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Deconstructing compassionate conservation
Matt W. Hayward 1, 2, 3, Alex Callen1, Benjamin L. Allen 4, Guy Ballard 5, Femke
Broekhuis 6, Cassandra Bugir 1, Rohan. H. Clarke 7, John Clulow 1, Simon Clulow1, 8, Jennifer
C. Daltry 9, Harriet T. Davies-Mostert 3, 10, Peter J. S. Fleming 5, Andrea S. Griffin 11,
Lachlan G. Howell 1, Graham I. H. Kerley 2, Kaya Klop-Toker1, Sarah Legge 12, Tom Major
13, Ninon Meyer 14, Robert A. Montgomery 15, Katherine Moseby 16,17, Daniel M. Parker 18,
Stéphanie Périquet 19, John Read 20, Robert Scanlon 1, Rebecca Seeto 1, Craig Shuttleworth 21,
Michael J. Somers 3, 22, Cottrell T. Tamessar 1, Katherine Tuft 17, Rose Upton1, Marcia
Valenzuela-Molina 23, Adrian Wayne 24, Ryan R. Witt 1 , Wolfgang Wüster 13
1 School of Environmental and Life Sciences, University of Newcastle,
Callaghan, New South Wales 2308, Australia, email matthew.hayward@newcastle.edu.au
2 Centre for African Conservation Ecology, Nelson Mandela University,
University Way, Summerstrand, Port Elizabeth 6019, South Africa
3 Mammal Research Institute, University of Pretoria, Lynwood Road, Hatfield
0028, Pretoria, South Africa
4 University of Southern Queensland, Institute for Life Sciences and the
Environment, West Street, Toowoomba, Queensland 4350, Australia
5 School of Environmental and Rural Science, University of New England,
Northern Ring Road, Armidale, New South Wales 2351, Australia and Vertebrate Pest
Research Unit, NSW Department of Primary Industries, Orange, New South Wales 2800,
Australia
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6 WildCRU, Department of Zoology, University of Oxford, Tubney House,
Abington Road, Oxford OX135QL, U.K.
7 School of Biological Sciences, Monash University, Wellington Road, Clayton,
Victoria 3168, Australia
8 Department of Biological Sciences, Macquarie University, Balclava Road,
Sydney, New South Wales 2019, Australia
9 Fauna & Flora International, The David Attenborough Building, Pembroke
Street, Cambridge CB23QZ, U.K.
10 Endangered Wildlife Trust, Pinelands Office Park, Building K2, Ardeer Road,
Modderfontein 1609, Johannesburg , South Africa.
11 School of Psychology, University of Newcastle, University Drive, Callaghan,
New South Wales 2308, Australia
12 Centre for Biodiversity Conservation Science, University of Queensland,
University Drive, St Lucia, QLD 4072, Australia and Fenner School of Environment and
Society, The Australian National University, Linnaeus Way, Acton, Canberra, Australian
Capital Territory 2601, Australia.
13 College of Natural Sciences, Bangor University, College Road, Gwynedd
LL572DG, U.K.
14 Fondation Yaguara Panama, Ciudad del Saber, calle Luis Bonilla, Panama
City 0843 – 03081, Panama
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15 Research on the Ecology of Carnivores and their Prey (RECaP) Laboratory,
Department of Fisheries and Wildlife, Michigan State University, 220 Trowbridge Road, East
Lansing, Michigan 48824, U.S.A.
16 The University of New South Wales, School of Biological, Earth and
Environmental Sciences, ANZAC Parade, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia
17 Arid Recovery, Roxby Downs, South Australia 5725, Australia
18 Wildlife and Reserve Management Research Group, Department of Zoology
and Entomology, Rhodes University, Drosty Road, Grahamstown 6139 South Africa and
School of Biology and Environmental Sciences, University of Mpumalanga, D725,
Mbombela 1200 South Africa
19 Ongava Research Centre, P.O. Box 640 Outjo, 21005 Namibia
20 University of Adelaide, Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences,
Kintore Avenue, South Australia 5005, Australia
21 College of Natural Sciences, College Road, Bangor University, Gwynedd,
LL572DG Wales, U.K.
22 Centre for Invasion Biology, University of Pretoria, Lynwood Road, Hatfield
0028 , Pretoria, South Africa
23 Instituto Politécnico Nacional, Centro Interdisciplinario de Ciencias Marinas,
Av. Instituto Politécnico Nacional s/n Col. Playa Palo de Santa Rita, C.P. 23096 La Paz,
B.C.S., México
24 Department of Biodiversity, Conservation and Attractions, Brain Street,
Manjimup, Western Australia 6258, Australia
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Running head: Compassionate Conservation
Keywords: evidence-based conservation, animal welfare, animal rights, effective
conservation, invasives, invasive species, lethal control, translocation
Article Impact Statement: Compassionate conservation has an arbitrary focus on mammals,
lacks compassion, and offers ineffective conservation solutions
Abstract
Compassionate conservation focuses on 4 tenets: first, do no harm; individuals matter;
inclusivity of individual animals; and peaceful coexistence between humans and animals.
Recently, compassionate conservation has been promoted as an alternative to conventional
conservation philosophy. We believe examples presented by compassionate conservationists
are deliberately or arbitrarily chosen to focus on mammals; inherently not compassionate;
and offer ineffective conservation solutions. Compassionate conservation arbitrarily focuses
on charismatic species, notably large predators and megaherbivores. The philosophy is not
compassionate when it leaves invasive predators in the environment to cause harm to vastly
more individuals of native species or uses the fear of harm by apex predators to terrorize
mesopredators. Hindering the control of exotic species (megafauna, predators) in situ will not
improve the conservation condition of the majority of biodiversity even if compassionate
conservationists do no harm to individuals of the exotic species. The positions taken by so-
called compassionate conservationists on particular species and on conservation actions could
be extended to hinder other forms of conservation, including translocations, conservation
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fencing, and fertility control. Animal welfare is incredibly important to conservation, but
ironically compassionate conservation does not offer the best welfare outcomes to animals
and is often ineffective in achieving conservation goals. Consequently, compassionate
conservation may threaten public and governmental support for conservation because of the
general publics‘ limited understanding of conservation problems.
Introduction
The relationship between the welfare of individual animals and a holistic ecosystem
perspective has evolved since the inception of conservation as a science. In his initial
definition of conservation biology, Soulé (1985) adopted Aldo Leopold‘s land ethic, whereby
―the individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts‖ that include the
environment (Leopold 1949). This perspective conflicted with the individualism philosophies
promoting animal welfare at the time (Regan 1983; Singer 1990). Thereafter, due concern for
individual animal welfare was slowly introduced into conservation theory and practice (Web
of Science search of ―conservation‖ AND ―animal welfare‖ on 9 May 2019 returned <30
publications/year from 1995 to 2004 and over 1100 records in 2018), but only as an ancillary
individualistic ethic to the principal holistic conservation ethic that culminated in
―International Consensus Principles for Ethical Wildlife Control‖ (Dubois et al. 2017). But
beginning with Bekoff (2010) and later Wallach and Ramp and their coauthors (Ramp 2013;
Ramp et al. 2013; Ramp & Bekoff 2015; Wallach & Ramp 2015; Wallach et al. 2015;
Wallach et al. 2018a; Wallach et al. 2018b), a new philosophy – compassionate conservation-
-emerged that aims to make the welfare of individual animals the primary tenet of
conservation, thereby attempting to make the compassionate tail wag the conservation dog.
Compassion (or, less specifically, concern for individual animal welfare) has already become
an important aspect of best practices in conservation. However, the conflict is increasing
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between those who believe individual animal welfare is paramount and those who believe
conservation of entire populations at the landscape level is the primary goal. Bekoff, Ramp,
and Wallach‘s perspective of compassionate conservation advocates subordinating
traditional conservation concern for biodiversity to concern for the welfare of individual
animals. This may be considered radical compassionate conservation, but published
perspectives from less extreme compassionate conservationists to confidently conclude this
are lacking.
Mainstream conservationists are only beginning to recognize the risks of elements of
the compassionate conservation philosophy (Fleming & Ballard 2018; Oommen et al. 2019;
Rohwer & Marris 2019; Driscoll & Watson 2019). At a time when resources for conservation
are stretched and urgent action is required conservationists must focus on maximizing
conservation success or they risk losing critical funding and support in favour of inefficient
and ineffective strategies. We examined compassionate conservation to determine how this
philosophy could hinder the conservation of biodiversity. We acknowledge that concern for
the welfare of individual animals has an important place in conservation ethics. Debate on
this matter is timely because most mainstream conservationists are keen to embrace ethical
concern for individual animals as an important element in conservation best practices, but
only to the extent that it is consistent with landscape-level methods of protecting native
biodiversity that are measurably successful.
Examples of compassionate conservation
Proponents of compassionate conservation have identified several conservation
actions they deem compassionate. Wallach et al. (2015) promote the cessation of ―killing in
the name of conservation‖ by arguing that it often has unintended consequences. They go on
to identify culling programmes aimed at reducing the impact of introduced cane toads
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(Rhinella marina ) on Australian native fauna, gray wolves (Canis lupus ) on woodland
caribou (Rangifer tarandus caribou), and introduced European red foxes (Vulpes vulpes ) on
Australian native fauna. Killing for conservation is therefore considered unjustified because
the costs to individuals are certain and the benefits to populations and ecosystems are not
(Vucetich & Nelson 2007), despite clear evidence of benefits, in Australia at least. Wallach et
al. (2015) provide examples of animal control where the benefits were questionable;
however, these examples can be countered equally by others illustrating clear benefits. In
Australia controlling red foxes vastly improves survival and persistence of native marsupials
(e.g., Kinnear et al. 2010); in Europe controlling introduced eastern grey squirrels (Sciurus
carolinensis ) has allowed the native red squirrel (S. vulgaris ) to persist and expand its range
(Shuttleworth et al. 2015); and in South Africa controlling introduced Himalayan tahr
(Hemitragus jemlahicus ) has improved the plight of the endemic fynbos biodiversity hotspot
(Rebelo et al. 2011).
Key members of the Centre for Compassionate Conservation
(https://www.uts.edu.au/research-and-teaching/our-research/centre-compassionate-
conservation) promote the idea of leaving non-native megafauna in situ and unchecked to
increase the number of megafauna species present in various countries (Lundgren et al.
2018). This proposition would leave exotic species, such as camels (Camelus dromedarius),
horses (Equus callabus), and donkeys (E. asinus), unchecked in Australia despite the clear
evidence of the damage they do to human, bird, amphibian, mammal, and plant communities
(Nimmo & Miller 2007; Beever et al. 2018). Despite cats (Felis catus ) being present in
Australia since only 1788 (Abbott 2002) and the ecological devastation this species has
caused there (Woinarski et al. 2015), compassionate conservationists advocate for the
reclassification of feral cats to a native species in Australia (Wallach & Ramp 2015). Others
promote leaving drug-lord Pablo Escobar‘s introduced African hippopotamus population
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(Hippopotamus amphibius ) in Colombia (Dembitzer 2017). The general understanding of
conservation is premised on nativism – that native species are of more value to their
ecosystems than non-native species. Nativism and what constitutes a native species is debated
in the literature (Peretti 1998; Simberloff 2012; Wallach et al. 2018a), but there is ample
evidence of the ecological damage caused by non-native species, and they remain a key threat
to biodiversity (Salo et al. 2007).
Another implicit assumption in compassionate conservation recommendations for
invasive animal management is that predation by nonhuman animals on other animals is more
desirable, on ethical grounds, than predation by humans. From the killed animal‘s viewpoint,
however, it is irrelevant who or what the predator is, and only humans show any compassion
for their prey or concern for their welfare (Lewis et al. 2017). The methods used by
professionals to kill animals for conservation purposes will almost always be more humane
and compassionate than the methods used by animals to kill each other (Allen et al. 2019).
Defining conservation
Conservation is the protection of biodiversity from factors that threaten it or the
amelioration of those threats (Soulé 1985). These threats are almost invariably caused by
humans (Hayward 2019). The point of view from which we critique compassionate
conservation is that of scientists and managers devoted to conserving populations of diverse
kinds of animals and plants in the ecosystems to which they have naturally adapted. This
point of view is not shared by advocates of compassionate conservation, and therein lies the
first tension associated with its ethos.
Among the 12 categories of threats to biodiversity of the International Union for
Conservation of Nature are habitat loss or degradation, use, invasive species, human
disturbance, pollution, and persecution (Maxwell et al. 2016). The abatement of these threats
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is the essence of conservation science and involves a range of practices, such as the creation
of protected areas to ameliorate habitat loss and degradation; legislation to stop pollution,
overuse, and persecution; translocations to establish new populations of threatened species
within their historic range; landscape manipulations to facilitate coexistence of susceptible
species and their threats; control and eradication of invasive species; and ex situ practices,
such as captive insurance colonies and genome storage for mitigating permanent species and
genetic loss when threats cannot be abated immediately. Conservationists generally support
these actions because, at times, intervention is required. In the last 30 years, the evolution of
large-scale conservation programs, embedded in a robust scientific framework, has allowed
the development of effective decision-making practices that consider efficacy, animal
welfare, logistics, and cost (Sutherland et al. 2004; Pullin et al. 2013) and have yielded
significant conservation successes (Hoffmann et al. 2010). This is nowhere more obvious
than in invasive species management, given that invasive species have caused vast numbers
of native animal extinctions around the world (Butchart et al. 2010).
Critiquing Compassionate Conservation
Compassionate conservation has been defined as ―a rapidly growing international and
cross-disciplinary movement that promotes the protection of wild animals as individuals
within conservation practice and policy‖ via ―…a conservation ethic that prioritizes the
protection of other animals as individuals: not just as members of populations of species but
valued in their own right‖ (University of Technology Sydney n.d. & Supporting Information).
It is an ethic that combines a number of well explored philosophies, including virtue ethics
(undertaking an action because it is ennobling to do so [MacIntyre 2013]), deontology
(undertaking an action because it is morally correct to do so [Regan 1983]), and
consequentialism or utilitarianism (equal regard for the interests of all individuals irrespective
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of race, creed, sex, and species [Driver 2011]), and takes the view that individual animals are
as valuable as populations or species from a conservation perspective (Singer 1990). This
ethic holds to 4 tenets: first, do no harm; individuals matter; inclusivity of all individuals; and
peaceful coexistence between humans and animals. We considered the implications of these
tenets for conservation practice.
First, Do No Harm
The do-no-harm principle (Supporting Information) is a traditional tenet of medicine
(Hippocratic Oath) that implies medical treatment should be performed only when benefits
outweigh the risk of harm (Shmerling 2015). However, unlike human medicine that focuses
on the health and well-being of an individual patient, conservation is a complex arrangement
of interconnected components in which a decision directed at one portion of an ecosystem
can have large direct and indirect consequences for numerous other parts of the system.
The choices made by conservationists have repercussions throughout biotic
communities, not just for targeted species. For example, doing no harm to introduced feral
cats and European red foxes leads to vast numbers of native Australian fauna suffering and
dying daily, and will ultimately lead to the extinction of many species—negative
consequences at both the individual and group levels (Kinnear et al. 2010; Frank et al. 2014).
Doing no harm to eastern grey squirrels, an invasive species in Europe from the United States
and Canada, will increase suffering of red squirrels and likely lead to extirpation of red
squirrels in the United Kingdom and possibly throughout Europe (Shuttleworth et al. 2016).
Doing no harm to feral dogs in the Neotropics will lead to the harm of countless Brazilian
animals (Lessa et al. 2016). Doing no harm to cane toads, which have invaded more than 50
countries around the globe, will lead to continued mortality of numerous predators with
rippling effects through ecosystems on mesopredators and prey via trophic cascades (Doody
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et al. 2017). In these and many other cases, doing no harm results in more harm being done to
more individual animals. Yet stopping the lethal control of invasive mammals, despite the
inordinate amount of suffering they inflict on other animals, is a cardinal concern of
compassionate conservationists (Wallach et al. 2015).
The do-no-harm principle may encourage more apathy than empathy and lead to a do-
nothing approach to conservation (Bercovitch 2018). Therefore, it is important to
acknowledge that the do-nothing option may do greater harm to a larger number of
individuals than doing something that harms a few individuals (e.g., controlling introduced
predators in Australia to reduce the harm to the millions of native animals they kill every day
[Doherty et al. 2017]). These decisions fall into a broader paradigm in which the costs to
individual animals are compared with the likely benefits to populations or species (Vucetich
& Nelson 2007), but this trade-off is not possible under compassionate conservation despite
its being accepted as appropriate by other ethicists (Shermer 2015).
Compassionate conservationists propose alternatives to lethal control, such as fencing
(Fox & Bekoff 2011), yet this introduces further contradictions. Conservation fencing is
designed to separate areas important for biodiversity from factors that threaten the
biodiversity therein (Hayward et al. 2014). However, restricting the free movement of
animals with conservation fences could be construed as harming individuals because they
cannot move wherever they choose to access specific resources or flee predators and
competitors (Fraser & MacRae 2011).
Harm was, is, and always will be, an inescapable part of life on Earth. Food webs
inextricably involve harm - harm by one species to another, directly or indirectly, as all living
things compete for the planet‘s finite resources (Wackernagel et al. 2002). Whether
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conservationists let nature take its course (do nothing) or actively manage nature for
biodiversity conservation, harm cannot be avoided given nature‘s interdependencies.
Individuals matter
Compassionate conservationists often refer to individual animals as ―wildlife
individuals,‖ entire species or populations of species as ―wildlife collectives,‖ and individual
animals belonging to wildlife collectives as ―members of collectives‖ (Wallach et al. 2018a).
Yet to characterize transorganismic levels of biological organization, such as species, as
wildlife collectives rhetorically suggests that species (and other levels of biological
organization, such as biotic communities and ecosystems) are merely aggregates of
individuals. That, however, is not how biologists understand the concepts of species,
communities, and ecosystems. Rather a biological species is a gene pool (expressed by
organisms capable of interbreeding and spawning fertile offspring) and is thus a historic line
of descent evolving through natural selection. Thus, there are clear evolutionary arguments
for species conservation, and more generally biodiversity conservation, because a species‘
extinction is the termination of a line of descent (Rolston 2012) and the value of communities
and ecosystems is greater than the sum of their parts (Golley 1993; Allen & Hoekstra 2015).
Inclusivity
Inclusivity in compassionate conservation recognizes the intrinsic value of animal
individuals. That is to say, it respects individuals irrespective of their clan (species), status
(population size, conservation status), native or alien heritage, or usefulness (Wallach et al.
2018a). There is a contradiction here in that advocates for compassionate conservation
concede a hierarchy of animal protection by prioritizing a reduction of the suffering of
sentient individuals, their definition of which appears not to include nonmammalian species
(Wallach et al. 2018a). This is a seemingly Orwellian approach, suggesting all animals are
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equal, but some are more equal than others (Orwell 1945). Their current focus on mammalian
taxa exemplifies this contradiction of inclusivity, which is further contradicted by
generalisations that ―sentience and sapience are prevalent across the animal kingdom‖
(Wallach et al., 2018, but see Low 2017). The removal of ectoparasites that cause life-
threatening wounds on reintroduced lions (Panthera leo ) by veterinarians (Hayward et al.
2007) seems likely to be acceptable on compassionate grounds because the individual lions
survived. However, the ticks were killed with little compassion, and the lions were harmed
by darting and sedation for tick removal to happen. Conservation has long recognized the
need to avoid prioritizing efforts aimed at large, charismatic species (Amori & Gippoliti
2000), but, to date, the compassion of compassionate conservation appears to prioritize large,
charismatic mammals.
Peaceful coexistence
The tenet peaceful coexistence focuses on the relationship of humans with nonhuman wild
and feral animals and emphasizes the need to reflect on human actions and people‘s ability to
modify these actions, rather than defaulting to interventions that have impacts on wildlife
(Wallach et al. 2018a). Partisans of compassionate conservation advocate for conservation
actions that eliminate or minimize trade-offs between the welfare of the individual animal
and effective conservation of populations and ecosystems. Yet, most conservationists
recognize their actions often require compromises with stakeholders. Traditionally,
stakeholders have often been humans and wildlife. For example, the creation of protected
areas to conserve wildlife may force people out of their homelands, and the strict
enforcement of these protected area boundaries and rules may limit the ability of people to
feed themselves (West et al. 2006; Oommen et al. 2019). Compassionate conservationists
advocate translocating dingoes (Canis lupus dingo ) to control cats and foxes (Wallach et al.
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2015). This is a valid option for some parts of Australia, but it is inconsistent with
compassionate conservations‘ principle of first, do no harm (Bekoff 2010) (Supporting
Information) because dingoes are predators and will inevitably harm both the introduced
predators they are promoted to control and native species (Allen & Fleming 2012; Fleming et
al. 2012), and the translocation of dingoes involves human moral agency and makes actors
responsible for the welfare outcomes of these interventions. It also disregards 2 other
compassionate conservation tenets because it suggests individual cats and foxes do not
matter, and this is not inclusive of those species. So restoring dingoes to an area (Newsome et
al. 2015) will initiate a new level of harm to animals living there and that harm is essential for
the objective of mesopredator suppression to be achieved (Allen et al. 2019).
This position was starkly illustrated in an interview with Arian Wallach from the
Centre for Compassionate Conservation (Marris 2018) in which the case of the Tristan
Albatross (Diomedea dabbenena ) on Gough Island was considered. There, the invasive
house mouse (Mus musculus ) preys on chicks of several critically endangered albatross
species (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ePmlPpNND_g), causing immense suffering and
death and driving entire species to extinction (Caravaggi et al. 2019). For Wallach the
principles of compassionate conservation mean the mice may not be poisoned to save the
albatross. Wallach asks, ―What gives us the right to be the gods of Gough Island, to say who
lives and who dies?‖ (quote taken from Marris [2018]). This position (extended in the
interview as a general principle) could lead many conservationists to the conclusion that
whatever compassionate conservation is really about, it is not about conservation (Driscoll &
Watson 2019). Furthermore, this position is not realistically about peaceful coexistence.
Coexistence, peaceful or otherwise, is not possible if one of the species goes extinct. In this
scenario, a peaceful coexistence between the Tristan Albatross and mice would be to support
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albatross survival on Gough Island and let mice continue to occupy the rest of its enormous,
global range.
Potential perverse outcomes
Little in conservation is simple. Prescriptive rules, such as those promoted by compassionate
conservationists may well create perverse outcomes. The marooning of koalas (Phascolarctos
cinereus) on French Island (near Melbourne, Australia) for conservation purposes was
initially a great success; however, they rapidly became overabundant, causing severe
defoliation of food plants (Menkhorst 2008). In the absence of management to control this
overabundance (thereby harming individuals), a greater number of individuals were
inadvertently harmed as they starved to death. Similarly, mass mortality events during
droughts affect kangaroo populations that lack control, such as the 14,500 individuals that
starved to death in Kinchega National Park (Australia) in 1982-1983 (Robertson 1986) and
the multitude that are dying during the current drought in Australia. These animals experience
worse welfare outcomes than those managed by human interventions (Wilson & Edwards
2019). Reinstating natural predation patterns may help (Wallach et al. 2015), but predation
inherently causes harm and will also cause perverse impacts in pastoral zones by harming
livestock (Wilson & Edwards 2019). Conservation that is adaptive and flexible under each
unique situation is likely to deliver greater animal welfare gains than hard and fast rules
driven by emotion or ideology. In response to such concerns, advocates of compassionate
conservation may resort to virtue ethics – claiming it is sufficient to manifest the virtue of
compassion by letting the animals interact without human intervention. However, this
dialectic in reasoning ignores the fact that more individuals will be harmed without lethal
control (i.e., fewer individuals die a less painful death if one follows mainstream conservation
practice). Hence, compassionate conservation vacillates between animal-ethic paradigms
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(e.g., Wallach et al. 2018a) and retains vestiges of the more familiar and popular utilitarian
paradigm (notably articulated by Singer [1990]) (e.g., Wallach et al. 2018a). Mainstream
conservation practice already acknowledges individuals matter by recognising that
controlling introduced predators minimizes harm to the greatest number of individuals.
Conclusion
The Centre for Compassionate Conservation is an animal rights group posing as a
scientific conservation organisation (Fleming 2018). Evidence of this is that the primary
members of the centre are key participants in the animal welfare group Voiceless - The
Animal Protection Institute (https://www.voiceless.org.au/about-us). Although there are
important exceptions within animal-protection groups for mainstream conservation actions
(Dubois et al. 2017; RSPCA 2018), these are more of a response to the recognition that many
animal-welfare agencies have historically failed to show the leadership necessary to solve
conservation problems, and in many cases, these agencies have only fuelled conflict (Banks
2005; Vanak & Home 2018) and caused conservation disasters (Brown 1998; Bryce et al.
2011). While the broader principles of compassionate conservation certainly have merit (e.g.,
consideration for animal welfare and the individual), the practical challenges are often
particularly problematic, notably, the concept of the collective or greater good is ignored.
Although compassionate conservationists have begun to target the direct mortality
aspects of conservation, this is an arbitrary position they have selected that could initiate a
slippery slope and challenge other conservation practices, such as inhibiting free animal
movement, forced relocations, forced mating or genetic management, forced contraception or
medication, and introducing one species to disrupt or kill another. It is imperative that
conservation scientists provide information about the impact the compassionate conservation
philosophy could have on biodiversity conservation globally. Without this, society could
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easily embrace the philosophy of compassionate conservation, whereas tried and tested
conservation practices that have allowed threatened species to persist (Hoffmann et al. 2010;
Hoffmann et al. 2011) could lose political and financial support through uninformed and ill-
directed emotion and subsequent public pressure. The compassionate conservation arguments
could sway public opinion by appearing as a viable alternative to existing conservation
methods, yet science shows this is not the case. While mainstream conservationists must
always give animal welfare due consideration, they also need to continue to educate the
public and identify the problems that compassionate conservation will cause to ensure that
this ineffective and ironically inhumane strategy does not eclipse a true philosophy of
conservation in the popular imaginary. A compassionate tail should not wag the conservation
dog.
Acknowledgments
We thank B. Callicott, M. Drew, T. Newsome, A. Cox, G. Baxter, D. Lunney, and D.
Sutherland for their valuable contributions to the ideas and writing of this paper.
Supporting Information
The definition of compassionate conservation from the University of Technology
Sydney‘s Centre for Compassionate Conservation (Appendix S1) is available online. The
authors are solely responsible for the content and functionality of these materials. Queries (other than
absence of the material) should be directed to the corresponding author.
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