ArticlePDF Available

Abstract and Figures

Hosting a major sport event such as the FIFA World Cup, the Olympic and Paralympic Games or the Commonwealth Games, is a unique challenge and opportunity for any host city due to the sheer scale and complexity of a multiday, multi-sport mega event with a large number of client groups. Athletes, team officials, media, VIPs and spectators all have specific and demanding expectations, with distinctive desires and requirements. In addition, local residents and businesses’ requirements have to be attended too, with the aim of ensuring host cities continue to function properly during the event for all its citizens and visitors. It is clear that each host city, in conjunction with relevant law enforcement agencies, has a daunting task to assess risks, set-up a comprehensive strategy, define an efficient organizational structure, and identify, source and make available resources to support the planning and the delivery of an effective safety and security operation during a major sport events. The aim of this article is to detail the main elements, and their inherently interdependencies, of a sensible safety and security framework for major sport events, which identifies the strategic path to achieve a successful, well-managed and resilient event. The article also provides some insights on the most relevant lessons stemming from the practical experience of planning complex safety and security projects. Clearly, each event is different because of its specific idiosyncrasies related to the local legal system, roles and responsibilities, government set-up and the socio, political and economic characteristics. However, the proposed framework, which would need to be tailor-maid in line with the specific local characteristics, is an effective blueprint for planning major events through a single set of documentations (e.g. risk assessment, strategy, concept of operations) which cuts across different partners and directs the work of many role-players, assisting with the drafting of integrated operational plans. Such set up provides the necessary controls and reassurances locally, nationally and internationally, about the ability to deal effectively with public safety-related risks and to host a successful and peaceful event.
Content may be subject to copyright.
4
2016
4
La Rivista semestrale Sicurezza, Terrorismo e Società intende la Sicurezza come una
condizione che risulta dallo stabilizzarsi e dal mantenersi di misure proattive capaci
di promuovere il benessere e la qualità della vita dei cittadini e la vitalità democratica
delle istituzioni; affronta il fenomeno del Terrorismo come un processo complesso, di
lungo periodo, che affonda le sue radici nelle dimensioni culturale, religiosa, politica
ed economica che caratterizzano i sistemi sociali; propone alla Società – quella degli
studiosi e degli operatori e quella ampia di cittadini e istituzioni – strumenti di com-
prensione, analisi e scenari di tali fenomeni e indirizzi di gestione delle crisi.
Sicurezza, Terrorismo e Società si avvale dei contributi di studiosi, policy maker, analisti,
operatori della sicurezza e dei media interessati all’ambito della sicurezza, del terrorismo
e del crisis management. Essa si rivolge a tutti coloro che operano in tali settori, volendo
rappresentare un momento di confronto partecipativo e aperto al dibattito.
La rivista ospita contributi in più lingue, preferendo l’italiano e l’inglese, per ciascuno
dei quali è pubblicato un Executive Summary in entrambe le lingue. La redazione solle-
cita particolarmente contributi interdisciplinari, commenti, analisi e ricerche attenti alle
principali tendenze provenienti dal mondo delle pratiche.
Sicurezza, Terrorismo e Società è un semestrale che pubblica 2 numeri all’anno.
Oltre ai due numeri programmati possono essere previsti e pubblicati numeri speciali.
EDUCatt - Ente per il Diritto allo Studio Universitario dell’Università Cattolica
Largo Gemelli 1, 20123 Milano - tel. 02.72342235 - fax 02.80.53.215
e-mail: editoriale.dsu@educatt.it (produzione) - librario.dsu@educatt.it (distribuzione)
redazione: redazione@itstime.it
web: www.sicurezzaterrorismosocieta.it
ISBN: 978-88-9335-108-9
Sicurezza, Terrorismo e Società
Euro 20,00
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
Italian Team for Security,
Italian Team for Security,
Terroristic Issues & Managing Emergencies
Terroristic Issues & Managing Emergencies
SICUREZZA,
TERRORISMO
E SOCIETÀ
4
ISSUE 2/2016
EDUCATT - UNIVERSITÀ CATTOLICA DEL SACRO CUORE
EDUCATT - UNIVERSITÀ CATTOLICA DEL SACRO CUORE
Milano 2016
SICUREZZA, TERRORISMO E SOCIETÀ
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL –
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL –
Italian Team for Security, Terroristic Issues & Managing Emergencies
Italian Team for Security, Terroristic Issues & Managing Emergencies
ISSUE I – 4/2016
Direttore Responsabile:
Matteo Vergani (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore – Milano e Global Terrorism Research
Centre – Melbourne)
Co-Direttore e Direttore Scientifico:
Marco Lombardi (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore – Milano)
Comitato Scientifico:
Maria Alvanou (Lecturer at National Security School – Atene)
Cristian Barna (“Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy– Bucharest, Romania)
Claudio Bertolotti (senior strategic Analyst at CeMiSS, Military Centre for Strategic Studies – Roma)
Valerio de Divitiis (Expert on Security, Dedicated to Human Security – DEDIHS)
Chiara Fonio (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore – Milano)
Sajjan Gohel (London School of Economics – London)
Rovshan Ibrahimov (Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy University – Baku, Azerbaijan)
Daniel Köhler (German Institute on Radicalization and De-radicalization Studies – Berlin)
Miroslav Mareš (Masaryk University – Brno, Czech Republic)
Vittorio Emanuele Parsi (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore – Milano)
Anita Perešin (University of Zagreb – Croatia)
Giovanni Pisapia (Senior Security Manager, BEGOC – Baku – Azerbaijan)
Iztok Prezelj (University of Ljubljana)
Eman Ragab (Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies (ACPSS) – Cairo)
Riccardo Redaelli (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore – Milano)
Mark Sedgwick (University of Aarhus – Denmark)
Arturo Varvelli (Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale – ISPI – Milano)
Kamil Yilmaz (Independent Researcher – Turkish National Police)
Munir Zamir (Fida Management&C7 – London)
Sabina Zgaga (University of Maribor – Slovenia)
Ivo Veenkamp (Hedayah – Abu Dhabi)
Comitato Editoriale:
Gabriele Barni (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore – Milano)
Alessandro Burato (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore – Milano)
Alessia Ceresa (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore – Milano)
Barbara Lucini (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore – Milano)
Davide Scotti (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore – Milano)
© 2016 EDUCatt - Ente per il Diritto allo Studio Universitario dell’Università Cattolica
Largo Gemelli 1, 20123 Milano - tel. 02.7234.22.35 - fax 02.80.53.215
e-mail: editoriale.dsu@educatt.it (produzione); librario.dsu@educatt.it (distribuzione)
web: www.educatt.it/libri
Associato allAIE – Associazione Italiana Editori
: 978-88-9335-108-9
copertina: progetto grafico Studio Editoriale EDU Catt
Table of contents
R 
A B
Italian Foreign Terrorist Fighters:
a quantitative analysis of radicalization risk factors ........................................ 7
E A
Framing AQAP’s intra-jihadi hegemony in Yemen:
shifting patterns of governance and the importance of being local ............. 21
D B
Le mille e una Libia del passato
calate nella realtà del presente: quale direzione? ......................................... 35
A  C
L G, P S
Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Italian Case ............................................. 53
N G S
From Nuclear and Radiological Smugglin to Nuclear Terrorism:
Understanding the threat to the European cities ...............................................81
C C, F M
Protezione civile e rischio terrorismo: quale coinvolgimento? .................. 119
F: G 
G P
Major Sport Events Safety and Security Framework’s Core Elements ..... 139
Executive Summary.................................................................................... 159
Sicurezza, Terrorismo e Società 4 (2016)
Major Sport Events Safety and Security
Framework’s Core Elements
G P
ITSTIME – Italian Team for Security, Terroristic Issues & Managing Emergencies
Abstract
Hosting a major sport event such as the FIFA World Cup, the Olympic and Paralympic Games
or the Commonwealth Games, is a unique challenge and opportunity for any host city due
to the sheer scale and complexity of a multiday, multi-sport mega event with a large number
of client groups. Athletes, team officials, media, VIPs and spectators all have specific and de-
manding expectations, with distinctive desires and requirements. In addition, local residents
and businesses’ requirements have to be attended too, with the aim of ensuring host cities
continue to function properly during the event for all its citizens and visitors.
It is clear that each host city, in conjunction with relevant law enforcement agencies, has a
daunting task to assess risks, set-up a comprehensive strategy, define an efficient organizational
structure, and identify, source and make available resources to support the planning and the
delivery of an effective safety and security operation during a major sport events.
The aim of this article is to detail the main elements, and their inherently interdependencies,
of a sensible safety and security framework for major sport events, which identifies the strategic
path to achieve a successful, well-managed and resilient event. The article also provides some
insights on the most relevant lessons stemming from the practical experience of planning com-
plex safety and security projects. Clearly, each event is different because of its specific idiosyn-
crasies related to the local legal system, roles and responsibilities, government set-up and the
socio, political and economic characteristics. However, the proposed framework, which would
need to be tailor-maid in line with the specific local characteristics, is an effective blueprint
for planning major events through a single set of documentations (e.g. risk assessment, strat-
egy, concept of operations) which cuts across different partners and directs the work of many
role-players, assisting with the drafting of integrated operational plans. Such set up provides the
necessary controls and reassurances locally, nationally and internationally, about the ability
to deal effectively with public safety-related risks and to host a successful and peaceful event.
1 Member of the Italian Team for Security, Terroristic Issues & Managing Emergencies (IT-
STIME), Department of Sociology, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore – Milano, Largo
Gemelli 1, 20123, Milan, Italy. E-mail: giovanni.pisapia@itstime.it.
140 GIOVANNI PISAPIA
Keywords
Safety and security, major sport events, risk assessment and management, security operations.
1. Introduction
Hosting a major sport event such as the FIFA World Cup, the Olympic and
Paralympic Games or the Commonwealth Games, is a unique occasion for any
host city due to the sheer scale and complexity of a multiday, multi-sport mega
event with a large number of client groups such as athletes, team officials, media,
VIPs and spectators. All these clients have specific and demanding expectations,
characterized by different desires and requirements. In addition, local residents
and businesses’ obligations have to be attended to with the aim of ensuring the
host city continues to function during the event for all its citizens and visitors.
It is clear that each responsible law enforcement agencies, in conjunction
with the relevant host city, have a daunting task to assess risks, set-up a compre-
hensive public safety strategy, define an efficient organizational structure, and
identify, source and make available resources to support the planning and the
delivery of an effective safety and security operation during a major sport events.
The hosting of major event heightens and increases already existing pub-
lic safety-related threats, but does not fundamentally change their nature.
In general, the most relevant threat to an event is a terrorist attack, followed
by criminal activities towards its client groups and the citizens and visitors
at large. In this context, it is required the development of a well-balanced
strategy to articulate the difference scale of threats major events introduce to
public safety and how they would be managed.
In this context, there are three strategic principles from where to start to
secure a major event: Firstly, safety and security needs to be built within the
existing, business as usual public safety governance and processes in place,
which need to be augmented, because of the complexity of the project, with
further “additionalities”, required to deliver the event2. Thus, the first step is
to set up the correct structure, processes and governance to enable the “busi-
ness as usual” structure to deliver the project efficiently. Secondly, an intel-
ligence-led, risk-based approach is required to adopt any safety and security
measure to ensure the peacefulness of the event. This is the only practicable
2 For example, for the 2010 FIFA World Cup, the City of Johannesburg instituted a 2010 Con-
veyors Committee at strategic planning level and the attuned 2010 Office to deliver the project
in cooperation with other local government departments. The task of the 2010 Office, which
coordinated the delivery of the event, was to facilitate the successful implementation of the proj-
ect within the existing local government structures and agencies (City of Johannesburg, 2011).
MAJOR SPORT EVENTS SAFETY AND SECURITY FRAMEWORK’S CORE ELEMENTS 141
avenue to ensure efficient governance and clear transparency in the deci-
sion-making processes related to the implementation of security measures
for the event. Thirdly, because of the complexity of the project, there is the
need for factual coordination between all partners, including the cooperation
between government agencies and departments with the organizing commit-
tee and other relevant stakeholders. Because of the vastness of the project,
the sheer number of partners, which need to be consulted and coordinat-
ed during the planning phase, requires the setting up of robust structures
that can support the integrated planning efforts. Failing to do so, stakehold-
ers might feel placed aside, which could affect negatively the success of the
event. It is thus required the coordinating of all partners’ efforts in an effective
and productive fashion.
These three principles mark the foundation of the event’s safety and secu-
rity strategic planning and operational delivery, sustaining the need to imple-
ment proportionate safety and security measures to ensure a reasonable and
effective use of costly resources.
Within this context, the aim of this article is to detail the main elements,
and their inherently interdependencies, of an effective safety and security
framework for major sport events, which enables the control over the costs of
staging a secure event, both for planning and operational purposes that could
spiral without control3 without a sensible approach. The article also provides
some insights on the most relevant lessons stemming from the practical expe-
rience of planning and implementing complex safety and security projects.
Clearly, each event is different because of its specific context: Local legal
system, roles and responsibilities, government set-up and the socio, political
and economic characteristics4. The proposed framework, shaped through the
review of different event’s safety and security planning documentation and
lessons learned, is a blueprint that defines the fundamental elements that
3 Major event’s budget usually are established at national government level, and then costs
for each agency or department are claimed back as part of exceptional expenses, not business
as usual to fulfil daily obligations. However, in each major event, specific local arrangements
are done to cover the costs of safety and security, in particular the use of resources from law
enforcement agencies and military structures.
4 For example, each country has different regulations on how safety and security is carried out
during events: In the UK, the Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds, colloquially known as the
Green Guide, provides guidance on spectator safety at sports grounds. It places the responsibility
for venues’ safety and security (named routine security) to the event organizer and not the police,
which might not have neither capacity nor expertise to deal with the matter (Department for
Culture, Media and Sport, 2008). The suggestion of having all elements of safety and security
during the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games being planned and managed by law
enforcement agencies was deemed, even though appealing, not practical nor feasible because of
limited resources and expertise available, thus confirming what the regulation already stipulated.
142 GIOVANNI PISAPIA
should be applied to future events, to be tailor-made in accordance with the
specific characteristics of a location. This framework is detailed in the fig-
ure below and is composed of different core elements, which are explained
throughout the article.
Fig. 1: Safety and Security Framework for Major Sport Events
Furthermore, each framework’s core element would need to be complet-
ed in a specific timeframe, which is detailed in the figure below (Figure 2).
MAJOR SPORT EVENTS SAFETY AND SECURITY FRAMEWORK’S CORE ELEMENTS 143
Fig. 2: Safety and Security Framework’s Timeline for Major Sport Events
2. Event-Wide Safety and Security Risks Methodology
The safety and security planning for a major sport event starts very early,
already from the bid phase, where would-be host cities compile documenta-
tion for the right to host an event and when observer missions to other major
events take place to understand opportunities and challenges ahead. Usually,
from the outset of the project, a security planner is seconded from the respon-
sible law enforcement agency to the bid team to influence the security aspect
of the initial plan.
For an event to be assigned to a host city, the national government, in par-
ticular the responsible minister, needs to issue written guarantees, among oth-
ers, for the provision, coordination and implementation of safety, security and
emergency services to host major sport events5. To ensure the guarantees are
met, a methodology is necessary to identify the risks from a national, event-wide
5 As an example, for the 2010 FIFA World Cup, the South African national government agreed
to the delivery of seventeen guarantees made to FIFA, which were detailed in the Bid Book.
The seventeen guarantees, provided by various South African government departments, cov-
ered facilitated access to South Africa, a supportive financial environment, intellectual prop-
erty and marketing rights, healthcare services, transport, telecommunications and safety and
security. These guarantees were consolidated into an Act of Parliament in September 2006,
144 GIOVANNI PISAPIA
perspective. Such methodology provides the context for a whole set of efforts
which need to be reflected in the event strategic and operational plans.
An important aspect to consider is that the international reputation of host-
ing countries is at stake when staging a major event: it is thus of outmost impor-
tance the successful staging of the event, in particular from a safety and secu-
rity perspective. The protection of the lives and properties of the event’s client
groups (e.g. athletes, federations’ representatives) is of paramount importance.
It is thus vital to minimize existing risks and best utilize the time and resources
available and the existing structures to ensure the peacefulness of the event.
With national reputation at stake, governments usually employ a risk-averse
approach, where even residual, low-probability risks are attended to with the
aim of avoiding possible “hindsight critiques” in case an incident occurs. From
these considerations stems the importance of drafting, at the earliest stages as
possible, a practical, holistic event-wide risk assessment methodology.
Terrorism remains the fundamental security threat to major sport events,
as these provide an attractive and high profile target for terrorist attacks. Oth-
er risks consist in criminal activity, such as ticket fraud and attempts to dis-
rupt the games. In addition, the scale of such events, over multiple days and
locations, pose significant policing and public safety challenges in terms of
necessary resources, risks mitigation measures and logistical requirements.
From a risks assessment perspective, it is necessary to define a process to
analyse thoroughly possible threats and to determine their levels to stage a
peaceful and successful event. These risks will then inform the strategic and op-
erational plans for major events. In this regard, it is important to acknowledge
the difference in the risk appetite between government agencies and the private
sector (e.g. organizing committee), as this informs the decisions to be taken to
secure the event. While the former has logically a very low risk appetite, having
produced guarantees and since the country’s reputation is at stake, the latter
operates with other principles in mind (mainly profit), which might not align
with a desire to minimize risks at all costs. Such difference impacts directly on
decision-making and, ultimately, on the event’s security budget.
For example, the UK Government set up a specific methodology to iden-
tify the types and relative levels of risk which could have impacted negatively
on the effective delivering of safe and secure 2012 Olympic and Paralympic
Games. The Olympic Safety and Security Strategic Risk Assessment (OS-
SRA) informed strategic-level decision making by identifying and prioritis-
ing risks and the corresponding mitigation measures for London 2012 (UK
Home Office, 2011a).
the Special Measures Act, as per FIFA requirements (Government Communication and Infor-
mation System – GCIS).
MAJOR SPORT EVENTS SAFETY AND SECURITY FRAMEWORK’S CORE ELEMENTS 145
The OSSSRA, a classified cross-government document that incorporated
expertise from a wide range of government departments and agencies, con-
tained assessments of the relative severity of a wide range of major accidents
or natural events (collectively known as hazards), malicious attacks (known as
threats), serious and organised crime, public disorder, and domestic extremism.
Crucially, the OSSSRA identified those aspects of safety and security that were
unique to the hosting of the Games and that required specific planning, over
and above what was carried out under normal circumstances through the gov-
ernment’s and other agencies’ existing efforts (UK Home Office, 2011a).
The OSSRA considered threats and hazards to safety and security during
the Games emanating from five distinct areas. For each area, specific types of
risks were considered:
Terrorism, including attacks on crowded places, attacks on transport sys-
tems and non-conventional attacks
Serious and organised crime, including cyber-attacks
• Domestic extremism
• Public disorder
Major accidents and natural events, including severe weather and human
disease
In assessing the impacts of any potential risk, the OSSRA measured not
only the harm to individuals, for example through injury, death or damage
to personal property. The disruption to the critical services and infrastruc-
ture that supported the overall ability to ensure a safe and secure event, such
as the transport systems and the emergency services was assessed, including
the reputational damage to the UK should a particular incident occurred
(UK Home Office, 2011a). The risk assessment and management process
followed three different stages:
Identifying the risks – which included as a sub set also risk identification,
assessment and comparison through the completion of a risk matrix to
ensure resources and time were effectively used to tackle higher, more
serious risks, mapped through an impact/likelihood estimation;
Mitigating the risks – which included the adoption of strategic design re-
quirements needed to mitigate a particular risk by either reducing its like-
lihood or impact;
Understanding residual risks – which ensured that, even though risks
could not be eliminated, decision-makers acknowledged and accepted the
residual level of risks, which was in line with the necessity of meeting the
safety and security government guarantees;
The OSSRA was refreshed on a regular basis though the input of all rel-
evant role-players (UK Home Office, 2011a). While the strategic risk assess-
ment and management is unfolding, already from the onset of the project, law
146 GIOVANNI PISAPIA
enforcement agencies provide input into the early design of venues through
the work of experienced crime prevention and counter terrorist advisers.
These personnel assist in the early stages of the event planning by informing
the security elements of the venue design aspects, to ensure it supports the
implementation, at a later stage, of security operations during the event, forg-
ing early partnerships with the event designers and organizers.
3. Event Safety and Security Strategy
Each major sport event requires the drafting of a single safety and securi-
ty strategy, which cuts across different role-players, such as law enforcement
agencies, local organizing committee, government departments and other
delivery partners, to ensure all contributing organizations share the same pur-
poses, objectives and planning principles.
Usually, both the event-wide risk methodology and by the country’s na-
tional security strategy inform the event’s strategic objectives and thus the
structure of the entire framework, helping to determine different projects;
how to prioritize resources, efforts and attention; risk mitigation and residual;
linking the broader event-wide risks with the strategic objectives aiming at
mitigating them.
London 2012 provides us with a practical example of this process: In 2010,
the UK Government released the national security strategy (UK Govern-
ment, 2010), which defined the top priority risks from a security perspective:
International terrorism, cyber-attack, international military crises and major
accidents or natural hazards. Those risks were reflected upon in the London
2012 strategy (UK Home Office, 2011b). The latter overall aim was to “…de-
liver a safe and secure Games, in keeping with the Olympic culture and spirit”.
To achieve such aim, the event strategy provided five different objectives or
themes, each with different operational outcomes, which defined what was
needed to be achieved throughout the planning phase of the entire project
(UK Home Office, 2011b):
Protect the event’s venues and supporting transport infrastructure:
Stop people who would cause harm from entering the country
Ensure a safe and secure transport system
Ensure the protection of VIPs
Ensure venues were safe and secure
Prepare for incidents that might disrupt the event:
Plan and prepare responses to mitigate the impact of disruptive inci-
dents
Identify and disrupt threats:
MAJOR SPORT EVENTS SAFETY AND SECURITY FRAMEWORK’S CORE ELEMENTS 147
Gather intelligence to identify threats
Disrupt assessed threats
Command, control, plan and resource the operation:
Ensure availability and deploy appropriate resources with the right
skills and support
Maintain effective command and control
Ensure parallel events are safe
Engage with partners and communities:
Reassure the public
Obtain effective support from partners
In particular, each strategic theme had a programme built around it with
a team and governance structure. Each theme included different projects
(Figure 3 below) and had a specific organization leading it.
Fig. 3: Safety and Security Strategic Themes and Related Projects
The Strategy also defined its governance structure, planning phases and the
roles and responsibilities of each role-player, including for example, the role of
the local organizing committee, the Department for Transport, the Olympic
Delivery Agency (ODA), and all law enforcement authorities involved in polic-
ing the event, to ensure clarity of each partner’s duties and tasks for the event.
Briefly, the Strategy provided the necessary process to assure the government
guarantees to host a safe and secure event were met effectively.
From a planning assumption perspective, the national threat level from
terrorism was set as severe, which required that measures which would or-
dinarily be deployed in response to the national threat level being at severe
148 GIOVANNI PISAPIA
were in place during the Games. This assumption provided the context for
planning at operational level6 (UK Home Office, 2011b).
4. Event Safety and Security Concept of Operations (ConOps)
In line with the Strategy’s guidelines, the Safety and Security Concept
of Operations (ConOps) details the approach and responsibilities of each
agency to contribute to a “safe and secure” event, as per the stipulated roles.
For each agency, the ConOps defines the operational requirements and the
planning principles to conduct games-time operations, which include, for ex-
ample, search and screening, physical security measures (e.g. CCTV system,
pedestrian intrusion detection systems – PIDs, fencing and hostile vehicle
mitigations – HVM) and asset protection.
The drafting of the ConOps is the last opportunity to reflect on concepts
to be adopted to direct the operations of the event. Such principles are uti-
lized to draft the specific venue security plans and the safety and security pol-
icies, procedures (e.g. searching & screening processes, access control) and
contingency plans. It is of interest on the latter the decision, in many major
events, to move from contingency planning to reasonable eventuality some
risks to enable a more thorough planning and implementation of compre-
hensive security measures to ensure the appropriateness of the plans in place.
This approach reflects the risk averse stand of governments and the assurance
concerning the safety and security guarantees to host major events.
The importance of the ConOps is to ensure a common understanding and
knowledge of the planning requirements, stemming from the strategy’s guide-
lines to organizations’ different management levels. As individuals have differ-
ent backgrounds, it is of paramount importance to ensure a common under-
standing of the actions to be taken during the planning of the event within and
across organizations. In addition, it is important to ensure that all role-players
are ready to move ahead with the plans in unison, ensuring nobody is left be-
hind and guaranteeing that the plans advance homogenously across partners.
Thus, the ConOps needs to be in place as soon as possible to ensure that all
planning principles are understood before the planning tempo increases, as the
event approaches. Nevertheless, to ensure the planning progresses effectively,
in addition to having the ConOps readily available, there is the need to have
all management positions in each organization related to the event appointed.
This to ensure that the people that will manage the operations on the ground
6 The threat level for the UK from international terrorism is set by the Joint Terrorism Analysis
Centre (JTAC). MI5 is responsible for setting the threat levels from Irish and other domestic
terrorism both in Northern Ireland and in Great Britain (MI5, 2016).
MAJOR SPORT EVENTS SAFETY AND SECURITY FRAMEWORK’S CORE ELEMENTS 149
are able to build in time a common understanding and knowledge on how to
run such operations in conjunction with other partners.
In addition, the ConOps should include a first appreciation of estimated
resources required during the planning and operational phases of the proj-
ect7. This aspect is one of paramount importance. To give an example of the
enormity of the task, for London 2012 it was estimated that approximately
14000 police officers were working specifically on the event on a peak day8,
in addition to an overall number of 20000 British Army personnel and 24000
private security contract staff utilized throughout the entire event.
Once the ConOps is in place, the next step is the designing and the imple-
mentation of the event site-specific risk methodology, aimed at streamline the
risk-based approach to implementing security measures for the event.
5. Venue Risk Assessment and Management Methodology
The fourth element consists in drafting the specific venues’ security risk
assessment. This constitutes an important aspect of the entire framework as
all security measures implemented at venue level from a tactical perspective
need to be proportionate to the estimated terrorism/crime-related threats and
informed by the venue-specific risk assessment.
While the event-wide risk methodology provided the top-down approach
to draft the event’s strategy, the venue-specific risk assessment methodology
provides the sites’ risk information, for official and parallel venues, to define
specific countermeasures. Therefore, the strategic risk assessment does not
inform the specific security measures to be implemented at event’s sites. In-
stead, it provides the overall context to draw risks typologies for the venue-spe-
cific risk assessment.
The event specific sites’ methodology consists in a pre-determined and
agreed process by all relevant partners, including the responsible law en-
forcement authorities and the local organizing committee. The important
elements that such methodology needs to include are (Pisapia, 2016):
An objective rationale
A consistent approach and evaluation of risk across transport infrastructure
assets, including routes for example
A rationalized basis for security planning
7 One of the method to ensure the highest number of workforce is available during the event
for government departments is to declare a moratorium of annual leave requests close to and
during the event.
8 These officers do not include business as usual policing roles, which were maintained
throughout the event theatre.
150 GIOVANNI PISAPIA
Prioritization of resources and mitigation across transport assets through a
comparative process
Such methodology informs security planning at venue level through a
numerically based assessment of the risks against each event’s venue by the
most likely terrorist attacks modus operandi (e.g. improvised explosive devic-
es – IED) and crime incidents (e.g. theft, vandalisms) and takes into consid-
eration the following elements: capability, intent, vulnerability, likelihood,
impact, asset attractiveness and overall risk. To ensure consistency, so that
similar assets with similar risk score are protected through analogous secu-
rity measures, the risk assessments need to be conducted by a single project
team composed by a core of permanent members. It is important that subject
matter experts from law enforcement agencies and the private sector (e.g.
organizing committee), are present consistently when the scoring takes place.
Whilst the scorings do not need to be a unanimous between the members of
the group, there must be agreed consensus of the outcome.
Based on the outcome of the risk assessment, the event’s sites are catego-
rized into appropriate tier levels, which inform the level of security measures
required for each venue. The sites’ tier is then linked to the various security
measures through the event security standard plan document.
6. Event Security Standard Plan
The recommended security elements stemming from the venue risk as-
sessment and management methodology need to be aligned with the agreed
standard security measures for the event, which detail the costs and model-
ling of each possible security option, agreed by all stakeholders before the
start of the risk assessment. This ensures a standardized approach, guarantee-
ing that similar sites with similar estimated risks are protected through similar
agreed security measures.
However, the level of protection and the related security measures are
calibrated on the site’s tier level, which is defined through the venues’ risk
assessment methodology. The tier level informs the security requirements,
thus ensuring consistency across similar venues. It is unreasonable to assume
that the same overlay can be installed at every venue of the same tier for a
number of reasons. Therefore, it is important for security planners to under-
stand firstly what level of protection each venue aims to achieve, based on the
four security principles of deter, detect, delay and respond (Table 1 below).
An example on how these levels translate into practical security measures to
be implemented is provided in Table 2 below (Deniece MacDonald, 2014).
MAJOR SPORT EVENTS SAFETY AND SECURITY FRAMEWORK’S CORE ELEMENTS 151
Table 1: Security Levels per Venues’ Tiers
Tier Level of Protection
1 Moderate to high level of protective security assurance: The aim of the protec-
tive security arrangements is to deter an attack and be able to detect incursions,
provide a short delay to an attack and to intercept the attacker before they are
able to penetrate the most important areas of the site.
2 Moderate level of protective security assurance: The aim of the protective secu-
rity arrangements is to provide a strong level of deterrence with an ability to de-
tect incursions, provide a short delay to an attack and to intercept the attacker
before they are able to penetrate the most important areas of the site.
3 Limited to moderate level of protective security assurance: The aim of the pro-
tective security arrangements is to provide a reasonable deterrence by using low
security physical measures supplemented with operational security staff.
4 Limited level of protective security assurance: The aim of the protective security
arrangements is to provide a basic level of deterrence by using or adapting ex-
isting security measures, supplemented with limited operational overlay.
Table 2: Protective Security Assurance per Venues’ Tier Level 1
Tier 1 Level of Security Assurance: Moderate to High
Search & Screening Capability to search and screen all people, vehicles and materials,
entering site.
Detection: High level of assurance for selected types of explosive,
firearms and other conventional weapons.
High confidence level of deterrence for all other weapons (e.g.
knives) and component parts
Perimeter Security Physical security systems comprising of security fences and ac-
tive surveillance/detection systems (either people, technology
or both, covering perimeter and access points). Initial response
force to intercept intruders at the perimeter or at predetermined
interception points.
Perimeter to be illuminated to permit effective surveillance and
to provide safe environment for mobile patrols/response force.
Lighting to assist in deterring an attack.
Medium-high confidence level that security breach(s) of the pe-
rimeter will be immediately detected.
152 GIOVANNI PISAPIA
Access Control Robust access control measures at all times.
Entry limited to event ticket holders and/or those with official
accreditation to allow access to that specific venue.
Accreditation to be checked visually and if possible electronically
to ensure (a) it is authentic & unmodified (b) it belongs to the
owner (c) it is valid for venue (d) it is current/not withdrawn.
Further access control measures required for areas of high risk.
HVM All key vulnerabilities to be mitigated (e.g. access points) by hard
and soft measures.
May involve creating standoff from venue and controlling adja-
cent access routes
Guard Force - Pe-
rimeter
Dedicated and appropriately trained perimeter guard force with
patrol and response functions.
Perimeter patrols (all areas) at least once every 30 minutes.
Initial response capability to be maximum of 2 minutes from de-
tection of breach to deployment to scene /interception.
Areas of the perimeter not under constant surveillance (using
technology or people) will require additional manned guarding.
Guard Force –
Search and Screen-
ing
Dedicated search & screening staff that are well trained (to
recognised standards), with some experience (gained either op-
erational deployments or through exercises) and are well super-
vised. All staff must have participated in event specific training.
Guard Force – Other Additional manned guarding will be required for the protection
of high-risk assets for in venue security.
Additional manned guarding will be required for HVM measures,
both hard and soft.
Additional security functions to be conducted by non-security
staff (e.g. stewards), such as ‘routine search pre/post sporting
session, detecting possible hostile reconnaissance particularly at
vulnerable points.
Additional training to be provided to non-security staff.
Command, Control
& Communication
(C3)
Facility to be established to enable live monitoring of perimeter
and venue security systems, alarm verification/assessment and
control of initial guard force response (as defined in guarding
requirement).
Facility to be capable of managing incidents and liaison with
emergency services.
C2 capability to have good levels of resilience.
MAJOR SPORT EVENTS SAFETY AND SECURITY FRAMEWORK’S CORE ELEMENTS 153
Defensive Search Defensive search (lockdown) to give high levels of assurance that
there are no IED’s or firearms in a venue. Venue security staff and
stewards may to be used for some search areas (i.e. public areas).
Search and screening security to be implemented and maintained
during and following search to ensure integrity. Further mainte-
nance searches of key vulnerable areas (red areas) during events.
For new buildings and for overlay, non-accessible voids to be
subject to a formal and auditable inspection regime prior to clo-
sure.
Blast Mitigation All new build venues will be subject to structural blast mitigation
design measures and / or siting of asset to minimise impact of
blast considerations
Existing venues by exception may be subject to retrofitting of
blast mitigation measures following risk assessment.
Subject to risk assessment, the most robust temporary grand-
stands available will be selected for use.
Once the tier levels and the attendant protective security assurance are de-
fined, the Standard Plan provides the detailed design guidance and specifi-
cations for each of the identified security spaces and functions required for
the operations. Where the standard design could not meet the site’s specific
requirements, adaptations can be made providing they adhere to the protective
security assurance per each venue’s tier. The elements detailed in the Standard
Plan can be divided into physical, technological and procedural, such as:
Fencing: to ensure the integrity of sites after security measures are imple-
mented;
Vehicle search area: to screen all vehicles entering a games’ site and ensur-
ing they are free of prohibited and illegal items;
Pedestrian search area: to screen all persons entering the games’ site to
ensure they are not in possession of prohibited or illegal item;
Security technology equipment to deter and detect a possible adversary,
namely CCTV surveillance system, pedestrian intrusion detection system
(PIDS) and public lighting;
Law enforcement personnel and private contract security staff deployment
to deter, detect and respond to a criminal act;
Vehicle dispatch center: area where all vehicles and materials are subject-
ed to search before materials are delivered to a venue;
Vendor secure certification scheme: suppliers allowed to pre-screen mate-
rials for direct delivery to venues;
Accreditation and access control: to manage, monitor and allow accredit-
ed persons access to the venue or controlled area;
154 GIOVANNI PISAPIA
Security awareness training for operators (e.g. drivers, loading personnel):
see something/say something policy;
Security elements related to vehicle access to venues: road closures, park-
ing restrictions, hostile vehicle mitigation (HVM) measures and automat-
ic number plate recognition (ANPR) cameras for the protection from an
unauthorized vehicle entry to games’ site;
The standard plan provides a clear indication of the approved security
mitigations, detailed in the venue security plans, with a concrete estimation
of the related costs.
7. Event Venue Security Plans
An intelligence-led, risk-based approach is the foundation to define appro-
priate and proportionate safety and security measures linked to ascertained
risks and envisaged countermeasures. This approach is the foundation for
the drafting of effective security plans, which are informed by the venues’
risk assessment and management exercise and the indications of the security
elements detailed in the Standard Plan.
The key component of the venue security plans are the following:
Asset protection, pre games-time;
Physical infrastructure (e.g. fencing, CCTV, PIDs and HVM);
Security personnel requirements, delivered through multiple supply sourc-
es to meet the security needs, managed usually through three major supply
routes: law enforcement agencies, private contract security and military9;
Technological equipment for search and screening;
Command, control & communication (C3) structure and operations;
Policy, procedures and contingency plans variations;
Daily Run Sheets;
Venue countermeasures, as per the risk assessment and management exercise;
Operational equipment requirements and provision;
Resources requirements overview;
One the security plans are drafted, before they are implemented during
games-time, these are tested in part or entirely to ensure they are reliable and
accurate, in particular when implemented in cooperation with other role-players.
9 To increase capacity, usually agreements are established beforehand to ensure military forces
assist with Games’ security operations for such role as static protection of sites or search and
screening operatives, in case threat increases or if private contract security personnel is not suffi-
ciently available to conduct those operations during the Games. Another aspect to bear in mind
is the pressure on law enforcement agencies to provide additional resources for business as usual
policing during the event, which limit the number of officers available for event-related roles.
MAJOR SPORT EVENTS SAFETY AND SECURITY FRAMEWORK’S CORE ELEMENTS 155
8. Event Operational Testing and Readiness Programme
The venue security operational testing and readiness phase consists in
ensuring that the security plans are finalized, understood and can be imple-
mented effectively at each site.
Test events can range from small, unadvertised private invitational events,
with no public spectators, to world championship with significant public interest
and attendance. In each test, different elements can be tested, depending on the
requirements and appropriateness of each event. Thus, irrespective of the threat
and risk level, usually security measures (e.g. vehicle screening, access control,
communications) are implemented to test and exercise staff, systems and process-
es. This phase consists in making sure all the integrated security measures are
ready for the operations in cooperation and coordination with other role-players.
Part of the readiness element consists in conducting table-top exercises,
where operational plans are reviewed with all relevant stakeholder to ensure
alignment and seamless implementation among partners. Instead, testing
refers specifically to the implementation of operations by more than one
role-player to ensure the effective delivery during games-time. Part of this
endeavour is the setting up of effective performance management principles
for key contractors, such as private security personnel, and the support for all
staff to fulfil their role during the event.
9. Event Debriefing Report
The rounding up of a major sport event is probably one of the most im-
portant elements of the framework as it looks at the event’s legacy and allows
the retention of best practices after the games.
During the planning phase, some of the organizations involved in the event
have to go through a steep learning curve to absorb new techniques to plan com-
plex projects. For example, law enforcement agencies have experience in man-
aging security during sport events but might lack knowledge in long-term strate-
gic planning. Skills in the police environment consist, from a standard policing
approach, to respond promptly to issues, while there is a lacking of capability in
long-term planning through the drafting of complex documentation and the ef-
fective coordination of many stakeholders with specific objectives and purposes.
The learned new techniques utilized to organize effectively a well-man-
aged and peaceful event can be transferred to other endeavours in the com-
plex public safety environment. It is thus important, during this last phase of
the framework, to detail all strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of
staging a major event to build capabilities for the organization going forward.
156 GIOVANNI PISAPIA
10. Conclusions
This article highlights the main elements required for the planning and
operational delivery of a safe and well-managed major sport event through
the identification of a comprehensive and sound framework. However, as the
framework is a general blueprint to approach the safety and security planning
of a major event, it cannot be identically implemented in different contexts.
Instead, it provides a guidance for the development of specific approaches to
safety and security planning for future major sport events. Therefore, in order
to implement it effectively, there is the need to understand the idiosyncrasies
of the location where events take place, in particular the safety and security
setting within the host city, and then fully tailor-maid the framework in line
with the local context, characterized by specific governance, processes, so-
cial, political and economic characteristics. It is thus of outmost importance
the understanding of the host city’s governmental structure and its relation
with the local organizing committee and law enforcement agencies, who are
ultimately responsible for organizing a peaceful event.
The three basic principles to host peaceful major events for future host cit-
ies consist in approaching the planning as business as usual, employing an in-
telligence-led/risk-based approach to adopt any safety and security measure,
and effective coordination between all partners, including the cooperation
between government agencies and departments with the organizing commit-
tee and other relevant stakeholders.
As detailed in the article, the foundation of the security strategy for a major
event consists in how public safety obligations are already delivered and who is
responsible to address specific risks within a host city. However, because of the
sheer scale of the project, specific additionalities would need to be incorporated
within the already existing governance structure, to ensure ad hoc requirements
are identified, sourced and allocated. Thus, those who have responsibility to
manage public safety and address specific types of risks on a daily basis should
not change during the event. Instead, these should be the ones responsible for
the delivery of the event. The event’s magnitude and its requirements neces-
sitates specific additionalities, which would need to be addressed during the
planning phase with adequate resources, knowledge and funding.
In addition, the use an intelligence-led/risk-based approach to determine
practical safety and security operational objectives is of outmost importance
to ensure the resources to secure the event are correctly identified, sourced
and provided when needed. Once the necessary countermeasures are identi-
fied, the framework supports the processes of translating needs into factual re-
quirements and turn them into actual resources to be sourced and allocated.
MAJOR SPORT EVENTS SAFETY AND SECURITY FRAMEWORK’S CORE ELEMENTS 157
Furthermore, it is of outmost importance to ensure that single pieces of the
operational jigsaw come together into a single holistic and integrated strategic
and operational plan. This requires additional efforts to enhance and achieve
cooperation between partners. Such coordination necessitate the creation of a
clear framework and process to ensure all plans are integrated and all resources,
required to secure the event, are made available to address specific risks.
For a new project, it is thus important to clearly understand the framework
within which public safety is being delivered, the risk approach and the co-
operation between agencies before it is possible to establish new supporting
structures, such as committees, to facilitate the successful delivery of the event.
The challenge to host a successful event remains the need to ensure an in-
tegrated approach to the execution of operational tasks. The ability to under-
stand the nuisances of different client groups from various parts of the word,
with different languages, cultures and expectations, is important to ensure
effective service delivery during the operations.
The framework presented in this paper allows decision-making to keep the
planning and ultimately the operations running at the pace required to deliv-
er a well-managed event. However, the human element remains of outmost
importance: A fundamental part of successfully planning and executing safety
and security operations for a major sport event is to build strong relationships
and trust between different partners from the outset of the project to be able
to move faster with the deliverables as the event approaches. The difficulty of
such endeavour is the sheer amount of representatives of public and private
organizations that need to be included within the planning of the event and
that need to be consulted and have their input taken into consideration when
drafting operational documentation such as policies and procedures. This
represent one of the main challenges to stage a successful major event.
Annex: List of Acronyms
Full Name Acronym
Automatic Number Plate Recognition ANPR
Command, Control and Communications C3
Department for Transport (UK) DfT
Hostile Vehicle Mitigation HVM
Improvised Explosive Device IED
Italian Team for Security, Terroristic Issues & Managing Emergencies ITSTIME
Major Sport Events MSE
Olympic Safety & Security Strategic Risk Assessment OSSSRA
Organizing Committee OC
158 GIOVANNI PISAPIA
Pedestrian Intrusion Detection System PIDS
Pedestrian Screening Areas PSA
Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvise Explosive Device SVBIED
United Kingdom UK
Vehicle Screening Areas VSA
References Cited
C  J (2011) Delivering a Promise, Creating a Legacy. City of Jo-
hannesburg: 2010 FIFA World Cup, Cut to Black.
MD D (2014) Security Standards Plan: Physical Security, Version
D3.0, 10th Feb 2014, Glasgow 2014 Limited. Unpublished document.
D  C, M  S (2008) Guide to Safety at Sports
Grounds, Fifth edition. Retrieved on 21st September 2016 at: http://www.safetyat-
sportsgrounds.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/green-guide.pdf
G C  I S (GCIS), 2010 Com-
munication Project Management Unit, 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa. Re-
trieved on the 18th September 2016 at: http://www.gcis.gov.za/sites/www.gcis.gov.
za/files/docs/resourcecentre/multimedia/sa2010_govprep.pdf
MI5 (2016) Threat Web Page. Assessed on the 19th September 2016 at: https://www.
mi5.gov.uk/threat-levels
P G (2016) Transport Security Project (TSP) Methodology during Major
Sport Events, Fascicolo 3, Sicurezza, Terrorismo e Società/Security, Terrorism So-
ciety, International Journal of the Italian Team for Security, Terroristic Issues and
Managing Emergencies (ITSTIME), June 2016. Accessed on the 19th September
2016 at: http://www.sicurezzaterrorismosocieta.it/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/
Planning-Security-Measures-Pisapia.pdf
UK G (2010) A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National
Security Strategy. Retrieved on the 18th September 2016 at: http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121015000000/http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_con-
sum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191639.pdf
UK H O (2011a) London 2012 Olympic & Paralympic Safety and Security
Strategic Risk Assessment (OSSRAa) and Risk Mitigation Process. Summary, Version
2, 2011. Retrieved on the 18th September 2016 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97982/osssra-summary.pdf
UK H O (2011b) London 2012: Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Secu-
rity Strategy. Retrieved on the 18th September 2016 at: https://www.gov.uk/gov-
ernment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97983/olympic-safety-se-
curity-strategy.pdf.
4
2016
4
La Rivista semestrale Sicurezza, Terrorismo e Società intende la Sicurezza come una
condizione che risulta dallo stabilizzarsi e dal mantenersi di misure proattive capaci
di promuovere il benessere e la qualità della vita dei cittadini e la vitalità democratica
delle istituzioni; affronta il fenomeno del Terrorismo come un processo complesso, di
lungo periodo, che affonda le sue radici nelle dimensioni culturale, religiosa, politica
ed economica che caratterizzano i sistemi sociali; propone alla Società – quella degli
studiosi e degli operatori e quella ampia di cittadini e istituzioni – strumenti di com-
prensione, analisi e scenari di tali fenomeni e indirizzi di gestione delle crisi.
Sicurezza, Terrorismo e Società si avvale dei contributi di studiosi, policy maker, analisti,
operatori della sicurezza e dei media interessati all’ambito della sicurezza, del terrorismo
e del crisis management. Essa si rivolge a tutti coloro che operano in tali settori, volendo
rappresentare un momento di confronto partecipativo e aperto al dibattito.
La rivista ospita contributi in più lingue, preferendo l’italiano e l’inglese, per ciascuno
dei quali è pubblicato un Executive Summary in entrambe le lingue. La redazione solle-
cita particolarmente contributi interdisciplinari, commenti, analisi e ricerche attenti alle
principali tendenze provenienti dal mondo delle pratiche.
Sicurezza, Terrorismo e Società è un semestrale che pubblica 2 numeri all’anno.
Oltre ai due numeri programmati possono essere previsti e pubblicati numeri speciali.
EDUCatt - Ente per il Diritto allo Studio Universitario dell’Università Cattolica
Largo Gemelli 1, 20123 Milano - tel. 02.72342235 - fax 02.80.53.215
e-mail: editoriale.dsu@educatt.it (produzione) - librario.dsu@educatt.it (distribuzione)
redazione: redazione@itstime.it
web: www.sicurezzaterrorismosocieta.it
ISBN: 978-88-9335-108-9
Sicurezza, Terrorismo e Società
Euro 20,00
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.
Delivering a Promise, Creating a Legacy
  • Johannesburg City Of
City of Johannesburg (2011) Delivering a Promise, Creating a Legacy. City of Johannesburg: 2010 FIFA World Cup, Cut to Black.
Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds, Fifth edition
  • Macdonald Deniece
MacDonald Deniece (2014) Security Standards Plan: Physical Security, Version D3.0, 10 th Feb 2014, Glasgow 2014 Limited. Unpublished document. Department for Culture, Media and Sport (2008) Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds, Fifth edition. Retrieved on 21 st September 2016 at: http://www.safetyatsportsgrounds.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/green-guide.pdf Government Communication and Information System (GCIS), 2010 Communication Project Management Unit, 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa. Retrieved on the 18th September 2016 at: http://www.gcis.gov.za/sites/www.gcis.gov. za/files/docs/resourcecentre/multimedia/sa2010_govprep.pdf MI5 (2016) Threat Web Page. Assessed on the 19th September 2016 at: https://www. mi5.gov.uk/threat-levels
Threat Web Page. Assessed on the
MI5 (2016) Threat Web Page. Assessed on the 19th September 2016 at: https://www. mi5.gov.uk/threat-levels
Planning-Security-Measures-Pisapia.pdf UK Government (2010) A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy. Retrieved on the 18 th
  • Pisapia Giovanni
Pisapia Giovanni (2016) Transport Security Project (TSP) Methodology during Major Sport Events, Fascicolo 3, Sicurezza, Terrorismo e Società/Security, Terrorism Society, International Journal of the Italian Team for Security, Terroristic Issues and Managing Emergencies (ITSTIME), June 2016. Accessed on the 19 th September 2016 at: http://www.sicurezzaterrorismosocieta.it/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/ Planning-Security-Measures-Pisapia.pdf UK Government (2010) A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy. Retrieved on the 18 th September 2016 at: http://webarchive. nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121015000000/http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_con-sum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191639.pdf UK Home Office (2011a) London 2012 Olympic & Paralympic Safety and Security Strategic Risk Assessment (OSSRAa) and Risk Mitigation Process. Summary, Version 2, 2011. Retrieved on the 18 th September 2016 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/ uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97982/osssra-summary.pdf UK Home Office (2011b) London 2012: Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security Strategy. Retrieved on the 18 th September 2016 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97983/olympic-safety-security-strategy.pdf.