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A development bank’s choice of private equity partner: a behavioural game-theoretic approach

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Abstract

We develop a formal game-theoretic analysis of the economic (value-adding abilities) and behavioural factors (empathy, emotional excitement, passion) affecting a development bank’s choice of private-equity partner when investing into emerging market entrepreneurship. Triple-sided moral hazard (TSMH) problems occur in the form of effort-shirking, since the bank, the PE-manager, and the entrepreneur all contribute to value-creation. The bank’s investment choices are crucially affected by a) the relative abilities and the potential level of empathy, excitement and passion that may be generated between a PE-manager and an entrepreneur, and b) the personal emotional attachment that the bank develops towards a PE. The severity of TSMH increases inefficiencies in decision-making. Finally, we consider, in addition to political risk mitigation, an additional impact that the bank may have on PE/E value-creation: the bank may have a coaching/mentoring role. Our analysis has implications for academics and practitioners alike.
A Development Bank’s Choice of Private Equity Partner: A Behavioural Game-
theoretic Approach
Authors: Richard Fairchild, Ian Crawford: School of Management, University of
Bath, UK
Adil El-Fakir: Sheffield Business School, Sheffield Hallam University
Please note: This paper is Gold Open Access at the Journal’s website, and
therefore is freely available at the DOI link below:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1351847X.2019.1647863
... Further, the author concludes that policy should focus on the bargaining power of crowdfunders if it aims to promote crowdfunding processes and platforms. Fairchild et al. (2019) analyze the factors affecting a development bank's choice of a private equity partner when investing in entrepreneurship in emerging markets. The authors present a game-theoretic analysis of how the development bank's decisions are affected by economic factors and behavioral characteristics (such as passion and excitement) of private equity firms and entrepreneurs, in addition to the bank's own emotional biases. ...
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... This project will produce a certain, guaranteed, risk-1 Some behavioural corporate finance researchers have developed game-theoretic models to analyse the combined effects of economic (agency/moral hazard) and behavioural factors in other interesting areas. For example, Fairchild (2018) and Fairchild et al. (2019) consider the effect of economic and behavioural factors in the hedge fund industry, and in a development bank's relationships with its private equity financiers and entrepreneurs. Fairchild et al. (2020) develop a theoretical analysis of the effects of managerial agency issues and overconfidence on the corporate hedging decision. ...
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