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Strife Journal, Issue 10 (Spring 2019)
1
Diplomacy and Intelligence: Friends or
Foes? A Comment on the Intelligence-
Diplomacy Rivalry
Saawani Raje
Introduction
The relationship between diplomacy and intelligence has been much-
debated in international relations. Often, intelligence is pitted as a
direct rival to diplomacy, even to the extent of being called ‘anti-
diplomacy’. Scholars argue that the intelligence community and its
activities are often in contravention of the aims and practices of the
diplomatic community, which makes it difficult for the two
institutions to exist symbiotically.1 This article contests that thesis,
arguing that intelligence is in fact an extension of diplomacy and that
any perceived rivalry is purely structural rather than conceptual.
Schematically, the article is organised as follows: it will first
examine the definitions of diplomacy and intelligence. It will then
explore the relationship between diplomacy and intelligence as tools
available to states to fulfil their policy objectives, negating the
argument that diplomacy and intelligence are rivals. Through the use
of empirical cases as examples, it will highlight the interdependence
of the two institutions, positing that intelligence is an extension of
diplomacy. Finally, it will seek to explore supposed avenues of
diplomatic-intelligence rivalry, arguing that these are overstated and
better understood as subtle structural differences.
Defining ‘Intelligence’ and ‘Diplomacy’
1 See for example James Der Derian, ‘Anti-Diplomacy, Intelligence Theory and
Surveillance Practice’, in Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 8, no. 3 (1993), pp.
29-51; Michael Herman, ‘Diplomacy and Intelligence’, in Diplomacy and Statecraft,
Vol. 9, no. 2 (2007), pp. 1-22; Len Scott, ‘Secret Intelligence, Covert Action and
Clandestine Diplomacy’, in Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 19, no. 2 (2004),
pp. 322-341.
Strife Journal, Issue 10 (Spring 2019)
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Hedley Bull defines diplomacy as “the conduct of relations between
sovereign states with standing in world politics by official agents and by
peaceful means”.2 In its modern form, the practice of diplomacy has its
roots in the late fifteenth century city-states in the Italian peninsula.
While its basic purpose was being a tool for states to pursue their
foreign policies, it has also long been used as a weapon for
information-gathering.3 Geoff Berridge situates this term and its
definition further within its historical context: until 1796, when
British parliamentarian Edmund Burke first used the label of
‘diplomacy’ for any activities that fell under this definitional
umbrella, this practice was known as ‘negotiation’.4 Diplomacy can
thus be understood as the visible practice of maintaining interstate
relations by overwhelmingly peaceful means. Michael Herman
expands on these historical underpinnings of diplomacy, calling it
“an institution for making and executing policy as well as getting
information.”5
‘Intelligence’ on the other hand often operates in a relatively
more opaque sphere. While the necessity of intelligence-driven
information gathering is undisputed, the limits of its ethics,
accountability and reach have been a source of much friction in the
international community.6 Much of this uncertainty stems from the
problematic attempts at defining ‘intelligence’. The definitions of
‘intelligence’ are difficult and lack clarity, often to the benefit of
states and policymakers who have some stake in keeping the
understanding of ‘intelligence’ and all that it encompasses
understandably vague.7 Der Derian argues that the emergence of the
term ‘intelligence’ pertaining to information gathering to enhance a
2 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (Columbia
University Press, 1977), p. 156.
3 Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Royal Institute of
International Affairs, 1996), p. 34.
4 G.R. Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 1.
5 Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, p. 34.
6 See for example: Mark Vincent Vlasic, ‘Cloak and Dagger Diplomacy: The U.S.
and Assassination’, in Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2000)
pp. 95-104; David Omand, ‘Ethical Guidelines in Using Secret Intelligence for
Public Security’, in Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 4 (2006),
pp. 613-628; Hans Born, Loch K. Johnson & Ian Leigh, Who’s Watching the Spies?
Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability (Potomac Books, 2005); Loch K.
Johnson (ed.). Handbook of Intelligence Studies (Routledge, 2007).
7 Der Derian, ‘Anti-Diplomacy, Intelligence Theory and Surveillance Practice’, p.
30.
Strife Journal, Issue 10 (Spring 2019)
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state’s security is a relatively recent phenomenon, first appearing in
the sixteenth century as part of English and French diplomatic
discourse.8 However, the understanding of intelligence as mostly
covert information-gathering for state security appears much earlier,
in ‘Arthashastra’, an ancient Indian treatise on statecraft, economic
and military strategy as well as Sun Tzu’s ‘Art of War.’9
Despite its ancient roots, intelligence as a specialised
institution first made its presence felt in the form of military attachés
in the early nineteenth century. This need for military attachés was
evolved from states’ needs to be fully informed about armaments of
friends and foes due to advancements in science and technology
transforming the art and the practice of war.10 The appointment of
these attachés laid the foundation for the emergence of specialist
organisations or forces whose only function was information
gathering and analysis, a rudimentary blueprint for intelligence
agencies today. One of the earliest examples of military attachés was
in 1806, when Napoleon made an army Captain a second secretary of
the French embassy at Vienna to keep a watch on the strength of the
Austrian army. This practice then spread to the rest of Europe in the
second half of the century, with attachés often being used to facilitate
co-operation between the Great Powers in war situations. These
attachés eventually became permanent members of embassy staff as
technical experts who could keep their governments informed about
strategic and military developments abroad.11
Historical evolution notwithstanding, the modern definitions
of intelligence are numerous. Rarely do these definitions build off
one another, or are compelling enough in themselves.12 A notably
vague definition is by the CIA, which defines intelligence as “the
knowledge and foreknowledge of the world around us”.13 Sherman Kent’s
definition situates intelligence within the governmental civil-military
8 Ibid., p. 30.
9 See Kautilya, Arthashastra, trsl. by R. Shamasastry (Mysore Printing and
Publishing House, 1915); Sun Tzu, Art of War, trsl. by L. Giles (Luzac & Co., 1910).
10 Keith Hamilton & Richard Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Theory,
Evolution and Administration (Routledge, 1995).
11 Ibid.
12 Michael Warner, ‘Wanted: A Definition of Intelligence’ in Studies in Intelligence,
Vol. 46, No. 3 (2007), online at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-
of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol46no3/article02.html (Last
accessed 6 May 2019).
13 Central Intelligence Agency Office of Public Affairs, A Consumer’s Guide to
Intelligence (Central Intelligence Agency, 1999), p. vii.
Strife Journal, Issue 10 (Spring 2019)
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sphere: “Intelligence is…..the knowledge which our highly placed civilians
and military men must have to safeguard the national welfare.”14 Another
definition by Abram Shulsky, writing under the pseudonym H. A.
Random focuses on the centrality of secrecy within intelligence:
“Intelligence is the official, secret collection and processing of information
on foreign countries to aid in formulating and implementing foreign policy,
and the conduct of covert activities abroad to facilitate the implementation of
foreign policy.”15 Thus, definitional difficulties and historical
ambiguity in their functions are significant in debates about the
diplomacy-intelligence relationship.
Intelligence as an extension of diplomacy:
Contesting the ‘anti-diplomacy’ thesis
In his seminal paper on the relationship between intelligence and
diplomacy, James Der Derian conceptualises intelligence as the
displacement and continuation of international conflict by anti-
diplomatic means.16
Michael Herman casts a more conciliatory tone, arguing that Western
intelligence is less of a rival to diplomacy than has been portrayed by
the “anti-diplomacy” camp. Despite this view, he too recognises the
sharp differentiation between the two institutions. However, a brief
exploration of the historical interaction between the two institutions
reveals a significant overlap.
Long before the appointments of the first military attachés,
civil diplomats had been embroiled in all types of bribery and
deception.17 “Diplomacy”, according to one scholar, “evolved as
governments’ institution for gathering foreign intelligence, with its
conduct, privileges and ceremonial recognized in the seventeenth
century.”18 This diplomatic service was supported by a network of
overseas correspondents that had varying degree of clandestinity.
The example of military attachés being responsible for
facilitating cooperation between Great Powers in war situations as
14 Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American Foreign Policy (Princeton
University Press, 1949), p. vii.
15 R.A. Random, ‘Intelligence as Science’ in Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 2, No. 2
(1958), p. 76. Also see Warner, ‘Wanted’.
16 Der Derian, ‘Anti-Diplomacy, Intelligence Theory and Surveillance Practice’, p.
32.
17 Hamilton & Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy.
18 Herman, Intelligence Power, p. 34.
Strife Journal, Issue 10 (Spring 2019)
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mentioned above also highlights the commonalities between the
diplomatic and intelligence institutions— that an institution which
specifically evolved as a form of modern intelligence agencies
actually undertook classic diplomatic functions. The diplomacy-
intelligence separation and subsequent rivalry thus seems to be
overstated if the origins of both institutions are examined. However,
this does not mean that there are no distinctions between the
institutions of diplomacy and intelligence.
One of the fundamental differences between intelligence and
diplomacy lies in the legitimacy that the international system accords
to diplomats. The Vienna Convention establishes the functions of a
diplomatic mission as “ascertaining by all lawful means conditions
and developments in the receiving State, and reporting thereon to the
Government of the sending State”.19 According to Michael Herman,
who is one of the foremost scholars of intelligence-diplomacy
studies, diplomats in practice are front-door people in the
international system, while intelligence as an institution has no more
than ‘tacit international recognition’.20 This insinuates that diplomacy
and intelligence always co-exist in two different spheres of
legitimacy, which pushes them further apart as two separate entities.
However, this paper argues that in the post-9/11 international
system, intelligence has acquired a new legitimacy. Security Council
Resolution 1373 in 2001 called upon all states to “find ways of
intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational
information”21 This gave intelligence new legitimacy in the
international system, with increasing budgets spent on enhancing
intelligence-gathering capacities— for example, in 2014, Britain spent
a twentieth of its cost of defence on intelligence, while America spent
a tenth of its defence cost on intelligence. Both these amounts are
greater than what these states spend on diplomacy— an argument
often used to highlight the rivalry between these two institutions,
with intelligence being said to significantly reduce the importance of
diplomacy.
This distinction between intelligence and diplomacy leads on
to another very important distinction that is part of academic debates
surrounding this topic, which is the difference between the functions
that diplomacy and intelligence are said to fulfil. Most scholars
19 The Vienna Convention (1961), Article 3,1.d
20 Herman, ‘Diplomacy and Intelligence’, p. 6.
21 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), 3.e
Strife Journal, Issue 10 (Spring 2019)
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writing about intelligence opine that unlike diplomacy, the essence
of intelligence as an institution is providing information and
forecasts for others to act on.22 It is not a decision-taking or executive
institution. Diplomacy on the other hand is responsible for making
and executing policy as well as getting information, a role that it
enjoys as its preserve to this day. However, in the post-World War II
world that was slowly witnessing the emergence of the Cold War,
“the distinctions between diplomacy and espionage, and between
espionage and covert military operations, were….steadily eroded in
a new world of institutionalised and professionalised secrecy.”23
Thus, the gap between diplomacy and intelligence that existed in
terms of the roles they needed to fill, is gradually disappearing.
This can be illustrated through an example of the ‘Special
Relationship’ that existed between Britain and the United States in
the decade after the Second World War ended. This strong alliance
between the two nations was characterised by the sharing of
intelligence on an unprecedented level. Firstly, most Post-war short-
term policies as well as long-term strategic decisions in the West
were strongly influenced by these shared high-level intelligence
assessments.24 In this particular case, intelligence did go beyond its
mandate of merely collecting information and entered the
jurisdiction of diplomacy pertaining to the formation and
implementation of executive policy. For example in 1948, officials in
both London and Washington had decided upon a programme of
covert action designed to destabilise the Eastern Bloc. However, the
British intelligence and information about the Soviet atomic
capability made Britain increasingly conscious of its vulnerability
and led to reluctance on its part to carry through with any liberation
or destabilising policy. This divergence in intelligence decisions
mirrored broader Anglo-American disagreements over pursuing
détente as a foreign policy during early and mid-1950s.25
Another distinction between intelligence and diplomacy
relates to the method of collecting information by intelligence
services as opposed to the diplomats. Herman argues that the
methods of intelligence collection are on the whole distinctive, for
22 For a detailed discussion, see Herman, ‘Diplomacy and Intelligence’.
23 Hamilton & Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy, p. 192.
24 Richard J. Aldrich, ‘British Intelligence and the Anglo-American “Special
Relationship” during the Cold War’, in Review of International Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3
(1998), p. 332.
25 Ibid.
Strife Journal, Issue 10 (Spring 2019)
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example cipher-breaking and imagery interpretation.26 It is opined
that there are two ways to get classified knowledge— honestly,
through conversations with journalists, officials, politicians and
publications, and clandestinely through bribery, cryptanalysis and
employment of secret agents and devices.27
While the preserve of honest information gathering is
regarded as the legitimate function of a diplomat, any supply of
knowledge by clandestine means is considered espionage.28 The
central feature of clandestine intelligence gathering is said to be the
collection of information without the targets’ consent or cooperation,
and often without the targets’ knowledge. Highlighting the opacity
surrounding this activity, Herman posits that states give their
consent to the existence of diplomats and diplomatic reporting, but
not to intelligence sources.29 The practice of clandestine diplomacy,
however, weakens this argument. Clandestine diplomacy, according
to the scholar Len Scott is an activity undertaken by secret
intelligence services where deniable communication between
adversaries may be helpful.30 This form of diplomacy may overlap
with gathering intelligence and/or conducting deception, but with a
motive to influence the adversary.31 In this kind of activity,
intelligence agents themselves are primary actors for fulfilling
diplomatic aims. This is often to accord nations with the plausible
deniability required to fulfil certain diplomatic aims, as was in the
case of the US-UK-Libya talks in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Metter argues that in the case of these talks, the intelligence
community formed the basis of the diplomatic machinery used by
these nations for various reasons— mainly to circumvent domestic
and bureaucratic inhibitors and to maximise the maintenance of
secrecy.32 Additionally, the volatile nature of the issue meant that
secrecy and plausible deniability was crucial for these negotiations,
as is often the case in such situations which prompt the use of
26 Herman, Intelligence Power.
27 Hamilton & Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy, p. 192.
28 Ibid.
29 Herman, Intelligence Power.
30 Scott, ‘Secret Intelligence, Covert Action and Clandestine Diplomacy’, p. 336.
31 Ibid.
32 Nils Metter, ‘A Case for Clandestine Diplomacy: The Secret UK-US-Libyan
Talks’, in The Yale Review of International Studies (June 2015), online at
http://yris.yira.org/essays/1553 (Last accessed 6 May 2019).
Strife Journal, Issue 10 (Spring 2019)
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clandestine diplomacy. Another example will serve to highlight this
point further.
The Cuba missile crisis of 1962 was a major crisis which saw a
significant amount of clandestine diplomacy being practiced. This
eventually played a crucial role in averting a major conflict. The role
of Aleksandr Feklisov, the KGB ‘Rezident’ in Washington can be
analysed as that of a quintessential clandestine diplomat. At the
height of the crisis, he contacted an American journalist, John Scali,
who then conveyed to the State Department an outline deal to
facilitate the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba. This
assisted the de-escalation of this crisis.33 Thus, the covertness which
is the usual preserve of the intelligence community was also used in
diplomatic efforts and diplomacy in the above examples. Conversely,
in the post-9/11 world, intrusive collection methods that intelligence
agencies have been known to traditionally use, have become far
more acceptable in the international system in order to meet policy
goals.34 The bridging of this gap between traditional notions of
intelligence and diplomacy adds considerable value to the argument
that intelligence and diplomacy further each other’s functioning,
rather than being rivals or antithetical to each other.
Another way in which intelligence assists diplomacy in
fulfilling foreign policy goals is by having better access to non-state
actors, especially in terms of defence and security. The international
system today is composed of a combination of states and powerful
non-state actors, such as major terrorist groups. In such situations,
diplomacy as an established channel of communication between two
states is left restricted and it is intelligence that provides access to
actors that lie beyond the realms of established diplomatic
boundaries. The killing of Osama bin Laden that was planned
through intelligence channels, with diplomatic channels having
limited influence over the matter, highlights how intelligence
complements diplomacy in achieving national goals, rather than
being a rival.
The relationship between intelligence and diplomacy works
the opposite way, too. Intelligence needs and regularly uses the
cover that diplomacy provides in order to carry out usually covert
assignments. Intelligence officers take cover in embassies abroad in
33 Scott, ‘Secret Intelligence, Covert Action and Clandestine Diplomacy’, p. 333.
34 Michael Herman, ‘11 September: Legitimising Intelligence?’, in International
Relations, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2002), p. 232.
Strife Journal, Issue 10 (Spring 2019)
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order to maximise their chance of collecting information. Conversely,
embassies are targeted by intelligence services of other states. The
British Embassy in Washington played a very important role in
handling an ‘overwhelming bulk’ of Anglo-American relations in the
Post-War years.35. As Michael Hopkins opines, “The principal vehicle
for inserting opinions and recommendations in pursuit of the government’s
two goals of continued partnership as an equal and of material assistance
was the Washington Embassy- together with its network of offices around
the country.”36 Diplomats and intelligence officers in the Washington
embassy worked together towards the same goals and in a similar
manner to each other. This collaboration illustrates the complexity of
the relationship between intelligence and diplomacy, which cannot
be classified as antithetical, or rival.
At the same time, the work of the intelligence services was
facilitated by any personal relations cultivated by diplomats. Talking
about the Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’, Hopkins adds that
the personal relationship between the British Ambassador and the
US Secretary of State played a very important role in Anglo-
American cooperation.37
According to Michael Herman, another distinction between
diplomacy and intelligence is that of its subjects.38 According to him,
intelligence and diplomacy have different weights when different
subjects are of concern. The jurisdiction of each institution makes
clear the weight that each institutions’ concerns and priorities carry.
For example, intelligence could have greater authority on subjects
like a certain conflict, violence or questions of security, while
diplomacy draws authority on subjects like political situations or the
perceptions of a host country. What is significant to consider
however is that despite this apparent division in jurisdiction, both
intelligence and diplomacy complement rather than rival each other in
fulfilling a common goal— that presented by the state as its policy
aim.
Diplomacy is also an occasional customer of intelligence as an
institution.39 Diplomats use information provided by intelligence to
assist them in policymaking, threat perception or their own security.
35 Richard J. Aldrich & Michael F. Hopkins (eds.), Intelligence, Defence, and
Diplomacy: British Policy in the Post-war World (F. Cass, 1994)
36 Ibid., p. 87.
37 Ibid.
38 Herman, ‘Diplomacy and Intelligence’.
39 Ibid.
Strife Journal, Issue 10 (Spring 2019)
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Intelligence also gives confirmatory value to information gathered by
diplomats. This, again, fortifies the view of intelligence and
diplomacy working in tandem, with intelligence helping diplomacy
to extend and maximise its reach.
At its core, intelligence and diplomacy cannot be rivals as
neither has the levels of power or influence on its own as it does
when the two institutions work in tandem towards a common goal
supplementing each other’s work. For example, intelligence was only
one pillar of the Anglo-American Special relationship, and no doubt
would have been unable to fulfil its proposed objectives without the
involvement and cooperation of the Washington Embassy.
Intelligence here was thus a tool that shaped inter-state relations to
an extent, but as an extension of the diplomatic arm of the state.
Thus, the fundamental functions of intelligence and
diplomacy converge, fulfilling the same broad aims with similar
legitimacy. Rather than a threat, the evolution of intelligence as an
equal player in the international system therefore situates it as an
annex to the institution of diplomacy. In fact, Martin Wight stresses
that espionage and diplomacy are both components of the
international system in addition to other international institutions
which together yield “a modicum of order and intelligibility in
international relations.”40
The Intelligence-Diplomacy ‘rivalry’:
It is difficult to see intelligence and diplomacy in their conception as
institutions, to be intense rivals of each other. However, when the
work done by diplomats and intelligence officers is examined, it can
be argued that there is scope for structural and jurisdictional
differences which gets attributed to a deeper fundamental rivalry
between the two institutions. This is because both— the intelligence
services and diplomats— have been originally created to perform
very similar functions: they need to collect information about the
country they are posted in and act on it in a way that helps to
maintain peace between the two states. Despite this common
purpose, both organisations differ in their sphere of influence and
command structure. For example in the UK, diplomats answer to the
Foreign Office while Intelligence officers follow a completely
40 Der Derian, ‘Anti-Diplomacy, Intelligence Theory and Surveillance Practice’, p.
34.
Strife Journal, Issue 10 (Spring 2019)
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different chain of command. This is fertile ground for personal or
organisational differences purely at a structural level, neither
tantamount to a fundamental deep-running antipathy insinuated in
the use of terms such as ‘antidiplomacy’.
Further, diplomats face the potential threat of professional
overreach by intelligence agencies, leading to a perception of
competition between the two agencies. For example, Edward Korry,
the US ambassador in Santiago was not informed when in 1970, the
CIA used the diplomatic bag to supply arms to opponents of Chile’s
Marxist President. Multiple instances like these only serve to
intensify rivalries between the two establishments. Another factor
that plays up professional friction between intelligence officers and
diplomats is the general belief or the sense of pride amongst
diplomats that they are generalists and they can understand other
countries better than can specialised intelligence officers. This raises
tensions between diplomats and intelligence officers, especially in
areas where intelligence officers’ long-term predictions may
contradict the diplomats’ own assessment of events and situations.41
On a more systemic scale, the growing need for governments
to gather increasingly extensive intelligence has affected the lives of
diplomats. Information collection has put professional diplomats in
contact with the security services of other governments, which not
only is away from their original sphere of work, but also runs a risk
of being identified with the forces of repression.42 In a blog interview,
Shawn Kobb, an American diplomat working in Kabul highlighted
that one of the biggest misconception he has faced about his job is
people mistaking him for an intelligence officer or spy, which placed
him in danger in a hostile place like Kabul. This added dimension of
danger increases antagonistic feeling between intelligence and
diplomacy at the level of the professional actors in each institution.
In addition to the above difficulties, tit-for-tat expulsions of
embassy staff after unmasking of spy rings can impede the efficient
functioning of missions that diplomats are responsible for, and
interfere with otherwise legitimate activities they may undertake.43
This constant danger of being unmasked leads to diplomats looking
at intelligence officers as additional obstacles to their professional
life.
41 Robert Jervis, ‘Intelligence and Foreign Policy: A Review Essay’, in International
Security, Vol. 11, No. 3 (1986), pp. 141-161.
42 Hamilton & Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy.
43 Ibid.
Strife Journal, Issue 10 (Spring 2019)
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Rivalry can be seen to exist between professionals involved in
diplomacy and intelligence. However, it seems to be a manifestation
of regular professional rivalries in any organisation, akin to inter-
services rivalry in the armed forces of any state. In fact, this strong
rivalry between individuals in the two institutions can be taken as a
sign of the extent of close contact between the two institutions as a
whole, supporting the thesis that intelligence could be seen an
extension of diplomacy.
Conclusion
On basis of the above arguments, we can conclude that intelligence
and diplomacy differ in terms of their everyday functions. However,
historically speaking, both these institutions share the same
functional roots. A quote from Richard Longhorn and Keith
Hamilton succinctly sums it up: “As purveyors of advice and
information, diplomats have by definition long been involved in intelligence-
gathering of a kind.... an ‘honourable spy’.”44 Therefore, rather than
being a rival to diplomacy, intelligence bolsters its functioning,
influence, and effectiveness.
The distinction between the two institutions in terms of their
methods of operation is obvious and can be deceiving. The existence
and acceptance of clandestine diplomacy, and the increased
legitimisation of covert intelligence collection in the post-9/11 world
shows that the gap between intelligence and diplomacy has been
considerably overstated. Diplomacy has been evolving, while still
retaining in part its original function of collecting information. The
relationship between the two institutions as a producer and
consumer of information, and the opinion that they give each other
confirmatory value make it further apparent how they are an
extension of each other, especially with intelligence extending its
reach to areas that diplomacy cannot cover.
This is most true when dealing with non-state actors, where
intelligence has a relatively free reign over its access to them. At the
same time, intelligence’s need for the institutional backing that
diplomacy provides in the form of embassies sidelines the argument
that the increasing importance of intelligence is reducing the value of
the diplomatic institution. The type of rivalry between diplomacy
and intelligence that is most prominent is between diplomats and
44 Ibid., p. 189.
Strife Journal, Issue 10 (Spring 2019)
13
intelligence officers as professionals, or as two departments that are
in fact extension of each other in theory. This rivalry does not seem
enough for intelligence to be called ‘anti-diplomacy’.
To reiterate, this paper has thus argued that intelligence is an
extension of diplomacy (the institution as a whole), and not the
antithesis to what diplomacy stands for. Based on this thesis, it can
also be proposed that the position of intelligence vis-à-vis diplomacy
today can be seen as the evolution of diplomacy into a multipurpose
institution with an ever-increasing mandate to meet the needs of a
changing international system. Intelligence and diplomacy are
therefore not rivals or competitors, but add-ons to each other, with
each institution facilitating the other.
__________________________