Over the past several years, RAND has been exploring how new concepts made viable with emerging technologies can dramatically improve the effectiveness of light ground forces, particularly in the early-entry role. Motivation for this area of research is derived from studies showing that the U.S. military will need to deploy with greater speed, lethality, and survivability in the future, and that
... [Show full abstract] light forces will be the first deployed. Limitations of recent capability were observed during the Desert Shield build-up, where airborne ground forces such as the 82nd Division Ready Brigade (DRB) were deployed to secure key terrain without a credible anti-armor capability.1 Such improvements to early-entry capabilities appear even more germane in light of the concomitant reductions in prepositioned forces abroad and the rapid increase in threat uncertainty. Thus, as dfticult as the early-entry challenge has been in the recent past, early signposts suggest even more difficult challenges ahead.