Negotiating Sāṅkhya-Yoga concepts: al-Bīrūnī and Falsafa

Abstract

This article examines three passages drawn from al-Bīrūnī’s Taḥqīq mā li-l-Hind (Indica) and one from his Kitāb Pātanğal (Book Pātanğal). In these passages, the scholar applied a specific terminology belonging to Islamic philosophy and indebted to Aristotle in order to express technical Sāṅkhya and Yoga concepts. His choices of interpretation are rooted
in his intellectual background, such as the Falsafa terminology which he used was part of a shared knowledge among Muslim thinkers of his time. This article provides with a comparative analysis of the Arabic translated terms of the Sanskrit original concepts. It discusses the manner in which al-Bīrūnī interpreted these concepts and the possible reasons which led him to make these interpretive choices. Lastly, it highlights the necessity of examining al-Bīrūnī's transmission of Indian thought by way of his intellectual background.

Full text

Center for South Asian Studies, Ryukoku University
RINDAS
National Institutes for the Humanities（NIHU）Project
 Integrated Area Studies on South Asia（INDAS-South Asia）
Negotiating Sānkhya-Yoga concepts:
al-Bīrūnī and Falsafa
RINDAS Series of Working Papers: Traditional Indian Thoughts 28
Noemie Verdon
・

Center for South Asian Studies, Ryukoku University
Inter-Univesity Research Insitutute Corporation National Institutes for the Humanities
Ryukoku Research Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Religion, Science and Humanities
In many studies, it has been pointed out that Indian society has undergone radical changes since the 1990s. This is seen in
the political sphere in the spread and the deepening of democracy. In terms of the economy, changes are remarkable in the
development of the market economy, improvements in living conditions and widening of economic gaps, which is one of the
negative impacts of such economic growth. Societally, this has been expressed through the appearance and rise of various
social movements. Culturally and religiously, it has been expressed through a parallel rise in assertion of identities by diverse
communities. These changes can be seen as the results of embryonic fundamental changes in thought and values of people in
India and South Asia.
The unified theme of this project is Fundamental Changes in Thought and Values in South Asia. One perspective being
used to approach this theme is genealogical research along the long timeline of philosophy and thought in South Asian
societies, using Ryukoku Universitys extensive accumulation of research. Another is analysis of fundamental changes in
values based on fieldwork research of actual conditions. These perspectives are combined in comprehensive research, with the
aim of identifying the sources of changes in the foundations of contemporary Indian and South Asian societies, and the driving
power behind them. Special attention is paid to the rise of the Dalits, other lower strata people, and religious minorities, a
phenomenon that represents dynamic changes in contemporary Indian and South Asian societies. The project examines the
background and theory behind this, with relation to the history of philosophy and thought, and investigates and analyzes
changes in peoples living conditions, consciousness, and sense of values, based on fieldwork research.
The "South Asian Area Studies" Project (FY 2016 to 2021) is being operated and conducted by expanding upon the
National Institutes for the Humanities Contemporary India Area Studies Project (Phase 1: FY 2010 to 2014, Phase 2: FY
2015). Ryukoku University is one of six institutions working together, conducting joint networked research. It is joined by
Kyoto University (the central research hub), the National Museum of Ethnology (the secondary research hub), the University
of Tokyo, Hiroshima University, and the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies.

RINDAS Series of Working Papers: Traditional Indian Thoughts 28
Noemie Verdon
Negotiating Sāṅkhya-Yoga concepts: al-Bīrūnī and Falsafa

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Table of content
Negotiating S»Ӟkhya-Yoga concepts: al-Bårĥnå and Falsafa
1.Introduction
2.Transmission of potentiality/actuality: from Aristotle to al-Bårĥnå
3.Al-Bårĥnå’s use of potentiality and actuality
4.Concluding remarks
5.References
Negotiating S»Ӟkhya-Yoga concepts: al-Bårĥnå and
Falsafa1
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Noemie Verdon
Post-doctoral fellow, Institute for Research in Humanities, Kyoto University
This article examines three passages drawn from al-Bårĥnå’s TaҺqåq m» li-l-Hind (Indica)
and one from his Kit»b P»tanÙal (Book P»tanÙal). In these passages, the scholar applied
a specific terminology belonging to Islamic philosophy and indebted to Aristotle in order
to express technical S»Ӟkhya and Yoga concepts. His choices of interpretation are rooted
in his intellectual background, as the Falsafa terminology which he used was part of a
shared knoweldge among Muslim thinkers of his time. This article provides with a
comparative analysis of the Arabic translated terms of the Sanskrit original concepts. It
discusses the manner in which al-Bårĥnå interpreted these concepts and the possible
reasons which led him to make these interpretive choices. Lastly, it highlights the necessity
of examining al-Bårĥnå’s transmission of Indian thought by way of his intellectual
background.
Keywords: al-Bårĥnå, Islamic philosophy, Falsafa, India philosophy, S»Ӛkhya, Yoga,
transmission of ideas, history of philosophy, strategies of translations
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1.Introduction
At the turn of the first millennium CE, al-Bårĥnå (973 – ca. 1050) undertook to transmit Indian
philosophy, religion, cosmology and astronomy to a Muslim audience. In approximately 1030 CE, he
composed the TaҺqåq m» li-l-Hind, also commonly referred to as the Indica. In this work, he quoted
numerous Sanskrit works, some of which were completely or partly translated by him into Arabic. For
instance, he interpreted the Bh»gavadgåt», some Pĥr»Ӝas and several passages of the
Br»hmaspuԂhasiddh»nta.2 In the philosophical domain, the scholar also abundantly quoted in his
monograph the Kit»b S»nk (Ϛ˸ϧΎγΏΎΘ̯), i.e., the Book S»nk, and Kit»b P»tanÙal (ϞΠϨΗΎ̡ΏΎΘϛ), i.e., the Book
P»tanÙal. Whereas there is no extant entire text of the former, it is possible to connect it to the
SƗۨkhyakƗrikƗDQGRQHRILWVFRPPHQWDU\. The latter text of which a manuscript was discovered in the
1950s constitutes an Arabic translation of a Yoga text which is either identical to the
P»tañjalayogaĕ»stra or highly similar to it.3 The scholar translated both works into Arabic on the basis
of two Sanskrit originals, each constituted of two layers of text, i.e., an aphoristic text and its
commentary. At the same time, his interactions with Brahmins provided him with an oral commentary
of these two works.4
Al-Bårĥnå’s Arabic translations often diverge a great deal from their possible Sanskrit sources.5
There are several reasons for these discrepancies. This article aims to show how al-Bårĥnå tranmitted
some concepts of Indian thought to his readership by way of a terminology indebted to Falsafa and
Greek thought. For instance, al-Bårĥnå made use of the concepts of potentiality (dunamis) and of
actuality (energeia) in several of his works. The present survey points out different contexts in which
this specific terminology occurs and highlights that the scholar did not produce literal translations of
Sanskrit texts. On the contrary, his interpretative work was a process during which the form and the
content of his sources were highly transformed. Lastly, it emerges that the scholar attempted to transfer
a message foreign to his audience; an attempt which was rather pertinent in general. In addition, the
article highlights some advantages and problems generated by al-Bårĥnå’s strategy of interpretation. In
order to demonstrate the above points, the present study analyses three excerpts drawn from the TaҺqåq
m» li-l-Hind and one from the Kit»b P»tanÙal.
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2.Transmission of
potentiality
/
actuality
: from Aristotle to al-BærĦnæ
The two concepts dunamis (potentiality) and energeia (actuality) were originally conceived by Aristotle
(384-322 BC), who used them in several of his writings, such as the Metaphysics, De Anima or the
Physics. Aristotle utilized these two concepts notably to explain changes occuring in the nature and at
the same time he also made use of them as heuristic tools in several of his theories.6 As the objective
of this article is not to delve into the complexity of Aristotle’s different uses of these concepts, it is
sufficient to recall here his definition of them found in his Metaphysics. In this work, Aristotle defines
potentiality as the movement principle and as the natural abilty – or the built-in possibility – of
becoming or doing something in actuality.7 In other words, actuality is a realisation of what was in
potentiality.8
Arabic translations of Greek philosophical writings were available – often via Syriac9 – to early
medieval Muslim thinkers since the eighth century CE. This period corresponds to the time when the
physician and philosopher al-Kindå initiated a vast project of translations at the Abbassid court in
Baghdad. In this manner, Aristotle’s writings such as the Metaphysics were rendered accessible to the
intellectual sphere of the time.10 Thanks to these translations, Islamic philosophers benefited from a
technical vocabulary. They were thus able develop what is known as Islamic philosophy or Falsafa.
They interpreted Hellenic philosophical thematics, problems, methods and solutions, upon which they
built their own models. The interest in translating Greek works also came from the advantage of gaining
tools for elaborating further philosophical considerations.11 The time elapsed between Aristotle and al-
Kindå, i.e., more than one millennium, and the use of intermediary languages, such as Syriac, also
account for the transformations impacting Greek philosophical doctrines in the writings of the Islamic
philosophers.12 A number of Islamic philosophers, such as al-Kindå, al-F»r»bå’s (ca. 870-950) and Ibn
Sån» (980-1037) developped their ideas based on Greek thinkers, influenced by Platonism,
Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism.13 Jean Jolivet and Roshdi Rashed recall for instance that al-Kindå
accepted Plato’s concepts of the soul, of the body and of the divine world, while he endorsed parts of
the metaphysics, of the understanding of the phenomenal world and of theories on intellectual
perception from Aristotle.14 According to Mohammed Arkoun, al-F»r»bå and Ibn Sån» reworked
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specifically on Plato’s politics, Aristotle’s logic, Galen’s psychology and medecine and Neoplatonist
metaphysics.15
The two concepts of dunamis and energeia, as many others originating from the Hellenic thought,
were reused, reinterpreted and commented upon by Greek, Muslim and western thinkers, philosophers
and commentators. These two Greek terms respectively translated into Arabic with the expresssions
bi-l-quwwa (Γ˷
ϮϘϟΎΑ), i.e., in potentiality, and bi-l-fiɷli (ϞόϔϟΎΑ), i.e., in actuality. Some other philosophical
terms were phonetically transposed from Greek to Arabic, as, for instance, the term al-hayĥl» (ϰϟϮϴϬϟ΍),
originating from the Greek hyle, signifying matter.
Al-Bårĥnå, when interpreting Indian philosophy, notably used these three philosophical terms, and
whatever may have been his actual knowledge of Greek language, he was familiar with Hellenic
philosophical terminology and authors. In the TaҺqåq m» li-l-Hind, he quotes for instance Ptolemy,
Plato, Galen, Proclus or Aristotle. More specifically, he quotes from Aristotle’s Physics and
Metaphysics.16 In the TaҺqåq m» li-l-Hind, al-Bårĥnå also mentions two translations into Indian language
(ΪϨϬϟ΍Δϐϟϰϟ·), in most likelihood Sanskrit, from the Arabic versions of Euclid’s Elements and of Ptolemy’s
Almagest.17 In 1036 CE, the scholar composed the bibliography of the physician and philosopher
MuҾammad Ibn Zakaråy» R»zå (ca. 854-925/935 CE), which he complemented with a list of his own
works he had written by then. In 1955, Jacques-Dominique Boilot translated al-Bårĥnå’s auto-
bibliography and completed it by adding writings attributed to him after the year 1036, as well as works
composed under his supervision. According to Boilot, the Sanskrit translations of the Arabic Elements
and Almagest fall under the second category of works.18 However, this auto-bibliography constitutes a
goldmine of information on al-Bårĥnå’s works. It also indicates that the scholar composed works on
Ptolemy’s Almagest, on Aristotle and Galen. 19 Although al-Bårĥnå was not strictly speaking a
philosopher, he certainly knew – even superficially – a large number of philosophical doctrines
developped by ancient Greek and Islamic thinkers, as well as their debates and the terminology they
used.20 As seen in the next section, the scholar made use of this knowledge when transmitting Indian
thought to his readership.
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FRQQHFWHGWRSKLORVRSK\+RZHYHUIXUWKHULQYHVWLJDWLRQLQWRWKHHSLVWRODU\H[FKDQJHEHWZHHQDO%ƯUnjQƯDQG,EQ6ƯQƗZRXOG
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3.Al-BærĦnæ’s use of
potentiality
and
actuality
These extracts are drawn from a relatively long passage of the TaҺqåq m» li l-Hind which enumerates
twenty-five constitutive principles (tattvas), corresponding for the most part to the metaphysics of
classical S»Ӡkhya tradition.21 Al-Bårĥnå attributes this passage to “those [among the Indians] who
deviate from allusions [but direct themselves] to investigation” (ϖϴϘΤΘϟ΍ϰϟ·ίϮϣήϟ΍ϦϋϥϮϟΪόϳϦϳά˷ϟ΍).22 Without
mentioning any oral or written sources, the scholar concludes the whole passage with the following
statement:
7KHUHIRUH9\ƗVDWKHVRQRI3DUƗĞDUD΍ήη΍ή̡ϦΑαΎϴΑVDLG³OHDUQWKHWZHQW\ILYH>SULQFLSOHV@LQGHWDLO
ZLWK>WKHLUH[DFW@GHILQLWLRQV DQG ZLWK >WKHLU@GLYLVLRQVE\D NQRZOHGJH >EDVHG RQ@HYLGHQFHDQG
DVFHUWDLQPHQWQRWE\RUDOLQVWUXFWLRQ7KHQDGKHUHWRZKDWHYHUUHOLJLRQ\RXZDQW\RXUHQGZLOOEH
GHOLYHUDQFHΓΎΠϨϟ΍´23
The quotation here attributed to VyƗsa, which states that if one learns the twenty-five constitutive
principles, they would obtain deliverance regardless of their religious obedience can be paralleled to a
quoted verse occuring in some S»Ӛkhyak»rik»’s commentaries.24 In addition, due to the attribution of
this sentence to Vy»sa, son of Par»ĕara, the alledged author of the Mah»bh»rata, one may argue that
al-Bårĥnå based his enumeration of the twenty-five principles on version of the MokӸadharma section
of the Mah»bh»rata that he may have consulted.25 This attribution alone does not however constitute
absolute evidence that the passage was drawn from the Epic.
Al-Bårĥnå enumerates the principles in the following way:
1. One puruӸa (ε˶
έϮ˵̡pĥriš);26
2. One avyakta (˴
ΖϜ˴ϴΑ˴΍abyakta), i.e., the absolute matter (ΔϘϠτϤϟ΍Γ˷ΩΎϤϟ΍);
3. One vyakta (˴
ΖϜ˴ϴ˸Αbyakta), i.e., the shaped one (Γέ ˷
ϮμΘϤϟ΍);
4. One ahaӘk»ra (έΎ˴̴Ϩ˴ϫ΁ahang»r);
5-9. Five mah»bhĥtas (ΕϮΑΎϬϣmah»bĥta);
10-14. Five pañca tanm»tras (ή˴ΗΎϣΞϨ˴̡panja m»tara)
15-19. Five buddhåndriyas (ϥΎϳ ˸
έ˸Ϊϧ΍ indriy»n);

GRXEWRQWKHDXWKHQWLFLW\RIWKHFRQWULEXWLRQRIDO%ƯUnjQƯWRWKHGLVFXVVLRQD%RLORWQOLVWV
DQRWKHUZRUNE\DO%ƯUnjQƯRQ,EQ6ƯQƗ
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24 The Sanskrit wordings are different from the Arabic version. See for instance the Gau Ңap»dabh»Ӹya on k»rik» 1 and
introducing kƗrikƗ 23 (Sharma 1933: 2; 24), the SuvarӜasaptati and the S»ӘkhyavӰtti on k»rik»s 2 and 37 (Takakusu
1904: 982; 1023; Solomon 1973: 7; 52). These words are attributed to PaxcaĞikha in the printed edition of the
Jaya m a Ӛga l » in the introduction to kƗrikƗ 1 (65). 
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20. One manas (
˵Ϧ˴ϣ; manu);
21-25. Five karmendriyas (ϙଉ
˴ϥΎϳέΪϧ΍ ϡ˸
έ; karm indry»n).27
The exact origin of this passage would deserve a thorough analysis. However, some preliminary
remarks emerge at this stage. Al-Bårĥnå’s exposition differs from the one made in the Mah»bh»rata to
a great extent.28 For instance, it does not describe prakӰti as eightfold and rather tallies with the more
systematic presentation of the S»Ӛkhyak»rik»’s tradition. Further, as seen in the foregoing analysis, al-
Bårĥnå understood the unmanifest (avyakta) in a way similar as the commentaries on the S»ӚkhyakƗrikƗ
elaborated it. This passage, while systematically listing the constitutive principles in a way similar as
the S»Ӛkhyak»rik», yet presenting them in a different sequence, does also relates to principles found in
the Mah»bh»rata. This observation might lead to the conclusion that al-Bårĥnå collected his material
from Indian informants who were aware of both textual traditions.
In the following paragraphs, the three extracts drawn from al-Bårĥnå’s enumeration of the twenty-
five constitutive principles (tattvas) are examined. The first excerpt describes the puruӸa as follows:
$>«@WKH>,QGLDQVZKRGHYLDWHIURPDOOXVLRQV@ FDOOWKHVRXO βϔϨϟ΍puru܈aε˶
έϮ˵̡,WPHDQVWKH
PDQEHFDXVHLWLVDOLYHLQWKHH[LVWHQW7KH\GRQRWFRQVLGHULWDVDQ\WKLQJHOVHWKDQOLIH7KH\
DVFULEH WR LW WKH VXFFHVVLRQ RI NQRZOHGJH DQG LJQRUDQFH ,QGHHG LJQRUDQW inactuality DQG
HQGRZHGZLWKUHDVRQin potentiality ΔϠϫΎΟΓ˷
ϮϘϟΎΑΔϠϗΎϋϭϞόϔϟΎΑ LWUHFHLYHVNQRZOHGJHE\DFTXLVLWLRQ
,WVLJQRUDQFHFDXVHVWKHRFFXUUHQFHRIWKHDFWLRQDQGLWVNQRZOHGJHFDXVHVWKHUHPRYDORI>WKH
DFWLRQ@29
Al-Bårĥnå uses the Arabic term meaning soul (βϔϨϟ΍) to interpret the Sanskrit puruӸa. The extralinguistic
meanings of the two words overlap. Both concepts can be translated in English by the terms self, soul,
mind or person. The two traditions of Falsafa and S»Ӟkhya consider the soul or the self to belong to
every human being, to be plural and individual. But the concepts also differ from each other. For
instance, puruӸa is regarded as the inactive spectator of the creation according to the S»Ӛkhyak»rik»’s
tradition,30 whereas this conception of the sole observation attributed to the soul is absent from Islamic
thought.
In this extract, al-Bårĥnå gives a literal definition of puruӸa when he states that it ‘means the man’,
as it is indeed one meaning of the Sanskrit term. The scholar applies to puruӸa the two Aristotelian
concepts of actuality and potentiality, stating that it is ‘ignorant in actuality and intelligent in
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potentiality’. According to this interpretation, the self is endowed with knowledge or not; potentiality
being what is possible to become or not for a thing.31 The S»ӚkhyakƗrikƗ does not describe puruӸa
exactly in terms of acquisition of knowledge, but refers to it as the knower (jña).32
Al-Bårĥnå makes use of the Aristotelian terminology in a similar way in the Kit»b P»tanÙal. The
discussion occurs in a passage which has been greatly transformed by al-Bårĥnå in form and content.33
Therefore, rather than connecting this specific passage to precise verses of the P»tañjalayogaĕ»stra, it
is more relevant to notice the general correspondance of content between the P»tañjalayogaĕ»stra II.20
to II.24 and the groups of questions/answers 32 to 38 of the Kit»b P»tanÙal.34 The Arabic passage
discusses the relationship between the knower, i.e., the self, and its known objects. It elaborates on the
reason and the process leading to their union and concludes that ignorance is the reason for this union,
which then leads to entanglement in the world (questions 32 to 35). After this passage, it is explained
how the union comes to an end and how the knower, i.e., the self, reaches emancipation or deliverance
(questions 37 to 38).
The use of the concepts of potentiality and actuality occurs specifically in the answer to question
36.35 The Arabic words knower (ϢϟΎόϟ΍) and known (ϡϮϠόϤϟ΍) respectively translate the Sanskrit perceiver
(draӸԂӰ) and perceived (dӰĕya). The passage states that the knower, i.e., the self, is in his essence a
knower in potentiality and does not go toward actuality except through the known object.36 Further,
both the Sanskrit and the Arabic versions conclude the discussion by stating that the absence of union
between the knowner/perceiver and the known/perceived leads to the emancipation from this world.
This discussion relates to the S»Ӟkhya-Yoga understanding of the self to be isolated and detached from
the creation. In Sanskrit, the perceiver, or knower in al-Bårĥnå’s words, is to be identified with puruӸa.
The use of potentiality and actuality in this passage recalls the description of the puruӸa al-Bårĥnå made
in the TaҺqåq m» li-l-Hind, i.e., that the self is endowed with knowledge in potentiality.
Al-Bårĥnå however does not explain how exactly puruӸa would acquire knowledge. His
interpretation is idiosyncratic and diverges from the exact definition of puruӸa according to the
S»ӚkhyakƗrikƗ. This specific understanding however may relate to the important question debated in
Islamic thought about the relationship between the soul and its knowledge of the world.37 According
to al-F»r»bå, for instance the soul possesses the capacity to receive intelligible things, which correspond
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to the ‘intellect in potentiality’.38 Al-R»zå, on his part, considers that the soul is first ignorant, but has
the capacity of knowing things under specific circumstances.39 Al-Bårĥnå’s interpretation of the
relationship between puruӸa and knowledge, which derives from the S»Ӟkhya-Yoga understanding, is
thus perhaps to be explained in light of this debate on the soul found in Islamic thought.
Furthermore, al-Bårĥnå states that puruӸa is nothing else than life. This notion is not found as
such in the S»Ӛkhyak»rik»’s tradition, but it is interesting to note that a Sanskrit term meaning life, i.e.,
jåva, is used to refer to the self in the Mah»bh»rata. In Greek and Islamic thought, the soul is similarly
considered as the principle which can possess life (empsychon).40
In his translations, the scholar often chose an interpretation of this sort, i.e., with lexical analogies
and partial conceptual overlapping between the two concepts, i.e., between the Indian source-concept
and the Islamic target-concept.41 In other words, there are terminological and conceptual parallellisms
in the two types of concepts, which enabled al-Bårĥnå to choose his specific interpretation, whereas
there are also discrepancies which render his decision problematic.42
The next two passages, dealing with the unmanifest primary matter and the manifest shaped
matter, shall make the present argument clearer. They read:
%7KHDEVROXWHPDWWHU Γ˷ΩΎϤϟ΍ ΔϘϠτϤϟ΍ LHWKHSXUHPDWWHU ϰϟϮϴϬϟ΍ ΓΩ ˷
ήΠϤϟ΍ IROORZV>puru܈a@7KH\
FDOOLWavyakta
˴
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WKHWKUHHIRUFHV ϯϭϗ ΙϼΛ in potentialityZLWKRXWactualityWKHLUQDPHVDUHsattva ˵Ζ˴γrajas

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˵Ϣ˴Η43
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WKH\FDOOLWvyakta ˴
ΖϜ˴ϴ˸ΑLHWKHVKDSHG >RQH@Γέ ˷
ϮμΘϤϟ΍DQGWKH\FDOOWKHXQLRQZLWKWKHSXUH
PDWWHUDQGWKHVKDSHGPDWWHUprak܀ti Εή˶ϛ˸
ή˴̡44
Al-Bårĥnå uses the Arabic term al-hayĥl» (ϰϟϮϴϬϟ΍) to designate the concept of avyakta (unmanifest),
while the shaped matter (Γέ ˷
ϮμΘϤϟ΍), in al-Bårĥnå’s words, corresponds to vyakta (manifest).45 In classical
S»Ӟkhya, the Sanskrit term avyakta is used as a synonym of prakӰti, the cause, and of pradh»na, the
primary source. cause is one and unique. It is undetectable by the organs of perception. It constitutes
the only creative source of the world. The cause produces all constitutive principles (tattva) of the world,
except puruӸa which stands separate from the S»Ӟkhya evolution. The other principles constitute the
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manifest effects (k»rya) of this cause (k»raӜa) in the phenonemal world. They are multiple and
perceptible in this world.
Before further analysing al-Bårĥnå’s interpretations of S»Ӟkhya concepts through his intellectual
background, some of his renderings, which are difficult to explain, are worth mentioning. For instance,
he describes the unmanifest (avyakta) as dead or inanimate. In k»rik» 10, the manifest (vyakta) is given
several qualities, amongst which that of being active (sakriya). The last part of the same k»rik»
describes the unmanifest as being the opposite of the manifest (vyaktaӘ viparåtam avyaktam), that is
inactive.46 It is perhaps the reason lying behind al-Bårĥnå’s definition of avyakta as dead. Another
example is the designation by al-Bårĥnå of the union of avyakta and vyakta by the term prakӰti. The
S»ӚkhyakƗrikƗ however explains prakӰԂi as a synonym of avyakta.47 The reasons for these different
interpretations remain obscure and may be simply attributed to his misunderstandings or that of his
Indian informants.
Both Arabic and Sanskrit texts, however, agree that avyakta and vyakta possess the three guӜas
(constituents), which are called sattva, rajas and tamas. These consistuents are essential in classical
S»Ӟkhya metaphysics. They exist in all principles – except puruӸa. Their combination occuring in them
causes the activity and the multiplicity of the phenomenal world. The constituent sattva is characterized
by the properties of good and enlightenment, rajas defined by the properties of passion and movement
and tamas associated with apathy or immobility. Al-Bårĥnå provides the Arabic transliteration of these
three Sanskrit terms. This transliteration enables us to ascertain his rendering of the Sanskrit guӜa by
the Arabic word quw» (sg. quwwa), literally meaning force or faculty.48 In the S»Ӛkhyak»rik»’s tradition,
the unmanifest and the manifest both possess the three guӜas.49 The difference lies in the fact that in
the unmanifest cause, the three constituents are in perfect balance.50 In a passage of the S»Ӛkhyak»rik»,
the unmanifest is described as becoming active and proceeds to the phenomenal world, due to the guӜas’
combination which becomes uneven.51
Further, al-Bårĥnå describes the pure matter, i.e., the cause, as being ‘without shape’ ( ϼΑ ΓέϮλ ),
which corresponds to the Sanskrit term avyakta, literally meaning undevelopped or unapparent. In the
S»Ӟkhya context the word became a technical term signifying unmanifest. In a similar way, the Arabic
expression ‘shaped [one]’ (Γέ ˷
ϮμΘϤϟ΍) corresponds to vyakta, signifying in S»Ӟkhya context manifest. Al-
Bårĥnå also states that this shaped matter goes ‘out to actuality’. Thus, al-Bårĥnå’s rendering of manifest
(vyakta) by the Arabic shaped (Γέ ˷
ϮμΘϤϟ΍) not only presents lexical but also conceptual parallels. The
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Arabic term used here is a past participle derived from a verbal root meaning ‘to shape’, ‘to form’
(έϮλ). The substantive of this verbal root, meaning form (ΓέϮλ), was the Arabic term used to translated
the concept of eidos, i.e., form, as understood by Aristotle in his examination of the nature of change
and substance. 52 Al-Bårĥnå interestingly correlates avyakta to hayĥl» (Gr. hyle) in the stage of
potentiality which becomes manifest (vyakta) by taking on a shaped visible form in actuality.
The correlation between al-Bårĥnå’s rendering of these concepts and philosophical debates rooted
in Hellenic ideas and current amongst Islamic thinkers further continues. In Aristotle words, for
instance, ‘the hyle or matter is unknowable in itself, while some other [matter] is perceptible’53 and,
elsewhere, ‘some kind of matter is perceptible and some other kind of matter is intelligible.’54 From
this perspective, the use of Aristotelian terminology ‘pure matter’ (Gr. hyle; Ar. al-hayĥl») and matter
‘going out to actuality’ reflects the terminological and conceptual parallellisms which the concepts
indeed have with S»Ӟkhya philosophy. According to Louis Gardet, primary matter became pure
potentiality in the view of some Islamic philosophers, while form constituted its actuality. With Ibn
Sån» in particular, the notions of potentiality and actuality are reduced to that of matter and form
respectively.55 Thus, according to al-Bårnjnå’s rendering, the S»Ӟkhya concept of the manifest effect
corresponds to a matter which has taked shape or form in reality and moved to existence in the world
of perception.
It is also pertinent here to recall the emanation theory current in Greek and Islamic thoughts from
Plotinus onwards. This theory emerged from the question of how an existent thing occurs from
something non-existent,56 or, in other words, of how to connect the phenomenal world to an immaterial
unperceptible world.57 Thinkers elaborated different arguments about an unphysical and eternal cause
and its relationship with the physical world.58 For instance, Plotinus considered the following: from 1)
the One comes 2) the intellect (Gr. nous), then 3) the world soul, followed by 4) the individual souls
and finally 5) the physical universe.59 Al-F»r»bå who adapted Plotinus’ theory, described six principles
in his version of the emanation theory: 1) the first cause, 2) the secondary cause or the incorporeal
intellect, 3) the active intellect, 4) the soul, 5) the form and 6) matter.60
Classical S»Ӟkhya, on its part, developped the satk»ryav»da theory, i.e., the doctrine of the effect
(k»rya) [pre-]existing [in its cause (k»raӜa)]. A causal link is established between the different
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constitutive principles (tattva) of the creation. According to this doctrine, even if the unmanifest cause
(avyakta), that is unperceptible by the senes, it is possible to infer it, through its manifest (vyakta) effect.
Common points are existing between the Aristotelian distinction actuality/potentiality and the S»Ӟkhya
evolution and causation theory. In Aristotle, for instance, the anteriority of the actuality on the
potentiality is claimed because a substance is needed as a support for the potentiality.61 The
satk»ryav»da doctrine in S»Ӟkhya advocates that the effect, i.e., what would become in actuality
according to al-Bårĥnå, pre-exists in the cause, i.e., what would be in potentiality in al-Bårĥnå’s words.
The exact processes through which the transformation would occur differs in both systems,
however. Moreover, the cause (prakӰti) in classical S»Ӟkhya has a series of characteristics specific to
this Indian system of thought, which cannot be associated with the Aristotelian concept of primary
matter, and which were not developed by al-Bårĥnå. This process is only described by al-Bårĥnå in
Aristotelian terms, when he states that the unmanifest, i.e., avyakta, ‘owns the three forces, in
potentiality without actuality’ and that the manifest, i.e., vyakta, ‘goes out to actuality with shape and
with the three primordial forces.’
In the Kit»b P»tanÙal, there is another example of a similar use of the concepts potentialiy and
actuality by al-Bårĥnå. The passage, which al-Bårĥnå also highly transformed, corresponds to
question/answer 66 and translates P»tañjalayogaĕ»stra IV.12-13.62 In the Arabic version of it, it is
asked how merits and demerits, which are void and null, i.e., non-existent, in the ascetic’s past and
future, can bring about emancipation which is existent. The answer is: merits and demerits are not
absolutely inexistent, but are either a transition toward potentiality or existent (only) in potentiality.
These two possibilities apply for both past and future. The answer also states that past and future times
have no impact in actuality on the present time, which exists in actuality.63 The Sanskrit corresponding
passage discusses the debated philosophical question of the possibility for a thing to exist, or to be
produced, from another thing which is non-existent. The S»Ӟkhya-Yoga answer to this question is
generally considered to be the satk»ryav»da theory.64 Therefore, even if this specific passage of the
P»tañjalayogaĕ»stra does not here explicitly name this theory, it attempts to connect it to the
relationships between past, present and future; which al-Bårĥnå in his turn interpreted in terms of
potentiality and actuality. This example indicates that al-Bårĥnå coherently dealt with the satk»ryav»da
theory, as he explains it in two different contexts with the same terminology of Aristotelian origin.
Further, the scholar made use of these technical concepts whose meaning overlapped that of the
Indian concepts and at the same time diverged from them. Despite the divergences, however, the
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emanationist scheme of the Islamic philosophers and the satk»ryav»da doctrine of S»Ӟkhya both
derived the phenomenal and multiple world from an unperceptible and unique cause, by attempting to
answer similar questions. Al-Bårĥnå, with his choices of interpretation, appears to have been conscious
of this. The observations of the present study do not aim at identifying some aspects of Falsafa and
S»Ӟkhya as same, nor at drawing influences from one on another, but entail that an analysis of the
transmission of Indian thought by al-Bårĥnå must include an examination of his intellectual background.
In this case, his knowledge of Islamic philosophical terminology enables to grasp his choices of
interpretation better and to explicate divergences between the source-concept and the word used in the
target-language.
The last extract is drawn from the Kit»b P»tanÙal. It highlights a use of the two same concepts by
al-Bårĥnå, but in a different context. It deals with the Sanskrit kleĕas, i.e., afflictions, which have to be
reduced and annihilated in order to reach final emancipation from the rebirth’s cycle according to
PƗtaxjala Yoga. Al-Bårĥnå translates this concept by the Arabic term meaning burden (ϞϘΛ). The passage
reads:
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actualityLQWKHPDQQHURIDVHHGSODFHGLQWKHJUDQDU\ZKLFKGRHVQRWJURZDOWKRXJKD>IXWXUH@
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GRHVQRWFRPHWROLIHRQHDUWKDOWKRXJKLWLVDOLYH65
This passage is found in answer 26 of the Kit»b P»tanÙal and can be broadly linked with the topic
discussed in P»tañjalayogaĕ»stra II.3 to 4.66 There are five afflictions – burdens in al-Bårĥnå’s words.
The following table shows the Sanskrit terms for each of the afflications alongside their Arabic
renderings:
Sanskrit afflictions (
kleĖa
) Arabic burdens (ϝΎϘΛϻ΍)
1 ignorance (avidy») ignorance (ϞϬΠϟ΍)
2 feeling of individuality (asmit») [false] supposition (˷Ϧψϟ΍)
3 passion (r»ga) desire (ΔΒϏήϟ΍)
4 aversion (dveӸa) enmities (Ε΍ϭ΍Ϊόϟ΍)
5 will-to-live, attachment (abhiniveĕa) attachment, devotion (ϖϳϼόϟ΍)
Table 1: al-Bårĥnå’s translation of the Sanskrit kleĕas into Arabic.
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Al-Bårĥnå’s translations of these technical Yoga terms are relatively literal, except for number 2. As
for the analogy of the seed, a similar comparison is presented in the P»tañjalayogaĕ»stra, in the
P»tañjalayogaĕ»stravivaraӜa and in the Tattvakaumudå.67 The second analogy of the frog could not be
found in the Sanskrit texts under review. 68 Interestingly, here, al-Bårĥnå makes use of the two
Aristotelian concepts in a context different from the previous passages under review in this article, as
he determines two levels or stages, , i.e., in potentiality and in actuality, at which the afflictions (kleĕa),
or burdens, might stand. His interpretation that ‘they exist in potentiality, without manifesting
themselves in actuality’ suggests that they are latent, or dormant, and do not reveal themselves in an
ascetic renunciant. In P»tañjalayogaĕ»stra II.4, besides being burnt (dagdha) as a seed and thus
unfruitful, afflictions can exist at four gradual stages, asleep (prasupta), thin (tanu), interrupted
(vicchinna) and active (ud»ra).69 Further, according to PƗtaxjala Yoga, the ascetic (yogin) can – and has
to – weaken these afflictions. Did al-Bårĥnå connect the stages of this graduation when the afflictions
are burnt or asleep, to the potentiality and the last stage, i.e., when they are active, to the actuality?
Answering this question may be a conjecture. However, in view of the discussion of the previous
sections, this interpretation is likely. If this is accepted, it is possible to understand how al-Bårĥnå
adjusted the original Yoga concepts by way of Aristotelian terminology. This fourth example also
indicates a different use of this terminology, which is not the rendering the satkƗryavƗdaWKHRU\
4.Concluding remarks
This article thus focused on highlighting the role of al-Bårĥnå’s intellectual background in order to
interpret and transmit Indian thought and led to several observations with regard to his attempt to
transmit technical S»Ӟkhya-Yoga concepts to his peers.70 First, the necessity of analysing his works on
India by understanding is cultural background appears essential from this preliminary survey. Second,
this article pointed out to three distinct uses of the concepts of potentiality and actuality: 1) to describe
the self (puruӸa) as a potential knower (passage A), 2) to explain the evolution and causation theory of
classical S»Ӟkhya-Yoga (passages B and C), and 3) to characterize the technical concepts of afflictions
(kleĕa) (passage D). Further, although al-Bårĥnå used these Aristotelian concepts, he did not claim that
Greek theories had influenced Indian ones, or vice versa. These observations suggest that the scholar
made use of this terminology as heuristic tool to transfer Indian ideas to a Muslim audience, rather than
as a comparative tool. Third, this article highlighted that, despite differences in the concepts discussed
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and in the answers to the formulated questions, there was a similarity in the original problem, i.e. how
does a thing which is not existing in the phenomenal word (unmanifest or in potentiality) brings into
existence visible and phenomenal existents.71 Fourth, his portrait of Indian thought through Aristotelian
lens may also reflect his desire to transmit these Indian philosophical theories as having certain
authority.
Fifth, the Aristotelian concepts belonged to the philosophical lexicon of his audience. By using
them, al-Bårĥnå was thus able to convey the message with a relative transparency and reduced his
audience’s unfamiliarity with S»Ӟkhya-Yoga concepts.72 His choices of interpretation, indeed, entailed
a partial overlap between the meanings of the concepts and theories originating from the two distinct
intellectual cultures. In this manner, they were rather pertinent, and at the same time problematic, as
the Aristotelian concepts were not identical to the Indian ones. It is difficult to know whether he was
conscious of this implication of his interpretative choices, and, if yes, to what extent he might have
been. Nevertheless, it appears relatively natural that he used such a terminology, as it was part of a
shared background of his time. The scholar thus constitutes an interesting example of the general
influence of Greek thought on the Islamic intellectual sphere.
5.References
Aristote. 2008. Métaphysique. Présentation et traduction par Marie-Paul Duminil et Annick Jaulin.
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Negotiating Sānkhya-Yoga concepts: al-Bīrūnī and Falsafa
Noemie Verdon
February, 2019
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