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Sortition and Democratic Principles: A Comparative Analysis

May 2019

In book: Legislature by Lot: Transformative Designs for Deliberative Governance, 2019 (pp.229-248)
Chapter: 11
Publisher: Verso

Authors:

Harvard University

After centuries of absence, sortition is making its return through academic research, practical experiments, and activists’ calls for linking participation and deliberation. These invocations of sortition, however, offer divergent accounts of the concept and different justifications. Gastil and Wright’s proposal for a “sortition chamber” provides one such example, but sortition can be conceptualized more broadly. When properly analyzed in this larger sense, one can better appreciate how sortition satisfies democratic principles—often in novel ways that go beyond those enumerated in the lead chapter of this volume. To better understand the implications of sortition, I begin by contrasting it with the other modes of selection democracies use to place people in positions of power, including not only elections but also nomination and certifi cation. I then distinguish varieties of sortition that differ by their mandate, the population from which a random sample is drawn, and the degree to which service is voluntary or compulsory. Depending on the design considerations such as these, sortition can provide a novel means of realizing the democratic aspirations of equality, impartiality, representativeness, and legitimacy. Courant Dimitri (2019), "Sortition and Democratic Principles: A Comparative Analysis", in Gastil and Wright (eds.), Legislature by Lot: Transformative Designs for Deliberative Governance, Verso, New York/London, p. 229-248. https://www.versobooks.com/books/2969-legislature-by-lot

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Legislature by Lot

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The Real Utopias Project

Series editor: Erik Olin Wright

The Real Utopias Project embraces a tension between dreams

and practice. It is founded on the belief that what is pragmati-

cally possible is not  xed independently of our imaginations,

but is itself shaped by our visions. The ful llment of such a belief

involves “real utopias”—utopian ideals grounded in the real

potentials for redesigning social institutions.

In its attempt at sustaining and deepening serious discussion of

radical alternatives to existing social practices, the Real Utopias

Project examines various basic institutions—property rights

and the market, secondary associations, the family, the welfare

state, among others—and focuses on speci c proposals for their

fundamental redesign. The books in the series are the result of

workshop conferences, at which groups of scholars respond to

provocative manuscripts.

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Legislature by Lot

Transformative Designs for

Deliberative Governance

Edited by John Gastil and Erik Olin Wright

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[grant acknowledgment TK]

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Contents

Preface: The Real Utopias Series, Wright vii

I. THE ARGUMENT

. Legislature by Lot: Envisioning Sortition Within

a Bicameral System, Gastil and Wright 

. Postscript: The Anticapitalist Argument for

Sortition, Wright 

II. CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT

. From Deliberative to Radical Democracy: Sortition

and Politics in the Twenty-First Century, Sintomer 

. Random Assemblies for Lawmaking:

Prospects and Limits, Fishkin 

. Lessons from a Hybrid Sortition Chamber:

The – Irish Constitutional Convention,

Arnold, Farrell, and Suiter 

. Intercameral Relations in a Bicameral Elected

and Sortition Legislature, Vandamme, Jacquet,

Niessen, Pitseys, and Reuchamps 

. Joining Forces: The Sortition Chamber from a Social-

Movement Perspective, Felicetti and della Porta 

III. DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES

. Should Democracy Work Through Elections or

Sortition? Malleson 

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  

. Accountability in the Constituent-Representative

Relationship, Mansbridge 

. How to Ensure Deliberation Within a Sortition

Chamber, Carson 

. Sortition andDemocratic Principles:

A Comparative Analysis, Courant 

. In Defense of Imperfection: An Election-

Sortition Compromise, Abizadeh 

IV. ALTERNATIVE PATHS TOWARD SORTITION

. A Gradualist Path Toward Sortition, Burks and Kies 

. Sortition, Rotation, and Mandate:Conditions

for Political Equality and Deliberative Reasoning,

Owen and Smith 

. Who Needs Elections? Accountability, Equality,

and Legitimacy Under Sortition, Hennig 

. Why Hybrid Bicameralism Is Not Right for

Sortition, Bouricius 

V. CONCLUSION

. Sortition’s Scope, Contextual Variations,

and Transitions, Gastil and Wright 

Notes 

Bibliography 

About the Authors 

Acknowledgments 

Index 

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Sortition and

Democratic

Principles: A

Comparative Analysis

Dimitri Courant

After centuries of absence, sortition is making its return through

academic research, practical experiments, and activists’ calls for

linking participation and deliberation. These invocations of

sortition, however, offer divergent accounts of the concept and

different justi cations. Gastil and Wright’s proposal for a

“sortition chamber” provides one such example, but sortition

can be conceptualized more broadly. When properly analyzed

in this larger sense, one can better appreciate how sortition

satis es democratic principles—often in novel ways that go

beyond those enumerated in the lead chapter of this volume.

To better understand the implications of sortition, I begin by

contrasting it with the other modes of selection democracies use

to place people in positions of power, including not only elec-

tions but also nomination and certi cation. I then distinguish

varieties of sortition that differ by their mandate, the population

from which a random sample is drawn, and the degree to which

service is voluntary or compulsory. Depending on the design

considerations such as these, sortition can provide a novel means

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 



of realizing the democratic aspirations of equality, impartiality,

representativeness, and legitimacy.

Modes of Selection

When a good, task, or position are wanted by too many people,

or undesired but necessary to the collective, a selection process

is needed. Aside from in small direct democracies, certain

missions—particularly deliberative ones—cannot be carried out

by all the citizens and need to be accomplished, instead, by

representatives. I identify four modes of selection, any of which

can be combined with the others. In doing so, I focus on the

disadvantages of the mode of selection other than sortition.

Election

The “triumph of election” as the legitimate way of selecting

rulers makes us forget that prior to the American and French

revolutions, it was common to hold a contrary view, as expressed

by Montesquieu: “The suffrage by lot is the nature of democ-

racy. Suffrage by choice is the nature of aristocracy. Drawing

lots . . . leaves each citizen a reasonable hope of serving his

country.” In Athenian democracy, most public of ces were

appointed randomly, ensuring the equality of each citizen and

refusing to elect the “better” (aristoi), except for few speci c

tasks. By contrast, Sparta mainly used election and was consid-

ered to be an oligarchy.

Manin shows that despite this knowledge, the American

founding fathers and the French revolutionaries disliked democ-

racy. They chose election for selecting representatives to create

an elected aristocracy, socially distinct from the people. Later

the word democracy was used as an advertising tool by politi-

cians to lure electors. Eventually, modern political regimes

changed their names to “representative democracies.”

Election is a selection procedure that vertically ascends from

the bottom to the top. A majority or plurality of electors choose

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Sortition and Democratic Principles



every few years to which preselected candidate it will surrender

power. In terms of the democratic criteria discussed more fully

later in this chapter, elections have four limitations. First, they

fail to provide descriptive representation (that is, a body of

representatives demographically similar to the electorate).

Second, they produce only a kind of personal legitimacy. Third,

they cannot ensure competent and impartial governance. And

 nally, elections cannot function among true equals because

they require voters to distinguish between candidates; choosing

one person over another would be dif cult—if not impossible—

when none are considered superior.

Nomination

Nomination is a common selection method in representative

governments. In France, for example, the prime minister is

nominated by the president, who is elected through direct

universal suffrage. The prime minister then nominates govern-

ment ministers, and the president has to give his approval.

Nowhere are federal government cabinet ministers or agency

heads elected.

Nomination has signi cant problems. The nomination process

can be accused of being partial, biased, and arbitrary. Like elec-

tions, it fails to provide descriptive representation. A nominee’s

legitimacy vertically descends from the top of the political hier-

archy, which can create hostility among the lay public at that

system’s base. Finally, since nomination gives an of ce to a

speci c person, it produces a very individual type of legitimacy.

Certi cation

Certi cation is a mainstream selection process (for universities,

civil servants, and so on), but because it is seen as technocratic,

it is almost never used to produce political representatives in

democratic systems. Exceptions do exist, however. Persons wish-

ing to be nominated to judgeships in the United States, for

instance, commonly receive ratings from the American Bar

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

Association regarding their quali cations, with an “unquali-

 ed” score sometimes jeopardizing a nominee. Those who

wish to be eligible for random selection onto the C alifornia

Citizens Redistricting Commission must  rst meet a set of quali-

 cations set out by the state auditor.

Certi cation has its own problems. Those certi ed to serve

have not been authorized by the public, nor even necessarily by

elected of cials. It is grounded in a distinction principle, so

certi ed representatives, by de nition, do not resemble the

represented. Certi cation creates a type of legitimacy that is

both individual and based on superiority. Even though certi -

cation seems to guarantee some equality of opportunity between

candidates, producing a form of horizontal legitimacy, this

impartiality is often illusory. In reality, certi cation tests are

de ned and conducted by superiors who may not themselves

be accountable to anyone for the certi cation process. If the

decision-makers atop the hierarchy do not directly choose their

favored candidates, they create a test where those same candi-

dates are more likely to succeed. Therefore, the legitimacy

remains vertical.

Sortition

Sortition means selecting representatives by lot, but the follow-

ing section will clarify important variations of this general

concept. Concerns about sortition abound, as evidenced by

many of the other chapters in this volume. Here, I focus on one

particular drawback—the hazard that a sortition body would

produce incompetent of cials. Jacques Rancière noted a  rst

defense against this charge: “the drawing of lots has never

favoured the incompetent over the competent.” Sortition is not

a competence  lter, but the other selection modes all share this

problem. Only certi cation can pretend to ensure competence,

on the condition that its test criteria are “sound”—though in

whose judgment?

Moreover, the majority of deliberative-democracy experi-

ments, such as deliberative polls and citizens’ juries,

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Sortition and Democratic Principles



demonstrate that citizens learn fast and become more compe-

tent than elected of cials on complex issues. Finally, due to the

“cognitive diversity” it provides, random selection can be an

“epistemically superior mode of selection of representatives.”

Hélène Landemore explains that “decisions taken by the many

are more likely to be right than decisions taken by the few.”

Indeed, sortition produces an assembly with a greater diversity

of experiences and social pro les, which creates a stronger

collective intelligence capable of tackling issues elected legisla-

tures fail to address adequately.

Selection and Deliberation Frameworks in Sortition

Which kind of of cials do we want? If we want representatives

who look like the represented, we shall choose sortition, for the

democratic ideal of “government by the people.” If we prefer

socially distinct elites (an aristocratic view), we shall choose

election. If we think that leaders should choose the representa-

tives (an oligarchic perspective), we shall adopt nomination. If

we want quali ed representatives (leaning toward technocracy),

we shall select through certi cation. Even if one chooses sorti-

tion over the alternative methods of selection, there remain

many choices about how to create and organize a sortition

body. Gastil and Wright’s sortition chamber presents one set of

choices, but other sortition designs will re ect different deci-

sions about mandates, target populations, and voluntary versus

compulsory service.

Mandate and Duration

Regardless of the mode of selection, the deliberative rules and

institutional architecture in which an assembly is embedded are

crucial. This is especially the case for a sortition assembly, with

the shifts from consultative minipublics to a powerful body

granted legislative authority. Most sortition theorists and

advocates envision assemblies that are deliberative but not

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 



executive. These main missions, none of which are mutually

exclusive, include the following:

. Consultation of the population, as in a deliberative poll.

. Providing information to of cials and citizens, through writ-

ing a statement.

. Control and evaluation of of cials and policies.

. Making a policy or budgetary decision, as in some citizens’

juries or participatory budgeting.

. Legislation, with an additional chamber of the parliament, as

in Gastil and Wright’s proposal.

. Constitution, both for revising one or writing a new one.

. Long-term issues, such as climate change or techno-scienti c

risks.

Regardless of its mandate, so far, every political system based

on sortition has had short mandates and regular rotation of

members. By contrast, election favors reelection, certi cation

is easily sustained once met, and nomination maintains small

circles of initiates. Unlike consultative minipublics, a more

enduring sortition chamber would constitute a bold deviation

from precedent, which might be necessary for a full-functioning

legislature.

Population

Regardless of the mode of selection, there is always a delimita-

tion of the “relevant political body” and criteria to be part of the

selection process. As in the case of elections, the lottery for sorti-

tion draws from the citizens of a given political unit, but the

pool can sometimes be more inclusive. Some processes have

drawn names from a phone book, which includes individuals

not registered to vote—or not even eligible to do so. The Belgian

G reserved  percent of its seats for homeless people and

undocumented immigrants. The pool is usually related to the

level where the decision is implemented (such as workplace,

local neighborhood, state).

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Sortition and Democratic Principles



Mixed Selection

The different modes of selection are not opposed, but instead

complementary and combinable. In the French military, for

example, members of the High Council of Military Function

(Conseil Supérieur de la Fonction Militaire, CSFM) pass certi -

cation for their rank, then are sorted and elected by the other

randomly designated soldiers. The pairing of certi cation and

sortition is also used in the California Citizens Redistricting

Commission.

To show the  exibility of the selection mix and stimulate

democratic imagination, I propose that political parties could

present manifestos and a long unranked list of candidates.

Citizens could then vote on the manifestos, and the result would

determine the proportion of representatives randomly selected

from each party. This would avoid discussing candidates’

charisma or personal life to focus on manifestos and concrete

policy propositions.

Voluntary, Consensual, or Compulsory Service

When it comes to serving on a sortition body, there are different

degrees to which doing so might be obligatory. Here, I distin-

guish three levels: voluntary, consensual, and compulsory.

At the  rst level, sortition representatives are selected from a

pool of volunteers, which means they actively desired to be

selected. This method has the advantage of bringing motivated

people, but the disadvantage of letting power in the hands of

those who wanted it—“the worst of all evils,” according to

Plato or Ranci ère. However, volunteering to take part in sorti-

tion was the functioning mode in Athens, Venice, Florence, and

Aragon.

An alternative carries out the lottery among the whole rele-

vant political body, without any call for volunteers. In this case,

the persons selected have a right to refuse the public of ce a

posteriori. The vast majority of deliberative-democracy experi-

ments function on this consensual model. To encourage

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 



acceptance of the invitation, organizers typically provide incen-

tives for service, as do Gastil and Wright in their proposed sorti-

tion chamber. This approach fares better in terms of equality

and of representativeness. By letting invitees decide whether to

serve, even with strong incentives to do so, the resulting body

differs from the larger population it aims to represent. Some

demographic groups might be missing (or at least underrepre-

sented) because their randomly selected members did not

consider themselves as equal with the other selectees—not

worthy of a seat in the sortition body. The same pattern appears

for elections, in which underprivileged social classes vote less

frequently than others. The underrepresentation of disadvan-

taged social groups goes against principles of moral justice and

inclusion, but it also poses a legitimacy problem: those second-

class citizens who felt excluded might stop respecting laws they

had no hand in creating.

One solution to this problem would be moving away from

voluntary and consensual levels by making public service

compulsory for those chosen through sortition. It might seem

strange to regard participation as a duty; however, it is the secu-

lar practice of popular jury in France, the United States, British

Commonwealth countries, and many others. Many countries,

notably including Australia, make voting compulsory, and no

country excuses its citizens from paying taxes. There are other

advantages to this third approach. Obligatory sortition improves

the impartiality of those chosen. It would be suspicious to elect

a jury from volunteer candidates; one would wonder what inter-

ests they serve. A compulsory system also protects against the

“free rider” phenomenon. Taking part in a deliberative assem-

bly or jury is a heavy load in time and energy; a compulsory

system spreads that burden as widely as possible. Finally, obli-

gation would push into service those who might otherwise

perceive themselves as unworthy—thereby empowering the

most disenfranchised segment of society.

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Sortition and Democratic Principles



How Sortition Meets Democratic Principles

Having distinguished sortition from other modes of selection,

and with an appreciation for the different ways one can imple-

ment it, I turn now to how sortition expresses democratic values.

Historical analysis reveals three successive principles for sorti-

tion: the random selection of citizens for public of ces in ancient

Athens, based on the principle of equality; the lottery to pick out

members of popular jury, aiming for impartiality; and opinion

polls giving a representativeness of the population through repre-

sentative sample. Some authors in this volume address the issue

of democratic values, but they overlook some of the novel ways

sortition relates to equality, impartiality, representativeness—and

the legitimacy this relationship produces. Depending on its

institutional architecture, sortition’s democratic principles can be

enhanced or diminished, but here I stress its greatest democratic

potential compared to other modes of selection.

Equality

Without volunteering or quotas, sortition gives excellent statis-

tical equality between individuals. Each citizen has the same

chance to be randomly selected. For Cornel ius Castoriadis, this

principle is the same as universal suffrage and majority rule.

Each citizen is considered equally politically competent; there-

fore, each voice is considered equal to others. “The scandal of

democracy, and of the drawing of lots that is its essence, is to

reveal that [the title to govern] can be nothing but the absence

of title.” As Jacques Rancière says, the power of the people is

“the equality of capabilities to occupy the positions of gover-

nors and of the governed.”

An answer to skeptics of this equality of capabilities is the

evidence showing that citizens come to good decisions, if given

the chance, as has been shown in so many deliberative-

democracy experiments. Compared with the average voter,

addled by political infotainment, a participant in a random

assembly is demonstrably more competent.

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 



The second type of equality produced by sortition is the delib-

erative equality among the representatives. Once selected, all the

representatives in a sortition body become equals. Lottery

suppresses the af rmation of superiority, which in other selec-

tion modes might be expressed as, “I’ve won the election with a

bigger majority”; “I was the  rst nominated by the authorities”;

or “I’ve passed the test with better grades.” All representatives

drawn by lots have the exact same position, instead of being in

the majority or the opposition. Each voice should be heard with

the same attention, leading to a more equal footing for

deliberation.

Finally, sortition can create an inclusive equality between

representatives and represented. Indeed, the represented can say

to their representatives, “Only chance distinguishes us, so we

remain equals.” As Gil Delannoi puts it, this “inclusion effect is

not just coming from the fact that people elected by lots have an

equal chance, but also from the fact that everyone knows that

he or she can or could be selected.”

I expect that this af rmation of the equal political compe-

tence of all citizens could lead to another kind of inclusive

equality—through greater mass participation in politics. Under

sortition, it is no longer possible to say to citizens, “Your partici-

pation is your vote; give your power to the elected and be quiet

while they work.” Historical and recent cases show that with

sortition the necessary moment of mass participation is not

suppressed but moved from election toward the debates and

votes on laws through referendum. Deliberative experiments are

often linked with participatory and direct-democracy proce-

dures, such as public debates, e-participation, or referenda, as

was the case with every citizens’ assembly, whether in Canada,

Iceland, Belgium, or Ireland. These tools allow citizens to use

their power directly instead of delegating it. Moreover, as

sortition would give a representative sample, possibly adjusted

with quotas, excluded minorities would have a fair share in

seats, creating a feeling of inclusion that further emboldens their

participation.

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Sortition and Democratic Principles



Impartiality

Impartiality appears as the most obvious quality of sortition, as

expressed in the neutrality principle. This is probably why the

oldest use of random selection still exists through the popular

jury, which judges admonish to remain impartial in their

deliberations.

Neutrality is also the main principle justifying sortition for

consensus conferences, particularly on techno-scienti c issues in

cases like the Danish Board of Technology. There is a tension

between interests such as public health or economic bene ts, and

it is necessary to ask the impartial opinion of lay citizens who

have heard opposing experts. To consult only experts, activists,

or industrialists would raise doubts about process neutrality.

Suspicion can arise from the simple fact that an individual steps

forward as a candidate (or receives a nomination) to participate.

By contrast, a lottery increases the likelihood that people engag-

ing in the deliberation have no hidden agenda and may, instead,

seek the common good. Sortition also prevents cronyism and

backdoor negotiations between small powerful groups, as there

is no party line or campaign funding to negotiate.

A lottery makes manipulation through media and advertising

to win elections pointless. Nonetheless, parties and media still

play an important role on how an issue is debated in the public

sphere, especially in situations where a referendum follows the

assembly deliberation. Random selection also increases neutral-

ity by limiting bribery and the legal “buying” of representation

through campaign contributions. The process of sortition is

transparent, whether it is conducted physically or digitally by

source code that anyone can check, contrary to some elections

with “forgotten” ballots or vote miscalculation. Chance

suppresses favoritism and discriminations, though the risk of

corruption may exist for bodies that have broad agendas and

long-term of ces, as in Gastil and Wright’s proposal. Even so,

sortition should mitigate the tendency toward corruption

evidenced in the elected, nominated, and certi ed bodies that

exist today.

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 



A second kind of impartiality I call unity—or the discourage-

ment of destructive forms of con ict. Sortition may make compe-

tition or partisan strategy pointless. For this “peace producing

virtue of exteriority,” as Bernard Manin calls it, lots were used in

Italian republics to avoid “the violent tearing created by the open

electoral competition.” Sortition avoids electoral campaigns,

demagoguery, and factions, though it cannot guarantee that

those do not form after the fact—especially if paired with an

elected body, as Gastil and Wright envision.

Political parties are criticized for the division they create, as

they are “combat organizations specially built to carry out a

sublimated form of civil war [political campaign],” according to

Pierre Bourdieu. This fear of faction and division is a main

reason why the French Parliament chose sortition for the CSFM

in . There is a need for a concertation process within the

army to gather the views and approvals of the soldiers regarding

reforms affecting their wages, work conditions, pensions, and so

on. Nevertheless, the permanent imperative of ensuring the

defense of the nation cannot allow electoral competition within

the army. If all the voices—especially from lower ranks—must

be heard in the concertation process, the selection of the repre-

sentatives should provide diversity in the assembly but could

not endanger the army’s unity. This unity is also desirable for

broad public constituencies, as sortition prevents candidates

from targeting a big part of the electorate while leaving behind

or stigmatizing another part.

Among representatives and the larger publics they represent,

debates are important. Unity here is not the absence of divi-

sions, but the absence of longstanding—sometimes arti cial—

preestablished partisan cleavages that impede honest debate.

New divisions and debates should rise from concrete issues, but

they should do so based on empirical and normative disagree-

ments that relate to laws, budgets, and other legislative tasks,

rather than the public-relations imperatives of parties. The

absence of party discipline allows randomly selected representa-

tives to seek a common good, instead of pursuing factional

interests.

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Sortition and Democratic Principles



Finally, sortition creates a special kind of impartiality, which

I refer to as unpredictability. The professionalization of politics

leads to a trend of politicians who all look alike, sometimes even

across parties as well as within them. As Pierre Bourdieu argues,

elected of cials follow the rules and codes of their closed circles

and become predictable:

The sense of the political game that allows politicians to predict

other politicians’ positions is also what makes them predictable.

Predictable, which means responsible, competent, serious, relia-

ble; ready to play the game with constancy without surprise or

treasons of the role imposed to them by the game’s structure.

According to the historian Alexandros Kontos, the ancient

Athenian economic policy was predictable because the magis-

trates were not. By contrast, contemporary elections make poli-

ticians’ strategies predictable, which allows the economic sphere

to be volatile and uncertain. Kontos’s point is that since sorti-

tion made it impossible for a speci c class to stay in power, it

allowed an unpredictable, frequently renewed assembly of poor

people (the majority) to rule. The “free market” was tamed and

speculation banned. Unpredictability operates here in the same

way people might operate behind philosopher John Rawls’s

“veil of ignorance.” Selection by lottery prevents participants

from knowing the positions of the others on the issue, their rela-

tive rhetorical skills, or their openness to changing their minds.

Indeed, some minipublics have produced surprising results, as

with Texas residents championing renewable energy or Irish

citizens calling for marriage equality.

Representativeness

The recent hegemony of elections gives the illusion of represen-

tation through authorization as the only legitimate method of

democratic selection, but sortition provides an alternative.

Through the law of large numbers, sortition enacts the old ideal

of mirror representation since a representative sample provides

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 



a fair cross section of the population, in terms of social classes,

ages, gender, and more. Lottery also gives seats to ordinary

citizens. Therefore, sorted representatives would have similar

background to the population they represent. Gastil and Wright,

along with other authors in this volume, have noted this, but

they have overlooked subtle ways that sortition satis es the

principle of representativeness, by way of diversity and

proximity.

“Parliament should be as a map for a territory, a miniature

portrait of the People,” said (in substance) John Adams,

Mirabeau, and American anti-Federalists. Apart from mere

geographical diversity, however, modern elections produce

assemblies that do not capture the population’s diversity. In

France in , for example, blue- and white-collar laborers

were half of the workforce but were only  percent of MPs

(with the majority of MPs being lawyers or senior of cials).

This lack of diversity goes against the ancient quod omnes

tangit principles, meaning that everyone should discuss an

issue concerning everyone. As rephrased by Dewey, “The man

who wears the shoe knows best that it pinches and where it

pinches.” As in the epistemic argument, the diversity of a

representative assembly is also a question of ef cacy.

By including the full diversity of a public, sortition better

represents it in a collective sense. Even when the size of a sorti-

tion body is too small to have a statistically representative

sample of individuals, such as in a jury, the lottery aims to get

the greatest diversity possible. Some deliberative experiments

even make extra efforts to include marginalized people or

minorities, like indigenous peoples in Canada.

The so-called party diversity in modern democracies is actu-

ally weak, especially in two-party systems. Many people’s

concerns are not represented, and parties seem to be in decline.

Moreover, through sortition, representativeness is necessarily

collective: the whole assembly should represent the population

as a coherent whole, not each member individually (and not just

society’s separate factions). Whereas an elected of cial may feel

“personally representative” of a constituency because a

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Sortition and Democratic Principles



majority of voters granted authorization through an election,

sortition members have more latitude to represent the collective

because they were chosen from the full population.

Of cials chosen through sortition also represent the popula-

tion better by virtue of their enduring proximity to the public.

Distance between sortition representatives and represented

might grow ex post, but of cials chosen by lot serve short terms,

with regular rotation. Sortition is consistent with the view that

politics is an amateur job that should not be professionalized.

To look again at the example of representation within the French

military, that system values experiential proximity. As one

soldier holding of ce by lot explained in an interview I

conducted, “We live the same conditions as the colleagues we

represent.”

Elected and appointed of cials split away easily from constit-

uents with whom they do not share everyday life experiences,

but they also do so due to the “iron law of oligarchy.” Politicians

and unionists who work together become colleagues, creating a

connivance climate that leads to citizens’ de ance. Proudhon

gives testimony: “One needs to have lived in this ballot booth

that we call National Assembly to realize to what extent men

completely ignoring the state of the country are almost always

the ones representing it.” Democratic proximity should be

sharing the same life as the represented, not the false “proxim-

ity” displayed by politicians during their hand shaking. A single

four-year term in the sortition chamber seems brief enough to

maintain proximity, unlike a political career.

Legitimacy

A process that meets the principles of equality, impartiality,

and representativeness should gain some measure of demo-

cratic legitimacy. Legitimacy is crucial because it underwrites

consent—the willingness of the demos to accept decisions

without the use of force. There are three elements composing

this speci c type of legitimacy: impersonality, independence,

and humility (or nonsuperiority), which are connected to the

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 



three democratic principles—equality, impartiality, and repre-

sentativeness—previously analyzed.

First, impersonality comes from the character of representa-

tiveness within a sortition assembly. The assembly is “imper-

sonal” because it can be representative only as a whole; no

single member can claim to be “representative” on their own.

Representatives selected by lot should gain public legitimacy

because they have similarity and proximity to the people they

represent. Sortition can generate a diverse and representative

sample, without using quotas if the sample is big enough.

Sortition was (and still is) linked to proximity, thanks to brief

terms and rotation, contrary to communist of cials that

started their lives as factory workers but then never returned

to their roots. There are also cases of proximity without simi-

larity, like the young educated Maoist students going to farms

and factories, sharing the living conditions of the working

class, without coming from poor peasant backgrounds. The

combination of both similarity and proximity produced by

sortition, creating representativeness, enhances support and

the quality of citizens’ lives. Anyone represented by a sortition

body can say, “Some members of that body look like me and

share my living conditions.” This also prevents the risk of

charismatic leaders. Moreover, members resembling the repre-

sented come to of ce as unknowns, rather than as a candidate

who built a personal brand. In this sense, members gain legiti-

macy by virtue of being (formerly) anonymous members of

the demos.

Second, sortition’s legitimacy differs from other selection

modes because of the “direction” from which it comes. Contrary

to a nomination, it comes not from the top, and unlike elections,

it does not require climbing up from the bottom. Instead,

members of a sortition body gain power and legitimacy hori-

zontally: citizens remain lay citizens, even as sortition confers a

temporary title on them. In this way, sortition gains legitimacy

by producing independent representatives who do not owe their

title to anyone. This is a good solution for the concertation

process in the French military, as neither the minister nor the

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Sortition and Democratic Principles



soldiers would accept the authority of an assembly selected by

the other. Sortition is the only selection procedure that is

impartial, neutral, and horizontal. Sortition representatives do

not have to  atter an electorate, special interests, or a party hier-

archy to get reelected. They are not submissive to those who

nominated them. They do not have to follow rules set up by

experts designing the test for certi cation. Independence from

such constraints makes them, potentially, more legitimate in the

public’s eye.

Finally, the sortition body’s members might retain a kind of

humility that distinguishes them from of cials selected through

other means. A conventional representative has a feeling of

personal superiority over all those who failed—or did not even

try—to pass the selection contest in which he or she prevailed.

That sense might come from having won an election, being a

nominee chosen by elites, or being certi ed as a technocrat after

passing prestigious tests. This is a reason why elected represent-

atives so often fail to keep their promises or listen to popular

protest; they believe themselves superior to “the people.” By

contrast, sortition is insulated from the aristocratic “distinction

principle” linked to election, nomination, or certi cation.

Delannoi explains this crucial psychological dimension in these

terms:

“Sortition offends no one,” noted Montesquieu. It doesn’t create

vanity for the winner nor rancour for the loser. It diminishes

arrogance and bitterness. . . This soothing effect is individual,

collective and systemic. There are almost no exceptions to it.

Maybe a lottery winner can consider himself as “loved by the

Gods” but such a favor is at least special and never owned with

certitude. One cannot compare it to the feeling of one’s own

merit.

Sortition produces a legitimacy based on humility. The

randomly selected representatives do not consider themselves

better or worse than other candidates or the majority of people

that did not even try to be selected, because there is no credit to

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 



being designated by chance. One is not selected because one

would be superior to the group, but because one is an equal part

of the group. Thus the sortition representative can claim, “I have

the right to speak for you, because nothing distinguishes me

from you.” Constituents accept this representative claim because

they can tell themselves, “It could have been me selected for that

job.” Or, “It might be me next.” Even without parties, elections

always create a distinction. Voters can think of an elected repre-

sentative coming from the same background and displaying

proximity. A voter might say, “My representative looks like me

and shares the reality of my everyday life. But they are different

because they won an election, which is something I cannot do,

since I do not possess the qualities to be elected.” The same logic

applies to nomination and certi cation.

By contrast, the only difference between the mass public and

the people selected by sortition is that the sortition representa-

tives must get to work deliberating in citizens’ assemblies or

juries. Training and experience deliberating may come to set

these representatives apart, in terms of their legislative expertise,

but that same career lies within everybody’s reach. If we have to

select a deliberative assembly, it is not to create an elite, but

because deliberation cannot be undertaken by millions of people

simultaneously. This means that citizens would be more likely to

participate as the system considers them all politically

competent.

The message sent by sortition is that anyone is assumed to

have the ability to directly take part in deliberation. This message

is even stronger when sortition is coupled with direct democ-

racy, as happens in an important share of minipublics. This

might lead to a “Pygmalion effect”—a self-ful lling prophecy in

which people who are told they are competent become more

competent. By contrast, the logic of delegation and election

might have the opposite effect, a “Golem effect”—that is,

when people are told they cannot directly take part in delibera-

tion but must delegate their power to better actors, they might

become less motivated to care about politics. Sortition could

reverse that trend and make its legislators’ humility even more

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Sortition and Democratic Principles



warranted, as the public starts to hold itself to a higher civic

standard.

A lottery can be used to distribute desired of ces, like in

Italian republics, but also to assign duties necessary to the group

that no one wants to do. In this perspective, holding a public

of ce is nothing one should be proud of. Also, citizens might

accept the sortition assembly’s decisions because they want to

be accepted in return when they will be sorted and seated. The

last part of the legitimacy based on humility is the “authority of

the ordinary.” This is revealed by trust in “real people’s popular

wisdom” or “common sense.” In such cases, the ordinary person

receives the con dence and the support of the group.

Conclusion

To sharpen our appreciation of sortition, I have distinguished it

from other modes of selection, clari ed the variety of frame-

works it could operate within, and revealed less obvious ways in

which sortition can thereby ful ll democratic principles. Those

democratic principles, revealing what I call the new spirit of

sortition, are potentialities not always present but enhanced or

suppressed by the framework. Sortition is no magical solution

to the problems of modern democracies, but taking this idea

seriously gives us the opportunity to imagine democracy beyond

elections. Envisioning a sortition body helps us see the contra-

dictions between what passes for democracy and real demo-

cratic principles.

Explorations of sortition can also shift the debate from direct

versus representative democracy to the question of the repre-

sentative’s selection process. Gastil and Wright’s proposal for a

sortition chamber and, more broadly, the “real utopian” notion

of random selection could reopen the democratic imagination

and spark experiments that yield more inclusive forms of repre-

sentation, deliberation, and participation.

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Notes



. John Gastil, Democracy in Small Groups (Gabriola Island,

BC: New Society Publishers, ).

. Max Hardy, Kath Fisher, and Janette Hartz-Karp, “The

Unsung Heroes of a Deliberative Process: Re ections on the Role

of Facilitators at the Citizens’ Parliament,” in The Australian

Citizens’ Parliament, –.

. Dale Hunter, Anne Bailey, and Bill Taylor, Art of Facilitation:

How to Create Group Synergy (Tucson: Fisher Books, ).

. Usually, “a leader is best when people barely know he exists, when

his work is done, his aim ful lled, they will say: we did it ourselves.”

. Twyford et al., The Power of “Co.”

. See the de Borda Institute website: http://www.deborda.org/

faq/what-is-a-preferendum/

. Gavin Mooney, “A Handbook on Citizens Juries with

Particular Reference to Health Care,” newDemocracy (),

available on the newDemocracy website.

. See the G website.

. See the What Do We Think website, Turnometro, or Beta

Baoqu.

. See the newDemocracy website.

. Plato, The Republic, nd ed., trans. Desmond Lee (London:

Penguin Books, ), –.

. Naomi Klein, No Is Not Enough: Defeating the New Shock

Politics (New York: Penguin, ).

. Mark E. Warren, “When, Where and Why Do We Need

Deliberation, Voting, and Other Means of Organizing Democracy?

A Problem-Based Approach to Democratic Systems” (presenta-

tion, American Political Science Association, ).

. Barry Hindess, “De cit by Design,” Australian Journal of

Public Administration : (): –.

. Delannoi and Dowlen, Sortition.

11. Sortition andDemocratic Principles:

A Comparative Analysis, Courant

. This chapter is a shortened and completely revised version of a

paper published in an earlier and longer version in Spanish—see

Dimitri Courant, “Pensar el Sorteo. Modos de Selección, Marcos

Deliberativos y Principios Democráticos,” Daimon: Revista

Internacional de Filosofía,  (): –; and in English, see

Dimitri Courant, “Thinking Sortition. Modes of Selection,

Deliberative Frameworks and Democratic Principles,” Les Cahiers

de l’IEPHI, Working Papers  (); and in French, see Dimitri

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



Courant, “Penser le tirage au sort. Modes de sélection, cadres

délibératifs et principes démocratiques,” in Expériences du tirage

au sort en Suisse et en Europe : un état des lieux, eds. Antoine

Chollet and Alexandre Fontaine (Berne : Schriftenreihe der

Bibliothek am Guisanplatz, ).

. Yves Sintomer, From Radical to Deliberative Democracy? Random

Selection in Politics from Athens to the Present (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, , forthcoming).

. In this volume, see Gastil and Wright’s lead chapter, “Legislature

by Lot.”

. For empirical developments of this theoretical framework, see

Dimitri Courant, “Tirage au Sort et Concertation dans l’Armée

Française: Le Cas du Conseil Supérieur de la Fonction Militaire

(–)” (master’s thesis, EHESS, September ).

. I leave aside  liation (heredity) and acquisition (buying of of ces),

as those two modes have almost disappeared.

. Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des Lois (Paris: Garnier Flammarion,

), .

. For more detail on sortition in ancient Athens, see chapters in this

book by Owen and Smith and by Fishkin.

. Bernard Manin, Principes du Gouvernement Représentatif (Paris:

Flammarion, ).

. Francis Dupuis-Déri, Démocratie: Histoire Politique d’un Mot

(Montréal: Lux, ); Dimitri Courant, “Délibération et tirage

au sort au sein d’une institution permanente. Enquête sur le

Conseil Supérieur de la Fonction Militaire (-),”

Participations (forthcoming, ).

. Karoun Demirjian, “Grassley: Two Controversial Federal Bench

Nominees Won’t Be Con rmed,” Washington Post (December ,

).

. See the website of the California Citizens Redistricting

Commission, www.wedrawthelines.ca.gov.

. Jacques Rancière, Hatred of Democracy (New York: Verso,

), .

. Candidates and agents in charge of selecting representatives could

be completely wrong about the candidates’ real competences.

. Sintomer, From Radical to Deliberative Democracy.

. Hélène Landemore, “Deliberation, Cognitive Diversity, and

Democratic Inclusiveness,” Synthese : (): –.

. Oliver Dowlen, The Political Potential of Sortition (Exeter:

Imprint Academic, ).

. In this volume, see Gastil and Wright’s lead chapter,

“Legislature by Lot.”

. James S. Fishkin and Robert Luskin, “Experimenting with a

Democratic Ideal,” Acta Politica  (): –.

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Notes



. John Gastil and Robert Richards, “Making Direct Democracy

Deliberative Through Random Assemblies,” Politics & Society

: (): –.

. Dimitri Courant, “Les Militants du Tirage au Sort. Sociologie

d’un Nouvel Activisme Démocratique” (paper presented at the

CLAIMS workshop, Paris, ).

. Though conventional participatory budgeting does not incorpo-

rate random samples, randomly selected panels linked to participa-

tory budgeting exist in Germany, France, and China. See Yves

Sintomer, Anja Röcke, and Carsten Herzberg, Participatory

Budgeting in Europe: Democracy and Public Governance (London:

Routledge, ); Dimitri Courant, “From Klérotèrion to

Cryptology: The Act of Sortition in the XXIst Century, Instruments

and Practices,” in Sortition and Democracy, ed. Liliane Rabatel

and Yves Sintomer (Exeter: Imprint Academic, b).

. See Arnold, Suiter, and Farrell in this book.

. Dominique Bourg, ed., Pour Une 6e République Écologique

(Paris: Odile Jacob, ).

. Contrary to religious uses of sortition, see Courant, “From

Klérotèrion to Cryptology.”

. Courant, “Tirage au Sort et Concertation.”

. One could argue for tests to be used to  lter potential sorti-

tion legislators from a larger pool, but this aristocratic argument

goes against the democratic equality of the principle “one person,

one vote.”

. This typology goes beyond the distinction between auto-selec-

tion and hetero-selection.

. Rancière, Hatred of Democracy.

. Sintomer, From Radical to Deliberative Democracy?

. Daniel Gaxie, Le Cens Caché (Paris: Seuil, ).

. Mancur Olson, Logique de l’Action Collective (Bruxelles:

Université de Bruxelles, ).

. Courant, “Tirage au Sort et Concertation.”

. Cornelius Castoriadis, La Montée de l’Insigni ance (Paris:

Seuil, ).

. Rancière, Hatred of Democracy, , .

. Sintomer, From Radical to Deliberative Democracy?

. Gil Delannoi, Le Retour du Tirage au Sort en Politique (Paris:

Fondapol, ), .

. This connection between sortition and direct democracy can

be explained by the concept of legitimacy based on humility, as

we will see below. See also: Dimitri Courant, “ ‘We Have Humility’:

Perceived Legitimacy and Representative Claims in the Irish

Citizens’ Assembly” (paper presented at the American Political

Science Association Conference, Boston, ).

9781788736084 Legislature by Lot (184j) - 2nd pass.indd 383

09/01/2019 09:18:03





. The Danish Board of Technology is an of cial institution

aiming to provide reliable information to the Danish Parliament.

Since , it has organized debates on technological issues

among randomly selected citizens.

. However, control procedures are useful to prevent ex post

corruption by lobbies.

. Courant, “From Klérotèrion to Cryptology.”

. Manin, Principes du Gouvernement Représentatif, –.

. Pierre Bourdieu, “La Représentation Politique,” Actes de la

Recherche en Sciences Sociales – (): –.

. Courant, “Tirage au Sort et Concertation.”

. Bourdieu, “La Représentation Politique,” –.

. Alexandros Kontos, “La Démocratie, un Régime Politique

Inconnu” (PhD thesis, Paris, ): , .

. On the Texas case, see Felicetti and della Porta’s chapter in

this volume. On Ireland, see the chapter by Arnold, Suiter, and

Farrell.

. Sintomer, From Radical to Deliberative Democracy?

. John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (New York: Holt,

), .

. Landemore, “Deliberation, Cognitive Diversity, and Democratic

Inclusiveness.”

. This was done for the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly, along

with many other minipublics. Determination of relevant subpopu-

lations is contextual and should be open to political debate.

. A sortition system could make districts useless. Moreover, if

people represent districts, they might be encouraged to represent

a part of the whole—not the whole.

. Owen and Smith make this point in their chapter, as a critique

of the multiyear terms of service suggested by Gastil and Wright.

. Plato, Protagoras (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ).

. Courant, “Tirage au Sort et Concertation,” .

. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Les Confessions d’un Révolutionnaire

(Paris: TOPS, ).

. Courant, “Tirage au Sort et Concertation.”

. My perspective differs from that of Kelsen, who only compared

nomination and election, the  rst one creating a dependence to

the top, and the second a dependence to the electorate. See Hans

Kelsen, La Démocratie: Sa Nature, Sa Valeur (Paris: Dalloz, ).

. Courant, “Tirage au Sort et Concertation.”

. Manin, Principes du Gouvernement Représentatif.

. Delannoi, “Le Retour du Tirage au Sort,” .

. Robert Rosenthal and Leonore Jacobson, “Teacher

Expectation for the Disadvantaged,” Scienti c American :

(): –.

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Notes



. Elisha Y. Babad, Jacinto Inbar, and Robert Rosenthal,

“Pygmalion, Galatea, and the Golem: Investigations of Biased and

Unbiased Teachers,” Journal of Educational Psychology :

(): –.

. I discovered legitimacy-humility studying the military. I asked

if the CSFM-sorted of cials had a title, to which the secretariat

answered, “No, no title! We don’t want them to become arro-

gant!” Courant, “Tirage au Sort et Concertation,” . The

concept was also mentioned by members of the Irish Citizens’

Assembly in interviews I conducted: “We have humility, we don’t

care about the fame, we just want to help people.” See also

Courant, “ ‘We Have Humility.’ ”

12. In Defense of Imperfection: An Election-

Sortition Compromise, Abizadeh

. See Dennis C. Mueller, Robert D. Tollison, and Thomas D. Willett,

“Representative Democracy via Random Selection,” Public

Choice  (): –; Richard G. Mulgan, “Lot as a

Democratic Device of Selection,” Review of Politics : ():

–; Fredrik Engelstad, “The Assignment of Political Of ce

by Lot,” Social Science Information : (): –; Gil

Delannoi, Oliver Dowlen, and Peter Stone, “The Lottery as a

Democratic Institution,” in Studies in Public Policy (Dublin: Policy

Institute, ); Terrill G. Bouricius, “Democracy Through Multi-

Body Sortition: Athenian Lessons for the Modern Day,” Journal of

Public Deliberation : ().

. Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ).

. See also Kevin O’Leary, Saving Democracy: A Plan for Real

Representation in America (Stanford: Stanford University Press,

); John P. McCormick, “Contain the Wealthy and Patrol the

Magistrates: Restoring Elite Accountability to Popular

Government,” American Political Science Review : ():

–; Ernest Callenbach and Michael Phillips, A Citizen

Legislature (Exeter: Imprint Academic, ); Alex Zakaras, “Lot

and Democratic Representation: A Modest Proposal,”

Constellations : (): –; Michael K. MacKenzie, “A

General-Purpose, Randomly Selected Chamber,” in Institutions

for Future Generations, ed. Iñigo González-Ricoy and Axel

Gosseries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ); Pierre-Étienne

Vandamme and Antoine Verret-Hamelin, “A Randomly Selected

Chamber: Promises and Challenges,” Journal of Public

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About the Authors



elected representative in local government. She has published

widely on deliberative democracy over the past twenty- ve

years and been involved with most of Australia’s early experi-

ments with public deliberation. Her primary interest is in sorti-

tion that is coupled with deliberation. Relevant books include

Random Selection in Politics (with Brian Martin, ) and The

Australian Citizens’ Parliament and the Future of Deliberative

Democracy (), for which she was lead editor.

Dimitri Courant is a PhD candidate in political science at the

University of Lausanne and the University Paris-VIII. His

research focuses on sortition, democracy, deliberation, and

representation. His sociological analysis of political uses of

random selection in the twentieth and twenty- rst century

covers various areas and countries: pro-sortition activism;

evolution of lottery equipment both material and digital; and

qualitative comparative studies of empirical cases of randomly

selected deliberative assemblies in France, Ireland, and

Switzerland. He recently published in the reviews Daimon:

Revista Internacional de Filosofía (), Participations (),

and in the collective book Sortition and Democracy ().

David Farrell, MRIA, is professor of politics and chair of the

School of Politics and International Relations at University College

Dublin. A specialist in the study of parties, electoral systems, and

elections, he is currently researching deliberative minipublics in

Ireland.He was the research director of the Irish Constitutional

Convention (–) and the research leader of the Irish Citizens’

Assembly (–). His most recent books include The Post-

Crisis Irish Voter: Voting Behaviour in the Irish 2016 General

Election (coedited; Manchester University Press, ) and A

Conservative Revolution: Electoral Change in Twenty-First

Century Ireland (coedited; Oxford University Press, ).

Andrea Felicetti is a postdoctoral researcher at the Centre for

Political Research, KU Leuven. He previously held research

positions at the Scuola Normale Superiore (Center on Social

Movement Studies), European University Institute, University of

Lille , University of Louvain (Hoover Chair of Economic and

Social Ethics), and University of Canberra (Center for

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Sortition and the democratic governance of cooperatives

Chapter

Full-text available

Dec 2024

Simon Pek

Institutionalizing deliberative mini-publics? Issues of legitimacy and power for randomly selected assemblies in political systems

Article

Full-text available

Nov 2021

Dimitri Courant

Randomly selected deliberative mini-publics (DMPs) are on the rise globally. However, they remain ad hoc, opening the door to arbitrary manoeuvre and triggering a debate on their future institutionalization. What are the competing proposals aiming at institutionalizing DMPs within political systems? I suggest three ways for thinking about institutionalization: in terms of temporality, of legitimacy and support, and of power and role within a system. First, I analyze the dimension of time and how this affect DMP institutional designs. Second, I argue that because sortition produces ‘weak representatives’ with ‘humility-legitimacy’, mini-publics hardly ever make binding decisions and need to rely on external sources of legitimacies. Third, I identify four institutional models, relying on opposing views of legitimacy and politics: tamed consultation, radical democracy, representative klerocracy and hybrid polyarchy. They differ in whether mini-publics are interpreted as tools: for legitimizing elected officials; to give power to the people; or as a mean to suppress voting .

Planning Around Polarisation: Components of Finding Common Ground Based on Regeneration Projects in London and Gdańsk

Article

Full-text available

May 2023

Various forms of public participation in urban design and planning—as presented and discussed in literature—have recently been challenged by the needs and expectations of different stakeholders, including those coming from the private sector. This comes with a redefinition of the public good and the roles and responsibilities of municipal authorities in post-liberal times. As a result, contemporary participatory processes need to evolve to accommodate not only the wishes and ideas of the local communities, but also those of institutional stakeholders including investors, developers and land owners. This is also accompanied by the demands, expressed by all partners in this process, associated with having a much stronger influence on the final shape of the development policies and planning regulations. The gradual democratisation of spatial planning results in more engagement of stakeholders in the process. The article focuses on the co-design method as a way to bridge the polarisation of interests and find a consensus. The article focuses on identifying co-design components leading to the successful bridging of divisions and the realisation of large-scale regeneration initiatives that could be replicated. The authors have selected examples of large-scale regeneration areas in London and Gdańsk for a qualitative assessment, given the growing polarisation in both Polish and British societies. The discussion will focus on aspects of inclusivity, partnership working in co-design and political risks associated with co-design.

Improving, Bypassing or Overcoming Representation? (E-Book)

Book

Full-text available

Dec 2021

The discussion and empirical analysis of the increasing citizen dissatisfaction with existing representative institutions have become a central concern for political science in recent decades. Political theory has also contributed to this debate by focusing increasingly on non-elective forms of participation and representation. Paradoxically, there has not been a significant dialogue between political theory and empirical research that would aim to understand whether these non-elective forms of participation and representation are to be conceived as a complement, a diversion or even a full-blown alternative to electoral representation. Is representation dispensable? What are the alternatives to existing institutions? How are existing institutions and their alternatives perceived by citizens, parties and elected representatives? The aim of the present collection of articles was precisely to address these questions by means of a dialogue between political theory and empirical work on actors’ perceptions.

Empowered Mini-Publics: A Shortcut or Democratically Legitimate?

Article

Full-text available

May 2024

Shao Ming Lee

Contemporary mini-publics involve randomly selected citizens deliberating and eventually tackling thorny issues. Yet, the usage of mini-publics in creating public policy has come under criticism, of which a more persuasive strand is elucidated by eminent philosopher Cristina Lafont, who argues that mini-publics with binding decision-making powers (or ‘empowered mini-publics’) are an undemocratic ‘shortcut’ and deliberative democrats thus cannot use empowered mini-publics for shaping public policies. This paper aims to serve as a nuanced defense of empowered mini-publics against Lafont’s claims. I argue against her claims by explicating how participants of an empowered mini-public remain ordinary, accountable, and therefore connected to the broader public in a democratically legitimate manner. I further critique Lafont’s own proposals for non-empowered mini-publics and judicial review as failing to satisfy her own criteria for democratic legitimacy in a self-defeating manner and relying on a double standard. In doing so, I show how empowered mini-publics are not only democratic but can thus serve to expand democratic deliberation—a goal Lafont shares but relegates to non-empowered mini-publics.

Selection by Lot and Democracy: New Trend, Ancient Model

Article

Full-text available

Jan 2021

Ephraim David

Conflicts of Legitimacies in Representative Institutions: The Case of the French Citizen Convention for Climate

Article

Full-text available

Jun 2022

Conceived as an alternative form of democratic representation, the random selection of citizens for a political task comes in tension with the logic of electoral representation. The idea, carried by random selection, that anyone can be a good enough representative challenges the assumption that we need to choose the most competent among ourselves. And the fact that citizens’ assemblies are sometimes tasked to draft legislation may undermine the authority of elected representatives. This article tests this hypothesis of tension between competing forms of representation on a recent case: the French Citizen Convention for Climate (CCC) in 2020. Drawing on parliamentary hearings and questions as well as public political reactions to the CCC, we find indications that elected representatives may feel threatened in their legitimacy even when most randomly selected citizens do not see themselves as representatives. This may be due to the fact that the CCC was seen by some as stepping on the prerogatives of the Parliament. This suggests that future experiments of the sort could benefit from a clearer functional division between the two forms of representation.

Deliberative Mini-Publics as a Democratic Alternative: The Normative Desirability, Technical Feasibility, and Political Viability of Sortition

Article

Full-text available

Nov 2023

Victoria Solé Delgado

Democratic societies are currently facing a legitimacy crisis, as evidenced by citizens’ distrust towards political institutions and parties, as well as the emergence of anti-democratic responses. To address this crisis some civil society actors and scholars have proposed alternatives based on radical egalitarian principles that can be classified as “real utopias”. To overcome the contradiction between utopia and reality, these alternatives need to extend beyond what is considered normatively desirable and must also be both technically feasible and politically viable. This paper aims to analyze sortition and mini-publics as one of those alternatives.

Nomination Committees and National Sport Organizations: Designing the Way to Democracy?

Article

Apr 2022

The director selection processes of nonprofit national sport organizations underpin board composition and hence board and organizational performance. In the New Zealand context, this study verifies the emergence of nomination committees (NCs) and critically examines, from a democratic theory perspective, the extent to which democratic legitimacy is promoted within the NC structures of national sport organizations’ director selection processes. An analysis of national sport organization (NSO) constitutions affirms the NC emergence as a governance phenomenon and results in the development of an NC (constitutional powers-based) classification system. This NC classification contributes to a largely unexamined area of nonprofit sport governance by providing a foundational description of NC structural design features then used to reflect on the extent to which the identified design features may serve to protect member voice (community logic) in the face of increasing pressures on NSOs to adopt professionalized governance structures (corporate logic). A holistic system objectives approach to democratic theory is used to better understand how NC structural design may support such member voice. In this way, the article offers both scholars and practitioners an insight into a range of NC strategic design choices and potential implications for democratic legitimacy.

The Future of Self-Governing, Thriving Democracies: Democratic Innovations By, With and For the People

Book

Full-text available

Nov 2022

Brigitte Geissel

Democracy Through Multi-Body Sortition: Athenian Lessons for the Modern Day

Article

Full-text available

Apr 2013

Terrill G. Bouricius

Mature Classical Athenian democracy is presented as a representative system, rather than the commonly described form of “direct democracy.” When viewed in this way, the commonly assumed problem of scale in applying Athenian democracy to modern nation states is solved, and principles and practices of the Athenian model of democracy continue to have relevance today. The key role of sortition (selection by lot) to form multiple deliberative bodies is explained. Five dilemmas faced by modern proposals for the use of sortition are examined. Finally, a new model of lawmaking using multiple allotted bodies is presented, which resolves these dilemmas and which can be implemented in many ways, from a small addition to an existing system to a more fundamental reform such as replacing one or both elected chambers of a legislature.

A Randomly Selected Chamber: Promises and Challenges

Article

Full-text available

Apr 2017

This paper explores the idea of a randomly selected chamber of representatives (RSC) through an appreciation of the promises it offers and the challenges it would face. We identify two main promises: a RSC could offset the aristocratic character of elections, thereby increasing the legitimacy of the political system; and it could increase democracy’s epistemic potential, thanks to gains in terms of diversity, deliberations, humility, and long-term perspective. We then discuss four key challenges. First, participation: how can the chamber have diversity without mandatory participation or heavy sanctions? Second, how can we conceive or build legitimacy for this non-elected and somehow unaccountable chamber’s views? Third, independence: how to safeguard randomly selected people from corruption? Finally, there may be a linguistic challenge: if the RSC has a deliberative role, how should it cope with the possible linguistic diversity of its members? We conclude that these challenges are not insurmountable, but reveal some trade-offs that cannot be entirely dissolved.

Délibération et tirage au sort au sein d’une institution permanente. Le Conseil supérieur de la fonction militaire (1968-2016)

Article

Full-text available

Jun 2019

Dimitri Courant

L’interdiction des syndicats dans l’armée française entraîne la création en 1969 d’une institution représentative unique en son genre pour défendre les conditions de travail des soldats. Cinquante ans plus tard, le Conseil supérieur de la fonction militaire est devenu une force de proposition dialoguant directement avec son ministre. Ce rare cas d’institutionnalisation de la sélection aléatoire délibérative sur le temps long permet de penser le futur du tirage au sort en politique. Le dispositif révèle la possibilité du maintien d’une représentation à la fois diversifiée, unitaire et inclusive, de procédures d’accountability ainsi que d’une délibération coopérative relativement efficace. Courant Dimitri, « Délibération et tirage au sort au sein d’une institution permanente. Le Conseil supérieur de la fonction militaire (1968-2016) », Participations, 2019/1 (N° 23), p. 61-91. https://www.cairn.info/revue-participations-2019-1-page-61.htm

The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham: Securities Against Misrule and Other Constitutional Writings for Tripoli and Greece

Book

Jan 2006

Jeremy Bentham

The Lottery as a Democratic Institution

Book

Jul 2013

Proponents of random selection in politics have identified potential contributions that the practice can make to the political process: descriptive representation, prevention of corruption and/or domination, mitigation of elite-level conflict, distributive justice, participation, rotation and psychological benefits. We argue that random selection makes its strongest contribution when it selects citizens to function as impartial guardians of a democratic system. This summary of findings is part of an ongoing Research Program funded by Sciences-Po and organized by Gil Delannoi, Oliver Dowlen and Peter Stone.

The Civic Organization and the Digital Citizen: Communicating Engagement in a Networked Age

Book

Aug 2015

Chris Wells

Who Cares?: How to Reshape a Democratic Politics

Book

Dec 2015

Joan Tronto

Technocracy in the European Union

Book

Sep 2017

Claudio Maria Radaelli

Hope for Democracy: How Citizens Can Bring Reason Back into PoliticsHow Citizens Can Bring Reason Back into Politics

Book

Feb 2020

Concerned citizens across the globe fear that democracy is failing them, but civic reformers are crafting new tools that bring back into politics the wider public and its capacity for reason. This book spotlights one such innovation—the Citizens’ Initiative Review (CIR). Each review gathers a random sample of twenty voters to study a statewide ballot measure. These citizen panelists interrogate advocates, opponents, and experts and distill what they learn into a one-page analysis for the official Voters’ Pamphlet. The Oregon government permanently established the CIR in 2011, and reformers have tested it in locations across the United States and Europe. This book introduces the citizen activists responsible for the development of the CIR, as well as key participants at the inaugural CIR whose experiences changed their lives. Along with these stories, this book provides evidence of the CIR’s impact on voters, who not only make better decisions as a result of reading the citizen analysis but also change the way they understand their role in government. The CIR fits into a larger set of deliberative reforms occurring around the world and into a long history of democratic experiments that stretch back through the American revolution to ancient Athens. The book weaves together historical vignettes, contemporary research, and personal narratives to show how citizens, civic reformers, and politicians can work together to revitalize modern democracy.

Referendums

Chapter

Apr 2017

AJ Renwick

The Handbook of Electoral Behaviour is an authoritative and wide ranging survey of this dynamic field, drawing together a team of the world's leading scholars to provide a state-of-the-art review that sets the agenda for future study.

Sortition and Democratic Principles: A Comparative Analysis

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