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Special Issue 2019: European and American Political Parties: Becoming More Similar?
Abstract
For theories to be useful across systems requires a fundamental similarity of the things theorized about. In the 1980s, it was easy to question whether European and American political parties were sufficiently of the same “genus” for a single theory of parties to be relevant in both contexts. This paper asks whether that is still the case, identifying several respects in which European and American parties have become more comparable, but also a dimension on which they have become more different.
... Some scholars have questioned if he is changing the nature of the party itself, transforming it from a programmatic to a more personal organization, serving personal whims and ambitions of Donald Trump over ideology and party program (see e.g. Galvin (2020); Katz (2019); Rahat (2022)). Political pundits and academics seem to agree that he has fundamentally changed the American party system through an unrivaled hold over the Republican base. ...
... These steps, particularly the purging of the party apparatus of insufficiently loyal Republicans and the activation of base voters with personal loyalty to Trump, has created a leader effect for Trump that would not be transferable to other -Republican or Democraticleaders. Some have referred to this process as a "hostile takeover" of the party (Katz 2019). Similarly, Trump's assumption of control over the RNC after his surprising (McKee et al., 2019) election in 2016 itself was not unusual, but his decision to use the party organization to promote himself rather than any particular legislative program was (Heersink 2018). ...
... Even established parties in long-running democracies can become susceptible to this development. Departing from its programmatic history, the current GOP has become the party of Trump to such an extent that the party and Trump's person are often equated and used interchangeably (Katz 2019). Building on this, we suggest that due to this connection, Republicans' perception of their own party and even institutions should be affected if they are seen as loyal or disloyal to Trump. ...
Unprecedented in American politics, several Republican US Representatives, supported by former President Trump, led a motion in the House to remove the Speaker, providing an ideal case for understanding a strong leader’s control over the party base, conflation with the party brand, and ramifications for the health of the US party system. Leveraging this unique event, we conducted an original survey experiment of registered Republican voters to analyze how awareness of the leader’s approval influences their assessment of the ouster, approval of their party, and trust in the House. We argue that if a leader’s hold over the base and association between him and the party brand remains strong, his endorsement should boost Republican voters’ approval of the ouster, their party, and trust in the US House. We find consistent empirical support for these expectations, with significant implications for the leader -- party -- constituent relationship and the health of the American party system.
... The opposite holds for the case of the United States, positioned toward the laissez-faire, freemarket side of the regulatory continuum. Indeed, the regulation of political finance is significantly diverse on two the sides of the ocean, if not opposite in its theoretical principles, the US adopting a libertarian model and Europe an egalitarian one (Katz, 2019). Thus, private funding is allowed with few restrictions in the United States and limitations on private contributions were recently seen as threatening liberty and freedom of expression, 3 whereas in Europe it has become increasingly more regulated in the name of corruption prevention and equality. ...
This article presents a longitudinal comparative analysis of the regulation of private funding to political parties in 15 West European democracies and explores how these rules have changed under the most recent wave of political finance reforms. In particular, the article questions whether a deregulation of political finance regulation may be in sight, with a downsizing of the role of the state in the political finance domain. While evidence does not support a clear movement toward deregulation, the article shows that the move from private to public subsidization may not be that irreversible as it seemed and that private funding to political parties is likely to become more prominent in the near future also in Europe.
... Scholars also identified the personalization of political parties (Blondel and Thiébault 2010;Katz 2019;Passarelli 2015;Rahat and Kenig 2018;Schumacher and Giger 2017;Webb, Poguntke, and Kolodny 2012): that is, a decrease in the "partyness of government" in favor of a more personalized approach (Katz 2018); personalization in leader selection (Cross and Pilet 2015;Musella 2015) and candidate selection (Hazan and Rahat 2010); and a process of internal disintermediation, in which collegial party institutions dwindled while the rights and roles of party leaders expanded (Pizzimenti, Calossi, and Cicchi 2022). This personalization occurred not only in new parties but also in veteran ones (Musella 2015). ...
Democracies in general and political parties in particular have undergone political personalization in recent decades. The power balance between politicians (one or many) and the team (the party as a collegial entity) has changed, and existing party typologies are no longer suited to the analysis of today’s democratic politics. Although some new personalized party types have been added, what is missing is a systematic attempt to contrast them with the collegial option. This article proposes a new classification of political parties to fill the lacuna. It includes five ideal types of parties: two personalized-decentralized types, referring to collections of separated autonomous activists or to separated autonomous individual politicians (plural); a collegial type, which is about the centrality of the team and is based mainly on collective authorities and collective decision making; and two personalized-centralized types, referring to the centrality of an individual politician in her capacity as the party leader or that of a specific individual who “owns” the party.
... In the first piece, Katz (2019) directly asks the question of whether parties in the United States are comparable to parties in other parts of the world. Katz revisits the ongoing discussion among comparative scholars of whether U.S. political parties are of the same "genus." ...
Historical accounts of American presidential nominating contests suggest that candidates jockey over ideology and policy in ways that shape the outcomes of these races. Yet this aspect of competition has been difficult to analyze with the formal and statistical methods that dominate this research agenda. To address this gap, this article presents a computational agent-based model (ABM) of candidates’ ideological maneuvering during the invisible primary. We extend the framework developed by Michael Laver to study dynamic party competition in Europe, but recast it for the different context and to enable model fit to be more rigorously determined. Our analysis of data from the 2012 Republican invisible primary suggests the importance of ideological jockeying in this contest. Moreover, its dynamics can be well-explained by a basic version of the ABM in which candidates select between three strategies (aggregator, hunter or sticker) and then maintain that strategy over time. The fit of this model, particularly in the short run, can be improved by introducing a “momentum effect” that allows the candidates’ standing in the race to rise or fall without any accompanying ideological change.
Back H., Debus M., Muller J. and Back H. Regional government formation in varying multilevel contexts: a comparison of eight European countries, Regional Studies. Although governance in multilevel settings has become a prominent research field in political science, there are few comparative studies that focus on explaining sub-national coalition outcomes in such settings. This paper sets out to study regional government formation in eight European countries and it builds on a dataset that covers information on the policy preferences of parties drawn from regional election manifestos. The results show that parties at the regional level are likely to form congruent coalitions, that is, copying' the patterns of national government formation, and that they are more likely to do so in specific regional contexts.
We propose a theory of political parties in which interest groups and activists are the key actors, and coalitions of groups develop common agendas and screen candidates for party nominations based on loyalty to their agendas. This theoretical stance contrasts with currently dominant theories, which view parties as controlled by election-minded politicians. The difference is normatively important because parties dominated by interest groups and activists are less responsive to voter preferences, even to the point of taking advantage of lapses in voter attention to politics. Our view is consistent with evidence from the formation of national parties in the 1790s, party position change on civil rights and abortion, patterns of polarization in Congress, policy design and nominations for state legislatures, Congress, and the presidency.
This study analyzes legislative voting in the French National Assembly during the Fifth Republic. We use an original data set of roll-call votes to understand the development of party voting unity from the Ist to the XIIIth Legislature (1958–2012). We also include a spatial analysis of legislative voting to measure the dimensionality of politics in the legislature. Our results show that party unity is very high in the National Assembly and that the policy space in the legislature is primarily one-dimensional. However, we note that party unity is weaker under certain circumstances, particularly when voting is related to foreign policy issues and the European Union, or when the government is composed of an ideologically diverse coalition of parties.
The exceptional relevance of the state in party finance in contemporary European democracies is not only of particular importance for the way in which parties organize, but also has a bearing on the normative connotations associated with the place of political parties in modern democracy. The contention of this article is that the increasingly prominent role of the state in the funding of parties should be understood in the context of, and has been legitimized by, an ideational transformation by which parties have gradually come to be seen as necessary and desirable institutions for democracy. Moreover, the direct involvement of the state in internal party affairs has contributed to a transformation of parties from the traditionally voluntary private associations towards parties as public utilities. A comparison of the practice of public funding and public control on party finance in the older liberal democracies with more recent cases of democratization shows that the newer European democracies in particular provide unequivocal testimony of such a new conception of parties and democracy.
span style="font-size: 100%; font-family: Arial; color: #000000;" data-sheets-value="{"1":2,"2":"At least since the beginning of the 1980s, much of the writing on the strategies, tactics, and policies of parties has explicitly cautioned against the treatment of party as a \u201cunitary actor\u201d\u0094 (e.g., Daalder 1983; Laver and Schofield 1990). Party leaders, it is now argued, may differ from one another and from party followers with regard to the ends which they pursue and the resources which they employ; even within the leadership itself, it is suggested, the conflict between factions may be such as to militate against any theories taking the party as a whole as the relevant unit of analysis. Nonetheless, there is a striking lack of consensus regarding the number and type of different units into which a party may be disaggregated, and the extent to which this disaggregation may be applied to an understanding of processes of organizational change."}" data-sheets-userformat="{"2":2111744,"11":0,"14":{"1":2,"2":0},"15":"arial,sans,sans-serif","16":10,"24":{"1":0,"2":3,"3":0,"4":3}}">At least since the beginning of the 1980s, much of the writing on the strategies, tactics, and policies of parties has explicitly cautioned against the treatment of party as a “unitary actor” (e.g., Daalder 1983; Laver and Schofield 1990). Party leaders, it is now argued, may differ from one another and from party followers with regard to the ends which they pursue and the resources which they employ; even within the leadership itself, it is suggested, the conflict between factions may be such as to militate against any theories taking the party as a whole as the relevant unit of analysis. Nonetheless, there is a striking lack of consensus regarding the number and type of different units into which a party may be disaggregated, and the extent to which this disaggregation may be applied to an understanding of processes of organizational change.</span
The first book-length treatment of one of the most influential theories in party politics Provides an updated account of the cartel party thesis and first book-length argument in support of it Examines what cartelization means for parties and party systems, and what cartelization of the parties means for the future of democracy.
This article pursues a developmental understanding of American parties as autonomous and thick collective actors through a comparison of four key historical actors we term “prophets of party”: partisans of the nineteenth-century Party Period; Progressive reformers; mid-twentieth century liberal Democrats; and activists in and around the body popularly known as the McGovern-Fraser Commission. Leading theories portray political parties as the vehicles either of ambitious politicians or of groups eager to extract benefits from the state. Yet such analyses leave underdetermined the path from such actors’ desires for power to the parties’ wielding of it. That path is mediated by partisan forms and practices that have varied widely across institutional and cultural context. As parties search for electoral majority, they do so in the long shadow of ideas and practices, layered and accreted across time, concerning the role of parties in political life. We analyze four such prophesies, trace their layered contributions to their successors, and reflect on their legacy for contemporary party politics.
It is widely assumed that electoral institutions shape politicians' incentive for personal vote-seeking, with important behavioral and policy consequences. Yet, there is a surprising lack of consensus on how to compare real-world electoral institutions. Using new data this paper examines how legislators' own perception of their electoral incentives in fifteen democracies correspond to some of the most seminal classification schemes in political science. Our survey of 2,326 legislators - the empirically broadest study of personal vote orientation so far conducted - demonstrates that legislators do not always understand electoral incentives in the same way scholarly rankings do, highlighting the need for scholars of political institutions to justify their choice of classification scheme. If not, an entire body of literature may be misguided.
Can too much participation harm democracy? Democratic theory places great importance upon the conduct of elections, but it is not often recognized that the electoral game takes place in two arenas, not only between parties but also within them. This pioneering book presents a new approach to understanding political parties. It sheds light on the inner dynamics of party politics and offers the first comprehensive analysis of one of the most important processes any party undertakes - its process of candidate selection. Candidate selection methods are the mechanisms by which a party chooses its candidates for the general elections. It may be the function that separates parties from other organizations. For such an important function, this field has certainly faced a dearth of serious investigation. Hazan and Rahat, the leading scholars on this topic, conduct an in-depth analysis of the consequences of different candidate selection methods on democracy. This book is a culmination of almost two decades of research and defines the field of candidate selection. Part I of the book delineates candidate selection methods based on four major dimensions: candidacy, the selectorate, decentralization, and voting versus appointment systems. Part II analyzes the political consequences of using different candidate selection methods according to four important aspects of democracy: participation, representation, competition, and responsiveness. The book ends with a proposed candidate selection method that optimally balances all four of the democratic aspects concurrently, and answers the question "Is the most participatory candidate selection method necessarily the best one for democracy?."
This book addresses the relationship between the different and often incompatible values of democratic theory and the electoral institutions used to achieve them. By analysing electoral systems worldwide, including those of not only European and "honorary European" governments but also developing nations, this book provides the empirical data to find the institutions most appropriate to each model of democracy.
This book explores the ways in which political parties, in contemporary parliamentary democracies, choose their leaders and then subsequently hold them accountable. The authors provide a comprehensive examination of party leadership selection and accountability both through examination of parties and countries in different institutional settings and through a holistic analysis of the role of party leaders and the methods through which they assume, and exit, the office.
Historically, both Belgium and the Netherlands are archetypes of ‘consociational democracies’. These are characterized by broad multi-party coalitions, numerous power-sharing devices, and fragile checks and balances in order to ensure due influence for all relevant parties and minority groups. Hence, the overarching logic of these consensus democracies seems to represent an obstacle to a process of presidentialization.
However, we argue that the need for strong leadership resulted in more prominent and powerful positions for the (parliamentary) party leaders and Prime Ministers. We present evidence of a process of presidentialization that gained momentum a decade earlier in the Netherlands (from the 1970s onwards) than it did in Belgium (from the 1980s).
It is interesting to note that the increased autonomy of Prime Ministers is not due to constitutional amendments, but tends to be linked to the increased decision-making role for the inner cabinet, the professionalization of the Prime Minister’s Office, and the growing attention the audiovisual media give to the Prime Minister.
Similarly, parliamentary party leaders in The Netherlands and extra-parliamentary party leaders in Belgium grew stronger through an accumulation of power and resources at the leader’s office, personalized campaigning and a centralization of control over inner party selection procedures, and party leadership selection.
This book is one in a series (Comparative Politics) for students and teachers of political science that deals with contemporary issues in comparative government and politics. After an introduction, it has 11 contributions from leading scholars in the field, which present a critical overview of much of the recent literature on political parties, and systematically assess the capacity of existing concepts, typologies, and methodological approaches to deal with contemporary parties. The book critically analyses the ‘decline of parties’ literature, both from a conceptual perspective and—with regard to antiparty attitudes among citizens—on the basis of empirical analyses of survey data. It systematically re‐examines the underpinnings of rational‐choice analyses of electoral competition, as well as the misapplication of standard party models as the ‘catch‐all party’. Several chapters re‐examine existing models of parties and party typologies, particularly with regard to the capacity of commonly used concepts to capture the wide variation among parties that exists in old and new democracies today, and with regard to their ability to deal adequately with the new challenges that parties are facing in rapidly changing political, social, and technological environments. In particular, two detailed case studies (from France and Spain) demonstrate how party models are significant not only as frameworks for scholarly research but also insofar as they can affect party performance. Other chapters also examine in detail how corruption and party patronage have contributed to party decline, as well as public attitudes towards parties in several countries. In the aggregate, the various contributions to the book reject the notion that a ‘decline of party’ has progressed to such an extent as to threaten the survival of parties as the crucial intermediary actors in modern democracies. The contributing authors argue, however, that parties are facing a new set of sometimes demanding challenges, and that not only have they differed significantly in their ability to successfully meet these challenges but also the core concepts, typologies, party models, and methodological approaches that have guided research in this area over the past 40 years have met with only mixed success in adequately capturing these recent developments and serving as fruitful frameworks for analysis; the book is intended to remedy some of these shortcomings. It is arranged in three parts: I. Reconceptualizing Parties and Party Competition; II. Re‐examining Party Organization and Party Models; and III. Revisiting Party Linkages and Attitudes Toward Parties.
During the coalition government's first 18 months, backbench MPs in Westminster have rebelled in almost half of all votes. Philip Cowley and Mark Stuart examine the rising tide of dissent and ask what this might mean for the coalition's future.
It is well known that different types of electoral systems create different incentives to cultivate a personal vote and that there may be variation in intra‐party competition within an electoral system. This article demonstrates that flexible list systems – where voters can choose to cast a vote for the list as ordered by the party or express preference votes for candidates – create another type of variation in personal vote‐seeking incentives within the system. This variation arises because the flexibility of party‐in‐a‐district lists results from voters' actual inclination to use preference votes and the formal weight of preference votes in changing the original list order. Hypotheses are tested which are linked to this logic for the case of Belgium, where party‐in‐a‐district constituencies vary in their use of preference votes and the electoral reform of 2001 adds interesting institutional variation in the formal impact of preference votes on intra‐party seat allocation. Since formal rules grant Belgian MPs considerable leeway in terms of bill initiation, personal vote‐seeking strategies are inferred by examining the use of legislative activity as signalling tool in the period between 1999 and 2007. The results establish that personal vote‐seeking incentives vary with the extent to which voters use preference votes and that this variable interacts with the weight of preference votes as defined by institutional rules. In addition, the article confirms the effect of intra‐party competition on personal vote‐seeking incentives and illustrates that such incentives can underlie the initiation of private members bills in a European parliamentary system.
It is often argued that new technology will increase centralization of political parties but Internet-based technologies, especially the social media, provide individual candidates with opportunities to run campaigns more independently of the central party. This article argues that the effect of new technology depends on the contextual characteristics of the campaign, most importantly the nomination process and the electoral system. It investigates the effect of online social media on individual candidate campaigning through a study of parliamentary candidates' use of social media in the 2009 Norwegian election campaign, a campaign environment with few incentives for candidates to undertake individualized campaigning, using the 2009 Norwegian Candidate Study. Findings reveal that online social media are much appreciated by candidates and are used to a great extent. The technological effect on individual campaigning appears small as candidates who consider social media important do not focus on their own candidacy to a greater extent than other candidates. However, candidates with an individualized candidate focus are more inclined to use Facebook and consider social media important for their campaign communication. Consequently, although social media in the short run are not likely to increase individualized campaigning as such, candidates with a candidate focus have been offered a new channel for self-promotion.
“To have mastered ‘theory’ and ‘method’ is to have become a conscious thinker , a man at work and aware of the assumptions and implications of whatever he is about. To be mastered by ‘method’ or ‘theory’ is simply to be kept from working.” The sentence applies nicely to the present plight of political science. The profession as a whole oscillates between two unsound extremes. At the one end a large majority of political scientists qualify as pure and simple unconscious thinkers. At the other end a sophisticated minority qualify as overconscious thinkers, in the sense that their standards of method and theory are drawn from the physical, “paradigmatic” sciences.
The wide gap between the unconscious and the overconscious thinker is concealed by the growing sophistication of statistical and research techniques. Most of the literature introduced by the title “Methods” (in the social, behavioral or political sciences) actually deals with survey techniques and social statistics, and has little if anything to share with the crucial concern of “methodology,” which is a concern with the logical structure and procedure of scientific enquiry. In a very crucial sense there is no methodology without logos , without thinking about thinking. And if a firm distinction is drawn—as it should be—between methodology and technique, the latter is no substitute for the former. One may be a wonderful researcher and manipulator of data, and yet remain an unconscious thinker.
The aim of the article is to analyse whether democratization of the candidate selection process has occurred in Western European parties in general and in Denmark in particular in the period from 1960 to 1990. The analysis is based on the party rules in force around 1960 and 1990 of 57 and 71 Western European parties, respectively. The general assumption is that the greater the role of the individual party member, the more democratically the parties conduct their internal affairs and, furthermore, the more decentralized the procedure, the greater the possibilities for individual party members to play a role. The analysis indicates that the candidate selection process was more decentralized and the role of the individual party member in the process were greater at the beginning of the 1990s than they were around 1960.
At a time when the literature on political parties is brimming with health and vitality, the parties themselves seem to be experiencing potentially severe legitimacy problems and to be suffering from a quite massive withdrawal of popular support and affection. This article addresses one key aspect of the problems facing contemporary parties in Europe, which is the challenge to party government. I begin by reviewing the changing pattern of party competition, in which I discuss the decline of partisanship in policy-making and the convergence of parties into a mainstream consensus. I then look again at the familiar ‘parties-do-matter’ thesis and at the evidence for declining partisanship within the electorate. In the third section of the paper I explore the various attempts to specify the conditions for party government, before going on in the final section to argue that these conditions have been undermined in such a way that it is now almost impossible to imagine party government in contemporary Europe either functioning effectively or sustaining complete legitimacy.
Political scientists have expressed concern over the decline of political parties in recent years. This study provides evidence that at least one element of the political party, the party organization, is experiencing a resurgence rather than a decline. Data collected from nearly 400 House candidates reveal that party organizations continue to play an important role in congressional elections. National party committees, particularly the parties’ congressional campaign committees, are now providing candidates with valuable assistance in activities that require technical expertise, in-depth research, or connections with the Washington campaign community. Included among these activities are campaign advertising, issue development, and fund-raising. State and local party organizations continue to assist candidates with gauging public opinion and mobilizing the electorate. Republican party organizations, especially the Republican National Committee and the National Republican Congressional Committee, provide candidates with more assistance than do their Democratic counterparts. The RNC and the NRCC are more effective at targeting their assistance to candidates involved in competitive races. Party organizations are successfully adapting to the changing political environment.
During the 1992 Parliament the Conservative Party lost its reputation for unity. The parliamentary party, said by some to be unusually rebellious, got the blame. This article places the levels of dissent in the division lobbies of the House of Commons in historical perspective, comparing the 1992 Parliament with those before. Contrary to received wisdom, Conservative MPs were not noticeably more rebellious after 1992. The article also considers the ideological and factional basis of the rebellions. Because the rebellions in Parliament focused almost exclusively on Europe, the party remained one of tendencies, albeit well-organised and cohesive tendencies, rather than factions; and the extent to which the rebellions cut across existing ideological cleavages has been overstated.
This article offers an overview of levels of party membership in European democracies at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century and looks also at changes in these levels over time, comparing party membership today with figures from both 1980 and the late 1990s. While relying primarily on the direct and individual membership figures as reported by the parties themselves, the fit of the data with survey data is explored and it is concluded that the two perform well in terms of convergent validity. The differences between large and small democracies are examined, as well as old and new democracies, and it is found that levels of party membership are related to both the size and age of the democratic polity in question. Finally, the implications of the patterns observed in the membership data are discussed, and it is suggested that membership has now reached such a low ebb that it may no longer constitute a relevant indicator of party organisational capacity.
Almost one-fourth of the members of the lower house in Italy, the Chamber of Deputies, switched parties at least once between 1996 and 2001. Why would a legislator abandon one party and enter another during a legislative term? Starting from the basic assumption that politicians are ambitious, we examine electoral and partisan motivations for members of parliament (MPs) who switch parties. We conclude that party switching most likely is motivated by party labels that provide little information about policy goals and that pit copartisans against each other in the effort to serve constituent needs. Switching is especially frequent when ambitious politicians operate under heightened uncertainty.
Throughout the contest for the 2008 Democratic presidential nomination, politicians and voters alike worried that the outcome might depend on the preferences of unelected superdelegates. This concern threw into relief the prevailing notion thatâsuch unusually competitive cases notwithstandingâpeople, rather than parties, should and do control presidential nominations. But for the past several decades, The Party Decides shows, unelected insiders in both major parties have effectively selected candidates long before citizens reached the ballot box. Tracing the evolution of presidential nominations since the 1790s, this volume demonstrates how party insiders have sought since Americaâs founding to control nominations as a means of getting what they want from government. Contrary to the common view that the party reforms of the 1970s gave voters more power, the authors contend that the most consequential contests remain the candidatesâ fights for prominent endorsements and the support of various interest groups and state party leaders. These invisible primaries produce frontrunners long before most voters start paying attention, profoundly influencing final election outcomes and investing parties with far more nominating power than is generally recognized.
- Katz Richard S.
- Renwick Alan
Representative Government in Western Europe
- Michael Gallagher
- Michael Laver
- Peter Mair
Reforming the Presidential Nominating Process
- Steven S Smith
- Melanie J Springer
Which Face Comes First? The Ascendancy of the Party in Public Office
- Luciano Bardi
- Enrico Calossi
- Eugenio Pizzimenti
“Conclusion.” In Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective
- Michael Gallagher
Party Unity in Evolving Parliamentary Democracies: The Socialization of Representatives, the Impact of Democratic Competition, and Other Factors Leading to ‘Deviant Cases
- Erik Fritsche
Campaign Finance in the United States: Assessing an Era of Fundamental Change
- Nathaniel Persily
- Benjamin Ginsberg
- Robert Bauer
The Paradox of Party Funding: The Limited Impact of State Subsidies on Party Membership
- Ingrid Van Biezen
- Petr Kopecký
Chairman or Chief? Dublin: Gill & Co
- Brian Farrell
Personalization, Personalism and Electoral Systems.” In The Personalization of Democratic Politics and the Challenge for Political Parties
- Jean - Pilet
- Alan Benoit
- Renwick
George W. Bush and the Partisan Presidency
- Richard Skinner
The United Kingdom.” In Party Organizations: A Data Handbook
- Paul Webb