Nodal defence: the changing structure of U.S. alliance systems in Europe and East Asia

Abstract

Scholars and pundits alike continue to portray the U.S.-led regional alliance systems in Europe and East Asia in stark, dichotomous terms. Whereas the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is the standard model of multilateralism, the U.S.-led system of bilateral alliances in East Asia is the archetypal ‘hub-and-spokes’ structure in which different allies (the spokes) enjoy deep bilateral strategic ties with Washington (the hub) but not with each other. We argue that these common depictions of U.S.-led alliance systems are obsolete. Instead, we show that what we label ‘nodal defence’ – a hybrid category that combines overlapping bilateral, minilateral and multilateral initiatives – better captures how the U.S.-led alliance systems in Europe and East Asia operate today. Specifically, nodal defence is a hybrid alliance system in which allies are connected through variable geometries of defence cooperation that are organized around specific functional roles so as to tackle different threats. To show how nodal defence is an emerging central feature of the U.S.-led regional alliance systems, we conduct an original cross-regional comparison of how these alliance systems work, drawing on elite interviews, official documents, and secondary literature.

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Journal of Strategic Studies
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Nodal defence: the changing structure of U.S.
alliance systems in Europe and East Asia
Luis Simón, Alexander Lanoszka & Hugo Meijer
To cite this article: Luis Simón, Alexander Lanoszka & Hugo Meijer (2019): Nodal defence: the
changing structure of U.S. alliance systems in Europe and East Asia, Journal of Strategic Studies,
DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2019.1636372
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ARTICLE
Nodal defence: the changing structure of U.S.
alliance systems in Europe and East Asia
Luis Simón
a
, Alexander Lanoszka
b
and Hugo Meijer
c
a
Institute for European Studies, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium;
b
Department of
Political Science, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada;
c
Sciences Po, Center for
International Studies (CERI), Paris, France
ABSTRACT
Scholars and pundits alike continue to portray the U.S.-led regional alliance
systems in Europe and East Asia in stark, dichotomous terms. Whereas the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization is the standard model of multilateralism, the U.S.-
led system of bilateral alliances in East Asia is the archetypal ‘hub-and-spokes’
structure in which different allies (the spokes) enjoy deep bilateral strategic ties
with Washington (the hub) but not with each other. We argue that these
common depictions of U.S.-led alliance systems are obsolete. Instead, we
show that what we label ‘nodal defence’–ahybridcategorythatcombines
overlapping bilateral, minilateral and multilateral initiatives –better captures
how the U.S.-led alliance systems in Europe and East Asia operate today.
Specifically, nodal defence is a hybrid alliance system in which allies are con-
nected through variable geometries of defence cooperation that are organized
around specific functional roles so as to tackle different threats. To show how
nodal defence is an emerging central feature of the U.S.-led regional alliance
systems, we conduct an original cross-regional comparison of how these alli-
ance systems work, drawing on elite interviews, official documents, and sec-
ondary literature.
KEYWORDS Alliances; defence cooperation; United States; Europe; East Asia
Alliances are a foundational pillar of U.S. grand strategy. Shortly after the
Second World War, the United States established regional alliance systems
to confront emerging security challenges in Europe and East Asia. Scholars
and pundits alike have often portrayed the character of these alliance
systems in stark, dichotomous terms.
1
Whereas the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) is the standard model of multilateralism, the U.S.-led
system of bilateral alliances in East Asia is the archetypal ‘hub-and-spokes’
CONTACT Luis Simón Luis.Simon@vub.be Institute for European Studies, Vrije Universiteit
Brussel, Brussels, Belgium and Elcano Royal Institute, Madrid, Spain
1
See Victor D. Cha, Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press 2016); G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and
the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2001); and
Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, ‘Why is There no NATO in Asia? Collective Identity,
Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism’,International Organization 56/3 (2002), 575–607.
JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES
https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1636372
© 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

structure in which different allies (the spokes) enjoy deep bilateral strategic
ties with Washington (the hub) but not with each other. Yet, as we argue in
this essay, these commonly invoked descriptions are obsolete. What we
label ‘nodal defence’–a hybrid category that combines bilateral, minilateral
and multilateral initiatives –better captures how the U.S.-led alliance sys-
tems in Europe and East Asia operate today.
Since the Cold War ended, changing regional threat environments have
altered the strategic priorities of –and the defence cooperation patterns
among –allies and partners, thereby transforming U.S.-led alliance structures.
Throughout the Cold War, NATO’s multilateral structure was geared to
defending Europe from the overarching Soviet threat. Nevertheless, after
the Soviet Union collapsed, the regional threat environment subsequently
diversified due to the growing relevance the United States and its European
allies assigned to the threat of terrorism and instability in the broader Middle
East, which, from the late 2000s, also coexisted with a resurgent Russia. The
regional alliance system lost its original sense of purpose and has experienced
greater fragmentation. NATO members have increasingly focused on more
‘local’challenges and their own specific problems, grouping themselves
around different bilateral and minilateral clusters that concentrate on parti-
cular threats.
2
Eastern and northeastern European states have tailored and
coordinated their defence efforts around Russia’s conventional threat. For
their part, Western and Southern European states have largely configured
their defence policies around such challenges as regional instability or
terrorism.
3
Although NATO still exists and provides some unifying coherence
in European security, defence cooperation has evinced greater organization at
the bilateral and minilateral levels around local threats. These bilateral and
minilateral initiatives often operate outside of NATO’spurview,evenassome
of them might be linked to it. Put together, we are witnessing a cumulative
intertwining of bilateral, minilateral and multilateral initiatives, which charac-
terizes the evolving structure of the U.S.-led alliance system in Europe.
In East Asia, the opposite trend has unfolded. During the Cold War, the
hub-and-spokes system of bilateral alliances allowed the United States and its
individual allies to attend to multiple security challenges. Each U.S. ally in this
2
Andrew Cottey, ‘Europe’s New Subregionalism’,Journal of Strategic Studies 23/2 (2000), 23–47; Timo
Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, ‘Does a Multi-tier NATO Matter? The Atlantic Alliance and the Process
of Strategic Change’,International Affairs 85/2 (2009), 211–26; Hugo Meijer and Marco Wyss, ‘Beyond
CSDP: The Resurgence of National Armed Forces in Europe’, in Hugo Meijer and Marco Wyss, eds., The
Handbook of European Defence Policies and Armed Forces (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 14–31;
and Tuomas Forsberg, ‘The Rise of Nordic Defense Cooperation: A Return to Regionalism?’
International Affairs 80/5 (2013), 1161–81.
3
Lucie Béraud-Sudreau and Bastian Giegerich, ‘NATO Defense Spending and European Threat
Perceptions’,Survival 60/4 (2018), 53–74; Olivier de France and Nick Witney, ‘Europe’s Strategic
Cacophony’, European Council on Foreign Relations, ECFR Policy Brief 77, April 2014; and Hugo Meijer
and Marco Wyss, ‘Upside Down: Reframing European Defence Studies’,Cooperation and Conflict 54/3
(2019), 16–17.
2L. SIMÓN ET AL.

system tackled a different threat, be it countering Soviet influence in Asia,
deterring North Korea from attacking the South, checking the re-emergence
of Japan, or defending Taiwan against mainland China.
4
After the Cold War,
however, the rise of China has gradually become a region-wide threat that
has encouraged greater spoke-to-spoke interaction and cohesion.
5
As China’s
geostrategic rise and assertive behaviour increasingly unnerved regional
powers across East Asia, it has catalysed greater defence cooperation
among previously disconnected allies and partners. To be sure, many U.S.
allies still frame their national defence policies around more localized threats
like the North Korean nuclear program. Many of them may even have
reservations about openly forming a region-wide coalition aimed at counter-
ing Chinese power.
6
Still, the general assessment that China’s rise and asser-
tive behaviour is undermining the regional balance appears to be fostering
greater spoke-to-spoke interaction. U.S. security allies and partners are
increasingly cooperating through various overlapping bilateral, minilateral,
and multilateral channels so as to confront shared security threats and
challenges in concert with one another.
7
We contend that, because of changes in regional threat environments,
the U.S.-led regional alliance systems in Europe and in East Asia are conver-
ging towards what we call a nodal defence system. Nodal defence is a
hybrid alliance system in which allies are connected through variable geo-
metries of defence cooperation that are organized around specific func-
tional roles so as to tackle different threats. Specifically, nodal defence
features the cumulative intertwining of bilateral, minilateral and multilateral
initiatives. Multilateral, hub-and-spokes, and nodal defence systems vary in
how functional specialization is organized among members of the alliance
system in order to confront particular threats. Functional specialization is the
degree to which a state concentrates on a specific task (or role) within an
alliance system. In an ideal-type multilateral system, all allies agree on how
to prioritize the main threat faced by the alliance, with functional differen-
tiation revolving around that same threat. In an ideal-type hub-and-spokes
system, functional specialization revolves around different threats. Members
4
Cha, Powerplay.
5
See, e.g., Victor D. Cha, ‘Complex Patchworks: U.S. Alliances as Part of Asia’s Regional Architecture’,
Asia Policy 11/2 (2011), 27–50; Patrick Cronin et al., The Emerging Asia Power Web: The Rise of Bilateral
Intra-Asian Security Ties (Washington, D.C.: Centre for a New American Security 2013); Richard
Fontaine et al., Networking Asian Security (Washington, D.C.: Center for New American Security
2017); William T. Tow and Brendan Taylor (ed.), Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Asia-Pacific
Security: Contending Cooperation (New York: Routledge 2013); and Joel Wuthnow, ‘U.S.
“Minilateralism”in Asia and China’s Responses: A New Security Dilemma?’Journal of Contemporary
China 28/118 (2019), 133–150.
6
Chien-peng Chung, ‘Southeast Asia-China Relations: Dialectics of “Hedging”and “Counter-Hedging”’,
Southeast Asian Affairs 1 (2004), 35–53.
7
Minilateralism refers to defence cooperation agreements reached by a small number of countries
(usually from three and five) for the purpose of tackling one or more security challenges.
THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 3

of the alliance system disagree over which threat deserves priority and,
consequently, each bilateral alliance centres on a different threat. Nodal
defence is a hybrid since some, but not all, regional partners agree on
which threat matters most. To address different threats, they organize
themselves pragmatically through various configurations (i.e., bilateral, mini-
lateral and multilateral) and specific functional roles (i.e., security guarantors,
regional hubs, local hubs, and niche specialists).
This paper argues that common depictions of U.S.-led alliance systems in
Europe and East Asia are obsolete and shows how nodal defence is an
emerging central feature of them. In advancing a ‘proof of concept’, our
paper explores these two regional trends as they have unfolded after the
Cold War. It does not aspire to test competing explanations for what drives
the formation or transformation of alliance systems. Still, our contribution is
as empirical as it is theoretical. Whereas the scholarly literature generally
addresses the inner workings of individual U.S.-led regional alliance systems,
we conduct an original cross-regional comparison of how these alliance
systems work, drawing on elite interviews, official documents, and the
secondary literature.
8
Moreover, although scholars have discussed the emer-
ging network of bilateral, minilateral and multilateral security initiatives in
East Asia, this article differs from and complements these works in two
ways.
9
First, it links the trend of networking allies and partners to changes
in regional threat diversity and, more importantly, shows how such changes
drive functional specialization among allies and partners. In so doing, it
sheds light on the inner workings of this emerging regional alliance struc-
ture. Second, the concept of nodal defence, and the analytical framework
that we present, has broader applicability in that, unlike existing scholarship
which focuses either on East Asia or on Europe, it allows comparisons of
alliance dynamics across regions.
The paper proceeds as follows. Upon discussing the analytical categories
traditionally used to describe regional alliance systems, we introduce the
concept of nodal defence. We outline the different functions (or roles) that
make up a nodal defence system and how they relate to different threats.
We then apply this analytical framework to compare how the U.S.-led
alliance systems work in the foregoing regions, showing that they increas-
ingly feature nodal defence characteristics. The concept of nodal defence
thus has greater analytical value than both multilateral and hub-and-spokes
systems for understanding how U.S.-led alliance systems in Europe and Asia
operate today. We conclude by sketching a research agenda for the study of
8
Between January 2013 and June 2018, thirty interviews were conducted with current and former
officials in charge of political-military, European and East Asian affairs in the White House (National
Security Council/NSC Staff), the Department of State (DoS) and the Department of Defense (DoD) as
well as with NATO officials. All interviewees requested to be anonymized.
9
On the existing literature on alliance dynamics in East Asia, see footnote 5.
4L. SIMÓN ET AL.

nodal defence and of U.S.-led alliances, more generally, and by discussing
the policy implications of our findings.
Varieties of alliance systems
Alliances are formal or informal commitments for security cooperation
between two or more states that emerge when they seek to balance against
an external threat.
10
These states aggregate their capabilities and coordinate
their defence policies in order to deter and, if deterrence fails, to defeat that
external threat. An alliance system refers to a set of states in a given region
that share the same geopolitical alignment and are sufficiently intercon-
nected such that changes in one subset affect another subset. Alliance
systems often revolve around one (or more) great power guarantor(s)
which views those connections as forming a larger complex of security
ties even when other states do not. An alliance structure refers to the
institutionalized regularities that characterize relations between the states
making up an alliance system, and so qualifiers like multilateral, hub-and-
spokes, and nodal defence describe the structure of the overarching alliance
system.
Much of the scholarly literature has leveraged the differences between
the U.S.-led alliances systems in Europe and East Asia to conceptualize two
distinct models of alliance structures.
11
The first is a bilateral (or hub-and-
spokes) alliance system whereby one state (or hub) has bilateral alliances
with other states (the spokes) but those states themselves have at best very
limited defence linkages between them. The U.S.-led alliance system in East
Asia during the Cold War exemplifies a hub-and-spokes structure. The
second is a multilateral alliance system whereby every alliance member
has robust defence ties with one another which usually comprise formal
ties based on written commitments. Cold War NATO is the clearest example
of a multilateral alliance structure.
We argue, however, that a third alliance system is not only possible, but
also better captures what we observe empirically today. This system –what
we call nodal defence –is a hybrid category that combines elements of both
multilateral and hub-and-spokes alliance structures, yet has some distinguish-
ing attributes. Specifically, a nodal defence alliance system is one in which the
allies leverage variable geometries of defence cooperation.
We distinguish these three ideal-type alliance systems –hub-and-spokes,
multilateral and nodal defence –on the basis of how functional specializa-
tion is organized among security partners for the purpose of addressing
specific threats. This section first describes the different roles that can be
10
Stephen M. Walt, ‘Why Alliances Endure or Collapse’,Survival 39/1 (1997), 157.
11
See note 1 above.
THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 5

performed by members of an alliance system. It then explains how func-
tional specialization around these different roles varies across hub-and-
spokes, multilateral, and nodal alliance systems.
Functional roles in alliance systems
Members of an alliance system can undertake functional roles that include
security guarantors, regional hubs, local hubs, and niche specialists.
12
These
roles can be organized so as to tackle one or several threats.
13
Asecurity
guarantor provides strategic insurance to all the allies. It is sufficiently
powerful to offer extended deterrence pledges to all its allies, and plays a
key role in countering all threats to the alliance system.
Regional hubs play a leading or co-leading role within the broader
alliance system so as to engage meaningfully with all or most threats and
relevant tasks. While they cannot offer security guarantees to other
states, they can support the military operations of the security guarantor
across different theatres of operations, thereby splitting the defence
burden and lending legitimacy. They can also use their regional influence
to promote connections between different allies, thereby performing
coordinating functions in allied military strategy or capability
development.
Other allies may have neither the capacity nor the willingness to
engage with all relevant threats or operate meaningfully across different
sub-theatres. Nevertheless, because of their size and location, they can
lend critical local support to the guarantor’s military operations across
multiple functional areas (e.g., missile defence, air and land combat) in a
specific sub-region. Such allies are local hubs. In contrast to regional
hubs, local hubs perform their role in the context of one specificthreat
and sub-region, but play little or no part in tackling other threats or
addressing that one threat beyond their specificsub-region.Lastly,niche
specialists are generally small and offer a much more specialized, func-
tional contribution to counter one or more threats. They help bolster
deterrence of regional adversaries, defend local sea-lanes and trade
routes, or host critical infrastructure for the day-to-day operations of
the alliance.
As shown below, hub-and-spokes, multilateral and nodal alliance systems can
be distinguished by how functional specialization around these roles is organized
among the members of the alliance system to tackle specificthreats.
12
These categories are not mutually exclusive: security partners need not have only one function. The
extent to which certain states relate to certain functions is always a matter of degree. Two states can
both perform regional hub functions, but one may do so more robustly than the other.
13
Diverse roles are also possible because of variation in states’capabilities.
6L. SIMÓN ET AL.

Hub-and-spokes alliance systems
A hub-and-spokes alliance system is one where a great power (the hub) has
bilateral alliances with other states (the spokes), but those states themselves
have limited, if any, defence linkages between them (see Figure 1). The spokes
focus on their respective ‘local’threats and eschew developing ties with one
another, and so they play at best a minimal role in confronting threats other
than their main one. Hub-and-spokes systems evince little, if any, functional
organization because each bilateral alliance that constitutes the alliance
system is geared toward tackling one specific local threat. Whereas the hub
is the security guarantor, the unlinked spokes perform no specific functional
roles beyond those that address their main, compartmentalized security
concern.
The U.S. alliance system that emerged in East Asia during the Cold War
embodied such an arrangement.
14
As the most powerful state in the region, the
United States developed extensive bilateral ties through defence pacts with
South Korea, Japan, and, during the first half of the Cold War, Taiwan –as well
as with the Philippines and Thailand.
15
Without a shared, overarching regional
Figure 1. Hub-and-Spokes Alliance Systems.
14
See note 1 above.
15
The Philippines and Taiwan were originally members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO) before its dissolution in 1977. This multilateral alliance was largely ineffective. Furthermore,
most members were not even located in Southeast Asia.
THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 7

threat that could force them to overcome their historical grievances with one
another, those East Asian countries have had trouble maintaining stable secur-
ity relations among themselves. Each spoke in this alliance system have focused
on a different threat, be it the Soviet Union, North Korea, or China. The common
denominator between these spokes’foreign and defence policies was their
individualized alliance with the United States. Since each ally disagreed on
which regional threat deserved priority, each bilateral alliance attended to a
different adversary. No coordination took place or was planned among the
different spokes of the alliance system in various regional contingencies. In the
case of a Chinese attack on Taiwan, only the United States would be involved.
Neither Japan nor South Korea would play a direct intervening role. Similarly,
outside of the U.S.-South Korea alliance, no other U.S. ally would coordinate
with Washington and Seoul to defend against North Korean aggression.
16
Multilateral alliance systems
Unlike hub-and-spokes systems, multilateral alliances feature three or more
treaty allies and encompass formal and institutionalized structures intended to
facilitate cooperation between each and every one of them. No one ally is thus
isolated from another ally so that they ideally each have defence policy linkages
between them (see Figure 2). A central feature of multilateral systems is that all
the members prioritize a singular threat that they each confront, and functional
differentiation thus revolves around that same threat. The common focus on one
main threat distinguishes the functional differentiation seen in multilateral sys-
tems from the one we can observe in both hub-and-spokes and nodal defence
systems whereby functional specialization revolves around multiple threats.
Accordingly, in a multilateral system, some allies may have the capabilities (and
the willingness) to contribute to deterrence across several functional (e.g. nuclear
and conventional) and geographical domains. Other allies, however, may focus
on certain sub-regions or tasks like anti-submarine warfare, sea denial, air com-
bat, and land combat. From our viewpoint, the defining characteristic is that, in
multilateral systems, allies converge in their threat priorities facing the alliance
system and functionally differentiate themselves accordingly.Insum,functional
specialization revolves around one common, overarching threat.
The U.S.-led alliance system created in Europe in the early Cold War, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is usually portrayed as the arche-
typical multilateral security alliance.
17
This multilateral structure arose as a
16
See Cha, Powerplay; Uk Heo and Terence Roehrig, The Evolution of the South Korea-United States
Alliance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2018); Michael Schaller, Altered States: The United
States and Japan since the Occupation (New York: Oxford University Press 1997); and Dennis Van
Vranken Hickey, United States-Taiwan Security Ties: From Cold War to Beyond Containment (Westport,
CT: Praeger 1994).
17
See, e.g., Hemmer and Katzenstein, ‘Why is There no NATO in Asia?’.
8L. SIMÓN ET AL.

direct response to the single, largely monolithic Soviet threat. NATO’s inter-
governmental nature, and the fact that all member states have a veto right,
established the alliance’s formal multilateral character. Article V of the
founding Washington Treaty also highlights its multilateral aspirations. It
pledges that an attack against any member shall be considered an attack
against them all and so encourages all members to assist the attacked party.
Throughout the Cold War, functional specialization among European
allies was organized around an agreed-upon, overarching threat: the
Soviet Union. The United Kingdom served as a regional hub to NATO’s
deterrence mission functionally through its nuclear deterrent and its con-
ventional military power on land, at sea, and in the air. Its contributions
were geographically wide-ranging in light of its presence in West Germany,
its management of the so-called Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK)
Gap in the North Atlantic, and its direct engagement in the Mediterranean
and Baltic seas. Other countries focused instead on their respective sub-
regions as local hubs. For instance, by assisting in most domains of warfare
(with the exception of nuclear), Bonn was a local hub in Central Europe,
making itself indispensable to NATO’s strategy therein. Turkey held a similar
role in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean. Other countries performed
more modest functions as niche specialists. Denmark and Norway, for exam-
ple, concentrated on anti-submarine warfare and sea denial in the Baltic and
North Atlantic.
Figure 2. Multilateral Alliance Systems.
THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 9

Introducing nodal defence
Nodal defence is a hybrid category that combines elements of multilateralism
and hub-and-spoke (see Figure 3). It features different clusters of allies around
different threats and functions. Members of this alliance system specialize in
performing specific roles and tackling those missions for which they have a
comparative advantage. As indicated, in an ideal multilateral alliance system,
functional specialization is organized around the same common threat, with all
the allies forging close defence ties and cooperating to jointly confront that
threat. In hub-and-spokes systems, functional specialization revolves around a
variety of threats and is limited to the hub being the security guarantor and
each spoke focusing on its main local threat, with no defence cooperation or
coordination among different spokes. As a hybrid category, nodal defence
features different allies pursuing defence cooperation via a variety of over-
lapping bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral channels. These initiatives
revolve around specific functional roles so as to tackle multiple threats.
Nodal defence is thus a hybrid alliance structure that combines elements of
Figure 3. Nodal Defence Alliance Systems.
10 L. SIMÓN ET AL.

multilateral and hub-and-spokes ones. The roles described earlier assume even
greater importance in a nodal defence alliance system. A great power can be
the security guarantor, but it might have to delegate or subcontract certain
responsibilities or tasks. For instance, it can delegate the leadership of contain-
ing certain threats to either regional or local hubs. Niche specialists may be
attached to the security guarantor, but often depend on a local hub to
manage security relations in their own sub-region.
As we show below, the traditional analytical categories used to charac-
terize U.S. alliances have become obsolete. Changes in the regional threat
environments have reshuffled functional specialization in the U.S.-led alli-
ance systems in Europe and East Asia and the defence cooperation patterns
therein. U.S. allies and partners are increasingly coalescing around specific
roles through various bilateral, minilateral and multilateral configurations so
as to confront different threats. The U.S.-led alliance systems in both regions
are thus moving towards nodal defence.
Nodal defence in Europe
During the Cold War, as mentioned, functional specialization among NATO
allies was organized around the same threat. After the Soviet Union col-
lapsed, the diversification of the regional threat environment in and around
Europe has led European allies to adapt their strategic priorities and to
revise their patterns of defence cooperation. Today, a revisionist Russia
poses a strong threat to the littoral Baltic Sea states.
18
However, it does
not constitute a systemic threat as in the Cold War. Southern and Western
European allies are less directly concerned by Russia’s assertiveness.
19
Aside
from terrorism, instability in North Africa and the Middle East preoccupies
those countries instead. The existence of multiple threats –and ongoing
differences among allies about how to prioritize them –has reshuffled
patterns of functional differentiation within the European alliance system.
Whereas NATO continues to provide some form of cohesion to the U.S.-led
alliance system, European allies have increasingly fostered the development
of bilateral and minilateral initiatives around specific roles so as to confront
a diversifying threat environment. In light of the cumulative intertwining of
this variety of defence cooperation configurations, nodal defence has
become a central feature of the U.S.-led alliance system in Europe in the
three decades since the Cold War ended.
18
Jens Ringsmose and Sten Rynning, ‘Now for the Hard Part: NATO’s Strategic Adaptation to Russia’,
Survival 59/3 (2017), 135.
19
Margherita Bianchi, Guillaume Lasconjarias, and Alessandro Marrone, ‘Projecting Stability in NATO’s
Southern Neighbourhood’,NATO Defence College Conference Report 3, July 2017, p. 3; Béraud-Sudreau
and Giegerich, ‘NATO Defense Spending and European Threat Perceptions’; Meijer and Wyss, ‘Beyond
CSDP’.
THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 11

The security guarantor
The United States remains the bedrock of European security through its
extended security guarantees. Its superior power projection capabilities
make it central to any broad effort aimed at dissuading nuclear and large-
scale conventional aggression by Russia as well as to fighting terrorism and
rogue states in the Middle East and North Africa. Washington leads various
initiatives designed to improve deterrence and defence in light of Russia’s
recent assertiveness. They include the European Deterrence Initiative, the
deployment of U.S. Army troops in Poland, or the arrangement of local
multilateral exercises, training initiatives, and military educational exchanges
intended to bolster defence in the Baltics as well as in the Black Sea Basin.
20
The United States has also played a key role in tackling other security
challenges. It has sought the support of its European allies to fight terrorism
and address instability in North Africa and the Middle East, the chief issues of
concern for many Western and Southern European allies. Washington helped
to unseat Muammar Gaddafiin Libya; coordinated a broader international
coalition to counter Daesh in Iraq, Syria and the broader Middle East; and has
partnered with France to fight extremism in the Sahel. Moreover, it has been a
leading participant in other out-of-area stabilisation efforts like NATO’s
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.
21
Regional hubs
Britain, France, and Germany have emerged as regional hubs. They can play
a leading or co-leading role in the Alliance in relation to all relevant threats,
and across most sub-theatres or tasks. Britain and Germany represent two
important reference points for the U.S. force posture and defence strategy in
Europe. Britain hosts NATO’s Maritime Command and many U.S. Army and
air bases and intelligence and signal facilities. Germany still hosts the largest
network of U.S. and NATO bases. Ramstein Air Base is the largest U.S.
military base abroad, serving at once as the command and control hub of
the U.S. Air Force in Europe and as NATO’s Air Command. The U.S. Army has
several locations across Germany, including a combat aviation brigade.
Germany also hosts tactical U.S. nuclear weapons.
Both Britain and Germany have a privileged status within NATO’s com-
mand structure. Their claim on the position of Deputy Supreme Commander
Allied Forces Europe (DSACEUR) –always held by a British or German
20
Multiple interviews with U.S. and NATO officials in Washington, D.C. and Brussels, 2013–2018; and
General Philip Breedlove, ‘Statement to the Senate Committee on Armed Forces’, 25 February 2015, 13.
21
See Nathaniel D.F. Allen, ‘Assessing a Decade of US Military Strategy in Africa’,Orbis 62/4 (2018), 655–
59; and David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan. Fighting Together,
Fighting Alone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2014).
12 L. SIMÓN ET AL.

general –and Britain’s hold of Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) come
with the prerogative to develop connections among allies: they can offer
platforms through which Britain and Germany can coordinate other allies
around a wide range of functional issues and geographical areas. Britain and
Germany each lead a framework nation minilateral grouping and command
one of the four multinational battalions deployed in northeastern Europe
(the other two being led by the United States and Canada), signifying their
roles as regional hubs.
22
London and Berlin make themselves useful to Washington by supporting its
military operations and initiatives that address different threats across multiple
theatres. Britain’s status as a regional hub is more consolidated because it can
support deterrence missions at the nuclear and conventional levels.
23
Britain has
been enabling U.S.-led and NATO-wide efforts in the Baltic region, the Black Sea
Basin, and the GIUK gap, which constitutes Russia’s main entry into the North
Atlantic. Moreover, it has supported U.S.-led expeditionary campaigns aimed at
fighting terrorism in North Africa and the Middle East, especially in Libya or Syria.
It figured prominently in International Security Assistance Force, as the second
largest troop contributor (behind the United States) and led one of the five
regional commands. Although it lacks a nuclear deterrence and has some limita-
tions when it comes to expeditionary warfare, Germany also supports U.S.-led
operations against multiple threats. Its size and commitment to NATO mean that
it is expected to contribute to all or most initiatives. Germany’s contribution to
NATO revolves primarily around territorial defence and conventional deterrence.
Germany currently concentrates its efforts on NATO’seasternflank, leading a
framework nation grouping aimed at improving deterrence and commanding
one of NATO’s four multinational battalions in Lithuania.
24
Despite the caveats on
its military activities abroad, Germany also played a role in confronting a variety of
other contingencies. Berlin led one regional command and was the third largest
troop contributor to the ISAF mission. Germany also played a (limited) role in
expeditionary operations in North Africa and the Middle East.
25
Through its robust network of overseas military installations and its power
projection capabilities, France actively contributes to tackling the most rele-
vant security threats to Europe.
26
Its involvement in NATO’s deterrence
agenda is not as significant as that of Britain or Germany. Still, France
22
Alexander Mattelaer, ‘The NATO Warsaw Summit: How to Strengthen Alliance Cohesion’,Strategic
Forum 296, 2016.
23
Andrew Dorman, ‘The Future of British Defense Policy’,Focus Stratégique 74 (Paris: IFRI 2017).
24
Interviews with multiple U.S. and NATO officials in Brussels and Washington, D.C., 2013–2018.
25
Ulrich Krotz, History and Foreign Policy in France and Germany (London: Palgrave Macmillan 2015),
108–13.
26
On French defence policy within NATO and its relations with the U.S. and Britain, see Olivier Schmitt,
‘The Reluctant Atlanticist: France’s Security and Defence Policy in a Transatlantic Context’,Journal of
Strategic Studies 40/4 (2017), 463–74; and Alice Pannier, ‘From One Exceptionalism to Another:
France’s Strategic Relations with the United States and the United Kingdom in the post-Cold War
Era’,Journal of Strategic Studies 40/4 (2017), 475–504.
THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 13

participates in the German-led battlegroup in Lithuania; has deployed war-
planes and warships in the Baltic and Black Sea areas in support of NATO
deterrence initiatives; and its nuclear deterrent enhances European stability.
27
More importantly, France is most active operationally in Europe’s southern
periphery, an area where it plays a leading role.
28
It has taken the operational
lead in Mali and the Central African Republic, and has a drone base in Niger
that is vital for monitoring the larger Sahelian space.
29
France has also
deepened bilateral defence cooperation with the United States and the
United Kingdom.
30
President Barack Obama referred to France as America’s
key partner in Africa, particularly regarding security projection alongside the
geographical axis running ‘from Senegal to Somalia,’and including the Sahel,
Central and North Africa.
31
Moreover, the 2010 Lancaster House Treaty has
enhanced Anglo-French bilateral defence cooperation, with Africa and the
Middle East being an important referent in that regard.
32
Beyond the growth
in bilateral Franco-British ties –which complement an already highly devel-
oped bilateral defence relationship between the United States and Britain –
we have also seen a spike in trilateral US-UK-French cooperation in recent
years, revolving primarily around threats emanating from North Africa and the
Middle East. Such cooperation became manifest with the launch of the so-
called Trilateral Strategic Initiative (TSI) in 2010, and played an important part
in both the Libya and Syria interventions.
33
Local hubs
Other allies are instrumental in more local contexts. Although they cannot per-
form a leading role across most relevant theatres and threats, they are particularly
important in the context of specific security challenges. Examples include how
Italy and Spain perform important enabling functions in the Mediterranean and
Africa, or how countries like Poland or Romania act as local hubs with respect to
deterrence-related efforts in eastern and southeastern Europe, respectively.
34
27
Bruno Tertrais, ‘French Nuclear Deterrence Policy, Forces, and Future’,Foundation for Strategic
Research, January 2019.
28
See Leo Michel, ‘Cross-Currents in French Defense and U.S. Interests’,Strategic Perspectives 10
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies 2012).
29
Interview with U.S. defence official in Washington, D.C., 22 January 2013.
30
Pannier, ‘From One Exceptionalism to Another’, 475–504.
31
Barack Obama and François Hollande, ‘France and the U.S. Enjoy a Renewed Alliance’,The
Washington Post, 10 February 2014.
32
Multiple interviews with U.S. defence officials in Washington, D.C., 2013–2018.
33
Alice Pannier and Olivier Schmitt, ‘To Fight Another Day: France Between the Fight against Terrorism
and Future Warfare’,International Affairs 95/4 (2019): 908, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz050.
34
Félix Arteaga, ‘The Coming Defense: Criteria for the Restructuring of Defense in Spain’,Elcano Policy
Paper 3 (14 January 2014); Piero Ignazi, Giampiero Giacomello and Fabrizio Coticchia, Italian Military
Operations Abroad: Just Don’t Call it War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2012); Jordan Baev, ‘Bulgaria
and Romania’, in Hugo Meijer and Marco Wyss, eds., The Handbook of European Defence Policies and
Armed Forces (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2018), 263–78; and Marcin Zaborowski, ‘Poland: NATO’s
Front Line State’,Whitehall Papers 93/1 (2018), 88–97.
14 L. SIMÓN ET AL.

Because of their size, capabilities, and location, Italy and Spain constitute
local hubs in the Mediterranean region. From Washington’s perspective, the
ongoing turmoil in North Africa and the Middle East underscores the impor-
tance of the Mediterranean Sea. As one U.S. defence official explained,
‘without our infrastructure in southern Europe and the Mediterranean
region, our efforts in places like Libya, Syria or even Mali would be
unsustainable.’
35
Italy and Spain stand out in this context. Since January
2012, the U.S. Army Base in Vicenza has been (re-)designated as the head-
quarters of U.S. Army Africa (USARAF), whereas the U.S. Navy Base in
Sigonella, Sicily, has become the main U.S. Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR) hub in and around Europe.
36
Naples hosts the Fifth
Fleet of the U.S. Navy and Allied Joint Forces Command (one of NATO’s
three operational level commands). Similarly, bases in southern Spain pro-
vide the United States with a natural entry point into the Mediterranean,
and facilitate the access and mobility of U.S. forces to and from the Middle
Eastern, and East and West African theatres of operations. The deployment
of four Arleigh Burke destroyers to Rota will help fulfil missions regarding
ballistic missile defence, maritime interdiction, humanitarian relief, peace-
keeping training, and counterinsurgency.
37
Moreover, a 2015 deal between
Madrid and Washington would allow hosting up to 3,500 Marines in Morón,
thus confirming Spain as a key anchor of U.S. naval and amphibious power
in and around Europe.
38
Poland and Romania are local hubs in eastern and southeastern Europe,
respectively, and constitute important references in relation to the broader
allied effort to deter Russia.
39
Leading states within NATO and small, local
partners perceive those two countries as critical to augmenting security in
their sub-regional context.
40
Due to its size and geographical position,
Poland plays a key role in assisting U.S. and NATO efforts to strengthen
defence and conventional deterrence in the north-eastern flank. A secure
Poland helps preserve NATO’s advantageous position in the Baltic and
offer a safe maritime lifeline for supplying the Baltic countries. With a
fourth division now being raised, the Polish Army is for many in the
United States and the Baltic States a ‘reliable first responder’in the event
of Russian aggression in northeastern Europe.
41
The United States also
sees Poland as the main pillar of theatre air and missile defence in north-
eastern Europe. One of the two Aegis Ashore Missile Defence System sites
35
Interview with U.S. defence official in Washington, D.C., 13 February 2013.
36
Luis Simón, ‘Understanding US Retrenchment in Europe’,Survival 57/2 (2015), 165.
37
William H. McMichael, ‘Admiral: Rota DDG mission goes beyond BMD’,Navy Times, 5 March 2012.
38
Sam LaGrone, ‘Spain and U.S. Sign Permanent Basing Agreement for up to 3,500 U.S. Marines’,USNI
News, 18 June 2015.
39
Baev, ‘Bulgaria and Romania’; and Zaborowski, ‘Poland.’
40
Zaborowski, ‘Poland.’
41
Interviews with multiple U.S. and Baltic defence officials, 2013–2018.
THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 15

will be in Poland. The first site was completed in December 2015 in
Romania, and the second should be completed in Redzikowo, Poland, by
2020. Poland also hosts NATO’s Multinational Corps Northeast and the
interceptor of its ballistic missile defence system.
42
Furthermore, Poland
has been expanding its defence cooperation with the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Slovakia via the minilateral framework of the Visegrád
Group, in military training and education as well as in the development
of a Visegrád Battlegroup battalion.
43
Straddling the Black Sea and the Balkans, Romania has a similar function in
the Black Sea Basin. The United States is working to reinforce Romania’s‘air
surveillance capabilities and air force modernization.’
44
Mihail Kogălniceanu
Airfield is a staging base for the Marine Corps Black Sea Rotational Force but
has also seen used by NATO forces. Moreover, in December 2015, the United
States announced the completion of an Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System
(AAMDS) site in Romania. Crucial for this system will be the U.S. Army’s10
th
Area Air Defence Command and 5
th
Battalion’s7
th
Air Defence Artillery
Regiment’son-goingefforts to support engagement and exercises with
Romania on missile defence.
45
Additionally, Romania will host a
Multinational Division Headquarters on its territory, making it a local hub for
theatre air and missile defence and regional command and control in
Southeastern Europe.
46
Niche specialists
Niche specialists are small states with relatively limited military capabilities
that still play important functions vis-à-vis particular threats. They perform a
specialized task in support of other allies’efforts to confront one specific
threat. For example, the Baltic states avoid acquiring redundant capabilities
and focus instead on capabilities and strategies that can add value to the
deterrence mission against Russia.
47
One way involves developing the neces-
sary physical and command and control infrastructure to accommodate U.S.
and NATO forces. Another way involves preparing for asymmetric warfare.
Given the power disparities that they face collectively vis-à-vis Russia, they
could be quickly overcome in set-piece battles.
48
Their best option is thus to
enhance their ability to mount insurgencies that would challenge Russia’s
42
Statement of General Philip Breedlove, Commander U.S. Forces Europe, 25 February 2016.
43
TomášValášek and Milan Šuplata, ‘Towards a Deeper Visegrad Defence Partnership’,Central European
Policy Institute, 2012.
44
General Philip Breedlove, ‘Statement to the Senate Committee on Armed Forces’, 1 April 2014, 19.
45
General Philip Breedlove, ‘Statement to the Senate Committee on Armed Forces’, 1 March 2016.
46
General Philip Breedlove, ‘Statement to the Senate Committee on Armed Forces’, 25 February 2015, 12.
47
Interviews with multiple U.S. officials in Brussels and Washington, D.C., 2013–2018.
48
Alexander Lanoszka and Michael A. Hunzeker, ‘Confronting the Anti-Access/Area Denial and Precision
Strike Challenge in the Baltic Region’,The RUSI Journal 161/5 (2016), 12–18.
16 L. SIMÓN ET AL.

ability to hold territory and to consolidate political control. The Baltic coun-
tries have already made such investments, undertaking paramilitary exercises
and circulating manuals on how to wage guerrilla warfare to their citizens.
49
They have also bolstered their trilateral defence cooperation through the
development of a variety of initiatives, such as the Baltic Battalion
(BALTBAT), the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON), the Baltic Air Surveillance
Network (BALTNET), or the jointly-operated Baltic Defense College
(BALTDEFCOL).
50
As niche specialists, Denmark and Norway possess modern aerial and
naval capabilities, share an expeditionary strategic culture, and have long
been interoperable with U.S. and British armed forces.
51
These two coun-
tries have prioritised air power, which allows them to contribute not only
to deterrence and defence missions but also to expeditionary operations,
as illustrated by their role in Libya. These two countries have ample
operational experience in the Arctic area, and can play an important
role in helping check Russia’s military position in the High North, and
monitoring the GIUK gap more specifically.
52
In fact, Russia’s repeated
incursions into their sovereign airspace and territorial waters have incen-
tivised Oslo and Copenhagen to strengthen their minilateral cooperation
with Finland, Iceland and Sweden in the framework of the Nordic
Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO) initiative, which has prioritized areas
such as land, sea and air operations, logistic support, education, and
research and development, among others.
53
Summary
TheU.S.-ledalliancesysteminEuropeincreasinglyfeaturesnodal
defence characteristics. A more diverse threat environment has
reshaped functional specialization within it. Although NATO still exists
and provides cohesion to European security relations, U.S. allies are
fostering overlapping bilateral, minilateral and multilateral forms of
defence cooperation and performing different functional roles to miti-
gate diverse threats.
49
Alexander Lanoszka and Michael A. Hunzeker, Conventional Deterrence and Landpower in Northeastern
Europe (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute 2019); and Luis Simón, ‘The “Third”US Offset Strategy
and Europe’s“Anti-Access”Challenge’,Journal of Strategic Studies 39/3 (2016), 417–45.
50
Masha Hedberg and Andres Kasekamp, ‘The Baltic States’, in Hugo Meijer and Marco Wyss, eds., The
Handbook of European Defense Policies and Armed Forces (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2018), 219.
51
Franklin D. Kramer and Magnus Nordenman, ‘A Maritime Framework for the Baltic Sea Region’,
Atlantic Council Issue Brief, 2016.
52
Interviews with multiple U.S. defence officials, 2013–2018.
53
Håkon Lunde Saxi, ‘The Rise, Fall and Resurgence of Nordic Defence Cooperation’International Affairs
95/3 (2019), 659–80.
THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 17

Nodal defence in East Asia
Starting from the opposite direction, the U.S.-led regional alliance system in
East Asia is also transitioning towards nodal defence. In the Cold War hub-
and-spokes system, functional specialization was limited to the United States
being the security guarantor while each individual spoke focused on one
specific threat and eschewed defence cooperation and coordination with the
other spokes. Since the Cold War ended, U.S. allies and partners in East Asia
have fostered various bilateral and minilateral defence ties, as well as multi-
lateral collective security initiatives, which increasingly revolve around specific
roles so as to manage a changing regional threat environment.
Security guarantor
The United States remains the security guarantor in East Asia. Through its
forward deployed forces and bilateral mutual defence commitments,
Washington augments defence and deterrence to its East Asian allies,
whose ultimate foundation are the security guarantees to Australia, Japan,
the Philippines, Thailand and South Korea. The rationale for these security
guarantees partly evolved in the post-Cold War era, with Washington
attempting to repurpose its alliances in East Asia to check China’s expanding
regional clout and assertiveness in addition to North Korea’s growing missile
and nuclear capabilities. Consequently, the United States has sought to
maintain its technological edge, thereby adapting its regional force posture
and strengthening its security partnerships in light of China’s expanding
anti-access/area-denial capabilities.
54
As a former White House official
explains, a central ‘U.S. objective [is] to demonstrate to the states of the
region the U.S. long term enduring presence in the region and to not allow
a security vacuum to develop that China would fill’, which requires ‘a
tremendous amount of concentration on building up alliances’in East
Asia.
55
Accordingly, in light of the changing regional threat environment –
with China’s strategic rise and its impact on the regional balance as well as
the North Korean threat –regional allies and partners have increasingly
forged linkages with each other, thus moving beyond the Cold War hub-
and-spokes system.
56
54
See Michael Green et al., Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025: Capabilities, Presence, and Partnerships
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies 2016).
55
Interview with former White House senior official, Washington, D.C., 7 March 2017.
56
Michael J. Green, Kathleen H. Hicks and Zack Cooper, Federated Defense in Asia (Washington, D.C.:
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2014); Van Jackson, ‘Power, Trust, and Network
Complexity: Three Logics of Hedging in Asian Security’,International Relations of the Asia-Pacific
14/3 (2014), 331–56.
18 L. SIMÓN ET AL.

Regional hubs
Japan is a regional hub in East Asia. Although it cannot single-handedly offer
security guarantees to potential regional partners, Tokyo is the only regional
power that has the capacity and will to support diplomatic and defence
initiatives alongside the United States in Northeast and Southeast Asia.
Japan is the centre of gravity of U.S. force posture in East Asia. U.S. military
assets aimed at deterring China are concentrated in a handful of Japanese
bases, especially in the big three: Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, the Marine
Corps’base in Sasebo, and the Navy’s Yokosuka hub, home of the 7
th
Fleet.
But Japan has more than basing value: it has recently embraced a more
assertive, or at least a more ‘normalized’, security policy than in the Cold War
when it confined itself to self-defence. To be sure, Tokyo remains con-
strained in its defence policy endeavours by Article 9 of its Constitution,
which renounces war as a means to resolve international disputes.
Nevertheless, coupled with its advanced military capabilities, the reinterpre-
tation of Article 9, the easing of its restrictions on arms sales, and its
renewed diplomatic activism, Tokyo, with Washington’s support, now plays
a co-leading role within the U.S.-led regional alliance system.
57
Japan has widened its participation in multiple theatres of operation, thus
deepening defence cooperation with different U.S. allies and partners. For
instance, Washington, Tokyo, and Taipei have increasingly coordinated their
defence efforts for a Taiwan contingency so much that in the words of a
former senior White House official, ‘we knew [since the 2000s] that the
Chinese now assumed that Japan would be in any Taiwan scenario, [.. .]
which vastly complicated their problem.’
58
Due to North Korea’s nuclear
and missile threat, Tokyo has also improved its trilateral defence cooperation
with South Korea and the United States in areas such as intelligence, surveil-
lance, reconnaissance and missile defence.
59
As a former senior Pentagon
official explains, since the Cold War ended, Washington has sought ‘to
integrate the relationships among the two treaty allies, Korea and Japan’in
order to ensure ‘some level of integration if a war starts on the Korean
Peninsula, [. . .] because you are probably going to be conducting offensive
air operations or logistic operations from Japan in support of a wartime
contingency in Korea. [And] you had no choice but to begin integrating
and sharing real time information on missile defence. [. . .] Whatever you are
capturing or integrating in Korea should be shared with Japan and vice versa
[. . .] because of the evolution of the threat.’
60
57
Daisuke Akimoto, The Abe Doctrine: Japan’s Proactive Pacifism and Security Strategy (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan 2018).
58
Interview, 14 February 2017, Washington, D.C.
59
Junya Nishino, ‘Japan’s Security Relationship with the Republic of Korea’,CSIS Strategic Japan Working
Paper, 2017.
60
Ibid.
THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 19

Aside from the United States, Japan is the only regional power that is
involved in all the minilateral defence arrangements that have emerged in
East Asia since the 1990s. These include the U.S.-Japan-ROK and the U.S.-
Japan-Australia trilaterals as well as the so-called ‘Quad’between Washington,
Tokyo, Canberra and Delhi.
61
These minilateral ties are interwoven with multi-
lateral collective security initiatives (e.g., ADMM+) and multinational regional
military exercises.
62
Finally, besides bearing the burden in checking Russian
airpower in the northwestern Pacific, and countering the Chinese threat in the
East China Sea, Japan is expanding its presence in Southeast Asia through
capacity building efforts, military exercises, and arms transfers.
63
Its growing
bilateral defence ties with Vietnam or the Philippines - two countries that
have territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea - are especially
noteworthy. Japan has also sought to strengthen its bilateral defence coop-
eration with Australia. As a regional hub, Japan thus plays a meaningful role –
and enables greater inter-allied defence connections –in the context of all or
most threats in East Asia.
Australia is a potential regional hub in East Asia. Canberra has developed
strong bilateral defence ties with Washington in such areas as arms transfers,
intelligence sharing and coordination, joint exercises (e.g., Talisman Saber
exercises), and greater rotational access for U.S. forces.
64
The 2015 Force
Posture Initiative provides for increased air-to-air cooperation and the deploy-
ment of a rotational force of 2,500 U.S. marines in Darwin.
65
Australia is also
expanding its bilateral ties with Japan through joint training and exercises,
acquisition, cross-servicing, and information security agreements.
66
Furthermore, Canberra’s participation in some of the minilateral initiatives
mentioned above (i.e. Quad and U.S.-Japan-Australia trilateral) demonstrates
its alignment with and support of Washington’s regional objectives.
67
Washington wants Canberra to become a full-fledged regional hub. As a
61
Richard Fontaine et al., Networking Asian Security; and Tomohiko Satake and John Hemmings, ‘Japan–
Australia Security Cooperation in the Bilateral and Multilateral Contexts’,International Affairs 94/4
(2018), 815–34.
62
See Seng Tan, ‘The ADMM-Plus: Regionalism That Works?’Asia Policy 22 (July 2016), 70–5. Multilateral
collective security initiatives and multilateral alliance structures are analytically distinct. The former
aims to build confidence among potential adversaries and to tackle non-traditional security chal-
lenges. One example is the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+). In contrast, multilateral
alliance structures are primarily mutual defence treaties aimed at confronting inter-state threats.
63
See, for instance, Harry J. Kazianis, ed., Tackling Asia’s Greatest Challenges: A U.S.-Japan-Vietnam
Trilateral Report (Washington, D.C.: Center for the National Interest 2015).
64
U.S. State Department, ‘The U.S.-Australia Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty’,Fact Sheet (Washington,
D.C.: Bureau of East Asian and PacificAffairs, 18 January 2017).
65
Australian Department of Defence, ‘United States Force Posture Initiatives in Australia’, retrieved from
http://www.defense.gov.au/Initiatives/USFPI.
66
Michael Heazle and Yuki Tatsumi, ‘Explaining Australia–Japan Security cooperation and its Prospects:
‘The Interests that Bind?’The Pacific Review 31/1 (2018), 42.
67
Michael Green, Kathleen H. Hicks and Zack Cooper, Federated Defense in Asia (Washington, D.C.:
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2014); and Satake and Hemmings, ‘Japan-Australia
Security Cooperation’.
20 L. SIMÓN ET AL.

former senior Pentagon official explains, Washington sees regional hubs in
terms of ‘concentric circles of capability’with ‘the anchors of a networked
approach to security in East Asia for the United States [being] Japan in North
East Asia and Australia in the South.’
68
Nevertheless, Australia still lacks the
capability and region-wide engagement to be as influential as Japan.
Local hubs
The local hubs in East Asia are found in the various sub-theatres that compose
the region: the Korean peninsula and the South China Sea. The main local hubs
in East Asia are South Korea and Vietnam. The Korean peninsula constitutes a
sub-theatre in its own right, the dynamics of which centre on North Korea’s
nuclear and missile program. This localized security challenge affects primarily
South Korea and the United States (as well as Japan). Due to its location, South
Korea is the focal point for conventional deterrence and defence measures on
the peninsula. Its powerful and technologically sophisticated military allows
Seoul to balance the North Korean threat by itself, making it central to any
deterrence strategy on the peninsula.
69
U.S. bases and capabilities in South
Korea are also significant, as they provide the focal point for the U.S. Army inthe
region. Increasing importance is accorded to air and missile defence, especially
given the recent deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence
(THAAD) system. Similarly, given its location and size, Vietnam is a potential
local hub in the South China Sea. For Washington, Vietnam can play a key role
in a potential regional contingency given its geostrategic location on the shores
of the South China Sea. Both the U.S. and Japan have perceived it as such,
having recently strengthened their defence ties with Hanoi.
70
Still, Vietnam has
been reluctant to be an explicit part of a broader balancing coalition against
China.
71
Niche specialists
Some U.S. partners focus on specialized tasks that have regional value to
Washington. As a niche specialist, Singapore is the main logistical anchor for
U.S. forces in Southeast Asia. Ever since Manila asked Washington to close its
Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Base in 1991, and to withdraw all its forces from
Philippine territory, Singapore has become the main operating site for U.S.
68
Interview with former senior U.S. defence official, 15 February 2017.
69
Edward Kwon, ‘South Korea’s Deterrence Strategy Against North Korea’s WMD,’East Asia 35/1 (2018),
1–21.
70
Harry J. Kazianis (ed.), Tackling Asia’s Greatest Challenges: U.S.-Japan-Vietnam Trilateral Report
(Washington, D.C.: Center for the National Interest 2015); Walter Lohman, Lewis Stern, and William
Jordan, U.S.–Vietnam Defense Relations: Investing in Strategic Alignment (Washington, D.C.: The
Heritage Foundation 2012).
71
Do Thanh Hai, ‘Vietnam: Riding the Chinese Tide,’The Pacific Review 31/2 (2018), 205–20.
THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 21

forces in Southeast Asia. The United States and Singapore signed a
Memorandum of Understanding in 1990 allowing access by U.S. forces to
Singaporean facilities.
72
In 1992, the U.S. logistics coordinating unit –the
Commander, Logistics Group Western Pacific (COMLOG WESTPAC) –relocated
to Singapore. Today, COMLOG WESTPAC is the U.S. Seventh Fleet’sprincipal
logistics centre and bilateral exercise coordinator for Southeast Asia.
73
With the
2005 Strategic Framework Agreement, the two countries expanded the scope
of their defence cooperation and upgraded their relationship to that of ‘major
security-cooperation partners.’
74
Furthermore, Washington has bolstered its
rotational access to military bases in Singapore through the deployment of
four U.S. littoral combat ships (LCS) at the Changi Naval Base, thus providing the
first persistent U.S. naval presence in Southeast Asia in over two decades.
75
The Philippines is also a niche specialist in being the linchpin of U.S. efforts to
improve maritime domain awareness in the South China Sea with respect to
Chinese activities. Manila is by far the largest recipient of the Maritime Security
Initiative, a program partly intended to bolster the capacity of the Philippine
Navy, Coast Guard, and Air Forces to conduct operations around its coasts.
76
In
2014, the two countriessigned the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement
(EDCA), a ten-year agreement that grants U.S. troops greater access to military
bases, increased the rotational presence of U.S. personnel, ship, aircraft and
equipment and expanded existing facilities.
77
In the words of a former senior
Pentagon official who was involved in the establishment of the EDCA, ‘the
Philippines is a pivotal country because, from an operational standpoint, if we
are able to go back and put forces into the Philippines, even if it is just on a
rotational basis, that would give U.S. a lot more options in terms of dealing with
potential contingencies with the Chinese.’
78
Summary
U.S. allies in East Asia have fostered greater defence connectivity through
different forms of cooperation that are organized around specific roles to
tackle different threats. Post-Cold War shifts in the regional threat
72
Chris Rahman, ‘Singapore: Forward Operating Site’, in Carnes Lord and Andrew S. Erickson, eds.,
Rebalancing the Force: Basing and Forward Presence in the Asia-Pacific(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press 2014).
73
See ‘Commander, Logistics Group Western Pacific’, U.S. Navy, 15 December 2015, retrieved from
http://www.clwp.navy.mil/.
74
Adam P. Liff,‘Whither the Balancers? The Case for a Methodological Reset,’Security Studies 25/3
(2016), 448.
75
U.S. Department of Defense, Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy: Achieving U.S National Security in a
Changing Environment (Washington, D.C. 2015), 23.
76
‘The White House ‘U.S. Building Maritime Capacity in Southeast Asia’,’Fact Sheet, 17 November 2015.
77
Charmaine G. Misalucha and Julio S. Amador III, ‘U.S.-Philippines Security Ties: Building New
Foundations?’Asian Politics & Policy 8/1 (2016), 51–61.
78
Interview with former U.S. defence official, Washington, D.C., 13 February 2017.
22 L. SIMÓN ET AL.

environment have reordered functional specialization among U.S. regional
allies and, consequently, their defence cooperation. The U.S.-led alliance
system in East Asia is thus becoming increasingly nodal.
Conclusion
The analytical categories traditionally invoked to describe U.S. alliance sys-
tems in Europe and East Asia –multilateralism and hub-and-spokes systems,
respectively –do not adequately capture how the U.S.-led regional alliance
systems operate today. They obscure how regional threat environments
have changed so much as to reshuffle functional specialization among U.S.
allies (and partners) and, by extension, their patterns of defence coopera-
tion. In Europe, the view that the U.S. alliance system is multilateral is at
odds with the alliance fragmentation that we see amid the growing rele-
vance of bilateral and minilateral initiatives, organised around specific roles
to tackle multiple threats. In East Asia, the hub-and-spokes model does not
comprehend the growing connectivity and cohesion among partners
through various configurations of defence cooperation around different
roles and threats. What we call nodal defence better describes the evolving
structure of U.S.-led alliance systems in the two regions. Table 1 summarises
the functional roles that U.S. security partners in Europe and East Asia have
begun to assume.
Our findings open avenues for comparative research on alliance systems.
Since this article focuses on how nodal defence operates, further research should
examine how the Cold War multilateral and hub-and-spokes alliance systems
have transited towards nodal defence. Specifically, the impact of changing
regional threat environments on the transformation of alliance structures should
be investigated. Along these lines, scholarsshouldexploretheroleofagencyin
examining the changing nature of U.S.-led alliance systems. To what extent and
how do U.S. allies and partners enable or constrain Washington’schoices?What
is their capacity to affect the degree of functional specialization within an alliance
system? And what is Washington’s room of manoeuvre to induce its partners into
certain alliance structures? Finally, researchers should examine how –if at all –
nodal defence affects the so-called alliance dilemma, whereby a strong commit-
ment might encourage unwanted foreign policy aggression, but weak
Table 1. Functional roles in Europe and East Asia.
Functional Roles Europe East Asia
Security Guarantor United States
Regional Hubs Britain, France, Germany Japan (Australia)
Local Hubs Italy, Spain, Poland, Romania South Korea (Vietnam)
Niche Partners Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
Denmark, Norway, Iceland
Singapore, the Philippines
THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 23

commitments might unnerve allies.
79
Because nodal defence affords Washington
flexibility in managing its alliances, it might reduce its risk of being dragged into
conflicts against its will. Conversely, nodal defence could provoke fears on the
part of allies that Washington would not rescue them. Yet the multiplicity of
centres might attenuate those concerns if vulnerable states could turn to regio-
nal hubs for military support.
Our analysis also yields several policy implications. To begin with, a nodal
defence framework allows the United States to manage contradictory
dynamics in European and East Asian security. On the one hand, it helps
manage the spectre of excessive fragmentation within Europe and, on the
other hand, it allows the United States to leverage the growing connectivity
among its allies andpartners in East Asia. Furthermore, the flexibility associated
with nodal defence gives the United States the opportunity to push certain
allies to step up their roles (as regional or local hubs, or as niche partners) in
certain contexts –geographical or otherwise –by acting as nodes of coopera-
tion. Put simply, a nodal defence strategy can help the United States to bolster
its allies and partners’role in, and contributions to, tackling specificthreats.
Nodal defence offers Washington the diplomatic and strategic leeway to
flexibly and adaptively recalibrate its regional alliance systems to changes in
the threat environments in both Europe and East Asia –beyond the rigid
multilateral and hub-and-spokes alliance structures. To be sure, nodal defence
does pose several risks. By exploiting compartmentalization within Europe, the
United States could end up contributing to further fragmentation on the
continent. Similarly, in East Asia, the functional differentiation that nodal
defence entails could potentially embolden some of its allies and partners in
Northeast and Southeast Asia, thereby fuelling entrapment risks. The flexibility
and functional differentiation of nodal defence may just be double-edged
swords. The United States should thus take up nodal defence with care.
Acknowledgements
For useful and constructive feedback, the authors would like to thank Amnon Aran,
Jordan Becker, Caterina Carta, Zack Cooper, Mark Erbel, Stephanie Hofmann, TongfiKim,
and Ulrich Krotz. Thomas Provost created the figures. An earlier version of this paper
was presented at the 13-14 January 2017 European Initiative in Security Studies con-
ference in Paris. All errors are their own.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
79
Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1997).
24 L. SIMÓN ET AL.

Funding
Luis Simón’s work on this project was supported by the Global Research Network
program through the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea’s National
Research Foundation of Korea [grant number NRF-2016S1A2A2911284].
Notes on contributors
Luis Simón is research professor at the Institute for European Studies (Vrije
Universiteit Brussel) and director of the Brussels office of the Elcano Royal Institute.
He is also an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI, London)
and the Baltic Defense College, and a member of the editorial board of Parameters:
The US Army War College Quarterly. Luis received his PhD from the University of
London, and held a postdoctoral fellowship at the School of International and Public
Affairs (Columbia University). His research has appeared in such journals as Security
Studies, International Affairs, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Geopolitics, Survival, and
The RUSI Journal.
Alexander Lanoszka is an assistant professor of International Relations at the
University of Waterloo. His research agenda encompasses international security,
alliance politics, and theories of war, with special focus on Central and
Northeastern Europe. He sits on the editorial board of the journal Contemporary
Security Policy and is an Honorary Fellow at City, University of London, where he
previously taught prior to coming to Waterloo. He held fellowships at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Dartmouth College upon finishing his
PhD at Princeton University. He has published Atomic Assurance: The Alliance Politics
of Nuclear Proliferation (Cornell University Press, 2018) as well as articles in journals
such as International Security, International Affairs, Security Studies, and The
Nonproliferation Review.
Hugo Meijer is CNRS Research Fellow at the Centre for International Studies of
Sciences Po (Paris) and the founding director of The European Initiative for Security
Studies (EISS), a multidisciplinary network of scholars and universities that share the
goal of consolidating security studies in Europe. Previously, he was Marie
Skłodowska-Curie Fellow at the European University Institute (EUI, Florence) and
Lecturer in Defence Studies at King’s College London. He received his PhD in
International Relations from Sciences Po. He recently compiled Handbook of
European Defence Policies and Armed Forces (OUP, 2018), co-edited with Marco
Wyss. He has also published in such journals as Cooperation and Conflict, Journal of
Strategic Studies, European Journal of International Security and the Journal of Cold
War Studies.
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