Being resilient to radicalisation in PVE policy: a critical examination

Abstract

The problematic nature of certain policies and approaches to preventing and countering violent extremism has been robustly demonstrated; it is clear that rethinking the prevention of violent extremism requires concerted attention. One response to critiques of security-driven approaches has been the adoption of the language of resilience building. However, the turn to resilience has not been matched by a fundamental rethinking of approach, and may often mask troubling approaches in the language of objectivity and positivity. In rethinking the question of prevention, examining the concept of resilience is important not only to address a current trend in policy discourse, but also to benefit from the rich literature on resilience from which valuable lessons may be drawn. A critically informed concept of resilience has the potential to provide a framework of response that recognises individuals and communities as political actors who, rather than being shielded from ideologies, require the resources and channels to challenge violence, discrimination, and injustice, be it state or non-state driven. This article, through examining the current use of "resilience" in PVE policies, makes a modest attempt to draw on lessons from applying resilience in other contexts to articulate possible features of a critically informed approach to preventing violent extremism.

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Critical Studies on Terrorism
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Being resilient to radicalisation in PVE policy: a
critical examination
William Stephens & Stijn Sieckelinck
To cite this article: William Stephens & Stijn Sieckelinck (2019): Being resilient to
radicalisation in PVE policy: a critical examination, Critical Studies on Terrorism, DOI:
10.1080/17539153.2019.1658415
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2019.1658415
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Being resilient to radicalisation in PVE policy: a critical
examination
William Stephens and Stijn Sieckelinck
Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The
Netherlands
ABSTRACT
The problematic nature of certain policies and approaches to
preventing and countering violent extremism has been robustly
demonstrated; it is clear that rethinking the prevention of violent
extremism requires concerted attention. One response to critiques
of security-driven approaches has been the adoption of the lan-
guage of resilience building. However, the turn to resilience has
not been matched by a fundamental rethinking of approach, and
may often mask troubling approaches in the language of objectiv-
ity and positivity. In rethinking the question of prevention, exam-
ining the concept of resilience is important not only to address
a current trend in policy discourse, but also to benefit from the
rich literature on resilience from which valuable lessons may be
drawn. A critically informed concept of resilience has the potential
to provide a framework of response that recognises individuals
and communities as political actors who, rather than being
shielded from ideologies, require the resources and channels to
challenge violence, discrimination, and injustice, be it state or non-
state driven. This article, through examining the current use of
“resilience”in PVE policies, makes a modest attempt to draw on
lessons from applying resilience in other contexts to articulate
possible features of a critically informed approach to preventing
violent extremism.
KEYWORDS
Preventing violent
extremism; resilience;
countering violent
extremism; policy
Introduction
Many approaches to preventing violent extremism have been beset with challenges. Critical
scholars have done much to highlight the detrimental impact of policies in this area. In the
Western context, particular criticism has been directed towards the role these policies have
played in securitizing the social domain (Kundnani 2009; Stanley, Guru, and Coppock 2017;
Sian 2015; Kundnani and Hayes 2018), and to the lack of systematic attention given to the
role of the state in contributing to the conditions in which violence emerges (Sageman
2017). These particular critiques require little rehearsing, with numerous studies pointing to
challenges associated with the creation of “suspect communities”, in which whole groups,
most often Muslims, are cast as both a source of risk to control and a vulnerable group
requiring intervention (Heath-Kelly 2013;Kundnani2009; McDonald and Mir 2011). Similarly,
deep concerns have been raised about education and health being co-opted into a security
CONTACT William Stephens w.stephens@vu.nl
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agenda, with teachers and physicians tasked to detect and report signs of radicalisation in
their pupils and patients (Middleton 2016; Stanley, Guru, and Coppock 2017).
A relatively recent phenomenon in the preventing violent extremism discourse has been
to turn to the notion of resilience as a seemingly less problematic approach to prevention.
Recent reviews of the scientific literature (Wimelius et al. 2018; Stephens, Sieckelinck, and
Boutellier 2019) have pointed to the prevalence of resilience building as a key concept in
this literature, and an initial analysis of policy, presented in this article, suggests a similar
trend. This is perhaps unsurprising given that resilience has become a go-to term in many
other areas of social policy faced with complex challenges (Duit 2016;Amery2018).
The prevalence of “resilience”in social policy may in part be attributed to its “inherent
appeal for many due to its optimistic overtones”(Luthar and Cicchetti 2000, 380). These
optimistic overtones, and the focus on strengths rather than deficits, may seem parti-
cularly attractive to those concerned to avoid an overtly securitising approach.
However, despite its positive connotations, many problematic elements have
emerged when drawing on resilience in different areas of social policy (Amery 2018).
This article addresses three questions: what are the challenges associated with the use of
resilience in social policy? How do these challenges manifest themselves in current PVE
policies? And, what are the implications of this for rethinking approaches to prevention?
To address the first question, we begin by examining the concept of resilience and its
challenges, drawing on the extensive literature that has emerged in relation to resilience
and its application in the social domain. The second question is addressed through
a brief analysis of PVE policy documents in which we identify and then critically analyse
the dominant metaphors of resilience used in these documents. Finally, we consider the
implications of this critical analysis for PVE policy.
The concept of resilience and its challenges
Originally drawn upon in the field of engineering, resilience began to be applied as
a concept in both psychology and ecology, and somewhat later in the social sciences
(Alexander 2013;Adger2000; Davoudi 2012; Duit 2016). Resilience is often associated
with the notion of “bouncing-back”–returning to a state of equilibrium following some
form of stress or adversity (Davoudi 2012). This is often captured in the metaphor of a spring
or elastic that returns to its original form after pressure is applied. However, the ability to
“bounce-back”as the hallmark of resilience has been called into question, and the concept
has expanded to include, for example, the ability to transform and evolve (Davoudi 2012).
That is, rather than necessarily returning to its previous state, a system may adapt or
transform in the face of stress or adversity (Davoudi 2012;Davidsonetal.2016).
Through these developments, resilience has become a term drawn upon by a whole
range of fields with a variety of meanings. The breadth of its application is well
exemplified in the “100 resilient cities”project that aims to develop the resilience of
cities to all manner of issues, from unemployment to flooding (100 Resilient Cities 2019).
To bring some order to these many different uses, one broad brush distinction that can
be made is between resilience as the ability to rebound after a calamity, and a more
preventive notion of resilience as the ability to respond or develop well in spite, or even
because of, sources of stress or adversity. The first notion is evident in policies directed
towards “building resilience”in society to recover from terrorist attacks or natural
2W. STEPHENS AND S. SIECKELINCK

disasters (e.g. CORDIS 2017; OECD 2019). The second is evident in policies directed
towards mitigating the effects of poverty or social disadvantage (e.g. World Bank 2011;
National Center for Children in Poverty 2019).
The challenges of resilience as a concept in social policy
Given the breadth of issues to which resilience is applied, and the fact that it has
developed somewhat independently in different disciplines (Alexander 2013), it is
perhaps unsurprising that applying this concept to address complex social problems
has been beset with challenges. One of the most obvious challenges has revolved
around its definition. Davidson et al. (2016, 26) describe resilience as a “fuzzy concept”
that “lacks[s] clear definition, [is] difficult to operationalise, and lack[s] clear evidence”,
while others have pointed to the fact that it often serves as little more than a buzzword
(Wimelius et al. 2018; Joseph 2013).
Arguably, seeking a universal definition of resilience is a fruitless task given the wide
range of disciplines within which it is applied –from engineering to psychology –and
the different scales to which it refers –from the resilience of societies to the psycholo-
gical resilience of individuals. However, within the social and psychological fields, some
certain fundamental features of this concept can be discerned amongst the multitude of
definitions, including: (a) it refers to the functioning of an individual or system in the
face of some form of stress or adversity (Magis 2010; Rutter 2012; Carpenter 2014); (b) it
implies some form of positive or healthy functioning in the face of this adversity –that
is, a resilient individual or resilient society is generally regarded as positive in that they
are able to emerge from stress in a manner that is desirable (Endress 2015); and (c) it
implies moving primary attention from deficits to be fixed to the identification and
development of strengths (Matarrita-Cascante et al. 2017; Rutter 2012). We will examine
these elements more closely as we outline some central critiques that have emerged in
relation to the application of resilience in the psychological and social fields.
One of the first challenges that emerges is deciding on what terms something is
considered to be a positive or healthy outcome. Clearly, resilience is an inherently
normative concept (Anholt 2017; Davoudi 2012; Ungar 2011; Amery 2018). Resilience
only takes on any real meaning within the context of a world-view through which the
nature of a desirable outcome can be determined. Michael Ungar (2011), examining
resilience within child and youth development, refers to this as the cultural relativity of
resilience. That which is considered a desirable –and therefore resilient –outcome in
the face of adversity depends upon those features and attributes that are valued by
those defining resilience (Ungar 2011). Davoudi (2012) captures the issue well:
In the social context, defining what is desirable is always tied to normative judgements.
Quite often, particular outcomes are perceived as “natural”or desirable, while others are
dismissed as a lack of resilience. For example, in psychology, a return to social conformity
may be considered as a desirable outcome of individuals’resilience in the face of adversity.
If the outcomes depart from the perceived desirable, reaching an alternative outcome may
not be seen as a sign of resilience. (p.305)
To give an example, consider young people facing discrimination within a classroom: is
the one who is able to shrug this offand focus on their studies resilient, or is the one
CRITICAL STUDIES ON TERRORISM 3

who challenges and stands up to the offender, resilient? In a context in which stability
and conformity are valued the answer will be different than a context in which change
and assertiveness are valued.
That resilience is tied up in a world-view is in itself not necessarily problematic. It
becomes problematic when the normativity remains hidden. Given its origins in the
natural sciences, resilience has a ring of objectivity that can mask the value-laden work
involved in deciding what is resilient and what is not. The upshot of this for social policy
is that if these values are not laid open for examination, dominant world-views and
values are perpetuated without the opportunity for critical reflection (Ungar 2004).
The issue of normativity does not end with the determination of what constitutes
a resilient response. It has been argued that “resilience thinking”embodies a neo-liberal,
individualising, approach to governance (Joseph 2013). By turning attention to the role
of individuals and communities, a discourse on resilience can feed into a transfer of
responsibility from the state to local level actors (Anholt 2017). Global and systemic
challenges are transformed into local level issues arising from a lack of resilience on the
part of individuals and communities. To give a stark example: in the face of the vast
global inequality of wealth distribution, rather than tackling the underlying causes of
inequality, a discourse on resilience can turn attention to the need for poor communities
to become resilient to the effects of poverty. Similarly, on an individual level, a discourse
on resilience can direct attention to building coping mechanisms within the individual,
rather than tackling the environmental causes of adversity such as poverty, discrimina-
tion or abuse (Boyden and Cooper 2007).
It is this potential to obscure fundamental and systemic issues that has led resilience
to being described as having a depoliticising effect (Anholt 2017; Evans and Reid 2013).
A discourse on resilience can construct the role of the citizen as being to accept and
adapt to negative forces, rather than as an agent who can aspire to social transformation
(Evans and Reid 2013). This transfer of responsibility and corresponding de-politicisation
has been highlighted in efforts aimed at tackling poverty:
At a more practical level, the emphasis on individual functioning and the harnessing of
individual resources to overcome adversity de-politicises the project of poverty reduction.
Attention is diverted away from the state and other actors with the power and moral
responsibility to intervene and bring about change . . . Hence we find major players in the
field of poverty reduction adopting a default position which individualises that which
should, in fact, involve structural or collective effort for change in most circumstances.
(Boyden and Cooper 2007, 5).
These critiques of the application of resilience to societal challenges are certainly
severe and merit careful attention. We would suggest that thus far the growing
discourse on resilience in the context of violent extremism hasn’tgivensufficient
attention to these wider discussions taking place. Turning to this existing literature
on resilience can aid us in understanding both the possibilities and limitations of
“resilience”as a concept for overcoming some of the challenges associated with PVE
policies. To start to bridge this gap, we will examine the current use of resilience in
a number of PVE policies in light of the issues just raised.
4W. STEPHENS AND S. SIECKELINCK

Resilience in PVE policy
In our analysis of the academic literature on preventing violent extremism, “building
resilience”was a theme that cut across different fields of study and approach (Stephens,
Sieckelinck, and Boutellier 2019). Understanding whether and how this concept is drawn
upon in PVE policy became a pressing question, particularly given the challenges described
above associated with drawing on resilience in other policy areas. To gain an initial insight
into this question, we conducted a limited multilevel policy analysis, looking at interna-
tional, national, and municipal level PVE policy documents or action plans. The scope of the
review was limited to the United Nations
1
, the European Union, the United Kingdom, The
Netherlands, Belgium, and Canada, as well as municipal level documents from London,
Utrecht and the Hague (details of the documents reviewed can be found in Appendix 1).
The selection of documents was largely pragmatic as they correspond to areas in which
PVE practices are being examined as part of a larger research project.
However, the countries included in the review share similar challenges –such as
“home-grown terrorism”and “foreign fighters”, yet they represent some diversity in their
national policy responses. The limited scope of the review means that no claim of
representativeness can be made, rather, we sought to gain initial insight into how
resilience is being drawn upon at different levels of policy making, from the international
to the municipal. This is not an exhaustive review of PVE policies but rather a scoping of
the major themes and trends in these policy documents.
Analysis of the use of resilience in these documents was conducted through an initial
coding of all instances of “resilience”or “resilient”. Each of these instances was then
examined in more depth, looking at: (a) the context in which resilience was used in
these documents; (b) the stated aims of resilience; and (c) how resilience was proposed
to emerge or be developed.
The contexts in which resilience appears
Resilience arises in two distinct contexts, the first being the context of disaster pre-
paredness: building resilience in order to prepare society and citizens to respond when
an attack occurs. The second is resilience as a preventive concept: building a resilience
that prevents a process of radicalisation. For the purposes of this article, we are
concerned with the use of resilience as a preventive concept.
As a preventive concept, resilience appears most often in the context of formal and
informal education. In the United Kingdom, resilience as a preventive concept is primarily
evident in the advice of the Department of Education on the implementation of Prevent,
stating that “schools and childcare providers can also build pupils’resilience to radicalisation
by promoting fundamental British Values”(Department of Education 2015, 5). In 2018, the
European Commission stated that “Schools, teachers and youth workers play a crucial role in
strengthening vulnerable young people’s resilience ... ”(European Commission 2018,4).
The Flanders region place youth workers as central in building resilience (Vlaamse Regering
2015). The most extensive treatment of resilience in any of these documents is by UNESCO
in its guidance to policy makers, in which it is stated that “UNESCO . . . recognizes the
catalytic role of education in fostering youth resilience”(UNESCO 2017,11).
CRITICAL STUDIES ON TERRORISM 5

Resilience within the context of education tends to focus on building resilience at the
micro-level; that is, they focus on individual resilience. However, resilience is also
touched upon at meso (community) and macro (societal) levels. For example, the
United Nations General Assembly (2015) Plan of Action refers to “strengthening com-
munity resilience”, the European Commission (2016, 3) refers to “promoting an inclusive,
open and resilient society”, in the Canadian context there is the notion of “building
a resilient Canada”(Public Safety Canada 2013, 11), the British Government state that
“. . . isolated communities will be less resilient to the threat posed by extremism”(Home
Office 2015, 37) and the Dutch counterterrorism strategy has the goal of increasing
“societal resilience”(Nationaal Coordinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid 2016).
These community and societal level notions of resilience are generally not articulated
in much detail.
The stated aims of resilience
In terms of the aims of building resilience, the most prevalent ideas across these
documents is that of individuals and communities becoming resilient to extreme ideol-
ogies. This is formulated variously as resilience to “propaganda”(European Commission
2016,2014), “extreme views”(European Commission 2014; Public Safety Canada 2013),
“extremist messaging”(UNESCO 2017), “extremist and terrorist ideologies”(Nationaal
Coordinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid 2016), and to “extremist narratives”
(Home Office 2018). A more general, but related, aim of “resilience to radicalisation”or
“resilience to violent extremism”is also mentioned in a number of documents (European
Commission 2016; Department of Education 2015; United Nations General Assembly
2015; European Parliament 2015).
An additional notion of resilience is mentioned by the European Commission (2016, 12)
who call for increasing “democratic resilience”.Asthereisnodefinition or explanation given,
it is difficult to determine what is intended by this term. However, it would seem to suggest
developing resilience to extremist narratives through promoting democratic values or
practices.
Approaches to building resilience
In regards to how resilience is to be developed, one of the most notable features of
these documents is the limited detail on this question. Resilience appears often as an
aim, but less often with any details on how this resilience should emerge. It is particu-
larly within the context of education that the more concrete approaches are mentioned.
In the Dutch and Flemish context particular attention is given to resilience-building
projects or interventions –training programmes that have the specifically stated goal of
building resilience in young people. The focus is on specific interventions that are proposed
to develop certain skills or attributes in young people that render them resilient.
In contrast, the United Kingdom, and EU Commission describe resilience as emerging
as a consequence of more general educational practices and approaches. For example, it
is stated that resilience can be built by “promoting fundamental British values and
enabling them to challenge extremist views”(Department of Education 2015, 5), later
going on to describe that “schools can build pupils’resilience to radicalisation by
6W. STEPHENS AND S. SIECKELINCK

providing a safe environment for debating controversial issues and helping them to
understand how they can influence and participate in decision making”(p.8).
Resilience building is a central pillar of UNESCO’s guidance for policy makers, and this
document provides the most extensive treatment of how resilience may be built.
Particular attention is given to developing the capacity to think critically, and learning
to “verify facts”(UNESCO 2017, 20). It is further suggested that citizenship education and
global citizenship “is particularly relevant to foster learners’resilience to exclusionary
worldviews that pit one group against another.”(UNESCO 2017, 36).
The metaphors of resilience in PVE policy
Our analysis of the policy documents demonstrates that there is a multitude of ways of
understanding and operationalising resilience. However, much of the use of resilience in
these documents can be captured by two dominating metaphors of resilience. The first
being the metaphor of resilience as a shield, and the second being resilience through
connection.
Resilience is often discussed in terms of metaphors: the metaphor of the spring that
can “bounce-back”after experiencing pressure; the metaphor of elastic that can be
stretched to its limits then return to its original shape; the metaphor of the tree that can
withstand the buffeting wind. These metaphors are more than handy images to remind
us of a concept; they shape our understanding of the concept itself. These metaphors
matter, particularly when we assume the use of a word conjures a shared meaning
amongst interlocutors (Lakoffand Johnson 1980). These conceptual metaphors not only
shape our communication, but also the ways in which we think and act (Lakoffand
Johnson 1980). It is valuable then to consider these dominant metaphors and the
meanings they evoke.
Resilience as a shield
As mentioned, the idea of building resilience to extreme ideologies through education is
prevalent across many of these documents. The language surrounding this use of resilience
evokes the metaphor of resilience as a protective “shield”against radical influences, as
described by Doosje et al. (2016, 81). To interrogate this metaphor a bit more closely, it is
instructive to consider the subject of resilience –that is, who or what it is that is expected to
be resilient –and the object towards which this resilience is directed.
The subject of resilience is generally described as “young people”,“vulnerable indi-
viduals”,or“vulnerable young people”. The object towards which they are demonstrat-
ing resilience is primarily described as extremist ideologies or narratives. The nature of
the resilience is then some form of shield or barrier that prevents young/vulnerable
individuals from being influenced by these extreme ideas.
This image is reinforced when we examine the approaches to building resilience that
are described. It is suggested that developing skills for critical analysis will enable young
people to reject extremist narratives on the basis of rational rejection of the ideas. Space
to debate controversial issues is proposed as a way to weaken the power of extremist
ideas by giving them space and opening them up to argument. In the case of the United
Kingdom, it is anticipated that a commitment to British values creates a stronger
CRITICAL STUDIES ON TERRORISM 7

alternative value framework that leads to the rejection of extremist ideas
2
. These
measures seem to suggest that certain educational activities and experiences create
the conditions in which a young person will reject extremist narratives or ideas.
Together, these approaches reinforce the metaphor of resilience as some sort of internal
shield developed within young people. This image is further strengthened in documents
that place such educative resilience building approaches as a parallel or partner strategy to
the flagging and removing of extremist content online (European Commission 2016,2014).
We are left with the image of layers of shielding: the first shield being security forces and
internet providers filtering and removing the messages, and the second shield being this
“resilience”emerging from skills or values developed in young people themselves that
protects them from the influence of the messages that do reach them.
Resilience through connection
The second idea that is evident in a number of documents is that resilience emerges
from connected communities and a connected society. Strengthening relationships
within society and promoting integration enables the forming of strong bonds that
are proposed to withstand forces of polarisation and radicalisation. The image evoked is
that of strongly bonded atoms whose connections serve to protect them from divisive
forces. This perspective points to the need to build relationships of trust across society
and tackle discrimination.
In the United Kingdom, it is stated that “Whereopportunitiesarelimited,divisions
between people of different backgrounds can grow and be exploited by groups or
individuals, who seek to stoke divisions and fuel hatred. Such isolated communities will
be less resilient to the threat posed by extremism”(Home Office 2015, 37). The London
Mayoral Assembly seeks to “support and increase community cohesion and resilience and
to champion the work to promote stronger and more resilient communities where hatred
and intolerance cannot take hold”(Greater London Authority 2017, 126). The European
Commission (2016,11)statesthat“Combatting social exclusion and discrimination, and
promoting social justice and protection are objectives of the EU in their own right. Such
societies should prove to be more resilient to the threats of violent extremism”.
These notions echo ideas within the literature on community resilience that locate
“social capitals”as the source of resilience (Dalgaard-Nielsen and Schack 2016). Ellis and
Abdi (2017) refer to three forms of relationship as being central to a resilient community:
relationship within communities (social bonding), between communities (social bridging),
and between communities and institutions (social linking). It is argued that the strengthen-
ing of each of these relationships contributes to the resilience of a community. The policy
documents reviewed don’t explicitly address these different relationships, but do seem to
draw on the logic that a connected community is a resilient community.
Interrogating the metaphors
These two metaphors of resilience are not mutually exclusive, appearing within the
same documents, with the first gaining the lion’s share of attention. Given their pre-
valence, these metaphors merit some critical examination in light of the wider resilience
literature. In trying to understand any concept of resilience, it is helpful to consider who
8W. STEPHENS AND S. SIECKELINCK

is being resilient to what and what is counted as a resilient response or outcome (Obrist,
Pfeiffer, and Henley 2010). Therefore, we will examine these two metaphors in relation to
these three areas. We will begin with the last: what is counted as a resilient response or
outcome. Second, we will examine the “who”–that is, the notion of the citizen and
community suggested by these metaphors. Finally, we will examine the “what”–the
object towards which resilience is proposed to be developed.
The resilient response: a question of values
As discussed, the question of what counts as “resilient”is bound up with a world view:
the very notion of resilience as a positive/healthy outcome in the face of adversity
requires a means of determining what is to be regarded as positive. However, as the
worldviews undergirding notions of resilience are often implicit, it is worth making
explicit and scrutinising the ideas of what it means to be resilient in PVE policy.
Taking the first metaphor of resilience as a shield, this metaphor in its very construc-
tion seems to be aligned with a world-view concerned with resisting external influences.
The shield of resilience is directed towards external ideas and messages, enabling the
individual to critique and reject these ideas. To be resilient in this context therefore
essentially means that these ideologies and ideas do not influence the individual.
In many ways, this makes sense. Ideologies and world views are an inescapable
feature of violent extremism. The role of ideas is particularly notable in the use of
narratives as a persuasive tool through the framing and construction of events and
problems in the world, and some idealised vision of what the world or society could or
should be (Braddock and Horgan 2016; Mahood and Rane 2017; Kundnani 2012).
Narratives can feed into a process of moral disengagement through fuelling an “us
and them”discourse, reducing the humanity and value of the “them”rendering violence
more possible (Aly, Taylor, and Karnovsky 2014). Therefore, the ability to question,
unpack, and critique, worldviews offered is certainly a valuable tool. Indeed, developing
critical thinking skills is an educational aim shared by many teachers and youth workers.
However, a challenge arises when these critical thinking faculties are promoted and
developed within the frame of the rejection of extreme ideas. There are two issues here that
need to be addressed: the first concerns the identification of the ideas or narratives towards
which critical faculties should be directed, while the second concerns the scope of PVE policy.
To address the first, current PVE policy discourse focuses on developing the ability to be
critical of extremist narratives. In efforts to prevent violence, this makes sense. However,
whilst necessary, the ability to critique extremist narratives is not sufficient, as it only
addresses part of the narratives and ideas that may create an openness to violence.
Divisive rhetoric that promotes and fuels a simple delineation between “us and them”is
evident in mainstream media and indeed, in government policy and official communica-
tions (Kundnani 2012). Indeed, a recent area of enquiry has concerned the mainstreaming of
far right ideas and narratives (Feischmidt and Hervik 2015;Kallis2013). Construing resilience
as the ability to critique extremist narratives or propaganda can create a blind-spot to the
more embedded, mainstream, narratives that also deserve a critical gaze. Rhetoric and
language that feeds into a polarisation along the lines of “us and them”, a polarisation that
many extremist narratives rely upon (Kruglanski et al. 2017; Kassimeris and Jackson 2015),
are evident far beyond extremist narratives themselves. To seriously address the factors
CRITICAL STUDIES ON TERRORISM 9

involved in the movement towards violence, it would seem necessary to also direct critical
attention to mainstream ideas and narratives.
Directing critical attention to these ideas is also important if we are to engage with
the questions and concerns of young people. By reducing resilience to resisting extre-
mist narratives, we risk overlooking, or indeed rejecting, underlying questions or criti-
cisms of young people that are harnessed by these narratives. If critical attention is given
only to dismantling extremist narratives, and not to addressing criticisms of the prevail-
ing social order, such as the dominance of materialist perspectives, institutional discri-
mination and unjust social practices, or the changing face and norms of society, then
resilience is reduced to an uncritical acceptance of society as it is. From the perspective
purely of preventing violence, this may be defendable. However, such a conception of
resilience sits uncomfortably beside the notion of a democratic citizen.
This brings us to the second, related, issue. While PVE policy architects may have
as their primary role the prevention of violence, the discourse on building resilience
in young people and the associated practices fall into the domain of, and are
expected to be carried out by, professionals with a much broader set of goals. This
means that PVE policy needs to be compatible with the goals and mission of these
professions and practices. We cannot separate the vision of what it means to resist
violence from an overall conception of the forms of citizenship and personhood that
are valued. Therefore, notions of resilience advanced within PVE policy cannot contra-
dict, undermine, or narrow the goals of the professionals and practices charged with
building this resilience. The current construction of resilience as the ability to resist
extremist narratives would seem to lend itself to a narrowed conception of citizenship
and criticality.
We would contend then that the current prevalence of this shielding metaphor of
resilience is problematic in that in its very construction it feeds into the notion of out-
group narratives deserving of critique and requiring resistance, and in-group narratives
that avoid critical attention. These mainstream, embedded narratives can contribute to
an overall discourse of “othering”that feeds into the efforts of violence promoting
narratives (Kundnani 2012; Kallis 2013). Further, a focus on shielding against outside
ideas can be a narrowing of the goals and missions of the professionals and institutions
charged with building this resilience. A lack of studies makes it had to argue that
addressing the concerns of young people about the current social order will directly
increase the prevention of violence. However, there is evidence that failing to address
the concerns and criticisms of young people adversely impacts prevention efforts
(Thomas 2016;O’Donnell 2016).
To return to our earlier example of a student within a classroom, the metaphor of
resilience as a shield would suggest that the student who ignores or rejects an extremist
Islamist narrative would be considered to be “protected”and ergo, resilient. However,
it’s not so clear that a student who directs their critical attention towards the dominance
of a materialist world view would be considered equally resilient. Indeed, rather than
viewed as a sign of resilience, this critical attention towards a dominant discourse may
be viewed as a precursor to extremism.
Taking the second metaphor of resilience through connection, the values that char-
acterise the proposed resilient community or society are somewhat clearly stated, being
integrated, open, and cohesive. However, in examining some of the articulations of this
10 W. STEPHENS AND S. SIECKELINCK

form of resilience more closely, certain questions arise. There is a sense that the
dominating aim is the maintenance of the current order. Calls for “isolated communities”
to become integrated into society would appear to be akin to calls for assimilation, in
which communities take on characteristics of wider society in order to become part of
the integrated whole. We would indeed regard an integrated society as a desirable aim.
However, a distinction must be made between on the one hand, integration emerging
from a co-creation of communities of the kind of society in which they wish to live, in
which there is space to question and indeed transform dominant notions, and on the
other, integration emerging from a need to assimilate into and accept dominant
discourses and practices.
The point at issue here is that carried within the somewhat objective sounding notion
of a “resilient community”is a deeper value statement that assimilation into dominant
social values is the aimed for, positive, outcome. While integration and shared social
values is surely desirable, the current construction of this discourse renders acceptance
of the dominant values and practices as resilient and by extension, the questioning of
these dominant discourses as a sign of a lack of resilience. The notion of what consti-
tutes a resilient community when looking from the perspective of preventing violence
cannot be divorced from a broader and deeper question of what is considered valuable
and worthwhile.
The “who”of resilience: constructions of the citizen and community
The second issue to consider is that of “who”is supposed to demonstrate resilience.
Important issues arise both in relation to notions of the “pre-resilient”citizen or com-
munity, and in the notion of the “resilient”citizen or community.
It is notable that within the policy documents reviewed, the individuals who are
deemed to require resilience-building are the “young”(European Commission
2014,2016; Department of Education 2015;UNESCO2017;NationaalCoordinator
Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid 2016;VlaamseRegering2015), and the “vulner-
able”(Nationaal Coordinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid 2016; Department
of Education 2015). Significantly, it is the “young”because they are seen as
particularly susceptible to extreme ideologies, given the period of identity search
and development they are passing through (Vlaamse Regering 2015). What dom-
inates then is a vision of the “pre-resilient”citizen as vulnerable –as a potential
victim. Similarly, the pre-resilient community is one that is considered vulnerable,
at risk of embracing extremist ideas. This highlights one of the central, but often
overlooked, elements of resilience as a concept. Even though it focuses on
strengths and assets, it is still located within an overall framework of risk and
vulnerability. As Rutter (2012) states, resilience “fits firmly into the “risk”paradigm;
it merely concentrates on the positive, rather than the negative, pole.”(p.33).
Conceiving of those who are considered susceptible to radicalisation in terms of
vulnerable victims is problematic. Based on an analysis of the perspectives presented by
young radicals themselves, Sieckelinck, Kaulingfreks, and de Winter (2015) argue that
neither a view of these young people as victims or villains sufficiently accounts for the
views expressed by these young people. The perspective of vulnerable victim does not
take sufficient account of the agency demonstrated by many of these young people in
the choices they made (Sieckelinck, Kaulingfreks, and de Winter 2015; Furedi 2009;
CRITICAL STUDIES ON TERRORISM 11

Richards 2011). This perspective can diminish the fact that some individuals may choose
to align themselves with groups espousing violence, not because they are vulnerable
but because they see it as a potential solution to real challenges or problems. This is not
to legitimise violence, but rather to point to the distorted vision that is brought by
adopting a lens of vulnerability.
The notion of the resilient citizen that is supposed to replace this vulnerable indivi-
dual is equally problematic. As discussed, within the metaphor of the shield is an
underpinning predisposition towards maintenance of the way things are. This predis-
position opens up “resilience as a shield”to the critique of constructing a depoliticised
role for the citizen (Evans and Reid 2013). In their analysis of two programmes directed
towards building resilience to extremism, Altermark and Nilsson (2018) argue that these
programmes promote a view of the resilient citizen as one who withstands external
forces rather than as an active agent who can have legitimate desires to effect social
transformation. This point is made with some force in relation to a popular resilience
building programmes in Europe:
BOUNCE constructs radicalized youngsters as lacking the proper positive attitudes that
nurture active citizenship. By this theoretical manoeuvre, every other political measure –
for example seeking to battle discrimination, poverty, or segregation as social phenomena –
becomes superfluous. (Altermark and Nilsson 2018, 63)
Thus, although it may not be the role of PVE architects to challenge the status-quo, they
are involved in the creation of policy that shapes a certain conception of what it means
to be a citizen. These conceptions of citizenship need to stand up to scrutiny beyond
their ability to prevent violence.
The “what”of resilience: resilience towards ideas?
Finally, we turn to the “what”of resilience –that towards which resilience is being
demonstrated. As noted, resilience as a concept only makes sense in relation to some
form of adversity or stress (Rutter 2012).To start with the second metaphor, in the
documents reviewed there is little detailed as to what exactly resilience is being
developed towards. It would appear to be taken for granted that resilience is being
developed towards extremism, but the challenge remains to identify exactly what is
meant by this.
If we turn to the metaphor of resilience as a shield, the “what”is primarily cast as
extremist ideology or narratives. As discussed, this makes sense up to a point. The
distorting impact of narratives is surely something that must be addressed in the
prevention of violence. However, it is clear that factors other than ideas and ideology
are also central to individuals moving towards perpetrating political violence (Sageman
2017; Coolsaet 2016; Doosje et al. 2016; Kruglanski et al. 2014; Aly and Striegher 2012).
There are multiple factors at play that render openness to the simple solutions offered
by extremist violence, both individual psychological and life experience factors
(Kruglanski et al. 2014; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2008; Simi, Sporer, and Bulbolz 2016), and
structural or systemic factors (Sageman 2017; Doosje et al. 2016). To reduce the resi-
lience required to resist violence to being able to reject extreme narratives is to fail to
adequately address the multitude of stressors faced by individuals and communities.
12 W. STEPHENS AND S. SIECKELINCK

The point at hand is that being resilient in the face of calls to violence requires much
more than being able to resist or deconstruct extremist narratives. It also requires
individuals and communities to demonstrate resilience in the face of both personal
and structural stressors that can bolster or feed into calls for political violence.
In a study investigating the pathways of young people in the Netherlands and
Denmark into extremism, ideologies served to provide a possible answer to deeper
challenges than as a source of adversity itself (Sieckelinck et al. 2017). Similarly, it is
argued that an openness towards extremism emerges not from the message itself, but
rather from external conditions such as marginalisation and discrimination that render
extreme ideas potentially attractive (Doosje et al. 2016;Zięba and Szlachter 2015).
Another perspective suggests that an openness to political violence emerges from
seeking significance, from a desire to matter (Kruglanski et al. 2014). Similarly, previous
experiences of violence, either personal or state sanctioned, can render an openness to
perpetrating political violence (Sageman 2017; Crone 2016).
Extremist narratives therefore, can perhaps best be understood as “decision-shaping”,
rather than “decision-making”, requiring association and interaction with real-world
factors to lead to engagement with violence (Hassan et al. 2018). This is an important
distinction, as in the current formulation of resilience PVE policies the source of adversity
towards which individuals and communities are needing to demonstrate is narrowed to
messages and ideas.
It would appear more consistent to expand the sources of adversity to include the
multiple stressors, and fundamental questions, to which, for some, extreme narratives
construct a seemingly simple solution. That is, systemic injustices, discrimination,
a polarised political discourse emphasising divisions along the lines of “us and them”,
insecurities in home situations, and experiences of violence. Demonstrating a resilient
response in the face of such adversities seems different from, and in some cases, more
meaningful than, a narrow conception of resilience as the resistance towards extreme ideas.
To be clear, this is not to dismiss or disregard the role of messages and ideas, but
rather to locate them properly in our conception of the issues being faced by young
people. An approach to protection through shielding young people from ideas is to
dismiss what it is within the ideas that are attractive. Turning our attention to why these
ideas appear to offer a solution to the questions of certain young people would seem
more fruitful than a reactionary rejection. A reading of radicalisation that takes into
account the natural idealism of youth, and the arising desire to see a better world (e.g.
Sieckelinck, Kaulingfreks, and de Winter 2015; Robert 2018; Sageman 2007) would
suggest that preventive measures would do well to tap into this tendency, giving
ideas the space to be heard, to take shape, to be nuanced, and to be acted upon.
Challenging and indeed changing the way the world and society is, is not the goal of
PVE policy makers, and nor is it a necessarily desirable end that in and of itself will
prevent violence. However, approaches to prevention that promote the way the world is
as the alternative to violent and simplifying ideologies have proven not to achieve the
desired results (Thomas 2010,2009;O’Donnell 2016). Attention must also go to giving
space not only to explore and consider notions of a better world, but also to exercise
agency in acting towards social change. To associate discontent with the current social
order as arising primarily from the distorting lens of extremist narratives is to fail to
recognise the very real challenges being faced in the world.
CRITICAL STUDIES ON TERRORISM 13

To illustrate more clearly the distinction, let us return to the students in the class-
room. From the current policy perspective in which extreme messages are deemed the
primary stressor to which a resilient response is expected, resilience can be produced in
the classroom through a campaign of counter-narratives and teaching skills in critiquing
extremist messages. However, by broadening our focus to include other fundamental
stressors as the object of resilience, then resilience emerges from a perceived change in
one’s conditions. From this vantage point, resilience is produced by addressing the
existential questions and concerns of the student, and by providing them with the
tools and resources to affect change in their social and physical environment.
Of course, this is not to suggest that the responsibility for addressing injustice and
discrimination lies with those experiencing it –this being one of the pitfalls of
a discourse on resilience. Rather, it is to embrace an expanded and more active range
of responses as forms of resilience and to recognise that the broader range of stress
factors that can include injustice, oppression, or disaffection with the current social
order. Such a shift also moves attention from being primarily focused on responses to
non-state actor ideologies, and embraces the fact that individuals are often needing to
demonstrate resilience in the face of institutionally-derived discrimination and injustice.
In essence, we argue that a more expansive notion of resilience is required if we are
to meaningfully take into consideration the multiple factors involved in the process of
an individual becoming engaged in political violence.
Implications for governing resilient responses to extremism
The turn to resilience is a welcome change in an area of policy making and practice that
has proven often problematic, particularly through extending a security agenda into the
social domain. Notwithstanding the significant challenges outlined above, there are
certain implications of a resilience perspective that could make a substantial contribu-
tion to efforts to fundamentally change how we approach preventing political violence.
In this section, we first present the main differences between the way the notion of
resilience in PVE tends to be used, and the way resilience could be used to improve its
impact on the existing policies. Second, we draw out some dilemmas from a governance
perspective that must be addressed if a turn to resilience is to engender a real change in
approach. Third, we formulate the main conclusions and end with some limitations of
our endeavour and recommendations for follow-up research.
As we have seen, adopting the language of resilience does not guarantee a rethinking of
approach. Our preliminary policy review indicates that current policy approaches generally
frame resilience as a form of protection from the influence of extremist propaganda and
narratives. This is understandable, given the role of propaganda and narratives in providing
ajustification for political violence by playing on (perceived) grievances. In the reviewed
documents, building resilience to propaganda is currently approached in two ways: by
blocking propaganda, and by debunking extremist narratives through critical thinking.
This raises the question: What about the grievances? In current conceptions of
resilience to extremist narratives it seems that the grievances that these narratives
play on are given little attention. Indeed, the importance of the grievances can often
appear to be diminished by references to these grievances as “perceived”. Rather than
address the grievances directly, the rationale behind some resilience building
14 W. STEPHENS AND S. SIECKELINCK

programmes seems to be to show youth that their perceptions are mistaken, never mind
the thrust of the grievances.
However, research from surveys and in-depth interviews indicates that grievances are
crucial to engage with (Atran, Rosen, and Romaniuk 2010; the Change Insitute 2008).
The most consistent drivers of political violence include perceptions of marginalisation
and injustice, exposure to violence, feelings of isolation, and the belief that joining
a violent movement holds the best prospects of achieving justice, purpose, or glory.
Aggression towards or systemic exclusion of specific communities often fuels grievances
and increases a propensity for violence (Atran, Rosen, and Romaniuk 2010).
Grievances exert an influence even when the interpretation of events is not factual,
but perceived. We are reminded of the Thomas-theorem: if men define situations as real,
they are real in their consequences. Even if we are to relegate the status of some of the
grievances that are played upon in extremist narratives and propaganda to the status of
“perceived”, this does not eliminate the felt impact of these grievances on the perceiver.
Taking these “perceived”grievances into account, and the way in which they are given
meaning in extremist narratives, entails a somewhat different idea of what it might
mean to build resilience –one less focused on shielding, and more attentive to mean-
ing-making and political agency of (young) citizens.
Another shift we suggest is needed relates to the question of violence. Whereas
current programs –understandably given counter-terrorism agendas –focus on violence
by radicalised perpetrators, we suggest the need to be attentive to the violence citizens
are subjected to, be it experienced in the family, on the street, or through the actions of
the state. Building resilience in PVE involves helping people to challenge (perceived)
violence in their own lives.
The proposed shift is reminiscent of the peacebuilding approach that has recently
gained importance in the debate on PVE, as defended by a variety of scholars (Holmes
2017; Abu-Nimer 2018). Peacebuilding approaches offer a broader understanding of the
causes of and responses to violent extremism. From a peacebuilding paradigm, extre-
mism is driven by nuanced issues of identity, alienation and grievance. Hence, the
prevention of violent extremism entails building capacity not only to address divisive
rhetoric, but also to be empowered to take action to address professed grievances (see
for example, Equal Access International 2019).
Thinking in terms of resilience entails a recognition that citizens are not passive beings
to be acted upon through security policies but rather, they have aspirations, (latent)
capacity, and agency. It also entails the recognition that complex social problems cannot
be adequately addressed through top-down approaches, but that decentralised practices
emerging at the local level have a significant impact. Finally, and significantly, turning to
the concept of resilience represents an acknowledgement that individuals and commu-
nities are experiencing adversity or stress, and importantly, it can embrace the notion that
the source of this adversity can reside within the current social order itself.
Drawing on resilience as a preventive concept then raises a number of dilemmas from
a governance perspective, and these dilemmas can be structured along the lines of the
elements discussed in our analysis: the identification of the source of adversity towards
which resilience is to be shown; the definition of what counts as a resilient response; and
the vision of the citizen or community constructed through the resilience discourse.
CRITICAL STUDIES ON TERRORISM 15

The first dilemma concerns the accurate identification of the source of adversity. As
we highlight, this currently appears to be one of the major challenges in the PVE
resilience discourse. Locating the source of adversity in ideas and narratives diverts
attention from the sources of stress individuals and communities face which these
narratives play upon. The local turn that resilience entails (Wimelius et al. 2018) would
suggest the need to understand the forms of adversity experienced at a local level.
While the sources may be systemic and global in their nature, thinking in terms of
resilience calls for a clarity on how these global challenges manifest themselves at
a local level. This has implications for governance, at the very least suggesting that
policy-makers should have the possibility to problematize official definitions of the
problem, being able to draw on the sources of adversity identified at a local level.
There are promising indications of such local approaches, for example in Mechelen,
Belgium, a city that took a unique local strategy of tackling social alienation through
youth work, schools, and family support, combined with an explicitly inclusive political
narrative. The challenge before us is to understand the importance of local manifesta-
tions of adversity whilst simultaneously addressing their systemic and global origins.
Turning attention to strengths at a local level cannot be a reason to turn away from the
global and systemic. Yet our concern to tackle the systemic cannot be at the expense of
recognising the role of the local.
The second dilemma concerns the identification of what “counts”as resilience.
Resilience only makes sense in the context of a world-view which gives shape and
value to the decision as to what constitutes resilience. Failing to be explicit about the
value-laden nature of this issue can result in the perpetuation of cultural-hegemonic
values with no space to question these. At the very least, the values underlying any
conception of resilience in PVE policy need to be spelled-out, opening up the space for
discussion on these values. The current tendency towards the maintenance of the
status-quo is a limited offer, and particularly troubling if it is within the status-quo
that we find the conditions fuelling an attraction to extremism and political violence. If
there are features of the current social order that are a source of adversity, an implica-
tion of embracing resilience is that these features are also subject to scrutiny.
To take an important example: the force of polarisation that reduces difference to
a binary, conflictual “us and them”is not only a feature of most extremist narratives, but
is woven into many aspects of social and political life. To be resilient in the face of the
force of polarisation then is not as simple as critiquing the “us and them”discourse of
extremist narratives, but also requires the ability to respond to the often implicit or
hidden discourses and ideas fostering an “us and them”perspective that pervade daily
life. It seems crucial then to engage entire communities, and not just those members
involved or “at-risk”of becoming involved in VE groups. Addressing fundamental social
and political drivers of extremism must be an integral part of any PVE strategy.
Afinal dilemma revolves around the notion of the citizen or community that is
evoked by a notion of resilience. The challenge from a governance perspective is that
resilience itself –at least, a conception of resilience that takes seriously the core
assumptions outlined –cannot be governed (Frissen et al. 2013). It is not something
that can be imposed or enforced or controlled.
We see in the current PVE resilience discourse a tendency towards a risk-mitigating form
of citizenship. However, this in many ways undermines the very notion of resilience which
16 W. STEPHENS AND S. SIECKELINCK

seeks to identify and build on local level strengths and capacities. By its very nature,
a resilient response is unpredictable, emerging from the interaction between adversity
and the exercising of strengths and capacities at a local level. If we are to adopt resilience
as a guiding concept, this entails a measure of “letting go”of efforts to rigidly control and
shape the resilient citizen. Rather, resilience entails empowering citizens to respond to the
fundamental sources of adversity in our modern-day society. This opens up re-imagining of
the “pre-resilient”or “pre-radicalised”citizen not as vulnerable, but as disempowered or
lacking access to the resources to address fundamental concerns; radicalisation to extre-
mism offers the promise of empowerment (Niconchuk et al. 2018). Efforts at preventing
radicalisation that do not open up avenues for responding to (perceived) challenges, and
instead depoliticise the issue, would seem to feed into the very conditions to which
extremist discourses can appear to offer a solution.
Some concluding remarks
In the ecological field, the notion of bouncing back as the dominant perspective of
resilience has expanded to embrace alternative notions of resilience, particularly the
ability to transform and evolve (Davoudi 2012). The PVE-resilience discourse seems to
require a similar expansion, in terms of moving beyond the notion of resilience as
protection from external threats. Rather, resilience is about addressing discontentment
in our open societies. The challenge posed by individuals and communities being drawn
to calls to political violence is not to retreat to the status-quo, but rather to address the
very real forms of adversity affecting citizens, communities, and society.
Similarly, as the wider literature on resilience has moved beyond regarding resilience
as a trait of the individual (Luthar and Cicchetti 2000; Ungar 2012), the PVE-resilience
discourse needs to consider more carefully where resilience is located. If it is not some-
thing that is a trait of individuals or communities, nor something that can be built or
imposed by the state, then we must seek it somewhere in the interaction between the
individual/community and the context. Rather than seeking to “create resilient citizens”,
it would be more consistent to seek to create the contexts in which resilience can be
demonstrated (Ungar 2012; Grossman et al. 2017). That is, ensuring access exists at the
local level to the resources which enable individuals and communities to both demon-
strate and develop strengths and capacities to address grievances. This can be uncom-
fortable as it logically entails the ability to respond to all sources of adversity –including
institutional sources. As Briggs (2008, 11) argues, “The kind of social resilience we need is
therefore transformative rather than conservative. It is delivered by a strong and
mobilized society, not a passive and subservient one.”
This article, through examining the current use of “resilience”in PVE policies, has
made a modest attempt to draw on lessons from applying resilience in other contexts to
articulate possible features of a critically informed approach to preventing violent
extremism. As yet, the adoption of the language of resilience building has not been
matched by a fundamental rethinking of approach, and may often mask troubling
approaches in the language of objectivity and positivity. By examining the concept of
resilience as a current trend in policy discourse, drawing lessons from the rich literature
on resilience in adjacent fields, a critically informed concept of resilience emerged. This
conceptualisation may increase the potential to provide a framework of response to
CRITICAL STUDIES ON TERRORISM 17

extremism that recognises individuals and communities as political actors who rather
than being shielded from ideologies, require resources for empowerment and channels
to challenge violence, discrimination, and injustice, be it state or non-state driven.
Resilience is no silver bullet concept; indeed, many problematic practices have been
carried out under its banner. However, it also carries certain assumptions that may offer
a promising contribution to efforts to rethink certain suboptimal approaches to pre-
venting violent extremism.
Limitations and recommendations for future research
First, the scope of this review was limited and is therefore unable to claim a comprehensive
coverage of the policy discourse on resilience in the context of violent extremism. The
purpose here was to give a flavour of the policy narrative out there. Looking more closely
into its details is recommended.
Second, while we argue for the need to look beyond shielding young people,
countering extremist media and influences is an important element of CVE for protective
purposes. Children, especially young children, deserve to be shielded from harmful and
graphic content. In some cases of hate messaging, radical agents are rightly banned
from engaging with youth. These interventions are, we would say, conditional to
building the kind of resilience we are after. Operationalising this perspective in concrete
PVE endeavours is required.
Third, in this article, we sought to outline the elements of a perspective on resilience in
the context of violent extremism that offers potential for rethinking certain approaches to
prevention. Some of the arguments presented may be viewed as idealist. But, when it comes
to the topic of extremism, which has a tendency to spread anger and fear, we see value in
a hopeful perspective, especially for the professionals on the ground (Sieckelinck,
Kaulingfreks & De Winter). This position is not necessarily naive as people can learn; their
abilities can change and surprise us in negative as well as in positive sense. A preventative
approach has value because it foresees what might happen if we do not act, but should
never give way to an aversion for the unpredictable. Therefore, follow-up research may want
to focus on a study of arrangements and partnerships that work towards establishing truly
resilient responses against extremism.
Notes
1. Other PVE policy documents also refer to promoting European Values, the values of Human
Rights, or democratic values. Although these are not necessarily placed within the context
of resilience building, the underlying logic is presumably the same.
2. The United Nations is of course a multilevel organisation with multiple bodies. We included
the UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism as a central document that is referenced
in a number of national documents. UNESCO’s guidance to policy makers was also included
as a prominent document addressing the prevention of violent extremism directly.
18 W. STEPHENS AND S. SIECKELINCK

Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank Professor Hans Boutellier (VU Amsterdam) and Eleni Christodoulou
(Georg Eckert Institute) for their feedback and advice on this paper. This work was supported by
the Dutch Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Sport under Grant 326434
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Funding
This work was supported by the Dutch Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Sport [326434].
Notes on contributors
William Stephens is a PhD student at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. His research addresses local
approaches to preventing violent extremism and polarisation and the policy contexts in which
these emerge. With a background in education, he is particularly interested in understanding the
role of formal and informal education in contributing to social change. His academic work is
complimented by extensive experience working with young people striving for social change in
a number of different settings in Europe.
Stijn Sieckelinck (1980, Belgium) is senior researcher at the Institute for Societal Resilience at Vrije
Universiteit Amsterdam. He holds a PhD in Social Educational Theory. Focus lies on social
pedagogy, political philosophy, multiculturalism and governance of youth. Research and consul-
tancy interests lie in the broad field of education, governance and professional improvement, but
with a particular focus on radicalisation, conflict resolution, and civic education.
ORCID
William Stephens http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9593-0101
Stijn Sieckelinck http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6938-6752
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CRITICAL STUDIES ON TERRORISM 23

Appendix 1: Documents Reviewed
Location Document Title Author Date Context of Resilience
United Nations Plan of Action to Prevent Violent
Extremism (A/70/674)
United Nations
General
Assembly
2015 Community resilience to
radicalisation
United Nations Preventing Violent Extremism
Through Education –A guide for
policy makers
UNESCO 2017 Building resilience to
extremism through
education
European Union European Commission
Communication: Preventing
Radicalisation to Terrorism and
Violent Extremism: Strengthening
the EUs response (COM(2013) 941
final)
European
Commission
2014 Building resilience in young
people to extremist views
European Union European Commission
Communication: supporting the
prevention of radicalisation
leading to violent extremism (COM
(2016) 379 final)
European
Commission
2016 Individual resilience against
propaganda. Democratic
resilience. Resilient
societies.
European Union A Europe that Protects: Preventing
Radicalisation
European
Commission
2018 Strengthening vulnerable
young peoples’resilience.
Belgium (Flanders
Region)
Action plan for the prevention of
violent radicalisation and
polarisation: Overview of actions
and measures
Vlaamse Regering 2015 A call for resilience training
for young people.
UK The Prevent Duty: Departmental
advice for schools and childcare
providers
Department of
Education
2015 Building resilience in children
through promoting
fundamental British values.
UK Counter-Extremism Strategy UK Home Office, 2015 Building resilience to the
risks of radicalisation in
young people.
Creating communities
resilient to extremism.
UK Prevent Duty Toolkit for Local
Authorities and Partner Agencies
UK Home Office, 2018 Resilience through education
to extremist narratives.
Canada Building Resilience Against Terrorism:
Canada’s Counterterrorism
Strategy
Public Safety
Canada
2013 Building resilience of
communities to withstand
extremist ideologies
Netherlands National Counterterrorism Strategy NCTV 2016 Increasing the resilience of
vulnerable groups and
their communities.
London London –A safer city for all
Londoners
Greater London
Authority
2017 Promoting strong and
resilient communities
Utrecht Utrecht zijn we Samen Gemeente Utrecht 2015 Building resilience in young
people through earlier
signalling
The Hague Speerpuntenprogramma Gemeente Den
Haag
2015 Building resilient of citizens
of the Hague against
jihadism and other forms
of radicalisation.
24 W. STEPHENS AND S. SIECKELINCK