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Will Change in Government Affect China–Pakistan
Economic Corridor? The BRI, CPEC and the
Khan Government: An Analysis
Ejaz Hussain
Department of Social Sciences
Iqra University, Islamabad, Pakistan
ejaz.hussain@iqraisb.edu.pk
Published 5 September 2019
Abstract
China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) was formally launched in 2015.
From the very outset, skeptics raised doubts about its sustainability and
meaningfulness for particularly Pakistani society, economy and the state.
Nevertheless, the Sharif government in strategic interaction with its Chinese
counterpart ably thwarted such controversies and ensured execution of the
CPEC projects in different parts of Pakistan. Though within Pakistan, political
opposition and certain nationalist political and social forces voiced their re-
lated concerns, for instance, to the “route”alignment, the federal and Punjab
government led by the Sharifs held ground and accorded priority to sustain
the Corridor by engaging local and provincial stakeholders. However, this was
not the case with the Khan government whose commerce advisor doubted the
negotiated terms and conditions of the CPEC and, therefore, called for its
revision to provide a fair deal to the Pakistani side. Why did the Khan gov-
ernment adopt such a policy? How does such a discourse affect China–
Pakistan relation in general and CPEC and the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) in
particular? What made the Khan government correct its path ultimately? In
other words, does change in government impact CPEC negatively? This paper
attempts to address these questions empirically.
Keywords
BRI; CPEC; controversies; Sharif government; PML-N; military; Khan
government; PTI.
This is an Open Access article, copyright owned by World Scientific Publishing Company
(WSPC) and School of International Relations and Public Affairs of Shanghai International
Studies University (SIRPA of SISU). The article is distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 (CC BY-NC) License which permits use, distri-
bution and reproduction in any medium, provided that the original work is properly cited
and is used for non-commercial purposes.
Chinese Journal of International Review
1950004 (19 pages)
©WSPC & SIRPA of SISU
DOI: 10.1142/S2630531319500045
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1. Introduction
China and Pakistan recognized each other’s independence and sovereignty
in the early 1950s (Ali, 2017). Though the scale of bilateral relations remained
essentially neutral during the said decade, the 1960s saw a shift from tactical
to strategic dimension with both the countries amicably demarcating
their boarder and exchanging military hardware (Small, 2015). During the
1970s, Pakistan was instrumental to realize the China–US rapprochement.
Moreover, the trajectory of bilateral relations consolidated in the following
decades with China assisting Pakistan in technological and economic terms.
In the post-9/11 period, Beijing and Islamabad ensured continuation of
strategic cooperation in fighting extremism and terrorism in the region and
building peace in particularly Afghanistan (Yang and Siddiqi, 2011). Im-
portantly, however, in this period, the Chinese and Pakistani top leadership
envisioned an altogether new dimension in bilateral relations.
The presidential level interaction in 2006 and 2008 resulted in the for-
mulation of what in 2015 was termed as the China–Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC) that was placed under China’s broader economic vision of
the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) under which overall six economic corridors
were proposed to realize market connectivity, multilateral trade and in-
vestment opportunities in Asia, Europe and Africa. The CPEC is, thus, a
crucial part of the BRI (Hussain, 2019).
2. Literature Review
Since the formal launch of CPEC in 2015, it has received considerable policy
and academic attention. The existing literature can be classified into
Chinese, Pakistani, Indian, European and North American perspectives.
The Chinese scholarship views CPEC as cooperative engagement under the
BRI framework with the economic potential to fulfill Pakistan’s energy
needs and help stabilize its dwindling economy (Shulin, 2015). In addition,
the Corridor is accorded centrality with respect to socioeconomic devel-
opment of Xinjiang —China’s western part that borders northwest
Pakistan. Importantly, the Chinese academia, overall, views CPEC in “win–
win”proposition based on the principle of equality in strategic and
sovereign terms (Tong, 2015). The Pakistani perspective also regards CPEC
as “win–win”cooperation, which is projected as hallmark of bilateral
strategic confidence (Ahmar, 2015; Husain, 2017). The Corridor is contex-
tualized as a new “ball game”under the BRI (Rizvi, 2015). It is also viewed
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as a “game changer”in terms of uplifting Pakistan’s economy, enhancing
the regional outreach of the country along with consolidating China–
Pakistan strategic partnership (Ahmed, 2018).
While the Chinese and Pakistani perspectives project an overwhelming
positive and productive character of CPEC, the Indian scholarship has
largely approached the Corridor in negative terms by raising territorial
concerns regarding Gilgit–Baltistan which is bracketed with Jammu &
Kashmir that India, illegally, claims as its formal part constitutionally
(Ahmad and Singh, 2017). In addition, CPEC is seen as a China–Pakistan
ploy to contain India strategically. Indeed, India’s current Prime Minister,
Narendra Modi, publically —and that too in Dhaka, Bangladesh —
denounced CPEC at the state level. However, a minority view within India’s
academic circles seems to have believed in the economic incentives offered by
the Corridor to Indian businesses vis-à-vis Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and
the Central Asian market (Das, 2017). Here, Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–
Pakistan–India (TAPI) energy venture is cited as a case in point that reflects
India–Pakistan collaboration in a multilateral economic interaction (War-
ikoo, 2016). Overwhelmingly, however, anti-CPEC discourse dominates the
Indian political and policy discourse (Sachdeva, 2018).
The European scholarship, on the one hand, seems skeptical of the BRI
whereby CPEC is seen as China’s strategy to capture European market not
just in Europe but also in other parts of the world especially the African
continent where Chinese products and corporations have gained consid-
erable access in recent years (Barth, 2014; Callahan, 2015). On the other
hand, certain studies take a rational view of China’s engagement with
South Asian and European enterprises. Indeed, China’s trade volume with
the European Union (EU) has witnessed positive trend recently (Vergeron,
2018). Nevertheless, misgivings at political and policy level do exist; the
current skepticism on Huawei’s 5G technology is a case in point.
Similarly, the policy input produced in North America and Australia
views the BRI as China’s“grand strategy”to deprive particularly the US of
investment, business and trade opportunities in Europe, Africa and Asia
(Beeson, 2018; Lampton, 2016). Thus, the Trump administration-led ongo-
ing trade war between China and the US has essentialized the already
existing speculations about China’s rise regionally and internationally
(Bown, 2019; Rolland, 2017). As far as CPEC is concerned, South Asia is
regarded as a test ground for strategic realignment on the part of China.
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The latter is, therefore, assumed, though sans sound empirical data, as
potential colonizer of the economically vulnerable countries, Pakistan in-
cluded, under the BRI regime (Fair, 2017). The Chinese loans to, for in-
stance, Pakistan are regarded as part of “debt trap”on the part of Beijing to
gradually take control of economically and strategically sensitive locations
in Pakistan and elsewhere in the world (John Hurley and Portelance, 2018;
Kinyondo, 2019; Weerakoon, 2017).
This study tends to disagree with the foregoing opinion regarding the
colonization of Pakistan through particularly CPEC and broadly the BRI.
To begin with, China–Pakistan bilateral relations, as already highlighted,
are decades-old and have achieved a “factor of durability”(Ali, 2017).
Moreover, the modern international political system is predicated on the
concept of the nation-state; it is no longer the age of hardcore colonialism.
When the British colonized South Asia in the 19th century, the world had
witnessed the “empire-state”system globally (Rothermund, 2006). Nowa-
days, however weaker a nation-state could be, it tries its best to guard its
territorial integrity and sovereignty with all possible means. Within South
Asia, contemporary Afghanistan is a case in point —where the US-led
Western powers could not establish hegemony. Instead, the US is looking for
an honorable exit under Trump (Mitra et al., 2015).
Second, China itself has a history of partial colonization. Thus, it is quite
conscious of the ramifications of such a policy discourse. Third, Pakistan is
not a failed state with no capacity to sustain itself; fourth, the CPEC-related
loans amount to less than 7% of Pakistan’s total loan. Currently, it owes
more than 100 billion dollars to the western financial institutions such the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (State Bank of Pakistan, 2019). Impor-
tantly, if Pakistan’s economy managers work diligently, the CPEC (prefer-
ential) loans —which are around 2 billion dollars a year —can be paid
back through CPEC itself (Husain, 2017).
Having reviewed the major literature on different aspects of CPEC, the
paper, in the following sections, attempts to empirically address the posed
questions: Why did the Khan Government initially adopt a seemingly anti-
CPEC policy? How does such a discourse affect China–Pakistan relation in
general and CPEC and the BRI in particular? What made the Khan Gov-
ernment correct its path ultimately? In other words, does change in gov-
ernment impact CPEC negatively in the current context as well as the
foreseeable future?
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3. The BRI and South Asia
Globalization is as old as human beings. From the Neolithic period
onwards, people from the Eurasian region devised means and managed
resources to explore “routes”to establish transcontinental ideational, cul-
tural and commercial connectivity (Holton, 1985). Consequently, in the
medieval period, “Silk Route”gained currency in the African, European
and Asian social, political and economic milieu. However, the spirit of the
“Silk Route”was compromised on account of the West-led colonialism that,
for centuries, exploited the local market, culture and identity in Latin
America, Africa and Asia. South Asia, indeed, bore the brunt of the British
colonialism that extracted raw material to sustain its industrial growth at
home (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Importantly, the Chinese society
and economy in the 19th and early 20th centuries, too, faced unwanted
consequences of the western imperialism. Both the South Asian and the
Chinese people ultimately challenged foreign rule and domination and,
through prolong phase of struggle and resistance, won independence in
terms of the establishment of sovereign nation-states by the middle of the
20th century. The ensuing Cold War geopolitics though affected both China
and its neighboring South Asian countries such as India and Pakistan, it is
the latter that suffered the most on account of inter-state conflict, internal
instability and external financial pressures —that hindered sustained
economic growth in the absence of structural reforms in the means of
production (Mitra and Rothermund, 1997).
While South Asian countries lacked the imagination to reconcile the
domestic market conditions with the regional and global trends, the post-
Mao China started, on its own, the transformation of the economy in terms
of what is now famously known as the “reform and opening up”policy
(Yongming, 2007). Since 1979, China has consistently engaged the world in
terms of geo-economics —which is hallmark of economic globalization.
Moreover, in order to enhance its economic base along with contribution to
(extra) regional economic development, the Chinese government under the
leadership of President Xi Jinping launched, in 2013, its mega connectivity
and cooperation project commonly known as the BRI.
The Belt and Road run through the continents of Asia,
Europe and Africa, connecting the vibrant East Asia eco-
nomic circle at one end and developed European economic
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circle at the other, and encompassing countries with huge
potential for economic development. The Silk Road
Economic Belt focuses on bringing together China, Central
Asia, Russia and Europe (the Baltic); linking China with the
Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea through Central
Asia and West Asia; and connecting China with Southeast
Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean. The 21st-Century
Maritime Silk Road is designed to go from China’s coast to
Europe through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean
in one route, and from China’s coast through the South
China Sea to the South Pacific in the other. (NDRC, 2015)
As the foregoing highlighted, the BRI is grounded in transcontinental
market connectivity and economic cooperation. To realize the latter, six
multi-dimensional economic corridors under the Silk Road Economic Belt
were formally negotiated by the Chinese government in multi-level en-
gagement with regional and global leadership spanning more than five
years. Currently, 174 BRI cooperation documents have been signed by
China with around 126 countries and 29 international organizations
(Desheng, 2019). Indeed, in April 2019, China’s Second Belt and Road
Forum (BRF) received 37 head of governments/states along with more than
5000 delegations from 190 countries and 90 non-state organizations
(Tiezzi, 2019). This huge concentration of world leadership and economic
organizations underscore the overwhelming significance of mutual trade
volume that has surpassed six trillion US dollars (CGTN, 2019). Moreover,
the volume of investment between China and the participating countries
including Pakistan has exceeded 80 billion US dollars in 2019 (CGTN,
2019). In addition, South Asia, as an economic region, seemed to have been
privileged in terms of hosting two out of the six economic corridors,
namely, the Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corri-
dor and the CPEC. The following section explains the initiation and im-
plementation of CPEC along with the controversies it generated —and the
measures adopted by the federal government —in its initial phase.
4. The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor
China–Pakistan relations are based on time-tested strategic confidence
developed over the past six decades. In this timeframe, Beijing and
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Islamabad interacted with each other technologically, militarily and eco-
nomically. However, the scale of bilateral economic relations remained
limited in the pre-CPEC period (pre-2015). Indeed, the bilateral trade vol-
ume stood at 17 billion US$ in 2014 (Malik, 2017). In the post-9/11 period,
where regional geopolitical alignments started shifting —as, for instance,
India–US relations improved to the detriment of Pakistan —China and
Pakistan got further closer strategically and, importantly, economically
(Ali, 2017). Thus, in the 2000s, the top leadership of the two countries
deliberated pros and cons of the enhancement of economic engagement in
terms of innovation in infrastructural development. Though China and
Pakistan, in the past, had already collaborated in the construction of the
Karakoram Highway (KKH), which provided a land-based linkage to
products and people of the two countries, the two sides principally agreed
to not only improve upon the KKH but also expand economic cooperation
in related areas such as port development.
Thus, in the context of China’s BRI, as discussed above, the CPEC was
formalized by the two governments when the Chinese President Xi Jinping
made a historic visit of Pakistan in 2015 (Dawn, 2015). Initially, multiple
projects worth 46 billion US dollars in infrastructure, energy, fiber optic and
Gwadar port development were agreed upon by both sides. The CPEC was,
thus, hailed as a “flagship”project of the BRI by whole range of stake-
holders in China and Pakistan and beyond (Hussain, 2017). The Sharif
government, which formally inaugurated CPEC (projects), credited itself
for not only consolidating the bilateral relations but also attracting much-
needed financial input to the chequered economy. The opposition political
parties and certain socioethnic forces, however, thought differently.
4.1. Controversies
With the formal launch of the CPEC, one of the major controversies was
related to the so-called “routes”alignment. The opposition political parties,
especially based in the non-Punjab provinces and regions such as
Balochistan, criticized the Sharifs
1
-led federal and Punjab government for
having privileged the Punjab in terms of diversion of the originally
1
Nawaz Sharif was Pakistan’s prime minister during July 2013–2017. He was disqualified
from the office by the country’s Supreme Court in July 2017. He led the federal government
whereas his younger brother, Shahbaz Sharif, led the Punjab government as chief minister.
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proposed “western”route that was supposedly to pass through Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. The Awami National Party (ANP), based in
KP, and the Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP), based in
Balochistan —both are Pashtun nationalist parties —channelized popular
perception in political terms by urging the federal government for allo-
cating due share to the “aggrieved”communities (Daily Times, 2015). The
development of road infrastructure in northwestern Pakistan was, thus,
deemed by such political forces as means to enhance intra- and inter-pro-
vincial communicational and commercial capacity as the transport busi-
nesses in Pakistan are mostly controlled by the Pashtuns.
Another domain of disagreement among the regional, i.e. Gilgit–
Baltistan, provincial and the federal stakeholders pertained to the allocation
of CPEC funds. The anti-PML-N, the political party of the Sharifs, parties
particularly Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) accused the for-
mer for expropriation in the Corridor finances by over-allocating resources
into the Punjab government’s Orange Line Train Project (Malkham, 2017).
Moreover, the political parties and social forces from Sindh, KP and
Gilgit–Baltistan, too, registered their resentment towards the so-called
“Punjabization”of the CPEC (Wolf, 2016).
Last but not the least, the pro-climate organizations and activists raised
environmental concerns for the federal and the Punjab government, in their
view, not only bypassed climate-related rules and regulations but also
accorded little regard to centuries-old “archeological”heritage during the
planned construction of, for instance, the Lahore-oriented Orange Line
train project. Indeed, the matter was referred to the Lahore High Court
whose proceedings took time, and, in the meanwhile, the project got
delayed (Tanveer and Shaukat, 2016).
4.2. Sharing the cake
The CPEC did face controversies as discussed in Sec. 4.1. Indubitably, the
federal and the Punjab government led by the PML-N faced tough situation
politically and socially. Nevertheless, the federal government adopted a
pragmatist approach to deal with the “aggrieved”parties and their con-
stituencies. To begin with, in order to assuage the non-Punjab regional and
provincial grievances related to the “CPEC routes”, the Sharif government
sought a political solution in terms of generating consensus through the
mechanism of what is called All Parties Conference (APC) —where the
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concerned political parties sit together to discuss contested issues
(Haider, 2015).
Thus, through the conduct of the APCs, Nawaz Sharif, as prime minister
of Pakistan, was able to win over the confidence of the regional and pro-
vincial political elite by agreeing to the original “routes”map of the CPEC.
Indeed, the CPEC “Long Term Plan”, visualized by the PML-N government
by the end of 2017, carried added emphasis on the infrastructural and
socioeconomic development of the otherwise “neglected”regions and
provinces such as Balochistan (CPEC, 2017). To understand CPEC com-
prehensively from a bilateral perspective, the federal government also en-
couraged the provincial governments especially the chief ministers to visit
China and apprise themselves of the latest development that had materi-
alized under the BRI (Dawn, 2017).
Moreover, as an outcome of the 6th Joint Cooperation Committee
(JCC) meeting held in Beijing in December 2016 between the Chinese and
Pakistani authorities, nine Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were pro-
posed; each province, i.e. Sindh, and region, Gilgit–Baltistan, hosted one
SEZ in principle (Anjum, 2017). Importantly, the provincial government
of, for example, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, while marking its interest in
CPEC, started the purchase of land for the construction of SEZ. More-
over, work on the Gwadar Port was expedited under the Sharif gov-
ernment. In November 2016, indeed, the port partly became functional
for cargo shipment (Reuters, 2016). Balochistan, historically, stood at the
lower ladder of socioeconomic development due to various reasons
which include the Baloch insurgency that hindered developmental pro-
grams in certain districts. Also, the local landed elite along with the
provincial bureaucracy saw to its petty than the larger interests of the
provincial masses which lack in basic facilities such as health care and
quality education (Hussain and Khan, 2014). With the introduction of
CPEC to the southwest Pakistan, infrastructure development along with
proposed construction of Gwadar airport and power plants, one can
expect significant improvement in transportation, communication and
inter-provincial industrial cooperation —with trickle down effects for
the local population. Besides, the Sharif government also vowed to take
the climatic concerns into consideration.Indeed,theverdictofthe
Lahore High Court on the suspended Orange Line train project is a case
in point.
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Thus, what can be deduced from the foregoing is that the PML-N
government adopted a pragmatic approach to negotiate with the critical
forces on CPEC. It engaged the nationalist political parties and social forces
in a rational dialogue to seek a consensual solution to the highlighted
grievances. Consequently, the CPEC “Long Term Plan”, was a step in
the right direction. Also, exposure to the broader contours of the BRI to
the provincial elite also served as a catalyst for the effective realization
of CPEC.
Therefore, it is argued that the Sharif government was able to neu-
tralize the negative effects of the mentioned CPEC “controversies”and
place the Corridor at the core of China–Pakistan economic cooperation.
Interestingly, however, after the July 2018 general election in Pakistan,
the Sharif’s party, PML-N, could not form government in the Centre as
well as the Punjab. Rather, it was Imran Khan’sPTIthatwasabletoform
government at the federal and the provincial level except Sindh where
Asif Ali Zardari-led Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) formed government.
While the Sharifs had effectively managed anti-CPEC politics in
remainder of their tenure, the Khan government, from the very outset,
generated a new controversy over CPEC. The following sections analyze
it in detail.
5. The Khan Government and the CPEC
Pakistan held its 11th general elections in July 2018 in which Imran Khan’s
PTI won considerable number of seats to form government in the Centre as
well as provinces except Sindh. In the latter, the PPP led by Asif Ali
Zardari formed provincial government for the second consecutive time.
Since pre-election, the PTI’s social and electoral campaign was pretty much
focused on the eradication of “corruption”and improvement in the
economy, Khan, besides the selection of a formal cabinet, appointed a team
of advisors to the prime minister on important issues faced by the country.
Since management of the economy seemed to be the government’s topmost
priority, it appointed an industrialist, Abdul Razak Dawood, as advisor for
commerce, textiles, industry & production and investment (CTI&PI) —
commonly called as “commerce”advisor. Having assumed the charge,
Mr. Dawood took a critical view of the CPEC. The following section
analyzes it in detail.
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5.1. The Government-generated controversy
As discussed earlier in this paper, in the pre-PTI period, CPEC was seen by
certain political and social forces skeptically. However, due to the timely
and efficient management on the part of the Sharif government, the CPEC
“controversies”were neutralized. Moreover, such controversies were gen-
erated by the opposition political parties and/or pro-climate groups, and
not by the PML-N government. However, the case of the Khan government
was very interesting in the sense that it was the government itself that
generated a serious controversy on the CPEC. On September 10, 2018, the
Financial Times (London) published a report on CPEC in which it quoted the
Khan government’s advisor on commerce, Mr. Dawood, who said that:
[C]hinese companies received tax breaks, many breaks and
have an undue advantage in Pakistan; this is one of the
things we’re looking at because it’s not fair that Pakistan
companies should be disadvantaged... I think we should
put everything on hold for a year so we can get our act
together... Perhaps we can stretch CPEC out over another
five years or so. (Financial Times, 2018)
As the one highlighted above, Dawood’s take on the CPEC was not only
critical of CPEC’s terms and conditions negotiated by the previous PML-N
government, it raised concerns not just within Pakistan especially in the
anti-PTI parties but also in the concerned Chinese circles. Before the
implications of such statement by member of the cabinet are discussed, it
becomes pertinent to explain what led to the pronouncement of such a
policy (dis)course ostensibly on the part of the Khan government.
Three plausible factors might have factored in. First, since the PTI had
already based its political and electoral campaign on “corruption”com-
mitted by especially the Sharifs, once in office, the PTI government went on
with the same mindset (sub)consciously where, in order to sustain popular
legitimacy, it held the PML-N government responsible for the ills Pakistan
was suffering from. Indeed, Prime Minister Imran Khan himself cashed on
the disqualification of Nawaz Sharif while bracketing Pakistan’s poor eco-
nomic performance with the previous Sharif government which did mas-
sive corruption in the former’s view. Therefore, from this logic, it seems
plausible on the part of the Khan government to perceive corrupt practices
of the PML-N government in the determination of the terms and conditions
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of the Corridor. Ironically, however, the mentioned advisor to the prime
minister could not provide verifiable data in this respect.
Second, Mr. Dawood, being a businessman and industrialist himself,
would have placed his personal economic interest above the national in-
terest by trying to create possible space for the renegotiations of some, if not
all, CPEC projects. The foregoing, indeed, proved to be the case as, within
months, of his anti-CPEC rhetoric, Dawood’s company, Descon was able to
obtain contract worth Rs 300 billion for the construction of Mohmand Dam
in (formerly) FATA (Dawn, 2019). Third, despite the prevalence of the
preceding variable, the Khan government, overall, lacked experience in
policy articulation, implementation and, importantly, continuation. Put
differently, the Khan government miserably failed to fathom the strategic
depth of China–Pakistan relations and, instead of adopting a reasoned
discourse of cross-communication of disagreement, it simply relied on
foreign media to express its discontent which obviously carried the po-
tential to affect the CPEC as well as the BRI. Section 5.2 tends to elaborate it
concisely.
5.2. Implications of anti-CPEC rhetoric for the BRI
As highlighted earlier, CPEC is the core component of the China’s BRI.
Indeed, the CPEC is a hallmark of strategic confidence between the two
countries. Before the incumbent government, the PPP and the PML-N
governments were very mindful of the mutuality of relations that the lead-
ership of the two sides nourished over decades. The previous government
took extraordinary measures to generate consensus over the mentioned
controversies related, for instance, to the construction of CPEC routes.
The mentioned statement of the said advisor to Prime Minister Imran
Khan implicated CPEC in the short run. The regional anti-CPEC and anti-
BRI elements especially from India aired Dawood’s interview out of pro-
portion (Times of India, 2018). Such forces, which are very active on the
social media such as Facebook and Twitter, tried to portray China–Pakistan
relations in negative terms. Some linked the statement to Dawood and
Khan’s pro-west inclinations at the expense of China–Pakistan relations.
Internationally, the anti-BRI lobbies invoked its “debt trap”construct and
applied it to the Khan government’s apparent distain towards CPEC,
implying that Dawood exposed the unequal nature of the Corridor with
respect to its financial machinations. Interestingly, the Pakistani
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government was simultaneously engaging the IMF for loans, the (extra)
regional anti-BRI voices expected deterioration in the development of the
Corridor and, by default, predicted improvement in the US–Pakistan
relations for, in order to get loans from IMF or the World Bank, the ap-
proval of the US was a prerequisite (Rana, 2018).
Besides, the Chinese side would also have been resentful due to the fact
that Dawood’s critical approach on CPEC impacted the BRI negatively.
Being part and parcel of the BRI framework, CPEC carried high value
socially and economically. Any public display of displeasure over CPEC
contents, and that too by a representative of the Pakistani government,
would have meant, for the Chinese authorities, an explicit criticism of the
BRI which has encompassed more than 150 countries, plethora of non-
governmental organizations from four different continents. In other words,
the Khan government, arguably, treaded in a manner that not only affected
the CPEC negatively but also carried negative overtones for the overall
rapport and outreach of the BRI.
5.3. Course correction
China–Pakistan relations are unique in the sense that it is not just the civil
government that is a stakeholder but also the military and, most recently,
the corporate media that thrive on account of its coverage of CPEC. Thus,
within hours of Dawood’s CPEC statement, the local (social) media went
viral in highlighting the contents and implications of such a policy (dis-)course.
Indeed, the overwhelming thrust of the media coverage compelled the said
advisor to clarify his stance on the CPEC within no time (The Nation, 2018).
Moreover, certain other members of the Khan cabinet also softened the
situation at home.
Along with the media measures taken to cool down the negativity of
Dawood’s pronouncement, the Khan government attempted to handle the
matter diplomatically as well. In this respect, the visit, within a week of
Dawood’s interview, of China by the Chief of Army Staff, General Qamar
Javed Bajwa, carried immense significance. As a strong stakeholder of
politics and the state, the Pakistani military has viewed the country’s
relations with China in military-strategic terms since the mid-1960s
(Hussain, 2013). The two countries had also interacted technologically.
Post-9/11, the economic dimension has been factored into the trajectory of
bilateral relations.
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“Since the military is a powerful and responsible actor in Pakistan’s
polity and politics, it has always attached overwhelming importance to
Pakistan relations with Beijing. Thus, to neutralize the negative effects of
the inexperienced advisor to the [Khan] government, the army chief
thought it prudent to talk directly to his counterpart to ensure the Chinese
[government] of Pakistan’sfirm commitment to the continuation and ex-
pansion of China–Pakistan Economic Corridor”.
2
Another opportunity came in November 2018 when Prime Minister
Imran Khan visited China himself to participate in the China International
Import Expo (CIIE). Khan met with his Chinese counterparts and tried to
clear away the negativity espoused by his commerce and industry advisor
(Hussain, 2018). Though Khan could not convince the Chinese government
to bail out his government with the much touted 2 billion concessional
loans, the visit, overall, was seen positively, at least, by the Pakistani side.
Moreover, Khan made his second visit to China in April 2019 to take part in
China’s Second BRF. The BRF proved an effective platform for the Khan
delegation to discuss the contours of CPEC under the BRI framework
(The News, 2019b). The two sides engaged each other meaningfully with
the result that they signed various Memorandums of Understanding
(MoUs) to expand cooperation in economic terms. With respect to CPEC,
the two governments agreed to construct Rashakai SEZ on a priority basis
(The News, 2019a). In other words, Khan’s second visit proved more ef-
fective in terms of not only getting over the bitter episode on CPEC, but
also moving in the direction of finding a mutually acceptable solution to
issues that may creep up in the future.
6. Conclusion
China–Pakistan relations are grounded in mutuality of strategic confidence.
Though the overall trajectory of relations remained essentially military-
strategic, the post-9/11 geopolitical context provided a unique opportunity
to both the countries to add economic dimension which, by 2013, shaped
into China’s BRI of which the CPEC is a core component. The CPEC, thus,
has assumed immense significance for not only China–Pakistan economic
cooperation but also for the projection, expansion and consolidation of the
2
Conversation with a retired military man, Islamabad, January 22, 2019.
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BRI. The Corrida initially faced certain controversies related to, for exam-
ple, its routes. Nevertheless, the previous Sharif government neutralized
the negative effects of such controversies by generating inter-party and
inter-provincial consensus on the CPEC (projects). Indeed, the proposed
SEZs was a calculated measure to allocate CPEC resources to each region
and province, respectively.
Instead of consolidating the gains of its predecessor, the Khan govern-
ment generated another controvert itself —and that, too, on the very nature
of the CPEC. The government’s commerce advisor questioned the terms and
conditions of the Corridor and called for its thorough revision and renego-
tiation. The (extra) regional anti-CPEC and anti-BRI forces aired such a
stance. Before the situation could have worsened to the effect of impacting
China–Pakistan relations negatively, the Pakistani military leadership timely
intervened into the matter by providing assurances to its Chinese counter-
party of the sustainability of CPEC. Moreover, Prime Minister Imran Khan,
also, visited China, twice, to clear away misgivings and misunderstandings.
Consequently, China and Pakistan, most recently, signed various agreements
of which the construction of Rashakai SEZ is a topmost priority.
Last but not the least, three broader conclusions can be drawn from the
foregoing. One, it is likely, though at a low scale, that an inexperienced
advisor/minister, if not the entire government, may fumble at handling as
sensitive a project as CPEC in the future. Two, the Pakistani military is
highly expected to come forth to get any intriguing issue bilaterally dis-
cussed and, possibly, resolved. Three, given the factor of durability in
China–Pakistan relations, the broader contours of bilateral relations would
get further consolidated and the CPEC has the potential to add economic
incentives into the already established military-strategic domain. Finally, it
is in the mutual interest of both China and Pakistan to seek mutually
acceptable means to resolve any creeping issue. Also, the two sides ought
to gradually expand economic outreach of the CPEC within the South
Asian region and beyond.
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