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Dissatisfied yet efficacious? Protest and sincere radical right vote in Brandenburg, Saxony and Thuringia Landtag Election 2014

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In contrast to most extant approaches, this paper argues that protest and sincere populist radical right party vote cannot be seen as synonymous with a choice motivated respectively by dissatisfaction or ideological positioning. Not only can a vote perceived as a protest note to established parties be programmatic. Most especially, revisiting classical and newest literature, this article claims that high discontent can also drive sincere allegiance to the chosen actor, subjectively perceived as the only viable vehicle for a desired change. These unifying propositions are confirmed by a comparative quantitative analysis of electoral breakthrough by the Alternative for Germany in Brandenburg, Saxony and Thuringia Landtag Elections 2014. Subsequent qualitative analysis further suggests that the predominant protest or sincere vote character fuelled by particular motivations is congruent with the specific anti-establishment framing of PRRP issue supply. The insights offer a deeper understanding of the mechanisms, patterns and consequences behind broadening voter mobilization and mainstreaming political agency by PRRPs
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Bartek Pytlas
LMU Munich
Dissatisfied yet efficacious? Protest and sincere radical right vote in Brandenburg,
Saxony and Thuringia Landtag Election 2014
Working Paper presented at the ECPR General Conference 2017, 06-09 September,
Oslo
(under the working title ‘More than Programmatic Protest. A Representational
Perspective on Populist Radical Right Party Choice’)
1
Dissatisfied yet efficacious? Protest and sincere radical right vote in Brandenburg,
Saxony and Thuringia Landtag Election 2014
Introduction
Do voters choose populist radical right parties (PRRPs)1 to strategically signal perceived
grievances to all parties? Or does PRRP vote express a genuine allegiance to these very
actors? The debate about the protest or sincere (Oppenhuis et al., 1996; van der Eijk and
Franklin, 2009: 135) character of vote for non-established challengers most notably
PRRPs has a long tradition in the research on anti-establishment party politics (van der
Brug et al., 2000; van der Brug and Fennema, 2003, 2007; Swyngedouw, 2001; Bélanger
and Aarts, 2006; Hobolt and Spoon, 2012; Passarelli and Tuorto, 2016). Not only the
mood of multiple societal crises (Kriesi and Pappas, 2015); (Halikiopoulou and
Vasilopoulou, 2016) and the increasing electoral support for PRRPs across Europe, but
notably the diffusion of their issue positions and narratives into mainstream politics and
public debates (van Spanje, 2010; Rooduijn, 2014; Pytlas, 2015; Akkerman et al., 2016)
underscore the continuing empirical importance of this puzzle.
Yet, despite advanced scholarship and empirical relevance, the related question about the
effects of motors driving protest and sincere PRRP vote has still not been unilaterally
answered. This is due to the fact that on theoretical level sincere and protest vote have
become equated with ideological/policy vote on the one hand and a choice fuelled by
political discontent/cynicism on the other (van der Brug and Fennema, 2003, 2007;
Bélanger and Aarts, 2006; Hobolt and Spoon, 2012; Zhirkov, 2014; Passarelli and Tuorto,
2016). These conceptual “false friends” lost in operational translation make it challenging
to pin-point the exact effects of particular motivations behind distinctive types of electoral
behaviour. In consequence, the important and rich insights of previous research often talk
at cross-purposes.
Against this backdrop, this article aims to disentangle the effects of dissatisfaction and
programmatic positions on both protest and sincere vote for populist radical right parties.
Revisiting classical and newest research, the main conceptual argument of this paper is
that a vote fuelled by political discontent and policy positions cannot be treated as
synonyms of protest and sincere vote. The two latter concepts rather describe distinct
2
modes of electoral behaviour that pertain to the subjective perception of the
representational role of the chosen party in the political process: either as an implemental
protest note used to manifest a perceived grievance to other parties, or as an actor believed
to be the only one able to bring about the desired change. What follows is that not only
can PRRP protest vote be galvanized by both ideological considerations and
dissatisfaction (Bélanger and Aarts, 2006). More importantly and this, unlike previously
argued (van der Brug and Fennema, 2007), is not a contradiction a sincere PRRP vote
can be driven not only by ideology, but also by discontent. By a conceptual unification
and operational separation of these notions, the paper contributes to a deeper explanation
of the character and motors behind protest or sincere populist radical right vote. In
addition, the presented approach suggests the need to discuss how PRRPs can themselves
cue the subjective perception of their representational role through diverse anti-
establishment legitimization of their issue supply. It hence also allows to better
understand the relationship between PRRP political agency and varying patterns of
support mobilization, as well the resulting implications for established mainstream parties
and contemporary democracies.
The propositions discussed in the following section will be tested using a comparative
quantitative and qualitative analysis of a recent prominent electoral PRRP breakthrough
outside of the supranational arena: the success of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD,
Alternative for Germany) in the Landtag elections in Saxony, Thuringia and
Brandenburg. These events that took place within two weeks in August/September 2014
not only account for a most similar comparison in a second-order electoral context
favourable for challenger party success (Kitschelt and McGann, 1995: 79; Reif and
Schmitt, 1980). Contrasting three local branches of one PRRP also allows to subsequently
analyse the diverse framing of similar core anti-establishment nativist supply2 during
parallel electoral campaigns and observe whether the varying mobilization propensity of
sincere and protest vote fuelled by specific motivations relate to particular narrative
formulas of PRRP supply.
Reassessing protest and sincere vote: protest note or genuine preference?
3
Despite, or perhaps also because of the multitudinous comprehensive scholarship, the
discussion on the motors behind protest and sincere PRRP vote is still marked by
conceptual and operational confusion. A classical metaphor behind sincere electoral
behaviour is that it constitutes a vote with the heart cast in explicit preference of a
specific challenger party over other options, while protest vote is seen as putting in the
boot, or a strategic choice aiming to scare the first-preferred party (Oppenhuis et al.,
1996): 301-5; (van der Eijk and Franklin, 2009: 135). Still, most approaches operationally
conflate protest vote with political dissatisfaction, and by association conceptually
juxtapose it against programmatic voter motivations interpreted as an indicator of sincere
vote (van der Brug and Fennema, 2003, 2007; Bélanger and Aarts, 2006; Hobolt and
Spoon, 2012; Zhirkov, 2014; Passarelli and Tuorto, 2016). Some classical studies
suggested a mutually exclusive trade-off between policy and dissatisfaction-driven PRRP
vote (van der Brug and Fennema, 2003; van der Brug and Fennema, 2007). Others
presented evidence of co-occurrence of both dissatisfaction and ideological positions as
motors of challenger vote (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2000; Swyngedouw, 2001; Bélanger
and Aarts, 2006). The critique of this approach was nonetheless that it ‘renders the
concept of a protest vote meaningless’ (van der Brug and Fennema, 2007: 479), as it
cannot differentiate between ‘solely’ sincere motivation behind vote choice and the
interacting effect of dissatisfaction, seen as an exclusive indicator of a vote ‘with the
boot’. Therefore, it is necessary to revisit and unify previous findings on the concepts of
protest and sincere vote and their operational relationship with their underlying
motivations.
Protest and sincere vote: back to the roots
The classical understanding of protest and sincere vote (cf. van der Eijk and Franklin,
2009: 135) suggests that these concepts are first and foremost related to a particular
utilitarian view behind one’s electoral choice, itself mediated by a subjective perception
(Campbell et al., 1960; cf. Swyngedouw, 2001) of the chosen party’s representational role
in the political process: respectively as an implemental protest note to established parties,
or as a genuine sole possibility for desired change. Attraction towards a challenger
believed to be a viable representational vehicle (cf. Bélanger and Aarts, 2006), or feasible
alternative to established parties may be mediated by various aspects of its agency, such
4
as perceived credibility of candidates and party organization (van Kessel, 2015), or
distinctive resonant frame ownership over a position on salient issues (Pytlas 2015). Yet,
while both sincere and protest voters can be attracted to an representational alternative by
various considerations, the distinction between genuine and strategic behaviour in the
very end lies in the evaluation whether or not, of all available options, the chosen one is
believed to be the only one able to resolve a perceived grievance. Protest and sincere
electoral behaviour can hence be interpreted as two distinct modes of political
participation based on the cognitive-affective subjective perception of the relationship
between the individual, the political system, and the available representative options,
itself mediated by the extent of external efficacy (cf. Campbell et al., 1954: 187; Campbell
et al., 1960; Gamson, 1968).
Next to dissatisfaction as a feeling that the government does not follow one’s interest, the
belief that one’s action can make a direct difference is crucial for the activation of political
participation (see the mistrustful-efficiacous hypothesis of Gamson, 1968; cf. Paige,
1971; Sigelman and Feldman, 1983). Hence, in electoral terms, sincere vote (especially
for non-established challengers) is mediated by a subjective perception that change is
both necessary and possible (cf. Gamson, 1968: 48) to accomplish by choosing this
particular option not others. If change was believed at least remotely possible with
stronger parties, even programmatically congruent individuals would rather strategically
vote with the head (van der Eijk and Franklin, 2009). A protest vote on the other hand
is related to the perception of low external efficacy (Bélanger and Aarts, 2006).
Inefficacious voters do not believe that there is any specific party that can best tackle their
perceived grievance. Hence, a protest vote is related to the perception of the chosen party
not as the only possibility for change, but as an implemental protest note used to state the
necessity of specific change to the party system. The availability of mainstreaming anti-
establishment challengers (for obvious reasons not accounted for by the mistrustful-
efficiacous hypothesis) creates an opportunity even or especially for inefficacious
voters to neither abstain nor habitually continue voting for the first-preferred party, but to
actively manifest their grievance, even if their hopes that their specific choice can actually
make a direct difference are low.
Dissatisfaction and programmatic positions as motors of sincere and protest vote
5
These elaborations showcase that external (in)efficacy considerations, while empirically
interactive, are analytically distinct (cf. Sigelman and Feldman, 1983: 119) from their
underlying motivations such as political discontent or (non-)ideological considerations.
High discontent cannot be solely equated with a motivation to scare other parties, and by
far not conceptualized as the opposite of a programmatic vote.
First, programmatic stances can galvanize not only sincere but also protest vote (Bélanger
and Aarts, 2006). A protest vote is a rational ‘voice’ strategy that presupposes a
perception of grievance that the voters turn themselves against (van der Brug et al., 2000;
Bélanger and Aarts, 2006; Arzheimer, 2008; Passarelli and Tuorto, 2016). A protest vote
is hence a signal that change is necessary explicitly in accordance to one’s particular
interest, a protest note that is rarely blank. In this scenario, attraction towards the chosen
representational vehicle can be driven by the adherence to the distinctive stance on issues
that the party is believed to represent. Yet, it is not linked to a belief that there is one
particular party that can actually bring about this political change. The main thing is that
the demand to change the status quo is manifested, regardless who (if anyone at all) might
then attend to the subjective grievance.
Second, by consequence, high political dissatisfaction can drive not only protest, but also
sincere vote. This fact is already suggested by early observations that (especially radical)
political participation is mobilized by high efficacy and high dissatisfaction (Gamson,
1968; Sigelman and Feldman, 1983). Applied to electoral behaviour, discontent with the
choice offered by the party system (cf. van der Eijk and Franklin, 2009: 135) can drive
individuals to ‘revolt’ against previously available options and shift allegiance towards a
new competitor. In this scenario, dissatisfied voters are attracted to the new actor because
in their minds it can do a better job in bringing about change that other options couldn’t
make possible even if in government. The primary representational task of the challenger
is not to exhort established parties. Instead, the newly emergent party is perceived as a
‘normal’ and ‘equal’ political player (cf. van der Brug et al. 2000).
These elaborations show that protest and sincere vote are interrelated with, but cannot be
equated to, a choice motivated by dissatisfaction and ideological stances. The discussion
6
demonstrates that there is no contradiction between a mutually exclusive character (van
der Brug and Fennema, 2007: 479) of these two modes of electoral behaviour and the co-
occurring nature of their motivations (Swyngedouw, 2001; Bélanger and Aarts, 2006).
While protest and sincere vote are distinct, both of them can be galvanized by ideological
stances. Not only can protest vote be programmatic, but it can indeed be differentiated
from a sincere one. This is possible once we realize that not only protest but also sincere
vote can be driven by discontent. These re-enforcing motivations simply have a different
meaning in the minds of voters with low and high external efficacy in terms of how they
are cognitively linked with the perceived role of the chosen party in the political system.
Political discontent behind a belief of low external efficacy drives an implemental
manifest to one or all parties to attend to a particular subjective grievance, while for high
efficacy it fuels a sincere evaluation of genuine allegiance to the chosen party due to its
perceived capacity to accomplish the sought change better than all others.
In analytical terms, the advantage of this unifying approach is the operational possibility
to assess the effects of voter dissatisfaction and ideological self-positioning separately for
each type of electoral behaviour. It allows to go beyond a broad expectation that the odds
of voting for a PRRP will increase with both rising political dissatisfaction, and with more
right-wing and demarcative ideological self-positioning (H1). Most importantly, it allows
to test the effects of each of these attitudinal motivations on both sincere and protest PRRP
vote. It is thus assumed that the galvanizing effect of dissatisfaction and ideological self-
positioning on the odds of voting for a populist radical right challenger will in relative
terms be predominant either for voters with high or low external efficacy (H2), indicating
whether PRRP support driven by a specific motivation can be interpreted as protest or
sincere vote.
Research design
Data and dependent variable
To test the proposed hypotheses on crucial, most similar cases of PRRP challenger
breakthrough, the study uses data from the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES),
specifically the three Long-term Online-Tracking datasets on Landtag elections in
7
Brandenburg, Saxony and Thuringia (Rattinger et al., 2014a, 2014b, 2014c). The
dependent variable is the declared proportional vote choice in a Landtag election. I
transformed the item into a dichotomous variable, where 1 denotes a declaration of
voting for the PRRP challenger (Alternative for Germany) and 0 a vote for other
parties (for details see Appendix). My primary theoretical interest is not to explain AfD
success, but to specifically demonstrate the interactive effects of dissatisfaction and
ideology as motors of PRR challenger vote for voters with high and low external efficacy
relative to all other parties. I therefore prefer a binomial over a multinomial logistic
regression model. Multinomial regression is run as a robustness test (see Appendix).
Independent variables
Political dissatisfaction is measured by an additive index of three items: performance
evaluation of the Federal government as a whole, as well as of its two main members that
at time were incumbents in the three researched cases: the Christian-Democratic Union
(CDU) and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). External (in)efficacy is
operationalized as an index of two items asking whether it makes a big or no difference
which party is in government both at Federal and Land level. The variable describes
whether or not a specific party is subjectively perceived as the most viable vehicle of
change, regardless of the strategic evaluation whether it actually has any chance of
entering government. I rescaled the index to three values (0-1-2) indicating low, moderate
and high efficacy. Ideological self-positioning is measured in regard to the left-right, as
well as socio-cultural dimension. Self-positioning is preferred over a measure of spatial
proximity as this allows me to observe the interactive effects along both scales in more
detail. Socio-cultural positioning is assessed by voter self-placement on a scale measuring
the integrative-demarcative (Kriesi et al., 2006) position on immigration. Given that this
issue has become a universal irritant (Merkl, 2003: 27) for PRRPs, and that their
political agency revolves mainly around socio-cultural conflicts (Minkenberg, 2003;
Rovny, 2013), a demarcative socio-cultural stance can be seen as the key indicator of a
nativist positioning at the core of PRRP ideology. Finally, I control for age, gender,
education, and occupation.
8
In the first step I run a descriptive bivariate analysis to map key voter characteristics
across the party political spectrum in the three researched cases. Subsequent preliminary
regression tests the effects of political discontent, external (in)efficacy, as well as left-
right and socio-cultural positioning on the probability to choose the AfD (H1). The final,
central series of models test the interactive effects of dissatisfaction as well as left-right
and socio-cultural positioning separately for voters with high and low levels of efficacy
(H2).
Analysis
Figure 1: Voter dissatisfaction, external efficacy and ideological self-placement by party preference and
Landtag election (mean scores with 95% CIs)
Figure 1 draws a contextual picture of AfD voter characteristics contrasted against voters
of other parties, as well as between the three cases (for details see the Appendix). First,
political dissatisfaction distinguished AfD voters from supporters of most other parties,
except the challenger Left. Furthermore, AfD voters did exhibit a clear anti-immigration
attitude. At the same time supporters of other parties (except the Greens) on average also
tended to have a rather demarcative stance on immigration. These characteristics are
9
similar for AfD voters across all three elections. Yet, the figure yields interesting insights
especially in regard to external efficacy. The mean efficacy of AfD voters was indeed
lower than that of other party supporters and (as expected) higher than that of non-voters.
Nonetheless, on average, AfD voters were not primarily characterized by a feeling that
their vote makes no difference. In Saxony and Brandenburg they tended to believe that it
does matter which party they can potentially vote into government. The mean (in)efficacy
value falls below the middle of the scale only in Thuringia.
Table 1: Logistic regression of AfD vote in the 2014 Landtag elections.
Saxony
Thuringia
Brandenburg
Political Dissatisfaction
(+=more dissatisfied)
1.493***
1.238*
1.347***
External Efficacy
(+=high efficacy)
.550*
.565*
1.345
Socio-cultural position
(+=anti-immigration)
1.308**
1.285*
1.325*
Left-Right Position (+=Right)
1.393**
1.327*
1.280*
Controls
Age
.945**
1.030
.962
Gender (1=female)
1.100
1.120
.950
Education
.856
.887
1.246
Occupation
1.190
1.092
Intercept
104.188*
-64.755
66.489
χ2
55.41***
34.75***
40.63***
Pseudo R2
0.28
0.19
0.23
N
231
234
237
Note: Entries are odds ratios. *** p≤0.001; ** p≤0.01; *p≤0.05
These first observations are further formalized by both binomial and multinomial logistic
regression (Table 1, and Table A4 in the Appendix). The binomial model shows a positive
and statistically significant effect of party dissatisfaction on probability of AfD vote.
Subsequently, in all cases both a more right-wing self-placement as well as attitudinal
10
leaning towards more anti-immigrant stances significantly raise the probability of AfD
vote over all other parties, confirming Hypothesis 1.
Figure 2: The effect of dissatisfaction, ideological positions and external efficacy on the probability of AfD
vote (predictive margins)
Yet, the most interesting observation is, again, the effect of (in)efficacy. While more
right-wing and demarcative attitudes, as well as growing dissatisfaction all
unambiguously raise the odds of AfD vote, the influence of efficacy is not unidirectional,
as visualised in Figure 2. In Thuringia and Saxony, the probability of voting AfD
increases significantly with lower external efficacy relative to voters of other parties. In
Brandenburg, surprisingly, the opposite is the case, although its isolated effect as such is
not statistically significant (except versus non-voters).
Most studies would stop at this point, drawing a correct, yet broad conclusion that for all
observed cases PRRP vote is galvanized by both dissatisfaction and ideological
considerations. This is in line with previous research on the additive effect of these
motivations (a.o. Swyngedouw, 2001; Bélanger and Aarts, 2006), including AfD vote in
11
the 2013 Federal election (Schwarzbözl and Fatke, 2016). Yet, this conclusion cannot
unambiguously provide insights on protest or sincere character of PRRP vote. The
preliminary analysis legitimizes the need to look deeper into the interactive relationship
between the similar effects of vote motivations and external (in)efficacy (Table 2).
Table 2: Logistic regression of AfD vote in the 2014 Landtag elections (interactive effects).
Saxony
Thuringia
Brandenburg
Model
I
II
III
I
II
III
I
II
III
Political
Dissatisfactio
n
(+=more
dissatisfied)
1.120
1.583**
*
1.465**
*
1.188
1.240*
1.241*
1.048
1.348**
*
1.366**
*
External
Efficacy
(+=high
efficacy)
.131**
.053***
.128*
.431
.520
.214
.383
9.037*
.523
Left-Right
Position
(+=right)
1.442**
.927
1.375*
1.331*
1.310
1.318*
1.299*
2.031**
1.281*
Socio-cultural
position
(+=anti-
immigration)
1.292*
1.311**
1.115
1.287*
1.282*
1.150
1.382**
1.346**
1.141
Dissatisfactio
n x Efficacy
1.262*
1.044
1.208
Socio-cultural
x Efficacy
1.188
1.114
1.107
Left-Right x
Efficacy
1.508**
1.014
.743*
Controls
Age
.946*
.950*
.947**
1.031
1.030
1.027
.955
.963
.962
Gender
(1=female)
1.000
1.096
1.027
1.115
1.124
1.110
.895
1.122
.954
Education
.849
.857
.869
.883
.884
.895
1.295
1.224
1.252
Occupation
1.172
1.142
1.174
1.087
1.095
1.100
1.153
1.138
1.165
Intercept
104.451*
96.048*
102.844*
-65.078
-64.518
-56.957)
81.394
61.0128
68.5153
Pseudo R2
0.30
0.33
0.29
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.25
0.25
0.23
χ2
59.32**
*
65.00**
*
58.25**
*
34.93**
*
34.76**
*
35.48**
*
44.25**
*
45.03**
*
41.23**
*
AIC
160.595
7
154.914
7
161.664
164.297
4
164.465
1
163.744
155.788
1
155.01
158.812
6
12
BIC
195.019
9
189.338
9
196.089
198.850
6
199.018
3
198.297
2
190.468
7
189.690
6
193.493
2
N
231
231
231
234
234
234
237
237
237
Note: Entries are odds ratios. *** p≤0.001; ** p≤0.01; *p≤0.05
The following figures visualise these interactive effects, allowing to observe in detail the
effects of dissatisfaction and ideological self-positioning separately for voters with high
and low efficacy. For better interpretation, plot markers in the subsequent figures depict
the range where the effect is statistically significant (p≤0.05).
Figure 3: The effect of political dissatisfaction on the probability of AfD vote for voters with high and low
efficacy (predictive margins).
Figure 3 demonstrates that high political dissatisfaction as motor of PRRP vote cannot be
interpreted solely as an indicator of protest, but also of sincere vote. In Thuringia, rising
dissatisfaction equally fuels the probability of voting AfD for voters with both high and
low efficacy. At the same time, regardless of their dissatisfaction level, inefficacious
voters were more probable to vote for the challenger than respondents with high efficacy.
13
Hence, in this case it is the logic of protest that dominates the effect of high dissatisfaction
on PRRP vote. In Saxony and Brandenburg, the picture is different. In both cases highly
dissatisfied voters who believed that their vote specifically for the AfD can make a big
difference were more probable to vote for the PRRP than highly dissatisfied, yet
inefficacious voters. Especially in Brandenburg, growing dissatisfaction only minimally
raises the probability to vote AfD for low efficacy voters. Therefore, in both cases the
galvanizing effect of high discontent on PRRP vote is strongly related not predominantly
to protest, but to sincere vote.
Figure 4: The effect of integrative-demarcative position on the probability of AfD vote for voters with
high and low efficacy (predictive margins)
Subsequently, Figure 4 demonstrates the effects of integrative-demarcative stances for
sincere and protest vote. The first finding is that in all three elections, anti-immigration
positions generally increase the probability of PRRP vote for voters with high and low
efficacy. In Thuringia, both sincere and protest vote were related especially to more
demarcative attitudes, while in Saxony the effect of protest vote is broader and sets in
earlier (see below). Yet, in both cases it were anti-immigrant voters with low rather than
14
high efficacy who were relatively more probable to vote for the PRRP. Therefore, next to
core nativist supporters, the AfD vote in these two cases was able to predominantly
mobilize voters who wanted to signal a demand for a tougher stance on immigration, yet
did not link it with the belief that it is only the AfD that is best suited to tackle this
subjective grievance. A crucial finding is that the opposite is the case in Brandenburg,
where anti-immigration stances of AfD voters are strongly related to sincere rather than
protest vote. Hence, PRRP vote in this case seems to be driven especially by the sincere
belief that it is the challenger, not others, that can shift immigration policies towards more
demarcative stances.
Figure 5: The effect of left-right self-placement on the probability of AfD vote for voters with high and low
efficacy (predictive margins).
Finally, Figure 5 demonstrates the effect of left-right positioning on AfD vote. The picture
in Thuringia is analogous to previous observations. The effect of more right-wing
positioning is comparable for voters with both high and low efficacy. Still, again even
more right-wing supporters were predominantly following the logic of protest. The vote
in Thuringia was much less due to the conviction that specifically the AfD can actively
shift mainstream politics in a more rightist direction, but was rather a protest note to other
15
parties. In Brandenburg, it is also protest that predominantly drives right-wing AfD vote.
A crucial finding is that in this case the AfD was believed to be specifically able to bring
about a more nativist policy on immigration, but as it seems not a general shift of
mainstream politics in a more right-wing direction. Saxony presents a mirror image of
this relationship. Unlike in the case of immigration, a more right-wing position as a motor
of AfD vote predominantly constituted a sincere vote. Hence, while anti-immigration
motivations of AfD vote were mediated by the logic of protest, unlike in two other cases
the Saxon AfD was additionally strongly perceived as an actor that can bring about a
more general right-wing change of the mainstream party system. A concurrent
predominant probability of non-right-wing individuals to choose AfD if inefficacious (see
also Figure 4) does not necessarily suggest a non-programmatic vote (beyond the spatial
sense of the word). It might rather indicate that these protest voters supported the PRRP
for additional reasons related to its supply, such as the will to manifest grievances related
to valence issues (see the qualitative analysis).
Altogether, the findings largely confirm the hypothesis that in relative terms the
predominant effects of dissatisfaction and ideological motivations on radical right vote
are distinctive for voters with both high and low external efficacy (H2). High
dissatisfaction vote cannot be solely interpreted as protest, but can, and in fact does
(especially in Saxony and Brandenburg) also predominantly fuel highly efficacious,
sincere PRRP vote. Although in all cases ideological positions were similarly relevant for
AfD choice, the results also show varying effects of these motivations for voters with
high and low efficacy. In Thuringia, even though the party did attract sincere nativist
supporters, even voters with demarcative and more right-wing stances were relatively
more probable to vote AfD if they saw it as a protest note. In the two other cases,
programmatic voters were relatively more likely to choose the PRRP for sincere rather
than protest reasons, yet this propensity varied for particular motivations. In Brandenburg
a sincere vote was predominant only in regard to the niche issue of immigration, not to a
more right-wing ideology. In Saxony the opposite is the case. While both less right-wing
voters and individuals with a more demarcative stance on immigration chose the PRRP
mostly as a protest note, a sincere vote was predominant for more right-wing voters. This
suggests that PRRP vote ‘with the heart’ can be mobilized not only by the subjective
16
perception of the party as a niche actor but also as an equalmainstream competitor from
the right.
Discussing the divergent patterns of PRRP vote: the anti-establishment framing of
issue supply
The findings instantly beg the question on the reasons behind the diverse interaction
between sincere and protest PRRP vote and their underlying attitudinal motivations in the
three most similar cases. How might one explain the varying propensity to which nativist
anti-establishment actors gathered under the label of the AfD were able to profit from
protest or sincere vote? How come was a programmatic AfD vote ‘with the heart’
galvanized either predominantly by a demarcative niche issue position, or by more
general right-wing ideological stance, whereas in the third case even most nativist and
rightist voters were more likely to support the PRRP if they voted ‘with the boot’?
The presented conceptualisation of protest and sincere vote suggests the need to look into
whether a PRRP can actively mediate the subjective perception of its role in the party
system through their particular narrative claims. New parties with a clear ideological
profile can portray themselves as ‘prophets of new niche issues, or as ‘purifiers’ of
established ideologies (Lucardie, 2000). At the same time, party elites are able to provide
the electorate with heuristic cues that allow voters to cognitively link interests and
positions, with both old and new options on the ballot (Sniderman, 2000; Steenbergen et
al., 2007; Marinova, 2016). Sheets and colleagues (2015) presented evidence that both
anti-immigrant and anti-establishment cues, when associated with a PRRP, boost
individual attitudinal support of these claims. Pytlas (2015) furthermore underlined the
role of active discursive political agency of parties that use diverse legitimizing frames to
establish distinctive, resonant frame ownership over a specific position on a particular
issue.
These insights suggest a possible mediating influence of specific narrative supply
formulas on the varying linkage between the instrumental or sincere attraction to a party
and the particular issues fuelling these subjective perceptions. Given that both
programmatic positions and discontent with the political status quo drive PRRP vote,
17
these narrative formulas can be pin-pointed by observing the divergent frame alignment
(cf. Benford and Snow, 2000), or discursive interaction between issue-based frames, as
well as claims that delegitimize mainstream political and public discourse. The latter
frame may be either isolated from issue supply to cue a general feeling of resentment to
other parties, or can be linked with issue supply to legitimize the party’s claims for
change, helping to frame its image as both a distinctive and credible challenger to the
mainstream in regard to particular issues.
Table 3: Framing of AfD social media campaign prior to the 2014 Landtag elections.
AfD Thuringia
AfD Brandenburg
AfD Saxony
15.07-15.09.2014
15.07-15.09.2014
01.07-01.09.2014
Share of
frames
C-
coefficient
Share of
frames
C-
coefficient
Share of
frames
C-
coefficient
Anti-establishment
Isolated
25.4
11.8
9.2
Anti-establishment
Embedded
10.7
12.4
9.8
EU
18.4
0.11
9.2
0.10
12.5
0.11
Socio-cultural issues:
demarcative
9.8
0.14
11.1
0.29
14.7
0.07
Law and Order
3.7
0.06
10.5
0.30
5.4
0.08
Social policy
7.8
0.13
6.5
0.12
6.5
0.15
Family policy
4.9
0.15
5.9
0.27
9.8
0.20
Education policy
5.3
0.15
5.9
0.22
12.5
0.17
Class appeal (self-
employed)
4.1
0.00
3.3
0.04
9.8
0.06
Russia-related issues
3.3
0.03
11.8
0.09
1.6
0.00
Varia
6.5
0.05
11.8
0.03
8.1
0.14
N total frames
244
153
184
Note: Entries show the share of claims relative to all coded frames in per cent, as well as the co-occurrence
coefficient between issue-based and embedded anti-establishment frames. For details see Appendix.
18
In order to test these assumptions, I run a qualitative frame analysis of the electoral
campaign of the three local AfD branches in question. As alternative channels of
communication and mobilization, social media are crucial especially for niche and
challenger parties (cf. Caiani and Parenti, 2013). Using the Facepager tool (Keyling and
Jünger, 2013), I hence collected publicly available posts from AfD fanpages via
Facebook API for the time period of two months prior to the respective Landtag election.
Next to issue claims, I coded each post that delegitimized mainstream politics and media
as ‘anti-establishment’ (see Appendix for details). I differentiated between isolated and
embedded anti-establishment frames. The latter code was applied if the claim was not
articulated as a standalone, general statement, but if it was linked to a particular issue. To
account for discursive intensity between issues and embedded anti-establishment claims
I then calculated the co-occurrence coefficient (C-coefficient), a normalized coefficient
portraying the relationship strength between the two codes.
As Table 3 demonstrates, despite a similar focus on anti-establishment claims,
demarcative socio-cultural positions, and valence issue appeals, the three AfD branches
indeed showcase differences in the respective framing of their political supply. The
campaign in Thuringia was dominated by Eurosceptic and anti-immigration claims, as
well as the accentuation of welfare and social issues. Yet, the share of statements that
delegitimize established parties isolated from programmatic claims was much higher than
the share of anti-establishment frames used to legitimize particular issue-based demands.
Interestingly, on 12. September the Thuringian AfD released an ad where the word
Wahlzettel, (voting ballot) was crossed out and replaced by Denkzettel(protest
note’) (AfD, 2014b). This post is a prime example of the AfD strategy to portray the party
not only as a niche challenger, but also explicitly as a general outsider. The strong anti-
establishment appeal relatively isolated from issue claims matches the observations of a
programmatic, yet predominantly protest character of AfD vote in Thuringia and its
relative independence from the less relevant sincere vote by core supporters.
In Brandenburg, and even more so in Saxony, the AfD framed its supply differently. In
both cases anti-establishment claims were equally distributed between standalone
statements and legitimization of issue appeals. Yet, AfD Brandenburg aligned their
embedded anti-establishment cues especially with a demarcative position on socio-
19
cultural issues, itself frequently combined with a law and order construction of blanket
threat by cross-border criminality, as well as a nativist family policy (AfD, 2014a).
Hence, here the PRRP focused its anti-establishment appeal principally to legitimize its
nativist stances, narrowing down its issue appeal to an image of a ‘prophet’ capable of
changing politics mainly in regard to a niche stance on socio-cultural issues. This
narrative supply formula corresponds with the observation of a strongly sincere AfD vote
in Brandenburg, especially with regard to a demarcative socio-cultural stances.
In Saxony, finally, the distribution of isolated and embedded anti-establishment frames is
similar to Brandenburg. Yet, what makes the difference here is that next to a high relative
share of demarcative claims, the PRRP combined its anti-establishment appeal not
primarily with niche socio-cultural issues, but with valence social policy appeals and
traditionalist position on family and education policy. Hence, beyond to its nativist stance,
the Saxon AfD additionally presented itself as a mainstream ‘purifier’ of the conservative
CDU. Its self-induced image not only as a niche alternative to the mainstream, but also
as a substitute conservative party corresponds with the observation of a broader and more
heterogenous AfD electorate in Saxony. Beyond valence issue-related protest vote, as
well as anti-immigrant voters, the AfD additionally mobilized its supporters around a
strongly sincere belief that the vote for this PRRP can append the mainstream party
system with a more traditionalist option.
Conclusions
This article aimed to reassess the sincere and protest character of vote for populist radical
right parties and disentangle the galvanizing motivations behind these two modes of
electoral behaviour. The main argument was that protest and sincere vote cannot be
operationally treated as synonyms of a choice motivated respectively by dissatisfaction
or programmatic positions. By revisiting the classical literature on electoral behaviour
and political participation, the paper suggested that the differentiation between protest
and sincere vote pertains much more to the evaluation whether a vote for a specific party,
and not for others, can bring about a desired political change, or whether it is unlikely
that any party can tackle the perceived grievance. Protest and sincere vote are therefore
related to the perception of the representational role of the preferred party in the political
20
process: either as an implemental protest ‘memo’ used to manifest a subjective grievance
to all parties, or as a sincere allegiance to the party as the one that can best bring about a
desired change, even compared to likely prospective incumbents.
As demonstrated with the help of the comparative analysis of Alternative for Germany
electoral breakthrough in the 2014 Landtag elections in Brandenburg, Thuringia and
Saxony, the proposed approach helps to better understand how exactly ideological
positions and discontent fuel sincere and protest PRRP vote. The results confirm previous
findings that both high dissatisfaction and more demarcative/right-wing ideological
positions can galvanize protest vote (Swyngedouw, 2001; Bélanger and Aarts, 2006). A
choice of the PRRP as an implemental memo note is rarely blank. Yet, most importantly,
the evidence proves that discontent can drive not only protest, but also, if not especially,
sincere vote. A vote of highly dissatisfied, highly efficacious nativist or more right-wing
voters is not a programmatic protest note. Instead, it is an indicator of a ‘sincere
programmatic’ subjective belief that it is the radical right actor, not other parties, that is
the most viable possibility of sought political change.
The findings also reveal that while AfD vote in all three cases was similarly galvanized
by high dissatisfaction, as well as more demarcative and right-wing stances, its particular
branches differed in their propensity to mobilize protest and sincere voters around these
motivations. In Thuringia, voters voting ‘with the boot’ were more likely to choose AfD
than sincere voters even if they exhibited more nativist and right-wing positions. At the
same time, the ability of PRRPs to attract a more sincere programmatic voters was fuelled
by more demarcative stances on immigration in Brandenburg, and in Saxony additionally
by a combination of nativist and broader right-wing attitudes. The qualitative analysis
suggests that these different interactive effects are congruent with the specific frame
alignment between the issue supply of PRRPs and their claims that delegitimize the
mainstream. The stronger use of anti-establishment cues isolated from issues relates to a
predominant protest vote for a party as a way to manifest a grievance rather than as a
genuine possibility of change, even for more programmatic voters (Thuringia). The
embedded use of anti-establishment frames as legitimization of issue positions (narrow
socio-cultural stances in Brandenburg or, additionally, broader traditionalist and valence
claims in Saxony) relates to the sincere subjective perception of the actor respectively as
21
a niche alternative to the mainstream, or even as an equal substitute-mainstream’ political
player. These observations provide us with a deeper understanding of narrative
mechanisms behind issue entrepreneurial strategies (Lucardie, 2000; de Vries and Hobolt,
2012) of anti-establishment challengers and their relationship with a specific character of
protest and sincere PRRP vote.
Empirically, the findings underscore the growingly relevant challenge of the diffusion of
populist radical right narratives into mainstream politics. Even though the AfD also
mobilized protest supporters, the observed efficacious, sincere programmatic PRRP vote
potential (even during breakthrough second-order elections) linked to its induced
‘purifier’ image provides further evidence that these actors are not an ephemeral crisis-
driven flash in the pan. It instead reconfirms that the ‘pathological normalcy’ (Mudde,
2010) of populist radical right political agency might be here to stay. As further cases
throughout Europe suggest, the silent counter-revolution’ (Ignazi, 1992) from the radical
right seems to have become more vocal than silent. PRRPs are able to mobilize a
growingly broader and diverse electorate not only by portraying themselves as outsiders
or niche alternative to the mainstream, but also increasingly by depicting their
exclusionary supply as a legitimate addition to the mainstream party system as such.
These developments constitute further challenges for both established parties and liberal
democracy. PRRPs cannot be sustainably tackled by ignoring or accommodating their
positions and narratives. Especially the co-optation strategy was shown to only further
legitimize these actors within the mainstream, carrying further negative consequences for
the liberal pluralist quality of democracy and public discourse (cf. Pytlas 2015).
The results of this paper open up further comparative quantitative and qualitative research
perspectives on populist radical right party vote and political agency. Further avenues for
research should include larger comparative studies that would allow to test the proposition
in cross-country comparison of first-order national elections, as well as across time.
Further investigation is also needed on the interaction between sincere and protest PRRP
vote and other motivations, especially including non-spatial evaluations such as valence
issue competence. Finally, the findings suggest that there is potential for further
comparative research on the (de)legitimizing role of anti-establishment cues within
22
parties’ issue supply, and the relationship between distinctive strategic narrative formulas
and motors behind protest and sincere anti-establishment challenger vote.
1 Following Minkenberg (2001) and Mudde (2007), populist right-wing radicalism is defined as an ideology
based on an exclusionary narrative of mythicized, nativist ultra-nationalism that challenges the liberal and
pluralist principles of representative democracy.
2 Initially a combination of neo-liberal Eurosceptic, as well as anti-immigrant actors, the AfD increasingly
became dominated by its nativist wing represented predominantly by its East-German branches. The power
shift within the party, sealed at the Essen congress in May 2015, was made possible especially after the
three successful Landtag elections in question, that hence mark a critical junction for the consolidation of
the Federal-level AfD around the core populist radical right narrative (cf. Grimm 2015: 265; Häusler 2016:
240). The AfD appealed to voters not only as a memo note against established politics (AfD 2014b), but
also engaged in what Häusler (2016) described as ‘Kulturkampf from the right’ (on this PRRP frame see
also Minkenberg 2001: 19). Simultaneously, the Alternative for Germany nomen est omen presented
itself as a legitimate substitute to the mainstream, a tactic crucial for the establishment of this radical right
challenger in the context of German party politics (Berbuir et al. 2015; Grimm 2015; Arzheimer 2015).
23
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Appendix
Quantitative Analysis
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics.
Notes:
a
For age, the reported value is the median;
b
Descriptive statistics after variable transformation (see Table A2)
Obs Mean SD Min Max
Saxony Brandenburg
Thuringia Saxony Brandenburg Thuringia Saxony Brandenburg Thuringia Saxony Brandenburg Thuringia
Age
a
503 507 504 1969 1969 1970 1.428 1.467 1.436 1934 1927 1932 1996
Gender
b
503 507 504 .501 .525 .488 .501 .500 .500 0 0 0 1
Education
b
501 503 502 6.224 6.394 6.279 1.538 1.478 1.528 1 1 1 8
Occupation 339 341 348 2.230 2.355 2.253 1.292 1.232 1.368 1 1 1 8
Party Dissatiscation
b
497 501 494 5.559 5.257 5.549 2.324 2.531 2.443 1 1 1 11
Party Efficacy
b
496 496 489 1.375 1.280 1.270 0.819 0.841 0.850 0 0 0 2
Left-Right Position 459 472 461 5.120 5.019 4.933 2.024 2.114 2.141 1 1 1 11
Socio-cultural position 462 472 473 6.173 6.180 6.228 2.164 2.305 2.252 1 1 1 11
Table A2: Variable description and transformation.
Variable GLES Variable Transformation Scale Min. Scale Max.
AfD Vote l71bb Dummy variable No (Vote Other Parties) Yes (Vote for the AfD)
Gender l1 Dummy variable No (Male) Yes (Female)
Age l2 - Continuous Continuous
Education l3 „Still a school pupil“ (9)
treated as missing value
No formal qualification Abitur or equivalent
Occupation l186 - Blue-collar In apprenticeship
Party Dissatisfaction l12, l13a, l13c Additive index, standardized (1-11), scale inverted
Fully satisfied with the performance
of [actor]
Fully dissatisfied with the
performance of [actor]
Party Efficacy
l161, l162 Additive index (1-5), standardized (0-2)
It makes no/little difference at all
which party is in government at
federal and local level
It makes a (very) big difference
which party is in government at
federal and local level
Left-Right Position l165 - Left Right
Socio-cultural position l171 - Opportunities for the immigration of
foreigners should be relaxed
Opportunities for the immigration of
foreigners should be tightened
Table A3: Ideological positions, dissatisfaction and efficacy of party electorates in Saxony, Brandenburg and Thuringia.
Note: Shown values are means. Standard deviation in parentheses.
Left-Right Position (1-11) Position on Immigration (1-11) Dissatisfaction (1-11) Efficacy (0-2)
Saxony Brandenburg Thuringia Saxony Brandenburg Thuringia Saxony Brandenburg Thuringia Saxony Brandenburg Thuringia
AfD
6.
296
(1.949)
6.25
(2.426)
6.
056
(1.756)
8.
648
(2.578)
9.
238
(1.985)
8.
825
(2.074)
6.518
(2.272)
6.
929
(2.278)
6.
3
(2.186)
1.232
(.934)
1.
286
(.805)
.
95
(.904)
CDU
6
.
0
(1.697)
6.3
30
(1.673)
6.
275
(1.716)
7.
75
(2.420)
7.9
43
(2.470)
7.
615
(2.395)
3.966
(1.377)
3.8
78
(1.816)
3.931
(1.702)
1.593
(.679)
1.4
22
(.764)
1.
583
(.679)
SPD
4.
408
(1.632)
4.6
46
(1.674)
4.
452
(1.517)
6.
714
(2.739)
7.
327
(2.730)
6.7
73
(2.675)
5
(2.227)
4.
491
(2.247)
4.
045
(1.711)
1.38
(.830)
1.
319
(.858)
1.375
(.774)
FDP
6.636
(1.747)
6.375
(1.685)
5.889
(1.054)
7
.
214
(2.154)
4.375
(2.387)
8.2
22
(2.167)
4.429
(1.342)
3
.
111
(.928)
4.
5
(1.716)
1.5
(.760)
1.778
(.441)
1.
333
(.866)
GREENS
4.
184
(1.411)
4
.
235
(1.821)
4.
154
(1.713)
4.
811
(2.283)
6.0
(2.925)
4.96
(2.761)
5.538
(2.199)
5.
45
(2.395)
5.2
70
(1.991)
1.55
(.749)
1.
3
(.923)
1.
54
(.811)
LEFT
2.
955
(1.308)
3.
230
(1.962)
3.
457
(1.866)
5.
559
(2.695)
6.
729
(3.397)
6.9
63
(3.153)
6.414
(2.344)
6.1
45
(2.611)
6
.
981
(2.307)
1.386
(.822)
1.3
65
(.837)
1.
128
(.893)
OTHERS
5.391
(2.061)
5.75
(1.612)
5
.
222
(2.636)
6.348
(3.284)
7.
412
(2.959)
7.185
(3.375)
6.917
(2.283)
6.
529
(3.145)
6.593
(2.606)
1.25
(.897)
.
941
(.827)
1.519
(.753)
NON-VOTERS
5.
346
(2.365)
5.219
(1.996)
4.
919
(2.073)
7.
938
(2.735)
8.
515
(2.884)
7.
571
(3.238)
6
.
970
(2.234)
6.
349
(2.388)
6.
667
(2.517)
.758
(.902)
.500
(.663)
.
897
(.940)
Table A4 Multinomial regression of AfD vote in the 2014 Landtag elections. Note: Entries are relative-risk ratios, standard errors in parentheses.
Non-voters included. *** p≤0.001; ** p≤0.01; *p≤0.05 + p≤0.01
Saxony Thuringia Brandenburg
AfD/CDU AfD/SPD AfD/LEFT AfD/NON-
VOTERS AfD/CDU AfD/SPD AfD/LEFT AfD/NON-
VOTERS AfD/CDU AfD/SPD AfD/LEFT AfD/NON-
VOTERS
Party
Dissatisfaction
(+=more
dissatisfied)
2.057***
(0.30)
1.467**
(0.21)
1.044
(0.15)
.775
(0.13)
1.815***
(0.25)
1.646**
(0.26)
1.043
(0.12)
1.105
(0.15)
1.704***
(0.20)
1.466***
(0.16)
1.068
(0.12)
1.088
(0.14)
Party Efficacy
(+=high efficacy)
.554*
(0.16)
.461*
(0.16)
.410*
(0.15)
1.507
(0.14)
.443*
(0.15)
.664
(0.24)
.792
(0.24)
1.020
(0.36)
1.063
(0.35)
1.633
(0.52)
1.382
(0.48)
3.541**
(1.47)
Left-Right Position
(+=Right)
.960**
(0.18)
1.781*
(0.30)
2.807***
(0.55)
1.168
(0.22)
.903
(0.13)
1.341*
(0.25)
1.813***
(0.25)
1.268
(0.20)
.812
(0.12)
1.456*
(0.22)
2.156***
(0.18)
1.414+
(0.28)
Socio-cultural
position
(+=anti-
immigration)
1.169
(0.13)
1.195
(0.14)
1.315*
(0.16)
1.074**
(0.13)
1.326*
(0.18)
1.389*
(0.20)
1.220+
(0.14)
1.102
(0.15)
1.289*
(0.17)
1.295*
(0.16)
1.276+
(0.16)
1.243
(0.19)
Controls
Age .926**
(0.02)
.945*
(0.03)
.967
(0.03)
.950
(0.03)
1.017
(0.03)
1.035
(0.03)
1.047
(0.03)
.998
(0.03)
.971
(0.03)
.960
(0.03)
.969
(0.03)
.917**
(0.02)
Gender (1=female) .916
(0.46)
.757
(0.43)
.994
(0.60)
.315
(0.23)
.691
(0.37)
.743
(0.47)
1.681
(.88)
1.656
(.02)
.435
(0.24)
.739
(0.40)
1.223
(0.70)
.561
(0.39)
Education .908
(0.14)
.779
(0.15)
.827
(0.16)
.816
(0.12)
.869
(0.19)
.850
(0.21)
.938
(0.19)
.765
(0.20)
1.123
(0.25)
1.273
(0.27)
1.470
(0-33)
1.205
(0.32)
Occupation 1.156
(0.22)
1.179
(0.26)
1.311
(0.30)
1.671
(0.65)
1.090
(0.24)
1.765
(0.64)
1.167
(.24)
1.135
(.28)
1.086
(0.24)
1.426
(0.33)
1.190
(0.20)
.862
(0.19)
Intercept 146.787**
(47.36)
106.800*
(53.54)
61.077
(56.60)
103.281
(64.76)
-37.141
(53.20)
-74.478
(63.69)
-95.926
(49.95)
3.749
(59.77)
53.043
(49.61)
69.456
(50.26)
52.174
(54.88)
163.976**
(63.94)
χ
2
252.51*** 252.51***
252.51*** 252.51*** 199.41*** 194.50***
194.50*** 194.50*** 237.55*** 237.55***
237.55*** 237.55***
Pseudo R
2
0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
N 246 246 246 246 255 255 255 255 260 260 260 260
Qualitative analysis
Extended methodological note on conducted frame analysis
I run a qualitative frame analysis of the electoral campaign of the three local AfD branches, coding publicly available posts from respective AfD
Facebook ‘fanpages’ for the time period of two months prior to the respective Landtag election. Following the theoretical framework, I constructed a
general codebook of three code categories: isolated and embedded anti-establishment claims, as well as issue-related claims. For technical reasons,
the basic coding unit is a post. I open-coded the textual corpus non-automatically in accordance with the three general categories and analysed the
sample using Computer-Assisted Qualitative Discourse Analysis software MaxQDA (Kuckartz, 2007). I coded solely text and visual posts that
included anti-establishment and/or issue-related claims. I did not code posts that lacked a narrative content, such as technical posts and photos, calls
for signature gathering, etc.
I coded a claim as ‘anti-establishment’ if the narrative delegitimized the content and processes of mainstream politics, discourse and media. This
coding allows me to differentiate anti-establishment narratives from issue positions. If several claims co-occurred within a particular post, I applied
codes additively, coding the claim once per post with several issue codes. I coded delegitimizing claims semantically linked to an issue claim as
‘embedded anti-establishment’. I coded claims as ‘isolated anti-establishment’ if there was no semantic, legitimizing link between the claim and an
issue code (applying a conservative semantic distance of more than a single paragraph from an issue claim, or if an issue claim was missing altogether).
I applied the ‘demarcative socio-cultural issue’ code if it articulated a demarcative stance on immigration and asylum policy, ethnic and cultural
minorities, as well as other nativist claims directed against discursively constructed socio-cultural ‘Others’. For examples of particular codes see
Table A5
The calculations in the analysis pertain to the total number of issue and anti-establishment frames. To account for the co-occurrence between anti-
mainstream and programmatic claims, I used the MaxQDA Code-Relations-Browser tool to measure the frequency of intersections between embedded
anti-mainstream and issue codes within a single post. To account for discursive intensity between issues and embedded anti-establishment claims I
then manually calculated the co-occurrence coefficient (C-coefficient), a normalized coefficient portraying the relationship strength between the two
codes used by another CAQDA software Atlas.ti. The formula is: c := n12/(n1 + n2) – n12, where n12 describes the co-occurrence frequency of codes
c1 and c2, and n1 and n2 describe the absolute frequency of their occurrence (Friese, 2014: 305). This allows me to compare frames both across cases
and within a single case. For calculations see Table A6.
Table A5: Calculation of the c-coefficient between issue codes and embedded anti-establishment claims
Thuringia Brandenburg Saxony
n1 n2 n12 c n1 n2 n12 c n1 n2 n12 c
Embedded anti-establishment (n1)
EU 26 45 7 0.11 19 14 3 0.10 18 23 4 0.11
Socio-cultural issues: demarcative 26 24 6 0.14 19 17 8 0.29 18 27 3 0.07
Law and Order 26 9 2 0.06 19 16 8 0.30 18 10 2 0.08
Social policy 26 19 5 0.13 19 10 3 0.12 18 12 4 0.15
Family policy 26 12 5 0.15 19 9 6 0.27 18 18 6 0.20
Education policy 26 13 5 0.15 19 9 5 0.22 18 23 6 0.17
Class appeal (self-employed) 26 10 0 0.00 19 5 1 0.04 18 18 2 0.06
Russia-related issues 26 8 1 0.03 19 18 3 0.09 18 3 0 0.00
Varia 26 16 2 0.05 19 18 1 0.03 18 15 4 0.14
Notes: Entries are absolute numbers of code intersections. n1 = occurrence ‘anti—establishment embedded’; n2 = occurrence particular issue; n12 =
co-occurrence ‘anti-establishment embedded’ and ‘issue’; c = c-coefficient. Calculation formula c := n12/(n1 + n2) – n12).
References
Friese S (2014) ATLAS.ti 7 User Guide and Reference. Available at: http://atlasti.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/atlasti_v7_manual_en_201409.pdf (accessed 5 January 2017).
Kuckartz U (2007) Einführung in die computergestützte Analyse qualitativer Daten. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
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