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Religion and sexuality: between- and within-individual differences in attitudes to pre-marital cohabitation among adolescents in four European countries
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies
Abstract
In light of growing concerns about the acculturation prospects of Europe’s ethnic minorities, this study explores the role of religious affiliation and religiosity in the formation of attitudes towards cohabitation among young people with an immigrant background and majority populations in Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands and England. Evidence from the cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses of the CILS4EU data largely shows that ethnic minority Muslims and Christians, from both majority and minority ethnic groups, who are (or become) more religious reject sexual liberalisation to a greater extent. Less religious adolescents – including Muslims – are just as tolerant of sexual liberalisation as religiously unaffiliated youths. These patterns remain stable independent of ethnic origin, migration status and socio-economic background in the cross-sectional models and when controlling for structural transitions, cultural and social influences in the longitudinal analyses. These and related findings are discussed in the context of the immigrant integration scholarship, the literature on religion and value orientations, as well as youth transition research.
... Furthermore, the influence of third parties is particularly relevant in the realm of religion given that most religious denominations contain rules on interfaith partnerships, which are-to a varying degree-enforced by their members and religious institutions. Previous research generally posits that, in comparison to other religions prevalent in Western societies, Islam is characterised by stricter rules and more rigorous enforcement mechanisms (Kalmijn & Kraaykamp, 2018;Kogan & Weißmann, 2020;Röder, 2015). ...
... The divergence in societal attitudes and demographic behaviour between Muslims and non-Muslims is also evident in research on immigrants in Western Europe (Drouhot & Nee, 2019), with studies showing more traditional attitudes towards sexual liberalisation (e.g. Kogan & Weißmann, 2020;Soehl, 2017) and gender equality (e.g. Diehl et al., 2009;Kretschmer, 2018) among Muslim immigrants and their offspring in Germany. ...
... This differs greatly from secular family law in Western countries (Esposito, 2001;Moghadam, 2003). Although this secular family law also applies to Muslims living in Western countries, previous research has suggested that the influence of religious institutions and family remains stronger among Muslim immigrants compared to members of the Christian or non-religious majority (Kogan & Weißmann, 2020). Given a stronger impact of third parties and social control for Muslim compared to Christians, we expect: ...
Preferences for homogamous partnerships, not only in terms of having a partner with the same ethnicity, but one with the same religion, are an important factor in explaining low levels of interethnic partnerships in Western countries. However, previous research has rarely explicitly focused on the role of preferences for partnership formation patterns. Using data from a factorial survey experiment, which was implemented in the 9th wave of the “Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries” among young adults in Germany (CILS4EU-DE), this study explores patterns of religious homophily in partnership preferences among young adults in Germany. It thereby specifically focuses on individuals belonging to two major religious groups: Christians and Muslims. It investigates the effects of religious denomination, religiosity, type of intimate partnership, and gender differences for religious homophily in partnership preferences. Both male and female respondents were found to prefer partners of the same religious denomination, with this effect being stronger among Muslims than Christians. Muslim respondents showed no or little disapproval of more strongly religious partners, whereas Christian respondents showed strong disapproval of more religious partners. Among Christian and male Muslim but not among female Muslim respondents, preferences for religious homophily were lower for casual partnerships than for marriage. Overall, the findings suggest that religious homophily and religion play an important part in shaping partnership choices among young Christian and Muslim adults in Germany.
... For interreligious romantic relationships, the sources of the gender gap are well-established. More than Muslim boys, Muslim girls are confronted with religious norms that constrain their interreligious romantic relationships, particularly endogamy norms that disapprove of girls' interreligious romantic relationships (Carol and Teney, 2015;Van Pottelberge, Dupont, Caestecker, Van de Putte & Lievens, 2019) and norms on female chastity (Abo-Zena, 2019;Saharso, van Hoogstraaten, Claassen & Jokic, 2023) that most non-Muslim youth do not share (Kogan and Weißmann 2020;Yip and Page, 2016). ...
... Furthermore, dominant interpretations of the Qur'an prohibit marriage between Muslim women and Christian or Jewish men, but not between Muslim men and Christian or Jewish women (Cila and Lalonde, 2014;Munniksma, Flache, Verkuyten & Veenstra, 2012). Due to the tight link between family reputation and female purity, chastity norms are also much stronger among Muslim girls than among Muslim boys (Cense, 2014;Hawkey et al. 2018;Kogan and Weißmann 2020). On top of gendered endogamy norms, intergroup dating is further complicated for Muslim girls who have internalized these chastity norms. ...
... On top of gendered endogamy norms, intergroup dating is further complicated for Muslim girls who have internalized these chastity norms. Many Western non-Muslims do not share these norms and thus are reluctant to deal with the expectations they come with, such as a renunciation of premarital physical intimacy (Kogan and Weißmann 2020). ...
... To not further add to the idea that strict norms about premarital sex and sex segregation are exclusive for Muslims, and because we suspected that their experiences might cut across ethnic and religious boundaries, we included participants from different ethnic and religious backgrounds, who all come from communities where premarital sex is prohibited and sex segregation is expected. 2 Also, the literature often discusses views and attitudes (Kogan and Weißmann 2020;Williams, Irby, and Warner 2018), while how young people experience and negotiate these restrictive norms regarding sexuality gets less attention. The present study aims to make up for this gap by focussing on how young men and women from these communities experience these norms and thus give them a voice. ...
... As virginity is so important for women, we searched what could explain that well over a third of the young women has had sexual intercourse. Some are highly educated, which is in line with acculturation theory that expects the highly educated to be more acculturated and hence to have more liberal sexual views (Kogan and Weißmann 2020). The Muslim young women who have had penetrative sex are highly educated, but there are also highly educated Muslim women, the deeply religious ones, who (want to) abstain from premarital sex. ...
... 7. Hawkey, Ussher, and Perz (2018) found that also women discuss virginity in terms of purity. 8. Cf. Kogan and Weißmann's (2020) finding that highly religious individuals whether of Islamic or Christian background reject premarital cohabitation (and premarital sex) irrespective of other background characteristics like education. 9. Yip and Page (2016) also found this strategy, but in their study, it was employed by young men. ...
While restrictive norms on premarital sexuality are not exclusive for Muslims, most of the research on premarital sexuality is on Muslim women, while young men are virtually absent. This Dutch study also includes young people of other religious backgrounds and young men. It discusses how the 55 young people who were interviewed experience and navigate the virginity imperative and norm of sex segregation. The deeply religious young people experience virginity as a deep moral value. Others do not subscribe to the virginity imperative, but neither do they openly rebel. Many young women have had secret sexual relationships. While young men are believed to enjoy more sexual liberties, our male participants also felt monitored in their love life. These young people refrain from openly rebelling, because they do not want to disgrace their parents. By taking responsibility for their parents’ well-being in their sexual choices, they demonstrate a relational sexual agency.
... This study unpacks the relation between Islamic religiosity and support for (or hostility toward) gender equality, by disaggregating Islamic religiosity and assessing how its impacts are dependent on the hostility of the context. In doing so, we diverge from both right-wing populists' assumptions that there is one essentialist Islam that is necessarily hostile to women's empowerment Phalet et al., 2013;Kogan and Weißmann, 2020) and the majority of public studies that compare Muslims to other people and attribute any differences to patriarchal Islam (e.g., Diehl et al., 2009;Norris and Inglehart, 2012;Kalmijn and Kraaykamp, 2018). Instead of one patriarchal Islam, we argue that there is great diversity in the meanings Muslims attach to their religion and therefore disaggregate Islamic religiosity and its effects in different contexts. ...
... The second aspect of Islamic religiosity we disentanglefeelings of religious identification-have been linked to both conservative and progressive outcomes. Some studies report that stronger identification decreases progressive values (e.g., Kogan and Weißmann, 2020), whereas other studies find nileffects (Glas et al., 2018), and yet others report identifications to increase support for gender equality (Glas et al., 2019). To resolve this paradox, we propose that religious identifications set several processes in motion, some of them are more feminist, some are more patriarchal, and gendered processes might provide a first explanation of which gets the upper handanother might flow from the context, as we will discuss further down below. ...
... Diverging from this approach, this study addressed diversity among European Muslims, which allows us to consider that there is no one way to live Islam to which all Muslims adhere (Ginges et al., 2009;Beller et al., 2021;Glas and Spierings, 2021). Instead, we argue that Islamic religiosity is flexible: it consists of multiple dimensions, which, in turn, relate to gender values in different ways through meaning-giving processes that are gendered, subject to change, and dependent on contextual circumstances Phalet et al., 2013;Beek and Fleischmann, 2020;Kogan and Weißmann, 2020). Testing this framework using a pooled dataset that uniquely covers over 9,000 Muslims in 16 European countries between 2008 and 2019 and multilevel analyses, our results show that mosque attendance, religious identification, and individual prayer shape Muslims' support for public-sphere gender equality in far more complex ways than we expected-let alone any right-wing populist claim on one essential patriarchal Islam captures. ...
Right-wing populist voices argue that Muslims do not belong in Western Europe because Islam opposes the “core Western value” of women's empowerment. Ironically, such hostilities could cause European Muslims to reject antagonistic natives and their “Western values,” potentially creating backlashes in Muslims' support for gender equality. Delving into this possibility, this study diverges from simple conceptualizations of one inherently patriarchal Islam to study the diversity among Muslims in the gendered meanings they attach to their religion in different contexts. Empirically, we use a uniquely pooled dataset covering over 9,000 European Muslims in 16 Western European countries between 2008 and 2019. Multilevel models show that while mosque attendance limits support for public-sphere gender equality, religious identifications only do so among men and individual prayer only among women. Additionally, our results tentatively indicate that in more hostile contexts, prayer's effects become more patriarchal while religious identification's connection to opposition to gender equality weakens. We conclude that Islamic religiosities shape Muslims' support for public-sphere gender equality in far more complex ways than any right-wing populist claim on one essential patriarchal Islam captures.
... While scholarly work on religion has tended to side-line sexuality, research on sexuality has apparently disregarded the impact of religion on sexual values, attitudes and lived experiences. Only a limited number of studies have examined the intersection of religion and sexuality (Kalmijn & Kraaykamp, 2018;Kogan & Weißmann, 2020;Wong et al., 2017;Yip et al., 2011). Few of the available studies on the role of religious affiliation or religiosity in attitudes towards sexuality have tended to focus on family socialisation, educational level, employment status, mass media, and schooling (Kalmijn & Kraaykamp, 2018;Kogan & Weißmann, 2020). ...
... Only a limited number of studies have examined the intersection of religion and sexuality (Kalmijn & Kraaykamp, 2018;Kogan & Weißmann, 2020;Wong et al., 2017;Yip et al., 2011). Few of the available studies on the role of religious affiliation or religiosity in attitudes towards sexuality have tended to focus on family socialisation, educational level, employment status, mass media, and schooling (Kalmijn & Kraaykamp, 2018;Kogan & Weißmann, 2020). However, the role of non-formal Islamic education (NFIE) has been almost entirely absent in these discussions, as if Muslim youth do not spend a relatively long period of time in these settings, learning about Islamic norms, values, and principles Cherti & Bradely, 2011). ...
... Furthermore, rather than focusing on a single Muslim community, the study looks at four different Muslim communities: Turkish, Moroccan, Egyptian and Pakistani communities in the Netherlands. Most of the available research on sexuality and religion has taken a quantitative approach (Kalmijn & Kraaykamp, 2018;Kogan & Weißmann, 2020); using a qualitative approach enables an open exploration of the lived experiences of Muslim youth. Moreover, religious young adults could "benefit from hearing the stories of their contemporaries to understand the wide range of experiences and negotiations in their religious and sexual lives" (Yip et al., 2011, p. 5). ...
This qualitative study seeks to examine the sexuality-related values and norms that Muslim youth are taught and socialised into at non-formal Islamic education settings, compares these with values and norms conveyed at secondary schools, and then identifies the ways in which Muslim youth navigate these distinct messages and competing pressures around this subject. The data are based on 62 semi-structured in-depth interviews with young adults and secondary school students from four Muslim communities in the Netherlands (Turkish, Moroccan, Pakistani and Egyptian). The study reveals that explicit messaging as well as institutional practices in mosques convey a specific narrative about proper conduct between the sexes that prohibits sexual conduct before marriage, and in some cases, even any form of touching or socialising. This collides with the institutional practices and educational content in mainstream secondary schools, which are co-educational and provide sexuality education. Three strands of attitudinal choices young Muslims make are identified: opting for chastity, re-negotiating the norm, and embracing romantic entanglements, all having different ramifications for the wellbeing and relationships of these young people.
... Foner and Alba 2008). For instance, Muslims' traditional Islamic beliefs and values are considered to be in conflict with the liberal sexual and gender equality norms of Western societies (Koopmans 2016; see also Kogan and Weißmann 2019). Previous research confirms a negative link between religiosity and integration amongst first-generation Muslim immigrants (e.g. ...
... Several studies consider Muslims' attitudes towards the position of women within the household and sexual liberties, including the acceptance of homosexuality, as indicators of their adaptation to the host society's cultural values (e.g. Kogan and Weißmann 2019;Maliepaard and Alba 2016;Scheible and Fleischmann 2013). Islam holds allegedly traditional views regarding these matters (e.g. ...
... Norris and Inglehart 2012) we found that more religious immigrants hold more traditional ideas about sexual and marital norms. This association is equally strong for both immigrant generations, which illustrates the intertwinement of religiosity with conservative norms and values regarding these matters (Abukhalil 1997; also see Kogan and Weißmann 2019). ...
Public debates on Muslim migration to Europe often describe religiosity as a barrier to immigrant integration. Among the first generation, negative correlations between Muslims’ religiosity and integration were indeed found, but among the second generation, religion and integration are more often decoupled. To examine whether the relation between religion and integration differs across immigrant generations, this study compares foreign-born with local-born Turkish and Moroccan minorities in the Netherlands based on the NELLS data (N = 1,776). We analyse how religiosity (religious identification and practices) relates to eight indicators of immigrant integration and find it to be unrelated to socio-economic participation, Dutch contacts, national identification and gender egalitarianism, but negatively related to Dutch friendships, language skills and sexual liberalism in both generations. Only the association between religiosity and educational attainment in the Netherlands differs across generations, and changes from negative in the first to non-significant in the second generation.
... In Turkey, similar to many societies, pre-marital sexual activity is generally seen play a significant role in women's decisions to abstain from sexual experiences (Evcili et al., 2013). Studies have shown that Muslim individuals are generally less likely to engage in premarital sex (Kadri et al., 2007;Kogan & Weißmann, 2020;Simbar et al., 2005). The strict religious stance on this issue can lead to various fears and behaviors of sexual avoidance (Kalmuss, 2004;Karacan & Balamir Bektaş, 2016). ...
... However, some women considered premarital sexual experience positively in terms of trust and relationship quality. In the related literature, premarital sexual experience is often seen as conflicting with moral values and viewed as a sinful and prohibited act from a religious perspective (Evcili et al., 2013;İlkkaracan, 2001;Kadri et al., 2007;Kalmuss, 2004;Kogan & Weißmann, 2020;Ozansoy-Tunçdemir, 2018;Simbar et al., 2005;Sani & Quaranta, 2017). In Turkey, a substantial segment of the population holds the perspective that sexuality is considered legitimate exclusively within the confines of marriage. ...
The societal perception of engaging in sexual activity prior to marriage is widely considered inappropriate in various cultures. Despite a growing tolerance over time, premarital sexual encounters generally carry negative connotations. In Turkey, premarital sexual activity is regarded as a topic that is considered taboo within society. Additionally, differing perspectives between gender.s are prevalent on this issue. Consequently, the aim of this study is to examine how married working women perceive the experience of sexuality before marriage. This study employed a phenomenological approach within the framework of qualitative research methodologies. Conducted in January 2024, it involved 12 married working women who volunteered to participate and reside in Turkey. Data obtained from semi-structured interviews with these women underwent meticulous analysis using content analysis. The findings reveal that a substantial majority of married working women, specifically 75%, do not consider premarital sexual experiences to be appropriate. Moreover, 83% of the participants perceive that such experiences could have a negative impact on marriage. The participants indicated a preference against engaging in premarital sexual experiences, as they believe such actions are inconsistent with their religious and moral values. Additionally, the data suggest that a significant portion of their families (83%) and the sociocultural environment (67%) generally hold a negative perspective regarding premarital sexual experiences. These outcomes were subsequently deliberated within the framework of pertinent literature, resulting in the proposal of several recommendations.
... Finally, we include individuals' religion, separating the measures of the intensity of belief (religiosity), and self-described religious affiliation (religion). Both can have an effect on social values in that religions may prescribe specific norms and moral rules regarding behaviour while religiosity captures the degree to which an individual practises their religion and thus adheres to these norms [52]. In previous research, both religion and religiosity, have shown to be strong predictors of immigrants' social values, with Muslim and more religious individuals being more against gender equality [27,28], homosexuality [30-32, 46, 53], premarital co-habitation [52], and hold more conservative views on sexual and reproductive rights [35,54]. ...
... Both can have an effect on social values in that religions may prescribe specific norms and moral rules regarding behaviour while religiosity captures the degree to which an individual practises their religion and thus adheres to these norms [52]. In previous research, both religion and religiosity, have shown to be strong predictors of immigrants' social values, with Muslim and more religious individuals being more against gender equality [27,28], homosexuality [30-32, 46, 53], premarital co-habitation [52], and hold more conservative views on sexual and reproductive rights [35,54]. ...
Concerns have been raised that immigrants coming to Europe bring fundamentally different social values, affecting the more liberal receiving societies negatively. However, the topic of immigrants’ social values is understudied, and much research studies only one issue at a time, lacking a systematic approach to compare immigrants and native-born across issues. We study the social values of immigrants in Sweden using a large sample of newly arrived immigrants and their opinions on 35 different moral issues. Our results indicate a large heterogeneity across different issues, with, on average, a general tendency towards liberal social values among immigrants. We find that individual characteristics are more important than characteristics of the country of origin in explaining variation of social values between immigrants. Religiosity has the largest effect, with more religious individuals having more conservative stances. Using external data sources, we compare immigrants with native-born regarding both average positions on different issues, and the correlation between issue positions. Compared with the native-born, immigrants have, on average, somewhat more conservative values, but the underlying values structure is the same.
... As the disadvantaged groups in the receiving countries' marriage markets, immigrants received relatively insufficient focus on their family formation strategy, especially their cohabitations (Carol et al., 2014;Kogan & Weißmann, 2019). Previous cross-national studies about cohabitation mostly compare citizens from different nationalities (Heuveline & Timberlake, 2004) and focus on socioeconomic levels, institutional support or specific characteristics of each country. ...
... It has been shown that cohabitation can be especially common among disadvantaged minority groups, such as Blacks and Hispanics in the US (Bumpass & Lu, 2000). To our knowledge, only a limited number of studies are available on cohabitation among ethnic groups in Europe (Carol et al., 2014;Kogan & Weißmann, 2019). These studies, moreover, mostly consider larger ethnic minorities, often with a Muslim background. ...
Using data of Chinese immigrants extracted from the Belgian National Register registering a cohabitation or marriage between 2005 and 2015 (N = 3945), this study aims to advance the understanding of cohabitation among disadvantaged groups in local marriage markets. From the difference in prevalence of cohabitation between Chinese men and women, we conclude that Chinese immigrants could use cohabitation rather as a practical living arrangement in the context of recent migration rather than as an alternative to marriage, as the receiving society does. The practical living strategy of ethnic minorities enhances our understanding of cohabitation among disadvantaged groups, for whom the choice for cohabiting would be largely influenced by the home familial culture.
... In other words, major divine religions aim to have moral guidelines and set community expectations, thereby significantly affecting personal attitudes. For example, Christianity, Islam, and Orthodox Judaism do not accept premarital sexual relations and therefore, sexual restriction and sexual conservative views can be found in any religion (Kogan and Weißmann 2020). Regardless of their religion, more religious people possess more restrictive beliefs toward sexual relations outside marriage. ...
... Regardless of their religion, more religious people possess more restrictive beliefs toward sexual relations outside marriage. Many studies found an association between religiosity and disapproval attitudes toward liberal sexual morality, abortion, and premarital sex (Ahrold and Meston 2010;Kogan and Weißmann 2020). ...
The present study examines the association between sexual morality, religion, and attitudes toward the practice of abortion in Turkey. Drawing upon data from the 2008–2010 European Value Survey in the case of Turkey, several hypotheses were tested concerning the role of liberal sexual relations and many aspects of religion on abortion attitudes. Findings reveal that support of liberal sexual relations demonstrates the strongest justification for abortion. As a religious determinant, prayer practice indicates the most robust opposition to the practice of abortion. Additional religious factors, personal religious identity, and personal faith were also found to be significantly associated with antiabortion attitudes. The findings are discussed and have implications for future research on attitudes toward abortion.
... Ein ebenfalls wachsendes Forschungsfeld sind kulturelle Einstellungen und Werte, zum Beispiel zu Geschlechterrolleneinstellungen (Röder und Mühlau 2014), Homosexualität (Röder und Spierings 2022) oder vorehelicher Kohabitation (Kogan und Weißmann 2020). Identifikation mit der ethnischen Gruppe und mit dem Aufnahmeland sind ebenfalls Gegenstand empirischer Forschung (Diehl et al. 2016), mit besonderem Augenmerk auch auf eine mögliche Mehrfachidentifikation (Fleischmann und Verkuyten 2016). ...
... Ein ebenfalls wachsendes Forschungsfeld sind kulturelle Einstellungen und Werte, zum Beispiel zu Geschlechterrolleneinstellungen (Röder und Mühlau 2014), Homosexualität (Röder und Spierings 2022) oder vorehelicher Kohabitation (Kogan und Weißmann 2020). Identifikation mit der ethnischen Gruppe und mit dem Aufnahmeland sind ebenfalls Gegenstand empirischer Forschung (Diehl et al. 2016), mit besonderem Augenmerk auch auf eine mögliche Mehrfachidentifikation (Fleischmann und Verkuyten 2016). ...
... For such studies, often only one or two questions were used to determine respondents' cohabitation attitude (e.g. Kogan & Weißmann, 2020;Rontos et al., 2017;Shields-Dutton, 2004;Xu & Ocker, 2013). therefore, to the best of our knowledge, there appears to be a dearth of standardized instruments that measure cohabitation attitudes and intentions. ...
The relationship between attitudes and behaviour is largely defined by intentions. The stronger the intention to engage in a behaviour, the greater the likelihood that attitudes will predict that behaviour. In order to predict cohabitation behaviour, both cohabitation attitudes and intentions must be measured. However, to the best of our knowledge, there appears to be a lack of standardized instruments that measure cohabitation intentions and only a few that measure cohabitation attitudes. We therefore set out to develop and validate a Cohabitation Intentions Scale (CIS) in Ghana. The CIS was developed and validated with an existing Cohabitation Attitudes Scale (CAS). The validation process was conducted in two phases: phase I with 226 respondents and phase II with 245 respondents, both from one of the public universities in Ghana. The phase I results necessitated changes to the wording of three items in the CAS and modifications to the rating scales for both the CIS and the CAS. The final instruments contained six items each which were rated on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Overall, the CIS and the CAS were found to be highly reliable and valid instruments in the Ghanaian context. These findings suggest that the new CIS can be used to measure cohabitation intentions alongside the CAS which measures cohabitation attitudes, and may predict future cohabitation behaviour.
... Furthermore, highly religious individuals should internalise religious rules to a larger degree than less religious individuals and adhere to a more conservative worldview and lifestyle. Hence, higher religiosity should result in more conservative attitudes on societal affairs (Kogan and Weißmann 2020;Kretschmer 2018), whereas a prediction on the position individuals should adopt on issues related to the economy or toward migration seems to depend on whether a person is religious at all or follows secular beliefs (e.g. Stegmueller et al. 2012). ...
Migration has become an important and polarising issue on the political agenda, in particular since the migration movements to Europe in 2015. What attitudes migrants bring to the host societies is relevant for the stability of modern democracies in general and for political representation in particular. Several studies investigate differences in attitudes and preferences between migrants and non-migrants, on the one side, and within the heterogeneous group of migrants on the other. These (differences in) attitudes among migrants are often related to the dominant patterns of political attitudes in the countries of origin. We contribute new insights to this literature using novel survey data from Germany covering subsamples of respondents with an Italian, Russian and Turkish migrant background. We argue and show empirically that migrants' positions on contentious issues like migration, the order of society, and welfare state policy are shaped not only by the cultural background of the migrant's society of origin, but also by personal characteristics like the status of a first-or second-generation migrant and their religious orientation in terms of denomination and religiosity.
... 3 The original filtering question about language use at home asks "Is there a language other than <survey country language> spoken at your home?" and followed by a question asking "In this (second) language, how often do you talk to your family?". We follow prior studies (e.g., Jasini et al., 2019;Kogan & Weißmann, 2019) and assume that another language spoken at home is one's heritage language. report using a heritage language at home in either wave. ...
Understanding the development of behavioral and mental health issues among adolescents, particularly those from immigrant families, is a key area of concern. Many prior studies have focused on the role of societal (country-of-destination) language skills, but we know less about the role played by the use of the heritage language in families. We examined this latter relationship with a focus on changes in heritage language use and internalizing and externalizing problems, and how family relations moderate this relationship. We used the first two waves (2010/2011 and 2011/2012) of the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries (CILS4EU) data collected from Germany (n = 1614; Mage = 14.8 years, 50% female), the Netherlands (n = 1203; Mage = 14.7 years, 54% female), Sweden (n = 1794; Mage = 14.2 years, 53% female), and England (n = 1359; Mage = 14.6 years, 50% female). Our results suggest that increased use of heritage language is associated with fewer externalizing problems only in families with greater family cohesion and parental warmth (in Germany and the U.K.) and with fewer internalizing problems only in families with higher parental monitoring (in the Netherlands and Sweden). Good family relations are thus an important precondition for increased heritage language use to lead to improved behavioral and mental health for children of immigrants.
... Although we did not find a significant relationship between youth religiosity/beliefs and sexual behaviors, other studies have noted that religiosity was found to decrease involvement in sexual behaviors (Kogan & Weißmann, 2019;Luquis et al., 2012). A possible explanation for this finding is that we assessed religiosity by a single question, created for this study. ...
Most youth, including those living in traditional societies, have virtually unlimited access to information through global media. These technological advances of the past few decades and the unique situation of traditional societies did not exist when frameworks, such as the Human Ecological Systems Model, were designed. As a result, an adaptation of this framework, called the Galaxy Model (GM), was created to guide this study on youth
sexuality in a traditional society. Using a community-based participatory approach and a cross-sectional design, this study examined the personal, local and global influences on sexual behavior and recruited 558 Palestinian Israeli youth, ages 16–18 years old from five different high schools. The anonymized questionnaire only included measures approved by the study’s community advisory board comprising representatives from the Palestinian Israeli traditional society. Among youth, approximately 44 % reported sexual behaviors such as use of pornography, intimate physical contact, and sexual intercourse. Although the GM exhibited good model fit predicting sexual behavior (p < 0.001) for youth living in a traditional society, most variance was explained by the personal (e.g., self-esteem, religiosity) and local (e.g., family, school) influences, rather than by global influences (e.g., internet, cultural dissonance). Accordingly, culturally- and socially-appropriate services must be created for this population of youth.
... The first set of research explores mainly religiously motivated migrations, missionaries and pilgrims, as well as the role of religious networks in migration (e.g., Wuthnow and Offutt, 2008). The second one concerns the influence of religion on various areas of immigrants' lives, such as the situation in the labor market (e.g., Connor and Koenig, 2013,), family situation (e.g., Carol, 2016), civic participation (e.g., Stepick, Rey and Mahler, 2009;Levitt, 2008), or family background and cultural capital (e.g., Kogan, and Weißmann 2020;Alba, Sloan, and Sperling 2011). In older studies on the relationship between religion and migration, religion is considered from the perspective of (non)adaptation to the host society, resources and benefits that allow immigrants to develop a sense of belonging (Hirschman, 2004;Hagan and Ebaugh, 2003), immigrant religious adaptation or patterns of immigrant religious participation (Connor, 2009). ...
This article seeks to address the intersection of migration and religion/religious affiliation of migrants in Central Europe. Increase in immigration from Ukraine to Poland observed since around 2015 has been challenging and remodeling religious relations in the relatively homogeneous country. Drawing on the qualitative research conducted in 2020 in Krakow, one of the key Polish destinations for the migrants, this article explores the strategies and choices of immigrants in relation to the religious market, and consequences of their decisions. Our research, embedded in the theoretical perspective of the economics of religion, shows the fluidity of religiosity in migration processes as well as inconsistencies in religious affiliations in the context of migration. We propose a concept of non-religious incentive for participation/church affiliation and argue that identified inconsistencies stem largely from the non-religious motivations related to the attractiveness of the goods and services offered by some religious communities.
... Los jóvenes más aculturados y los que mantienen más conflictos intrafamiliares se acogen a formas amorosas y relacionales más liberales (Kalmijn, & Kraaykamp, 2018). Por su parte, los jóvenes que llevan menos tiempo en España, proceden de zonas rurales de Marruecos, son más religiosos y cuentan con relaciones positivas familiares, mantienen formas amorosas más tradicionales y románticas (Kogan & Weißmann, 2020). Si tenemos en cuenta el género, en las mujeres marroquíes la persistencia del ideal romántico es fuerte (Soriano-Ayala, et al. 2021), expresando una visión sustentada sobre el mito romántico de la complementariedad y el encuentro del futuro marido y padre de sus hijos. ...
Los programas socioeducativos de prevención de la violencia en la pareja han demostrado ser ciegos a la diversidad étnico-cultural y sexual que existe en las relaciones adolescentes. Este estudio analiza las narrativas y los conflictos culturales en las relaciones de pareja de 25 estudiantes musulmanes de educación secundaria de origen marroquí (15-19 años). Los resultados revelan una comprensión de las relacionales mayoritariamente liberal y en la que persisten valores familiares marroquíes. Existe una diversidad de discursos respecto al amor y la pareja, aunque se mantiene el matrimonio, la monogamia y la fidelidad. Los jóvenes musulmanes refieren una visión positiva hacia los celos. Respecto a la construcción del género en la pareja, las mujeres exteriorizan vivir en constante negociación entre formas liberales y tradicionales, mientras que en los varones predomina una masculinidad tradicional. Asimismo, declaran conflictos culturales y religiosos entorno a: (1) la sexualidad, especialmente en lo relativo a la virginidad; y (2) la concepción de los roles de género y la violencia machista dentro de la familia. Los discursos muestran un triple choque cultural: intrafamiliar, con la comunidad de origen y con la comunidad española. Estos aspectos deben considerarse de cara a la adaptación transcultural de programas en contextos multiculturales.
... In honor cultures, men are expected to be aggressive toward their wives and a formal decorum of respect prevails between a husband and a wife which makes it difficult to be sexually assertive (Brown et al., 2018). Culture has a vital role in sexual arousal (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006;Marieke et al., 2020) and sexual suppression (Abdolmanafi et al., 2018;Hall, 2019;Kogan & Weißmann, 2019;Lamb & Peterson, 2012;NasrollahiMola et al., 2020;Seabrook et al., 2017;Sungur & Bez, 2016). The socio-cultural factors, as (Chao et al., 2011;Hally & Pollack, 1993;Marcus-Newhall et al., 2000;Miller & Maner, 2010;Mulhall et al., 2008;Voon et al., 2014;Yabiku & Gager, 2009). ...
Explicit and frequent verbal and non-verbal sexual communication is essential for marital satisfaction. Most of the studies on sexual communication relate to the Western cultures. The current study investigated the gaps between the actual and the desired sexually assertive verbal and non-verbal communication between husbands and wives belonging to a collectivistic Muslim culture. The study involved 207 married couples from Pakistan. A newly developed questionnaire along with ‘the longing for interpersonal touch picture questionnaire’ was used to gather data. The study revealed significant differences between the actual and the desired levels of sexually assertive communication among couples. It was found that husbands and wives were not sexually as vocal and expressive as they desired to be. Husbands, furthermore, significantly craved for hugging and stroking from their wives. The significant gap between the actual and the desired levels of sexually assertive communication was regarded as a product of certain psychosocial factors such as shame, gender, morality, modesty, culture, and female objectification.
... Sümer (2015) revealed that level of religiousness was a significant predictor in explaining Muslims young adults' negative attitudes toward masturbation and pornography. Kogan and Weißmann (2020) examined the attitudes of Christian and Muslim adolescents toward sexuality and found a positive relation between the level of religiousness and negative attitudes toward premarital sex. However, an individual's actual sexual behavior may not always align fully with one's religious beliefs and attitudes about sexual behavior (Frances, 2018). ...
Jewish religious singles may feel guilty and ashamed due to sexual behaviors that violate religious law, such as pre-matrimony sexual relations, viewing pornography, and masturbation. This study examined the relation between sexual guilt and shame (SGS) and psychological well-being, and whether this relation was moderated by level of religiousness. It was hypothesized that SGS would be negatively related to psychological well-being and that this relation would be stronger at higher levels of religiousness compared to lower levels of religiousness. Participants were single young-adult men (N = 165, Mage = 23.3) belonging to the national-orthodox Jewish community in Israel who completed online questionnaires. SGS was positively associated with anxiety and depression and negatively associated with life satisfaction. Additionally, the relations between SGS and measures of psychological well-being were moderated by the level of religiousness. However, contrary to the hypothesized moderation effect, SGS was positively related to negative psychological consequences and negatively related to life satisfaction at a low level of religiousness, whereas at a high level of religiousness no significant relationship between SGS and the psychological outcome measures was found. These findings may indicate that there may be adaptive elements in religion that can help an individual cope with SGS, and thus to negate its detrimental effects on psychological well-being.
... Immigrants, in particular those from Muslim-majority countries, are much more religious than the host country population, and religion is strongly transmitted within immigrant families. Islam has a particularly strong intergenerational persistence (Simsek et al. 2018;Jacob and Kalter 2013;Jacob 2020), and those who are more religious have more conservative attitudes (Kogan and Weißmann 2020;Röder and Lubbers 2015;Kogan 2018). Hence, religion and religiosity can potentially explain any lack of acculturation. ...
Swedes uphold progressive attitudes regarding family, sexuality, and gender norms. At the same time, Sweden has had generous immigration policies for decades. This leads to challenges for children of immigrants, who must navigate between expectations from their family and the surrounding society. Therefore, this study asks whether children of immigrants’ attitudes relating to family, sexuality and gender roles adapt and approach those of their Swedish-background peers, using the Swedish branch of the CILS4EU survey (n=5434). We account for dynamics in three ways: We compare attitudes of first- and second-generation immigrants; compare attitudes of youth to those of their parents; and study change in youth’s attitudes over time. In favour of acculturation, we find that second-generation immigrants have more liberal attitudes than first-generation immigrants, that immigrantbackground youth are closer to majority peers in attitudes than their parents are to majority parents, and that gender norms of immigrant-background youth move closer to those of Swedishbackground youth over time. For attitudes relating to family and sexuality, however, we find a divergence in attitudes over time, but not because immigrant-background youth become less liberal: Their views do become more liberal, but majority youth see an even stronger change in the same direction
... Men, on the other hand, are considered more dominant and more expressive in general (Emmerink et al., 2017;Zhang & Yip, 2018). Cultural and religious values, usually portrayed through media, play a very important role in developing or suppressing sexual assertiveness (Abdolmanafi et al., 2018;Hall, 2019;Kogan & Weißmann, 2019;Lamb & Peterson, 2012;NasrollahiMola et al., 2020;Seabrook et al., 2017;Sungur & Bez, 2016). ...
The expressions of sexual assertiveness in lyrics and poetry can be found in the literature of almost every culture. The current study, based on the earlier literature and public perception, assumed an increase in the sexually assertive content in the trending songs because of modernization. The study analyzed the content of 150 popular songs of English, Urdu, and Punjabi from 1970 to 2019 and revealed that the aforesaid assumption was quite valid until 2009. The study found a gradual increase in the frequency of sexually assertive content in English, Urdu, and Punjabi songs from 1970 to 2009. A strange shift in this trend was however observed from 2010 to 2019 whereby the frequency of sexually assertive content decreased. As the existing literature is silent in this regard, the current study opened a new gate of curiosity by sensitizing the researchers to explore the reasons of this decrease further.
... In contrast, the relation with religiosity is consistently negative with regard to specific social attitudes that demarcate the boundary between conservative and progressive factions of the population. Thus, more religious (Muslim) immigrants hold more conservative values regarding issues of sexual liberalism, such as the acceptance of premarital sexual relations, homosexuality and abortion (Becher and El-Menouar 2014;Beek and Fleischmann 2019;Eskelinen and Verkuyten 2018;Kogan and Weißmann 2019). Regarding gender equality, findings are more mixed and include negative (Becher and El-Menouar 2014;Lewis and Kashyap 2013a;Scheible and Fleischmann 2013) as well as non-significant associations (Beek and Fleischmann 2019). ...
This contribution to the special issue on religion and migration reviews two decades of large-scale survey research on changes in immigrant religion and the relationship between immigrants’ level of religiosity and their integration into European societies. The body of work reveals that Muslims in European societies stand out due to their comparatively high levels of religiosity and greater stability in religiosity over time and across immigrant generations. While the comparative picture is rather clear, findings regarding the long-term trend in Muslims’ religiosity and its association with immigrant integration are instead inconclusive. A systematic review of empirical studies of the association of (various indicators of) individual religiosity with immigrant integration reveals positive, negative and non-significant results for all outcomes and domains. Thus, based on the current state of art it is hard to assess whether and why religion forms a bridge or barrier to immigrant integration in Europe. To move the field forward, the contribution ends with a twofold proposal for a research agenda that includes a broadened empirical scope, moving beyond the focus on Sunni Muslims, and a conceptual extension that focuses on differences in reasoning about religion and religious meaning-making as additional, potentially more consistent and more powerful explanation for immigrants’ social relations and positions in their new societies
... In the light of such findings, some scholars claim that religion does not matter anymore when the focus of analysis is on immigrants' descendants (Voas andFleischmann 2012, cited in Beek andFleischmann 2020). Yet, others point out that the religiosity of migrants' children is still negatively associated with egalitarian gender role attitudes (Kretschmer 2018), values of sexual liberalism (Kogan and Weißmann 2020), majority language skills and interethnic friendships (Beek and Fleischmann 2020). The conflicting findings of the studies imply that there might be a need to re-conceptualize the definition of integration and to re-evaluate the different ways it has been measured so far. ...
This study addresses the perceived role of mosque education in the integration of Turkish–Dutch Muslim children in the Netherlands. It is based on interviews with imams, mosque teachers, parents of mosque students, chairs of migrant organizations, policymakers and experts (N = 75). Most respondents (N = 49) view mosque education as potentially aiding the integration of the children, often depending on whether mosques adopt this as a policy and train imams and mosque teachers accordingly. Mosque education is perceived by many as contributing to integration by teaching the children values of respect and tolerance, offering positive identity affirmation to children’s stigmatized Islamic identity and countering youth radicalization by providing messages of moderation. While sixteen participants see mosque education as irrelevant for integration, ten participants voice concerns about the potential of mosque education to cause value confusion, alienate students from the Dutch society and indoctrinate them with Turkish state propaganda. Implications are discussed.
... It may be inferred that these values are in agreement with their decision to get married and that the importance of tradition is in line with their higher level of religiosity. The fact that people in non-formalised relationships do not value tradition as much as married people confirms the results of studies which indicate that those who choose to cohabitate share a liberal viewpoint and tend to disavow tradition and customs (Kogan and Weißmann 2019;Slany 2006). Those who value security are more likely to seek a marriage that they perceive as a stable and lasting relationship where they can rely on their partner's support. ...
The study aims to investigate the differences concerning the religiosity (understood as the placement of religious constructs in the structure of a personality) and value system of young adults who are married, people in non-formalized relationships, and singles. The participants of the study were 321 women and 302 men aged 22 to 42 (45% singles, 55% in relationships). The results of the research prove significant differences regarding the religiosity and preferred values between married people and those living in informal relationships. There are more differences between these groups than between singles and those living in marital and informal relationships. Consequently, it seems important to differentiate between formalized and non-formalized relationships.
... Scientifically, the predominant view is that acculturation into the destination society leads to dissimilation from the origin society, suggesting inter-and intra-generational secularisation that leads to more progressive gender equality attitudes (e.g. Kogan and Weißmann 2019). However, it is increasingly argued that this tripartite relationship is rather complex (Kogan, Fong, and Reitz 2019) and not well understood. ...
Turkish migrants are one of the largest minority groups within Europe, the majority of which is Muslim. Radical right politicians stress the threat of Islam for what they consider European culture. Yet we know that migrant communities can adapt to the destination society culturally, albeit not always and in complex ways. This study aims advance our understand of this complex matter, as it analyses how such attitudinal developments take place and in what way religion plays a role. Through acculturation processes, where Muslim migrants become more secular and consequently more open to gender equal norms, and/or through decoupling, where migration leads to weaker connections between religious identity and patriarchal gender norms. With the use of the 2000Families data on Turkish Muslim European-migrants and Turkish-Muslim stayers, we find that the connection between religiosity and gender equality attitudes is gender-dependent. Across the board findings indicate limited support for both mechanisms. However, we do cautiously conclude that we find both acculturation and decoupling processes among migrant men with regard to individual religiosity, while we find decoupling between communal religiosity and gender-equality attitudes in migrant women. This suggests migrants undergo a range of acculturation processes simultaneously, but that the linkages for men and women differ between these dimensions.
Aim: Adolescence is a period marked by rapid physical and sexual changes, as well as the internalization of societal norms. However, while studies on sexual attitudes and religiosity yield inconsistent results, research on sexism remains limited. This study aims to examine the impact of religiosity on internalized sexism and sexual attitudes in late-adolescent women. Materials and Methods: Conducted in Turkey, this study explores the effects of religiosity on internalized sexism and sexual attitudes among late-adolescent women. The sample consists of 670 women aged 18-25 years. Results: Religiosity directly influences sexual attitudes and internalized sexism in late-adolescent women. Moreover, internalized sexism plays a mediating role in the relationship between religiosity and sexual attitudes. Conclusion: Appropriately interpreting religious knowledge acquired from reliable sources positively influences adolescent women's attitudes toward sexism and sexuality. In this context, multidisciplinary collaborations among healthcare professionals are assumed to have a protective effect against risky sexual behaviors.
This volume largely draws upon research traditions focusing on identity constructions (Johansson, 2007; Johansson & Lalander, 2012) and categorizing practices as well as the normative, economic, social, and political consequences of such practices for the life chances of children and young people (Fangen et al., 2012). It is mainly informed by a critical education framework aiming to hone in on exclusion processes that affect migrant groups in their schooling and seeks to identify factors that mitigate disparities in educational experiences and outcomes. By bringing together a cross-national set of scholars with backgrounds in sociology, child and youth studies, education, and anthropology, the book aims to offer a broad interdisciplinary perspective on the educational experiences and trajectories of migrant youth in five Northern European contexts: Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, Norway, and the United Kingdom.
Studies exploring the integration of European immigrants tend to find cultural gaps between Muslim children and their peers. While some scholars argue that parent-to-child transmission is a key mechanism underlying this pattern, others privilege extrafamilial explanations by pointing to differences in cultural values within Muslim households. In the present study, I argue that these mixed results stem from a tendency in the literature to analyze distinct components of personal culture in isolation from cognate dimensions. To address this shortcoming, I use multigroup latent class models to explore how a wide range of attitudes (tapping ethnocultural identity, gender norms, sexual liberalism, and perspectives on integration) are clustered together in disparate regions of the belief space, marking distinct cultural identities. Then, I fit a series of logistic regressions to map how these cultural identities are distributed among immigrant-origin samples in four European countries and transmitted across generational lines. Ultimately, I arrive at the following conclusion: while Muslim youth stand out from their peers vis-à-vis their cultural identity profiles, there is little evidence to suggest that this pattern is decisively shaped by parent-to-child transmission.
This study examines the preferences of young people from the majority group and minority ethnic groups in Germany regarding partnerships with recent refugees from Syria and Afghanistan. On the basis of a factorial survey experiment implemented in the year 2022 in the 9 th wave of the CILS4EU-DE data, we demonstrate that young people in Germany – both with and without migration background – are much less favourable to partnerships with refugees compared to partnerships with native Germans. Of all respondents, young people who either themselves or whose parents come from Turkey are most opposed to partnerships with refugees. Particularly those who tend to extensively consume Turkish media and those who identify more strongly with their origin country are more negative about partnerships with refugees.
The practice of samen leven or cohabitation is a violation of the religious and cultural norms of Indonesian society, but semen leven is increasingly common in today's modern society, especially in Indonesia and Malaysia. The rise of this cohabitation shows a decline in moral and religious values in society. Discussion in this article will cover various regulations related to semen leven or (cohabitation) included in the previous or new Criminal Code and discuss various polemics around them. Then it will also be discussed how legal, religious, and social perspectives are on the practice of semen leven and how the sanctions are imposed. The purpose of this paper is to understand the legal views governing the act of cohabitation as well as efforts to deal with the problem of samen leven in Indonesia by comparing and analyzing a comparison of the two views of the legal system that applies between Malaysia and Indonesia towards the practice of cohabitation. The approach research method that we use is carried out through a literature review and normative juridical methods using primary sources in this study in the form of the Criminal Code, Law Number 1 of 1974 concerning marriage, the 1984 Islamic Family Law concerning marriage and divorce in Malaysia. Secondary sources in the form of all legal publications, including textbooks, legal dictionaries, legal journals, legal articles, and comments on court decisions. KEYWORDS: Samen Leven, Cohabitation, Legal Comparasion.
Objective: For healthy sexuality and effective sexual health education, it is important to know the sexual health perception of individuals, their sexual education needs, and the affecting factors. The purpose of this research is to learn in-depth the perceptions of young men about sexual health and sexual education. Methods: This study was carried out in a health vocational school of a foundation university. The study was constituted using an in-depth interview method, and interviews were conducted with 16 students, 2 of whom were pilots. Content analysis was used to assess the obtained data. Results: Sexual education with sexual behavior and health were determined as the main themes. The male students indicated level of sexual knowledge was insufficient, and they needed to receive comprehensive sexual education from a qualified specialist. In addition, they stated that education should be given to men and women separately, and in small groups. It was also found that friends, religious and cultural values were important factors in sexual knowledge and behavior. Conclusion: As a result, it has been revealed that male university students need sexual education, and the correct information can only be learned through a comprehensive and socio-cultural norms-sensitive education.
As a consequence of international migration, religion has returned – if it had ever disappeared – as an important group boundary in contemporary society. This is evident in research on attitudes and social contacts that repeatedly shows social segregation and negative stereotyping particularly between Muslims and non-Muslims, but also between religious and non-religious individuals. The research outlined in this inaugural lecture focuses on the question under what conditions this group boundary becomes stronger, and when it takes on a more symbolic character or fades altogether. Drawing on large-scale survey research I aim to establish when people with a migration background can identify with and participate in European societies that are prevalently secular but where an anti-Islamic discourse is strong. What role do length of stay and intergroup friendship relations play in this process? I will argue that in addition to counting practice frequencies and the importance of religion, we need to better understand the different meanings that immigrants derive from their religion to get a grip on how and why religion acts as a social boundary in contemporary society.
This study focuses on young people's marriage behavior, which includes cohabitation, marriage, and plans to marry among the unmarried. The decline in marriages and planning to marry is often explained by the general expansion of education, which contributes to women's economic independence and decision to postpone marrying. Research suggests that religiosity has a greater impact on marriage decisions than either socioeconomic status or education. In this study, we aim to contribute to the literature on how young adults' marriage behavior is influenced by religiosity and socioeconomic status, as measured by education, financial status, and the place of residence. During the analysis, we used data from the Hungarian Youth 2016 survey on young adults aged 18 to 29 years. We examined the determinants of young people's marital status and plans to marry using multinomial and logistic regression analysis. According to our results, the positive effect of religiosity on marriage and plans to marry could be confirmed even after controlling for the influence of education. Although education strengthened plans to get married, it also delayed their occurrence. Furthermore, we found that religiosity increased the chance of cohabitation compared to being single in the sample, but its effect on marriage was stronger. Limitations of this study include our examined age group(18-29 years) , as at this age not all marriage decisions had been made, so it was not possible to fully investigate what proportion refrained from marriage entirely.
Immigrant fertility and the realization of fertility intentions are two topics of considerable interest in contemporary demographic research. Yet very few studies have explored the relationship between intended and actual fertility among immigrants and their children. Using data from the Norwegian and Swedish Generations and Gender Surveys, this article analyzes how both positive and negative short-term fertility intentions stated by men and women at Wave 1 in 2007/08 (Norway) or 2012/13 (Sweden) had been realized at register-based follow-ups three years after the initial interview. Results show that second-generation women of non-Western origin were significantly less likely than native women (defined here as Swedish-born women with two Swedish-born parents) to realize a positive fertility intention, whereas first-generation men of Western origin were significantly more likely than native men to realize a positive fertility intention. Western-origin men were also significantly less likely than native men to have an unintended birth. These findings are robust to controlling for demographic and socioeconomic characteristics at interview. Possible reasons for these intergroup realization differences include group differences in the ability to predict future changes to demographic and socioeconomic status and in the motivation to pursue the realization of a reported fertility intention. This article demonstrates that exploring immigrant-native differences in realization patterns can provide information about immigrants’ ideational and behavioral adaptation to the destination country’s fertility regime that cannot be attained by studying intended or actual fertility alone.
Muslim migrants and their descendants in Western Europe have consistently been shown to hold more negative attitudes toward homosexuality, the more religious they are. In this article, we go beyond this mono-dimensional view of religiosity and develop a theoretical framework that combines (a) the role of different dimensions of religiosity in anchoring cultural attitudes and (b) the potential impact of destination hostility and discrimination on the retention of cultural attitudes toward homosexuality among Muslim migrants in Western Europe. For the analysis, we use eight rounds of the European Social Survey, enriched with country-level data. Findings indicate that Muslim migrants’ mosque attendance, as a dimension of religiosity, has the negative effect that was expected. Particularly, Muslims who grew up in Western Europe are negative about homosexuality if they attended mosque regularly, whereas among first-generation Muslim migrants, origin-country norms are a strong predictor of attitudes toward homosexuality. In addition, we find that perceived group discrimination drives the maintenance of negative attitudes toward homosexuality, especially among mosque attendees. These results imply that the development of more liberal attitudes among European Muslims is held back by a combination of socialization in conservative religious communities and hostility from host-country populations.
Although previous studies have examined the role of religion in immigrant integration, little systematic knowledge is available on how much and through which mechanisms religion facilitates or hinders immigrant socioeconomic and cultural integration. The papers in this collection explore the role of religion in the socioeconomic and cultural integration of immigrants and minorities from a cross-national perspective, with a particular focus on the experiences of immigrant youth. The formative years of adolescence and early adulthood serve as the foundation for individuals’ later integration trajectories. In this introductory editorial, we describe the methodological challenges associated with the study of the role of religion in minorities’ integration, and then identify five mechanisms that are prominent in the literature on the effects of religion. We then summarise the key findings reported in the papers included in this collection, and show how they help us understand these mechanisms. These papers highlight variations in the impact of minority religions on facilitating or hampering integration, and help clarify inferences regarding the significance of discrimination against minorities who have certain religious affiliations, such as Muslims. They also underscore the role of social, cultural and economic contexts in determining how religious affiliation is associated with integration outcomes.
Public debates on Muslim migration to Europe often describe religiosity as a barrier to immigrant integration. Among the first generation, negative correlations between Muslims’ religiosity and integration were indeed found, but among the second generation, religion and integration are more often decoupled. To examine whether the relation between religion and integration differs across immigrant generations, this study compares foreign-born with local-born Turkish and Moroccan minorities in the Netherlands based on the NELLS data (N = 1,776). We analyse how religiosity (religious identification and practices) relates to eight indicators of immigrant integration and find it to be unrelated to socio-economic participation, Dutch contacts, national identification and gender egalitarianism, but negatively related to Dutch friendships, language skills and sexual liberalism in both generations. Only the association between religiosity and educational attainment in the Netherlands differs across generations, and changes from negative in the first to non-significant in the second generation.
Employing Dutch longitudinal information on 1250 second-generation Moroccan and Turkish migrants we investigate cultural assimilation using attitude questions on marriage and sexuality (including measures of homophobia). Two theoretical approaches guide our analyses. First, it is expected that the family of origin may push migrants in a more conservative direction. Second, it is expected that aspects of individual achievement in social, cultural and socioeconomic domains may pull migrants in more liberal directions. We find that Moroccan and Turkish migrants have considerably more conservative values about marriage and sexuality than natives, but there is also variation within the second generation. Both cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses for migrants indicate that the role of parents is particularly important: migrant children of religiously more orthodox parents and children of parents who were poorly integrated socially and culturally in their youth, currently have more conservative values about marriage and sexuality, even when individual characteristics are controlled for. Of the various aspects of individual achievement, we find that especially social integration of the second generation is a relevant predictor of liberal values, and not socioeconomic indicators of integration. These results remain significant in a stringent longitudinal test which minimises the bias due to reverse causation.
BACKGROUND Italy is customarily viewed as a traditional Catholic country. At the same time, couples are increasingly living together without marrying. Establishing links between religion and family formation is a complex issue and little is known about specific mechanisms through which religion shapes family change in the country. OBJECTIVE We aim to shed light on which aspects of religion are important in decisions about family formation. METHODS We analyze data from eight focus group interviews conducted in Florence. In the transcripts we identify any references to religion and systematically compare categories to investigate how religiosity intertwines with relationship choices. We apply bottom-up coding procedures to identify meaning and concepts within three theoretically relevant areas: Catholic precepts, social pressure, and tradition. RESULTS Despite the predominance of religion in the studied setting, Italians behave without according much importance to Catholic precepts and dogmas. Religion seems to influence people's family behaviors through social pressures to marry generated by the family of origin and the judgment of 'other'.. Tradition also plays an important role. CONCLUSIONS The widely prevailing pressure of parents and peers and the hedonistic aspects of the traditional Church wedding seem to be more important in partnership formation than Catholic prescripts. Thus, we posit that the direct effect of religion on individual choices is overestimated when interpreting the Italian family. In addition, we note the divergence that exists between the lack of state laws concerning consensual unions and the acceptance of cohabitation on an individual basis.
In this contribution, we elaborate on disapproval of homosexuality in 20 European countries. We mainly focus on the explanation of differences in the disapproval of homosexuality at the individual and the national level. Data from four waves of the European Social Survey are used, using multilevel techniques to test our hypotheses. Individual differences in disapproval of homosexuality can be derived from theories of socializing agents (religious institutions, schools) and socializing circumstances as well as from psychological theories on conventionalism and tradition. We find that religious people, people who support conventionalism, and those who attach to traditions disapprove of homosexuality more, whereas highly educated people disapprove less. Differences between countries can be explained by socializing circumstances of the national context as the countries' religiosity and laws on homosexuality turned out to be important determinants of the disapproval of homosexuality. We found that disapproval of homosexuality is the least in countries where law permits homosexuals to marry. In addition, people who live in more religious countries disapprove of homosexuality more than people who live in secular countries.
Attitudes towards intergroup dating and their determinants are important to comprehend group boundaries of multicultural societies. Our contribution investigates gender and ethnic differences in intergroup dating approval among 18 year olds from 11 ethnic groups in Belgium. We observe ethnic differences in the level of approval of intergroup dating. However, these ethnic disparities are largely explained by the degree of sexual liberalization, parental control and religiosity. Moreover, the associations of parental control, sexual liberalization and religiosity with attitudes towards intergroup dating differ for girls and boys. We conclude by highlighting the relevance of the interaction of gender and ethnic origin in shaping attitudes towards intergroup dating.
The article first describes how the principle of non-discrimination of homosexuals is anchored in EU legislation and influences concrete policies of the European Union. Against this background, the second section analyses citizens’ attitudes towards homosexuality and whether there are differences among the 27 EU member states and Turkey. The descriptive findings show that there are substantial differences at the national and individual level in the degree to which citizens think of homosexuality as acceptable. A sense that homosexuality is justifiable is particularly low in recently acceded countries and is almost non-existent in Turkey. Modernization theorists have argued that economic development influences the value orientation of the citizens. Other scholars have claimed that values are strongly influenced by the religious heritage of a country. Using multilevel analysis, the study tests to what extent modernization factors and/or religious factors influence citizens’ attitudes towards non-discrimination of homosexuality. According to the results of the causal analysis, modernization theory and cultural heritage theory contribute to explaining attitudes towards homosexuality. All the hypotheses derived from the two theories are supported by the statistical analysis
Theological, sociological, and psychological analyses of religion suggest that religiosity associates positively with values that enhance transcendence, preserve the social order, and protect individuals against uncertainty, and negatively with values that emphasize self-indulgence and favor intellectual or emotional openness to change. On this basis, an integrated set of hypotheses was generated to relate religiosity to the importance that individuals attribute to 10 basic types of human values across religious groups. Hypotheses were largely confirmed in educated adult samples of Israeli Jews (n = 635), Spanish Roman Catholics (n = 478), Dutch Calvinist Protestants (n = 217), and Greek Orthodox (n = 400). Hypotheses also were largely confirmed in a representative West German sample (n = 1,807) with different measures of religiosity and values. The pattern of correlations was robust across subsamples divided by age, gender, education, and income, and for Lutheran Protestants and Roman Catholics.
This paper addresses the debate concerning the influence of cultural and economic contexts on the adoption of modern values by individual members of society. We have applied for this purpose a multilevel analysis (HLM), using the World Value Survey (WVS) and European Value Survey (EVS) data bank for 36 of the countries included in the 2000 wave. The cultural and economic higher-level variables are represented by religious zones (Protestant, Catholic, Ex-Socialist Catholic and Islamic) and level of economic development (Real Gross Domestic Product per Capita). The individual-level variables include age, gender, schooling and religiousness (N=51792). The dependent variables consist of two measures: political liberal values (PLV) and social liberal values (SLV). The results of the HLM analysis indicate that although most of the variance in both measures derives from differences in individual characteristics across countries, there is also strong evidence for contextual effects of religious zones and economic development, when each factor is examined by itself. Yet because of multi-colinearity, we cannot estimate the effects of the two higher-level variables independently of each other. We end by discussing the theoretical and methodological implications of our findings.
Over the past decades, the concept of values has gone in and out of fashion within sociology. Relatively recent advances in both the conceptualization and measurement of values offer the potential for a reincorporation of values into sociological work. Sociologists often employ cursory understandings of values, imbuing values with too much determinism or viewing them as too individually subjective. The concept is employed sporadically in sociological subdisciplines. This review maps out the contours of the various approaches to linking values with culture, social structure, and individual behavior. We discuss theoretical and empirical approaches to values, organizing the broad literature to address three questions: (a) What are values? (b) Where do values come from? and (c) What do values do? We identify important research findings and suggest areas for future inquiry.
This study examined attitudes toward lesbians and gay men (referred to in the literature as sexual prejudice ) in a sample of pupils from 70 secondary schools in Brussels. We used items measuring traditional and modern sexual prejudice and support for gay civil rights. We performed a multilevel linear multivariate response analysis to assess both the impact of individual characteristics and school influence on pupils’ attitudes. Controlling for sociodemographic variables, second-generation migrants had more prejudice toward homosexuals than pupils from the ethnic majority group. Identification with the receiving society and perception of group-level institutional discrimination, however, mediated the association between ethnic origin and homonegativity. In contrast to traditional sexual prejudice and gay civil rights issues, modern sexual prejudice items were less affected by individual sociodemographic variables. Modern sexual prejudice also remained rather stable across schools; however, schools did appear to affect civil rights issues and traditional sexual prejudice. This contribution sheds light on the relationship between ethnic origin and sexual prejudice and on the variation of several sexual prejudice dimensions across social groups and schools.
The aim of the present study is to answer three research questions on 1'1l()fal attitudes (i. e. , attitudes concerning abortian, premarital and extramarital relations, and homosexual relations). Which parental and individual characteristics affect moral attitudes? Do the effects of parental and individual characteristics vary across countries? And, if so, can these effect differences an moral issues be explained by national characteristics? To answer these questions, we use the 1991 ISSP database cantaining relevant data of 16,604 inhabitants of 15 countries. Hypotheses are tested using multi~level analyses. We find that parental andindividual religiosity, as weU as individual educational attainment, have strong effects an moral attitudes. However, we observe considerable effectdiffer~ ences across countries, which is a rather new firuJ.ing. Effects of individual religiosity an moral attitudes appear to be stranger in more religious countries andweaker in more secularized countries. Effects of individual educatian are stranger in more religiously heterogeneous countries and weaker in more religiously homogeneous countries. Finally, effects of individual educatian an moral attitudes are weaker in short~standing democracies than in lang~ standing ones.
The sociology of religion is experiencing a period of substantial organiza-tional and intellectual growth. Recent theoretical and empirical papers on the sociology of religion appearing in top journals in sociology have generated both interest and controversy. We begin with a selective overview of re-search on religious beliefs and commitments. Second, we investigate the in-fluence of religion on politics, the family, health and well-being, and on free space and social capital. Finally, we review rational choice theories in the so-ciology of religion and the controversies surrounding applications of these perspectives.
This review synthesizes research about religion in the lives of post-1965 immigrants to the United States. Such research consists primarily of case studies, published since 1990, focused on individual religious organizations started and attended by immigrants. We analyze these case studies to demonstrate the different ways religion influences immigrants' adaptation in the United States. We then consider how religion informs immigrants' ethnic and gender-based identities, their experiences of civic and political life, and the lives of the second generation. We argue that current research is more descriptive than analytic overall, and we highlight a series of research questions and comparisons to enrich theoretical thinking. In particular, we advocate a comparative approach to examining immigrants' religious organizations and increased attention to a "lived religion" perspective, which takes seriously the ways religion is important for immigrants outside of religious organizations in social institutions, including civic organizations, families, workplaces, schools, and health-care organizations.
This study examines cross-national differences in the religiosity of immigrants in Europe utilizing three different measures of religiosity: religious attendance, praying, and subjective religiosity. Hypotheses are formulated by drawing upon a variety of theories—scientific worldview, insecurity, religious markets, and social integration. The hypotheses are tested using European Social Survey data (2002–2008) from more than 10,000 first-generation immigrants living in 27 receiving countries. Multilevel models show that, on the individual level, religiosity is higher among immigrants who are unemployed, less educated, and who have recently arrived in the host country. On the contextual level, the religiosity of natives positively affects immigrant religiosity. The models explain about 60 percent of the cross-national differences in religious attendance and praying of immigrants and about 20 percent of the cross-national differences in subjective religiosity.
International surveys have documented wide variation in religious beliefs and practices across nations, but does this variation in the national religious context make a difference? Building on existing theory, we explain why religion should have both micro- and macro-level effects on morality not sanctioned by the state and why the effects of religion differ from other forms of culture. Using two international surveys and hierarchical linear modeling techniques we sort out the effects of national context and personal beliefs on morality with and without legal underpinnings. We find that national religious context, the respondent's age, and religious beliefs and practices are the most consistent predictors of the sexual morality index. For morality sanctioned by the state, however, the effects for personal beliefs and practices are attenuated, and the effects of the national religious context are no longer significant.
In this paper we present an International Socio-Economic Index of occupational status (ISEI), derived from the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO), using comparably coded data on education, occupation, and income for 73,901 full-time employed men from 16 countries. We use an optimal scaling procedure, assigning scores to each of 271 distinct occupation categories in such a way as to maximize the role of occupation as an intervening variable between education and income (in contrast to taking prestige as the criterion for weighting education and income, as in the Duncan scale). We compare the resulting scale to two existing internationally standardized measures of occupational status, Treiman's international prestige scale (SIOPS) and Goldthorpe's class categories (EGP), and also with several locally developed SEI scales. The performance of the new ISEI scale compares favorably with these alternatives, both for the data sets used to construct the scale and for five additional data sets.
Although it has been hypothesized that culture and religion play an important role in sexuality, the relative roles of acculturation and religiosity on ethnic differences in sexual attitudes have not been often empirically explored. The present study assessed differences in sexual attitudes in Euro-American, Asian, and Hispanic American populations using measures of acculturation to analyze the relative effects of heritage and mainstream cultures, as well as religiosity, within each ethnic group. A total of 1,415 college students (67% Euro-American, 16% Hispanic, 17% Asian; 32% men, 68% women) completed questionnaires which assessed attitudes towards homosexuality, gender role traditionality, casual sex, and extramarital sex. In concordance with previous studies, Asians reported more conservative sexual attitudes than did their Hispanic and Euro-American peers. Hispanics reported sexual attitudes similar to that of Euro-Americans. For both Hispanic and Asians, higher acculturation predicted sexual attitudes similar to that of Euro-Americans. For Asian, Hispanic, and Euro-American women, there was a significant interaction between intrinsic religiosity and spirituality such that the relationship between conservativism of sexual attitudes and intrinsic religiosity was stronger at higher levels of spirituality. In Euro-Americans and Asians, intrinsic religiosity and religious fundamentalism strongly predicted conservative sexual attitudes; while still significant, these relationships were not as pronounced in the Hispanic sample, implying an ethnic-by-religious effect. Novel to this study, acculturation did not mediate the relationship between religiosity and sexual attitudes, indicating that ethnic differences in religiosity effects were distinct from acculturation.
Although previous studies have examined the role of religion in immigrant integration, little systematic knowledge is available on how much and through which mechanisms religion facilitates or hinders immigrant socioeconomic and cultural integration. The papers in this collection explore the role of religion in the socioeconomic and cultural integration of immigrants and minorities from a cross-national perspective, with a particular focus on the experiences of immigrant youth. The formative years of adolescence and early adulthood serve as the foundation for individuals’ later integration trajectories. In this introductory editorial, we describe the methodological challenges associated with the study of the role of religion in minorities’ integration, and then identify five mechanisms that are prominent in the literature on the effects of religion. We then summarise the key findings reported in the papers included in this collection, and show how they help us understand these mechanisms. These papers highlight variations in the impact of minority religions on facilitating or hampering integration, and help clarify inferences regarding the significance of discrimination against minorities who have certain religious affiliations, such as Muslims. They also underscore the role of social, cultural and economic contexts in determining how religious affiliation is associated with integration outcomes.
The subjective correlates of abortion attitudes for six different religious traditions (Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam). For all six groups, attitudes toward sexual morality exhibit the strongest relationship with abortion attitudes, followed by the effects of attitudes toward human life. Gender role attitudes are much less powerful predictors of abortion attitudes. Further, the multivariate models which explain abortion attitudes are remarkably similar across religious traditions, with inter-religious differences largely being attributable to differences in the marginal distributions of the independent variables.
With increasing diversity of migrants in Europe, questions around cultural integration are gaining importance. This study focuses on attitudes towards homosexuality amongst first and second generation immigrants from 186 origin countries to examine the role of religion, origin country socialization and acculturation. There is clear evidence for intra-and intergenerational acculturation of attitudes with declining importance of origin country context. While individual characteristics of migrants and origin country context can explain a substantial part of religious group differences particularly amongst the first generation, Muslims and to a lesser extent other non-Christian and Eastern Orthodox migrants hold overall more negative attitudes.
In a secular host society where Islam is not reinforced outside the family or ethnic community, little is known of the extent to which Muslim immigrants succeed in transmitting their religion to their second-generation children. Parents are generally found to be important religious socialisation agents for children, but this has rarely been studied in a migration context. In this article we study parental religious transmission, taking into account the child's educational attainment and social contacts with Dutch friends as possible inhibitors. On the basis of data from 641 parent–child dyads, we find the expected positive relation between the parents’ and the child's frequency of religious attendance and their respective attitudes toward religious homogamy and religious schools. Turkish-Dutch parents are more effective than Moroccan-Dutch in transmitting religious attendance, in line with higher levels of social cohesion in Turkish immigrant communities. Having Dutch friends and higher levels of education has little influence on the transmission of religious values from parents to children. The effective transmission of religion is a strong explanation for the continuously high religious involvement in the Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch communities.
This paper investigates religiosity among immigrant children in four European countries: England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. Drawing on major strands of theories in the sociology of religion and of migration, we analyse intergenerational change in religiosity within immigrant families of different religious affiliation and test how far common arguments can contribute to explaining existing patterns. We overcome several challenges and shortcomings in this field by studying adolescent‐parent dyads. Using strictly comparable and comprehensive data from the new Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries (CILS4EU), we find a considerable stability of religiosity or even an increase therein within Muslim immigrant families, in contrast to Christian immigrant families, whose religiosity declines over generations. This finding is astonishingly stable across the four countries. Our analyses furthermore suggest that interfamilial change in religiosity is only weakly related to assimilation processes in other domains of life.
This article discusses the behavioural and institutional mechanisms that guide the matchmaking process of arranged marriages1 amongst Muslim migrants in Germany and clarifies how this practice may influence ethnic homogamy. The focus is on general characteristics of arranged marriages rather than differences between diverse ethnic groups. The methodology is qualitative due to the sensitive and complex topic and the current state of research. Typically, the whole family is deeply involved in the process of arrangement, which consists of three stages (pre-engagement, engagement, marriage). Thereby, the extension of parental scope of action by means of institutionalized admission procedures turns out to be vitally important. In consideration of the fact that mate
selection takes place at the pre-engagement stage, it is the most crucial. Furthermore, differences to other partner-choosing processes are at their most distinct at this point, being responsible for the identification and labelling of this model as an arranged marriage. Selection criteria are mainly determined by the reputation of the marriage candidate and her ⁄ his family along with cultural features (such as belonging to a particular religious group, ethnicity or nationality). In our study, preferences for a cultural homogenous match were the most dominant ones. This inclination may cause the tendency towards transnational marriages when there are no suitable marriage candidates to be found in Germany.
Using two waves of the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent
Health, this study examines two sets of relationships between attitudes,
religiosity, and first sex among adolescents. First, I estimate the
effects of religiosity and attitudes about sex on the likelihood of
engaging in first sex. Then, I estimate the effect of having sex on
subsequent religiosity and attitudes. The findings are consistent with
past research that finds attitudes are a significant predictor of sexual
activity. The effect of religiosity on first sex is mediated by attitudes
about sex. Regarding reciprocal effects, having sex for the first time
has a significant effect on later attitudes, but not religiosity. This
study highlights the importance of going beyond traditional, recursive
models that consider only one side of a causal relationship.
This article considers causal interconnections between adolescent sexuality and the religious affiliation and participation of adolescents. Our empirical analysis is consistent with previous research in showing religious involvement and adolescent sexual attitudes and behavior to be strongly correlated. Young people who attend church frequently and who value religion in their lives have the least permissive attitudes and are less experienced sexually. This study, however, goes beyond the point of view of earlier research in which the assumption was that the empirical correlation between religious involvement and sexuality entirely reflects the impact of religiosity on sexual attitudes and experience. The theoretical arguments presented here support the traditional hypothesis of an effect of religious participation on adolescent sexuality, but the study also posits that sexual behavior and attitudes significantly influence religious involvement. This causal model is estimated on the basis of data from a sample of young men and women and their mothers. The empirical analysis supports the theoretical arguments in that significant causal effects in both directions are found in the data.
What happens to the religious identity, belief, and practice of Muslims who settle in Western countries? Do they, or their children and subsequent generations, gradually become more secular? Or do they react against the dominant ethos and perceived prejudice by becoming more religious? We review recent research that touches on these questions. Most Muslim immigrants outside the United States come from rural areas of less developed countries where religiosity is higher than in the receiving societies. Residence in areas of high coethnic concentration, support from religious communities, and religious endogamy help to maintain religious commitment. The situation is more complicated for the second generation. Western culture has an influence, but structural integration does not necessarily reduce religiosity. Some children of immigrants try to follow a “real” Islam that has been purified of culturally specific practices. Hostility toward Muslims may lead some to react by increasing their own religious involv...
This article investigates social and cultural aspects of "teenage life" among south Asian girls in Britain, particularly their experiences of relationships with boys and the extent to which they become involved in sexual activities. In-depth interviews were carried out with teenage girls and young women from Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi backgrounds and a comparative group of white British girls, in four schools and one college in the South and West Health Authority Region. Asian teenage girls conformed to different behavioural norms than their white peers. They were influenced by cultural traditions, religious obligations, family loyalties and community expectations. Few Asian girls became involved in relationships or sexual activities. However, once removed from the parental home, the influence of parents and their Asian community, their social and sexual behaviour changes; they experience an independence which often involves relationships and sexual activities. In contrast, white teenage girls experienced a different set of pressures which came from peers and boyfriends and accepted involvement with boys and sexual activity.
What is tolerance, and how does it differ from prejudice and discrimination? Is tolerance something that can be learned and therefore taught? This book explores these questions and addresses such issues as: Can people be prepared to cope with diversity and equality? How much tolerance is wise and what in particular should be tolerated? What are the direct and indirect ways in which attitudes and values are learned? And do different types of tolerance require educational processes unique for each type? (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
La psychologie interculturelle a montré qu'il existait des rapports étroits entre le contexte culturel et le développement comportemental de l'individu. Cette relation établie, l'effort des recherches interculturelles a de plus en plus porté sur ce qu'il advenait des individus quand ils tentaient de refaire leur vie dans une culture différente de leur culture d'origine. Les conséquences psychologiques à long terme de ce processus d'acculturation sont très variables, dépendant de variables sociales et personnelles qui renvoient à la société de départ, à la société d'accueil et à des phénomènes qui existent avant, mais qui émergent pendant la période d'acculturation. Cet article esquisse un schéma conceptuel à partir duquel acculturation et adaptation peuvent ětre étudiées, puis présente quelques conclusions et résultats généraux tirés d'un échantillon de travaux empiriques. On envisage des applications possibles à la politique et aux programmes d'insertion en prenant en considération les couts et les bénéfices sociaux et psychologiques émanant de l'adoprion d'une orientation pluraliste et intégrationniste.
The goal of this research was to explore the generality of developmental processes related to intergenerational value discrepancies across 701 families from immigrant and non-immigrant groups. In a study involving 471 immigrant families (197 Armenian, 103 Vietnamese, and 171 Mexican) and 230 non-immigrant families (95 African American and 135 European American), adolescents and parents reported their endorsement of values pertaining to family obligations. We examined similarities and differences at three levels of analysis, from the general to the group-specific. Results provide evidence for general developmental processes (family obligations were endorsed more by parents than by adolescents in all groups), processes associated with immigration (the intergenerational value discrepancy generally increased with time in the United States), and processes that are unique to each ethnic group.
This text is a Stata-specific treatment of generalized linear mixed models, also known as multilevel or hierarchical models. These models are "mixed" in the sense that they allow fixed and random effects and are "generalized" in the sense that they are appropriate not only for continuous Gaussian responses but also for binary, count, and other types of limited dependent variables.
This research has expanded our understanding of the determinants of adolescent sexuality in several directions. We have used a study of mothers and children to construct and estimate a model of the intergenerational transmission of sexual attitudes and behavior. With data collected from both mothers and children, we were able to proceed further than most past research and to consider both the attitudes and behaviors of mothers as reported by the mothers themselves. These data permitted an investigation of the determinants of maternal attitudes concerning adolescent sexuality as well as an examination of the influences of the attitudes and experiences of mothers on the attitudes, perceptions, and behavior of children. Obviously, limiting the study to white families prevents generalization of our findings to other subgroups of the population. The findings demonstrate the importance and relevance of parental and adolescent attitudes in understanding adolescent sexuality. Premarital sexuality is a salient issue to both young people and their parents. There are, however, very important and substantial differences in the attitudes of parents and children. On average, the attitudes of young people today are much less restrictive than those of their parents, reflecting either life cycle differences or the impact of social change. The intergenerational difference is recognized by young people themselves and probably affects the ability of parents to assist their maturing children in adjusting to and dealing with their sexuality--a difficulty likely to be reflected in the relative lack of success sexually active young people have in preventing pregnancy. Our findings also add to the research literature in demonstrating that although children, on average, have more permissive attitudes than their parents, the attitudes of individual parents tend to be reflected in the attitudes of individual children. Children whose mothers have less restrictive attitudes have, on average, less restrictive attitudes themselves. Further, the attitudes of mothers are also reflected in the behavior of their children, so on average, mothers with more permissive attitudes have children who are more sexually active. The influence of maternal attitudes, however, is stronger for children's attitudes than for their behavior. Of course, variability in children's attitudes and behavior--and even their perceptions of maternal attitudes--can only be partially explained by the attitudes of their mothers; but presumably, if the attitudes of other important family members, including fathers and siblings, were known, the prediction of adolescent attitudes would improve.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)
"The reconciliation between ¿assimilation' and ¿pluralism' is sought to help prevent further polarization among immigration researchers and is based mainly on two arguments. First, if assimilation and acculturation are distinguished, acculturation has proceeded more quickly than assimilation in both ¿old' and ¿new' immigrations. This reconciles traditional assimilationist theory with current pluralist--or ethnic retention--theory, which admits that acculturation (and accommodation) are occurring but without assimilation. Second, the reconciliation can also be advanced by the recognition that the researchers of the old and new immigrations have studied different generations of newcomers and have approached their research with ¿outsider' and ¿insider' values, respectively." The geographical focus is on the United States.
Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries (CILS4EU) - Full version.” Data file for on-site use
- F Kalter
- A F Heath
- M Hewstone
- J O Jonsson
- M Kalmijn
- I Kogan
- F Van Tubergen