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The Organizational Neuroscience of Emotions

August 2019

Authors:

Sebastiano Massaro

The Organizational Neuroscience Laboratory | University of Surrey | Warwick University

Preprints and early-stage research may not have been peer reviewed yet.

In book: Cambridge Handbook of Workplace Affect Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Classification of organizational neuroscience methods based on their testing rationale (adapted from Massaro, 2018)

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2The Organizational Neuroscience

of Emotions

Sebastiano Massaro

The study of emotions has taken center stage in

several areas of organizational scholarship over

the past few decades. The mid-1990s saw the

emergence of the seminal affective events theory

(AET; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996), which pro-

poses that discrete workplace “affective events”

elicit “affective responses”that then inﬂuence atti-

tudinal and behavioral outcomes. Since then,

research has experienced an affective revolution

(Barsade, Brief, & Spataro, 2003). Work on emo-

tional contagion (e.g. Barsade, 2002), discrete

emotions (e.g. Lazarus & Cohen-Charash, 2001),

and multi-level integrations (e.g. Ashkanasy,

2003a; Elfenbein, 2007), among other topics, has

rapidly advanced both theory and practice, becom-

ing integral to the lexicon of organizational scho-

lars (Brief & Weiss, 2002).

More recently, Becker and Cropanzano (2010),

building on information deriving from increas-

ingly sophisticated methods of investigating

human neurophysiology and cognition, proposed

organizational neuroscience (ON). ON is an infor-

mative perspective incorporating knowledge about

the neural substrates supporting individuals’cog-

nitive machinery into organizational theory

(Becker, Cropanzano, & Sanfey, 2011). Although

the ﬁeld is still nascent, interest in using neu-

roscience as an opportunity to advance explana-

tions of administrative behavior has rapidly spread

to other domains of managerial research, including

strategic management (Powell, 2011) and entre-

preneurship (Day, Boardman, & Krueger, 2017;

Drover, Massaro, Cerf, & Busenitz, 2017).

Moreover, journals have dedicated special issues

to neuroscience (e.g. Organizational Research

Methods,Journal of Business Ethics,

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision

Processes), and at several scholarly meetings

(e.g. Academy of Management, Society for

Industrial and Organizational Psychology,

American Psychological Association) the number

of sessions devoted to the topic has steadily

increased. Yet as is typical of an emerging ﬁeld,

the development of ON has been characterized by

both hype and hope (see Ashkanasy, Becker, &

Waldman, 2014). In addition, scholars have pur-

sued a variety of theoretical perspectives (cf. Lee,

Senior & Butler, 2012), resulting in a fragmented

research program thus far. This chapter, while

arguing for a more uniﬁed development of ON,

purposely aims at infusing workplace affect

research with neuroscience knowledge to show

why and in what ways ON can offer a productive

platform for the advancement of organizational

studies on emotions.

First, some caveats. Investigating the intersec-

tion of emotion and neuroscience is certainly not

new. From Hippocrates (460–370 BC), who in De

morbo sacro (“The sacred disease,”400 BC;

Hippocrates, trans. 1923) argued that the brain

gives rise to emotions and judgments, to

Descartes (1596–1650) contending that human

“passions”cannot be localized in the body

(Descartes, 1649); from William James’s (1842–

1910) peripheralist theory, which holds that emo-

tions are stimuli-driven automatic perceptions of

speciﬁc bodily changes (James, 1884), to the

debate on the relations between emotions and

cognition (Lazarus, 1982; Zajonc, 1984), people

have long been fascinated by the association

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between emotions and the brain. Here I focus on

the most recent research in affective neuroscience

as inaugurated by neuroimaging techniques.

These powerful methods have greatly advanced

our understanding of how the brain encodes,

accumulates, and retrieves knowledge about

emotions; how emotional states regulate and

shape cognitive processes, such as decision-

making; and how emotions inﬂuence behavior

(e.g. Damasio, 1996; Davidson & Irwin, 1999;

Lane & Nadel, 1999; LeDoux, 1998; Panksepp,

1998; Rolls, 2000).

Second, ON is not (and should not be) merely

a narrow investigation of activated or deactivated

brain areas. Neuroscience, and by extension

affective and organizational neuroscience, inves-

tigates the entire nervous system and its relation-

ship to behavior (Massaro & Pecchia, 2019). The

nervous system is a complex structure comprising

central and peripheral autonomic parts, the latter

discernible in the sympathetic and parasympa-

thetic systems (i.e., the systems responsible for

the “ﬁght-or-ﬂight”and the “rest-and-digest”

responses, respectively). Moreover, neuroscience

is concerned with multi-level interconnections

from the submolecular to the cellular, anatomical,

behavioral, and social levels of analysis

(Cacioppo, Berntson, Sheridan, & McClintock,

2000; Ochsner & Lieberman, 2001). Within the

ON perspective, for example, an angry employee

could be characterized by the combination of low

serotonin, high dopamine, and high noradrenaline

in the body (Lövheim, 2012), or an altered

responsiveness of the brain circuitry amygdala-

hypothalamus-periaqueductal gray (Blair, 2012),

or increased heart rate mapped onto behavioral

processes occurring in certain social interactions

(Denson, Grisham, & Moulds, 2011), or all these

features together. As a consequence, many meth-

ods, and functional neuroimaging in particular,

can be used to capture these points.

Finally, readers should be aware that the termi-

nology of affective science has been used incon-

sistently in both organizational literature (see

Barsade & Gibson, 2007, for an exhaustive the-

saurus) and neuroscience literature. Emotions are

complex phenomena involving different interpre-

tations, theories, and focuses of inquiry.

Importantly, such a multifaceted body of knowl-

edge offers a valuable point of entry to explore

ON initiatives in workplace affect research. As

Panksepp (1998) notes, only with concurrent neu-

roscience analyses can affective concepts be used

non-circularly in the scientiﬁc discourse.

Thus, I begin by explaining why and in what

ways the ON perspective and its core methods

matter for emotion research in the workplace.

I also draw theoretical parallels to AET, arguably

one of the most acknowledged frameworks sup-

porting the scholarship in workplace affect. I then

review recent neuroscience evidence on topics

relevant to organizational research in emotion,

considering both the intra-individual and inter-

personal dimensions. I conclude by presenting

some questions for future research that ON

might address in furthering our understanding of

the “emotional workplace.”

The Methodological Rationale

The methodological advancements recently put

forward by neuroimaging represent the most logi-

cal entry point to substantiate the usefulness of

neuroscience in management research (Massaro,

2015). In particular, in affective research, scho-

lars have suggested the existence of

a“misalignment of theory and methods”due to

the use of self-reported and observational data

(Briner & Kiefer, 2005; Gooty, Gavin, &

Ashkanasy, 2009). Thus, methods capturing the

neural and physiological correlates of affect can

provide novel and reliable measures that promise

to mitigate this imbalance (Becker & Menges,

2013; Massaro, 2014).

Several peripheral physiological reactions,

those automatic responses of the nervous system

that generally occur beyond one’sawareness,

may now be monitored to investigate emotional

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arousal and valence. These responses include

respiration rates and heart rate variability

(HRV; Massaro & Pecchia, 2019), electromyo-

graphy (EMG) tracing of facial cues (Hazlett &

Hazlett, 1999), and changes in skin conductance

response (Christopoulos, Uy, & Yap, 2019).

Organizational researchers can also assess

neural changes through functional imaging,

which more precisely shows “what,”“where,”

and “when”affective events occur in the brain.

In particular, electrophysiological methods

based on assessing brain electrical activities

(e.g. electroencephalography, EEG) or their

tomographic quantiﬁcation (qEEG; Teplan,

2002), or magnetic activity (magnetoelectroen-

cephalography, MEG; Ahlfors & Mody, 2019)

capture cortical events underlying affective

states in almost real time (milliseconds).

Moreover, functional magnetic resonance imaging

(fMRI), which typically assesses the increase in the

oxygenated blood ﬂow accompanying cerebral

activity (Aine, 1995), allows mapping activation

of deeper areas in the brain, including the so-

called limbic system (MacLean, 1952), a cluster

of regions strongly involved in our emotional life

(Figure 2.1).

Finally, metabolic imaging, including positron

emission tomography (PET), is less common due

to the use of dangerous ionizing radiations.

Despite low spatial and temporal resolutions

(30s–minutes), this technique yields high speciﬁ-

city (Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000).

Given the variety of methods available,

Massaro (2018) has recently illustrated

a methodological framework to guide ON

research (Table 2.1). Accordingly, when inves-

tigating affective states as functions of the

measurement of neural activity, researchers

can best understand and apply these methods

by considering their correlational, causational,

or manipulating properties.

Importantly, all these approaches generate

objective measures, improving the examination

of emotional experiences in the workplace

beyond what could be achieved with observa-

tions or subjective data. Moreover, neuroscience

tools can often provide real-time information

about someone’s emotional state, overcoming

demand effects that often sway self-reported

data (Thorson, West, & Mendes, 2017). Added

to this, due to their unobtrusiveness, many neu-

roscience instruments allow researchers to

assess affective processes without disrupting

their dynamics, including those that occur dur-

ing interpersonal interactions or in real-world

organizations.

Finally, thanks to the growing availability of

wearable and portable technologies (e.g.

Figure 2.1 Activations peaks (darkened in image) of brain structures conventionally associated with the

limbic circuit; images were obtained by performing a meta-analysis (based on a framework developed by

Yarkoni, Poldrack, Nichols, Van Essen, & Wager, 2011) of over 400 fMRI activation studies, published

between 1992 and 2018, that reported “emotion(s)”as a keyword

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smartwatches, portable EEG caps), parallel mea-

surements of different individuals might advance

our knowledge of such interpersonal affective

dynamics as occur in emphatic processes within

organizations. This feature is also particularly

promising in upholding the requirement of eco-

logical validity necessary for ON investigations

to thrive (Massaro, 2018).

The Theoretical Rationale

Methodological advantages have been the driving

force behind the ON approach thus far. Yet inqui-

ries into workplace affect offer another valuable

prospect for appreciating the informative power

of ON. Herein lies the opportunity to integrate

and advance management theory with insights

from neuroscience theory concerning the func-

tioning mechanisms of the brain. Speciﬁcally,

affective research recognizes that emotions are

complex states and highly mutable phenomena

(e.g. Beal, Weiss, Barros, & MacDermid, 2005);

a better knowledge of their mechanisms and

dynamics might thus substantially improve

existing theory (e.g. Askanasy & Humprey,

2011; Brief & Wiess, 2002) and illuminate how

affective mechanisms develop within and

between organizational actors (Ashkanasy,

2003a; 2003b).

Consider the possible parallel between AET

and neuroscience theory on the information-

processing of emotions (Figure 2.2; see also

Elfenbein, 2007, for a comparison between AET

and emotions as stimuli-driven processes, yet

lacking the neuroscience perspective).

AET is an acknowledged organizational

research framework that examines the structure,

causes, and consequences of affective experiences

at work (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). It starts

from the concept that work events are proximal

causes of affective reactions: what happens at work

can be seen as discrete and cumulative events that

trigger employees’internal inﬂuences –“affective

reactions”–that then, along with affective disposi-

tion, shape organizational behavioral outputs

(Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996; Weiss & Beal, 2005).

ON can be of particular help in disentangling

what occurs in the black box of individual

Table 2.1 Classiﬁcation of organizational neuroscience methods based on their testing rationale (adapted

from Massaro, 2018)

Type of test Deﬁnition

Method linking regional neural activity to

mental function

Association Experimental methods that involve

a manipulation of a psychological state or

behavior, the simultaneous measurements

of the neural activity, and the subsequent

analysis of the correlation between the two

fMRI

PET

EEG

MEG Physiological (HRV; skin

conductance)

Necessity Experimental methods that involve a

disruption of the neural activity and aim to

show

how this event impairs a speciﬁc behavior

or psychological function

Lesion studies

TMS

Sufﬁciency Experimental methods that involve enhancing

a neural activity and seeking to establish

that this process results in a speciﬁc

behavior or psychological state

TMS (anodal)

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Figure 2.2 Integration of affective event theory (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996) with an organizational neuroscience perspective to disentangle the core brain

structures and mechanisms involved in “affective reactions”

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affective reactions. Indeed, contemporary neu-

roscience research contends that affective

responses are mental representations that prepare

the organism for certain behaviors, usually asso-

ciated with survival value (Lane & Nadel, 1999).

This concept follows the evidence, generalizable

beyond research on emotions, that the brain

works as an information processing system for

external stimuli through a series of complex ana-

tomic and physiological interconnections. These

circuits are genetically predetermined to respond

to external stimuli, and connections are recipro-

cal; they rely on both feedback and feedforward

patterns (Tau & Peterson, 2010).

At its simplest, the starting point, much like the

focusonaffectiveeventsinAET,isthatanemo-

tionally salient stimulus in the environment triggers

an input process for the brain. We can think about

a discrete event, say an unjust happening in the

workplace (Barsky & Kaplan, 2007),

a recollection of that occasion, or even a cognition

of something emotionally weighted taking place in

the organization. Affective mental processes,

including perceptions and judgments, can also be

subconsciously activated (Chartrand & Bargh,

2002; Higgins, 1996) as responses to biologically

signiﬁcant triggers (e.g. threats, primary needs,

associational cues) through our sensorial or cogni-

tive pathways (e.g. attention, memory, perception).

This insight is already signiﬁcant for ON research

because it provides neurobiological support for the

analysis of both conscious emotions (i.e., the sub-

jective feeling of the evaluation and appraisal of an

affective event) and implicit or unconscious emo-

tions (i.e., the detection of a potential stimulus)

(Barsade, Ramarajan, & Westen, 2009). Moreover,

it supports the idea that emotional climates in orga-

nizations (e.g. stressful administrations, toxic work-

places) can implicitly inﬂuence employees’

affective reactions and ultimately their organiza-

tional behaviors by acting at the subconscious

level (Carr, Schmidt, Ford, & DeShon, 2003;

Chartrand & Bargh, 2002).

In the brain, information is carried through the

sensory cortex and then routed into the thalamus

for processing and, simultaneously, to other spe-

cialized cortical structures for further processing

(e.g. occipital and temporal lobes). The thalamus

is an integrative structure of the brain that plays

a major role in regulating arousal, circadian

rhythm, and, through the thalamo-cortico-

thalamic circuit, human consciousness (Jones,

2012).

There information is also routed to other sub-

cortical areas. Pioneering work by Papez (1937)

and MacLean (1952) suggests that emotions are

located in a group of subcortical structures called

the “limbic system”(MacLean, 1952).

In parti-

cular, within these limbic areas, information

reaching the amygdalae promotes the release of

hormonal responses through the pituitary system,

leads to autonomic activations through the brain

stem, and, through the basal forebrain, supports

mechanisms of arousal (LeDoux, 2000, who also

gives a fuller account of emotion circuits in the

brain). These relays are essential because they

promote adaptive bodily (i.e., hormonal, auto-

nomic, and neuromodulatory) and behavioral

reactions preparing the organism to respond to

the stimulus (Phelps, 2009).

Processed information is thus sent to the hip-

pocampus, entering into the memory system to be

organized, disseminated, and associated with the

cortical areas related to long-term retention.

Together with one’s unique background, this

information shapes affective traits and attitudes

(Ekman & Davidson, 1994). This state of neu-

roscience knowledge may help reﬁne organiza-

tional theory on affect by suggesting

a neurobiological mechanism of interaction

between the processing of new information from

the environment and existing internal information

stored in the memory. Moreover, this knowledge

Current affective neuroscience has allowed research to

move from a global view on emotions to recognizing

distinctive aspects of each emotion, each forming a part

of its own circuit and a different part of the traditional

limbic circuit (Ward, 2010).

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can support further investigations on the interplay

between one’s affective reactions, dispositions,

and attitudes in the workplace (e.g. Thoresen,

Kaplan, Barsky, Warren, & de Chermont, 2003).

Finally, following evaluation of the signiﬁ-

cance of the affective stimulus, modulation of

the automatic behavior, cognitive appraisal, and

associated decision processes, the brain produces

aﬁnal response: actual decision, normally invol-

ving the prefrontal cortex, as well as parallel and

associated motor responses involving the motor

cortex (Adolphs & Damasio, 2001). Once again,

this process proves relevant to workplace

research because it suggests that emotions and

higher-level cognition are highly interrelated pro-

cesses requiring overlapping neural systems.

Thus changes in cognitive abilities necessarily

relate to changes in emotion, and vice versa.

Organizational research should then investigate

them in conjunction.

Neuroscience research has proposed several inte-

grative theories of emotions (e.g. LeDoux, 2000),

including the “somatic marker hypothesis”

(Damasio, 1996), a theory evolutionarily grounded

and generalizable across emotional events. This

theory holds that when a person is confronted

with emotional stimuli, both the brain and the

body change. Somatic markers are thus internal

bodily states connected to external events that inﬂu-

ence cognitive processing. This insight is important

to guide ON research because it supports predic-

tions that variations in the intensity of bodily reac-

tions to a stimulus are markers of the intensity of

emotions. Put in other terms, by appreciating neural

and physiological responses, organizational

researchers can open a window to observe and

assess the affective reactions of professionals.

Between Affective Neuroscience

and Workplace Affect Research

Having explained the processing mechanism of

affective events in the brain, I now review neu-

roscience knowledge relevant to workplace affect

research. In line with the most recent accounts of

emotions in ON (Haley, Hodgkinson, & Massaro,

2018), I organize this evidence in the areas of

intra- and inter-individual emotions. Speciﬁcally,

I present evidence related to basic emotions, com-

plex intra-individual affective processes, and inter-

individual social emotions. As often occurs in

neuroscience and ON, this is not a ﬁxed categor-

ization, but rather a pragmatic device to organize

current knowledge.

Basic Emotions

A widely accepted understanding of emotions is

that they are affective states focused on a speciﬁc

target or cause, are short-lived and intense, and

entail a range of synchronized features and neu-

rophysiological responses (Ekman, 1992; Phelps,

2009). The so-called basic emotions (also known

as primary) represent the most common categor-

ization in both neuroscience (e.g. Ortony &

Turner, 1990) and organizational scholarship

(e.g. Elfenbein, 2007). Despite debates about the

actual number of basic emotions (e.g. Plutchik,

1980), Ekman’s original research (Ekman,

Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1971) acknowledges six

cross-cultural emotions (see also Ekman, 1994),

that can be encoded through facial expressions.

These emotions are anger, disgust, fear, sadness,

happiness, and surprise. As we shall now see,

each presents characteristic neural circuitry and

correlates (Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss-

Moreau, & Barrett, 2012, who also provide

a meta-analysis). Understanding their neural cor-

relates and mechanisms is particularly important

for workplace research because it would answer

calls for higher speciﬁcity in empirical research

on emotions when investigating affective states

that are generalizable across organizations and

their actors (e.g. Barsade et al., 2003).

Anger

Organizational research has increasingly explored

anger as a key emotion to explain workplace

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phenomena (e.g. Geddes & Callister, 2007).

Intriguingly, research has reported both negative

outcomes from anger expression –such as reduced

productivity and job satisfaction, increased job

stress, and mutual comebacks (Friedman,

Anderson, Brett, et al., 2004; Glomb, 2002) –

and positive ones. For instance, anger has been

found to drive problem solving, promote mutual

understanding, fuel work motivation, and improve

attitudes, and it may offer competitive advantage

by fostering an adaptive drive for competition and

learning (Gibson & Callister, 2010; Fitness, 2000;

Kiefer, 2002). Given this imbalance and the

ongoing discussion about the theorizing of anger

in the workplace (Geddes & Callister, 2007),

researchers have supported the use of neuroscience

methods as “essential to begin to capture more

objectively how anger is experienced and

expressed”(Gibson & Callister, 2010, p. 19; also

provides a review).

Identifying the neural foundations of anger

has, however, proven difﬁcult: meta-analytical

evidence shows that the medial and ventromedial

and lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), the anterior

and posterior cingulate cortex, and the thalamus

all play critical roles in the neural circuitry

(Murphy, Nimmo-Smith, & Lawrence, 2003;

Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002).

More recently, Denson, Pedersen, Ronquillo,

and Nandy (2009) have investigated the neural

correlates of anger in an experiment in which they

elicited anger by addressing participants in an

insulting manner; this induction was then fol-

lowed by a fMRI session. The researchers found

that self-reported feelings of anger, but of no

other emotion, positively correlated with activa-

tion in the left dorsal anterior cingulate cortex.

Moreover, general aggression was associated

with increased activity in the left dorsal anterior

cingulate cortex, but displaced aggression was

not; instead, displaced aggression was signiﬁ-

cantly associated with increased activity in the

medial prefrontal cortex. Extending these results,

Blair (2012) investigated reactive aggression to

suggest that the prefrontal cortex moderates such

circuits in the presence of anger.

Moving beyond brain imaging, electromyogra-

phy (EMG) has been used to measure facial mar-

kers of anger. Dynamic expressions induce EMG

activity interpretable as facial mimicry more evi-

dently than in cases of static expressions (Sato,

Fujimura, & Suzuki, 2008). Moreover, HRV has

been proposed as a key correlate of adaptive

emotion regulation in response to anger

(Denson, Grisham, & Moulds, 2011). A recent

ON study uses the Prisoner’s Dilemma frame-

work to show that elicited anger in research par-

ticipants reduces their cooperation, their

individual monetary gains, and their global

aggregated performance relative to control con-

ditions (Castagnetti, Massaro, & Proto, 2018).

This evidence can be explained through

a mechanism of anger-induced emotional regula-

tion, which is accurately traceable through

depression of HRV high-frequency bands.

Disgust

Disgust is a response of refusal toward something

or someone potentially harmful, nasty, or unplea-

sant. It has been theorized as a withdrawal emo-

tion (Rozin & Fallon, 1987), and is also often

presented as one of our “hardwired”emotions;

disgust would have evolved as a response to

unpleasant foods that could be a potential source

of harm (Wicker, Keysers, Plailly, et al., 2003).

Perhaps because disgust is habitually associated

with taste and other such primary senses, it has

rarely been investigated in organizational

research.

One notable exception is Pelzer (2002), who

argues that disgust is the most severe reaction to

negative perceptions occurring in organizational

life. Speciﬁcally, such an effect is morally salient

as constituting “a revolt of the body against

a perception of something unacceptable, harmful,

damaging, poisoning”(p. 841). Further support-

ing this concept, research shows that people tend

to react to certain moral violations with a sense of

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disgust (e.g. Skarlicki, Hoegg, Aquino, &

Nadisic, 2013).

By providing a direct example of the usefulness

of ON, Cropanzano, Massaro, and Becker (2017)

present disgust as an emotion involved in deontic

justice, a key driver of workplace fairness

(Cropanzano, Goldman, & Folger, 2003), suggest-

ing that the insula –a small region of the cortex

hidden behind the temporal lobes –is a core site

for the existence of “justice rules.”This evidence

resonates with mainstream neuroscience research:

Mataix-Cols, An, Lawrence, et al. (2008) show

that the anterior part of the insula is activated in

response to facial expressions of disgust.

Moreover, Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, Moll, et al.

(2005) reveal that the experience of disgust,

when dissociated into “pure disgust”as opposed

to “moral indignation,”recruits both the frontal

and temporal lobes. This evidence supports the

role of the prefrontal cortex in moral judgment

and may be helpful to integrate the most recent

scholarship on justice arguing that disgust sensi-

tivity is a strong predictor of extreme deontic

judgment (Robinson, Xu, & Plax, 2018).

The key involvement of the insula in disgust has

been conﬁrmed by several other methodological

perspectives. For instance, Calder, Keane, Manes,

Antoun, and Young (2000) show that lesions on the

anterior insula indicate deﬁcits in the experience of

disgust, and electrical stimulation of the anterior

insula during neurosurgery triggered nausea –

a strong marker of disgust (Jones, Ward, &

Critchley, 2010). Moreover, the insula is thought

to be a core site for interoception, one’s perception

of the body’s internal state, which is a construct

strongly associated with the cognitive processing of

emotional awareness (Barrett & Simmons, 2015).

While the insula is center stage in the neural

circuit for disgust, it is also worth mentioning that

Phan et al. (2002) conducted a meta-analysis of

PET and fMRI activation studies, showing that

disgust can be associated with the subcallosal

basal ganglia, a region of the brain generally

involved in motor functional coordination.

Sprengelmeyer, Rausch, Eysel, and Przuntek

(1998) argue that the activations seen in the

basal ganglia in response to disgust may represent

a state of preparedness triggered by a warning

stimulus to process emotionally salient informa-

tion. Thus in organizational settings, the basal

ganglia may play a key role for workers in arran-

ging appropriate “affective responses”toward

emotional events (Panksepp, 1998). Future

researchers in ON might ﬁnd it valuable to con-

sider these regions, probably in conjunction with

the insula, as candidate areas to explain violations

of organizational values such as fairness, trust,

and justice (Massaro & Becker, 2015).

Fear

Fear is probably the most investigated emotion in

neuroscience. Its core neural circuit develops

around the amygdala (LeDoux, 2003). Phan et al.

(2002) show that nearly 60 percent of fear induction

studies report activation in the amygdala. The

amygdala has been implicated in the recognition

of fearful facial expressions (Adolphs, Tranel,

Damasio, & Damasio, 1995), in fear conditioning

(Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, et al., 1995; LaBar,

LeDoux, Spencer, & Phelps, 1995), and in the evo-

cation of fearful emotional responses from direct

stimulation (Halgren, Walter, Cherlow, & Crandall,

1978). The amygdala also appears to be crucial in

the detection and coordination of appropriate

responses to threat and danger (Amaral, 2002).

Yet one major cross-disciplinary challenge in

affective research is the ability to reliably distin-

guish fear and anger (Stemmler, Heldmann,

Pauls, & Scherer, 2001). To tackle this issue,

Whalen, Shin, McInerney, et al. (2001) compared

neural activation of fearful, angry, and neutral

faces, to ﬁnd that the ventral amygdala shows

higher activity when facing a condition with

a negative valence (i.e., fearful or angry) in com-

parison to the control condition; yet when the

fearful and angry face conditions were equated,

the dorsal amygdala was activated only in the

former.

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Moving to analyses of the wider nervous sys-

tem, studies on fear have also identiﬁed an exten-

sive pattern of sympathetic activations (Kreibig,

2010). Fear-associated responses show unique

cardiac sympatho-vagal activation and withdra-

wal dynamics (Rainville, Bechara, Naqvi, &

Damasio, 2006), indicating that these features

can be used as autonomic biomarkers for this

basic emotion. The increasing speciﬁcity of

these ﬁndings suggests that in organizational

research, anger, which is often difﬁcult to dissoci-

ate from other negative emotions following

induction procedures (i.e., video or picture sti-

muli, or memory recollections; see also Phelps,

2009), can be discerned by a concomitant assess-

ment of subjects’neurophysiological correlates.

This opportunity is of particular relevance for

ON, given the increasing availability of portable

tools that assess peripheral measures readily

applicable to organizational investigations.

Sadness

Sadness is another relevant emotion for the work-

place. It is associated with absenteeism (Porath &

Pearson, 2012), but also with increased organiza-

tional citizenship behavior and workplace deviance

(Lee & Allen, 2002). In leadership, Lewis (2000)

reveals that followers facing a “sad leader”felt less

enthusiasm and more fatigue compared to those

observing a leader expressing anger or no emotion.

In neuroscience, sadness induction studies

generally report activation in the cingulate cortex

(e.g. Barrett, Pike, & Paus, 2004). Speciﬁcally,

Liotti, Mayberg, Brannan, et al. (2000) show that

sadness induces activity in the anterior cingulate

cortex. In recent years, this brain region has

become an important topic of research because

it involves speciﬁc processing modules for both

cognitive and emotional information and inte-

grates input representations from cognitive and

emotional networks (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000).

Anatomical and brain-mapping studies support

the distinction between a cognitive–affective

division of the cingulate. The presence of

a dorsal-cognitive and rostral-ventral-affective

division may thus promote research seeking to

further understand the interactions between cog-

nition and emotion associated with sadness

(Lane, Reiman, Axelrod, et al., 1998). Research

shows that the dorsal division signals the occur-

rence of conﬂicts in information processing,

thereby triggering compensatory adjustments in

cognitive control; this signalling regulates cogni-

tive control to prevent further conﬂicting apprai-

sals (see Bush et al., 2000).

Finally, of particular impact for organizational

behaviour research on the role of rewards in

motivating employees (e.g. Wiersma, 1992),

Gehring and Willoughby (2002) ﬁnd that the

cingulate engages when research participants

were told the outcomes of their decisions in

a gambling task, indicating that this region is

susceptible to aversive results related to external

reward. This function could thus work following

a cost–beneﬁt evaluation that integrates informa-

tion about outcomes of past actions and present

environmental requests (Rushworth & Behrens,

2008).

Happiness

The neuroscience of positive emotions has only

recently received scientiﬁc attention (Burgdorf &

Panksepp, 2006). Biological theories suggest that

there may be several distinct forms of positive

emotions, but all are closely related to sub-

neocortical brain regions: happiness seems to

engage a widely distributed neural network

(Ward, 2015). In one of the early functional ima-

ging studies of happiness, George, Ketter,

Parekh, et al. (1995) investigated the brain activ-

ity of healthy women during transient sadness

and happiness using PET. The participants were

required to recall life events that they found

happy, sad, and neutral; they were also presented

happy, sad, or neutral human faces. Happiness

was associated with signiﬁcant and widespread

reductions in cortical cerebrovascular ﬂow, espe-

cially in the right prefrontal and bilateral

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temporal-parietal regions. Adding to this body of

knowledge, Sato, Kochiyama, Uono, et al. (2015)

investigated the structural neural substrate of hap-

piness and found a positive relationship between

a score of subjective happiness and gray matter

volume in the right precuneus, suggesting that

this area mediates subjective happiness by inte-

grating its emotional and cognitive components.

Over the years, neuroimaging research has

consistently shown that the ventral striatum and

putamen respond to presentation of happy faces

(e.g. Whalen, Rauch, Etcoff, et al., 1998), plea-

sant pictures (e.g. Davidson & Irwin, 1999), and

competitive and sexual arousal (Rauch, Shin,

Dougherty, et al., 1999). These areas are charac-

terized by rich innervations of dopaminergic neu-

rons, which respond to incentive reward and

motivation toward reaching planned goals

(Telzer, 2016). This convergence represents

a useful insight for the growing body of organiza-

tional research exploring the causal links between

happiness, employees’rewards, and organiza-

tional behavior outputs (e.g. Lyubomirsky, King,

& Diener, 2005; Ryan & Deci, 2001).

Surprise

There is growing evidence suggesting that

dopaminergic systems in the brain are recruited

in anticipatory positive affective states.

Moreover, research has shown that the amygda-

la’s central nucleus, the cholinergic neurons of

the nucleus basalis, and their innervation of the

posterior parietal cortex are critical to surprise

enhancements in associative learning (Wessel,

Danielmeier, Morton, & Ullsperger, 2012).

Wessel et al. have investigated the neural sites

of surprise by administering an error-

monitoring/novelty-oddball task in which the

frequency of new surprising trials was matched

to the frequency of errors. Combining electro-

encephalographic recordings and event-related

functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI),

they compared neural responses to errors with

neural responses to novel events, revealing

increased activity in the posterior medial frontal

cortex and anterior midcingulate.

This evidence suggests strong associations

between awareness of surprising events and asso-

ciative learning, as processes mediated by shared

neural systems. Thus these ﬁndings could further

knowledge in organizational research on the way in

which surprising situations, such as a newcomer’s

entry experience (Louis, 1980) or a person-

environment ﬁt (Caplan, 1987), inﬂuence employ-

ees’learning. In the future, on the practical side, this

knowledge could also allow for the formulating of

surprise-eliciting “nudges”as possible interven-

tions to improve organizational learning.

Intra-individual Emotional Processes

While studies on basic emotions have been one of

the most visible backers of affective neu-

roscience, research has also focused on bettering

our understanding of the complexity surrounding

individuals’emotional experiences (Panksepp,

1998). While it is not possible to provide a full

account of this emerging research stream,

I mention here three areas worthy of attention

for research in the workplace.

Emotional intensity and valence

The individual propensity to respond, more or

less intensively, to affect-related events is an

important area of workplace affect research. For

example, den Bos, Maas, Waldring, and Semin

(2003) show that people high in affect intensity

display robust affective responses after experien-

cing outcome and procedural fairness. However,

when affect intensity is low there are marginal

fairness effects. This evidence suggests that

affect intensity may play a fundamental role in

the psychology of affective reactions to unfair

events, offering generalization to several contex-

tual and organizational circumstances (den Bos

et al., 2003). Thus, advancing knowledge on why

and in what ways people differently weigh their

emotions is a compelling and timely ambition.

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Neuroscience has provided important insights

into how strongly people feel their emotions (e.g.

Cooper & Knutson, 2008). For example, Ewbank,

Barnard, Croucher, Ramponi, and Calder (2009)

suggest that the amygdala’s response to emo-

tional stimuli is not a function of valence alone,

but also a function of the stimuli’s signiﬁcance. In

a fMRI experiment, these authors ﬁnd that the left

amygdala has a signiﬁcantly larger response to

high-impact stimuli than to neutral and low-

impact ones. This ﬁnding is signiﬁcant because

it shows the discriminatory potential of neuroi-

maging in assessing salience of affective states,

and might thus be useful for enriching organiza-

tional research looking at unraveling this aspect

(e.g. Rafaeli & Sutton, 1989).

Adding to this knowledge, Cunningham, Van

Bavel, and Johnsen (2008) provide fMRI evi-

dence that the relation between affective valence

and the amygdala’s activity can be modulated by

evaluative goals. When research participants

were asked to provide affective evaluations on

facial stimuli, the amygdala’s modulation was

more pronounced for positive than for negative

information. Altogether, this evidence supports

the view that our brain systems process both

intensity and valence of emotional information

in a ﬂexible manner.

Complex emotions

Affective neuroimaging research has produced

a growing number of studies on self-conscious

emotions, those emotions that are evoked when

a person reﬂects on their self or evaluates their

self in relation to the environment (Lewis, 1993).

These processes can occur implicitly or explicitly

and require the capacity for introspection and

self-knowledge leading to complex emotions

such as regret, guilt, shame, embarrassment, and

pride (Müller-Pinzler, Krach, Krämer, & Paulus,

2016). Importantly for ON, these emotions can

drive immediate punishment or reinforcement of

behavioral outcomes, and therefore can motivate

social behavior, which in turn helps to retain

social structures (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek,

2007). Within this domain, research on regret has

offered a landmark example to investigate the

involvement of the orbitofrontal cortex and of

the amygdala during choice, when the brain is

anticipating possible future consequences (i.e.,

anticipated regret; Coricelli, Dolan, & Sirigu,

2007).

Emotional regulation

A growing stream of research in affective neu-

roscience concerns the mechanisms of emotional

regulation, which are widely acknowledged con-

structs related to emotional labor (Grandey,

2000). Neuroscience research has recently

shown that emotional regulation includes

a series of complex processes such as reappraisal,

selective attention, and emotional extinction,

each featuring distinct neural correlates (see for

review Dunsmoor, Niv, Daw, & Phelps, 2015;

Ochsner & Gross, 2005).

Braunstein, Gross, and Oschner (2017) cluster

these mechanisms into four categories: explicit-

controlled; implicit-controlled; explicit-automatic;

and implicit-automatic regulation strategies. These

clusters are based on a neuroscience-driven analysis

of the orthogonal dimensions explicit–implicit,

which accounts for the regulation targets, and con-

trolled–automatic, which instead covers the nature

of the emotional process at stake. Thus, a placebo

mechanism is an explicit-automatic process that

recruits both the ventromedial and dorsolateral pre-

frontal cortex (Wager & Atlas, 2015), whereas

emotional extinction is an implicit-automatic pro-

cess recruiting the ventromedial prefrontal cortex

alone (Phelps, Delgado, Nearing, & LeDoux,

2004). Comparatively, reappraisal, selective atten-

tion, and distraction belong to the explicit-

controlled cluster and involve the prefrontal cortex,

inferior parietal gyrus, and dorsal anterior cingulate

cortex (Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002;

Van Dillen, Heslenfeld, & Koole, 2009). Finally,

implicit-controlled regulation strategies, such as

affective labeling, automatic goal pursuit, and

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reversal learning, involve ventromedial and pos-

tero-medial prefrontal cortex and the dorsal anterior

cingulate cortex (Buhle, Silvers, Wager, et al.,

2014; Lieberman, 2007).

This framework suggests the possibility of

recognizing emotional regulation mechanisms

on the basis of different activations in the neural

systems involved. Moreover, it provides the

opportunity to form hypotheses and predictions

about the inﬂuence of situational and workplace

factors on emotional regulation strategies. For

instance, stress can impair explicit-controlled

regulation by impairing optimal prefrontal func-

tioning (Arnsten, 2009). Thus, as Braunstein et al.

(2017) argue, it is also possible to deduce that

implicit-automatic emotional regulation strate-

gies would not be as impacted by stress because

stress reinforces non-prefrontal dependent

responses.

Interpersonal and Social Emotions

Affective neuroscience research is often accom-

panied by investigations in the social domain.

Charles Darwin (1896) suggested that emotional

expressions evolved both as a means of social

communication and to determine others’inten-

tions. Indeed, recognizing the emotional states of

others is a critical component of social interac-

tions, because we use our emotional responses to

regulate our behavior toward others. An interper-

sonal ON perspective on emotions is thus useful

when moving from investigations of individual

actors to those on dyads, teams, or groups, where

workers can experience emotions related to and

interconnected with those around them.

Emotional contagion, affective empathy,

and theory of mind

The way in which individuals represent the emo-

tional states of others has been a major area of

interest for both organizational scholars (e.g.

Barsade, 2002; Kellett, Humphrey, & Sleeth,

2002; Hareli, & Rafaeli, 2008) and neuroscience

scholars (e.g. Ruby & Decety, 2004).

Neuroscience research has proposed that three

main systems, supported by partially separable

neural circuits, are involved in our capacity to

understand other people’s emotions (Singer,

2009).

Emotional contagion The ﬁrst system concerns

our ability to understand others’motor intentions

and action goals. This system is often associated

to mirror neurons (see Gallese & Goldman,

1998). Mirror neurons represent a cluster of pre-

motor cortex neurons observed in monkeys to

“ﬁre”when they either perform goal-related

movements or watch others, including humans,

doing the same (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004).

Correspondingly, research has shown evidence

for the possible existence of mirror neurons in

humans. While there has been intense debate on

the topic (Keysers, 2009), research has shown

that in humans the inferior frontal cortex and the

anterior cingulate respond when a person sees

another one experiencing an emotion, leading to

the idea that those areas could be the neural sites

for emotional contagion (Keysers & Gazzola,

2006).

Affective empathy According to Kanske,

Böckler, Trautwein, and Singer (2015), there are

two further neural systems that can help indivi-

duals to understand the emotions of others. One

route, known as the affective route or simulation

theory, involves the direct ability to imitate and

thus understand others’emotions and results in

empathy. This route generally involves the ante-

rior insula and middle anterior cingulate cortex.

Neuroscience research suggests that empathy

represents the ﬁrst step of a succession that begins

with affect sharing, a subsequent imitation of

another person’s feelings, which may then moti-

vate other-related concerns, including engage-

ment in helping behavior (Singer, 2009).

Moreover, observation of this process enables us

to detach affective empathy from the closely

linked process of emotional contagion, the phe-

nomenon of having one person’s emotions and

related behavior directly trigger similar patterns

in other people (Barsade, 2002). Differently from

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empathy, in the latter casea person would not

realize that the other’s emotions were the trigger:

emotional contagion would not be an empathic

response as such.

Neuroscience research has also converged

around the idea that there is an underlying

mechanism of shared brain networks which give

humans the ability to empathize (Decety, 2010).

Intriguingly, when investigating the neural sub-

strates of empathy neuroscientists tend to use

paradigms in which both the participant and

a confederate received painful stimulations:

Singer, Seymour, O’Doherty, et al. (2004) found

an overlap between the receiving and observing

conditions in various brain areas, including the

bilateral anterior insulae and middle anterior cin-

gulate cortex.

Theory of mind The third mechanism requires

people representing and reasoning about others’

beliefs and thoughts, a process referred to as

mentalizing or theory of mind (ToM). This path

involves the ventral temporoparietal junction,

along with anterior and posterior midline regions

(Dodell-Feder, Koster-Hale, Bedny, & Saxe,

2011). A meta-analysis by Bzdok, Schilbach,

Vogeley, et al. (2012), which investigated the

neural networks activated during ToM, supports

these ﬁndings. Moreover, Schurz, Radua,

Aichhorn, Richlan, and Perner (2014) ﬁnd that

the temporoparietal junction and medial prefron-

tal cortex are consistently activated in ToM.

Importantly, however, while these networks

form the basis of ToM, differentiated patterns

within the overall network are engaged during

different tasks. For example, there are speciﬁc

activation clusters for false-belief tasks, wherein

the temporo-parietal junction is activated

(Aichhorn, Perner, Weiss, et al., 2009), and for

rational action judgment tasks, wherein the para-

cingulate cortex is activated (Walter, Adenzato,

Ciaramidaro, et al., 2004).

This point is particularly germane for ON, given

that one frequent criticism of the ON perspective is

that experimental neuroscience paradigms often

rely on situations ﬁxed a priori and not based on

the real world. Indirectly tackling this concern,

Wolf, Dziobek, and Heekeren (2010) investigated

ToM in close to real-life conditions by using

a paradigm that involves the video-based “Movie

for the Assessment of Social Cognition”(Dziobek,

Fleck, Kalbe, et al., 2006). In this study, the

authors show that brain areas such as the superior

temporal sulcus, temporoparietal junction, medial

prefrontal cortex, temporal poles, and precuneus

are activated depending on the task’s components.

Thus, face processing and recognition activate the

occipito-parietotemporal cortices; language com-

prehension activates the temporal lobes, lateral

prefrontal cortex, and precuneus; and self-

awareness activates the dorsomedial prefrontal

cortex and the precuneus.

Emotional intelligence and leadershi p

Emotional intelligence (EI) represents a consistent

focal point for research in the workplace (e.g. Law,

Wong, & Song 2004). Although the neural sub-

strates of EI are still largely unknown, it is recog-

nized that the prefrontal cortex may play a crucial

role. For instance, Kruger, Barbey, McCabe, et al.

(2009) studied a unique sample of combat veterans

in order to examine strategic and experiential EI.

They ﬁnd that these capabilities depend on distinct

neural correlates. Ventromedial PFC damage

diminishes strategic EI and thus obstructs the

understanding of emotional information; dorsolat-

eral PFC damage diminishes experiential EI,

impairing the perception and integration of emo-

tional information. These ﬁndings are relevant for

ON research because they suggest that EI should

be investigated under its individual components

and in conjunction with cognitive intelligence.

Finally, the most developed area in ON, which

has also shown implications for emotional

research, concerns leadership (e.g. Antonakis,

Ashkanasy, & Dasborough, 2009). Largely con-

centrated in the work by Waldman and colleagues,

and in the use of qEEG (Waldman, Balthazard, &

Peterson, 2011), a rich body of research in neuro-

leadership has bloomed over the last few years. Of

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relevance for this work’s purpose, these research-

ers have suggested that qEEG coherence measure-

ments can be an optimal means of examiningthose

leadership behaviors that are likely to require an

interface between the brain’s emotional and cog-

nitive systems (Cacioppo, Berntson, & Nusbaum,

2008). Speciﬁcally, they report that the presence of

high coherence in the right hemisphere of leaders’

brains could imply greater emotional balance and

ToM (Thatcher, North, & Biver, 2007).

Closing Thoughts and Future

Research

In this chapter I undertook an ON approach to

investigate the thriving and multifaceted domain

of workplace affect, arguing that neuroscience can

provide a substantial step toward furthering

research on emotions in organizational studies.

Notwithstanding the multitude of organizational

and neuroscience research on affect, which could

only be summarized here, and the important head-

way that neuroscience has made in the past two

decades, many questions at the interface between

these two ﬁelds remain unanswered. For instance,

how can organizational research on cognition

further integrate the evidence coming from affec-

tive neuroscience? What kinds of employees are

most susceptible to grasping others’emotions, and

can this capacity be “mapped”neurophysiologi-

cally? Are dual-system accounts of behavior in

management adequate to fully capture the complex-

ity of affectivity in the workplace? Can neurofeed-

back help workers learn to be more in tune with

others’emotions, helping to create improved orga-

nizational climates? These are just some of the

intriguing questions that are likely to populate

future ON research on emotions.

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36 massaro

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Chapter 10: Neuroscience Methods: A Framework for Managerial and Organizational Cognition

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Dec 2017

Sebastiano Massaro

Explicit and Implicit Emotion Regulation: A Multi-level Framework

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The ability to adaptively regulate emotion is essential for mental and physical well-being. How should we organize the myriad ways people attempt to regulate their emotions? We explore the utility of a framework that distinguishes among four fundamental classes of emotion regulation strategies. The framework describes each strategy class in terms their behavioral characteristics, underlying psychological processes, and supporting neural systems. A key feature of this multi-level framework is its conceptualization of the psychological processes in terms of two orthogonal dimensions that describe (1) the nature of the emotion regulation goal (ranging from to implicit to explicit) and (2) the nature of the emotion change process (ranging from more automatic to more controlled). After describing the core elements of the framework, we use it to review human and animal research on the neural bases of emotion regulation and to suggest key directions for future research on emotion regulation.

Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion

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Nov 1999

This book, a member of the Series in Affective Science, is a unique interdisciplinary sequence of articles on the cognitive neuroscience of emotion by some of the most well-known researchers in the area. It explores what is known about cognitive processes in emotion at the same time it reviews the processes and anatomical structures involved in emotion, determining whether there is something about emotion and its neural substrates that requires they be studied as a separate domain. Divided into four major focal points and presenting research that has been performed in the last decade, this book covers the process of emotion generation, the functions of amygdala, the conscious experience of emotion, and emotion regulation and dysregulation. Collectively, the chapters constitute a broad but selective survey of current knowledge about emotion and the brain, and they all address the close association between cognitive and emotional processes. By bringing together diverse strands of investigation with the aim of documenting current understanding of how emotion is instantiated in the brain, this book will be of use to scientists, researchers, and advanced students of psychology and neuroscience.

The Student’s Guide to Cognitive Neuroscience

Book

Dec 2019

Jamie Ward

Can Brains Manage? The Brain, Emotion, and Cognition in Organizations

Chapter

Sep 2018

In response to recent calls to better understand the brain’s role in organizational behavior, we propose a series of theoretical tests to examine the question “can brains manage?” Our tests ask whether brains can manage without bodies and without extracranial resources, whether they can manage in social isolation, and whether brains are the ultimate controllers of emotional and cognitive aspects of organizational behavior. Our analysis shows that, to accomplish work-related tasks in organizations, the brain relies on and closely interfaces with the body, interpersonal and social dynamics, and cognitive and emotional processes that are distributed across persons and artifacts. The results of this “thought experiment” suggest that the brain is more appropriately conceived as a regulatory organ that integrates top-down (i.e., social, artifactual and environmental) and bottom-up (i.e., neural) influences on organizational behavior, rather than the sole cause of that behavior. Drawing on a socially situated perspective, our analysis develops a framework that connects brain, body and mind to social, cultural, and environmental forces, as significant components of complex emotional and cognitive organizational systems. We discuss the implications for the emerging field of organizational cognitive neuroscience and for conceptualizing the interaction between the brain, cognition and emotion in organizations.

The Influence of Anger on Strategic Cooperative Interactions

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Apr 2018

The frustration-aggression hypothesis posits that anger affects economic behaviour essentially by changing temporally the individual preferences. Here, we test a different channel in an experiment where we externally induce anger to a subgroup of subjects (following a standard procedure that we verify by using a novel method of textual analysis). We show that anger can impair the capacity to think strategically in a beauty contest game. Angry subjects choose numbers further away from the Nash equilibrium and earn significantly lower profits. Our structural analysis shows that anger increases more than 30% the number of level-zero players. Furthermore, with a second experiment, we show that this effect is not common to all negative emotions. Sad subjects do not play significantly further away from the Nash equilibrium than the control group and sadness does not lead to more level-zero play. We analyze the implications of this finding on bargaining and cooperation games.

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The functional neuroanatomy of emotion and affective style

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Recently, there has been a convergence in lesion and neuroimaging data in the identification of circuits underlying positive and negative emotion in the human brain. Emphasis is placed on the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and the amygdala as two key components of this circuitry. Emotion guides action and organizes behavior towards salient goals. To accomplish this, it is essential that the organism have a means of representing affect in the absence of immediate elicitors. It is proposed that the PFC plays a crucial role in affective working memory. The ventromedial sector of the PFC is most directly involved in the representation of elementary positive and negative emotional states while the dorsolateral PFC may be involved in the representation of the goal states towards which these elementary positive and negative states are directed. The amygdala has been consistently identified as playing a crucial role in both the perception of emotional cues and the production of emotional responses, with some evidence suggesting that it is particularly involved with fear-related negative affect. Individual differences in amygdala activation are implicated in dispositional affective styles and increased reactivity to negative incentives. The ventral striatum, anterior cingulate and insular cortex also provide unique contributions to emotional processing.

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Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is a part of the brain's limbic system. Classically, this region has been related to affect, on the basis of lesion studies in humans and in animals. In the late 1980s, neuroimaging research indicated that ACC was active in many studies of cognition. The findings from EEG studies of a focal area of negativity in scalp electrodes following an error response led to the idea that ACC might be the brain's error detection and correction device. In this article, these various findings are reviewed in relation to the idea that ACC is a part of a circuit involved in a form of attention that serves to regulate both cognitive and emotional processing. Neuroimaging studies showing that separate areas of ACC are involved in cognition and emotion are discussed and related to results showing that the error negativity is influenced by affect and motivation. In addition, the development of the emotional and cognitive roles of ACC are discussed, and how the success of this regulation in controlling responses might be correlated with cingulate size. Finally, some theories are considered about how the different subdivisions of ACC might interact with other cortical structures as a part of the circuits involved in the regulation of mental and emotional activity.

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