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Mind and epistemic constructivism: Wang Yangming and Kant
Abstract
This essay explores the philosophical insights of Zhu Xi, Wang YangMing, Kant, and Husserl and therefore proposes a new epistemic constructivism. It demonstrates that a knowing mind is a constructor, not merely a mirror-like copier or a camera-like copier in the experience of knowing. It argues that just as different kinds of machine produce kinds of product of different qualities, different kinds of mind produce different kinds of knowledge; to know X is to construct belief and understanding of X that has truth. Therefore, while Kant correctly indicated that before we set out to know things in the world, we should inquire what the mind can know, Confucian masters profoundly suggest that in order to know things in the world and know better, we should constantly expand our mind to the extent that it is broad（博）， great（大）， refined（精）and profound （深）so that our mind can know millions of things in the world.
... In existing comparative studies between German Classical Philosophy and Yangming's Neo-Confucianism, the most common approach is to compare Kant and Wang Yangming. It is generally believed that Kant's philosophy shares many similarities with Wang's thought, such as the concept of practical philosophy, where Kant posits transcendental principles for cognition, practice, and aesthetics, akin to Wang's idea that "the mind (Xin 心) is principle (Li 理)", which holds that the subject itself possesses transcendental principles (Yu 2000;Hu 2003;Yang 2012;Chen 2019;Lee 2023). However, a frequently overlooked issue in contemporary research is that, unlike Kant, who emphasizes the universal validity of the transcendental principles governing cognition and practice, Wang Yangming focuses more on the practical dimension of the mind as the principle, or rather, the actualization of moral motivation. ...
In comparative philosophy, the study of Fichte and Wang Yangming has been largely overlooked. This article compares their views on the highest good and their approaches to the human–world relationship. Fichte sees the highest good as the realization of practical reason, achievable through religious faith and love for God, enabling individuals to transcend sensual desires and unify with God. Religious faith connects individuals to a higher existence, fostering moral actions. Wang Yangming, however, defines the highest good as the manifestation of conscience within, emphasizing internal cultivation and moral practice to achieve the unity of knowledge and action. Fichte’s approach relies on religious faith, while Wang Yangming’s focuses on self-cultivation. This study reveals the complementarity between Chinese and Western perspectives on the highest good, offering a new lens for cross-cultural dialogue and insights into the complex relationship between humans and the world.
... What is noteworthy here is that Bruno's description of the transcendence and immanence of human mind, which is both an effector and receptor, reminds us of the characteristic ancient Confucian instruction that a human being should constantly expand his own mind to the realm of the extensive (博), vast (大), perfect (精), and profound (深), so that even a single mind can be combined with myriad beings in the universe. Accordingly, Wang practices his transcendental "monist doctrines" (wan wu yi ti万物一体) in addressing the problem of acquiring holistic consciousness and universal empathy (Chen 2019). In the Great knowledge, one of the fundamental classics for Confucianism, the opening sentence is "the way of ultimate wisdom is the comprehension of absolute integrity, genial development of the common people and endless pursuit of the perfection of humanities" (Chu 1988;Zheng 2021), which is very famous and often quoted by Zhu Xi. ...
This study examines the various explanations of the deliberative humanity, regarding a new gnoseology in the intellectual contexts of Giordano Bruno and Wang Yangming during the 15th and 16th centuries. In a similar way to Marsilio Ficino and Giordano Bruno for the European Renaissance, Wang Yangming is the enlightener among the representatives of Neo-Confucianism in early modern China. Each of these three takes an individual’s mind as the point of departure. They then modify the traditional theory of gnoseology, in search of the good and principle. Nevertheless, behind these similarities on the surface, the metaphorical and theoretical interpretations follow different directions. Marsilio Ficino translates hierarchic Platonism as a transcendent norm. Giordano Bruno and Wang Yangming, however, seem to liberate the individual’s humanity from the traditional norms of gnoseology. In their methodologies, they both have developed a generative gnoseology that differs from the orthodox pattern of knowledge in their respective traditions.
This concise, well written and often convincing book of 9 short chapters is designed to defend “the intuitive view that there is a way things are that is independent of human opinion, and that we are capable of arriving at belief about how things are that is objectively reason able” and thus “binding on anyone capable of appreciating the relevant evidence” (pp. 130-131). Boghossian draws upon Gilbert Harman and Thomas Nagel as significant sources of support, and the chief targets of criticism include Richard Rorty and Nelson Goodman. The book avoids overly technical philosophical language and thus deserves attention from a broad range of academic disciplines—including the various strongholds of relativism and constructivism. “At its best”, Boghossian remarks, citing writings of Simone de Beauvoir, K. Anthony Appiah and Amy Gutman, social constructivist thought “exposes the contingency of those of our social practices which we had wrongly come to regard as naturally mandated;” but “It goes astray when it aspires to become a general theory of truth or knowledge” (pp. 129-130).
The main goals of this paper are two. First, it articulates what kinds of knowing pure knowing (liang zhi) is in its narrow sense (approval and disproval) (1) pure knowing as the capacity of moral judgment; (2) pure knowing (of Heavenly principle) as moral knowledge and standard. Besides, it analyses pure knowing’s different features through a phenomenological description. All these aspects of pure knowing are tied by moral feeling. Second, this paper addresses two sets of theoretical problems that have been raised in Confucian discourse with respect to pure knowing and Heavenly principle, primarily those that render Wang’s notion of pure knowing to be static recognition toward particular moral issues, or immediate response, which reading cannot really admit the possibilities of extension, reflection, moral cultivation, and reform of institution; and those that understand pure knowing to be merely abstract without concrete content, such as merely being a metaphysical substance. When properly understood, that is, from the perspective of moral emotions, Wang Yangming’s account of pure knowing provides for the possibilities of enhancement and cultivation, while insisting that the content of pure knowing is always accessible to us.
A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy is a milestone along the complex and difficult road to significant understanding by Westerners of the Asian peoples and a monumental contribution to the cause of philosophy. It is the first anthology of Chinese philosophy to cover its entire historical development. It provides substantial selections from all the great thinkers and schools in every period--ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary--and includes in their entirety some of the most important classical texts. It deals with the fundamental and technical as well as the more general aspects of Chinese thought. With its new translation of source materials (some translated for the first time), its explanatory aids where necessary, its thoroughgoing scholarly documentation, this volume will be an indispensable guide for scholars, for college students, for serious readers interested in knowing the real China.
Relativist and constructivist conceptions of knowledge have become orthodoxy in vast stretches of the academic world in recent times. This book critically examines such views and argues that they are fundamentally flawed. The book focuses on three different ways of reading the claim that knowledge is socially constructed, one about facts and two about justification. All three are rejected. The intuitive, common sense view is that there is a way things are that is independent of human opinion, and that we are capable of arriving at belief about how things are that is objectively reasonable, and is binding on anyone capable of appreciating the relevant evidence, regardless of their social or cultural perspective. Difficult as these notions may be, it is a mistake to think that recent philosophy has uncovered powerful reasons for rejecting them.
This article is a comparative study of the philosophical views on learning and learning methods elaborated by Wang Yangming and Francis Bacon. It argues that as different criteria for the advancement of learning Bacon's empirical learning and Wang's “learning of the heart-mind” represent two different philosophical orientations, and are responsible, at least partially, for laying down the basis for the parting ways of China and Europe at the dawn of the modern era. It concludes that an appreciation of the mutual complementarity rather than opposition between these two philosophical approaches will be a sign for the new and real advancement of learning.
Within cognitive science, two approaches currently dominate the problem of modeling representations. The symbolic approach views cognition as computation involving symbolic manipulation. Connectionism, a special case of associationism, models associations using artificial neuron networks. Peter Gärdenfors offers his theory of conceptual representations as a bridge between the symbolic and connectionist approaches.
Symbolic representation is particularly weak at modeling concept learning, which is paramount for understanding many cognitive phenomena. Concept learning is closely tied to the notion of similarity, which is also poorly served by the symbolic approach. Gärdenfors's theory of conceptual spaces presents a framework for representing information on the conceptual level. A conceptual space is built up from geometrical structures based on a number of quality dimensions. The main applications of the theory are on the constructive side of cognitive science: as a constructive model the theory can be applied to the development of artificial systems capable of solving cognitive tasks. Gärdenfors also shows how conceptual spaces can serve as an explanatory framework for a number of empirical theories, in particular those concerning concept formation, induction, and semantics. His aim is to present a coherent research program that can be used as a basis for more detailed investigations.
Bradford Books imprint
Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is both one of the most rewarding of all philosophical works, and one of the most difficult. Norman Kemp Smith's translation is immensely valuable, not simply because he rendered Kant's language into readable English, but also because his own extensive understanding of the Critique made him acutely aware of the pitfalls of translation. The text followed is that of the second edition of 1787, and a translation is also given of all first-edition passages which in the second edition have been either altered or omitted. For this reissue of Norman Kemp Smith's classic translation, renowned Kant scholar Gary Banham has contributed a unique, extensive bibliography of secondary resources. Combined with Howard Caygill's context-setting introduction and guide to further reading, this reissue provides the definitive edition of this cornerstone of Western intellectual history.
The horizon of being and non-being
- L Chen
The collected works of Lu JiuYn (《陆九渊集》)
- J Lu
The essence and substance of Confucius (《孔子正义》)
- Confucius
The essence and substance of Mencius (《孟子正义》)
- Mencius
Beijing: China Book Bureau
- X Zhu