Content uploaded by Romain Weikmans
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Romain Weikmans on Jun 13, 2019
Content may be subject to copyright.
ecbi
POCKET
GUIDE TO
TRANSPARENCY
POCKET
GUIDE TO
TRANSPARENCY
POCKET
GUIDE TO
TRANSPARENCY
POCKET
GUIDE TO
TRANSPARENCY
UNDER THE UNFCCC
2019 EDITION
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
I
POCKET
GUIDE TO
TRANSPARENCY
POCKET
GUIDE TO
TRANSPARENCY
POCKET
GUIDE TO
TRANSPARENCY
POCKET
GUIDE TO
TRANSPARENCY
UNDER THE UNFCCC
2019 EDITION
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
II
The contents of this report do not necessarily represent the views of the
European Capacity Building Initiative (ecbi), any of its members, or its
supporting partners.
Copyright © ecbi 2017
This version was published in June 2019
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without
prior permission of the ecbi.
Series Editor: Anju Sharma
anju.sharma@iied.org
This guide is written by Harro van Asselt, Romain Weikmans, and
J.Timmons Roberts.
The authors are grateful to Rafael Da Soler, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Brazil, for his comments and suggestions to earlier versions of this Guide.
Designed by DamageControl
This project is part of the International Climate Initiative (IKI). The
German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation,
Building and Nuclear Safety (BMUB) supports this initiative on the basis
of a decision adopted by the German Bundestag. For more information on
IKI, see www.international-climate-initiative.com
It is also supported by SIDA
Funding Partners
Member Organisations
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
III
FOREWORD
For over a decade, the European Capacity Building Initiative
(ecbi) has adopted a two-pronged strategy to create a more level
playing field for developing countries in the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC): training for new
negotiators; and opportunities for senior negotiators from
developing countries and Europe to interact, understand each
other’s positions, and build mutual trust.
The first part of the strategy focuses on providing
training and support to new developing country negotiators,
particularly from least developed countries. The climate
change negotiations are often technical and complex, and
difficult for new negotiators to fully grasp even over a period
of two or three years. We hold regional training workshops
to bring them up to speed on the negotiations. We also
organise workshops before the Conference of Parties (COPs)
to the UNFCCC, covering topics specific to that COP. To
ensure continuity in our capacity building efforts, we offer a
few negotiators, particularly women, bursaries to attend the
negotiations and represent their country and region/grouping.
Finally, we help negotiators build their analytical capacity
through our publications, by teaming them up with global
experts to author policy briefs and background papers.
This strategy has proven effective over time. “New”
negotiators that trained in our early regional and pre-COP
workshops have risen not only to become senior negotiators
in the process, but also leaders of regional groups and of
UNFCCC bodies and committees, and ministers and envoys of
their countries. These individuals are still part of our growing
alumni, now capacity builders themselves, aiding our efforts
to train and mentor the next generation of negotiators. Their
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
IV
insights from being “new” negotiators themselves have helped
us improve our training programmes.
The second ecbi strategy relies on bringing senior
negotiators from developing countries and from Europe
together, at the annual Oxford Fellowship and Seminar and
the Bonn Seminar. These meetings provide an informal space
for negotiators to try to understand the concerns that drive
their national positions and come up with compromises. They
have played a vital role in resolving some difficult issues in the
negotiations.
Following the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015,
ecbi produced Guides to the Agreement in English and in
French. These proved popular with both new and senior
negotiators. We therefore decided to develop a series of
thematic Pocket Guides, to provide negotiators with a brief
history of the negotiations on the topic; a ready reference to
the key decisions that have already been adopted; and a brief
analysis of the outstanding issues from a developing country
perspective. These Guides are mainly web-based and updated
regularly. Although we have printed copies of the English
version of the Guides due to popular demand (write to us if
you would like copies), the online versions have the added
advantage of hyperlinks to access referred material quickly.
As the threat of climate change grows rather than
diminishes, developing countries will need capable negotiators
to defend their threatened populations. The Pocket Guides are
a small contribution to the armoury of information that they
will need to be successful. We hope they will prove useful, and
that we will continue to receive your feedback.
Anju Sharma
Head, ecbi Publications and Policy Analysis Unit, ecbi
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
V
CONTENTS
Why does transparency matter? 1
What has been done under the UNFCCC and
Kyoto Protocol? 3
What do the Paris Agreement and rulebook say
about transparency? 15
How do the Paris and UNFCCC transparency
arrangements compare and relate? 27
How does the transparency framework relate to
other parts of the Paris Agreement? 30
How do UNFCCC and Paris transparency
arrangements on support compare? 35
What can developing countries do to improve
transparency of support? 39
What is the Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency? 40
What are key challenges for climate transparency? 41
References 47
Annex: Transparency provisions in the climate treaties 50
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
VI
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
BR Biennial Report
BTR Biennial Transparency Report
BUR Biennial Update Report
CBIT Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency
CGE Consultative Group of Experts
CMA Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the
Paris Agreement
COP Conference of the Parties (to the UNFCCC)
CTF Common Tabular Format
CTU Clarity, Transparency and Understanding
ERT Expert Review Team
ETF Enhanced Transparency Framework
FMCP Facilitative, Multilateral Consideration of Progress
FSV Facilitative Sharing of Views (under ICA)
GEF Global Environment Facility
ICA International Consultations and Analysis
IAR International Assessment and Review
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
MPGs Modalities, Procedures and Guidelines
MRV Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification
NDC Nationally Determined Contribution
NIR National Inventory Report
SBI Subsidiary Body for Implementation
SBSTA Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
TACCC Transparency, Accuracy, Completeness, Consistency and
Comparability
TER Technical Expert Review
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
1
Are we doing enough to address climate change? Are countries
living up to their promises? Are some doing better than they
pledged? Transparency is key for answering these questions.
e 2015 Paris Agreement put forward a new “enhanced
transparency framework” (ETF) to monitor, report, and
review information relevant to the implementation of the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and
the series of other agreements that followed it. is includes
information related to Parties’ greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions,
actions taken to reduce those emissions and to adapt to the
impacts of climate change, as well as the nancial, technological,
and capacity building support provided and received by some
Parties.
e regular provision of this information, and a subsequent
review by experts to ensure that information is reliable,
has become one of the backbones of international climate
agreements. By making clear what Parties are doing to
implement their commitments under international agreements
like these, transparency helps to build trust and condence.
Transparency can indicate whether the level of collective eorts
undertaken by countries is adequate to address climate change,
by shining a light on what they do individually.
WHY DOES TRANSPARENCY
MATTER ?
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
2
By generating information on Parties’ eorts, transparency
can also help mobilise domestic support for stronger climate
action, and uncover new opportunities for countries to
increase the ambition of their actions. For example non-
governmental organisations can use public information to
encourage their governments to follow through on their
Paris commitments. e success of the Paris Agreement
rests on each country following through on their Nationally
Determined Contributions (NDCs), the achievement of which
is not legally binding (for more information, see the Pocket
Guide to NDCs).
As one of the few mechanisms to assess progress made
towards the achievement of NDCs, transparency is key to
securing that success. Moreover, given the diversity of NDCs,
the ETF can help clarify the information that underpins them
and facilitate a comparison of eorts.
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
3
e Paris Agreement’s ETF is the latest stage in the
development of transparency arrangements under the
UNFCCC that goes all the way back to its draing in 1992.
e Paris Agreement introduces new elements, but largely
follows existing rules and practices. e major change is
that reporting requirements have increased for developing
nations. Below, we outline the transparency arrangements
preceding Paris.
REPORTING AND REVIEW UNDER UNFCCC
e UNFCCC (Article 12) requires all Parties to submit regular
national reports, in the form of National Communications.
Table 1 lists the information required for Annex I and non-
Annex I Parties. Revised guidelines for Annex I Parties are
currently under consideration.
Parties agreed to make the National Communications
submitted by Annex I Parties every four years subject to
regular in-depth reviews. ese reviews are organised by
the UNFCCC Secretariat and are carried out by Expert
Review Teams (ERTs), which comprise experts nominated by
Parties and, at times, from intergovernmental organisations.
National Communications submitted by non-Annex I Parties
are not subject to review.
WHAT HAS BEEN DONE UNDER
THE UNFCCC AND KYOTO
PROTOCOL?
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
4
ERTs play an important part by reviewing the information
provided and assessing progress made. While the experts are
more oen than not government ocials, the review process
is intended to be non-political, and experts are to serve in
their personal capacity. e reviews can be:
TABLE 1: INFORMATION FOR NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS
ANNEX I NON-ANNEX I
National circumstances National circumstances
GHG inventory, including
information on national systems and
national registry for Kyoto Parties
GHG inventory
Policies and measures and their
effects, including domestic and
regional programmes and/or
legislative arrangements and
enforcement and administrative
procedures for Kyoto Parties
General description of steps taken or
envisaged to implement the UNFCCC,
including adaptation/mitigation measures
Projections of the total effect Other information relevant to achieving
the objective of the UNFCCC, including
technology transfer, research and
systematic observation, education,
training and public awareness, capacity
building, and information and networking
Vulnerability assessment, climate
change impacts and adaptation
measures
Constraints and gaps, and related
nancial, technical, and capacity needs
Financial resources and transfer of
technology
Research and systematic
observation
Education, training, and public
awareness
Sources: Decisions 4/CP.5, 22/CP.7, 17/CP.8, Annotated Outline for the Fifth National Communication
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
5
Desk-based, with experts reviewing the information at
home.
Centralised, with experts meeting up to review the
information.
In-country, with experts visiting the country under
review.
e review reports are made public, though the process
allows Parties to respond to the reports before their release.
In addition to National Communications, all Parties
need to submit regular GHG inventory reports, with Annex
I Parties required to do so on an annual basis. ese reports
consist of a National Inventory Report (NIR) and a Common
Reporting Format, which provides the main information
in tabular form. e reporting guidelines specify the main
criteria – also known as “TACCC” – to which the reports
should adhere:
T
ransparency: assumptions and methodologies need to
be clearly explained.
Accuracy: estimates of emissions or removals should be
as exact as possible, and uncertainties reduced as much
as possible.
Consistency: inventories should be internally consistent
with previous inventories (by applying the same
methodologies).
Comparability: inventories should be comparable across
Annex I Parties.
Completeness: inventories should cover all sources and
sinks; all gases; and the entire territory of a Party.
To meet these criteria, Annex I Parties are encouraged
to follow the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
6
(IPCC) 2006 Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas
Inventories in preparing their inventories. An update of the
Guidelines was adopted by the IPCC in May 2019; however,
Parties to the UNFCCC still have to decide how to incorporate
this update in their reporting guidelines.
Since 2003, each inventory has been subject to a technical
expert review. Like the in-depth reviews of National
Communications, these reviews include desk-based reviews,
centralised reviews and in-country visits (the latter at least
once in every ve years), and review reports are made
publicly available.
e UNFCCC does not require non-Annex I Parties to
submit separate NIRs, but these Parties do need to include
the results of their GHG inventories in their National
Communications.
REPORTING AND REVIEW UNDER KYOTO
Expanding the reporting and review requirements of
the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol introduced further
transparency arrangements for developed countries,
requiring them to report annually on (and demonstrate
compliance with) their Kyoto emission reduction targets (see
Table 1). Given the crucial role of emissions accounting for
the environmental integrity of the treaty, the information
in these reports is more detailed than that contained in
the National Communications under the UNFCCC. ese
reports are also reviewed by ERTs. In this process, the reviews
of National Communications and GHG inventories of Annex
I Parties that are also Kyoto Parties are combined.
A key dierence between the review under Kyoto and the
UNFCCC is that, under the former, ERTs can raise so-called
“questions of implementation”. If these questions cannot be
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
7
resolved by the Party in question, an ERT can refer the matter
to the Kyoto Protocol’s Compliance Committee, which can
adopt various measures to promote compliance. While ERTs
are to refrain from political judgements, they can still play an
important role in facilitating compliance.
REPORTING AND REVIEW UNDER THE
CANCÚN AGREEMENTS
e Copenhagen Accord, which was taken note of at the
15th Conference of the Parties (COP15) in 2009, oered
a blueprint for future international climate policy, not
only by introducing new, voluntary climate pledges for
both developed and developing countries for the period
leading up to 2020, but also by signaling a new direction for
transparency arrangements under the UNFCCC.
ese arrangements were eshed out and formally
decided in the Cancún Agreements adopted one year later. e
Agreements specify that Annex I Parties need to submit new
Biennial Reports (BRs) every two years, either independently
or together with their National Communications. Table 2
lists the information to be included in the BRs. Following
Decision 19/CP.18, such reports also need to include a new
Common Tabular Format, oering a detailed and organised
overview of part of the information reported.
e BRs are subject to International Assessment and
Review (IAR), a process that combines a TER with a new
peer-to-peer process called Multilateral Assessment. e
technical review of BRs resembles the review of National
Communications and GHG inventories. Experts can ask
questions and request information from the Party, and
can also oer suggestions and advice. e Multilateral
Assessment draws on the technical review, the Party’s
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
8
reports, and supplementary information. Other Parties can
submit written questions, or raise questions in a session of the
Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI). e Secretariat
maintains a record of the questions and answers, and the SBI
can forward conclusions to the COP.
e rst round of Multilateral Assessments took place
at SBI sessions in 2014 and 2015, resulting in a review of
43 developed country Parties. e second round took place
TABLE 2: INFORMATION FOR BIENNIAL (UPDATE) REPORTS
BIENNIAL REPORTS
(DEVELOPED COUNTRIES)
BIENNIAL UPDATE REPORTS
(DEVELOPING COUNTRIES)
GHG emissions and trends, including
summary of inventory
National circumstances and
institutional arrangements
Quantied economy-wide
emission reduction target, including
assumptions and conditions
National Inventory Report
Progress in achieving quantied
economy-wide targets, including
mitigation actions and effects,
including estimates from use of
market mechanisms and land
use, land-use change and forestry
activities
Mitigation actions and effects,
including methodologies and
assumptions
Emissions projections Constraints and gaps, and related
nancial, technical and capacity
needs, including support needed and
received
Provision of nancial, technological
and capacity-building support to
developing countries
Support received to prepare and
submit Biennial Update Report
Any other relevant information Domestic measurement, reporting
and verication
Any other relevant information
Source: Decision 2/CP.17
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
9
in 2016 and 2017 and resulted in a review of 42 Parties. A
third cycle is currently underway, with 11 Parties reviewed at
COP24 in Katowice in December 2018, and 19 further Parties
under review at the 50th SBI session in June 2019.
Cancún also introduced new obligations and processes
for developing country Parties, who agreed to submit Biennial
Update Reports (BURs) every two years from 2014 onwards
– with the exception of Least Developed Countries (LDCs)
and Small Island Developing States (SIDS), who can so at
their discretion. e BURs should include information on,
among other things, national circumstances and institutional
arrangements, mitigation actions, and nancial, technical,
and capacity needs (Table 2).
ese reports are subject to International Consultation
and Analysis (ICA) under the SBI. e aim of the ICA is to
enhance transparency through a process that is to be non-
confrontational and non-intrusive, and that respects national
sovereignty. e process mirrors the two steps of the IAR that
developed countries go through, by starting with an analysis
of BURs by a team of technical experts, in consultation with
a Party. Based on the experts’ report, a Facilitative Sharing of
Views (FSV) will take place, which can include questions and
answers between Parties. Since 2016, FSV workshops have
been organised alongside SBI meetings, covering a total of
40 developing country Parties (including Brazil, China, India,
Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea), with 13 Parties
undergoing a second FSV.
For the purposes of the ICA, LDCs and SIDS can be
analysed in groups, rather than individually. However, to
date, no group of Parties has availed of this possibility.
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
10
TIMELINE
1992 19971995 2000 2002 2006
UNFCCC adopted.
Article 12 requires all
Parties to communicate
information,
including annual
GHG inventories
and information on
implementation
Kyoto Protocol adopted.
Article 7 requires Annex
I Parties to provide more
detailed information to
demonstrate compliance.
Article 8 establishes an
expert review process
COP5 adopts
reporting guidelines
for Annex I
GHG inventories
and National
Communications
COP8
launches a
technical
review
process for
annual GHG
inventories
COP1 adopts
procedures for
in-depth review
of National
Communications.
Establishes an expert
review process
IPCC establishes
guidelines for GHG
inventories
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
11
20112010 20152014 2016 2018
Parties adopt
Cancún Agreements,
introducing new
biennial reporting
requirements for
developed and
developing countries
and International
Assessment and
Review (IAR)
and International
Consultation and
Analysis (ICA)
processes
COP17 adopts
guidelines for
reporting by
Annex I and non-
Annex I Parties,
and modalities for
IAR and ICA
Guidelines for
technical review
of Annex I
reports adopted
by COP20. First
Multilateral
Assessment takes
place
Paris Agreement
adopted. Article
13 establishes
an “enhanced
transparency
framework” for
both action and
support
First Facilitative
Sharing of Views
takes place
Modalities,
procedures
and guidelines
for the ETF
adopted at
COP24
First Biennial
Transparency Reports
(BTRs) due
2024
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
12
LESSONS LEARNED
e experience with the existing review processes shows a
gradual convergence of review arrangements for developed
and developing countries, with exibilities for developing
countries, particularly for LDCs and SIDS. Dierentiation
of the transparency arrangements was most pronounced
under the UNFCCC’s initial reporting and review process
and the Kyoto Protocol, with the latter’s reporting and
review requirements only applying to developed countries.
Before Copenhagen, developing countries such as China and
India resisted a move towards enhanced transparency for
developing countries’ climate actions, insisting that domestic
verication would be sucient.1 However, as part of a trade-
o to strengthen the transparency of support provided,
developing countries agreed to the system embedded in the
Cancún Agreements.2
In terms of reporting, the record of mitigation-related
reporting by developed country Parties is generally seen as
adequate, albeit with some variation.3 However, it is apparent
from TERs of the second BRs that the two sections that were
the most challenging for Parties with regard to complying with
the mandatory reporting requirements were those related to
information on the progress made towards the achievement
of the quantied economy-wide emission reduction target,
including projections; and information on the provision of
support to developing country Parties.4
ere were also variations in the compliance of developed
country Parties in reporting requirements linked to the
provision of support.5 Reporting on the provision of support
has improved somewhat since 2010, with the introduction of
the Common Tabular Format in BRs. However, as project-
level reporting of the support provided is not required,
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
13
users of this information are largely unable to understand
what is included in the summaries reported in the tables.6
Moreover, very little information has been provided on
private nancial ows mobilised in developing countries
through public interventions by developed countries. In
short, developed country Parties have used a large variety
of accounting methodologies for nancial support, making
it largely impossible to compare data between countries, or
even compare one country’s contributions from year to year.7
For developing countries, the challenge of ever more
regular and comprehensive reporting can be discerned from
the fact that, by May 2019, only 46 (out of 156) developing
countries had submitted their rst BURs, which were
due by the end of 2014 (though 76 LDCs and/or SIDS are
allowed to submit such reports at their discretion). Although
reporting requirements for developing countries are less
stringent than those for developed countries, this suggests
that developing countries are struggling with aspects of
reporting. For example, while most developing countries
have provided some information on their needs in terms of
support within their National Communications or BURs, few
of them have reported on support received.8 e absence of
a common format (similar to the Common Tabular Format)
for reporting information on nancial support needed and
received has led to widely dierent practices in this regard
between developing countries. Because of the inconsistency
and incompleteness of this information, no global picture can
be assembled of whether and where climate nance promises
are being met.9
Reporting hurdles may be related to a lack of nancial
resources, data, or established domestic reporting
infrastructures.10 However, while reporting challenges are
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
14
associated with capacity constraints, there may also be a lack
of political willingness to report to the UNFCCC.11
e existing arrangements have also shown that technical
reviews can place a signicant burden on Parties, expert
reviewers and the UNFCCC Secretariat, and that it requires
signicant nancial and human resources. By one estimate,
the average amount of working days for carrying out one
Party’s review is 153 days if it involves an in-country review,
or 83 days if it involves a centralised review.12 is has been
problematic, as the number of technical experts available for
carrying out reviews – particularly from developing countries
– is still limited.13
Finally, the jury on the outcomes and usefulness of state-
to-state multilateral review processes established under the
Cancún Agreements is still out. e Multilateral Assessments
thus far involved many Party-to-Party questions, for instance
related to individual Parties’ use of market-based mechanisms
and the progress made in achieving climate pledges. e process
has been said to create greater clout at the domestic level for
ministries involved in implementation, contribute to policy
exchange and learning, clarify technical issues in reporting
and oer space for asking political questions.14 e FSV
similarly oers a forum for information exchange. However,
both processes are hampered by limited participation by states.
is reects resource limitations: for smaller countries, it is
not always possible to engage in detail with the lengthy reports
and their reviews.15
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
15
e Paris Agreement establishes an enhanced transparency
framework (ETF), which will be the main system for reporting
and review for Parties to the Agreement, superseding over
time the transparency arrangements under the Cancún
Agreements.
e framework for transparency of action (Article 13.5)
aims to provide clarity on the climate actions taken by Parties,
including progress made towards achieving NDCs, their
adaptation actions, and priorities, needs and gaps, with a
view to informing the global stocktake under Article 14. e
framework can thus oer much-needed insights into how
Parties are implementing their mitigation and adaptation
commitments under the Paris Agreement.
In addition, the framework for transparency of support
(Article 13.6) aims to provide clarity on support provided and/
or received by individual countries in the context of climate
actions (mitigation, adaptation, nance, technology transfer
and capacity building), and to provide a full overview of
aggregate nancial support to inform the global stocktake. e
framework might therefore provide a much-improved view of
what is happening on whether promises on climate nance are
being met.
e ETF consists of two main elements: reporting and
review (Table 3).
WHAT DO THE PARIS AGREEMENT
AND RULEBOOK SAY ABOUT
TRANSPARENCY?
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
16
In terms of reporting, Article 13.7 requires each Party
to submit annual inventory reports as well as Biennial
Transparency Reports (BTRs) with information necessary
to track progress made in implementing and achieving its
NDC (except for LDCs and SIDS, who can submit reports at
their discretion). ere is also a so obligation for all Parties
to provide information on adaptation and climate change
impacts (Article 13.8). In addition, developed country Parties
are required to provide information on support provided,
whereas “other Parties” that provide support are under a
soer obligation to do so (Article 13.9). Lastly, developing
TABLE 3: PARTY OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE ETF
REPORTING
Each Party shall provide a National Inventory Report (NIR)
Each Party shall provide the information necessary to track progress in
implementing and achieving its NDC
Each Party should provide information on climate impacts and adaptation
Each developed country Party shall and each other Party providing support
should provide information on support provided
Each developing country Party should provide information on support needed
and received
REVIEW
Technical Expert Review (TER)
Each Party shall undergo a TER of GHG inventory and information on progress
towards its NDC
Each Party shall undergo a TER of information on support provided
Facilitative, Multilateral Consideration of Progress (FMCP)
Each Party shall undergo a FMCP on the implementation and achievement of
its NDC
Each Party shall undergo a FMCP of its efforts related to support provided
Source: Decision 2/CP.17
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
17
countries should provide information on the support needed
and received (Article 13.10).
e information reported by each Party is subject to
review. Like the arrangements established by the Cancún
Agreements, the review process will include two main
elements: a Technical Expert Review (TER) and a Facilitative,
Multilateral Consideration of Progress (FMCP). e expert
reviewers can identify “areas of improvement” for the Party
under review and examine the consistency of the reported
information with multilateral guidelines. e FMCP focuses
on the implementation and achievement of NDCs as well as
the obligations related to providing climate nance.
At COP24 in December 2018, Parties adopted the
Katowice Climate Package, including the “Paris Rulebook” –
a set of decisions to make key parts of the Paris Agreement
work. e Rulebook includes an agreement on detailed
modalities, procedures, and guidelines (MPGs) to implement
the transparency framework (Decision 18/CMA.1). e
MPGs outline several guiding principles for the transparency
framework:
Building on and enhancing the UNFCCC transparency
arrangements, recognising the special circumstances
of LDCs and SIDS and implementing the transparency
framework in a facilitative, non-intrusive, non-punitive
manner, respecting national sovereignty and avoiding
placing undue burden on Parties;
Facilitating improved reporting and transparency over
time;
Providing exibility to those developing country Parties
that need it in the light of their capacities;
Promoting transparency, accuracy, completeness,
consistency and comparability;
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
18
Avoiding duplication of work and undue burden on Parties
and the Secretariat;
Ensuring that Parties maintain at least the frequency and
quality of reporting in accordance with their respective
obligations under the Convention;
Ensuring that double counting is avoided; and
Ensuring environmental integrity.
e following sections will oer an overview of the MPGs
agreed at COP24. It is important to note that the work on
the details of the ETF is not yet completed. Negotiators still
need to develop outlines of the BTRs and national inventory
documents, “common reporting tables” for GHG inventories,
and “common tabular formats” for reporting information on
progress in implementing and achieving NDCs and on support
needed, provided, and received. ey are also still working on
the development of an outline for the TER report and on a
training programme for technical experts participating in the
TER. e adoption of these outlines, tables, and formats, and
the training programme, is expected to happen in November
2020 (Annex of Decision 18/CMA.1, paragraph (§)12).
FLEXIBILITY
e Paris Agreement’s transparency framework provides for
“built-in exibility” considering Parties’ dierent capacities
(Article 13.1-13.2), meaning that not all requirements
for reporting and review are the same for all Parties. e
Agreement already states clearly that LDCs and SIDS require
exibility. But what about other developing country Parties?
e MPGs specify that it will be up to each developing country
Party to self-determine if it needs exibility or not.
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
19
However, exibility is only available for specic elements
of the MPGs. e MPGs contain 18 instances of exibility
that are available to developing country Parties that need it
in the light of their capacities, oen specifying conditions on
that application (Table 4 lists examples). Flexibility relates to
the scope, frequency, and level of detail of reporting; and the
scope of the review. In addition, when a developing country
Party applies exibility, it shall also “concisely clarify capacity
constraints” and “provide self-determined estimated time frames
for improvements in relation to those capacity constraints”
(Annex of Decision 18/CMA.1, §6).
REPORTING
e information to be provided in the BTRs includes:
NIR of GHG emissions by sources and removals by sinks;
Information to track progress in implementing and
achieving NDCs;
Information related to climate change impacts and
adaptation;
For developed country Parties, information on nancial,
technology development and transfer, and capacity-
building support provided and mobilised; and
For developing country Parties, information on support
needed and received on nance, technology development
and transfer, and capacity building.
e NIR consists of a national inventory document
and common reporting tables. All Parties are required to
follow the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse
Gas Inventories and, as such, they are required to follow
the methodologies for estimating emissions and removals
specied in those guidelines. Exceptions are possible, however,
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
20
for instance because of national circumstances or a lack of
resources. Under these limited conditions, Parties may opt to
follow lower-tier, less complex methodologies. Overall, the
TABLE 4: EXAMPLES OF FLEXIBILITIES FOR DEVELOPING
COUNTRY PARTIES, IN LIGHT OF CAPACITY
GENERAL OBLIGATION FLEXIBILITY AVAILABLE
National Inventory Reports (NIR)
Sectors
and
gases
(§48)
Each Party shall report
seven gases: carbon
dioxide, methane, nitrous
oxide, hydrouorocarbons,
peruorocarbons, sulphur
hexauoride, and nitrogen
triuoride
Party to report at least three
gases (carbon dioxide, methane,
nitrous oxide) and any of the
other four gases included in the
Party’s NDC; covered by an activity
under voluntary cooperation; or
previously reported
Time
series
(§57)
Each Party shall report a
consistent annual time series
starting from 1990
Party to report data covering,
at a minimum, the reference
year/period for its NDC and a
consistent annual time series from
at least 2020 onwards
Information on mitigation action, policies, and measures related to implementing
and achieving an NDC
§85 Each Party shall provide
estimates of expected and
achieved GHG emission
reductions for its actions,
policies and measures
Party encouraged to report such
information
Projections of GHG emissions and removals
§92 Each Party shall report
projections
Party encouraged to report such
projections
§95 Projections shall begin from
the most recent year in the
Party’s NIR and extend at
least 15 years beyond the next
year ending in zero or ve
Party to extend their projections
at least to the end point of their
NDC
Source: Annex to Decision 18/CMA.1
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
21
reporting requirements resemble those for Annex I country
inventory reporting under the UNFCCC, meaning that for
non-Annex I countries the requirements are signicantly
more stringent than before.16
To track progress in implementing and achieving NDCs,
Parties are required to: describe their NDCs, including
possible updates; identify qualitative and/or quantitative
indicators for tracking progress (e.g. net GHG emissions and
removals); provide recent information on these indicators
and compare this with baseline information; and describe
the methodologies and accounting approaches used for
the targets, baselines, and indicators. Moreover, the rst
BTR containing information on the end year or end of the
period of a Party’s NDC needs to include an assessment of
whether the Party has achieved its target(s). To synthesise the
information, each Party is required to include a “structured
summary” in its BTR.
In addition to the information necessary to track
progress in achieving the NDC, Parties are also required to
provide information on the actions, policies, and measures
that support the implementation and achievement of their
NDCs, including information on estimates of expected and
achieved GHG emissions reductions. However, developing
country Parties that need it in the light of their capacities are
merely “encouraged” to provide this information. Likewise,
while Parties are required to oer projections on the impact
of mitigation policies and measures on future trends in GHG
emissions and removals, this information is voluntary for
developing country Parties that need it in the light of their
capacities.
In line with the Paris Agreement, providing information
on climate change impacts and adaptation is not mandatory.
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
22
Nonetheless, Parties are requested to report information on,
among others, trends and hazards, observed and potential
impacts, adaptation priorities and challenges, and adaptation
actions and their implementation. Moreover, Parties may
provide information on loss and damage associated with
climate impacts.
e provisions on reporting of support related to nance,
technology development and transfer, and capacity building
support will be discussed later in this Pocket Guide.
TECHNICAL EXPERT REVIEW
e MPGs adopted in Katowice oer details on the process
through which the reported information is reviewed. e rst
stage of the review process, the TER, will consist of:
A review of the consistency of the information submitted
by the Party and the MPGs, taking into account any
exibilities availed of;
Consideration of a Party’s implementation and
achievement of its NDC;
Consideration of the Party’s support provided;
Identication of areas of improvement related to
implementing Article 13; and
Assistance in identifying capacity-building for developing
countries.
However, the TER cannot:
Make political judgments;
Review the adequacy or appropriateness of a Party’s NDC
or its chosen indicators for reporting progress;
Review the adequacy of a Party’s domestic actions;
Review the adequacy of a Party’s support provided; and
Review a Party’s determination to apply exibility or the
self-determined estimated time frames for improvement.
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
23
ere are four types of TERs:
Centralised review, where a team reviews one or several
Parties from a centralised location;
In-country review, through a visit planned in coordination
with the Party under review;
Desk review, where the review is carried out in the
reviewers’ home countries; or
Simplied review of a NIR, where the Secretariat carries
out an initial assessment of completeness and consistency
with the MPGs.
e use of the most labour-intensive form of review, the
in-country review, is limited to specic instances (Table 5). If
a Party does not undergo an in-country review or simplied
review, it will be subject to either a centralised or a desk review.
TABLE 5: TYPES AND APPLICABILITY OF TER
TYPE APPLICABILITY
In-country
reviews
First BTR
At least twice every 10-year period
If recommended by a TER
At a Party’s request
Centralised
At the request of a group of LDCs or SIDS
Instead of in-country review for developing country Parties
that need exibility in the light of their capacities
Desk review
Not more than once every ve years
Not for the rst BTR after communicating or updating NDC
Not for BTR containing information on NDC achievement
Simplied
review
For NIR submitted in year in which BTR is not due
Source: Annex to Decision 18/CMA.1
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
24
e MPGs provide detailed instructions for the review
process, with a view to completing the entire review within
one year (for in-country, centralised, and desk reviews).
Within this process, developing country Parties that need it
in the light of their capacities can avail of several exibilities
granting them more time (Table 6). For simplied reviews, the
procedure is more straightforward (Table 7).
e TER teams consist of experts acting in their personal
capacity. Experts can be selected from a roster maintained by
the Secretariat, for which they can be nominated by Parties
TABLE 6. TIMELINE OF A TECHNICAL EXPERT REVIEW
TIMELINE DEVELOPED COUNTRY DEVELOPING COUNTRY
(FLEXIBILITY)
Secretariat starts preparing TER immediately after BTR submission
0 Week Agreement on dates of TER week
4 Weeks Secretariat composes TER team
10 Weeks TER team to communicate preliminary questions
14 Weeks TER WEEK
TER team communicates draft
areas of improvement
TER team communicates draft
areas of improvement and
capacity-building needs
Party to respond to
information requests within
2 weeks
Party to respond to
information requests within 3
weeks
+2 Months Draft TER report sent to Party
+1 Month Provide comments on draft
TER report
+2 Months Provide comments on draft TER
report
TER to prepare nal TER report within a month of receiving
comments
1 Year TER completed
Source: Annex to Decision 18/CMA.1
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
25
and international organisations and are required to complete
a training programme. In the selection of experts for review
BTRs, a variety of considerations come into play, including
ensuring the experts have the necessary competences,
geographical and gender balance, and language prociency.
e organisation of the TERs is in the hands of the Secretariat.
In doing so, the Secretariat works in close collaboration with
lead reviewers (two per review, one from a developed country,
and one from a developing country), which are responsible for
overseeing individual reviews and ensuring adherence to the
MPGs.
e nal product of the review – the TER report – will be
made publicly available. In line with existing review practices,
the expert reviewers will convey “recommendations” for those
reporting provisions that are phrased with the legally binding
“shall”, whereas “encouragements” are used for “non-shall”
provisions.
FACILITATIVE, MULTILATERAL CONSIDERATION
OF PROGRESS
For the implementation and achievement of NDCs, as well as
eorts related to Article 9 (on nancial support), Parties are
also subject to a Facilitative, Multilateral Consideration of
Progress (FMCP), even if no BTR has been submitted. e
TABLE 7: TIMELINE OF A SIMPLIFIED REVIEW
0 Submission of National Inventory Report
6 Weeks Secretariat drafts initial assessment
+4 Weeks Party provides comments on draft assessment
+4 Weeks Secretariat publishes nal assessment
Source: Annex to Decision 18/CMA.1
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
26
FMCP looks at the Party’s reports, the TER report, and any
other information provided by the Party.
e FMCP is a two-stage process, consisting of a written
question-and-answer phase, and a working group session
phase (Table 8). Flexibilities are once again available to
developing country Parties in this phase, allowing them more
time to respond to questions. Moreover, LDCs and SIDS can
participate in the process as a group.
Although only Parties can ask questions, the FMCP will
be open to observers and will be accessible via a webcast.
Moreover, the full record – including questions and answers,
a recording, and a summary of the process – will be made
available online.
TABLE 8. TIMELINE OF A FMCP
TIMELINE DEVELOPED COUNTRY DEVELOPING COUNTRY
(FLEXIBILITY)
-3 Months Start as soon as possible after publication of the TER report.
Other Parties can submit questions through an online platform
-2 Months Cut-off date for mandatory answers to written questions
-1Month Written response to
questions
-2 Weeks Written response to questions
0 Working group session, including a presentation by Party and a
discussion
+1 Month Possible additional written responses by Party under review.
Secretariat to publish record of FMCP of Party under review
Source: Annex to Decision 18/CMA.1
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
27
HOW DO THE PARIS AND UNFCCC
TRANSPARENCY ARRANGEMENTS
COMPARE AND RELATE?
e ETF builds on the existing transparency arrangements
under the UNFCCC (Article 13.4). Tables 9 and 10 provide
a comparison of the transparency arrangements established
by the UNFCCC and the ETF of the Paris Agreement, for
reporting and review. It shows that most elements from
existing transparency arrangements will be transposed in
some form. is includes biennial reporting, technical expert
reviews, multilateral Party-to-Party review, and exibilities for
LDCs and SIDS.
Decision 1/CP.24 provides clarity on the transition from
the “old” to the “new” transparency arrangements. It species
that the developed countries’ nal BRs are due by 31 December
2022; developing countries’ nal BURs are due by 31 December
2024. Following the submission of the nal reports, the MPGs
of Article 13 will supersede the arrangements under the
Cancún Agreements. For NIRs, the MPGs will replace existing
UNFCCC guidance for Parties to the Paris Agreement.
Streamlining the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement
guidance, Parties can submit National Communications and
BTRs as one report. However, in doing so, Parties need to
ensure that they include the information that is required under
National Communications but not BTRs, such as information
on research and systematic observation, and on education,
training, and public awareness.
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
28
TABLE 9. COMPARISON OF UNFCCC AND PARIS AGREEMENT
TRANSPARENCY ARRANGEMENTS FOR REPORTING
UNFCCC PARIS AGREEMENT
GHG
inventories
Who: All Parties
Frequency: Every year for
developed countries; every
2 years for developing
countries; exibility for
LDCs and SIDS
Who: All Parties
Frequency: Every year
for developed countries;
every 2 years for
developing countries;
exibility for LDCs and
SIDS
Scope: Flexibility for
countries that need
it in the light of their
capacities
National
Communications
Who: All Parties
Frequency: Every 4 years
for developed countries;
developing countries
encouraged to do the
same, depending on
support
Scope: Information on
support only mandatory
for developed countries
Guidelines: Different
guidelines for developed
and developing
countries
No new provisions;
UNFCCC continues to
apply
Biennial reports Who: All Par ties
Frequency: Every 2 years
Scope: Information on
support only mandatory
for developed countries
Guidelines: Different
guidelines for developed
and developing countries
Who: All Parties
Frequency: At least every
2 years; exibility for
LDCs and SIDS
Scope: Flexibility for
countries that need it in
light of their capacities
Source: Adapted from Briner, G. & Moarif, S. (2016). Enhancing Transparency of Climate Change
Mitigation under the Paris Agreement: Lessons from Experience. OECD, Paris
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
29
TABLE 10. COMPARISON OF UNFCCC AND PARIS AGREEMENT
TRANSPARENCY ARRANGEMENTS FOR REVIEW
UNFCCC PARIS AGREEMENT
Review of GHG
inventories
Who: Developed
countries; review of
developing country
inventories part of
technical review of
BUR
Who: Developed countries;
review of developing
country inventories part of
technical review of BTR
Scope: Simplied review for
National Inventory Report
in years when no BTR is
due
In-depth review
of National
Communications
Who: Developed
countries
No new provisions;
UNFCCC continues to
apply
Technical expert
analysis/review
Who: All Parties
Guidelines: Different
guidelines for review/
consideration of
developed and developing
country reports
Who: All Parties
Scope: Flexibility for
countries that need it in
light of their capacities
Multilateral review/
consideration
Who: All Parties
Guidelines: Different
guidelines for review/
consideration of
developed and developing
countries; review
voluntary for LDCs and
SIDS, who can also be
reviewed as group
Who: All Parties
Scope: Flexibility for
countries that need it in
the light of their capacities;
review voluntary for LDCs
and SIDS, who can also be
reviewed as group
Source: Adapted from Briner, G. & Moarif, S. (2016). Enhancing Transparency of Climate Change Mitigation
under the Paris Agreement: Lessons from Experience. OECD, Paris
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
30
e ETF is closely interlinked with various other parts of the
Paris Agreement (see Figure 1).
LINKAGES WITH NDC GUIDANCE AND
ACCOUNTING
Given that BTRs need to provide information necessary to
track progress towards NDCs, the information requirements
for NDCs under Article 4 are important. One of these
requirements is to provide information to facilitate the clarity,
transparency and understanding (CTU) of the NDCs (Article
4.8). is may include, for example, information on reference
points, time frames, scope and coverage, assumptions and
methodological approaches, and information on how a Party
considers its NDC to be fair and ambitious.
Another key requirement from the Paris Agreement is
that Parties are to account for NDCs (Article 4.13 and 4.14).
Creating a link between Articles 4 and 13 of the Agreement,
§17 of Decision 4/CMA.1 species that this accounting
should be done in Parties’ BTRs, including through the
structured summary mentioned above. Moreover, the Article
13 MPGs specify that Parties are to clearly report their
accounting approach, including its consistency with Article
4.13 and 4.14, in their rst NDCs. Further, from the second
NDC onwards, Parties have to explain how their reporting is
consistent with Decision 4/CMA.1 (Annex of Decision 18/
CMA.1, §71-72).
HOW DOES THE TRANSPARENCY
FRAMEWORK RELATE TO
OTHER PARTS OF THE PARIS
AGREEMENT?
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
31
Adaptation communications
(Article 7)
Global stocktake
(Article 14)
GHG inventories
Multilateral
consideration
of progress
Adaptation-related
information
Technical expert
review
REPORTING
REVIEW
Source: Adapted from Dagnet, Y., et al. (2017). Mapping the Linkages between the Transparency Framework
and Other Provisions of the Paris Agreement. World Resources Institute, Washington, DC
FIGURE 1. LINKAGES BETWEEN THE TRANSPARENCY FRAMEWORK
AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT
Clarity, transparency and
understanding information,
accounting and public registry
for NDCs
(Article 4)
Cooperative approaches
& sustainable development
mechanism (Article 6)
Implementation and compliance
mechanism (Article 15)
Information on
NDC progress
Financial, technology transfer
& capacity building support
(Articles 9-11)
Information on
support
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
32
LINKAGES WITH ADAPTATION
e ETF is also connected to Article 7 on adaptation.
Adaptation-related information has been communicated
by Parties to the COP in the past as part of their National
Communications, National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and
National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs),
and some developing countries have included adaptation-
related information in their NDCs. e Paris Agreement
introduces a new, voluntary, Adaptation Communication,
which can be submitted together with an NDC, a NAP, a
National Communication and/or a BTR. e Article 13
MPGs underscore the voluntary nature of submission of
adaptation-related information and oer details on the types
of information countries should report. To a large extent,
the information to be reported under Article 13 and the
Adaptation Communication under Article 7 is overlapping,
with a few exceptions – such as reporting on loss and
damage, which is included in the Article 13 MPGs (for more
information, see the Pocket Guide to Adaptation).
Reporting adaptation-related information may have
certain advantages. For instance, reporting adaptation needs
can help attract adaptation nance, understand whether
international adaptation nance is eective, and clarify
whether the temperature goals of the Paris Agreement are
appropriate, especially for LDCs and SIDS. Furthermore,
reporting on adaptation needs and eorts could help Parties
learn from each other and from themselves.17 However,
reporting on adaptation may entail a risk of further shiing
the burden to adapt to developing countries, if eorts to
reduce vulnerabilities are seen as their responsibility. It
may be useful for developing countries, particularly LDCs
and SIDS, to begin with reporting on the impacts, costs,
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
33
and needs related to adaptation, rather than on adaptation
policies and measures. Nevertheless, developing countries
that wish to have their adaptation eorts recognised may still
want to highlight their adaptation actions.
LINKAGES WITH SUPPORT
e ETF provisions are inter-related to the provisions on
nancial (Article 9), technology transfer (Article 10) and
capacity building (Article 11) support. e Article 13 MPGs
oer detailed information requirements for developed
country Parties to report on nancial, technology transfer,
and capacity building support provided (with “other Parties”
having a slightly soer obligation to report such information).
e MPGs also contain detailed guidance for developing
country Parties on reporting nancial, technology transfer,
and capacity building support needed and received. e
linkages with nancial support are discussed in more detail
be l ow.
LINKAGES WITH OTHER REVIEW PROCESSES
e ETF can also be linked to two other review processes
under the Paris Agreement: the ve-yearly global stocktake
(Article 14) and the mechanism to facilitate implementation
of and promote compliance with the provisions of the Paris
Agreement (Article 15).
Parties decided that the sources of input for the global
stocktake include reports by individual Parties such as BTRs,
NIRs, or Adaptation Communications (Annex of Decision
19/CMA.1, §37(a)). However, it is less clear whether TER
reports and summaries of the FMCP for individual Parties
will serve as sources of input for the global stocktake.
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
34
ere are multiple linkages between the ETF and the
Article 15 mechanism. First, if a Party fails to submit one of
the mandatory reports under Article 13.7 (for all Parties) or
Article 13.9 (for developed country Parties only), the Article
15 Committee will initiate a consideration of issues (Annex
of Decision 20/CMA.1, §22(a)(ii)). However, the Committee
cannot examine the substance of the reports, but merely
examine whether the report is submitted on time (e.g., for
the rst BTR, whether it has been submitted by 31 December
2024). In addition, the Committee can consider cases of
Parties that have failed to participate in the FMCP (Annex of
Decision 20/CMA.1, §22(a)(iii)).
A second linkage is that the Article 15 Committee
may begin a “facilitative consideration of issues” in case of
“signicant and persistent inconsistencies” between a Party’s
report and the Article 13 MPGs. Such a consideration is to be
based on “recommendations” in TER reports – which, as noted
above, can only be given for “shall” provisions in the MPGs
– and requires the consent of the Party concerned. Moreover,
the exibilities for developing country Parties that need it in
the light of their capacities need to be taken into account. e
Article 15 guidance does not spell out what “signicant and
persistent” inconsistencies entail, but arguably refer to serious
reporting issues that may undermine the eectiveness of the
transparency framework, as well as repeated failures to meet
the reporting requirements.18
e linkages with the Article 15 Committee mean that
the technical review of reports may lead to a slightly more
political review of implementation and compliance. While
this may be regarded as intrusive of national sovereignty,
the link also provides an important backstop in case the
transparency framework does not function as well as hoped.
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
35
HOW DO UNFCCC AND PARIS
TRANSPARENCY ARRANGEMENTS
ON SUPPORT COMPARE?
e key dierences between the approach to transparency of
support before and aer Paris are summarised in Table 11.
A key change brought about by the Paris Agreement’s ETF is
that developing countries that provide nancial, technology
transfer, and capacity building support to other developing
countries in the context of climate actions should report
information on such support on a biennial basis (Article
13.9).
Another key dierence with the pre-Paris approach is
that developing countries should now provide information on
nancial, technology transfer, and capacity building support
received every two years – except for LDCs and SIDS, which
may submit this information at their discretion (Article 13.10).
Previously, developing countries were only encouraged to
report such information in their National Communications
and BURs. However, there is still no common format (like
the Common Tabular Format) for reporting information on
nancial support needed and received.
e communication of ex-ante projections of future
funding is not completely new, as developed countries were
expected to report earlier on how they were going to scale
up nance to meet the 2020 pledge of jointly mobilising US$
100 billion per year (Decision 3/CP.19). However, the text of
Article 9.5 is much broader, and turns this into an obligation
for developed country Parties. e voluntary nature of
reporting for developing country contributors is emphasised.
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
36
TABLE 11. TRANSPARENCY OF SUPPORT BEFORE AND AFTER
PARIS
BEFORE PARIS AFTER PARIS
Information on support provided and mobilised to developing countries
Developed countries
required to provide
information on nancial,
technology transfer and
capacity building support
provided and mobilised on
a biennial basis (in their
National Communications
and Biennial Reports)
Developed countries shall continue to provide
information on nancial, technology transfer and
capacity building support provided on a biennial
basis (Article 13.9)
Other countries that provide nancial,
technology transfer and capacity-building support
to developing countries in the context of climate
actions should now report information on such
support on a biennial basis (Article 13.9)
Information on projected levels of public nancial resources to be provided to
developing countries
Developed countries
expected to report on
how they would scale up
nance to meet the 2020
pledge of jointly mobilising
US$100 billion per year
(Decision 3/CP.19)
Developed countries shall biennially
communicate indicative quantitative and
qualitative information on nancial support,
including as available on projected levels of public
nancial resources to be provided to developing
countries (Article 9.5)
Other Parties providing nancial resources are
encouraged to communicate biennially such
information on a voluntary basis (Article 9.5)
Information on support needed and received
Developing countries
encouraged to report this
information in National
Communications and
BURs.
Developing countries should provide information
on nancial, technology transfer and capacity-
building support received on a biennial basis –
except for LDCs and SIDS, which may submit this
information at their discretion (Article 13.10)
TER on the information submitted on support provided
Information on support
provided from developed
countries subject to TER
Information submitted by developed countries and
other countries that provide nancial, technology
transfer and capacity-building support shall
undergo a technical expert review (Article 13.11)
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
37
CONTD.
BEFORE PARIS AFTER PARIS
Multilateral consideration of progress with respect to nancial support provided
No multilateral
consideration of progress
Developed countries and other Parties that
provide nancial, technology transfer and capacity-
building support shall participate in a multilateral
consideration of progress with respect to efforts
on nancial support provided (Article 13.11)
Global stocktake
No global stocktake,
although the Standing
Committee on Finance
produces a Biennial
Assessment and Overview
of Climate Finance
The ETF for support is to provide clarity on
support provided and received in the context
of climate change actions (mitigation, adaptation,
nance, technology transfer, and capacity building),
and, to the extent possible, to provide a full
overview of aggregate nancial support provided,
to inform the global stocktake (Article 13.6)
It will therefore be important to identify incentives and build
capacity for countries to provide this important information.
e types of information to be provided by Parties in
accordance with Article 9.5 is detailed in the Annex to
Decision 12/CMA.1.
During the Paris Conference, a crucial task was delegated
to the Subsidiary Body for Scientic and Technological
Advice (SBSTA) to develop modalities for accounting of
nancial resources provided and mobilised through public
interventions. As a result of this work, the MPGs agreed by
Parties in Katowice in December 2018 contain details on the
information that Parties have to report on support provided
and mobilised through public interventions (Annex of
Decision 18/CMA.1, §118-129).
e new accounting modalities for nancial resources
provided and mobilised still leave considerable discretion
to Parties in the accounting of climate nance provided and
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
38
mobilised through public interventions. Parties are required to
provide more information than before on several key aspects
of their accounting methodologies. ey are also required to
explain how the information provided reects a progression
from previous levels in the provision and mobilisation
of nance under the Paris Agreement. However, each
contributing Party will still be able to decide what it counts as
climate nance and why its climate nance can be considered
as “new and additional”. Parties are still allowed to report their
nancial support at face value; the grant-equivalent value is
only to be reported on a voluntary basis. is means that a
loan of US$ 50 million could still appear to be equal to a US$
50 million grant in the gures reported by some contributing
countries.19
e MPGs also detail the information that is to be reported
by developing country Parties on support needed and received
(see Annex of Decision 18/CMA.1, §130-145). Reporting
requirements on support received are far less detailed that on
support provided, which will make it dicult to assemble a
global picture of whether and where climate nance promises
are being met.
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
39
Access to information about the nancial support received
for mitigation and adaptation is severely limited in many
developing countries, making it dicult to assess where it is
distributed and how eectively it is being used.
A possible way to overcome these limitations would be to
put in place standing arrangements at the government level
through which climate nance received could be tracked over
time. One example would be to create national dashboards
of mitigation and adaptation eorts (supported by nancial
support), such as those that exist for development aid in several
developing countries (for instance, the Aid Management
Programmes that exist in 30 countries). e set-up of such
national dashboards involves collecting and displaying in one
place (for instance, on an online platform) data from bilateral
and multilateral donors, national and local governments in
developing countries, and possibly from private philanthropic
agencies, non-governmental organisations and private
actors. Combining all this information will allow major
advances in coordination between these actors, improving
eectiveness and collaboration, and will lead to improved
national strategic planning in the face of climate change. e
systematic presentation of climate nance received also could
highlight topical areas and geographic regions of nations
where vulnerability and green energy needs have not been
addressed with international funding.
WHAT CAN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES DO TO IMPROVE
TRANSPARENCY OF SUPPORT?
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
40
e UNFCCC and subsequent climate agreements call
on developed countries to provide support to developing
countries to help the latter comply with their reporting duties
(e.g. UNFCCC Article 4.3). Several initiatives have supported
non-Annex I Parties in the preparation of their National
Communications and BURs to the UNFCCC. ese include
the Global Support Programme (jointly administered by the
UN Development Programme and the UN Environment
Programme, with funding from the Global Environment
Facility (GEF)), a ve-year (2014-2019) initiative aiming
at providing logistical and technical support in order to
facilitate the preparation of these and their (intended) NDCs.
In Paris, developing countries called upon developed
countries to provide additional support to help them meet the
enhanced transparency requirements of the Paris Agreement.
To do so, Parties decided to establish the Capacity-building
Initiative for Transparency (CBIT). e CBIT is a trust fund
(hosted by the GEF) that aims to build institutional and
technical capacity, both pre- and post-2020. Pledges to the
CBIT currently amount to approximately US$ 62 million.
As of 1 February 2019, the GEF Secretariat had approved 45
CBIT projects, including projects in 11 LDCs and 5 SIDS,
and 4 global projects that aim to improve knowledge sharing,
coordination, and facilitate additional capacity building. A
global coordination platform has also been put in place to
share lessons learned and engage with partners to help deliver
more country projects.
WHAT IS THE CAPACITY-
BUILDING INITIATIVE FOR
TRANSPARENCY?
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
41
WHAT ARE KEY CHALLENGES FOR
CLIMATE TRANSPARENCY?
e ETF will likely help Parties and observers to uncover
useful information on country-specic emissions trends and
projections, on how Parties are living up to their promises
to provide climate nance and other support, and on
whether Parties are on track towards their NDCs. Moreover,
reporting and reviewing information on progress made in
implementing and achieving NDCs could help other Parties
and observers in identifying whether a Party is on track.
Some of the features of the ETF outlined above are
however likely to limit the extent to which it will provide
clarity on the climate actions taken by Parties (Article 13.5
of the Paris Agreement) and on support provided and/or
mobilised in the context of climate actions (Article 13.6).
In the near term, the timing of the transition to the new
ETF means that at least some of the information related to
transparency will not be available in time for the preparation
of the next round of NDCs, expected in 2020. Parties are only
expected to submit their rst BTR and NIR, if submitted as a
stand-alone report, at the latest by 31 December 2024.
More fundamentally, the ETF is not designed to make
visible the ambition or fairness of Parties’ individual eorts.
In the lead-up to Paris, some Parties pushed for the inclusion
of an ex-ante review of NDCs that would help clarify
whether pledges are sucient.20 However, while the idea of
such a review was integrated in the Paris Agreement’s global
stocktake (see Article 14.1), it focuses on collective rather
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
42
than individual eorts.21 In this section, we identify several
other challenges for climate transparency linked to the two
main elements (reporting and review) of the ETF.
REPORTING
A signicant challenge for climate transparency is that
existing reporting weaknesses would need to be overcome.
As noted above, few non-Annex I Parties have submitted
their rst BUR so far. Will the ETF be able to generate more
than fragmented and outdated information?
Many observers explain current reporting hurdles by
pointing to capacity constraints in developing countries,22
and call for increased international support to build
capacities to report. is rationale is apparent in the Paris
Agreement’s reference to “built-in exibility which takes into
account Parties’ dierent capacities” (Article 13.1), and the
creation of the new CBIT. Capacity constraints are real in
some countries, and the CBIT could help overcome some of
these constraints. However, the demand for CBIT support is
currently exceeding resource availability. It seems likely that
capacity building for transparency will be a long-standing
need and that capacity constraints will not be resolved
anytime soon. For some countries, gaps in reporting may
consequently persist for a long time.
In addition to international support to build capacities,
several processes set up by the Paris Agreement – such as
the TER and the mechanism to facilitate implementation
and promote compliance – could be helpful in supporting
countries in identifying capacity gaps and needs. ey could
also help Parties identifying solutions and good practices
already implemented in other countries that can be replicated
at home.23
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
43
However, beyond capacity constraints, timely and
adequate reporting may also be limited by a lack of political
willingness to report. e transparency framework of the
Paris Agreement does not address these cases, by for example
identifying and promoting incentives to report or specifying
consequences of not reporting. Although a lack of reporting
can be taken up by the implementation and compliance
Committee set up under Article 15, this Committee “shall
neither function as an enforcement or dispute settlement
mechanism, nor impose penalties or sanctions” (Annex of
Decision 20/CMA.1, §4). While this may result in some
“naming and shaming”, persistent non-compliance with
reporting requirements will be hard to prevent entirely.
e way the “built-in exibility” of the Paris Agreement
has been translated into the MPGs could also lead to the
generation of fragmented information by the transparency
framework. Instead of dening objective criteria24 to
dierentiate between those developing country Parties that
need exibility in the light of their capacities and those that
do not, the MPGs specify that it will be up to each developing
country Party to “self-determine” if it needs exibility or not.
While the number of exibilities in the MPGs is limited, and
a Party needs to indicate its capacity constraints as well as
a time-frame for improvement, the TER teams are barred
from reviewing a Party’s determination to apply exibility
provided for in the MPGs and from reviewing whether a
Party possesses the capacity to implement a specic provision
without exibility (Annex of Decision 18/CMA.1, §6).
Such self-determination by developing country Parties
could lead to an unpredictable and problematic system
in which some Parties could choose the most exible
requirements, making data incomplete and incomparable.
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
44
In addition, some of the exibilities provided for in the
MPGs could give countries the perverse incentive to submit
intentionally limited NDCs to avoid having to report in detail
in the future. at is for example the case regarding the gases
that Parties have to report in their NIRs (see Table 4; and
Annex of Decision 18/CMA.1, §48).
A more pervasive issue is linked to the fact that, even
with the new MPGs, Parties will retain much discretion over
many accounting and reporting dimensions of their climate
eorts. e ETF still largely relies on a bottom-up approach
to accounting and reporting, in which limited guidance for
tracking climate action means that Parties will likely adopt
a variety of accounting and reporting practices but have to
report on several dimensions of the accounting and reporting
methodologies that they use to prepare their transparency
reports. e ETF could consequently generate information
that could be largely incomparable between Parties. Based
on such heterogeneous information, signicant resources
will have to be available to allow for meaningful comparisons
between the climate eorts of dierent Parties. In some
cases – when Parties do not make available crucial details on
the methodologies that they used to account for and report
on their climate eorts – such comparisons will be very
challenging or even impossible to make.
Similarly, it will also be complicated to assess progress
made by some Parties towards achieving their NDCs. For
instance, some Parties have put forward qualitative NDCs
or have made some or all of their commitment’s conditional
on nancial support, making it dicult to track progress.25
e NDC Explorer counts 71 NDCs where the mitigation
contribution is partly dependent on international nance
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
45
forthcoming, and another 17 NDCs where this contribution
is fully conditional on nance.
REVIEW
Concerning review, a major challenge will be ensuring
that sucient capacity exists among the expert reviewer
community as well as the UNFCCC Secretariat to carry out
a much larger number of technical reviews than in the past.
A lack of nancial resources can easily compound already
existing challenges in securing sucient capacity in this
regard and will likely lead to trade-os that will limit the
scope and depth of the review.26
Besides these capacity constraints, the standards of
evaluation of the TERs will likely limit the extent to which
such reviews will generate useful information for non-state
actors to play a role in pushing governments to strengthen
the ambition of their NDCs. In the context of both the
existing and the enhanced TERs, Parties are solely evaluated
against procedural rather than substantive standards. ese
procedural standards – i.e., the TACCC criteria – relate to the
quality of the reporting of information that the transparency
framework seeks to make visible. ese standards used
by the TER teams are detached from the climate actions
implemented by Parties. is means that a Party could
perform extremely well against procedural standards (for
instance, submit a timely report with all the necessary
information on how it is doing), while at the same time
refraining from implementing meaningful climate action.
TER teams are barred from making political judgments
and from reviewing the adequacy of a Party’s NDC, or of its
domestic actions (Annex of Decision 18/CMA.1, §149). And
while a TER can conrm whether a Party has achieved its
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
46
NDC – something a Party is to report itself – this does not
lead to any further consequences, such as the engagement of
the Article 15 Committee.27
e FMCP is probably more likely to generate information
that could give some leverage to observers to encourage
governments to progressively strengthen the ambition of
their promised eorts. However, it remains to be seen if
Parties will be able to devote the necessary resources to truly
engage in this process. More fundamentally, it is uncertain
whether many Parties will ask questions that concern the
ambition of other Parties’ NDCs and if the concerned Parties
will answer such questions in a meaningful manner.
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
47
REFERENCES
1. Dubash, N.K. (2010). Copenhagen: Climate of Mistrust. Economic and Political
Wee k ly , 44(52), 8-11
2. Morgan, J., Ballesteros, A., McGray, H., Levin, K., Daviet, F., Stolle, F. &
McMahon, H. (2010). Reections on the Cancun Agreements. World
Resources Institute, Washington, DC
3. Ellis, J. & Moarif, S. (2015). Identifying and Addressing Gaps in the UNFCCC
Reporting Framework. OECD, Paris
4. UNFCCC (2017). Review Practice Guidance. 2017 Update of the Analysis of
the Assessment of Completeness and Transparency of Information Reported
in Biennial Reports. Background paper for the 4th Lead Reviewers Meeting,
6-7 March 2017, Bonn, Germany
5. Adams, K., Ciplet, D., Weikmans, R., Roberts, J.T., Chokshi, S., Gurwitt, S.,
Holloway, M., Natson, S., Gewirtzmann, J., Avila, C. & Mitra, M. (2015).
Ranking Donor Countries on their Biennial Reports. AdaptationWatch,
Amsterdam. See also Weikmans, R., Adams, K., August, H., ... & Ciplet,
D. (2016). Assessing developed countries’ transparency: A review of 2016
Biennial Reports. AdaptationWatch, Amsterdam
6. Ciplet, D., Adams, K., Weikmans, R. & Roberts, J.T. (2018). e Transformative
Capability of Transparency in Global Environmental Governance. Global
Environmental Politics. 18(3), 130-150
7. Weikmans, R. & Roberts, J.T. (2019). e International Climate Finance
Accounting Muddle: Is ere Hope on the Horizon? Climate and
Development. 11(2), 97-111
8. Weikmans, R. & Roberts, J.T. (2019). e International Climate Finance
Accounting Muddle: Is ere Hope on the Horizon? Climate and
Development. 11(2), 97-111
9. Roberts, J.T. & Weikmans, R. (2017). Postface: Fragmentation, Failing Trust
and Enduring Tensions over What Counts as Climate Finance. International
Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics. 17(1), 129-137
10. Ellis, J. & Moarif, S. (2015). Identifying and Addressing Gaps in the UNFCCC
Reporting Framework. OECD, Paris
11. Zahar, A. (2015). International Climate Change Law and State Compliance.
London: Routledge; and Weikmans, R. (2017). Transparency from the Other
Side: A Review of the rst Biennial Update Reports. AdaptationWatch,
Amsterdam
12. Pulles, T. (2016). Did the UNFCCC Review Process Improve the National GHG
Inventory Submissions? GHG Management Institute.
13. Dagnet, Y., Rocha, M.T., Fei, T., Elliott, C. & Krnjaic, M. (2017). Mapping the
Linkages between the Transparency Framework and Other Provisions of the
Paris Agreement. World Resources Institute, Washington, DC
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
48
14. Deprez, A., Colombier, M. & Spencer, T. (2015) Transparency and the Paris
Agreement: Driving Ambitious Action in the New Climate Regime. Paris:
IDDRI. Also Briner, G. & Moarif, S. (2016). Enhancing Transparenc y
of Climate Change Mitigation under the Paris Agreement: Lessons from
Experience. OECD, Paris
15. Briner, G. & Moarif, S. (2016). Enhancing Transparency of Climate Change
Mitigation under the Paris Agreement: Lessons from Experience. OECD, Paris
16. Dagnet, Y., Cogswell, N., Bird, N., Bouyé, M. & Rocha, M. (2019). Building
Capacity for the Paris Agreement’s Enhanced Transparency Framework:
What Can We Learn from Countries’ Experiences and UNFCCC Processes?
World Resources Institute, Washington, DC
17. Dagnet, Y., Waskow, D., Elliott, C., Northrop, E., waites, J. Mogelgaard,
K., Krnjaic, M., Levin, K. & McGray, H. (2016). Staying on Track from
Paris: Advancing the Key Elements of the Paris Agreement. World Resources
Institute, Washington, DC
18. Gu, Z., Voigt, C. & Werksman, J. (2019). Facilitating Implementation and
Promoting Compliance with the Paris Agreement Under Article 15:
Conceptual Challenges and Pragmatic Choices. Climate Law. 9(1), 65-100
19. Weikmans, R. & Roberts, J.T. (2019). e International Climate Finance
Accounting Muddle: Is ere Hope on the Horizon? Climate and
Development. 11(2), 97-111
20. van Asselt, H., Sælen, H. & Pauw, P. (2015). Assessment and Review under a
2015 Climate Change Agreement. Nordic Council of Ministers, Copenhagen
21. Gupta, A. & van Asselt, H. (2017). Transparency in Multilateral Climate
Politics: Furthering (or Distracting from) Accountability? Regulation &
Governance. 13(1), 18-34
22. For instance, see Ellis, J. & Moarif, S. (2015). Identifying and Addressing Gaps
in the UNFCCC Reporting Framework. OECD, Paris; and Winkler, H.,
Mantlana, B. & Letete, T. (2017). Transparency of Action and Support in the
Paris Agreement. Climate Policy. 17(7), 853-872
23. Dagnet, Y., Cogswell, N., Bird, N., Bouyé, M. & Rocha, M. (2019). Building
Capacity for the Paris Agreement’s Enhanced Transparency Framework:
What Can We Learn from Countries’ Experiences and UNFCCC Processes?
World Resources Institute, Washington DC. 22-25
24. Such criteria could have been based on existing classications such as the
criteria for the identication and graduation of LDCs (see UN-OHRLLS.
(2019). Criteria for Identication and Graduation of LDCs. UN Oce of
the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked
Developing Countries and the Small Island Developing States, New York)
or the World Bank’s criteria for classifying countries by income level per
capita (see World Bank. (2019). World Bank Country and Lending Groups.
Washington, DC)
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
49
25. Pauw, W.P., Klein, R.J.T., Mbeva, K., Dzebo, A., Cassanmagnago, D. &
Rudlo, A. (2018). Beyond Headline Mitigation Numbers: We Need More
Transparent and Comparable NDCs to Achieve the Paris Agreement on
Climate Change. Climatic Change. 147(1-2), 23-29
26. See also Dagnet, Y., van Asselt, H., Calvaheiro, G., Rocha, M.T., Bisiaux, A.
& Cogswell, N. (2017). Designing the Enhanced Transparency Framework,
Part 2: Review under the Paris Agreement. World Resources Institute,
Washington DC
27. Gu, Z., Voigt, C. & Werksman, J. (2019). Facilitating Implementation and
Promoting Compliance with the Paris Agreement Under Article 15:
Conceptual Challenges and Pragmatic Choices. Climate Law. 9(1), 65-100
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
50
UNFCCC
ARTICLE 4
COMMITMENTS
1. All Parties, taking into account their common but dierentiated
responsibilities and their specic national and regional development priorities,
objectives and circumstances, shall:
(…)
(j) Communicate to the Conference of the Parties information related to
implementation, in accordance with Article 12.
(…)
ARTICLE 7
CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES
(…)
2. e Conference of the Parties, as the supreme body of this Convention, shall
keep under regular review the implementation of the Convention and any
related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt, and
shall make, within its mandate, the decisions necessary to promote the eective
implementation of the Convention. To this end, it shall:
(…)
(e) Assess, on the basis of all information made available to it in accordance
with the provisions of the Convention, the implementation of the Convention
by the Parties, the overall eects of the measures taken pursuant to the
Convention, in particular environmental, economic and social eects as well
as their cumulative impacts and the extent to which progress towards the
objective of the Convention is being achieved;
(…)
ANNEX: TRANSPARENCY
PROVISIONS IN THE CLIMATE
TREATIES
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
51
ARTICLE 12
COMMUNICATION OF INFORMATION RELATED TO
IMPLEMENTATION
1. In accordance with Article 4, paragraph 1, each Party shall communicate to
the Conference of the Parties, through the secretariat, the following elements
of information:
(a) A national inventory of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals
by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, to the
extent its capacities permit, using comparable methodologies to be promoted
and agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties;
(b) A general description of steps taken or envisaged by the Party to implement
the Convention; and
(c) Any other information that the Party considers relevant to the
achievement of the objective of the Convention and suitable for inclusion in
its communication, including, if feasible, material relevant for calculations of
global emission trends.
2. Each developed country Party and each other Party included in Annex I
shall incorporate in its communication the following elements of information:
(a) A detailed description of the policies and measures that it has adopted to
implement its commitment under Article 4, paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b); and
(b) A specic estimate of the eects that the policies and measures referred to
in subparagraph (a) immediately above will have on anthropogenic emissions
by its sources and removals by its sinks of greenhouse gases during the period
referred to in Article 4, paragraph 2(a).
3. In addition, each developed country Party and each other developed Party
included in Annex II shall incorporate details of measures taken in accordance
with Article 4, paragraphs 3, 4 and 5.
(…)
5. Each developed country Party and each other Party included in Annex I
shall make its initial communication within six months of the entry into force
of the Convention for that Party. Each Party not so listed shall make its initial
communication within three years of the entry into force of the Convention
for that Party, or of the availability of nancial resources in accordance with
Article 4, paragraph 3. Parties that are least developed countries may make
their initial communication at their discretion. e frequency of subsequent
communications by all Parties shall be determined by the Conference of the
Parties, taking into account the dierentiated timetable set by this paragraph.
(…)
7. From its rst session, the Conference of the Parties shall arrange for the
provision to developing country Parties of technical and nancial support,
on request, in compiling and communicating information under this Article,
as well as in identifying the technical and nancial needs associated with
proposed projects and response measures under Article 4. Such support may
be provided by other Parties, by competent international organizations and by
the secretariat, as appropriate. (...)
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
52
KYOTO PROTOCOL
ARTICLE 7
1. Each Party included in Annex I shall incorporate in its annual inventory
of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse
gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, submitted in accordance
with the relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties, the necessary
supplementary information for the purposes of ensuring compliance with
Article 3, to be determined in accordance with paragraph 4 below.
2. Each Party included in Annex I shall incorporate in its national
communication, submitted under Article 12 of the Convention, the
supplementary information necessary to demonstrate compliance with its
commitments under this Protocol, to be determined in accordance with
paragraph 4 below.
3. Each Party included in Annex I shall submit the information required under
paragraph 1 above annually, beginning with the rst inventory due under the
Convention for the rst year of the commitment period aer this Protocol has
entered into force for that Party. Each such Party shall submit the information
required under paragraph 2 above as part of the rst national communication
due under the Convention aer this Protocol has entered into force for it
and aer the adoption of guidelines as provided for in paragraph 4 below.
e frequency of subsequent submission of information required under this
Article shall be determined by the Conference of the Parties serving as the
meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, taking into account any timetable for
the submission of national communications decided upon by the Conference
of the Parties.
4. e Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this
Protocol shall adopt at its rst session, and review periodically thereaer,
guidelines for the preparation of the information required under this Article,
taking into account guidelines for the preparation of national communications
by Parties included in Annex I adopted by the Conference of the Parties. e
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol
shall also, prior to the rst commitment period, decide upon modalities for the
accounting of assigned amounts.
ARTICLE 8
1. e information submitted under Article 7 by each Party included in Annex
I shall be reviewed by expert review teams pursuant to the relevant decisions of
the Conference of the Parties and in accordance with guidelines adopted for this
purpose by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties
to this Protocol under paragraph 4 below. e information submitted under
Article 7, paragraph 1, by each Party included in Annex I shall be reviewed as
part of the annual compilation and accounting of emissions inventories and
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
53
assigned amounts. Additionally, the information submitted under Article 7,
paragraph 2, by each Party included in Annex I shall be reviewed as part of
the review of communications.
2. Expert review teams shall be coordinated by the secretariat and shall
be composed of experts selected from those nominated by Parties to the
Convention and, as appropriate, by intergovernmental organizations, in
accordance with guidance provided for this purpose by the Conference of
the Parties.
3. e review process shall provide a thorough and comprehensive technical
assessment of all aspects of the implementation by a Party of this Protocol.
e expert review teams shall prepare a report to the Conference of the
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, assessing the
implementation of the commitments of the Party and identifying any potential
problems in, and factors inuencing, the fullment of commitments. Such
reports shall be circulated by the secretariat to all Parties to the Convention.
e secretariat shall list those questions of implementation indicated in such
reports for further consideration by the Conference of the Parties serving as
the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol.
4. e Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this
Protocol shall adopt at its rst session, and review periodically thereaer,
guidelines for the review of implementation of this Protocol by expert review
teams taking into account the relevant decisions of the Conference of the
Parties.
5. e Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this
Protocol shall, with the assistance of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation
and, as appropriate, the Subsidiary Body for Scientic and Technological
Advice, consider:
(a) e information submitted by Parties under Article 7 and the reports of
the expert reviews thereon conducted under this Article; and
(b) ose questions of implementation listed by the secretariat under
paragraph 3 above, as well as any questions raised by Parties.
6. Pursuant to its consideration of the information referred to in paragraph
5 above, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the
Parties to this Protocol shall take decisions on any matter required for the
implementation of this Protocol.
PARIS AGREEMENT
ARTICLE 7
(…)
10. Each Party should, as appropriate, submit and update periodically
an adaptation communication, which may include its priorities,
implementation and support needs, plans and actions, without creating any
additional burden for developing country Parties.
11. e adaptation communication referred to in paragraph 10 of this Article
shall be, as appropriate, submitted and updated periodically, as a component
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
54
of or in conjunction with other communications or documents, including a
national adaptation plan, a nationally determined contribution as referred to
in Article 4, paragraph 2, and/or a national communication.
12. e adaptation communications referred to in paragraph 10 of this Article
shall be recorded in a public registry maintained by the secretariat.
ARTICLE 9
(…)
5. Developed country Parties shall biennially communicate indicative
quantitative and qualitative information related to paragraphs 1 and 3 of this
Article, as applicable, including, as available, projected levels of public nancial
resources to be provided to developing country Parties. Other Parties providing
resources are encouraged to communicate biennially such information on a
voluntary basis.
(…)
7. Developed country Parties shall provide transparent and consistent
information on support for developing country Parties provided and mobilized
through public interventions biennially in accordance with the modalities,
procedures and guidelines to be adopted by the Conference of the Parties
serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement, at its rst session, as
stipulated in Article 13, paragraph 13. Other Parties are encouraged to do so.
ARTICLE 11
(…)
4. All Parties enhancing the capacity of developing country Parties to implement
this Agreement, including through regional, bilateral and multilateral
approaches, shall regularly communicate on these actions or measures on
capacity-building. Developing country Parties should regularly communicate
progress made on implementing capacity-building plans, policies, actions or
measures to implement this Agreement.
(…)
ARTICLE 13
1. In order to build mutual trust and condence and to promote eective
implementation, an enhanced transparency framework for action and support,
with built-in exibility which takes into account Parties’ dierent capacities
and builds upon collective experience is hereby established.
2. e transparency framework shall provide exibility in the implementation
of the provisions of this Article to those developing country Parties that need
it in the light of their capacities. e modalities, procedures and guidelines
referred to in paragraph 13 of this Article shall reect such exibility.
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
55
3. e transparency framework shall build on and enhance the transparency
arrangements under the Convention, recognizing the special circumstances
of the least developed countries and small island developing States, and be
implemented in a facilitative, non-intrusive, non-punitive manner, respectful
of national sovereignty, and avoid placing undue burden on Parties.
4. e transparency arrangements under the Convention, including national
communications, biennial reports and biennial update reports, international
assessment and review and international consultation and analysis, shall form
part of the experience drawn upon for the development of the modalities,
procedures and guidelines under paragraph 13 of this Article.
5. e purpose of the framework for transparency of action is to provide a
clear understanding of climate change action in the light of the objective of the
Convention as set out in its Article 2, including clarity and tracking of progress
towards achieving Parties’ individual nationally determined contributions
under Article 4, and Parties’ adaptation actions under Article 7, including
good practices, priorities, needs and gaps, to inform the global stocktake under
Article 14.
6. e purpose of the framework for transparency of support is to provide
clarity on support provided and received by relevant individual Parties in the
context of climate change actions under Articles 4, 7, 9, 10 and 11, and, to
the extent possible, to provide a full overview of aggregate nancial support
provided, to inform the global stocktake under Article 14.
7. Each Party shall regularly provide the following information:
(a) A national inventory report of anthropogenic emissions by sources
and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases, prepared using good practice
methodologies accepted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
and agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the
Parties to this Agreement; and
(b) Information necessary to track progress made in implementing and
achieving its nationally determined contribution under Article 4.
8. Each Party should also provide information related to climate change
impacts and adaptation under Article 7, as appropriate.
9. Developed country Parties shall, and other Parties that provide support
should, provide information on nancial, technology transfer and capacity-
building support provided to developing country Parties under Articles 9, 10
and 11.
10. Developing country Parties should provide information on nancial,
technology transfer and capacity-building support needed and received under
Articles 9, 10 and 11.
11. Information submitted by each Party under paragraphs 7 and 9 of this
Article shall undergo a technical expert review, in accordance with decision
1/CP.21. For those developing country Parties that need it in the light of their
capacities, the review process shall include assistance in identifying capacity-
building needs. In addition, each Party shall participate in a facilitative,
multilateral consideration of progress with respect to eorts under Article
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
56
9, and its respective implementation and achievement of its nationally
determined contribution.
12. e technical expert review under this paragraph shall consist of
a consideration of the Party’s support provided, as relevant, and its
implementation and achievement of its nationally determined contribution.
e review shall also identify areas of improvement for the Party, and include
a review of the consistency of the information with the modalities, procedures
and guidelines referred to in paragraph 13 of this Article, taking into account
the exibility accorded to the Party under paragraph 2 of this Article. e
review shall pay particular attention to the respective national capabilities and
circumstances of developing country Parties.
13. e Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to
this Agreement shall, at its rst session, building on experience from the
arrangements related to transparency under the Convention, and elaborating
on the provisions in this Article, adopt common modalities, procedures and
guidelines, as appropriate, for the transparency of action and support.
14. Support shall be provided to developing countries for the implementation
of this Article.
15. Support shall also be provided for the building of transparency-related
capacity of developing country Parties on a continuous basis.
POCKET GUIDE TO TRANSPARENCY
57
ecbi
POCKET
GUIDE TO
THE
UNFCCC
POCKET
GUIDE TO
THE
UNFCCC
POCKET
GUIDE TO
THE
UNFCCC
POCKET
TO GUIDE
THE
UNFCCC
For other guides in this series visit
https://ecbi.org/pocket-guides
or scan this code
