ArticlePDF Available

Abstract and Figures

Humans evolved in the context of intense intergroup competition, and groups comprised of loyal members more often succeeded than those that were not. Therefore, selective pressures have consistently sculpted human minds to be "tribal," and group loyalty and concomitant cognitive biases likely exist in all groups. Modern politics is one of the most salient forms of modern coalitional conflict and elicits substantial cognitive biases. Given the common evolutionary history of liberals and conservatives, there is little reason to expect pro-tribe biases to be higher on one side of the political spectrum than the other. We call this the evolutionarily plausible null hypothesis and recent research has supported it. In a recent meta-analysis, liberals and conservatives showed similar levels of partisan bias, and a number of pro-tribe cognitive tendencies often ascribed to conservatives (e.g., intolerance toward dissimilar others) have been found in similar degrees in liberals. We conclude that tribal bias is a natural and nearly ineradicable feature of human cognition, and that no group—not even one’s own—is immune.
Content may be subject to copyright.
1
Tribalism is Human Nature
**In press; Current Directions in Psychological Science; as of June 10, 2019**
Cory J. Clark
Durham University
Brittany S. Liu
Kalamazoo College
Bo M. Winegard
Marietta College
Peter H. Ditto
University of California, Irvine
2
Abstract
Humans evolved in the context of intense intergroup competition, and groups comprised of loyal
members more often succeeded than those that were not. Therefore, selective pressures have
consistently sculpted human minds to be "tribal," and group loyalty and concomitant cognitive
biases likely exist in all groups. Modern politics is one of the most salient forms of modern
coalitional conflict and elicits substantial cognitive biases. Given the common evolutionary
history of liberals and conservatives, there is little reason to expect pro-tribe biases to be higher
on one side of the political spectrum than the other. We call this the evolutionarily plausible null
hypothesis and recent research has supported it. In a recent meta-analysis, liberals and
conservatives showed similar levels of partisan bias, and a number of pro-tribe cognitive
tendencies often ascribed to conservatives (e.g., intolerance toward dissimilar others) have been
found in similar degrees in liberals. We conclude that tribal bias is a natural and nearly
ineradicable feature of human cognition, and that no group—not even one’s own—is immune.
Keywords: politics, bias, symmetry, tribal loyalty, intergroup conflict
3
Tribalism is Human Nature
The human mind was forged by the crucible of coalitional conflict (Geary, 2005). For
many thousands of years, human tribes have competed against each other. Coalitions that were
more cooperative and cohesive not only survived but also appropriated land and resources from
other coalitions and therefore reproduced more prolifically, thus passing their genes (and their
loyalty traits) to later generations (Tooby & Cosmides, 2010). Because coalitional coordination
and commitment were crucial to group success, tribes punished and ostracized defectors and
rewarded loyal members with status and resources (as they continue to do today). Thus, displays
of loyalty and commitment to other members of the tribe also enhanced individual-level fitness
(by increasing status and resources and minimizing risks of ostracization). Over time, this would
select for traits that signal and enhance coalitional commitment (Berreby, 2005) such as ingroup
favoritism (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Tribalism, therefore, is natural.
1
Tribal Bias
Although tribal loyalties inspire many noble behaviors, they can impel humans to
sacrifice sound reasoning and judgmental accuracy for group belonging and commitment
(Kahan, Peters, Dawson, & Slavic, 2017). In other words, tribal loyalties can lead to tribal
biases. For example, people selectively approach information that supports their tribe’s interests
and avoid information that has potential to harm their tribe (by watching particular news
networks, or by forming “echo chambers” in their social environments; Stroud, 2010). And
people evaluate information they are exposed to in a biased manner by being uncritically
1
By tribe, we simply mean a human social group sharing a common interest, and by tribalism,
we mean tendencies to be loyal to and favorable toward one’s own tribe (and less favorable
toward other tribes). By human nature or natural, we mean evolved human propensities that
develop in most humans.
4
accepting of information that supports their tribe’s agenda and more skeptical of information that
opposes it (Ditto et al., 2018). These kinds of cognitive biases are problematic because (1)
post-enlightenment societies prize reason and rationality and no longer explicitly tolerate
obvious displays of ingroup favoritism, and (2) modern governments require the coordination of
multiple groups (e.g., political groups) to function. Biases decrease the likelihood of consensus
as groups fail to agree even on the facts in a particular debate.
There are at least two reasons tribalism distorts beliefs. First, beliefs display and signal
loyalty to group goals. Asserted opinions at least partially function as behavioral intention
indicators and therefore as coalitional membership indicators (Pietraszewski, Curry, Petersen,
Cosmides, Tooby, 2015). When one asserts “Abortion is immoral,” one indicates willingness to
coordinate with others to regulate abortion. Coalitions that generally oppose abortion (e.g., the
modern GOP) react negatively toward putative members who assert skepticism about pro-life
principles (Ditto & Mastronarde, 2009) because this indicates an unwillingness to cooperate on
that goal. If beliefs are held fervently, compel strong emotional displays, or are costly to hold,
they might function as honest (and thus trustworthy) loyalty signals (Kurzban & Christner,
2011). Perhaps perversely, dogmatism and resilience to contrary evidence likely enhance the
persuasiveness of the signal, because they show that one is strongly dedicated to the group’s
ideology in spite of potential consequences (e.g., being wrong about a difficult to answer
question).
Second, beliefs are precursors to potential arguments that support the interests of the
group, which coalitions are often formed to pursue and protect (e.g. wealthy people who want
low tax rates). In modern societies, violence is verboten, so tribes prevail not by conquering
other tribes, but by persuading other people—often, by making arguments. Sincere beliefs
5
generally lead to better and more zealous arguments than cynical hypocrisy (von Hippel &
Trivers, 2011). Therefore, people are motivated to favor and believe information that promotes
their group’s interests and to resist information that opposes their group’s interests because it
makes them more persuasive proponents of their group’s cause (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, &
Braman, 2011).
Political Bias
These two reasons also likely explain why politics appears to be one of the most fertile
grounds for bias (Van Bavel & Pereira, 2018). Political contests are highly consequential
because they determine how society will allocate coveted resources such as wealth, power, and
prestige. Winners gain control of cultural narratives and the mechanisms of government and can
use them to benefit their coalition, often at the expense of losers. Given these high stakes,
motivations to signal group loyalty and to defend the positions of the group are likely
particularly powerful in politics.
Within the political domain, individuals appear most biased about those issues most
important to the group, which often include moral commitments (Ditto, Pizarro, & Tannenbaum,
2009). As noted above, moral commitments signal that one is willing to conform to the rules of
the coalition. Therefore, groups are particularly prone to giving status to those who conform to
and vocalize support for moral norms and to deducting status from those who rebel and vocalize
dissent against those norms (Descioli & Kurzban, 2013). Thus, we can expect tribal biases to be
especially large for important moral commitments (Tetlock, 2002). For example, if opposing
abortion is a central goal for the political right, conservatives will be particularly biased about
facts surrounding abortion. If enhancing the status of women in society is a central moral goal of
6
the political left, liberals might be particularly biased about facts surrounding the gender wage
gap.
However, humans also care about truth and accuracy (for obvious evolutionary reasons),
and so biases are most likely to emerge for issues where the truth is ambiguous (Munro, Weih, &
Tsai, 2010). Many if not most political (and moral) disagreements are about ambiguous issues.
Experts disagree about when a fetus or child can experience conscious pain and about the many
contributors to the gender wage gap (and even the size of it). Even if experts could agree on the
facts, political positions often reflect opinions about what ought to be the case (often subjective
beliefs) based on beliefs about what is the case (ideally objective facts). For example, if the
within-profession wage gap is largely due to women’s choices to work fewer hours, should they
be paid the same as men? Policy choices often involve painful and complicated tradeoffs (e.g.,
interfering with free market autonomy to reduce income inequality, investing in new and more
costly energy technology to minimize climate change).
When the truth is ambiguous, tribal biases are more powerful because argument is more
important than when the truth is clear. Groups do not debate whether trees exist because the
answer is virtually undeniable. They do, however, debate whether fetuses deserve various legal
protections or whether women are paid less than men for equal work, because there are
intelligent arguments on both sides of these issues and there is no one obvious correct answer.
There is an unfortunate tribal logic here. One might imagine that ambiguity would compel
humility and confessions of uncertainty, but when ambiguity occurs in the context of coalitional
conflict, it may actually increase epistemic arrogance and bias. This is perfectly sensible,
however, if we remember that humans are coalitional animals, not dispassionate reasoners. They
7
were not “designed” to be humble; rather, they were “designed” to conform and to protect the
status of their tribe (Kahan et al., 2017).
Our guiding assumption, then, is that tribal bias is a nearly ineradicable element of human
nature and that it causes predictable cognitive biases (those that benefit the self and the group).
Specifically, people will be biased in favor of their tribe, particularly for issues important to the
tribe (often moral issues) and particularly when ambiguity is high and therefore the importance
of argument and persuasion is high. Given that modern liberals and conservatives share
evolutionary histories that favor loyalty signals and tribal biases, it is a priori likely that the
psychological propensities for bias would be similar on the political left and right. We call this
the evolutionarily plausible null hypothesis and recent research has supported it.
Everyone’s a Little Bit Biased…
Social sciences for a long time focused especially on the biases of conservatives, with
some scholars arguing that conservatives are more biased than liberals (e.g., Jost, Glaser,
Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003).
2
But in recent years, researchers have pushed back against this
narrative, contending that the overwhelming preponderance of liberals in the social sciences may
have skewed research about political ideologies and the people who hold them. Liberals likely
see their own biases as truths (Pronin, Lin, & Ross, 2002) and see conservative beliefs as
peculiar and wrong; therefore, they seek to explain the “conservative mind” and its perplexing
biases (Duarte et al., 2015; Eitan et al., 2019).
This insight inspired Ditto and colleagues (2018) to conduct a meta-analysis to test these
competing hypotheses. Across 51 experiments that tested the tendency for liberals and
2
Likely all political tribes display group loyalty biases, but the majority of this work has been
conducted in the U.S., so we focus on U.S. politics here. Future work should examine these
patterns in other political systems.
8
conservatives to evaluate identical information more favorably when it supports their own
political commitments than when it opposes them (for example, a death penalty supporter
evaluating scientific methods as more valid when the results of those methods support rather than
oppose the deterrent efficacy of the death penalty), there was strong support for the symmetry
hypothesis: liberals and conservatives were both biased, and to virtually equal degrees. Because
the included studies were performed under tightly controlled laboratory conditions, these results
cannot tell us how liberal and conservative biases might vary over time and context, but they do
suggest that liberals and conservatives share the same basic psychology that leads to bias—and
to similar degrees. This finding is consistent with the evolutionarily plausible null hypothesis:
tribal bias is natural, and thus all political tribes should be similarly susceptible to it.
…Even liberals
Whereas earlier scholars often emphasized that conservatives were higher in proclivities
that ought to predict stronger biases (than liberals) such as authoritarianism and dissonance
avoidance, a new wave of research in social psychology suggests that many of these proclivities
exist in equal levels in conservatives and liberals. As can be seen in Table 1, these include
authoritarianism, discrimination, dissonance avoidance, prejudice, selective exposure, and
resistance to science. For example, although researchers previously thought conservatives were
more intolerant of dissimilar others, such results may have been due to confounds between the
target groups investigated by liberal researchers (e.g., African Americans) and the political
ideology of the target groups (e.g., African Americans tend to be politically liberal). More recent
work suggests that people exhibit higher intolerance toward groups perceived as more dissimilar
to their own group, and to similar degrees for liberals and conservatives (Brandt, Reyna,
Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014).
9
Table 1. Recent work demonstrating more symmetry between liberals and conservatives than
previously believed.
Domain
Claim
Reference
Authoritarianism
Left-wing authoritarianism exists, and
predicts similar outcomes as right-wing
authoritarianism
Conway, Houck, Gornick, &
Repke, 2018
Discrimination
Liberals and conservatives similarly
endorse more discrimination against
groups that violate their values than
groups that do not
Wetherell, Brandt, & Reyna,
2013
Dissonance
avoidance
Liberals and conservatives similarly
avoid writing counter-attitudinal essays
Collins, Crawford, & Brandt,
2017
Prejudice
Liberals and conservatives are similarly
intolerant toward ideologically
dissimilar and threatening groups
Brandt et al., 2014
Resistance to
science
Liberals and conservatives have similar
negative reactions to dissonant science
communication
Liberals and conservatives similarly
deny scientific interpretations of results
that conflict with their attitudes
Nisbett, Cooper, & Garrett,
2015
Washburn & Skitka, 2018
Selective exposure
Liberals and conservatives are similarly
averse to learning the views of
ideological opponents
Extreme conservatives demonstrate the
most selective exposure, but moderate
conservatives demonstrate the least
Frimer, Skitka, & Motyl,
2017
Rodriguez, Moskowitz,
Salem, & Ditto, 2017
This does not mean that conservatives and liberals are similar in all ways or that one
group will never be vastly more biased or incorrect than the other—they will (Federico & Malka,
2018; Ditto et al., 2019). Groups, as we have argued, are most biased about issues that are
morally important and ambiguous. The general psychological propensities for bias appear similar
on the political left and right, but there are predictable domain-specific asymmetries in bias.
To consider a few examples, conservatives appear more motivated to reject
anthropogenic climate change than liberals, likely because it seems to support government
10
regulation and more centralization and hurts the fossil fuel industry, an important part of the
Republican base in the United States (Lewandowsky & Oberauer, 2016). Conservatives may also
exaggerate the amount of choice people exercise over their sexuality because homosexuality is
considered immoral by a substantial proportion of the religious believers in the Republican
coalition (Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2008), and contending that it is a free decision rather than an
innate inclination is more compelling for moral condemnation (Clark, Baumeister, & Ditto,
2017). On the other hand, a growing body of work suggests that liberals in general are more
biased than conservatives about traditionally conceived disadvantaged groups (e.g. women,
Blacks; see Table 2), likely because an important moral value of the political left is opposition to
inequality (Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008).
Table 2. Recent work documenting a domain-specific bias asymmetry about disadvantaged
groups such that liberals are more biased than conservatives
Finding
All political orientations demonstrate a pro-black bias, but higher
liberalism was associated with a larger pro-black bias
Liberals were more willing to make a utilitarian sacrifice of a White
man’s life than of a Black man’s life, whereas race had no influence on
conservatives’ judgments
Whereas liberals are more inclined to amplify the successes of
disadvantaged groups (i.e., Blacks, women) than advantaged groups
(i.e., Whites, men), conservatives treat the successes of both groups
more similarly
White liberals present less self-competence to Black than White
interaction partners, whereas White conservatives treat the groups more
similarly
Liberals are biased against the notion that there could be biological
differences between demographic groups when those differences appear
to favor advantaged groups, whereas conservatives display less of a bias
A study from a political bias meta-analysis with the closest relevance to
disadvantaged groups (affirmative action and same-sex marriage) found
one of the largest effect sizes for liberal bias (Crawford, Jussim, Cain, &
Cohen, 2013)
11
Note that if one group currently has more or stronger concerns (because of historical and
time variant factors such as rapidly changing demographics or having recently lost a presidential
election), or if one group has more moral convictions in general, one might predict more bias in
that group (during that time period, or in general). However, our best current estimate is that
domain-specific asymmetries between liberals and conservatives appear to produce general
symmetries in pro-tribe biases among liberals and conservatives when averaged across multiple
domains (and over at least a brief period of time). Until newer or better information contradicts
these recent findings, it seems reasonable to posit that liberals and conservatives are roughly
symmetrical in their pro-tribe cognitive tendencies.
Conclusion
Humans are tribal creatures. They were not designed to reason dispassionately about the
world; rather, they were designed to reason in ways that promote the interests of their coalition
(and hence, themselves). It would therefore be surprising if a particular group of individuals did
not display such tendencies, and recent work suggests, at least in the U.S. political sphere, that
both liberals and conservatives are substantially biased—and to similar degrees. Historically, and
perhaps even in modern society, these tribal biases are quite useful for group cohesion but
perhaps also for other moral purposes (e.g., liberal bias in favor of disadvantaged groups might
help increase equality). Also, it is worth noting that a bias toward viewing one’s own tribe in a
favorable light is not necessarily irrational. If one’s goal is to be admired among one’s own tribe,
fervidly supporting their agenda and promoting their goals, even if that means having or
promoting erroneous beliefs, is often a reasonable strategy (Kahan et al., 2017). The incentives
for holding an accurate opinion about global climate change, for example, may not be worth the
12
social rejection and loss of status that could accompany challenging the views of one’s political
ingroup.
However, these biases decrease the likelihood of consensus across political divides. Thus,
developing effective strategies for disincentivizing political tribalism and promoting the much
less natural but more salutary tendencies toward civil political discourse and reasonable
compromise are crucial priorities for future research. A useful theoretical starting point is that
tribalism and concomitant biases are part of human nature, and that no group, not even one’s
own, is immune.
13
References
Axt, J. R., Ebersole, C. R., & Nosek, B. A. (2016). An unintentional, robust, and replicable pro-
Black bias in social judgment. Social Cognition, 34, 1-39.
Berreby, D. (2005). Us and them: Understanding your tribal mind. New York, NY: Time Warner
Book Group.
Brandt, M. J., Reyna, C., Chambers, J. R., Crawford, J. T., & Wetherell, G. (2014). The
ideological-conflict hypothesis: Intolerance among both liberals and
conservatives. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 23, 27-34.
Clark, C. J., Baumeister, R. F., & Ditto, P. H. (2017). Making punishment palatable: Belief in
free will alleviates punitive distress. Consciousness and Cognition, 51, 193-211.
Collins, T. P., Crawford, J. T., & Brandt, M. J. (2017). No evidence for ideological asymmetry in
dissonance avoidance: Unsuccessful close and conceptual replications of Nam, Jost, and
van Bavel (2013). Social Psychology, 48, 123-134.
Conway, L. G., Houck, S. C., Gornick, L. J., & Repke, M. A. (2018). Finding the Loch Ness
Monster: Left-Wing Authoritarianism in the United States. Political Psychology, 39,
1049-1067.
Crawford, J. T., Jussim, L., Cain, T. R., & Cohen, F. (2013). Right-wing authoritarianism and
social dominance orientation differentially predict biased evaluations of media
reports. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 43, 163-174.
DeScioli, P., & Kurzban, R. (2013). A solution to the mysteries of morality. Psychological
bulletin, 139, 477-496.
Ditto, P. H., Clark, C. J., Liu, B., Wojcik, S. P., Chen, E. E., Grady, R. H., Celniker, J. & Zinger,
J. F. (2019). Partisan bias and it’s discontents. Perspectives on Psychological Science.
14
Ditto, P. H., & Mastronarde, A. J. (2009). The paradox of the political maverick. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 295-298.
Ditto, P. H., Liu, B., Clark, C. J., Wojcik, S. P., Chen, E. E., Grady, R. H., Celniker, J. & Zinger,
J. F. (2018). At least bias is bipartisan: A meta-analytic comparison of partisan bias in
liberals and conservatives. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 14, 273-291.
Ditto, P. H., Pizarro, D. A., & Tannenbaum, D. (2009). Motivated moral reasoning. Psychology
of Learning and Motivation, 50, 307-338.
Duarte, J. L., Crawford, J. T., Stern, C., Haidt, J., Jussim, L., & Tetlock, P. E. (2015). Political
diversity will improve social psychological science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 38,
1-13.
Dupree, C. H., & Fiske, S. T. (2019). Self-presentation in interracial settings: The competence
downshift by white liberals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.
Eitan, O., Viganola, D., Inbar, Y., Dreber, A., Johannesson, M., Pfeiffer, T., ... & Uhlmann, E. L.
(2018). Is research in social psychology politically biased? Systematic empirical tests and
a forecasting survey to address the controversy. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 79, 188-199.
Federico, C. M., & Malka, A. (2018). The contingent, contextual nature of the relationship
between needs for security and certainty and political preferences: Evidence and
implications. Political Psychology, 39, 3-48.
Frimer, J. A., Skitka, L. J., & Motyl, M. (2017). liberals and conservatives are similarly
motivated to avoid exposure to one another's opinions. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 72, 1-12.
15
Geary, D. C. (2005) Origin of mind: evolution of brain, cognition, and general intelligence.
Washington DC: American Psychological Association.
Haider-Markel, D. P., & Joslyn, M. R. (2008). Beliefs About the Origins of Homosexuality and
Support For Gay RightsAn Empirical Test of Attribution Theory. Public Opinion
Quarterly, 72, 291-310.
Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservatism as
motivated social cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 339-375.
Jost, J. T., Nosek, B. A., & Gosling, S. D. (2008). Ideology: Its resurgence in social, personality,
and political psychology. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3, 126-136.
Kahan, D. M., Jenkins-Smith, H., & Braman, D. (2011). Cultural cognition of scientific
consensus. Journal of risk research, 14, 147-174.
Kahan, D. M., Peters, E., Dawson, E. C., & Slovic, P. (2017). Motivated numeracy and
enlightened self-government. Behavioural Public Policy, 1, 54-86.
doi:10.1017/bpp.2016.2
Kteily, N. S., Rocklage, M. D., McClanahan, K., & Ho, A. K. (2019). Political ideology shapes
the amplification of the accomplishments of disadvantaged vs. advantaged group
members. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 201818545.
Kurzban, R., & Christner, J. (2011). Are supernatural beliefs commitment devices for integroup
conflict? In J. Forgas, A. Kruglanski, & K. Williams (Eds.), The 13th Sydney
Symposium of Social Psychology: Social Conflict and aggression (pp. 285–300). New
York: Psychology Press.
Lewandowsky, S., & Oberauer, K. (2016). Motivated rejection of science. Current Directions in
Psychological Science, 25, 217-222.
16
Munro, G. D., Weih, C., & Tsai, J. (2010). Motivated suspicion: Asymmetrical attributions of the
behavior of political ingroup and outgroup members. Basic and Applied Social
Psychology, 32, 173-184.
Nisbet, E. C., Cooper, K. E., & Garrett, R. K. (2015). The partisan brain: How dissonant science
messages lead conservatives and liberals to (dis) trust science. The ANNALS of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 658, 36-66.
Pietraszewski, D., Curry, O. S., Petersen, M. B., Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2015). Constituents
of political cognition: Race, party politics, and the alliance detection system. Cognition,
140, 24-39.
Pronin, E., Lin, D. Y., & Ross, L. (2002). The bias blind spot: Perceptions of bias in self versus
others. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, 369-381.
Rodriguez, C. G., Moskowitz, J. P., Salem, R. M., & Ditto, P. H. (2017). Partisan selective
exposure: The role of party, ideology and ideological extremity over time. Translational
Issues in Psychological Science, 3, 254-271.
Stroud, N. J. (2010). Polarization and partisan selective exposure. Journal of communication, 60,
556-576.
Tajfel, H. & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. The Social
Psychology of Intergroup Relations, 33, 33-47.
Tetlock, P. E. (2002). Social functionalist frameworks for judgment and choice: intuitive
politicians, theologians, and prosecutors. Psychological review, 109, 451-471.
Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (2010). Groups in mind: The coalitional roots of war and
morality. Human morality and sociality: Evolutionary and comparative perspectives, 91-
234.
17
Uhlmann, E. L., Pizarro, D. A., Tannenbaum, D., & Ditto, P. H. (2009). The motivated use of
moral principles. Judgment and Decision making, 4(6), 479.
Van Bavel, J. J., & Pereira, A. (2018). The partisan brain: An Identity-based model of political
belief. Trends in Cognitive Science, 22, 213-224.
von Hippel, W., & Trivers, R. (2011). The evolution and psychology of self-
deception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34, 1-16.
Washburn, A. N., & Skitka, L. J. (2017). Science denial across the political divide: liberals and
conservatives are similarly motivated to deny attitude-inconsistent science. Social
Psychological and Personality Science, 1-9.
Wetherell, G. A., Brandt, M. J., & Reyna, C. (2013). Discrimination across the ideological
divide: The role of value violations and abstract values in discrimination by liberals and
conservatives. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 4, 658-667.
Winegard, B. M., Clark, C. J., Hasty, C. R., & Baumeister, R. F. (2018). Equalitarianism: A
source of liberal bias. Manuscript in preparation.
18
Recommended Readings
1. Ditto et al., 2018 (see References): A meta-analysis of partisan bias studies (which found
liberals and conservatives showed an equivalent tendency to evaluate politically congenial
information more favorably than politically uncongenial information), including a discussion
of how to reconcile conflicting literature on the question of symmetry in partisan bias.
2. Eitan et al., 2019 (see References): An article demonstrating the extent to which political
social psychology research can be affected by liberal viewpoints and values.
3. Van Bavel and Pereira, 2018 (see References): A comprehensive and topical overview on
ways in which partisan identity can affect individuals’ cognition, judgments, and decision-
making.
4. Kahan, Peters, Dawson, and Slavic, 2017 (see References): An article for understanding how
motivated reasoning in politics serves to maintain individuals’ standing in important ingroups
(e.g., based on political identity).
5. Federico and Malka, 2018 (see References): Example of a review article that challenges the
notion that conservative ideology is invariably linked with certain psychological dispositions
and argues instead that the association is often dependent on various factors, such as issue,
context, and group loyalty.
... However, the codesign process must contend with the concept of tribalism, which refers to the tendence of individuals or groups within a particular community, such as professional sectors, academic institutions, or healthcare system, to prioritize their own perspectives, beliefs or methodologies over others [14][15][16]. In the context of this study, tribalism can manifest as a strong identification with a particular group's approach to solving problems, potentially leading to resistance against new ideas or innovations proposed by external parties. ...
... Addressing tribalism is crucial for effective stakeholder engagement. The need for a co-designed Graduate Certificate suggests a deliberate attempt to break down the silos (tribes) that exist within the healthcare workforce and academic sectors [14,16]. Tribalism might lead to resistance from certain stakeholder groups who prefer maintaining control over the curriculum or methodologies they are accustomed to rather than adopting new, collaborative frameworks [14,16]. ...
... The need for a co-designed Graduate Certificate suggests a deliberate attempt to break down the silos (tribes) that exist within the healthcare workforce and academic sectors [14,16]. Tribalism might lead to resistance from certain stakeholder groups who prefer maintaining control over the curriculum or methodologies they are accustomed to rather than adopting new, collaborative frameworks [14,16]. Furthermore, as the program aims to integrate diverse perspectives from various health sectors, tribalism could hinder collaboration across disciplines. ...
Article
Full-text available
Background A significant issue with innovative problem-solving in healthcare is an existing deficiency in continuing education for many healthcare professionals, which hinders the successful implementation of inventive solutions and progress in the field. Educators play a crucial role in guiding students to cultivate the knowledge and skills necessary to confront these challenges, including problem solving, collaboration, and the use of rapidly advancing technologies. It is vital to design educational programs that empower and motivate students to develop the proficiency and knowledge they need to be effective problem solvers, collaborators, and cultivators of innovative solutions. This project aims to assess the implementation and effectiveness of a codesigned postgraduate university program for a multidisciplinary health workforce. Methods The Leading Health Services Innovation Project is a hybrid type 2 mixed method implementation trial of a codesigned Graduate Certificate in Health Services Innovation. In collaboration with a large tertiary and quaternary health service, we developed a codesign process to guide the project, with time quarantined to create space for two-way learning between health sector partners and healthcare academics. Qualitative interviews and quantitative surveys for primary users will evaluate the implementation strategies. The reach, effectiveness, adoption implementation, and maintenance (RE-AIM) framework will guide the evaluation and maintenance of the program. Results Integrating a codesign strategy complemented by a well-structured implementation and evaluation protocol that is a combination of implementation science theoretical frameworks (Knowledge to Action, Evidence-Based Co-design, RE-AIM) may lead to translational competence as a potential outcome. Anticipated outcomes The application, resourcing and commitment to codesigned tertiary-level learning and qualification will demonstrate the achievement of a contemporary and comprehensive postgraduate university degree program in health innovation management.
... Instead, this study supports the idea that xenophobia has multidimensional facets (Wimmer 1997;Hjerm 2001;Esses et al. 2005;Yakushko 2009) and is context-dependent. Xenophobia manifests as a form of tribalism by which subgroups tend to be more lenient toward those who share their identities and values and harsher toward those who do not (Clark et al. 2019). The ingroup-outgroup effects in the encounter of foreign parties take the forms of both racism and nationalism in inducing xenophobic bias, as racial or ethnic homogeneity produces similarity leniency and conservative ideology leads to protectionism. ...
Article
Full-text available
With the upsurge of anti-globalizing ideologies and politics, the increasing institutionalization of xenophobia within the legal system has emerged as a pressing concern. Existing law and social science research has underexplored xenophobic bias in the US legal system. This article conceptualizes xenophobic bias as consisting of racism and nationalism. It investigates whether mock jurors reach different verdicts on defendant companies from foreign countries of origin (Japan, France, and China) compared to domestic (US) companies. Using a test simulating a patent lawsuit, the research finds no evidence of general xenophobic bias in juror liability verdict decisions, yet there is a specific bias against the Chinese company when granting damage awards. The similarity-leniency effect that has been established in the previous literature is corroborated in this article. Additionally, political views moderate the effects of the company’s country of origin on juror decisions. This research offers a more nuanced conceptual framework of xenophobic bias in juror decision-making for future law and social science research and informs judicial policies seeking to improve jury instructions and jury selection to reduce xenophobic bias.
... This was even more so for Hutu choosing to take an active role in helping the victims. This intragroup boundary policing is one of the strategic pillars of the instrumentalization of ethnicity (Clark et al., 2019). Specifically, it involves identity leveraging, that is, the strategic manipulation of social distance between constructed groups for political gain (Bleich & Morgan, 2019). ...
Chapter
Full-text available
In the literature on sympathetic resistance (also referred to as ally activism, bystander interventions, or outgroup activism), bystanders’ action against violent oppression is theorized to have substantial political impacts. However, much work in this area reveals bias, assuming a negative set of moral and psychological attributes (e.g., passivity). We argue that this bias arises partly from not sufficiently accounting for the socio-political context. Applying a situated perspective to the case of the Rwandan genocide—an example of ethnopolitical violence in a multi-ethnic, institutionally authoritarian context—we posit that two systemic strategies (instrumentalization of ethnicity and systematic terror) shape bystanders’ subjective perceptions of an outgroup’s oppression, thereby repressing sympathetic resistance and demobilizing solidarity with ethnic outgroups to facilitate bystander passivity in ethnic conflicts. We call for future research to test our theoretical ideas and to better situate the psychology of sympathetic resistance in its sociopolitical context.
... In particular, humans are desirous of climbing social hierarchies within peer groups (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009;Kurzban & Leary, 2001;Tooby & Cosmides, 2010). In modern western societies, political groups are often an important social group, and people engage in a variety of behaviors to signal their commitments and coalitional value to their political ingroups (Clark et al., 2019;Clark & Winegard, 2020;Pietraszewski et al., 2015). Consequently, organizational leaders might be tempted to use the authority and influence of the organizations they lead to benefit their political ingroup in order to increase their own status. ...
Article
Full-text available
Organizations and their leaders have begun publicly signaling political values in candidate endorsements, statements, and advertisements, yet political action often has negative organizational consequences, including lower public support, financial costs, and reduced trust. We review the costs of organizational politicization, moderators of those costs (such as ideological alignment and size of the organization), and potential reasons why leaders take political action. Scholars often attribute political action to public pressure to “take a stand”, but this public pressure may be misunderstood. Members of the public who want organizations to take political stances desire particular stances to be made in particular ways, tend to believe in the superiority of their own values, and are relatively likely to boycott businesses for political reasons. Catering to these individuals could lead to the accumulation of supporters who are especially politically zealous and likely to punish perceived political missteps. Demands to “take a stand” might seem like one unified call to action, but they may instead be a large set of directly conflicting demands. We make recommendations for future research to better understand leaders' reasons for political action and when, if ever, such actions support the interests of organizations and broader society.
... Lack of a sense of shared identity provokes additional divisions between heterogeneous ethnic and religious groups. People are less tolerant towards groups perceived as dissimilar to their own (Clark et. al., 2019), especially in the political sphere. In most cases, socio-cultural predispositions become the main reason for polarization and segmentation within countries. This is most clearly evident in the tendency towards social homogeneity in the housing and household sector (Van Gent et al., 2019). Social status or class (Clark et al., 2014), et ...
Article
Full-text available
This study delves into the issue of state fragility, specifically exploring features distinctive to multicultural and polyethnic communities. It examines the potential impact of changes in ethnic proportions within the modern-day Russian Federation, their hypothetical link to the stability of the political system and the functionality of its institutions. To assess whether ethnic diversity contributes to intra-systemic issues, an ethnic vigilantism propensity (EVP) index is proposed as a quantitative measure. The study highlights the importance of addressing ethnic heterogeneity to mitigate ethnic vigilantism and suggests that further research is needed to fully understand these dynamics. The results offer a new perspective on ethnic conflicts by considering insights from human ethology and their relevance to political science and practice addressing political system stability.
... In this chapter, we focus on the relevance of the security-dynamics construct for understanding individual differences in what Clark et al. (2019) called tribalism -the tendency to express strong loyalty to one's own tribe or social groups (in-groups); exalt and identify with their values, norms, and beliefs; and engage in behaviors that promote the group's effectiveness and sustainability (see also Crano & Gaffney; Forgas; and Krueger & Gruning, this volume). We first review the basic concepts of attachment theory, focusing on what we, following Fredrickson (2001), call the "broaden-and-build" cycle of attachment security (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). ...
Conference Paper
Full-text available
ÖZET Finansal kabilecilik ortak değer ve duygulara sahip kişilerin finansal piyasalara ilişkin algıladıkları belirsizliği azaltmak, bilgi edinmek ve yargıya varabilmek amacı ile gönüllü olarak sosyal gruplara katılmasıdır. Bu katılım bireylerin karar ve davranışlarını etkilediği gibi hislerini ve düşüncelerini de etkiler. Ancak herhangi bir bağlayıcılıkları olmadığı gibi bir kişi aynı anda birden fazla kabileye de dahil olabilir. Bu bağlamda antropolojik kabilecilikten ve marka topluluklarından farklılaşır. Oldukça yeni bir kavram olan finansal kabilecilik bireylerin finansal piyasaları ve finansal enstrümanları anlayabilmeleri için dahil oldukları informal yapılardır. Bu çalışmanın amacı finansal kabilecilik kavramını ele almak, sebep ve sonuçları ile değerlendirmektir. Bu amaçla Türkiye’den online ve gönüllük esası ile 1473 denekten veri toplanmıştır. Stres ve risk algısı finansal kabileciliğe sebep olurken, finansal kabilecilik de sürü davranışını, özgüveni, finansal varlığa güveni ve riskli yatırım niyetini arttırmaktadır. Anahtar Kelimeler: Finansal kabilecilik, risk algısı, stres, riskli yatırım niyeti, sürü davranışı ABSTRACT Financial tribalism is the voluntary participation of people with common values and feelings in social groups in order to reduce the uncertainty they perceive about financial markets, to obtain information and to make judgments. This participation affects individuals' decisions and behaviors, as well as their feelings and thoughts. However, they are not binding and a person can belong to more than one tribe at the same time. In this context, it differs from anthropological tribalism and brand communities. Financial tribalism, a fairly new concept, is the informal structures that individuals participate in to understand financial markets and financial instruments. The aim of this study is to discuss the concept of financial tribalism and evaluate it with its causes and consequences. For this purpose, data was collected from 1473 subjects from Turkey on an online and voluntary basis. While stress and risk perception cause financial tribalism, financial tribalism increases herd behavior, self-confidence, trust in financial assets and risky investment intention. Keywords: Financial tribalism, risk perception, stress, risk investment intention, herd behavior
Article
Researchers have long sought to make generalizable conclusions about the relationship between conspiracism and political identities. However, this literature remains deeply conflicted. The “extremity hypothesis” argues that, due to the psychology of extremism, individuals who identify as extremely left or right wing should display higher levels of conspiracism than centrists. But the “asymmetry hypothesis” argues that, due to the psychology of conservatism, individuals who self‐identify as right wing should display higher levels of conspiracism than those identifying as centrists or left wing. Here, we attempt to reconcile these competing hypotheses and the empirical findings supporting them. First, we demonstrate that the inconsistent findings stem from research designs that cannot support generalizable conclusions about the relationship between conspiracism and political identities. Second, we reexamine the most prominent studies supporting the extremity and asymmetry hypotheses. We find that they suffer from inappropriate measurement and modeling strategies, rendering their conclusions suspect. We then test the extremity and asymmetry hypotheses by reexamining 18 U.S. surveys (2012–21; n = 32,056) and examining new surveys from 18 countries (2022; n = 18,033). In total, our 77 samples spanning a decade and 27 countries ( n = 161,492) provide only weak support for either hypothesis. The wide variability in our findings suggests that differences in the relationship between conspiracism and political identities across political and temporal contexts do not stem from sampling variability, but rather from systematic forces that impact ideology, conspiracism, or both. We conclude that there is no single functional form that universally characterizes the relationship between conspiracism and political orientations across countries, or even over time within countries.
Article
Full-text available
Most Whites, particularly sociopolitical liberals, now endorse racial equality. Archival and experimental research reveals a subtle but persistent ironic consequence: White liberals self-present less competence to minorities than to other Whites—that is, they patronize minorities stereotyped as lower status and less competent. In an initial archival demonstration of the competence downshift, Study 1 examined the content of White Republican and Democratic presidential candidates’ campaign speeches. Although Republican candidates did not significantly shift language based on audience racial composition, Democratic candidates used less competence-related language to minority audiences than to White audiences. Across 5 experiments (total N = 2,157), White participants responded to a Black or White hypothetical (Studies 2, 3, 4, S1) or ostensibly real (Study 5) interaction partner. Three indicators of self-presentation converged: competence-signaling of vocabulary selected for an assignment, competence-related traits selected for an introduction, and competence-related content of brief, open-ended introductions. Conservatism indicators included self-reported political affiliation (liberal-conservative), Right-Wing Authoritarianism (values-based conservatism), and Social Dominance Orientation (hierarchy-based conservatism). Internal meta-analyses revealed that liberals—but not conservatives—presented less competence to Black interaction partners than to White ones. The simple effect was small but significant across studies, and most reliable for the self-reported measure of conservatism. This possibly unintentional but ultimately patronizing competence-downshift suggests that well-intentioned liberal Whites may draw on low-status/competence stereotypes to affiliate with minorities.
Article
Full-text available
Significance Inequality prospers when successes of advantaged group members (e.g., men, whites) get more attention than equivalent successes of disadvantaged group members (e.g., women, blacks). What determines whose successes individuals deem worth promoting vs. those they ignore? Using hundreds of thousands of tweets from the 2016 Olympics, we show that liberals are much more likely than conservatives to shine a spotlight on black and female (vs. white and male) US gold medalists. Two further experiments provide evidence that such differential amplification of successful targets is driven by a motivation—higher among liberals—to raise disadvantaged groups’ standing in service of equality. We find that liberals drive differential amplification more than conservatives and establish a behavioral mechanism through which liberals’ egalitarian motives manifest.
Article
Full-text available
Baron and Jost (this issue) present three critiques of our meta-analysis demonstrating similar levels of partisan bias in liberals and conservatives: 1) that the studies we examined were biased toward finding symmetrical bias among liberals and conservatives, 2) that the studies we examined do not measure partisan bias but rather rational Bayesian updating, and 3) that social psychology is not biased in favor of liberals but biased instead toward creating false equivalencies. We respond in turn that: 1) the included studies covered a wide variety of issues at the core of contemporary political conflict and fairly compared bias by establishing conditions under which both liberals and conservatives would have similar motivations and opportunity to demonstrate bias, 2) we carefully selected studies that were least vulnerable to Bayesian counterexplanation and most scientists and laypeople consider these studies demonstrations of bias, and 3) there is reason to be vigilant about liberal bias in social psychology, but this does not preclude concern about other possible biases, all of which threaten good science. We close with recommendations for future research and urge researchers to move beyond broad generalizations of political differences that are insensitive to time and context.
Article
Full-text available
The present investigation provides the first systematic empirical tests for the role of politics in academic research. In a large sample of scientific abstracts from the field of social psychology, we find both evaluative differences, such that conservatives are described more negatively than liberals, and explanatory differences, such that conservatism is more likely to be the focus of explanation than liberalism. In light of the ongoing debate about politicized science, a forecasting survey permitted scientists to state a priori empirical predictions about the results, and then change their beliefs in light of the evidence. Participating scientists accurately predicted the direction of both the evaluative and explanatory differences, but at the same time significantly overestimated both effect sizes. Scientists also updated their broader beliefs about political bias in response to the empirical results, providing a model for addressing divisive scientific controversies across fields.
Article
Full-text available
Both liberals and conservatives accuse their political opponents of partisan bias, but is there empirical evidence that one side of the political aisle is indeed more biased than the other? To address this question, we meta-analyzed the results of 51 experimental studies, involving over 18,000 participants, that examined one form of partisan bias—the tendency to evaluate otherwise identical information more favorably when it supports one’s political beliefs or allegiances than when it challenges those beliefs or allegiances. Two hypotheses based on previous literature were tested: an asymmetry hypothesis (predicting greater partisan bias in conservatives than in liberals) and a symmetry hypothesis (predicting equal levels of partisan bias in liberals and conservatives). Mean overall partisan bias was robust (r = .245), and there was strong support for the symmetry hypothesis: Liberals (r = .235) and conservatives (r = .255) showed no difference in mean levels of bias across studies. Moderator analyses reveal this pattern to be consistent across a number of different methodological variations and political topics. Implications of the current findings for the ongoing ideological symmetry debate and the role of partisan bias in scientific discourse and political conflict are discussed.
Article
Full-text available
Recent scholarship has challenged the long-held assumption in the social sciences that Conservatives are more biased than Liberals, yet little work deliberately explores domains of liberal bias. Here, we demonstrate that Liberals (some might call them Progressives) are particularly prone to bias about victims’ groups (e.g. women, Black people) and identify a set of beliefs that consistently predict this bias, termed Equalitarianism. Equalitarianism, we believe, stems from an aversion to inequality and a desire to protect relatively low status groups, and includes three interrelated beliefs: (1) demographic groups do not differ biologically; (2) prejudice is ubiquitous and explains existing group disparities; (3) society can, and should, make all groups equal in society. This leads to bias against information that portrays a perceived privileged group more favorably than a perceived victims’ group. Eight studies and twelve mini meta-analyses (n=3,274) support this theory. Liberalism was associated with perceiving certain groups as victims (Studies 1a-1b). In Studies 2-7 and meta-analyses, Liberals evaluated the same study as less credible when the results portrayed a privileged group (men and White people) more favorably than a victims’ group (women and Black people) than vice versa. Ruling out alternative explanations of normative reasoning, significant order effects in within-subjects designs in Study 6 and Study 7 (preregistered) suggest that Liberals believe they should not evaluate identical information differently depending on which group is portrayed more favorably, yet do so. In all studies, higher equalitarianism mediated the relationship between liberalism and lower credibility ratings when privileged groups were portrayed more favorably. Although not predicted a priori, meta-analyses also revealed Moderates to be the most balanced in their judgments. These findings do not indicate whether this bias is morally justifiable, only that it exists.
Article
Full-text available
Although past research suggests authoritarianism may be a uniquely right-wing phenomenon, the present two studies tested the hypothesis that authoritarianism exists in both right-wing and left-wing contexts in essentially equal degrees. Across two studies, university (n = 475) and Mechanical Turk (n = 298) participants completed either the RWA (right-wing authoritarianism) scale or a newly developed (and parallel) LWA (left-wing authoritarianism) scale. Participants further completed measurements of ideology and three domain-specific scales: prejudice, dogmatism, and attitude strength. Findings from both studies lend support to an authoritarianism symmetry hypothesis: Significant positive correlations emerged between LWA and measurements of liberalism, prejudice, dogmatism, and attitude strength. These results largely paralleled those correlating RWA with identical conservative-focused measurements, and an overall effect-size measurement showed LWA was similarly related to those constructs (compared to RWA) in both Study 1 and Study 2. Taken together, these studies provide evidence that LWA may be a viable construct in ordinary U.S. samples.
Article
Democracies assume accurate knowledge by the populace, but the human attraction to fake and untrustworthy news poses a serious problem for healthy democratic functioning. We articulate why and how identification with political parties – known as partisanship – can bias information processing in the human brain. There is extensive evidence that people engage in motivated political reasoning, but recent research suggests that partisanship can alter memory, implicit evaluation, and even perceptual judgments. We propose an identity-based model of belief for understanding the influence of partisanship on these cognitive processes. This framework helps to explain why people place party loyalty over policy, and even over truth. Finally, we discuss strategies for de-biasing information processing to help to create a shared reality across partisan divides.
Article
Research on the dispositional origins of political preferences is flourishing, and the primary conclusion drawn from this work is that stronger needs for security and certainty attract people to a broad-based politically conservative ideology. Though this literature covers much ground, most integrative assessments of it have paid insufficient attention to the presence and implications of contingencies in the relationship between dispositional attributes and political attitudes. In this article, we review research showing that relationships between needs for security and certainty and political preferences vary considerably—sometimes to the point of directional shifts—on the basis of (1) issue domain and (2) contextual factors governing the content and volume of political discourse individuals are exposed to. On the basis of this evidence, we argue that relationships between dispositional attributes and political preferences vary in the extent to which they reflect an organic functional resonance between dispositions and preferences or identity-expressive motivation to adopt a political attitude merely because it is discursively packaged with other need-congruent attitudes. We contend that such a distinction is critical to gaining a realistic understanding of the origins and nature of ideological belief systems, and we consequently recommend an increased focus on issue-based and contextual variation in relationships between dispositions and political preferences.