The winter sports industry and Winter Olympics in historical perspective: from Grenoble 1968 to Albertville 1992

Full text

67
6. The winter sports industry and Winter
Olympics in historical perspective:
from Grenoble 1968 to Abertville
1992
Wladimir Andreff
Before 1950, a pair of skis consisted of two planks curved at the front, manu-
factured by carpenters in the woodwork industry. Grenoble in 1968 was a city
of high-tech manufacturing industry, and France’s leading ski producer was
located in its suburbs. In 1980, Albertville was an enclave in the mountains,
difficult to access by roads and railways, and famous for its long-lasting traffic
jams every year when a crowd of skiers was moving to Savoie’s ski resorts.
The town located in the middle of Alpine valleys was industrialised thanks to
hydraulics and later was affected by crisis and unemployment in the 1980s.
The two economic contexts for hosting Winter Olympics were contrasted and
likely to generate differentiated spin-offs from the event. Though only 24 years
and 82 km distant from each other, Grenoble and Albertville Winter Olympic
Games took place in different economic sequences as regard the development
of skiing practice, expansion of winter sports market, innovation in ski manu-
facturing and economic internationalisation of sport.
A new analysis of international mega sporting events (IMSEs) suggested
here relies on historical comparison in quantitative terms of the economic
context in which the event occurred, because the context influences IMSEs’
economic impact and the multiplier value. This comparative analysis is applied
to the 1968 and 1992 Winter Olympics, both located in the same economic
region: Rhône-Alpes.
6.1 IMPACT STUDY AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS:
THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF THE OLYMPIC
GAMES
A basic assumption found in economic impact studies devoted to IMSEs is
that hosting a sporting event triggers an exogenous shock (investment, inflow

Historical perspectives on sports economics
68
of tourists) that, through the Keynesian multiplier, creates some value-added
in the host economy which would not have emerged in the absence of the
IMSE. Methodological biases that plague impact studies have been underlined
at length by economists. One may result from choosing a too high value for
the impact multiplier k; in IMSE impact studies about s k > 2 is often assumed,
which is unrealistically high.1 As against this overestimation, Naves (1988)
estimated the multiplier for the Albertville Games at 0.7 due to a swift stop in
the iterative multiplying process, heavier tax pressure, and significant gener-
ated imports, while there is no impact study of the Grenoble Olympics.
A more interesting dynamic view about the multiplier is when its value is
high right after the initial shock and then diminishes on a non-linear path as
the multiplying process is increasingly distant in time from the shock. Such is
the approach adopted in the MESANGE model of the French National Institute
for Statistics (Bardaji et al., 2017): the multiplier reaches its maximal value at
1.6 a few months after the shock, then it turns down and decreases to 1.2 after
seven years, and afterwards its value tends towards 1. The multiplier value is
likely to vary as a function of different variables such as economic growth,
inflation or foreign trade balance. This is at odds with impact studies where the
multiplier is taken as a constant.
Obviously, the impact will not be the same in a host economy or region
according to whether it meets a swift growth path or recession, high inflation
or deflation, high unemployment or full employment, net exports or net
imports. The value of the Keynesian multiplier will be different in these two
opposite economic contexts. When the 2004 Games were awarded to Athens
in 1997, no one could forecast that meanwhile Greece would sink into debt
crisis and a subsequent economic slump; the objective value of the multiplier
decreased in Greece from 1997 to 2004. The 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympics
occurred in economic recession (Brazil’s GDP growth rate: -3.8 per cent in
2015; 0.5 per cent in 2014) and a city in deep crisis; this was unexpected when
Brazilian and carioca economies were still resilient to the global crisis in 2009
when the Games were awarded. The impact of the Sochi Winter Olympics
materialised in the Russian economy being in trouble (GDP growth rate: 1.3
per cent in 2013, 0.7 per cent in 2014, -2.8 per cent in 2015) compared to
2007 when the Games were awarded before the subprime crisis; the situation
even worsened after 2014 with reciprocal sanctions and retaliation meas-
ures between Russia and Western countries. By contrast, the 2008 Beijing
Olympics took place in the fastest growing economy of the world at that time,
and the 1988 Seoul Games that occurred in a booming South Korean economy
emerged from underdevelopment. The objective value of the multiplier always
varies between the awarding date and the staging time of the Olympics due to
the economic context.

The winter sports industry and Winter Olympics in historical perspective 69
Given that the multiplier is not a figure fixed once and for all in a given
local economy, the context requires in-depth analysis to enable exhibiting the
roots of a local value-added creative process and checking the relevance of the
chosen multiplier value that depends on whether the Games occur in a good,
bad or medium economic situation.
The Keynesian multiplier applied to a local economy is expressed as:
where Y stands for total impact, X* initial (injection) expenditure, e marginal
propensity to spend/consume locally, and m marginal propensity to locally
import. Propensities e and m reflect the current state of the local economy – in
a region open to external trade e is lower and m higher than in a region less
open to trade. Moreover, e and m vary with the local economy’s evolution.
With slow economic growth and unemployment, precautionary motives for
saving strengthen, propensity to save increases and propensities e and m both
decrease; the opposite applies if economic growth is fast. With high inflation,
higher than abroad, a negative exchange rate effect pushes import prices up
and reduces m relative to e.
The main message from the present chapter is that estimating propensities
in the multiplier calls for detailed study of the current state and evolution of
the local economy which must complete the usual impact study of staging the
Olympics. France’s Rhône-Alpes region has the unique experience of hosting
three Winter Olympics: Chamonix 1924, Grenoble 1968 and Albertville 1992
(Arnaud and Terret, 1993). Since few data are available for Chamonix 1924,
the chapter concentrates on historical comparison between economic contexts
surrounding the Winter Games staged in Grenoble and Albertville.
6.2 THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF 1968 AND 1992
WINTER OLYMPIC GAMES
The concept of economic context retained here is multidimensional. It encom-
passes a macro dimension (France’s GDP growth, inflation, unemployment),
then a local dimension with Grenoble and Albertville urban areas and, further,
an industrial dimension with the markets that evolved in relationship with
winter sports participation in France and winter sports goods manufacturing
– two-thirds of which are concentrated in the Rhône-Alpes. This industry was

Historical perspectives on sports economics
70
not coming across a similar economic sequence in 1968 and 1992; its level of
internationalisation and its innovation process was different too.
6.2.1 France’s Economic Context in 1968 and 1992
France’s economic context was more favourable to hosting the Winter
Olympics in 1968 than in 1992. The Olympics were awarded to Grenoble in
1964, the best year in the decade as regard GDP growth rate (6.6 per cent). In
the year of the Games growth was still fast (4.5 per cent), in an overall phase of
swift economic growth – average GDP growth rate per annum was 5.2 per cent
in 1964‒68 and 5.6 per cent in 1969‒74. The Grenoble Olympics were hosted
in a period likely to boost consumption and investment expenditures and less
favourable to precautionary savings alongside very low real interest rates.
Propensity to consume was high in France and therefore the multiplier as well.
The Games were awarded to Albertville in 1986 when GDP growth was
2.4 per cent. In 1992, economic growth fell to 1.6 per cent, three times lower
than in 1968. France’s economy grew at 2.8 per cent average rate when the
Olympics were in preparation (1986‒92), and 2.9 per cent after the Games
(1993‒98). Consumption and investment expenditures were far below their
1960s level; nearly twenty years of economic crisis had triggered a stronger
behaviour of precaution savings. With lower propensity to consume, the mul-
tiplier value must have been smaller than 24 years earlier.
A French Employment National Agency was launched in 1967. Until then
unemployment was a secondary issue in France with a rate below 2 per cent,
basically reflecting frictional unemployment due to normal mobility between
two jobs given the lapse of time required for moving from one job to another.
In 1968, the unemployment rate was 3.0 per cent. France’s economy was close
to full employment. The Grenoble Olympics had a low probability of generat-
ing many jobs except if due to a specific situation in the local labour market.
The employment multiplier cannot work in a full-employment economy.
Between 1974 and 1983, the unemployment rate in France trebled com-
pared to two previous decades, though it remained lower than the Western
European average. The Albertville Games were awarded, organised and staged
with France having an average 10 per cent unemployment rate, which even
increased to a 12 per cent average during the five years right before the Games.
The Albertville Olympics were staged in an excess supply labour market which
was making job creation likely. Indeed, the Albertville Mayor’s main hope was
that hosting the Games would decrease unemployment in the Tarentaise valley
which was muddling through de-industrialisation (Andreff, 1991).
The multiplier is also influenced by inflation. The higher the inflation, the
lower is inter-temporal impact in real terms. The Games were awarded to
Grenoble when inflation was 3.4 per cent, below the 1960s’ decennial average

The winter sports industry and Winter Olympics in historical perspective 71
(4.0 per cent); they were prepared when average inflation was 3.2 per cent and
opened in 1968 with 4.5 per cent inflation, right before a high inflation phase
in France. The Olympics were awarded to Albertville when inflation was
down to 2.7 per cent, they were prepared under 3.0 per cent average inflation
and opened in 1992 with a 2.3 per cent inflation rate. Therefore, the inflation
differential was not very significant between pre-Grenoble and pre-Albertville
Olympics periods, with a slight advantage for the latter; but the gap was not
big enough to translate into substantial difference in the real multiplier value.
However, post-Games periods were markedly different with 7.6 per cent
average inflation after 1968 and 1.4 per cent after 1992. Ex post real impact
was lessened in post-Grenoble by a significantly higher inflation compared to
post-Albertville.
6.2.2 Economic Context in Grenoble and Albertville Urban Areas
Grenoble actually is not a mountain city; the closest skiing facilities are over
30 km from downtown. The city and its urban area were in fast expansion in
1968 (Frappât, 1979) while the Tarentaise valley was muddling through stag-
nation and de-industrialisation in 1992.
In 1968, Grenoble’s economy was growing fast. Starting from 102,000 in
1946, the city’s population reached 161,616 inhabitants in 1968 and 166,037 in
1975. The whole urban area grew from 166,200 inhabitants in 1954 to 236,300
in 1962, 329,600 in 1968, 389,100 in 1975, and 400,000 in 1990. From 1962
to 1968, population in the urban area had grown at 4.3 per cent annual rate, the
highest among all French cities bigger than 100,000 inhabitants. Demographic
growth slowed down falling to 2.3 per cent from 1968 to 1975; it was sustained
thanks to immigration from North African countries which represented 18.5
per cent of all foreign inhabitants in 1968 and 35.5 per cent in 1979 (Chauveau
and Hollard, 2011). Three-quarters of demographic growth in the 1950s and
1960s were due to a net inflow of migrants. The population has been nearly
stagnant since 1990.
Grenoble was attractive to qualified personnel with 11 per cent highly
skilled white collars, 20 per cent other white collars and 31 per cent highly
qualified blue collars in the population. Jobs in Grenoble region’s manufac-
turing industry were up from 25,000 in 1946 to 55,000 in 1962, and 67,000
in 1975. Firms manufacturing electrical equipment, nuclear plant equipment
and electronics products had an impetus that boosted the development of
Grenoble’s manufacturing industry. However, from 1973 to 1975, production
of manufacturing products decreased and became stagnant in 1976‒78. The
number of unemployed in Isère department grew from 4,000 in 1973 to 17,000
in 1977; the local manufacturing industry lost about 10,000 jobs in three years
of economic crisis.

Historical perspectives on sports economics
72
Since the 1950s, a new generation of entrepreneurs have emerged in Grenoble
such as Marc Braillon (RMO), Yvon Gattaz (Radiall), Auguste and Lucienne
Faller (Lou), Vincent Rivier (Phénix), Serge Kampf (Cap-Gemini-Sogeti),
Daniel Cathiard (Genty-Cathiard), Gaston Cathiard (Pomagalski ski lifts),
Laurent Boix-Vives (Rossignol skis), Bernard Deconinck (Sommer-Allibert)
and Jean-Pierre Dini (Le 38). They contributed to economic momentum in
the urban area, attracting foreign direct investors before and after the Games:
Caterpillar opened a plant manufacturing tractors with caterpillar tracks (3,000
employees) in 1962, Becton-Dickinson (600 employees) medical equipment,
and Hewlett-Packard (400 employees) small computers and laptops since
1970. Ford acquired Richier (excavators) in 1972, and the Belgian Empain
group bought shares in Pomagalski’s capital in 1976 and then acquired
Neyrpic (9500 employees) in 1977.
Nothing similar happened in Albertville where the local economic context
was radically different (Kukawka, 1991). The urban area is ten times smaller
than Grenoble’s. Albertville was born in 1835 from the merger of twin agglom-
erations, Conflans and L’Hôpital, which are separated by Arly ditch (Gex,
1921). In 1992, Albertville was still a small town with an industrial legacy less
geared towards high-tech than Grenoble, and without a burgeoning university
campus. The population was 15,739 inhabitants in 1968 and 17,411 in 1992;
after the Games, it went down to 17,340 in 1999, and eventually recovered to
18,950 in 2014, when the urban area, including Ugine and Beaufortain, had
43,225 inhabitants. The active population was distributed across 0.4 per cent
peasants, 7.4 per cent craftsmen, traders and entrepreneurs, 7.7 per cent highly
qualified white collars, 21.2 per cent intermediate white collars, 30.7 per cent
office workers and 32.6 per cent factory workers.
Heavy industry developed in Albertville’s region based on hydro-electric
sources of energy. Located in the valleys, it is geared towards metallurgy, the
steel industry, electrical equipment and chemical products. The most notice-
able enterprises in the region were MSI (boiler-making industry, ironwork),
Ugitech (steel industry), Cezus-Areva (zirconium), Péchiney (aluminum),
Kässbohrer (rammers), Tivoly (mechanical tools), Timet (titan), UCAR/
Graftech (graphite manufacturing), Mecad (cutting from the bar), MSSA
(sodium metal), PEM Abrasifs Réfractaires (non-metallic minerals), Savoilor
(mechanical industry), InPact-Walfers (indium phosphide), Gerland Savoie
Léman and Colas Rhône-Alpes (road building and sporting floors), and
Lyonnaise des Eaux (water treatment).
In 1992, Albertville was a city no more attractive to tourism than Grenoble
in 1968, even though it is located at a crossroads towards big ski resorts where
four valleys cross each other (Tarentaise, Beaufortain, Val d’Arly, Combe de
Savoie). In Haute-Tarentaise, 29 per cent of high mountain pasture acreage
was transformed into winter sports and ski resorts (Reffay, 1974). Albertville

The winter sports industry and Winter Olympics in historical perspective 73
was suffering every year during the winter sports season from daily traffic
jams with a million tourists’ cars driven to big Savoie ski resorts. Hosting the
Games pushed the tertiary sector and tourism to become dominant activities in
the city (30 per cent of all employed in 2009) with 20,941 available hotel beds.
Commercial and service businesses concentrated in winter sports resorts (CCI
Savoie, 2004). Those Savoie mountains that surround Albertville were already
making up 70 per cent of the French winter sports market in 1986 and were
regularly hosting Alpine ski World Cup contests (Val d’Isère, Trois Vallées),
free-styling Championships (Tignes) and international speed skiing contests
(Les Arcs).
6.2.3 The Evolution of Winter Sports Practice in France
It is not easy to exactly estimate how the number of winter sports participants
evolved. Figures in Table 6.1 show that skiing practice at the world level was
expanding fast after the Grenoble Olympics – the number of skiers in the world
multiplied 1.8 times from 1972 to 1980. By the time of the Albertville Games
it was growing at a slower pace, the number of skiers in the world multiplied
2.1 times from 1980 to 2016. In 1987, there were 55 million skiing participants
in the world, of which thirty million were in Western Europe, nine million
in North America, and twelve million in Japan. The US representative case
highlights that both Alpine and cross-country skiing practices regressed after
Albertville Olympics, a regression that was not compensated by swift expan-
sion of new sports such as snowboarding and snowshoeing in 1998‒2003. The
number of snowboarders even diminished by 28 per cent from 2003 to 2013.
The number of days spent in winter sports resorts regressed in the world, and
in particular in the two leading countries, the USA (60 million days in 2011)
and France. In France the frequency of winter skiing vacations, defined as the
percentage of the population which has stayed in a winter sports resort during
a year, increased from 2.4 per cent in 1964 to 3.1 per cent after the Grenoble
Olympics (in 1971) and reached its climax with 10 per cent in 1983; then it
started decreasing from 1984 onwards. The average length of stays in winter
sports resorts fell from 13.2 days in 1975 down to 8.8 days in 1988,2 which is
explained by both skiing becoming less fashionable and a change in the clien-
tele in terms of revenues and social categories. In 1964, 90 per cent of skiers
belonged to the highest half of revenue distribution, 65 per cent to the two
highest deciles, 50 per cent to the single highest decile, and 33 per cent to the
5 per cent highest revenues. After the 1968 Olympics, skiing and winter sports
practice started to be fashionable in France and spread beyond the elite upper
class towards the middle class (Table 6.2). To the contrary, in 1992 the market
for cross-country and Alpine skiing was saturated. Since the mid-1980s,
new sport practices (mono-ski, snowboarding, hot-dog, free-style, half-pipe,

Table 6.1 Number of world skiers
Country 1972 1980** 2016
Germany 4,500 8,000 14,607 Skiers in the US
Austria 1,500 2,000 2,960 in: 1998 2004 Variation
Spain with Portugal 2,369 Alpine ski 5,903 -23.1%
and Portugal 900 1,500 216 Cross-country 2,352 -11.0%
France 2,000 4,500 8,574 Snowboard 6,572 81.1%
United
Kingdom 400 1,000 6,340 Snowshoeing 857 1,014 18.3%
Italy 2,000 4,000 4,919 Winter sports days in 2015 (millions)
Netherlands 75 200 n.a. France 53.9 World in:
Sweden with Norway 1,824 USA 53.6 2014–15 400
and Norway 2,000 4,000 1,181 Austria 51.8
Switzerland 2,000 2,500 2,959 Japan 34.0 France in:
USA with Canada 13910 Italy 30.5 2008-09 59
and Canada 7,000 14,000 n.a. Switzerland 22.6 2009-10 56
Japan 8,000 16,000 n.a. Canada 18.7 2010-11 56
Yugoslavia 150 n.a. n.a.
Czech
Republic 14.0 2013-14 55
Others 1,002 n.a. 19,773* China 8.5 2014-15 54
Total 31,627 57,800 Sweden 8.5
Notes: * other European countries ** estimations.
Sources: Di Ruzza and Gerbier (1977), Lipsey (2006) and Statista.
Historical perspectives on sports economics
74
ski-hok, speed-riding) and new selling conditions (rental skis, second-hand
skis) have only partly counteracted declining fashion and decreasing demand
for winter sports. Also, access to winter sports became financially harder for
the middle class in times of economic crisis.
The frequency of winter sports vacations diminished since 1984 in France
and the average length of stay in winter sports resorts has fallen since 1976.
On the brink of hosting the Albertville Games, the frequency of winter sports
vacations in Savoie has fallen since 1982‒85 in those ski resorts hosting the
Olympics such as Val d’Isère, Les Arcs, Tignes and La Plagne. Sales of new
mountain lodges and apartments started decreasing after 1981 (CGS, 1989).
The French market of lodges in winter sports resorts was clearly in excess
supply after 1992 (Damour and Garigue, 1998) despite an attempt at triggering
new attractiveness through hosting the Albertville Olympics.
The number of registered sport participants3 in the French Ski Federation
(FFS) grew quickly after 1949 and even more so between 1959 and 1967.

Table 6.2 Winter sports participation in France, 1964‒74 (rate of participation to winter sports vacations)
Average income (francs) 1964–65 1968–71 1974–75 Socio-professional category 1964–65 1968–71 1974–75 1987–88*
< 6,000 2.4 0.3 1.6 Farmers, agric. workers 0 0.4 0.5
6,000 – 10,000 0.3 0.1 0.2 Business bosses 4.3 5.3 5.1
10,000 – 15,000 1.1 0.8 0.5 White collars (high qual.) 12.8 18.6 17.2 29.8
15,000 – 20,000 1.2 1.2 0.4 White collars 2.9 8.7 10.5 17.6
20,000 – 30,000 5.0 2.9 1.2 Employees, officers 1.2 2.2 2.8 9.1
30,000 – 50,000 10.1 8.7 3.6 Blue collars 0.7 1.6 1.4 4.8
> 50,000 29.9 23.0 34.7 Not active 0.7 1.7 0.5
Population overall 2.4 3.0 3.8 Population overall 2.4 3.0 3.8 8.8
Note: * in Savoie.
Sources: Adapted from Lavaud (1970), Di Ruzza and Gerbier (1977) and CGS (1989).
The winter sports industry and Winter Olympics in historical perspective 75

Table 6.3 Registered number of participants: French Ski Federation,
1949‒2016 (% growth rate and thousand participants)
Period Growth Year Thousands
1949–54 11.0 1987 994.0
1954–59 11.9 1991 561.1
1959–64 15.3 1992 625.7
1964–67 17.6 1993 578.5
1967–70 10.7 1994 531.4
1970–73 1.3 1995 471.5
1973–76 -3.3 1996 303.2
1976–79 -0.7 1997 268.4
1979–82 8.1 1998 234.9
1982–85 6.4 1999 206.2
1985–87 9.6 2000 183.0
1987–89 -15.4 2001 165.9
1989–92 -11.5 2003 157.8
1992–95 -24.7 2005 155.8
1995–98 -51.2 2006 151.1
1998–2001 -29.4 2007 138.1
2001–04 -3.2 2008 139.3
2004–07 -14.1 2010 137.8
2007–10 -0.3 2012 134.7
2010–13 -1.2 2014 130.4
2013–16 -11.5 2016 120.4
Sources: Andreff (1991) and the French Ministry of Sports.
Historical perspectives on sports economics
76
After the Grenoble Games the growth in the number of registered skiers
slowed down and actually decreased between 1973 and 1979 (Table 6.3). After
1988, it engaged in an historical fall, until 2016. The context was much less
favourable for Albertville than the Grenoble Games since skiing in France had
lost one quarter of its participants between 1992 and 1995, and a further 50 per
cent from 1995 to 1998. The Albertville Olympics had generated anything but
growth in skiing participation. FFS was one of the three biggest French sports
federations in 1987 with about one million registered subscription fees; the
number fell below 200,000 in 2000.
In 1968, there were 5,000 cross-country skiing participants in France. Some
contend that the Grenoble Olympics triggered a new cross-country skiing
becoming less fashionable, reaching 500,000 participants in 1976 (Di Ruzza
and Gerbier, 1977), but the collapse of the cross-country skiing market in the

The winter sports industry and Winter Olympics in historical perspective 77
1980s did not confirm the sustainability of the contended fancy. Could we
assume that the nine medals won by the French team at the Grenoble Olympics
were drivers of growing winter sports practice? The number of medals won by
the French team in Sapporo 1972 (three), Innsbruck 1976 (one), Lake Placid
1980 (one), Sarajevo 1984 (three) and Calgary 1988 (two) did not verify the
hypothesis of a demonstration effect, never tested econometrically, according
to which the Olympics trigger an increase in sport participation. The French
team won as many medals (nine) in Grenoble as in Albertville alongside
a sharp decrease in skiing practice, and even more so after 1992 when Olympic
performances of the French winter sports team were actually good on average
(between eight and 15 medals won in all Winter Games from Nagano 1998
to Sochi 2014) while winter sports participation and market were in decline.
Medals won at the Albertville Games did not stop the demand decrease for
winter sports participation in France.
6.2.4 Globalisation of the Winter Sports Goods Market and Industry
The Grenoble and Albertville Olympics were hosted neither at a similar stage
of the ski product life cycle, nor at a similar internationalisation phase affecting
the winter sports goods market and industry. The global market for skis and
accessories witnessed an exceptional growth from 1962 to 1978, a context
extremely favourable to the Grenoble Games (Table 6.4). World sales of
Alpine skis reached four million pairs in 1972, four years after the Games,
and peaked at seven million pairs in 1979. Since then they regressed down to
6.3 million pairs in 1992, the year of the Albertville Olympics, then less than
three million pairs in 2015. The world market for cross-country skis reached
its maximum level in 1979 (4.1 million pairs), then sales started falling down
to 1.5 million pairs in 1989. Market growth after the Grenoble Olympics
sharply contrasts with regression during and after the Albertville Games. The
world market for ski shoes and bindings was less regressive. The snowboard,
invented by end of the 1970s, was still a new product in 1992 with an expand-
ing market.
Between the Grenoble and Albertville Olympics, the first domestic ski market
was located in the USA followed by Japan, ahead of Germany, France and
Switzerland. In the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, except for snowboards, domestic
markets for skis and ski shoes were characterised by either slower growth or
stagnation, with, eventually, a decline in sales in France, the USA, Switzerland
and the UK. Even snowboard sales started falling after 2007.
In France, the winter sports goods manufacturing industry was booming
in 1968, namely in Isère valley (Grenoble), while in 1992 it had already been
shaken by the slowdown in skiing participation, decreasing sales, production
restructuring and relocation. Employment in the Rhône-Alpes winter sports

Table 6.4 Ski sales on the world market ((million pairs sold, thousands for ski shoes, bindings, snowboards)
Season Alpine skis Variation
Cross-country
skis Variation Ski shoes Bindings Snowboards
1971–72 3.7
1972–73 4.1 11%
1973–74 4.4 7%
1974–75 4.8 9%
1977–78 6.0 25% 3.3
1978–79 6.7 12% 3.8 15%
1979–80 7.0 5% 4.1 11%
1980–81 6.3 -11% 3.4 -12%
1981–82 5.8 -36% 3.1 -10%
1982–83 5.8 0 3.3 6% 400 365
1983–84 5.6 -4% 2.9 -14% 370 345
1984–85 6.1 9% 3.0 3% 350 335
1985–86 6.6 8% 3.0 0 365 350
1986–87 6.9 5% 3.2 7% 480 420
1987–88 6.6 -5% 2.6 23% 430 370
1988–89 6.2 -7% 2.0 -30%
1989–90 5.9 -5% 1.5 -33%
Alpine+cross-country skis
1992–93 6.3 150
Historical perspectives on sports economics
78

Season Alpine skis Variation
Cross-country
skis Variation Ski shoes Bindings Snowboards
1993–94 6.0 350
1994–95 5.9 650
1995–96 5.4 900
1996–97 4.7 -22%
1997–98 4.2 -11%
2008–09 3.5 -17%
2009–10 3.5 0
2012–13 3.4 -3%
2015–16 2.9 -15%
Source: Andreff (1991).
The winter sports industry and Winter Olympics in historical perspective 79

Historical perspectives on sports economics
80
goods industry (two-thirds of this industry and of overall skiing resorts
in France were concentrated in the region) grew 3.5 per cent per annum
on average from 1970 to 1978, but diminished -2.5 per cent per annum in
1978‒87. This industry’s employment in the Rhône-Alpes fell from 6,640
jobs in 1978 to 5,322 in 1987 (Reydet, 1989). The same industry is not much
settled in Tarentaise, a valley specialised in heavy industry, and the valley’s
capacity to attract winter sports goods production was low given that the latter
was already located next door, around Grenoble.
Ski sales on the French market fell in the early 1980s for Alpine skis and
initiated a steady decline for cross-country skis. In 1985, 18.6 per cent of the
French population owned Alpine skis and 8.8 per cent cross-country skis. The
ski shoes market exhibited a downturn in 1987 and it never resumed its level
of 740,000 pairs sold. Only the winter sportswear market went on growing.
Recession in the French ski market was deepened by the development of ski
rental which encompassed 60 per cent of all sales in France, against 20 per
cent in the USA and 0 per cent in Japan. The Grenoble Olympics occurred in
a French flourishing ski market, whereas the Albertville Games were staged in
a recession market, that is, in two different stages of the ‘ski and accessories’
product life cycle.
According to theory regarding consumer durable goods, the product life
cycle evolves through four typical stages (Andreff, 1991) generated by the
function:
Vt = k. t a. e –bt
(6.2)
where Vt stands for sales (in volume) of the product at time t, while parame-
ters k, a and b determine the exact shape of the curve for each given specific
product that fit in Figure 6.1. Theory adds that the sales curve Vt in turn deter-
mines the evolving number nt of competitors that manufacture the product at
time t and their average profit margin πt at time t.
A product enters a stage 1 of introduction of the new product in the market;
sales are relatively low but grow increasingly faster; nt and πt are low but
growing. In stage 2, it becomes a growth product when sales are significant
while growing at a decreasing pace; nt and πt reach their maximum. Then in
stage 3, the maturing product is characterised by the market (sales) reaching its
maximum size and even exhibiting the first signs of decrease; nt and πt fall due
to either firms leaving the market or mergers or bankruptcies. In stage 4 of the
declining product, sales are rarer and rarer often because a substitute product
has emerged in the market (e.g. snowboard and parabolic ski compared to ski);
most producers disappear, profits tend towards zero and even some firms are in
the red. Referring to data in Table 6.4, Alpine ski and cross-country ski sales in

Figure 6.1 The product life cycle
The winter sports industry and Winter Olympics in historical perspective 81
world markets reached the maturing stage in 1979. Sales of skis in the French
market exhibited a shape similar to Vt curve for the first three stages of the
product life cycle between 1975 and 1990. In French markets for Alpine skis
and ski shoes, a downturn in sales occurred in 1987, and for cross-country skis
as early as the end of the 1970s (Andreff, 1991). Thus, the Grenoble Olympics
were at the growing stage and Albertville Games in the maturing stage in the
‘ski and accessories’ product life cycle. While in 1992‒95, snowboard (a new
product) sales were still in stage 1 as well as mono-ski and short ski in 1992;
one can understand that free-styling and speed skiing disciplines were intro-
duced in the Albertville Games programme.
The Grenoble Olympics were held when the ski and winter sports market
and industry started internationalising, whereas the Albertville Games took
place when they were globalising. Internationalisation of the sports industry
was only in the starting blocks in 1968 (Andreff, 1989) while it was very
much advanced in 1992, although it had not yet reached its current stage of
fully-fledged globalisation (Andreff, 2012). In 1960 in Squaw Valley, Vuarnet
won the Olympic men’s downhill race and opened an era of Rossignol fast
growth and French skiers’ successes, and at the same time a huge international
winter sports market emerged. In 1966, at the skiing World Championship in
Portillo, the French team won thirteen trophies. At the Grenoble Olympics,
Killy’s and Goïtschell’s gold medals were a climax for French elite skiers that,
by the same token, facilitated the penetration of French winter sports goods in
foreign markets. In leading position, Rossignol held a 21 per cent share of the
global market and became a multinational company (MNC) by opening new
plants abroad. In 1972, Rossignol topped as the world’s number 1 when selling

Historical perspectives on sports economics
82
500,000 pairs of skis, then 1.5 million in 1977, despite a relative failure of
French skiing team at 1972 Sapporo Olympics.
As early as 1965, before the Grenoble Games, Rossignol developed
a network of foreign subsidiaries in Switzerland, Italy, the USA, Canada,
Austria, Germany and Spain while the company was making only 30 per cent
of its consolidated turnover in France. For example, a Rossignol US-based
subsidiary was selling skis manufactured in Spain (to take advantage of lower
unit labour cost) and ski shoes manufactured by the Italian firm Nordica.
Consequently, Rossignol downsized its employment in France, while Salomon
was increasing its domestic labour force. Later, by 1991, Salomon held 15
foreign subsidiaries .and was achieving 85 per cent of its turnover abroad. In
1994, Dynamic relocated its factory from Saint-Etienne de Saint-Geoirs to
Austria and made workers redundant. At the opening of the 1992 Olympics
there were practically no new foreign winter sports goods markets in
which to spread, except in Eastern European countries muddling through
a post-communist transition crisis.
When Albertville was about to stage the Games, the maturing French winter
sports industry and big ski resorts in Tarentaise were hoping to conquer new
market shares abroad. In this maturing product market, the number of ski pro-
ducers was diminishing, while this stage in the life cycle was a warning that
the number of firms in the industry will continue shrinking (Figure 6.1). Major
ski producers in terms of global sales were Rossignol (950,000 pairs), Atomic
(Austria, 720,000), Elan (Yugoslavia, 590,000), Head (Austria, 580,000),
Dynastar (570,000), Blizzard (Austria, 510,000), Fischer (Austria, 480,000)
and Kästle (Austria, 300,000) but only Rossignol, Atomic, Elan, Head,
Dynastar, and Salomon became MNCs spreading to most significant foreign
markets. Competition on the French market was much harder in 1992 than 24
years earlier and increasingly reached an international dimension, while the
French ski industry was still benefiting, though less and less, from Rossignol’s
leading position and Salomon's innovative orientation.
France, together with her main Austrian, Swiss and Italian competitors,
was used to having a foreign trade surplus in skis and accessories. After the
Grenoble Olympics, the export to import ratio for these products was 600
in 1973. All through the 1980s and 1990s the skis and accessories export to
import ratio remained higher than 500 even though it was slightly moving
down from 897 in 1986 to 742 in 1992 (Andreff and Andreff, 2009) – and for
ski shoes from 409 to 231 (Andreff and Nys, 1994). With French MNCs losing
their leading position in the ski industry, the trade balance surplus started
shrinking and, by end of the 2000s, the export to import ratio practically came
down to 100. In 2013, the winter sports goods trade balance exhibited its first
(slight) deficit and export to import ratio was below 100. France is no longer
a net exporter of skis and accessories. This also reflects the effect on foreign

The winter sports industry and Winter Olympics in historical perspective 83
trade of production relocation by MNCs in the now globalised ski industry to
areas with lower unit cost of labour.
Major French MNCs (Rossignol, Salomon) were less and less resisting the
pressure of foreign competitors and eventually ended up being taken over.4
This resulted from major ski producing firms anticipating the downturn in the
ski market towards its maturing then declining stages and adjusting through
production diversification and industrial restructuring by means of mergers
and acquisitions.5 Part of diversification and acquisitions were used by MNCs
to either produce a combined skis–bindings–shoes nexus or start up producing
products whose sales were not on decline like skis. The number of producers
sharply reduced in the skis and accessories industry from the 1970s to the
2000s, typical of a maturing industry.
Starting from 1977, several MNCs of the ski industry diversified into tennis
rackets (Rossignol, Head, Fischer, Kneissl, Völkl) then into golf equipment;
Salomon acquired Taylor Made in 1985, Rossignol bought Cleveland in 1991,
while Look switched from ski bindings to bike accessories in 1984. Nordica
(ski shoes) and Atomic (skis) started producing rollers, Fischer, Dynamic and
Authier launched cross-country and mountain bikes manufacturing. Rossignol
acquired ski shoes (Lange, Caber, Le Trappeur), ski poles (Kerma), and
winter sportswear producers (Veleda-Killy and Anoralp through Dynastar,
a Rossignol subsidiary acquired earlier). Geze (bindings) was acquired by
Look in 1985, then Look was sold to Ebel (an Authier ski distributor) in 1989,
while Nordica was acquired by Benetton and Koflach (ski shoes) and Ess
(bindings) by Atomic. From 1988 to 1991, Anoralp, Skirail, Gimar (number 2
in ski lifts) and Millet went bankrupt, Rossignol, Salomon, K-Way, Moncler
(winter shoes) and Solar (skiing masks) were in the red for some years, and
Rossignol closed down subsidiaries and downsized its manpower. In 1989,
Pomagalski merged with Skirail, Botto took over Montaz-Mautino (ski lifts),
K-Way merged with Eider, and a French–Swiss group took over Lacroix
(skis). Head, Tyrolia and Mares were bought by Spagli and d’Assolo (ski
sportswear) by Benetton in 1990. Head took over Brixia (ski shoes), in 1993
Salomon acquired San Giorgio (ski shoes) and ended up being acquired by
Adidas in 1997, K2 and Völkl (ski producers) merged in 2004, Amer Sports
acquired Atomic and Bonfire (snowboards), the US Nyse group (fibreglass)
took over K2 while Quicksilver acquired Rossignol in 2006.
Overall, the Grenoble Olympics coincided with winter sports industry
expansion and internationalisation. The Albertville Games occurred alongside
industry restructuring and concentration, in which surviving firms had to adapt
to genuine globalisation.

Historical perspectives on sports economics
84
6.2.5 Sequencing Innovation in Winter Sports Goods
In the postwar period, Grenoble became the cradle of an increasing number
of innovations. Petzl, after the 1968 Games, started diversifying towards
manufacturing products for mountain climbing and alpinism. Then Petzl
innovated in 1975 with producing off-piste ski bindings, forehead lights and
climbing harnesses, and ended up with setting a subsidiary in Salt Lake City
in 1988. Similar innovative trajectories have been pursued by most firms in
the ski industry. Wood started disappearing from ski manufacturing, leaving
the joinery industry for metallurgy, then for synthetic chemical products
(plastics, synthetic fibres), while lending some techniques to the aeronautical
industry, for example, counter-gluing of synthetic materials used for aeroplane
wings. To achieve such transformation, firms spent a lot on R&D. In 1971‒72,
Rossignol, Dynamic and Salomon were spending between 5 per cent and 8 per
cent of their turnover on R&D expenditures.
BOX 6.1 INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN SKI AND
ACCESSORIES PRODUCTION
1948
Patent registered by Pierce of a ‘sandwich’-structured ski with metal strips
and a wooden core (adopted by Head, USA); first ski lift by Pomagalski;
graphite-loaded epoxy ski soles (Dynamic)
1948
First chairlift in Bogue Mountain, US Midwest
1949
Aluminum ski (Head), lucoflex then polyethilene soles (Rossignol)
1950
Process enabling to stick polyethylene canvas (Kofler, Austria)
1952
Skis with lower strip, core and higher strip (Rossignol, Dynamic); new ad-
justable ski bindings (Salomon); producing artificial snow in Grossinger,
New York State
1955
Buckled ski shoes (Henke Speed Fit, USA)
1957

The winter sports industry and Winter Olympics in historical perspective 85
Aluminum ski poles (Scott, USA)
1958
Wooden core definitely substituted by hollow caisson within the ski
(Hadelmann, Switzerland); first cable car in Wildcat, New Hampshire
1960‒62
Fibreglass skis (Kneissl, Sailer, Plymold, USA)
1963
Manufacturing skis by humid milling (Rossignol)
1964
Plastic ski shoes (Lange, Austria)
1967
Fibreglass ski with a torsion box (Dynamic), the VR-17, Killy’s equipment
at Grenoble Games
1969
Ski core in polyurethane mousse (Bader and Bayer, Germany)
1970
Plastic-metal skis (Rossignol)
1974
Using acrylic sponge in ski core (Dynamic)
1975
Metal sole (in zycral) flooded with polyurethane sponge in the core
(Dynastar); air-cushioned ski shoes
1977
Snowboard (Burton, USA), first patent registered in 1939 by Burgeson
(USA)
1979
Mono-ski (Dynamic); aerodynamic smooth ski-suit
1980
Backward entrance ski shoes

Historical perspectives on sports economics
86
1981
Goretex for winter sportswear
1984
Programmable ski shoes (Salomon)
1985
Using Vibtene, a viscous-elastic product, softening vibrations in Dynamic
and Rossignol skis
1986
Setila, a fibre that avoids coating in ski sportswear (Rhône Poulenc, France);
short-skis for competition (Figl, Austria); adjustable skiing mask (Solar);
snow rackets with adjustable bindings (Folly’s)
1987
Comforel, polyester fibre for rucksacks (Du Pont de Nemours, USA);
warming ski shoes (Nordica); automatic waxing tunnel (Avoriaz)
1988
Zirconium introduced into winter sportswear (Japan)
1989
Parabolic mono-shell skis, Salomon
1990
Adjustable-framed rucksacks (Big Pack, Germany)
1995
Parabolic short-skis (Elan, Yugoslavia and Kneissl, USA)
1998
Snowblade, between parabolic ski and snowboard (Salomon)
2013
Snowboards with integrated brake (Streetboardz Boarder Kontrol, Australia)
A cluster of innovations (substituting wood with synthetic fibres, and auto-
mated assembly lines) in manufacturing skis and other winter sports goods
emerged over the 1949‒75 period, from which a number of new products
were in competition at the Grenoble Games. In 1950, Head introduced in

The winter sports industry and Winter Olympics in historical perspective 87
the market a ‘sandwich’-structured metallic ski which replaced, step by step,
traditional wooden skis. In 1952, Salomon innovated in manufacturing new
ski bindings which became famous worldwide during the Grenoble Olympics.
The industrial revolution in ski production went on during the 1970s, metal
being substituted by a sandwich of different plastics and composite synthetic
materials. In the 1980s appeared a ski with a torsion box, enabling automated
ski manufacturing with robots on assembly lines. These last two technologies
were representing 90 per cent of the global ski market by end of the 1980s,
when the big cluster of innovations having transformed the ski product was
reaching its end. An increasingly complex and sophisticated technology was
called into ski production from the 1960s to 1980s gathering new inputs, skills
and materials from metallurgy, mechanical engineering, chemical and textile
industries.
The ski product also became complex from the standpoint of those speci-
fications that were looked for by consumers – lightness, robustness, rigidity,
anti-corrosion, design, aesthetics, anti-vibrations (Desbordes, 2001). This
corresponded to a second cluster of innovations that started up right before
the Albertville Games. Facing a declining market, those innovations that were
looked for no longer were geared towards improving elite skiers’ performances
in competition but, increasingly, towards facilitating access to skiing for every-
one from the youngest kids to the oldest potential participant –innovations that
‘euphemize’6 sport practice (Andreff, 1985); or innovations that responded to
a demand for safer and more solid winter sports goods (Pourquet, 1995); or
innovations that were diversifying skiing practice or increasing fun such as
the mono-ski, snowboard,7 short-ski, snow racket with adjustable bindings,
warming ski shoe, adjustable skiing mask and parabolic mono-shell ski.
In 1984, Salomon committed significant R&D expenditures to manufac-
turing a new ski, and Rossignol reacted through diversifying in ski shoes
manufacturing. Salomon expected that the Albertville Games would upgrade
the impact of the parabolic mono-shell ski in the market. Salomon’s invention
of the parabolic ski changed the ski geometry in such a way as to facilitate
rotations, minimise physical effort and save time, while reducing the number
of components compared with the sandwich ski. The new ski was launched
in November 1989, practically two years before the Albertville Olympics.
Salomon sold 5.5 million pairs of parabolic skis from 1990 to 2000, reaching
nearly 10 per cent of the global market. The new product was protected by
423 patents registered between 1990 and 1996 which maintained a market
quasi-monopoly of the parabolic ski innovator – most competitors kept on
producing sandwich skis until the late 1990s, except Kneissl and Elan. In 1998,
Salomon launched the snowblade, a compromise between parabolic ski and
snowboard. However, right before and after 1992, major innovations basically

Historical perspectives on sports economics
88
were ‘euphemizing’, that is, facilitating winter sports practice, and attempting
to slowdown the decline in ski markets.
The Grenoble Games occurred in the middle of an industrial revolution in
ski production, an extremely favourable context. Rossignol conquered foreign
markets in the 1970s and became the world leader in 1975 thanks to metal,
plastic and metal–plastic skis. Whereas the Albertville Games were contem-
porary with skiing practice decline, when ski producers in a maturing market
were looking for ‘euphemizing’ innovations opening access to new clienteles.
Sales data in Table 6.4 do not allow contending that the latter cluster of inno-
vations was able to trigger an upturn in market trends.
6.3 CONCLUSION
Whatever would have been an econometric estimation of the 1968 Grenoble
Olympics’ impact multiplier value, the above analysis ensures that it should
have been higher than the one (0.7) calculated for Albertville 1992. One possi-
ble exception might be the employment multiplier, since Grenoble’s economy
was at full employment in 1968 whereas Albertville’s area was firing workers
in an overall high unemployment economy in 1992.
NOTES
1. The multiplier used for 1984 LA Olympics was 3, for 1988 Seoul 2.99 (Kim and
Kim, 1989), for 1992 Barcelona 2.4 (Cotrina and Sauri, 1992), and 1.25 for 1998
FIFA World Cup in France (Foucard and Torrenti, 1991).
2. In 2014, 47 per cent of stays in ski resorts were only half a day, one day or one
weekend long, according to FIFAS (French Federation of the Sports Goods
Industry).
3. This figure is quite representative of real skiing practice since someone buying
a lump sum ticket to use ski lifts was automatically registered as a participant into
FFS membership.
4. To some extent, a same analysis applies to French winter sports resorts which
were facing traditional competitors (Switzerland, Austria, Italy) in 1968 while in
1992 those winter Albertville area’s winter sports resorts were under harsher pres-
sure including from resorts located in Germany, Scandinavian countries, North
America, and even Poland and the Czech Republic.
5. For a detailed presentation of restructuring in the ski industry: Andreff (1990,
2006 and 2012).
6. Alleviate the difficulty of acceding to sport practice.
7. For some time, snowboarding practice was forbidden in winter sports resorts, then
it became a kind of leisure sport, and eventually it was introduced in the Winter
Olympics programme in Nagano 1998.

The winter sports industry and Winter Olympics in historical perspective 89
REFERENCES
Andreff M. and Andreff W. (2009), Global Trade in Sports Goods: International
Specialisation of Major Trading Countries, European Sport Management
Quarterly, 9 (3), 259‒294.
Andreff W. (1985), Le muscle et la machine, Culture Technique, 13, 38‒61.
Andreff W. (1989), L’internationalisation économique du sport, in W. Andreff
(ed.), Economie politique du sport, Paris: Dalloz, 203‒234.
Andreff W. (1990), La restructuration des industries des sports d’hiver en
Rhône-Alpes et les Jeux Olympiques d’hiver d’Albertville, in P. Arnaud
(ed.), Le sport moderne en question: Innovation et changements sociaux,
Lyon: AFRAPS, 332‒338.
Andreff W. (ed.) (1991), Les effets d’entraînement des Jeux Olympiques d’Al-
bertville, Lyon-Grenoble: PPSH Rhône-Alpes.
Andreff W. (2006), The sports goods industry, in W. Andreff and S.
Szymanski (eds), Handbook on the Economics of Sport, Cheltenham, UK
and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 27‒39.
Andreff W. (2012), La mondialisation économique du sport. Manuel de
référence en Economie du sport, Bruxelles: De Boeck.
Andreff W. and Nys J.-F. (1994), Economie du sport, col. ‘Que sais-je?’ 2294,
2nd edition, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Arnaud P. and Terret T. (1993), Le rêve blanc. Olympisme et sports d’hiver en
France. Chamonix 1924 – Grenoble 1968, Bordeaux: Presses Universitaires
de Bordeaux.
Bardaji J., Campagne B., Khder M.-B., Laffeter Q., Simon O., Dufernez A.-S.,
Elezaar C., Leblanc P., Masson E. and Partouche H. (2017), Le modèle mac-
roéconométrique Mésange: réestimation et nouveautés, Paris: Direction des
Etudes et Synthèses Economiques, INSEE, G2017/04.
CCI Savoie (2004), Présentation du tissu économique du bassin d’Albertville
– Tarentaise – Vanoise, Albertville: Chambre de Commerce et d’Industrie
de la Savoie.
CGS (1989), La Savoie dans le marché des sports d’hiver: Orientations pour
une charte de développement, Chambéry: Conseil Général de Savoie.
Chauveau M.-F. and Hollard M. (2011), Vivre et agir ensemble, in D. Bloch
(ed.), Grenoble, cité internationale, cité d’innovations: Rêves et réalités,
Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 139‒154.
Cotrina D. and Sauri M. (1992), Impacto economic dels Jocs Olimpics,
Barcelona: Cabinet tecnic de Programacio, Ajuntament de Barcelona.
Damour P. and Garigue M.-A. (1998), Où en sont les stations de sports
d’hiver?, Problèmes économiques, 2568, 16‒18.

Historical perspectives on sports economics
90
Desbordes M. (2001), Innovation management in the sports industry: lessons
from the Salomon case, European Sport Management Quarterly, 1 (2),
124‒149.
Di Ruzza F. and Gerbier B. (1977), Ski en crise. Le cirque blanc: du profit …
à la compétition, Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble.
Foucard M. and Torrenti J.-M. (1991), Impact socio-économique de la Coupe
du Monde de football 1998, Paris: Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées.
Frappât P. (1979), Grenoble: Le mythe blessé, Paris: Alain Moreau.
Gex F. (1921), Albertville: Etude de géographie urbaine, Revue de Géographie
Urbaine, 9 (1), 5‒134.
Kim J.-G. and Kim C.-G. (1989), Impact of the Seoul Olympic Games on
National Development, Seoul: Korea Development Institute.
Kukawka P. (1991), Albertville 92: les enjeux olympiques, Grenoble: Presses
Universitaires de Grenoble.
Lavaud B. (1970), Les sports d’hiver en France, Notes et Etudes Documentaires,
Paris: La Documentation Française.
Lipsey R.A. (2006), The Sporting Goods Industry: History, Practices and
Products, Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company.
Naves P. (1988), L’impact économique de l’organisation des Jeux Olympiques
d’hiver de 1992, Revue Juridique et Economique du Sport, 4, 5‒16.
Pourquet L. (1995), Le sport en liberté: Les Français privilégient la pratique
conviviale et les articles de sport sécurisants, Consommation et Modes de
Vie, 94.
Reffay A. (1974), Alpages et stations de sports d’hiver en Haute-Tarentaise,
Revue de Géographie Alpine, 62 (1), 41‒73.
Reydet P. (1989), Les industries de sports d’hiver: l’emploi sur la mauvaise
pente, Points d’appui pour l’économie Rhône-Alpes, 52, 7‒10.