y tecnología. Se presenta una visión crítica y reflexiones finales sobre cómo preservar la dignidad humana frente al desarrollo tecnológico acelerado, con el fin de sostener los valores humanistas fundamentales para enfrentar los desafíos contemporáneos.
In today's rapidly digitalizing world, cybersecurity requires the protection of information and communication technologies as well as the infrastructure of countries. In this framework, some countries consider cyber sovereignty to be connected with cybersecurity as an approach that discloses the control and authority of states over their digital infrastructures. This study analyzes the cybersecurity policies and understanding of cyber sovereignty in China. In doing so, the possibility of theorizing dominance in cyberspace is discussed. In this context, the main purpose of this study is to examine the theoretical dimensions of cybersecurity and cyber sovereignty concepts and to analyze China's cybersecurity policies and cyber sovereignty approach. Cyberspace represents a new field of dominance in international relations. Rather than providing a definitive answer to whether cyber sovereignty is possible under international law, the focus should be on how cyber sovereignty can play a role in international power struggles and shape cybersecurity policies. In this context, the study's methodology consists of a brief introduction to cybersecurity, followed by an analysis of the research question of whether cyberspace dominance is possible and the concept of cyber sovereignty. Within the scope of the theoretical framework, a literature review of the relevant concepts was conducted, and China's cybersecurity policies and cyber sovereignty approach were analyzed as a case study. The documents, sources, and data discussed throughout the study demonstrate China's understanding of cyber sovereignty and how it is shaped on international platforms. The study concludes that if China sees cyberspace sovereignty as the key to becoming a global power in the international system, it must integrate all factors, including military, political, and economic factors, besides cybersecurity.
A new era for BRICS has begun with the desire of new countries to join BRICS. This expansion, the BRICS+, poses several challenges and opportunities for the renewed alliance, particularly concerning the digital sovereignty of the countries. On the one hand, the leading five BRICS nations have the potential to achieve digital sovereignty, earning the moniker “the hawks of digital sovereignty.” On the other hand, expanding BRICS membership to countries with varying levels of digitalization raises issues for the alliance. These include improving national legislation on digital sovereignty and defining actions to foster cooperation within BRICS+. This article aims to design a theoretical legal model for BRICS+ digital sovereignty, outlining its pillars and offering recommendations for achieving digital sovereignty within BRICS+. The comparative legal method, used to analyze regulations in digitalization and digital sovereignty among BRICS+ member countries, ensures a comprehensive understanding of the legal landscape. Retrospective analysis, which studied the development of BRICS+ regulations in these areas, provides a historical context. The systematic method, which examined legal tools and instruments that contribute to achieving digital sovereignty, ensures a thorough exploration. The content analysis allowed for the interpretation of news articles and social media sources related to BRICS+ digital sovereignty, adds a contemporary perspective. The authors conclude that achieving digital sovereignty for BRICS+ is possible and offer several recommendations for collaboration, including developing a BRICS+ digital sovereignty memorandum, launching a BRICS+ regulatory sandbox, and deploying a BRICS+ sovereign cloud. These recommendations can inform BRICS+ policy-making, contribute to the limited literature in this field, and serve as a basis for future research on BRICS+ digital sovereignty.
The harm prevention rule - including the due diligence standard of conduct it requires - is often seen as a potentially powerful accountability mechanism for malicious cyber operations of state and non-state actors when attribution fails. Yet a lack of clarity on its doctrinal status, content and scope has hampered its practical utility so far. To address this problem, the book provides the first comprehensive analysis of the harm prevention rule in cyberspace. Through an in-depth analysis of state practice and opinio iuris it carves out which risks of cyber harm trigger due diligence obligations to prevent harm and which measures states are required to take in concreto . The book differentiates between binding minimum standards and non-binding best practice standards.
Background: As the worldwide community becomes increasingly linked via digital platforms, the rise in social media crimes brings unprecedented problems to the global legal environment. Traditional international law frameworks were often based on physical limits and tangible contacts, rendering them less able to manage the virtual and borderless character of these new types of wrongdoing. Objective: This article aims to identify places where present legal conceptions may need to be revised or misaligned by illuminating the gaps and conflicts between social media-related crimes and international law principles. Methods: Using a qualitative review of landmark cases, international treaties, and conventions, this study examines the compatibility of international legal instruments with the distinctive features of crimes committed via social media platforms. Results: The results show that the complexities of social media crimes regularly call into question numerous significant concepts of international law, such as jurisdiction, sovereignty, and non-interference. Furthermore, the need for a global definition and identification of some cybercrimes exacerbates discrepancies and uncertainty in international legal responses. Conclusion: International legal frameworks must be reassessed and restructured to address social media crimes. This might lead to more effective and coordinated global cybersecurity solutions in the digital age.
A strong and prevailing innovation imperative is sweeping across the public sector and despite a growing literature on public sector innovation (PSI), the actors driving these processes tend to end up in the background of analysis. Based in an analytical framework of narrative theory and organization studies, and the efforts to introduce Social Impact Bonds (SIB) in Sweden as empirical case, the aim of this article is to unpack and analyze the neglected initial stages of PSI. Building on a 4-year qualitative study, the analysis shows that actors promoting PSI narrate the public sector as in need to “open up” for (1) new actors; (2) new services and solutions; and (3) new forms of knowledge. Our findings suggests that the initial stages of PSI are substantially more formative than previously indicated. We show how the innovation at hand function as a discursive node towards which the actors’ storylines gravitate. Despite differences, the actors involved narrate their world similarly constituting discourse coalitions that connects and aligns their interests and objectives. We argue that the early stages of PSI are to be understood as cognitive and narrative struggles, or negotiations. The potentially good news here is that change continuously takes place in processes of PSI, despite narratives of inertia. The potentially bad news is that the same change is difficult to predict, control and govern.
Bu makalede ülkesel Devletin siber alandaki, özellikle de etkin kontrolü dışındaki alanlardaki insan hakları yükümlülükleri açıklanacaktır. Bu makalede, ülkesel Devletin siber alandaki insan hakları yükümlülüklerini ortaya koymak için incelenen beş önemli konu bulunmaktadır. Birincisi, temel haklara saygı: Devlet, siber alanda bulunan veya siber alandaki eylemlerinden etkilenen bireyler için mahremiyet hakkı, ifade özgürlüğü ve ayrımcılığa uğramama gibi temel insan haklarını korumalıdır. İkincisi, gerekli özeni gösterme: Devletin, belirli alanlar üzerinde doğrudan kontrolü olmasa bile, siber alandaki insan hakları ihlallerini önleme ve azaltma konusunda gerekli özeni gösterme görevi bulunmaktadır. Devlet, bireyleri zarardan korumak için makul adımlar atmalıdır. Üçüncüsü, ülke dışı yükümlülükler: Devlet, eylemlerinin kendi kontrolü dışındaki alanlardaki bireylerin hakları üzerinde önemli bir etkiye sahip olması halinde, siber alanda insan haklarını sınırlarının ötesinde korumak için ülke dışı yükümlülüklere sahip olabilir. Dördüncü olarak, uluslararası iş birliği: Sınır ötesi siber tehditleri ele almak ve insan haklarını evrensel olarak korumak için diğer Devletler ve uluslararası örgütlerle iş birliği çok önemlidir. Beşincisi, şeffaflık ve hesap verebilirlik: Devlet siber alanla ilgili politikalarında ve eylemlerinde şeffaf olmalıdır. Ayrıca, herhangi bir ihlal için hesap verebilirlik mekanizmalarının mevcut olmasını sağlamalıdır. Bu makale güvenlik ve hakların dengelenmesinin önemli olduğu sonucuna varmaktadır. Siber alanda güvenliğin sağlanması esas olmakla birlikte, Devlet güvenlik tedbirleri ile insan haklarına saygı arasında bir denge kurmalı ve orantısız kısıtlamalardan kaçınmalıdır. Devlet, etkin kontrolü dışındaki alanlarda, ilgili paydaşlarla iş birliği içinde, siber alan yönetişiminin karmaşıklığını kabul ederken, insan hakları üzerindeki olumsuz etkileri en aza indirmek için çaba göstermelidir. Siber alanda insan haklarının korunması sadece ülkesel Devleti değil, aynı zamanda uluslararası toplumu da kapsayan ortak bir sorumluluktur.
This study explores the ideological aspect of the US-China cyberspace competition and its potential impact on global cyber-stability. The research employs the 'Thucy-dides Trap' concept as an analytical lens through which to scrutinize the dynamics characterizing US-China relations in cyberspace. This analysis delves into the intricate interplay between an ascendant yet discontent challenger (China) and a pre-eminent and apprehensive dominant power (the US) in cyberspace. While risks are acknowledged due to strained communication and ideological competition, the study suggests that shared interests in cyberspace stability could prevent the two powers from falling into the Thucydides Trap. The outcome hinges on future actions by both countries' leadership.
This paper explores the motives and mechanisms behind data localization implemented by states to protect data, which is essential to emerging technologies such as Artificial Intelligence. Despite the significant negative aspects of data localization for states, the practice has become increasingly prevalent, leading to the unexplored question of why states choose to implement it. This suggests that data localization is a form of economic means derived from digital technologies and employed by states to serve political objectives. Focusing on the data in platforms, the theoretical mechanism of data localization is captured in light of two factors: network perception and security externality. Network perception pertains to a state’s perception of the positive network effect generated by platforms, while security externality refers to a state’s consideration of the security implications in relation to the economic benefits derived from the positive network effect, serving the national interest in domestic and/or international contexts. To substantiate these theoretical propositions, the paper employs a comparative case study approach where Vietnam, Singapore, and Indonesia have been chosen as empirical cases based on the selection strategy. The paper bridges the concept of economic statecraft with digital technologies, fosters interdisciplinary discussions, and offers policy implications.
The concept of sovereignty was traditionally linked with the notion of territorial control. However, in the digital age, new dimensions of sovereignty appear, including digital sovereignty, which implies the independence of state in domestic and foreign policy in the digital realm. Digital sovereignty is becoming a popular topic in the contemporary scientific research. Cross-border nature, accessibility, and anonymity of ICTs significantly complicate the analogies between territorial and digital sovereignty, but do not make it impossible to ensure sovereignty and protect the jurisdiction of states in the digital realm. Approaches to the definition of the digital sovereignty vary both in scientific literature and in official documents of states and international organizations. Differences reflect the peculiar features of the political culture and the level of digitalization and foreign policy priorities of countries and regions, as well as academic culture. While western authors and politicians use the term “digital sovereignty,” in the Chinese academic literature, the term “Internet sovereignty” is widespread. Russian authors often refer to the term “information sovereignty.” Due to the technological development, new approaches and new terms appear, such as “data sovereignty.” Methodologically, the paper is based on discourse analysis of the official documents of states and international organizations, as well as academic discourse on digital sovereignty. Discourse analysis allows to reveal peculiar characteristics of the digital sovereignty as a practice of states. Motives of states which emphasize the importance of digital sovereignty both domestically and internationally include control over economically valuable resources and politically contested digital spaces. The considerations of cybersecurity and the problem of “digital nonintervention” also play an important role. Digital technologies are transboundary, but in the political sphere, the world is divided into sovereign states. Under these conditions, sovereignty can act as a common denominator necessary for the further development of international cooperation in the field of information security while respecting the interests of all states.
The military now views cyberspace as a new warfare domain, with constant cyber operations potentially causing significant consequences. Internationally, countries are heavily involved in cyberspace, but international law lags behind this evolution, raising questions about its application and retaliation measures. This article investigates international law in cyberspace and cyber operations in warfare and terrorism, exploring recent calls for increased legislation. The impact of cyberspace nonregulation on international security is examined from both positive and negative perspectives. It argues that solving anonymity and attribution issues requires state collaboration, with an initial step of cooperation against cyber‐terrorism. The conclusion emphasizes the necessity of cyberspace regulation and legislation for international and national security, offering a starting point for discussion.
This interdisciplinary anthology addresses the criticism that previous investigations of borders often lack complexity and, therefore, fall short. Instead, the authors assess the complex interplay of elements and dimensions of borders and show how this gives rise to instances of disorder/order and how such disorder/order becomes socially and spatially effective. They discuss principles of complexity-oriented border research, the significance of borders in emergent disorder/order formations and border demarcations as examples of social disorder/order in European border regions, the EU’s and US’ migration systems, and virtual realities. This book makes an important contribution to the emerging complexity shift in current border studies. With contributions by Falk Bretschneider | Cécile Chamayou-Kuhn | Ulla Connor | Norbert Cyrus | Maria M. Fellner | Dominik Gerst | Guillaume Javourez | Rodrigo Bueno Lacy | Daniel Lambach | Carolin Leutloff-Grandits | Islam Rachi | Henk van Houtum | Christian Wille
The war in Ukraine has underscored the risks and threats to global Internet infrastructure from geopolitically motivated cyber operations. The Domain Name System and core protocols responsible for the routing, forwarding, and security of Internet traffic have been exploited by actors in Russia and Ukraine for denial‐of‐service attacks, surveillance, and censorship. Additionally, states have tried to compel organisations that maintain and govern such infrastructure to cut Russia off from the Internet. These cyber operations and sanctions targeting the ‘public core of the internet’ have serious transboundary effects, and threaten the stability and functionality of the Internet. Most such attacks appear, at the time of writing, to have been buffeted by the internet's resilience, but there is equally the risk that the Ukraine war becomes a permissive, norm‐constitutive moment for similar operations in the future targeting its core physical, institutional and logical infrastructure. The technical community, a growing number of states and other stakeholders have been arguing for the protection of the ‘public core’ of the internet for nearly a decade, anchoring the concept in policy, multistakeholder and diplomatic fora and documents. This paper, while noting that states increasingly acknowledge the need to protect the public core of the internet, argues that norms and international law are still ill‐equipped to regulate damaging cyber operations, given unsettled questions regarding the sovereignty of states over global Internet infrastructure, and the precise scope of their existing international obligations towards its protection.
Kurzfassung
Ausgehend von Begriffen wie „digitale Souveränität“ und „strategische Autonomie“ untersucht die vorliegende Analyse, gestützt auf eine Vielzahl von Indikatoren, die digitale Dependenz von 37 Ländern. Während die Ergebnisse in Bezug auf verschiedene Sektoren (Software und Hardware) und Dimensionen (Handel, Infrastruktur, geistiges Eigentum) stark voneinander abweichen, zeigt das Gesamtbild einen hohen durchschnittlichen Grad an digitaler Abhängigkeit. Die Daten offenbaren außerdem äußerst asymetrische globale Strukturen. Die USA sind mit einem Wert von 0,46 die bei Weitem am wenigsten digital abhängige Volkswirtschaft. Die ausgeprägteste Asymmetrie zwischen den USA und dem Rest der Welt zeigt sich bei der Abhängigkeit von digitalen Infrastrukturen. China hat in den letzten zehn Jahren enorme Fortschritte gemacht, seine digitale Dependenz zu verringern. Die europäischen Länder behielten hingegen einen sehr vulnerablen Status bei. Die quantitative Messung der digitalen Abhängigkeit legt eine Neubewertung der gängigen Vorstellungen von „digitaler Autonomie“ nahe. Aus der Sicht globaler Strukturen bleibt Autonomie für die Länder Europas, wie für die meisten anderen, eine Illusion.
This paper investigates possible contributions that AI-based detection mechanisms for deepfakes could make to the challenge of responding to novel cyber threats, including fraud and disinformation as anti-democracy tools. The paper investigates the implications of such a tool for the emerging European discourse on digital sovereignty in a global environment. While cybersecuri-ty and disinformation are not new topics, recent technological developments around AI-generated deepfakes have increased the manipulative potential of online audiovisual content, making this a specific but important challenge in the global and interconnected information context. KEYWORDS deepfake detection artificial intelligence digital sovereignty remote ID proofing
Purpose
The issue of cybersecurity has been cast as the focal point of a fight between two conflicting governance models: the nation-state model of national security and the global governance model of multi-stakeholder collaboration, as seen in forums like IGF, IETF, ICANN, etc. There is a strange disconnect, however, between this supposed fight and the actual control over cybersecurity “on the ground”. This paper aims to reconnect discourse and control via a property rights approach, where control is located first and foremost in ownership.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper first conceptualizes current governance mechanisms through ownership and property rights. These concepts locate control over internet resources. They also help us understand ongoing shifts in control. Such shifts in governance are actually happening, security governance is being patched left and right, but these arrangements bear little resemblance to either the national security model of states or the global model of multi-stakeholder collaboration. With the conceptualization in hand, the paper then presents case studies of governance that have emerged around specific security externalities.
Findings
While not all mechanisms are equally effective, in each of the studied areas, the author found evidence of private actors partially internalizing the externalities, mostly on a voluntary basis and through network governance mechanisms. No one thinks that this is enough, but it is a starting point. Future research is needed to identify how these mechanisms can be extended or supplemented to further improve the governance of cybersecurity.
Originality/value
This paper bridges together the disconnected research communities on governance and (technical) cybersecurity.
This article is an attempt to interrogate some of the predominant forms of analogical reasoning within current cyber-security discourse, with a view to clarifying their unstated premises, major strengths and, vitally, points of conceptual failure. It seeks to improve dialogue between and across the various epistemic communities involved with cyber-security policy. As we seek to adapt to the new security realities of the information age, it is incumbent upon scholars and strategists to address the benefits of connectivity, in all its dimensions, as much as the threats it presents. Current cyber-security discourse channels us into a winner-takes-all modality that is neither desirable nor necessary in the current strategic reality.
No frontier lasts forever, and no freely occupied global commons extends endlessly where human societies are involved. Sooner or later, good fences are erected to make good neighbors, and so it must be with cyberspace. Today we are seeing the beginnings of the border-making process across the world's nations. From the Chinese intent to create their own controlled internal Internet, to increasingly controlled access to the Internet in less-democratic states, to the rise of Internet filters and rules in Western democracies, states are establishing the bounds of their sovereign control in the virtual world in the name of security and economic sustainability. The topology of the Internet, like the prairie of the 1800s' American Midwest is about to be changed forever -rationally, conflictually, or collaterally- by the decisions of states.
David Johnson and David Post argue that Cyberspace requires a system of rules quite distinct from the laws that regulate physical, geographically-defined territories. Cyberspace challenges the law's traditional reliance on territorial borders; it is a "space" bounded by screens and passwords rather than physical markers. Professors Johnson and Post illustrate how "taking Cyberspace seriously" as a unique place can lead to the development of both clear rules for online transactions and effective legal institutions.
The Internet has transformed the manner in which information is exchanged and business is conducted, arguably more than any other communication development in the past century. Despite its wide reach and powerful global influence, it is a medium uncontrolled by any one centralized system, organization, or governing body, a reality that has given rise to all manner of free-speech issues and cybersecurity concerns. The conflicts surrounding Internet governance are the new spaces where political and economic power is unfolding in the twenty-first century. This book reveals the inner power structure already in place within the architectures and institutions of Internet governance. It provides a theoretical framework for Internet governance that takes into account the privatization of global power as well as the role of sovereign nations and international treaties. In addition, the book explores what is at stake in open global controversies and stresses the responsibility of the public to actively engage in these debates, because Internet governance will ultimately determine Internet freedom.
Why the Internet was designed to be the way it is, and how it could be different, now and in the future.
How do you design an internet? The architecture of the current Internet is the product of basic design decisions made early in its history. What would an internet look like if it were designed, today, from the ground up? In this book, MIT computer scientist David Clark explains how the Internet is actually put together, what requirements it was designed to meet, and why different design decisions would create different internets. He does not take today's Internet as a given but tries to learn from it, and from alternative proposals for what an internet might be, in order to draw some general conclusions about network architecture.
Clark discusses the history of the Internet, and how a range of potentially conflicting requirements—including longevity, security, availability, economic viability, management, and meeting the needs of society—shaped its character. He addresses both the technical aspects of the Internet and its broader social and economic contexts. He describes basic design approaches and explains, in terms accessible to nonspecialists, how networks are designed to carry out their functions. (An appendix offers a more technical discussion of network functions for readers who want the details.) He considers a range of alternative proposals for how to design an internet, examines in detail the key requirements a successful design must meet, and then imagines how to design a future internet from scratch. It's not that we should expect anyone to do this; but, perhaps, by conceiving a better future, we can push toward it.
How institutions for Internet governance are emerging from the tension between the territorially bound nation-state and a transnational network society.
When the prevailing system of governing divides the planet into mutually exclusive territorial monopolies of force, what institutions can govern the Internet, with its transnational scope, boundless scale, and distributed control? Given filtering/censorship by states and concerns over national cybersecurity, it is often assumed that the Internet will inevitably be subordinated to the traditional system of nation-states. In Networks and States, Milton Mueller counters this, showing how Internet governance poses novel and fascinating governance issues that give rise to a global politics and new transnational institutions. Drawing on theories of networked governance, Mueller provides a broad overview of Internet governance from the formation of ICANN to the clash at the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), the formation of the Internet Governance Forum, the global assault on peer-to-peer file sharing, and the rise of national-level Internet control and security concerns.
Internet governance has become a source of conflict in international relations. Networks and States explores the important role that emerging transnational institutions could play in fostering global governance of communication-information policy.
Purpose
There is growing contestation between states and private actors over cybersecurity responsibilities, and its governance is ever more susceptible to nationalization. The authors believe these developments are based on an incomplete picture of how cybersecurity is actually governed in practice and theory. Given this disconnect, this paper aims to attempt to provide a cohesive understanding of the cybersecurity institutional landscape.
Design/methodology/approach
Drawing from institutional economics and using extensive desk research, the authors develop a conceptual model and broadly sketch the activities and contributions of market, networked and hierarchical governance structures and analyze how they interact to produce and govern cybersecurity.
Findings
Analysis shows a robust market and networked governance structures and a more limited role for hierarchical structures. Ex ante efforts to produce cybersecurity using purely hierarchical governance structures, even buttressed with support from networked governance structures, struggle without market demand like in the case of secure internet identifiers. To the contrary, ex post efforts like botnet mitigation, route monitoring and other activities involving information sharing seem to work under a variety of combinations of governance structures.
Originality/value
The authors’ conceptual framework and observations offer a useful starting point for unpacking how cybersecurity is produced and governed; ultimately, we need to understand if and how these governance structure arrangements actually impact variation in observed levels of cybersecurity.
Purpose
The empirical record of cyberattacks features much computer crime, espionage and hacktivism, but none of the major damage feared in prevalent threat narratives. The purpose of this article is to explain the absence of serious adverse consequences to date and the durability of this trend.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper combines concepts from international relations theory and new institutional economics to understand cyberspace as a complex global institution with contracts embodied in both software code and human practice. Constitutive inefficiencies (market and regulatory failure) and incomplete contracts (generative features and unintended flaws) create the vulnerabilities that hackers exploit. Cyber conflict is a form of cheating within the rules, rather than an anarchic struggle, more like an intelligence-counterintelligence contest than traditional war.
Findings
Cyber conflict is restrained by the collective sociotechnical constitution of cyberspace, where actors must cooperate to compete. Maintenance of common protocols and open access is a condition for the possibility of attack, and successful deceptive exploitation of these connections becomes more difficult in politically sensitive situations as defense and deterrence become more feasible. The distribution of cyber conflict is, thus, bounded vertically in severity but unbounded horizontally in the potential for creative exploitation.
Originality/value
Cyber conflict can be understood with familiar political economic concepts applied in fresh ways. This application provides counterintuitive insights at odds with prevalent threat narratives about the likelihood and magnitude of cyber conflict. It also highlights the important advantages of strong states over the weaker non-state actors widely thought to be empowered by cyberspace.
Through most of the seventeenth century, European states used an “imaginary” boundary in the Atlantic referred to as “the line” to cordon off the affairs of Europe from those in the New World. The line structured colonial rule, captured in the phrase “there is no peace beyond the line.” However, by the middle of the eighteenth century, the idea of “the line” no longer held. Common explanations ranging from the rise of capitalism, technology, and interstate competition do not explain this shift. Instead, I argue that the “golden age of piracy” was instrumental. In giving this explanation, I argue that the empire turn in IR has under-theorized the tensions between state and empire in the modern era. I introduce the state–empire hybrid polity as one that is constantly mediating the tensions between the difference characteristic of empire and the integration of the state. “The line” was how European states mediated this tension in the seventeenth century. Pirates took advantage of the open markets and ungoverned spaces inherent in the line, causing a crisis in colonial rule. To defeat piracy and make the world safe for trade, these tensions needed to be remediated and “the line” transformed. As an unintended consequence, this put further strain on England’s North American empire.
There are vast spaces of the earth that lie outside the sovereign jurisdiction of any single sovereign state, including much of the world’s oceans, the atmosphere, outer space, and the continent of Antarctica. Accessible to all, these “global commons” serve as vital zones for global connectivity, as well as a critical source for military power and environmental resources. Yet, they lack strong global institutions to govern them. This discussion considers how changes to the international order, driven by the rise of new actors, new technologies, and new tests to human and environmental security, pose risks to the future of global spaces shared by all.
Efforts to study and practice Internet governance start, virtually without exception, from the premise that the Internet is governed by an innovative, unusual (perhaps unique) ‘multistakeholder’ model. Preserving that model is a primary goal for the broader Internet community as well as for many governments, though not for all. Viewing multistakeholderism as a teleological goal for Internet governance creates several problems. First, multistakeholderism is often elevated as a value in itself rather than as a possible approach to meeting more salient public interest objectives such as preserving Internet interoperability, stability, security, and openness. Second, multistakeholder governance may not be appropriate in every functional area of Internet governance. Internet coordination is not a monolithic practice but rather a multilayered series of tasks of which some are appropriately relegated to the private sector, some the purview of traditional nation-state governance or international treaty negotiations, and some more appropriately multistakeholder. It is a misnomer to speak not only of multistakeholder governance but also of Internet governance as a single thing. The concept of multistakeholderism can also serve as a proxy for broader political struggles or be deployed as an impediment to the types of Internet coordination necessary to promote conditions of responsible governance. For example, governments with repressive information policies can advocate for top-down and formalized multistakeholderism to gain additional power in areas in which they have traditionally not had jurisdiction. These types of efforts can result in multilateral rather than multistakeholder approaches with non-governmental actors limited from participating in formal deliberations and lacking any meaningful voting power. Alternatively, companies and other actors with vested interests in current governance arrangements can deploy multistakeholderism in a manner either meant to exclude new entrants (whether public or private) with incommensurate interests and values or to preserve incumbent market advantage.This paper suggests that multistakeholderism should not be viewed as a value in itself applied homogenously to all Internet governance functions. Rather, the appropriate approach to responsible Internet governance requires determining what types of administration are optimal for promoting a balance of interoperability, innovation, free expression and operational stability in any particular functional and political context. Doing so requires conceptual and theoretical tools that have not yet been developed. Accordingly, the paper proceeds in three parts. First, it presents a more granular taxonomy and understanding of Internet governance functions – differentiating between, for example, cybersecurity governance, Internet standards setting, and the policymaking function of private information intermediaries. Second, it performs the same task of disaggregation with respect to multistakeholderism. It presents distinct varieties of multistakeholder Internet governance (which differ according to the varieties of actors involved and the nature of authority relations between them) and sets these arrangements in a broader context of modalities for accomplishing global governance in other issue areas. Such an approach contributes both to the study and practice of Internet governance, and to scholarship in International Relations and global governance.
Internet Governance can be understood as a search process, the aim of which is to establish legitimate and stable ways of filling a regulatory void. This void is due to the fact that the principle of sovereignty which governs the international telecommunications regime has not been applied to the Internet. To date, it has been impossible to develop stable governance arrangements for the Internet. However, there have been three less dynamic periods during the last 15 years when the speed of change slowed down for a time. The first period could be called the technical regime. The central forum at that time was the Internet's first standard setting organization, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Until the mid 19905, Internet Governance more or less amounted to developing technical standards and administrating technical identifiers. The second period of Internet Governance emerged as a result of the privatization of the Net's infrastructure. It was marked by efforts to establish a self-governance regime independent of government authority, associated with open, inclusive, bottom-up, and consensus-based decision-making. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a non-profit company founded in 1998, was initiated by the US-Government to institutionalize Internet self-governance. However, ICANN proved unable to meet the high expectations within the framework of private sector management of the Internet's infrastructure. The relevant stakeholders could not agree on policy decisions, and many of them were unwilling to delegate authority to ICANN. A third period pf Internet Governance has been evolving in the context of the UN World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). This summit has caused a »forum shift« away from ICANN towards intergovernmental territory. It has enabled new actors to participate in the discussion of Internet Governance, among them governments from developing countries but also international NGOs, which are pushing a broader agenda including issues such as human rights, digital divides, and cultural diversity. While a stable regime for the Internet still seems a long way off, WSIS may have influenced the direction of the search process. State intervention has lost its negative connotations. Instead, there is growing interest in what is now called a »multi-stakeholder approach« to Internet Governance, which would include governments, industry, and civil society.
Concerns about cyberwar, cyberespionage, and cybercrime have burst into focus in recent years. The United States and China have traded accusations about cyber intrusions, and a December 2012 U.N. conference broke down over disagreements about cyberspace governance. These events show the increased risk of cyberconflict and the corresponding need for basic agreement between states about governing cyberspace. States agree that something must be done, but they disagree about almost everything else. Two competing visions of cyberspace have emerged so far: Russia and China advocate a sovereignty-based model of cyber governance that prioritizes state control, while the United States, United Kingdom, and their allies argue that cyberspace should not be governed by states alone. Prior academic writing has focused on cyber issues related to states' regulation of their citizens, but this Article addresses the now-pressing state-to-state issues. A limited analogy to existing legal regimes for the high seas, outer space, and Antarctica shows that global governance of cyberspace is possible. Moreover, these existing regimes provide a menu of options for governance and establish a baseline against which cyber governance can be assessed. The Article examines three fundamental questions that states have answered for the other domains and must now answer for cyber: (I) what role, if any, private parties should play in governance; (2) how the domain should be governed (no governance system, treaty, or norms); and (3) whether and how to regulate military activities in the domain. The answers for the old domains were similar multilateral governance, governance by treaty, and some level of demilitarization. But cyber differs from the old domains in important ways that suggest the answers for cyber should be different. This Article argues for multistakeholder governance, governance through norms, and regulated militarization.
For more than a decade, Russia's foreign policy has sought to challenge the international consensus on a number of issues. Today, as the international internet ecosystem is becoming more volatile, Moscow is eager to shift the western narrative over the current global internet governance regime, in which the United States retains considerable leverage. In a context wherein states increasingly forge links between cyberspace and foreign policy, this article explores Russia's deepening involvement in internet governance. The disclosure by Edward Snowden of the US government's wide net of online surveillance contributed to legitimize the Russian approach to controlling online activity. While the struggle around the narrative of internet governance has been heating up since then, Russia actively seeks to coordinate internet governance and cyber security policies with like-minded states in both regional forums and the United Nations. By introducing security concerns and advocating more hierarchy and a greater role for governments, Moscow is contributing to the politicization of global cyber issues and seeking to reshape the network in accordance with its own domestic political interests. Indeed, the Russian leadership has come to consider the foreign policy of the internet as the establishment of a new US-led hegemonic framework that Washington would use to subvert other sovereign states with its own world views and values.
International norms governing appropriate conduct in cyberspace are immature, leaving politicians, diplomats, and military authorities to grapple with the challenges of defending against and executing hostilities in cyberspace. Cyberspace is unlike the traditional physical domains where actions occur at specific geographic places and times. Rules governing conduct in the traditional domains emerged over centuries and share a common understanding of sovereignty that helps establish and justify the use of force. In cyberspace, sovereignty is a more abstract notion because the geographic boundaries are often difficult to define as data and applications increasingly reside in a virtual, global “cloud.” This paper proposes a construct for establishing sovereignty in cyberspace by studying similarities between space and cyberspace. The characteristics of the space domain challenged traditional notions of sovereignty based on geography. As nations deployed space-based capabilities, the concept of sovereignty needed to mature to deal with the physical realities of space. Sovereignty is defined, and general requirements for claiming sovereignty are presented. The evolution of sovereignty in space is then discussed, followed by a construct for how sovereignty could be defined in cyberspace. The paper also reviews U.S. civil policy and military doctrine and discusses how these documents offer insights into the U.S. approach to asserting its claims within these domains. It concludes by examining an emerging trend where nations not only seek to establish sovereign claims over the architectural aspects of cyberspace, but also the information that flows over it.
The new US administration has begun efforts to securitize the substantial problems the United States is currently facing in cyberspace. Recently, President Obama ordered his National Security Council to conduct a rapid review of existing measures being undertaken by the federal government, and provide recommendations for additional ones. Many stakeholders in the US government and private industry are watching these actions closely as there seems to be broad acceptance that the issues call for more extensive security measures. However, many issues will complicate effective securitization of threats in cyberspace. For example, not all stakeholders agree on the priorities or where the focus of security measures should be yet cyber security is a “trans-sovereign” issue affecting both developed and developing countries in an interdependent manner.
With the emergence of Internet based communication and collaboration, new forms of production have surfaced that are based on openness and non-proprietary resources. The paper analyses the role of open source and peer production elements in the response to the attacks on Estonian Internet services in 2007 and the Conficker botnet in 2008/2009.While both cases can not be classified as purely peer-produced security, the two cases of incident response examined here do show some of the characteristics of peer production. By applying certain institutional techniques, the communities balance their need for secrecy with their need to widely share information.The paper concludes with an explanatory model for the observed results. For appropriate policy outcomes, it suggests greater consideration of the role of social production by researchers and designers of the organisation of Internet security.
This memo discusses when it is appropriate to register and utilize an Autonomous System (AS), and lists criteria for such. ASes are the unit of routing policy in the modern world of exterior routing, and are specifically applicable to protocols like EGP (Exterior Gateway Protocol, now at historical status; see (EGP)), BGP (Border Gateway Protocol, the current de facto standard for inter-AS routing; see (BGP-4)), and IDRP (The OSI Inter-Domain Routing Protocol, which the Internet is expected to adopt when BGP becomes obsolete; see (IDRP)). It should be noted that the IDRP equivalent of an AS is the RDI, or Routing Domain Identifier.
Space debris has been and still remains a growing threat for the international space community. The population of man-made debris polluting the space environment has exacerbated, resulting from some 50 years of space-related activities being undertaken. Present estimates reveal that there are about 24,500 cataloged in-orbit objects and some 7,500 of those objects are artificial debris. In the absence of proper controls, the number of all cataloged objects is expected to rise from 50 per cent in 2019 and quadruples in 2059. As a source of pollution, orbiting debris adversely damages the space environment. The continuing growth of debris in heavily used orbital regions, like Low Earth Orbit and Geostationary Orbit, not causes minor or complete abruptions to space operations, but potentially could prevent launches of planned space vehicles; thus, denying future access to, and use of, outer space. This Article shall refer to the metaphorical model of the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ as developed by Garrett Hardin, and constructs a parallel with that hypothetical model with the congested space environment caused by orbiting debris. It shall be demonstrated that space is and can be characterised as the ‘Space Commons’.
The 350th anniversary of the Peace of Westphalia in 1998 was markedby a flurry of conferences and publications by historians, but it waslargely ignored in the discipline of international relations (IR). Thisoversight is odd because in IR the end of the Thirty Years War isregarded as the beginning of the international system with which thediscipline has traditionally dealt. Indeed, the international system hasbeen named for the 1648 peace. For some time now, this Westphaliansystem, along with the concept of sovereignty at its core, has been asubject of debate: Are the pillars of the Westphalian templedecaying ? Are we moving beyond Westphalia ?
UN's WCIT Summit Opens, Discussing Internet Regulation
- Anonymous
- Clark
- Deibert
Sovereignty in Cyberspace: Can It Exist?
- Franzese
A Three-Perspective Theory of Cyber Sovereignty
- Hao
- Kello
WSIS: A New Diplomacy? Multistakeholder Approach and Bottom Up Policy in Global ICT Governance
- Kleinwachter
The Evolution of Layered Protocol Stacks Leads to an Hourglass-Shaped Architecture
- Akhshabi
- DeNardis
Sovereignty and the Role of Government in Cyberspace
- Lewis
- Schmitt
Tallinn 2.0 and a Chinese View on the Tallinn Process
- Deeks
Uncivil and Post-Western Cyber Westphalia: Changing Interstate Power Relations of the Cybered Age
- Demchak
The Rise and Decline of the International Telecommunications Regime
- Drake