Christopher S. Parker is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago.
For their comments, patience, and encouragement I thank Dean Calloway, Michael Creswell, Charles Glaser, Henk Goemans, Andrew Grant-Thomas, Paul Kappur, Christopher Layne, Kier Leiber, Sean Lopez, John Mearsheimer, George Moreno, Sharon Morris, Bradley Thayer, Ivan Toft, and Monica Toft.
1. For states in the core, economic interdependence, political democracy, and nuclear weapons combine to lessen the security dilemma and promote peace. States in the periphery, on the other hand, do not have a similar mix of incentives and deterrents that militate against the likelihood of conflict. For an exceptional exposition on the post-Cold War security environment between developed and developing states, see James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era," International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 467-491. For the purposes of this article, I borrow the following taxonomy from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI): the industrial world, the developing world, and least developed countries. The roster of states in the developing world includes such key regional players as Israel, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East; and China, the Koreas, and Taiwan in Asia. SIPRI Yearbook 1997: World's Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 294.
2. On the prevalence of regional security systems, see Goldgeier and McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds"; and Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-33.
3. For an overview of the causes of war and the use of modern weapons in the developing world, see Eliot A. Cohen, "Distant Battles: Modern War in the Third World," International Security, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Spring 1986), pp. 143-171. Geoffrey Kemp discusses similar issues in greater detail in "Arms Transfers: The 'Back-End' Problem in Developing Countries," in Stephanie Neuman and Robert Harkavy, eds., Arms Transfers in the Modern World (New York: Praeger, 1979), pp. 264-275. For a more nuanced treatment of the relationship between weapons deployment, military institutions, and personnel, see Mary Kaldor and Asbjorn Eide, The World Military Order: The Impact of Technology on the Third World (London: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 9-10; and Steven J. Rosen, "New Land-Based Technologies," in Neuman and Harkavy, Arms Transfers in the Modern World, pp. 111-124. On weapons and regional instability, see W. Seth Carus, "Weapons Technology and Regional Stability," in Shelley A. Stahl and Geoffrey Kemp, eds., Arms Control and Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), pp. 10-12.
4. By transitional period I refer to the current confusion over the distribution of power that did not exist during the Cold War. Robert Jervis highlights this problem when he states that systemic polarity is "unipolar because the United States is so much stronger than the nearest competitor, bipolar because of the distribution of military resources, and tripolar because of an emerging united Europe." Jervis, "The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?" International Security, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Winter 1991/92), pp. 41-42.
5. Since 1991 China has acquired approximately 200 Russian-made Su-27 fighter bombers, 50 MiG-31 high-altitude interceptors, two Sovremennyi-class guided missile destroyers, and an undisclosed number of Russian Kilo-class submarines. Not to be outdone, Iraq in 1985-92 received $13.6 billion in arms transfers from the Soviet Union, including 1,000 T-72 main battle tanks and 45 MiG-29 Fulcrum fighter-interceptors. For more on Chinese military acquisitions and arms racing in Asia, see Charles P. Wallace, "Arms Race, Round 2," Los Angeles Times, March 23, 1993, p. D1; Desmond Ball, "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 78-112; Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon: China's Threat to East Asian Security," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 149-168; and Avery Goldstein, "Great Expectations: Interpreting...