No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.
The "Win-Win-Win Papakonstantinidis Model": from Social Welfare's Philosophy towards a Rural Development Concept by Rural Tourism Approach: The WERT Case Study
Abstract
The article is dealing with two interconnected problems based on the conjectures: a) social welfare is a condition for rural development and not the prerequisite for it; b) shape a new landscape (the "win-win-win") based on critique of the "Impossibility Theorem (Kenneth Arrow 1951) through the Nash Bargaining Solution (Nash, John 1950). Specifically, this article discusses and analyses social welfare and rural development objectives integrating elements from the impossibility theorem, the bargaining theory, and the theory of agency by (a) reviewing the literature on coordination "social welfare" and "rural development" (b) reversing the focus from "voting" to "bargaining" and (c) underlining that Social choice is the perquisite of social welfare, using the "win-win-win Papakonstantinidis model's solution as the bridge between "voting"(Arrow) and "bargaining"(proposal). This solution highlights the Role of Rural Community as an "Aggregation" corresponding to its "sensitization process".
... However, the researchers could not identify a similar trend in developed economies (Langnel et al., 2021). Various aspects of West African states according to Gulzar et al. (2020) and Papakonstantinidis (2017), the main motivation behind pollution in developing countries is poverty and inequality due to their reliance on fossil fuels as a source of energy. As previous studies have found, the consequences of environmental degradation are particularly relevant for developing countries. ...
This study used the Structural Equation Modeling approach to investigate the relationships among Green Finance, Renewable Energy Consumption, Ecological Footprint, and Income Inequality. Data from the years 2001 to 2022 of a total of 126 countries globally were analyzed using Structural Equation Modeling approach. The objective was to examine the impact of Green Finance on Ecological directly and through mediation of Income Inequality indirectly. This study’s results demonstrate crucial links that exist between sustainable finance, environmental sustainability, and socioeconomic inequalities. These results point towards the importance of socioeconomic development for these factors. Moreover, Green Finance exhibited potential for alleviating the Ecological Footprint syndrome, and Renewable Energy induced differential effects on ecological degradation as well as Income Inequality. Economic Development and Urbanization as control variables have significant and insignificant positive effect respectively on Ecological Footprint. The policy recommendations as proposed covered a range of strategies for dealing with environmental and social issues. This will involve promoting green finance ventures, enabling renewable energy infrastructure expenditures and investments, supporting sustainable urbanization measures, as well as enhancing public awareness of the interdependence between environmental and social factors. Incorporating these suggestions into policy frameworks would mean stakeholders could contribute towards achieving harmony in terms of environmental sustainability and socioeconomic equity.
Poverty, widening income inequality, and environmental degradation are very critical challenges to sustainable development while in the light of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), these challenges have been addressed in numerous past empirical studies. However, increasing environmental degradation is a big constraint in the path of sustainable development, poverty alleviation, and controlling income inequality as well. Hence, in this study, we empirically investigate the theoretically ambiguous and complex relationship between poverty, income inequality, and ecological footprint (EFP) for 18 Asian developing countries over the period 2006–2017. Empirical results obtained from the Driscoll–Kraay (D–K) standard error approach confirmed that poverty headcount contributing to environmental degradation in terms of EFP. Further, widening income inequality has a detrimental and harmful effect on the environment in Asian developing countries. The findings of this study also confirm the inverted U-shaped Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC-Hypothesis) for investigated countries under the D–Kmethodology. This study provides some important policy implications for policymakers in the light of SDGs and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for the investigated region.
The research aim of this study was to examine the possibility to investigate win–win–win Spais-Papakonstantinidis model in order to develop an integrated bargaining solution analysis for vertical advertising campaigns under the prism of the “3-D Negotiation”. First, the author provided some summary points of the critical case of Proctor & Gamble (P&G) and Wal-Mart. Second, the utility functions were extended based on author’s previous works and the findings of the critical case study. The author considered a simplified situation where a brand manufacturer and an independent retailer are renegotiating, assuming that the negotiations occur in an incomplete and asymmetric information environment.
The paper examined the possibility of an extension of the win-win-win papakonstantinidis conceptualization, as an innovative bargaining solution analysis for vertical cooperative promotion management decisions between marketing channel members. This conceptualization was approached as an alternative pricing and promotion strategy to fixed prices. Our organized literature review led us on an initial judgmental sample of one-hundred (100) published research works (selected at the first stage of the literature review), in order to be scanned and reached at one to fifty-six (56) published research works, which were processed to offer some valuable findings. Our research intention was to categorize the constructs of the following fundamental concept: “vertical cooperative promotion management decision.” A critical hermeneutics approach was adopted for the present study. Our proposition was an extension of the win-win-win papakonstantinidis conceptualization, which led us to “win-win-win spais-papakonstantinidispapakonstantinidis model”, an innovative bargaining solution analysis for vertical cooperative promotion management decisions applied to a paradigm of a hotel, including three (3) adjusted utility functions.
Cooperative promotion is an important instrument for aligning manufacturer and retailer decisions in marketing channels. On the other hand, bargaining seems to be critical for marketing channel coordination, e.g., for vertical cooperative promotion. Based on our previous study (Spais, Papakonstantinidis and Papakonstantinidis, 2009), we propose an extension of the win-win-win papakonstantinidis conceptualization, which may lead us to a more valuable “win-win-win spais-papakonstantinidis-papakonstantinidis model”, as an innovative bargaining solution analysis for cases of optimal allocation of a promotion budget in a cooperative sales promotion campaign in vertical marketing channels. The proposition includes three (3) adjusted utility functions. In accordance to the research question of the study, the literature review findings allow us to extend the three adjusted utility functions considering the parameters of sales response budgeting method, the break-even sales analysis and the independent variable of the trade promotion goals for the existed level of sales of the marketing channel member. Based on the assumptions of the win-win-win papkonstantinidis model, we present the referee solution in order to be accepted by all three cooperating players; and the constraints. The basic initial assumption of this study is that specific contexts of marketing and promotion planning and decisionmaking in a cooperative level need adjusted bargaining solution analyses.
The research aim of this study was to explore brand manufacturers' perceived value of the 'triple pole' approach in bargaining for vertical cooperative sales promotion campaigns. Our research intention was to test seven (7) research hypotheses based on a survey (pilot study) of 32 marketing, sales directors and other senior executives of brand manufacturers from Greece and Cyprus. Each research hypothesis was to test an alternative research model in order to investigate which model may predict better the perceived value of considering the customer as the 'third pole' in a bargaining procedure between two members of a vertical marketing channel for cooperative sales promotion campaigns. The research results showed us that perceived value of considering the customer as the 'third pole' in a bargaining procedure between two members of a vertical marketing channel for cooperative sales promotion campaign was better predicted by model 7. 55.8% of the variance of the dependent variable is explained by the independents. Only bargaining problems related to the dominance of big retailers in bargaining situations influences the perceived value of considering the customer as the 'third pole' in a bargaining procedure between two members of a vertical marketing channel for cooperative sales promotion campaigns. For each unit increase-improvement of perceived importance of bargaining that related to the dominance of the big retailers, there is an increase-improvement 0.542 of the perceived value of considering the customer as the 'third pole' in a bargaining procedure between two members of a vertical marketing channel for cooperative sales promotion campaigns. No study, until now, has studied brand manufacturers’attitudes for the perceived value of considering the customer as the 'third pole' in a bargaining procedure for planning cooperative sales promotion campaigns and the group of attitudes that influence it.
The veil of ignorance has been used often as a tool for recommending what justice requires with respect to the distribution of wealth. We complete Harsanyi’s model of the veil of ignorance by appending information permitting interpersonal comparability of welfare. We show that the veil-of-ignorance conception of John Harsanyi, so completed, and Ronald Dworkin’s, when modeled formally, recommend wealth allocations in conflict with the prominently espoused view that priority should be given to the worse off with respect to wealth allocation.
The “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” is a “tool of consent” useful in socio-economic human (and not only) relations Using this tool, a decent answer can be given to Arrow’s impossibility theorem. Also it is a “tool” for conflict resolution Also it may be used in approaching the “Principal-Agent Problem” (PAP)
In particulary, argumentation of the work is focused on “tranfering the “voting perception (Arrow, 1951) from a single individual choice, in the”bargaining multiple decision making, thus taking into consideration the “Community Profit” (The 3rd part os a “peer-pressure perception” Bargainers A-B and the Community as a whole (the “C” Factor)
I tried to identify the "win-win-win" as a key tool for the approach to social welfare by clicking on the incompatibility of five basic theorems that define it - each one of its own side-either positive (justice theorem ) or negative (the impossibility theorem)
The suggested "win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” is built up on these incompatibilities, in particular as regards the pairs" Pareto efficiency – Impossibility Theorem” "paradox liberty (Amartya Sen) - Pareto Efficiency” , “Theorem of Justice –Pareto Efficiency” and (the most important) “the Theorem of incompleteness-the Impossibility Theorem”
The win-win-win papakonstantinidis model is a methodological tool for conflict resolution, especially in the case of decision making, or in forming "instant reflection winning strategies" in the BARGAIN (which is the frame) The “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” concerns the strategic decision making in a number of fields and domains (biology, psychology, management, marketing, history- especially in interpretation of historic events-laography, ethnology, anthropogeography, philosophy, economy, sociology, pure math, communication, public speech, diplomacy, and go on The reason so many regards thinking and research Special regard is given to regional and local development field both as a regional and social sciences. It proves that building social capital at local level mainly depends on social trust links among local people: Social cohesion based on social capital may be measured by the diversification Rate (R *) from strict globalization rules: From this point of view, local people’s intervention should be useful, so as to diversify these "rules" at local level adjusting them to local identity, including communication code, customs, ethics, culture. The Win-win-win methodology [Papakonstantinidis Model] should facilitate local people to "readjust" bargaining globalization rules locally, through a sensitization process: Community is defined as a discrete spatial / cultural entity, as their people’s sensitization process' is going to its limit………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
The “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” (2002, August, SW) may, thus, transform individual winning –instant reflection –strategies (the win-win Nash Theory) in a NEW –three poles-equilibrium point, including the COMMUNITY (Environmental Protection, Value Systems, Ethic etc), which is the “absolute cooperation” limit point in the bargain between TWO
Since the game theory (exactly: the “non cooperative game theory”) saved the New-classical School of Thought in Economics letting it to make a restart, focusing on the “bargaining equilibrium” (Nash Equilibrium) and the equimarginal principle (consumer choice) it seems that the bargaining behavior is in the centre of our research
Starting from the “zero sum two players game” (John von Neumann- Oscar Morgenstern 1944) in the form of “win- lose” at any bargain, then was the John Forbs Nash who made the difference, letting in both bargainers to win (win-win) But, for another time this bargain was rather to the side of the winners (due to their bargaining force) than eliminating social inequalities (the winner takes it all)
With this aim an hypothetical dipole bargain between 2 bargainers (*A,B) converted into 3-pole by introducing the "Community" (the village, the town, the inhabitants of a country, a continent, planet, after all) as a third pole in any bargain (win-win-win)
So the concept is to construct a theoretical-original-model so that it should respond better to the conditions of "social welfare"
With this aim an hypothetical triple-pole bargain between 2 (A and B and the "Community" included as the third pole) is a basis for scientific dialogue By the tem “Community” we can imagine any common structure, i.e the village, the town, the inhabitants of a country, a continent, planet, after all-
The point is that the third pole (the Community) will claim its own profits, in a future negotiation It is about a "win-win-win" concept which is now the global requirement For example, the first concrete example has to do with environmental protection Climate change leaves no room to 2 competitors
fields lies in the very nature of the model, especially in its triple pole perception, which leads us to see things from another, alternative approach, the triple view, whether in psychology or any interpretation of historical past time events or/and diplomacy, or even communication, or MANAGEMENT……………………………………… without considering the entire rest of the world Each negotiation between 2 concerns the entire planet The how achieved in practice I think it can be done with Laws, as long as there is the political will of Another Dimension It has to do with the war see the two superpowers to compete by focusing on the war in the Middle East (Syria and Iraq) But the agreement or disagreement affects millions of people in the two countries who come as refugees to Europe
The recognition of the third pole in our daily life is connected with its social necessity
Without any imposition by dictatorial regimes, the 3-pole approach to bargaining, is necessary and unavoidable if and only if humankind seeks survival solutions
In a “win-win-win” negotiation/deal there is more possibility of achieving social welfare: This can be proved by the math example below On the other side we have 5 basic foundational and global known Theorems which are incompatible each-other So the concept here was to put them one against the other and seek "material" to build the new papakonstantinidis statement
For example, the Incompleteness Theorem (Gödel) fades the Impossibility Theorem (K. Arrow) and the Pareto Efficiency is basic for the Impossibility Theorem, but not for the “Justice theorem (Rawls) But from these incompatibilities arises a necessity of completeness, effectiveness, universal justice, a necessity of "umbilical points" freedom , economic equilibrium The synthesis of all these lead to a situation utopia (romantic, idealistic) will certainly not get, but shows us, from the other, a path of self-preservation and survival if the goal is not suicidal
Local development as a local management process tables a number of questions, mainly concerning on conflict resolution among the three power local poles: (1) State and its appointed State peripheral Departments; (2) Local authorities; and (3) Local people and their local movements/lobbies. As the three poles are in constant negotiations, then each of them should prevail over the other two, thus be introduced in the bargaining problem. Bargaining behavior must therefore be defined. The suggested "win-win-win papakonstantinidis model" (coming from Nash win-win extended approach) tries to find ways for the three-pole bargaining conceptual equilibrium, under conditions, thus maximizing expected utilities for all the involved parts in local decision-making by applying a combination of Descriptive Behavior (DB), Rational Choice, Instrumental Rationality and the Applied Behavioral Analysis (ABA) methodologies, then an updating community's behaviorial state is expected, thus transforming the technical territory-community perception to a behavioral community perception, by sensitizing its population, toward the "guanxi relations" paradigm.
One may define a concept of an n-person game in which each player has a finite set of pure strategies and in which a definite set of payments to the n players corresponds to each n-tuple of pure strategies, one strategy being taken for each player. For mixed strategies, which are probability distributions over the pure strategies, the pay-off functions are the expectations of the players, thus becoming polylinear forms …
John Nash's formulation of noncooperative game theory was one of the great breakthroughs in the history of social science. Nash's work in this area is reviewed in its historical context, to better understand how the fundamental ideas of noncooperative game theory were developed and how they changed the course of economic theory. JEL Classification numbers: B20, C72 Author's address: J. L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208-2009. E-mail: myerson@nwu.edu 1 NASH EQUILIBRIUM AND THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THEORY by Roger B. Myerson, Northwestern University 1. Looking back on an intellectual revolution November 16, 1999 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the day that John Nash's first paper on noncooperative equilibrium was received by the editorial offices of the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. The fiftieth anniversary of a major event can be a good time to look back at it, when we are still linked to it by living memories, b...
Uber formal unentscheidbare S atze der Principia mathematica und verwandter Systeme I' (1931) Richard ZachFirst publication: Monatshefte fur Mathematik und Physik¨
• Godel Kurt, (1931) 'Uber formal unentscheidbare S atze der Principia mathematica und
verwandter Systeme I' (1931) Richard ZachFirst publication: Monatshefte fur Mathematik
und Physik¨,Physik¨Physik¨, 37, 173-198 Reprints: S. Feferman et al., eds., Kurt Godel. Collected Works
Volume I: Publications 1929-1936 New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 116-195.
Involving communities in rural tourism: Α "win-win-win Papakonstantinidis model" methodological approach and the examination of two Women Rural Tourism Cooperatives
- L A Papakonstantinidis
• Papakonstantinidis LA "Involving communities in rural tourism: Α "win-win-win
Papakonstantinidis model" methodological approach and the examination of two Women
Rural Tourism Cooperatives' Case Studies IJRCM, VOL No 2, 2012/1,issue no 1