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Hypersonic Weapons

Authors:
  • Independent Researcher

Abstract

Hypersonic missile technology, defenses, China and Russia
1
Hypersonic Weapons
No. 18May 2019
BRIEFING HIGHLIGHTS
Hypersonic weapons are coming online just as
the United States shifts its focus back to great
power competition as its most pressing national
security threat. To China and Russia – both of
whom are rapidly modernizing their military
capabilities and seeking ways to expand the
role of nuclear weapons in their strategies–the
unique characteristics of hypersonic systems
(including their ability to render useless all
current U.S. missile defenses) represent a
perfect opportunity to take the lead in a high-
stakes technological eld.
Because of their speed and maneuverability,
it would be nearly impossible to predict what
facilities (or even what country) is being targeted
if a country detected the launch of one of these
weapons. Moreover, it would be impossible to
know for certain the type of warhead it carries,
meaning that a conventional strike could easily
be mistaken for a preemptive nuclear attack.
The Russians may see destruction of the U.S.
national command authority in a pre-emptive
nuclear strike as a means to win a nuclear
war because it could delay any U.S. decision
to retaliate until after the main Russia nuclear
attack arrives or even prevent a U.S. decision to
retaliate or its execution.
After booster burnout of a hypersonic boost
glide vehicle or other hypersonic missiles (all
types of hypersonic missiles require rocket
boosters) we will lose track of it. It evades attack
conrmation by U.S. early warning radars. Since
we don’t get radar tracking data, we don’t know
where the missiles will impact until they do or
just seconds before.
Hypersonic weapons are what Beijing sees as
asymmetric forms of “assassin’s mace weapons”
have been China’s weapons of choice to hold the
U.S. military and its bases in Asia at risk.
According to Michael Grin, U.S. Undersecretary
of Defense for Research and Engineering,
“a space-based hypersonic defense is not a
practical approach, in my way of thinking. Even
if you had space-based interceptors, it would
be technically the wrong way to do it. The role
for satellites and space surveillance is in the
indications of warning, the launch detection, the
surveillance, acquisition, tracking — the whole
arena of persistent global timely awareness.”
Hypersonic Weapons: A Primer
By Margot van Loon
In today’s Department of Defense, one of the most crucial missions is
known as “conventional prompt global strike” (CPGS). The complex
title belies a simple objective: in the most basic terms, CPGS seeks to
guarantee the ability to strike a target any time at any place in the world
in under an hour.1 Of the multiple capabilities being pursued to achieve
this objective, hypersonic weapons are rapidly becoming one of the most
vital – and the most hotly debated.
Velocity and maneuverability are the variables that transform
traditional missile capabilities into this exotic new class of weapons.
As the name implies, anything traveling five times faster than the
speed of sound can be considered “hypersonic.” From there, hypersonic
capabilities fall into two general categories: cruise missiles capable of
Mach 5+ speeds; and boost glide vehicles, which are launched via rocket
but then can glide unpowered upon reentry into the atmosphere while
maneuvering and steering, and do so for thousands of kilometers.2
What’s the hype?
The advent of hypersonic weapons has been described as a
“renaissance” in the field of missilery. Indeed, while the concepts of a
supersonic weapon that could be controlled and maneuvered have been
Hypersonic Weapons: A Primer 1
Margot van Loon
Hypersonic Weapons in China’s Military Strategies 4
Dr. Larry Wortzel
Moscow’s Development of Hypersonic Missiles… 10
and What It Means
Dr. Mark B. Schneider
Notes 15
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY COUNCIL
DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM BRIEF
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Margot van Loon is a Junior Fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council,
where her research focuses on defense policy, arms control, and international
cooperation. As a 2018 Rosenthal Fellow, she served in the policy oce for
countering weapons of mass destruction at the Department of Defense, and
previously worked in the Oce of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics. She holds an MPP (International and Global Aairs) from
the Harvard Kennedy School of Government and a BA in International Studies from
American University.
By: Margot van Loon, Dr. Larry Wortzel, and Dr. Mark B. Schneider
No. 18May 2019 DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM BRIEF
2
studied for decades, translating them into development
and production has only now become feasible thanks to
recent technological advances. Any country seeking to
count hypersonic weapons among its military capabilities
can anticipate a number of crucial advantages, all related
to an increased degree of uncertainty posed by these
weapons to an adversary in the event of a conflict. To start,
the velocity with which hypersonic weapons
would be able to reach their targets reduces
the adversary’s ability to either relocate or
respond before the strike occurs. Meanwhile,
the weapons’ maneuverability allows them to
travel on unpredictable trajectories, making
it difficult to track and destroy them before
they successfully penetrate advanced air and
ballistic missile defenses.3 Lower signatures
and an ability to fly at lower altitudes also compound
the challenge of finding, targeting, and intercepting
hypersonic vehicles for current missile defense systems
like the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI), Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and Patriot.4
The fact that these vehicles can carry either nuclear
or conventional warheads adds another element of
uncertainty to an already unpredictable threat. In short,
hypersonic technologies are changing the game. As Dr.
Mike Griffin, DoD’s Under Secretary for Research and
Engineering, has noted, “this is not an advantage that we
can concede to people who wish to be our adversaries.”5
What does this mean for great power conflict?
Hypersonic weapons are coming online just as
the United States shifts its focus back to great power
competition as its most pressing national security
threat. To China and Russia – both of whom are rapidly
modernizing their military capabilities and seeking ways
to expand the role of nuclear weapons in their strategies6
– the unique characteristics of hypersonic systems
(including their ability to render useless all current U.S.
missile defenses) represent a perfect opportunity to take
the lead in a high-stakes technological field.
Russia’s “Kinzhal” aircraft-launched boost-glide
vehicle is currently operational,7 and its nuclear-capable
“Avangard” system will reportedly come online in 2019
(after much rhetorical fanfare from Vladimir Putin
and other high-profile Kremlin officials, who have
alarmingly boasted of the role such capabilities could play
in a potential decapitation strike on the United States).8
China has tested multiple systems, including the “Starry
Sky-2” boost-glide system and the DF-ZF unpowered
glide vehicle (referred to by DoD as WU-14) that would
give Beijing conventional prompt strike capability over
a multi-thousand kilometer range. 9 Both countries
have conducted multiple tests of these systems while
continuing to funnel massive funding into hypersonics
research and development (R&D) 10 – two trends that,
in the last year, have thrust the United States’ own
hypersonic efforts into an uncomfortable spotlight.
Somewhat understandably, the pace of testing and
the adversarial rhetoric has contributed to perceptions
and fears among American policymakers of a new arms
race. However, the reality may be more tempered. James
Acton, co-director of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, has argued that “in many ways, the
United States is running a different race from Russia and
China.”11 Russia and China are generally believed to take
a different view of the role that hypersonic weapons can
play in their strategy than the United States. Their interest
appears vested in the capability of getting nuclear-armed
vehicles past U.S. ballistic missile defenses. To many U.S.
experts and leaders, this is not the strategic disruption
it might seem. They assert that intercontinental ballistic
missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles
already give Washington, Moscow, and Beijing an
unpreventable ability to launch a nuclear strike. Adding
nuclear-equipped long-range hypersonic weapons that
can defeat current missile defenses essentially results in
the same outcome, and thus would not truly alter the
strategic balance among the three powers that currently
possess them.12 Rather, U.S. officials see greater potential
value in the ability of conventionally-armed hypersonic
weapons to disrupt the tactical dynamics of regional or
theater conflicts by expanding U.S. response options
without crossing the nuclear threshold.13
Certainly, hypersonic threats do not necessarily
require hypersonic responses, and the logic of
deterrence still matters.14 Should Beijing or Moscow
field hypersonic weapons with conventional warheads,
Both countries [Russia and China] have conducted
multiple tests of these systems while continuing to funnel
massive funding into hypersonic weapons research and
development (R&D)–two trends that, in the last year, have
thrust the United States’ own hypersonic eorts into an
uncomfortable spotlight.
No. 18May 2019 DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM BRIEF
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however, this would allow them “to threaten, with non-
nuclear warheads, targets in Europe and eventually the
continental United States that, previously, [they] could
only have destroyed with nuclear weapons,” 15 rendering
U.S. missile defenses obsolete while holding the United
States at risk and lowering the bar to full-blown military
conflict.16
That said, the inadvertent escalation risk of
hypersonic weapons should not be underestimated.
Because of their speed and maneuverability, it would
be nearly impossible to predict what facilities (or even
what country) is being targeted if a country detected the
launch of one of these weapons. Moreover, it would be
impossible to know for certain the type of warhead it
carries, meaning that a conventional strike could easily
be mistaken for a preemptive nuclear attack.17
What is the state of current U.S. efforts and countermeasures?
DoD recognizes the important offensive role that
hypersonic weapons will play in power projection,
deterrence, and reassurance, particularly in the face of
the advanced anti-access/area denial (A2AD) strategies
of Russia and China. Indeed, recent budgetary trends
reflect a dramatic shift in the willingness of both the
legislative and executive branch to begin recognizing the
importance of hypersonic programs. The Department
plans to spend $10 billion in the next five years on the
development of both offensive and defensive hypersonic
capabilities, and the 2019 budget request for hypersonic
weapons research funds increased 136% over the
previous year.18 Under Secretary Griffin, who has played
a significant role in moving the needle on this issue, has
promised that the next few years will be a time of rapid
maturation for U.S. hypersonic programs: “you’re going
to see our testing pace stepping up, and you’re going to
see capability delivery from the early ‘20s right through
the decade.”19
In this context, U.S. efforts on offensive capabilities
are making reasonable progress. General John E. Hyten,
Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, has confirmed
that DoD is pursuing at least 16 different lines of effort
in the development of American hypersonic capabilities
while also arguing for better prioritization to get the
systems fielded as quickly as possible.20 These programs
include the Advanced Hypersonic Weapon (AHW),
a boost-glide vehicle with a range between 6,000 and
8,000km currently under the auspices of the Navy;21 the
joint DARPA-Air Force Tactical Boost Glide (TBG)
program on rocket-propelled hypersonics; and the broad
umbrella of the Hypersonic Air-Breathing Weapon
Concept (HBWC) devoted to the technologies required
for jet-propelled hypersonic cruise missiles. 22
Of more pressing concern is the state of U.S.
countermeasures. Should China or Russia launch a
strike on the United States or on its allies, current
missile defense capabilities would be rendered useless.
Technically, current U.S. systems like Patriot or
THAAD can intercept ballistic missiles, which have
a faster velocity in the terminal phase of flight than a
hypersonic glide vehicle. However, such systems are
only effective over a limited area; the maneuverability
of hypersonic vehicles demands coverage of virtually
the entire continental United States – an impossible feat
from both a cost and feasibility perspective.23 Congress
has since mandated that DoD create and deploy a space
sensor layer,24 which could detect and track the signature
of a hypersonic vehicle after launch as it travels at
lower altitudes invisible to most ground-based radar.25
However, detection and tracking is only part of the kill
chain: General Hyten drove this point home before
the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2018,
warning that “we don’t have any defense that could deny
the employment of [hypersonic glide vehicles] against
us, so our response would be our deterrent force, which
would be the triad and the nuclear capabilities that we
have to respond to such a threat.”26 The development of
complete countermeasures to offset the hypersonic threat
will likely require not only detection capabilities, but
Should China or Russia launch a strike on the
United States or its allies, current missile defense
capabilities would be rendered useless.
General John E. Hyten, Commander of U.S.
Strategic Command, has conrmed that DoD
is pursuing at least 16 dierent lines of eort
in the development of American hypersonic
capabilities while also arguing for better
prioritization to get the systems elded as
quickly as possible.
No. 18May 2019 DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM BRIEF
4
also a hybrid approach of kinetic interceptors and other
non-kinetic means as well as an entire new command
and control architecture capable of processing data
quickly enough to respond to and neutralize an incoming
hypersonic threat – a far cry from the current reality.
What other challenges lie ahead?
Beyond the actual acquisition of hypersonic capabilities,
U.S. decisionmakers must anticipate and account for
three primary obstacles as they move forward with the
development and fielding of these systems.
First, institutional and cultural challenges will
inevitably plague the ramp-up of such an expensive and
high-profile effort. While former Secretary of Defense
Ash Carter appointed the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
as the executive agency for the counter-hypersonic
mission, the recent addition of the Space Development
Agency to the DoD bureaucracy foreshadows a battle
over portfolios and budgets that is likely to play out over
the long term.27
Related, the growing recognition of the importance
of these systems has not yet fully translated into the
requisite appropriation of resources. DoD’s most recent
budget request only contained $157 million for
hypersonic missile defense,28 leaving a number of
MDA’s priorities underfunded (among them the
development and deployment of space sensors).
By some accounts, U.S. research and development
on hypersonics is only half the size of China’s
infrastructure.29 Several top DoD officials have
expressed fears that if this gap between intention
and resources persists, the U.S. military will be
playing permanent catch-up with its adversaries in
this field,30 rather than reasserting technical dominance
by prioritizing this new class of technologies and systems
in the same way that our adversaries have chosen to do.
Finally, the United States as well as Russia and China
will have to contend with the challenge of technological
proliferation. At present, only these three countries are
playing in the hypersonic field, in part because of the
technical challenges and expense involved in doing so. It is
a difficult feat to build these weapons, since they generate
a massive amount of heat (unlike a traditional ballistic
missile, which only requires protection of the reentry
vehicle and for only a short period of time).31 However,
this means that international export controls limiting the
spread of hypersonic hardware and technologies have
yet to even be discussed, let alone instituted. It is only a
matter of time before other countries begin clamoring
for hypersonic capabilities of their own; a recent study
by the RAND Corporation suggests that there is, at best,
a decade “available to substantially hinder the potential
proliferation of hypersonic missiles and associated
technologies.”32 The study further concludes that failure
to prevent proliferation would increase the ability of
other countries to threaten credible attacks and could
create dangerous escalation risks.33
Hypersonic Weapons in China’s Military Strategies
By Larry M. Wortzel
China’s nuclear deterrence strategy for decades
depended on a small, or limited, number of nuclear
weapons that could inflict heavy and unacceptable
damage on an adversary if the country was attacked.1
However, despite claims of a limited deterrent, the
number of Chinese nuclear capable missiles has grown
over the years, along with its stockpile of warheads.2
As ballistic missile defenses improved and surrounding
countries such as India developed nuclear weapons, the
Chinese People’s Liberation Army began to develop other
technologies and systems to ensure it could maintain its
deterrence posture. Among the approaches to secure a
deterrent capability China has taken are developing a
nuclear ballistic missile submarine force, developing
new types of mobile ballistic missile systems with
multiple warheads and penetration aids, and developing
The development of complete countermeasures
to oset the hypersonic threat will likely require
not only detection capabilities, but also a hybrid
approach of kinetic interceptors and other non-
kinetic means as well as an entire new command
and control architecture capable of processing data
quickly enough to respond to and neutralize an
incoming hypersonic threat.
Dr. Larry M. Wortzel is a veteran Asia scholar and is Senor Fellow in Asian Security at the American Foreign Policy Council. He is a retired
U.S. Army colonel who served two tours of duty as a military attaché in China and directed the Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War
College. Dr. Wortzel is a commissioner on the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.
No. 18May 2019 DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM BRIEF
5
hypersonic warheads and missiles.3 Today, aspects of
that strategy are changing as China develops hypersonic
warheads for ballistic missiles and hypersonic cruise
missiles.
The People’s Liberation Army believes that
“hypersonic technology is the commanding height of
aerospace technology.”4 Li Jun, a PLA writer, argues that
the combination of supersonic speed, a high likelihood
of battle damage, the capability to penetrate armor with
conventional warheads, and a high capacity to penetrate
defenses for the PLA means that cruise missiles and
ballistic missile warheads can attack reinforced targets
and improve on subsonic kinetic warheads.5 Li Jun sees
Russia as the leader in hypersonic technologies, but notes
that the United States is not far behind. He notes that
“a “U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile takes more than an
hour to strike a target 1000 kilometers away … while a
hypersonic weapon can fly more than 1,000 kilometers
in eight minutes.6 This study will focus on China’s
development of hypersonic weapons and the implications
of those weapons for the United States.
According to the Defense Intelligence Agency’s
2019 China Military Power Report, “the PLA is
developing a range of technologies to counter
U.S. and other countries’ ballistic missile defense
systems, including maneuverable reentry
vehicles (MARVs), MIRVs, decoys, chaff,
jamming, thermal shielding, and hypersonic
glide vehicles.7 The DIA report goes on to
discuss other areas where China is concentrating
significant R&D resources including nuclear
fusion and the deployment and “hardening” of an
expanding constellation of multipurpose satellites. Some
of these space and satellite developments are designed to
assist in targeting for these hypersonic weapons.
China’s Quest for Deterrence and Sea Denial
By itself, the deployment of missile defenses by the
United States and its allies in Japan and South Korea
does not explain the entire rationale for the focus on
Li Jun sees Russia as the leader in hypersonic
technologies, but notes that the United States is not
far behind. He notes that “a U.S. Tomahawk cruise
missile takes more than an hour to strike a target 1000
kilometers away, …while a hypersonic weapon can y
more than 1,000 kilometers in 8 minutes.
hypersonic weapons in China. Rather, part of the PLA’s
urgency is driven by a particularly embarrassing set
of circumstances that developed around China’s own
missile threats against Taiwan.8
In 1995 and 1996, in an effort to influence the
presidential election in Taiwan, the PLA launched “a
major psychological warfare operation that, at the same
time, was a display of military force and a warning to
Taiwan not to go too far in moves toward democracy and
independence.”9 The PLA conducted a series of military
exercises that simulated an invasion of Taiwan
and also announced impact zones at sea, and
closed areas for air traffic, in the vicinity of the
Taiwan Strait. The closure areas for the missile
tests, which bracketed Taiwan, “had the effect
of a temporary blockade or embargo of shipping
and air travel to Taiwan.”10
In response to China’s missile exercises and
actions, which began on March 8, 1996, President Bill
Clinton announced that two U.S. aircraft carrier battle
groups would be dispatched into the area. Ultimately,
the carrier battle groups stayed out of the Taiwan Strait,
but were deployed within striking distance of China and
Taiwan. The carriers stayed in the area throughout the
PLA exercises, which ended after Taiwan’s presidential
election on March 25, 1996.11 Evidence suggests strongly
that these events led to the development of new missiles
systems in China that were designed to attack U.S.
carriers at sea, and which were the precursor of China’s
focus on hypersonic glide vehicles.
At that time, the author was the U.S. Army attaché
assigned to the American Embassy in Beijing. At an
evening reception at a foreign embassy, he began a
conversation with a senior PLA general, a member of
China’s Central Military Commission. After a cordial
greeting, the general said that the U.S. had gone too far
and China would not be humiliated again. He threatened
that, in the future, China would develop missiles that
could attack U.S. carriers. Thus, while the PLA may not
The deployment of missile defenses by the United
States and its allies in Japan and South Korea, alone,
does not explain the entire rationale in China for the
focus on hypersonic weapons. Part of the PLA’s
urgency is driven by a particularly embarrassing set
of circumstances that developed around China’s own
threats against Taiwan with missiles.
No. 18May 2019 DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM BRIEF
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have been working on the architecture of space, surface
surveillance and missiles needed to attack a carrier at that
time, what developed into China’s counter-intervention
doctrine, or anti-access/area denial doctrine,12 as the U.S.
calls it, probably had its genesis in those events.13
China’s approach to protecting itself from potential
attack by the U.S. and further humiliation now involves
not only ballistic missiles; it includes ships and aircraft
equipped with cruise missiles, many of which will be
hypersonic or carrying maneuvering hypersonic missile
warheads. These missiles and warheads travel at five
times the speed of sound and are “especially challenging
for U.S. defenses” because they either evade U.S. radar
and sensor architectures or move so fast the U.S. cannot
defend against them without a new generation of
systems.14
We also must keep in mind that one lesson of the
1996 U.S. carrier battle group deployment for China
was that the PLA needed ways to keep U.S. forces at risk
further away from China’s shores. The PLA’s area control
and counter-intervention strategy focuses on degrading
an opponent’s technical and weapons advantages and
controlling the maritime approaches to China – or, at
a minimum, denying the enemy full freedom of action
in the maritime approaches to China.15 The initial
effort by the PLA to use missiles for this purpose was
the development of a suite of electronic warfare and
reconnaissance assets, means to neutralize an enemy’s
missile sensor and anti-missile systems, and means to
interfere with the C4ISR16 systems of any enemy. To
do this, the PLA made strong advances in naval force
deployments, developed new air force assets, and from a
strategy standpoint sought to employ “soft” attacks with
electromagnetic energy systems and “hard” attacks that
follow up on “soft strikes” such as cyber- attacks or the
use of electro-magnetic pulse weapons with precision
strike kinetic attacks.17
Focusing on missiles and the threat to “attack an
American aircraft carrier with missiles,” the first phase
was the modification of the PLA’s Dong Feng 东风 21. The
DF-21, as it is known, is a single stage, road mobile, solid
fueled medium-range ballistic missile. The missile has
been in service since about 1991 and has several variants.
The DF-21 can carry both conventional and nuclear
warheads and has a range of about 900-1000 miles.18 The
anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) variant Dong Feng 21D
is called the “carrier killer” and was developed with the
specific intent of attacking large ships, like an aircraft
carrier, at extended ranges from China.19 Ajai Shukla,
a military analyst in India, also noted that at the 2018
Zhuhai Air Show the China Academy of Launch Vehicle
Technology (CALVT) offered the M-20B ASBM on the
international market. This is an export version of the DF-
21D ASBM, with its range limited to 280 kilometers so
that the sale adheres to the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR). 20 The longer range Dong-Feng-26,
discussed below, also is nuclear capable.
Shukla’s fears are somewhat overstated, however.
To be able to use the ASBM against naval formations
or ships, Pakistan would need a complex intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance system involving
satellites and long-range, over the horizon radar. Still, if
the PRC put different seekers on the warhead, at these
shorter ranges, a target could be painted with a laser or
other surface radars might work.
The DF-21D warhead was designed to use terminal
guidance to modify its trajectory during warhead
reentry. Articles in China’s Aerospace Electronic Warfare
and Command, Control and Simulation military journals
theorize that once in a terminal mode a DF-21D warhead
will have about one hundred kilometers (about 60 miles)
of maneuvering ability guided by the warhead’s terminal
seeker.21 PLA researchers believe that a carrier “cannot
effectively escape an attack within a short period of
time.”22
The range of a U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile is
probably a little longer than that of the DF-21D; but the
U.S. Navy’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fleet has a range
of just over 500 miles when loaded with munitions.23
This is not far enough to attack any ant-ship ballistic
missile launchers or batteries. Two responses by the
U.S. Navy are to extend the range of the F/A-18, and
to explore the use of unmanned aerial vehicles to
refuel the aircraft, thus extending the range.24
As the United States adjusted its tactics, the PRC
began to develop additional missile capabilities to
accomplish its counter-intervention mission. The U.S.
Navy refused to allow the PRC to conceptually prevent
it from conducting operations inside the second island
chain, extending roughly from the mainland of Japan
through Guam and the Marianna islands.
One response to China’s sea denial operations with
the DF-21D, anti-ship cruise missiles, and submarine
operations was to develop a concept of “distributed
lethality” for naval forces.25 The idea behind the
concept was that instead of concentrating on self-
No. 18May 2019 DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM BRIEF
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defense and defense of the carrier strike group, the
Navy will “add another dimension to U.S. capability” by
creating a surface force that has the capacity to conduct
offensive operations across the maritime battlespace.26
Navy strategists developed the concept of distributed
maritime operations, “where the Marine Corps
and Navy are preparing for a high-end fight that will
require ships to be distributed across the ocean rather
than clustered around an aircraft carrier.”27
The U.S. Air Force already had been discussing
more seriously forms of expeditionary operations
and rapid deployments of air power into the Pacific
region.28 The Marine Corps also had begun to
experiment with distributed operations and concepts
applied in the Middle East looked like they would also
be effective in Asia.29 And the U.S. began to build up air
and naval forces in Guam, an area that the PLA’s DF-
21D could not reach. Hence, the PLA began to develop
a new missile, the DF-26, that can bring Guam and
the Tinian Islands within strike range using nuclear
warheads or conventional hypersonic warheads.
That race for a strike capability against U.S.
deployed forces in China was carried on while PLA
strategists explored other forms of operations. In
particular, a senior researcher at the Chinese Academy
of Military Science, Jiang Yamin, published a book that
discussed what he believed to be serious deficiencies
in PLA capabilities that leave China’s mainland and
populace open to attacks by a “hegemonic,” advanced
military power.30 Jiang argued that the PLA needs
to be able to engage enemies with long distance and
expeditionary operations at far distances from China’s
immediate shores and waters, as well as be able to
threaten an enemy’s civilian populace in the same ways
that he believes China’s populace is threatened.31 This
book foreshadowed current PLA training and high-
technology capabilities that have led to the development
of hypersonic weapons and a range of information
operations and electronic warfare concepts.32
It is clear that there is a competition going on between
the United States and China for the ability to conduct
military operations in the Western Pacific. China has a
number of concerns here:
Source: Oce of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2019 (Washington, DC:
Department of Defense, 2019), p. 45. https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf
No. 18May 2019 DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM BRIEF
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U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations in areas
of international waters that China claims as its
own;
China’s fears that the U.S. might intervene in
any attempt by the PRC to take Taiwan by force,
blockade the island or conduct missile or artillery
strikes on the island;
U.S. support for Japan as a treaty ally should
China enter into conflict with Japan over the
Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea;
U.S. commitments to the Republic of Philippines,
another U.S. treaty ally with which China has
disputes over a number of South China Sea
islands; and
A concern that the U.S. may challenge China’s
claims of sovereignty over the entire South China
Sea and East China Sea.
Hypersonic weapons, what Beijing sees as asymmetric
forms of “assassin’s mace weapons,” have been China’s
weapons of choice to hold the U.S. military and its bases
in Asia at risk. These are not China’s only measures.
Beijing has developed what it calls “integrated network
electronic warfare or INEW” which involves jamming,
cyber penetrations, space and anti-satellite warfare,
precision strikes, and computer network attack as one
way to counter U.S. military operations.33 Also, Beijing
is developing a range of directed energy weapons such as
high power microwave, high energy lasers, and rail guns
as a means to address what the PLA sees as U.S. military
advantages.34 Although the PLA’s INEW capabilities are
well developed, its pursuit of directed energy weapons is
not moving along as quickly as Beijing might want. Scale
of weapons, physics challenges, and an adequate power
supply are slowing the development of these systems for
the PLA, just as they are for the U.S. military. It is in its
development and fielding of hypersonic weapons where
China is surging forward more quickly than the United
States.
The Missiles and Warheads
In August 2018, the Washington Free Beacon reported
that China had conducted a flight test of a new hypersonic
missile that is nuclear capable. The Xingkong-2 or Starry
Sky-2 missile is multi-stage and capable of maneuvers
at speeds of Mach 5.5, with a top speed of Mach 6
(4,603 miles per hour).35 Six months prior to that, the
Free Beacon carried an article reporting the testing of a
hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV), the DF -ZF, also known
as the WU-14.36 This missile warhead glides near its
target in near space and can maneuver during reentry,
confounding any U.S. defenses. The WU-14 is capable
of maneuvering at speeds of between Mach 5 and Mach
10, or between 3,836 and 7,672 miles per hour. China’s
test of the WU-14 came after the U.S. tested its own
hypersonic missile design from an Ohio-class submarine,
an indication that deterrence by demonstrating a similar
capability is one factor driving PLA testing.37
On January 27, 2019, the PLA tested its Dongfeng-26
ballistic missile, which not only brings Guam into range
but also is capable of targeting enemy naval formations at
greater distances from China’s shores than the DF-21D.38
The DF-26 is mentioned earlier in this paper as the “Guam
Killer.” Publicity surrounding the test in one of China’s
Communist party-controlled newspapers revealed that
this was the test of a nuclear or conventional strike/anti-
ship missile using a hypersonic gliding warhead.39
The article also claims this is the world’s first
supersonic mid-range and long-range missile with
boost-gliding technology.
At the 2018 Zhuhai Air Show, the PRC showed
off a model of the CM-401 anti-ship cruise missile
(ASCM), manufactured by China Aerospace
Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC).40 The CASIC
brochure, according to media coverage from India,
described the CM-401 as world’s first “ultrafast ASBM.”
The brochure’s claim may not be truthful, however;
Russia developed a hypersonic ASCM much earlier. The
Russian BrahMos II hypersonic missile system was first
tested in 2011 and is known in Russia as the 3K22.41
The BrahMos II has been sold to India. A newer Russian
hypersonic ASCM, the Zircon, may be a domestic version
of the BrahMos II. Nevertheless, despite the fact that
the CM-401 may not be the first hypersonic ASCM, its
development represents a major achievement for China
and a significant threat to U.S. warships.42
The Threat
Michael Griffin, the U.S. Undersecretary of Defense
for Research and Engineering, told reporters in July
Beijing is developing a range of directed energy
weapons such as high power microwave, high
energy lasers, and rail guns as a means to address
what the PLA sees as U.S. military advantages.
No. 18May 2019 DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM BRIEF
9
2018 that it would be a mistake to cede the ground in
the competition to develop hypersonic weapons to U.S.
adversaries.43 According to Griffin, hypersonic missiles
require a “very quick response;” their high speed and
high maneuverability make them difficult to find and
difficult to kill.”44 Griffin’s view is that “a space-based
hypersonic defense is not a practical approach in my way
of thinking. Even if you had space-based interceptors, it
would be technically the wrong way to do it.”45 The role
for satellites and space surveillance is in the indications
of warning, the launch detection, the surveillance,
acquisition, tracking — “the whole arena of persistent
global timely awareness,” according to Griffin.46
Sensors in space and surveillance from space are also
of great utility to China in targeting these missiles. China
has arrays of space sensors that will work with over-
the horizon radars and other air or ship based sensors
to find targets for ASCMs and hypersonic glide vehicles.
Therefore, any conflict in which hypersonic weapons
come into play will likely spread to space.
The U.S. response of dispersed naval formations is
one defensive measure, but the speed and accuracy of
hypersonic warheads threaten new U.S. concepts for
military operations in the Pacific, namely the U.S. Marine
Corp’s Expeditionary Amphibious Base Operations
(EABO), the U.S. Army’s concept of a Multi-Domain
Task Force (MDTF), and the U.S. Air Force concept
for the distribution of forces throughout a theater
of operations.47 The threat pose by these hypersonic
warheads means that a combination of passive defensive
measures like high mobility, deception, electromagnetic
signature reduction or emissions control, and camouflage
can all help protect a deployed unit. Additionally,
active measures like jamming and other electronic
countermeasures have great application.
Among the technologies that can address the
hypersonic threat are high power microwave weapons,
particle beam weapons, and laser weapons. Combined
with forms of cooperative target engagement, adequate
defenses are possible. However, these systems are only in
the development phase at this time. In the future, when
the weapons systems are developed, combining them
with artificial intelligence and new fire control systems
potentially offers better defenses. However, the sheer
amount of electrical power needed for these weapons
means that land-based and ship-based systems will
probably be available before airborne systems.
Conclusions
According to The Economist, the U.S. has “set aside
$2.6bn for hypersonic weapons in the Pentagon’s 2020
budget,” and is probably farthest ahead in its development
of hypersonic capabilities.48 The Economist notes that the
U.S.” tested a wedge-shaped glider in 2010 and 2011, a
more successful cone-shaped design in 2011, 2014 and
2017.” The U.S. is also working on systems that could be
air and ship-launched.49 China, however, has tested the
DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle “at least nine times since
2014,”50 and may therefore be closer to fielding these
systems than the United States. Moreover, China’s anti-
ship cruise missile, the CM-401, is already in production.
This means that deployed U.S. forces at sea and engaged
in the defense of island chains already face threats from
hypersonic weapons.
Despite what may be a current U.S. lead in research
and testing, China already possesses hypersonic anti-ship
cruise missiles.51 Also, China has a robust inventory of
ballistic missiles, many of which can be quickly adapted
to use hypersonic warheads. Like the U.S., the PRC also
has a well-developed space surveillance system and over-
the-horizon radar systems that will support the use of
hypersonic glide vehicles. For the U.S., developing long-
range cruise missiles for surface attack and stealth long-
range strike UAVs would improve force capability in the
future.52
All of this means that Congress should be aware
of the threat from China (and other countries), gauge
its authorizations and appropriations accordingly, and
– along with the Department of Defense – prioritize
development of both defenses and hypersonic systems
consonant with the priority given to Asia and the Indo-
Pacific region in U.S. strategy. Meanwhile, as they
develop force packages and operational strategies for
the Indo-Pacific region, the services must ensure that
defenses and tactics are adequate to meet the serious
threat that is posed by China’s hypersonic weapons, both
today and in the future.
China’s test of the WU-14 came after the U.S.
tested its own hypersonic missile design from
an Ohio-class submarine, an indication that
deterrence by demonstrating a similar
capability is one factor driving PLA testing.
No. 18May 2019 DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM BRIEF
10
The Russian Federation has achieved a monopoly in
hypersonic missiles in its confrontation with the U.S.
and NATO. While hypersonic missiles are hard to build,
the Russian programs are real, notwithstanding Russian
hyperbole. According to STRATCOM Commander
General John Hyten, “…you should believe Vladimir Putin
about everything he said he’s working on.”1 President
Putin has said Russia has one operational hypersonic
missile with a range of over 2,000-km, and a second with
intercontinental range that will be operational this year.2
Thus, the Russian monopoly will last at least until 2020
– even assuming a highly successful test program for
the U.S. Air Force’s conventional hypersonic weapon,
which is quite optimistic.3 In other words, the Russian
monopoly on intercontinental-range hypersonic missiles
will last for the foreseeable future. Moreover, Russia
will have a permanent monopoly on nuclear hypersonic
missiles unless there is a major change in U.S. policy.
Here ideology, not technology, has been the limiting
factor for the U.S.
The Russian advantage in hypersonic missiles is not a
result of superior Russian technology. Russian technology
is clearly inferior to our own in many areas. Rather, the
Russian advantage mainly results from the fact that the
Kremlin has been preparing for a war with the United
States for decades, while we, at least until the 2014 Russian
invasion of Ukraine, were in denial about so-called “near
peer competitor” threats. And as a practical matter, the
U.S. invested little in hypersonic weapons research until
the advent of the Trump administration – at which
point, we began to play catchup. The Pentagon’s FY
2020 budget request includes $2.6 billion for hypersonic
weapons development.4 Yet even today, U.S. efforts to
catch up to Russian advances are only partial in nature,
because they do not involve nuclear capable missiles.
In light of Russian views concerning the importance
of nuclear capabilities and hypersonic missiles, this is a
dangerous decision.
In March 2019, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry
Medvedev stated, “Our hypersonic missiles are of high
precision and reliability.”5 President Vladimir Putin
compared the Avangard hypersonic boost glide missile
to “the launching of the world’s first artificial satellite.”6
This is debatable, but the real question is whether Putin
actually believes this. He probably does. He may even
exaggerate the military significance of this and other
systems in his own mind, which could impact his future
decisions and may lead to war and nuclear escalation.
Hypersonic weapons have now been incorporated
into two of Russia’s standard nuclear weapons threats –
the nuclear superweapons threat and the nuclear missile
targeting threat.7 Russia sees nuclear threats as a means
to enhance its power, and uses them frequently. These
threats are deployed any time something happens in world
affairs that Russia does not like. There have been many
such threats since the U.S. announced the suspension
of the INF Treaty earlier this year in response to very
serious Russian violations of the Treaty. Notably, these
threats have included reference to hypersonic weapons.
According to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei
Ryabkov:
There are hypersonic warheads, different types
of air and underwater autonomous systems, the
new heavy missile, which is being developed.
Successful test-launches of the Avangard and
Kinzhal systems were recently conducted. All
this and much more makes up the set of forces
and means that reliably neutralize any potential
threat on the part of the U.S. and any other
direction wherever they come from.8
The incorporation of hypersonic weapons into the
usual Russian nuclear threat reflects Moscow’s perception
of the significance of its current monopoly on hypersonic
weapons.
In his February 2019 State of the Nation address
to the Duma, President Putin promoted the Tsirkon
(Zircon) hypersonic missile into the superweapon
category, hinting that it would be used to launch surprise
strikes against the U.S. national command authority.9
Within days, a retired Russian Admiral said that the
Tsirkon would be capable of hitting command posts in
Moscow’s Development of Hypersonic Missiles… and What It Means
By Dr. Mark B. Schneider
Dr. Mark Schneider is a Senior Analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy. Before his retirement from the Department of Defense
Senior Executive Service, Dr. Schneider served in a number of senior positions within the Oce of Secretary of Defense for Policy including
Principal Director for Forces Policy, Principal Director for Strategic Defense, Space and Verication Policy, Director for Strategic Arms
Control Policy and Representative of the Secretary of Defense to the Nuclear Arms Control Implementation Commissions. He also served
in the senior Foreign Service as a Member of the State Department Policy Planning Sta.
No. 18May 2019 DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM BRIEF
11
the U.S. within five minutes from Russian submarines
and, “Russia’s Vesti Nedeli state TV station published a
list of American targets it said the Kremlin could strike
with hypersonic nuclear missiles within five minutes if
war breaks out.”10 In an important March 2019 speech,
the Chief of the Russian General Staff, General Valery
Gerasimov, said Russia was forced to “plan future
delivery of strikes against decision making centers…”11
This constitutes a very serious threat, both because
Washington is undefended against hypersonic missiles
and because of the lack of deep underground bunkers in
Washington to protect the national command authority
from a surprise nuclear attack.
Russia’s hypersonic programs are not a response to
U.S. suspension and withdrawal from the INF Treaty,
as Kremlin officials contend. To the contrary, the
hypersonic weapons that the Russians now brandish are
the products of programs that have been going on for
many, many years. Most appear to be part of the initiative
that President Putin announced in his now-infamous
March 1, 2018 Duma address, in which he emphasized the
need for military modernization as a metric of national
greatness.12 The rest appear to be covert programs that
would have violated the INF Treaty but that are now
being made public so they can be used as threats. The
Kremlin’s announced date of 2020 for fielding an initial
operating capability (IOC) for its intermediate-range
and short-range ground-launched hypersonic missiles13
is obviously impossible to achieve unless these programs
have been underway for a long time.
Russian’s Hypersonic Missiles
The day after the U.S. announced that it was
suspending its obligations under the INF Treaty, Russian
Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu told President Putin that
“…we propose launching research and development,
followed by development and engineering to create
land-based launchers for hypersonic “intermediate-range
and shorter range missiles.”14 His statement was a public
confirmation of an effort that has long been underway. Yet
the true state of Russia’s hypersonics capabilities remains
shrouded in opacity – with numerous stated promises
of advanced systems (such as that of a new ground-
launched version of the Kinzhal) that appear speculative
at best.15 But while current Russian information warfare
statements about new readily available ground- launched
hypersonic missiles must be looked at carefully, there are
clearly multiple real hypersonic weapons programs, some
of which go back as far as fifteen years or more,
16 that are now operational or approaching
operational status.
The Kh-32
The Russian Kh-32 air-launched cruise
missile operates at just below hypersonic
speed, is dual capable (it can be equipped with
both nuclear and conventional warheads)
and functions as an anti-ship and land-attack
cruise missile which, according to Russian
state media, has a range of 1,000-km.17 State-run
Sputnik News states its speed as March 4.1, and TASS,
the main official Russian news agency, claims its speed
to be over Mach 5.18 Mach 5 appears too high, except
perhaps in a terminal dive, but even at a Mach 4 cruise
speed, reportedly at 130,000 feet, the Kh-32 is a very
serious threat, clearly very difficult and/or impossible
to intercept with existing U.S. air defenses. Sputnik News
has stated the Kh-32 became operational in 2016, and
would be carried by Russian Backfire bombers.19
The Russian Backfire bomber, meanwhile, has
been given air-to-air refueling capabilities and is
being substantially modernized into the Tu-22M3M
configuration. This will see improvements in almost
every domain except stealth,20 including substantially
longer range even without air-to-air refueling.21 The
range of the Kh-32 is about twice that of the Cold War-
era Kh-22, which in turn increases the strike radius
of the Backfire and will make it very difficult to create
a barrier defense using long-range fighter aircraft to
protect carrier battle groups before the Backfire can get
into launch range.22
The Iskander-M
The Iskander-M has been, until recently, the
posterchild of Russian nuclear missiles. It is still discussed
Chief of the Russian General Sta General of the Army
Valery Gerasimov said Russia was forced to “plan
future delivery of strikes against decision making
centers…” This is a very serious threat because
Washington is undefended against hypersonic
missiles and because of the lack of deep underground
bunkers in Washington to protect the national
command authority from a surprise nuclear attack.
No. 18May 2019 DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM BRIEF
12
quite a bit, although the Russians increasingly brag about
their newer and more capable missiles.
According to Russia, the Iskander-M is a nuclear
capable “aeroballistic” missile with a range of 500-km.
However, there are many reports that it really has a range
of up to 1,000-km when ground-launched.23 Lithuanian
Foreign Minister Linas Linkevicius has said that the
Iskander-M has a range of 435 miles (700-km).24 Like
almost all ballistic missiles, the Iskander-M has hypersonic
speed. Its deployment program into Russian brigade
units will be completed by 2019,25 but the capability of
the Russian system will continue to be increased by other
means.
Russia puts great emphasis on the ability of the
Iskander-M to maneuver in the atmosphere, hence the
terminology “aeroballistic” missile. Izvestia states that
the missile’s trajectory in the terminal phase is quite
complex: “Due to the energy obtained, the rocket can
perform complex manoeuvres.”26 This suggests that the
missile would be very difficult to intercept in its terminal
phase, but no different than ordinary ballistic missiles
of that range while above the atmosphere. However, in
another report, Izvestia stated that Iskander-M missiles “do
not leave the Earth’s atmosphere during launch…”27 This
feature would enhance its defense penetration capability,
as compared to terminal-only maneuverability. Since
ballistic missile defense capabilities are in short supply
within NATO as a whole, even if the Iskander-M was an
ordinary ballistic missile it would pose a serious threat to
Alliance forces in its present numbers.
Russia currently has ten brigades of Iskander-M
missiles, and a total of 120 launchers – each of which
is capable of carrying two Iskander-M missiles and is
relocatable.28 The field reloadable capability of the
Iskander-M launcher is very important, because it
indicates that the number of missiles available to Russian
generals is likely to be much larger than the number of
launchers itself. Each reload vehicle of the Iskander-M
system carries two missiles and, hence, can reload an
Iskander-M launcher.29
In February 2018, Russia announced the development
of an improved version of the Iskander-M and that the
inventory of these missiles would be increased.30 This may
have been underway for years, since Russia had already
announced the development of an advanced version of
the Iskander-M back in December 2015.31 What is clear
is that Russia is attempting to intimidate the West with
talk of advanced ground-launched INF range hypersonic
superweapons. Whether the program is new or dates
back to 2015 or even earlier, there will certainly be a
quantitative and qualitative increase in the Iskander-M
threat in the future – something which may very well
include a significant increase in its range. And currently,
no Western state has a missile like the Iskander-M.
The Kinzhal Hypersonic Missile (Kh-47M2)
The Kinzhal is one of the five nuclear “superweapons”
which President Putin unveiled in his March 1, 2018
State of the Nation address. On that occasion, Putin
called the Kinzhal a “hypersonic missile.”32 Actually,
however, it is an “aeroballistic missile” with hypersonic
speed, according to the head of the Russian Aerospace
Force (the new name for the Russian Air Force).33
The Kinzhal appears to be an adoption of the short-
range Iskander-M.34 (The extra range of the air-launched
version is imparted by the speed and altitude of the
carrier aircraft). The range of the Kinzhal is more than
twice the reported range of the Kh-32. President Putin
has said the Kinzhal was capable of Mach 10, and was “the
only one of its kind in the world.”35 The Russian Defense
Ministry has characterized the missile as being highly
maneuverable,36 (which means it has to operate in the
atmosphere for a substantial period of time rather than
flying a ballistic trajectory), as well as stealthy.37 Mere
terminal maneuverability is unlikely because most U.S.
theater missile defense systems cannot intercept in the
terminal portion of the flight trajectory. If the Kinzhal
flies in the atmosphere, it will have substantially greater
penetration capability against theater missile defenses
than would an ordinary ballistic missile with terminal
maneuverability. The increased range of the Kinzhal
makes it virtually impossible to create a barrier defense
against the bombers that carry the missile.38
In May 2018, Deputy Russian Defense Minister
Yuri Borisov said that ten Mig-31s are operational with
Kinzhals.39 In late 2017, TASS, the main official Russian
news agency, reported that an “aeroballistic missile”,
apparently the Kinzhal, would be carried by the Su-34
long-range strike fighter.40 Because the Su-34 is slower
than the Mig-31, the Kinzhal won’t fly as far when
launched by a Mig-31, but the range would still be quite
considerable. The Mig-41, the successor to the Mig-31,
will reportedly be able to fly at 4,500-km per hour.41 If
the Kinzhal, or its successor, is deployed on a Mig-41,
presumably it will fly significantly further than its 2,000-
km+ range when launched by the Mig-31. It has also
No. 18May 2019 DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM BRIEF
13
been reported that the Kinzhal will be deployed on the
Backfire.42 State-run Sputnik News says that the aircraft
can carry four Kinzhal missiles.43 The Backfire, equipped
with either the Kh-32 or the Kinzhal, would be able to
target all of Europe and U.S. Navy carrier strike groups
much more effectively than with legacy Soviet missiles,
and can attack the continental U.S. with either long-
range land-attack missiles and/or air-to-air refueling.44
Like the Su-34, the Backfire is slower than the Mig-
31. However, the Backfire has a much longer range than
either the Su-34 or the Mig-31. The improved version of
the Backfire (Tu-223M3M), according to noted aviation
journalist Alexander Mladenov, has a range of “5,000
nautical miles (10,000-km)…”45 If true, this would make
it an undeclared heavy bomber and, hence, a violation of
the New START Treaty.
In a December 2018 speech, Defense Minister
Sergei Shoigu revealed that the Kinzhal “has made 89
patrol sorties over the waters of the Black and Caspian
seas.”46 Thus, he is apparently saying that Russian aircraft
routinely “patrol” carrying nuclear capable hypersonic
missiles.
The Kinzhal is apparently not limited by the New
START Treaty, and can legally be deployed on any aircraft
big enough to carry it outside of Treaty constraints. Its
range will depend on the altitude and speed to which
it can be carried before launch. No Western country
currently has such a nuclear capable missile system. The
only Western fighter-launched nuclear missile is the
supersonic medium-range French ASMP-A, which has
both a strategic and tactical mission.
Smaller Version of the Kinzhal
In December 2018, TASS reported that, according to
a source in Russian industry “Russia’s fifth-generation
jet fighter Su-57 will be equipped with hypersonic
missiles with characteristics similar to that of the
Kinzhal missile…”47 The article provided no information
concerning the range of this version of the Kinzhal. Like
the original version, this missile can presumably carry
both nuclear and conventional warheads – although to
a shorter range.
The Su-57, meanwhile, is quite fast, with a reported
top speed of Mach 2.48 The Mig-31, by comparison, has a
reported top speed of Mach 2.35.49 This feature, combined
with its smaller size as compared to the Kinzhal, will
certainly give the missile less range and velocity than one
launched from a Mig-31.
Right now, however, Russia has planned the
acquisition of only 15 operational aircraft of the initial
version of the Su-57, with deployment to the troops
starting in 2019.50 At this time, we do not know how
many of the improved version will be produced.
The Tsirkon (Zircon) Hypersonic Cruise Missile
The Tsirkon is a powered hypersonic missile with multiple
basing modes. It is likely to be the cheapest (and, hence,
most widely deployed) of the current Russian programs
to develop and deploy hypersonic missiles. The 2017
DIA report on Russian military power predicted an 2018
IOC for the Tsirkon.51 In February 2019, Duma Defense
Committee head Vladimir Shamanov said that the
Tsirkon would be put into service in the next few years.52
The missile is now reportedly going to be deployed
on aircraft, naval ships and ground launchers.53 The
Tsirkon is generally reported to have a speed of Mach 6,54
although TASS has cited its speed as Mach 8.55 Sputnik
News reported that the Tsirkon “is designed for speeds of
up to 12 times the speed of sound.”56 Putin has stated that
the speed is Mach 9.57
The higher speeds, however, are unlikely in the near
future.58 References to them are probably associated
with an improved version of the missile.59 Indeed, when
making threats, Russia tends to attribute the capabilities
of an advanced version of a system to the initial version.
However, in February 2019, Colonel (ret.) Nikolai
Litovkin, a well-connected hardline Russian journalist,
wrote, “Military sources state that this [the Kinzhal] is
currently the only air missile able to fly at Mach 8.”60 That
is significant, insofar as any number in the range of Mach
6 to 9 represents a considerable threat.
Until recently, the official range of the Tsirkon was
400-km, although Russian state media reported estimates
of as much as 1,000-km.61 A 2017 unclassified report of
the Defense Intelligence Agency says the missile will
eventually have a range of between 500 and 1000-km.62
In February 2019, President Putin stated that the range of
the Tsirkon was over 1,000-km.63 The same month, Rear
Admiral (ret.) Vsevolod Khmyrov stated that the range
of the Tsirkon was at least 2,000-km.64
The Tsirkon will very likely be nuclear capable,65 with
an anti-ship and land-attack mission.66 Since the Tsirkon
is a powered hypersonic cruise missile, it does not slow
down like hypersonic boost glide vehicles do. Its ability
to penetrate defenses is enhanced by this and the fact that
its speed can be changed by altering the fuel flow into the
No. 18May 2019 DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM BRIEF
14
engine. Since it is much smaller than the Avangard, it will
also be much less detectable.
The Tsirkon has been tested from ground-based
launchers (reportedly, a total of five tests by December
2018) and, reportedly, it will be tested for the first time
from a naval vessel in 2019.67 Deployment could start in
2022,68 and is likely to be extensive. For example, the new
Russian frigate Project 22350M will have 48 launch tubes
capable of carrying the Tsirkon, although the vessel will
probably end up carrying a mix of missiles.69
In 2017, TASS reported that, according to a source
in the Russian defense industry, “Tsirkon missiles can be
launched with the help of a universal shipborne platform
with ZS-14 launchers that are also used for Kalibr and
Oniks missiles.”70 There probably is a linkage between
this and recent reports that the Tsirkon is one of the
hypersonic missiles that will be deployed in a ground-
launched mode in 2020.71 The Oniks is the missile that
is ground-launched in the Bastion anti-ship/land attack
system. It has a range, according to Interfax, of 600-km,
making it a violation of the INF Treaty.72 Substitution of
the Tsirkon for the Oniks would result in a much longer
range and faster missile.
The Avangard Hypersonic Boost Glide Vehicle
The Avangard hypersonic boost glide vehicle has
taken over from the Iskander-M the status of posterchild
of Russian strategic nuclear weapons. The Russians have
stated that the Avangard is in serial production and will
be operational this year. As noted above, President Putin
has characterized its significance as comparable to the
launching of the world’s first artificial satellite in 1957.
The Russians describe the Avangard as being
able to defeat any missile defense system. That
is certainly true with regard to current Western
missile defenses, but Russia does not need the
Avangard for this purpose and that is not its main
mission. Rather, the Avangard’s main mission
is a surprise nuclear first strike against critical
time urgent targets such as the U.S. national command
authority, early warning capability and bomber bases. In
this mission, the 50% reduction in flight time that General
Hyten mentioned is of critical importance. This mission is
vitally important for the Russian strategy of pre-emptive
nuclear strike, something that has been confirmed by
former Russian General Staff Yuriy Balyevskiy.73
The Avangard, formerly called Project 4202, uses
the Soviet legacy SS-19/UR-100NUTTH ICBM, a very
large ballistic missile, to boost the hypersonic glider.74
The most likely reason for selecting the SS-19
is that the glider is too heavy to be carried by
the much smaller but much more modern SS-
27/Yars ICBM. The new Russian Sarmat heavy
ICBM, now under development, is also reported
to carry the glider as one of its warhead options.
The reported speed of the Avangard is 24,000-km
per hour.75 TASS states that the missile carries a
two-megaton nuclear warhead.76
The Sarmat is declared by Russia to have a mammoth
ten tons of throw-weight and will reportedly carry 10
heavy or 15 medium nuclear warheads.77 The Sarmat will
clearly be Russia’s main counterforce weapon. However,
the claim that the Sarmat can carry 24 of the Avangard
hypersonic gliders is manifestly untrue; the Sarmat has
only about two and a half times the throw-weight of the
SS-19, which is about 4,300-kg.78 As a result, the report
that the Sarmat can carry three to five Avangard gliders
appears much more credible.79
Neither the SS-19 nor the Sarmat need hypersonic
boost glide vehicles to penetrate America’s very limited
strategic missile defenses. President Trump has said that
with two-on-one engagement of attacking warheads,
U.S. missile defense can destroy an attacking missile
97% of the time.80 That estimate, however, is clearly
not against a Russian level offense, but rather the Third
World threat the system is designed against. However,
even if there were no missile defense countermeasures
on Russian missiles, the 64 planned U.S. strategic missile
defense interceptors could engage just 32 attacking
Russia ballistic warheads.
Since the Tsirkon is a powered hypersonic cruise
missile, it does not slow down like hypersonic boost
glide vehicles do. Its ability to penetrate defenses
is enhanced by this and the fact that its speed can be
changed by altering the fuel ow into the engine.
President Trump has said that with two-on-one
engagement of attacking warheads, U.S. missile
defense can destroy an attacking missile 97% of the
time. That estimate, however, is clearly not against
a Russian level oense, but rather the Third World
threat the system is designed against.
No. 18May 2019 DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM BRIEF
15
The Russians reportedly plan to deploy 12 Avangard
launchers.81 Since the Avangard is a single warhead missile,
12 launchers are equal to 12 warheads. The original
configuration of the SS-19 carried four to six powerful
nuclear warheads on each missile.82 Twelve SS-19’s with
four to six warheads each would present the defense
with 48-72 target warheads. This would guarantee 18
to 40 nuclear detonations in the U.S., as compared to
12 in the Avangard configuration. Regarding the Sarmat,
four Sarmat missiles with 10 warheads each would more
than exhaust the entire U.S. strategic missile defense
system, resulting in eight Russian detonations in the U.S.
With 15 warheads per missile, the number would rise
to 28. With four Sarmat missiles carrying 3-5 Avangard
payloads, there would be 12 to 20 detonations in the U.S.
The main mission for the Avangard is not to
penetrate America’s very limited U.S. missile defenses,
however, but rather to destroy time urgent U.S. targets
in a surprise nuclear attack. In this mission, the nuclear-
armed Avangard would excel.
Moscow takes the lead
Russia has now achieved a monopoly on hypersonic
missiles and, in the best-case scenario, will retain a
monopoly on hypersonic intercontinental capability and
on nuclear hypersonic missiles forever absent a change
in U.S. policy. The Russians have linked their hypersonic
capabilities to a decapitation attack on the U.S., which
would likely be the first phase of an all-out nuclear strike.
Their theater range hypersonic missiles will be a very
serious warfighting threat to NATO as well as to U.S.
forces in the Far East and Japan.
America’s current situation is critical. At the moment,
the United States has a complete lack of a deterrent or
defenses against hypersonic missiles. This is a shortfall
that needs to be rectified, and rectified quickly.
AFPC hosts lunchtime brieng series for Congressional
Sta in the House and Senate, featuring presentations
by noted subject matter experts focused on a wide
array of defense technology issues. If you are a staer
interested in attending future briengs or would like
to suggest brieng topics, please contact Defense
Technology Programs director Rich Harrison via email
at harrison@afpc.org.
ENDNOTES
Hypersonic Weapons: A Primer
1) Amy F. Woolf, “Conventional Prompt Global Strike and
Long-Range Ballistic Missiles,” Congressional Research
Service, Updated January 8, 2019: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/
nuke/R41464.pdf.
2) James M. Acton, “Hypersonics Weapons Explainer,”
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2, 2018:
https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/04/02/hypersonic-
weapons-explainer-pub-75957.
3) Geoff Brumfiel, “Nations Rush Ahead with Hypersonic
Weapons Amid Arms Race Fear,” National Public Radio, October
23, 2018: https://www.npr.org/2018/10/23/659602274/
amid-arms-race-fears-the-u-s-russia-and-china-are-racing-
ahead-with-a-new-missil.
4) Sydney J. Freeberg Jr., “DoD Boosts Hypersonics 136% in
2019: DARPA,” Breaking Defense, March 1, 2018: https://
breakingdefense.com/2018/03/dod-boosts-hypersonics-136-
in-2019-darpa/.
5) Aaron Mehta, “3 thoughts on hypersonic weapons from
the Pentagon’s technology chief,” DefenseNews, July 16, 2018:
https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/07/16/3-thoughts-
on-hypersonic-weapons-from-the-pentagons-technology-
chief/.
6) U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review 2018,
accessed April 12, 2019: https://media.defense.gov/2018/
Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-
REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF
7) Acton, “Hypersonic Weapons Explainer.”
8) Mark Episkopos, “Why America Should Fear Russia’s
New Avangard Hypersonic Weapon: ‘We Don’t Have Any
Defense,’” The National Interest, December 26, 2018: https://
nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-america-should-fear-
russias-new-avangard-hypersonic-weapon-we-dont-have-
any-defense.
9) Aaron Mehta, “Air Force awards nearly $1 billion contract
for a hypersonic cruise missile,” DefenseNews, April 18, 2018:
https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/04/18/air-force-
taps-lockheed-for-new-hypersonic-cruise-missile/.
10) Andrew Tate, “China conducts further tests with
hypersonic vehicles,” Janes Defence Weekly, October 2,
2018: https://www.janes.com/article/83514/china-conducts-
further-tests-with-hypersonic-vehicles.
11) Acton, “Hypersonic Weapons Explainer”
12) George Lewis, “Conventional Prompt Global Strike,”
2015. Accessed April 13, 2019: https://pacs.einaudi.cornell.
edu/sites/pacs/files/Lewis.Prompt%20Global%20Strike%20
Weapons%20and%20Missile%20Defenses.pdf
13) Mehta, “3 thoughts;” U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed
Services, “Statement of John E. Hyten, Commander, United
States Strategic Command,” March 20, 2018: https://www.
No. 18May 2019 DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM BRIEF
16
armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Hyten_03-20-18.
pdf.
14) Jyri Raitasalo, “Hypersonic Weapons are No Game
Changer,” The National Interest, January 5, 2019: https://
nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/hypersonic-weapons-are-no-
game-changer-40632
15) Acton, “Hypersonic Weapons Explainer.”
16) Freeberg, “DoD Boosts.”
17) Lewis, 34.
18) Freeberg, “DoD Boosts”
19) David Axe, “Why Russia Being ‘First’ in Hypersonic
Weapons Might Be a Bad Thing,” The National Interest,
December 28, 2018: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/
why-russia-being-first-hypersonic-weapons-might-be-bad-
thing-40042
20) U.S. Senate, “Statement of John E. Hyten.”
21) Lewis, 5.
22) Andrew Knoedler, “Hypersonic Air-Breathing Weapon
Concept,” Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
accessed April 22, 2019: https://www.darpa.mil/program/
hypersonic-air-breathing-weapon-concept.
23) Acton, “Hypersonic Weapons Explainer.”
24) Ibid.
25) Interview by Dr. Tom Karako with Dr. Mike Griffin,
“Reenergizing the Missile Defense Enterprise,” Center for
Strategic and International Studies, December 11, 2018:
https://www.csis.org/events/reenergizing-missile-defense-
enterprise-0.
26) Rebecca Kheel, “Russia, China eclipse US in hypersonic
missiles, prompting fears,” The Hill, March 27, 2018: https://
thehill.com/policy/defense/380364-china-russia-eclipse-us-
in-hypersonic-missiles-prompting-fears
27) Raitasalo, “Hypersonic Weapons.”
28) U.S. Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Press
Briefing on the President’s Fiscal Year 2020 Defense Budget
for the Missile Defense Agency,” March 12, 2019: https://
dod.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/
Article/1784150/department-of-defense-press-briefing-on-
the-presidents-fiscal-year-2020-defense/.
29) Freeberg, “DoD Boosts.”
30) Tim Grieff, “The US plays a difficult game of catchup on
hypersonic weapons,” The Hill, April 22, 2019: https://thehill.
com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/439948-the-us-plays-a-
difficult-game-of-catch-up-on-hypersonic-weapons.
31) “New Materials Architecture Sought to Cool Hypersonic
Vehicles,” Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
December 17, 2018: https://www.darpa.mil/news-
events/2018-12-17.
32) Richard H. Speier, et al, “Hypersonic Missile
Nonproliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of
Weapons,” RAND Corporation, 2017: https://www.rand.
org/pubs/research_reports/RR2137.html
33) Ibid.
Hypersonic Weapons in China’s Military
Strategies
1) Yu Jixun 于际训, The Second Artillery Corps of the
People’s Liberation Army 中国人民解放军第二炮兵战役
(Beijing: PLA Press, 2004).
2)Estimates vary between 260 warheads and 3,000
warheads. See Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S.
Norris (2018) Chinese nuclear forces, 2018, Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, 74:4, 289-295 https://www.tandfonline.
com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2018.1486620; Alex
Lockie, “We Ranked the World’s Nuclear Arsenals – Here’s
Why China’s Cam Out on Topo,” Business Insider, January
25, 2019 https://www.businessinsider.com/9-nuclear-
nations-arsenals-ranked-us-vs-russia-china-wins-2019-
1#1-china-true-minimum-16; Phillip A. Karber, Strategic
Implications of China’s Underground Great Wall (Vienna,
VA: Potomoac Foundation, September 26, 2011) https://
fas.org/nuke/guide/china/Karber_UndergroundFacilities-
Full_2011_reduced.pdf; Mark B. Schneider, The U.S. Nuclear
Deterrent and the Russian and Chinese Nuclear Threat,
Center for Security Policy, December 12, 2017, https://
www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2017/12/12/center-
releases-crucial-analysis-by-dr-mark-schneider-on-americas-
deteriorating-nuclear-deterrent/
3) See Larry M Wortzel, China’s Nuclear Forces: Operations,
Training, Doctrine, command and Control, and Campaign
Planning (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, May 2007);
Larry M. Wortzel, The Dragon Extends its Reach: China’s
Military Power Goes Global (Washington, DC: Potomac
Books, 2013), pp. 99-116; and U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, 2018 Report to Congress of
the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
(Government Printing Office, November 2018), pp. 218-224,
235-237.
4) Li Jun 李准, “Hypersonic Weapons Allow War to Enter the
‘Countdown’ Era (高超声速武器让战争进入“读秒”时代),”
People’s Liberation Army Daily 解放军报, May 5, 2017, p. 11
(hereafter cited as PLA Daily).
5) Ibid.
6) Ibid.
7) Defense Intelligence Agency, 2019 China Military Power
Report (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency,
2019), pp. 37, 115. In particular in notes on page 115, the
DIA report cites: “Hypersonic missiles Can Defeat US Missile
Defenses,” Cankao Xiaoxi, February 23, 2014, URL: http://
ihl.cankaoxiaoxi.com/2014/0207/343864.shtml; “China hails
first test of hypersonic nuclear missile carrier,”
South China Morning Post, January 15, 2014, URL: http://
www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1405784/
china-
hails-first-test-hypersonic-nuclear-missile-carrier; Xiao
Tianliang, Chief Editor; The Science of Strategy, PLA National
Defense University publication; Beijing: NDU Press, April
No. 18May 2019 DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM BRIEF
17
2015, pp. 364, 369
8) J. Michael Cole, “The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis: The
Forgotten Showdown between China and America,” The
National Interest, March 10, 2017 (https://nationalinterest.
org/feature/the-third-taiwan-strait-crisis-the-forgotten-
showdown-19742.
9) Wortzel, The Dragon Extends its Reach, pp. 155-156.
10) Ibid. p. 156.
11) Barton Gellman, “U.S. and China Nearly Came to Blows
in ’96,” The Washington Post, June 21, 1998, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/06/21/us-and-
china-nearly-came-to-blows-in-96/926d105f-1fd8-404c-
9995-90984f86a613/?utm_term=.74c7d9f39a2f ; Robert S.
Ross, “The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion,
Credibility, and the Use of Force.” International Security25,
no. 2 (2000): 87-123. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2626754.
12) Andrew Krepinevich, Barry Watts, and Robert Work,
Meeting the Anti-Access and Area Denial Challenge (Center
For Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2003) https://
csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/2003.05.20-Anti-Access-
Area-Denial-A2-AD.pdf
13) Wortzel, The Dragon Extends its Reach, pp. 28, 50-54.
14) Colin Clark, “Tackling Hypersonic Threats: Offence
or Defense?” Breaking Defense, March 11, 2019, https://
breakingdefense.com/2019/03/tackling-hypersonic-threats-
offense-or-missile-defense/; Hudson Institute, “China’s
Hypersonic Missile Advances and U.S. Defense Responses,”
YouTube Video, March 11, 2019 https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=trCTKvAqXz0
15) Wortzel, The Dragon Extends its Reach, p. 62.
16) C4ISR is an acronym for command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence surveillance and
reconnaissance.
17) Paul H.B. Godwin, “Change and Continuity in Chinese
Military Doctrine,” in Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein,
Michael A. McDevitt, eds., Chinese Warfighting: The PLA
Experience since 1949 (New York, Routledge, 2003, 2015),
pp. 48-50.
18) Missile Defense Project, “Dong Feng 21 (DF-21/CSS-
5),” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, published April 13, 2016, last modified June 15, 2018,
https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-21/.
19) Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to
Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China (Washington, DC, Department of
Defense, 2011).
20) Ajai Shukla, “China’s New ‘Aircraft Carrier Killer” Missile
Could Add Teeth to Pakistan Navy,” Broadsword Blog,
Business Standard, December 28, 2018 http://ajaishukla.
blogspot.com/2018/12/chinas-new-aircraft-carrier-killer.
html
21) Wortzel, The Dragon Extends its Reach, pp. 36, 186, notes
67-70.
22) Ibid.
23) Kyle Mizokami, “The F/A-18 Super Hornet is About to
Fly farther than Ever Before,” Popular Mechanics, February
16, 2018, https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/
aviation/a18211702/fa-18-super-hornet-longer-legs-fuel-
tanks-range/
24) Ibid.
25) T.S. Rowden, Commander, Naval Surface Force, Surface
Force Strategy: Return to Sea Control https://www.public.
navy.mil/surfor/Documents/Surface_Forces_Strategy.pdf
26) Daniel L. Kuester, ‘Distributed Lethality’ Concept Gains
Focus at NWC, U.S. Navy War College Public Affairs Office,
October 29, 2015. https://usnwc.edu/News-and-Events/
News/Distributed-Lethality-concept-gains-focus-at-NWC
27) Megan Eckstein, “Navy Planning for Gray-Sone Conflict:
Distributed Maritime Operations for High end Conflict,” U.S.
Naval Institute News, June 6, 2018, https://news.usni.org/
tag/distributed-maritime-operations
28) Amaani Lyle, Air Force Poised for Expeditionary combat
Support System, Air Force Office of Public Affairs, October
27, 2010 https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/
Article/115177/air-force-poised-for-expeditionary-combat-
support-system/
29) Geoffrey Clark, U.S. Marine Corps Concepts of Operations
with the F-35B, Depuy Institute, April8, 2017, http://www.
dupuyinstitute.org/blog/2017/04/08/u-s-marine-corps-
concepts-of-operation-with-the-f-35b/
30) Jiang Yamin (蒋亚民), Yuan Zhan (远战) (Long-Distance
Operations), Beijing, China: Military Science Publishing
House, 2007.
31) Ibid. pp. 157-159, 163-164.
32) See Larry M. Wortzel, Taking the Fight to the Enemy:
Chinese Thinking about Long-Distance and Expeditionary
Operations (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, July
2916), and Larry M Wortzel, The Dragon Extends its Reach:
Chinese Military Power Goes Global (Washington, DC:
Potomac Books, 2013), pp. 27-44, 81-133.
33) Wortzel, The Dragon Extends its Reach, 29, 95, 139-143,
170.
34) Chris Perez, “China on Verge of Fielding World’s Most
Modern Weapon Systems: Pentagon,” New York Post, January
16, 2019 https://nypost.com/2019/01/16/china-on-verge-of-
fielding-worlds-most-modern-weapon-systems-pentagon/
35) Bill Gertz, “China Reveals Test of New Hypersonic Missile:
Starry Sky-2’ wave rider designed to carry nuclear warheads
through missile defenses,” Free Beacon, August 10, 2018
https://freebeacon.com/national-security/chinas-reveals-
test-new-hypersonic-missile/
36) Bill Gertz, “China Reveals Images of New Hypersonic
Strike Aircraft,” Free Beacon, November 8, 2017 https://
freebeacon.com/national-security/china-reveals-images-
new-hypersonic-strike-aircraft/. See also Joseph Trevithick,
“China Shows Off Hypersonic Glide Vehicle Test Model after
No. 18May 2019 DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM BRIEF
18
US Navy Weapons Test,” The War Zone, November 7, 2017,
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/15828/china-
shows-off-hypersonic-vehicle-test-model-after-us-navy-
weapon-test
37) Ibid, Trevithick, “China Shows off Hypersonic Glide
Vehicle Test Model after US Navy Weapons Test.”
38) 环球网 东风26已配备多锥体高超音速滑翔弹
http://mil.huanqiu.com/world/2019-01/14197658.
html?agt=15422
39) Ibid.
40) Shukla, “China’s New ‘Aircraft Carrier Killer” Missile Could
Add Teeth to Pakistan Navy,” http://ajaishukla.blogspot.
com/2018/12/chinas-new-aircraft-carrier-killer.html
41) Kyle Mizokami, “Russia’s New Hypersonic Missile Travels
Nearly Two Miles a Second,” Popular Mechanics, December
26, 2018 https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/
research/a25684396/zircon-hypersonic-missile/
42) “Gliding Missiles that Fly Faster than Mach 5 are Coming: The y
combine the speed of intercontinental ballistic missiles with the
accuracy of cruise missiles,” Economist, April 6, 2019 https://
www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/
gliding-missiles-that-fly-faster-than-mach-5-are-coming
43) Aaron Mehta, “3 Thoughts on Hypersonic Weapons
from the Pentagon’s Technology Chief,” Defense News, July
16, 2018 https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/07/16/3-
thoughts-on-hypersonic-weapons-from-the-pentagons-
technology-chief/
44) Bill Gertz, “China Reveals Test of New Hypersonic
Missile,” Free Beacon, August 10, 2018 https://freebeacon.
com/national-security/chinas-reveals-test-new-hypersonic-
missile/
45) Mehta, “3 Thoughts on Hypersonic Weapons from the
Pentagon’s Technology Chief,” Defense News, July 16, 2018.
46) Ibid.
47) U.S. Marine Corps, The Marine Corps Operating Concept
How an Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21st Century,
September 2016 https://www.mcwl.marines.mil/Portals/34/
Images/MarineCorpsOperatingConceptSept2016.pdf; Sydney
J. Freedberg, Jr., “Army’s Multi-Domain Unit ‘A Game
Changer’ in Future Operations,” Breaking Defense, April 1,
2019 https://breakingdefense.com/tag/multi-domain-task-
force/; and Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Rivera, Intra-
Theater Air Mobility and Theater Distribution for Joint
Forces (School of Advanced Aerospace Studies, Air University,
Maxwell Alabama, June 2011), https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/
fulltext/u2/1019182.pdf
48) “Gliding Missiles that Fly Faster than Mach 5 are Coming:
They combine the speed of intercontinental ballistic missiles
with the accuracy of cruise missiles,” Economist, April 6, 2019
49) Ibid.
50) Ibid.
51) International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military
Balance 2019 London: Routledge 2019), pp. 235, 256-257.
52) The author thanks Dr. Mark Schneider of the Center for
Security Policy for this observation and for his comments on
this paper.
Moscow’s Development of Hypersonic Missiles...
and What It Means
1) John A. Tirpak, “The Great Hypersonic Race,” Air Force
Magazine, August 2018, http://www.airforcemag.com/
MagazineArchive/Pages/2018/August%202018/The-Great-
Hypersonic-Race.aspx.
2) Presidential Address to Federal Assembly,” Kremlin.ru,
February 20, 2019, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/ president/
news/59863.
3) John A. Tirpak, “Roper: Hypersonics Capability Less
Than Two Years Away,” Air Force Magazine, February 7,
2019, http://www.airforcemag.com/Features/Pages/2019/
February%202019/Roper-Hypersonics-Capability-Less-
Than-Two-Years-Away.aspx.
4) “Department of Defense Press Briefing on the President’s
Fiscal Year 2020 Defense Budget for the Missile Defense
Agency,” (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense
March 12, 2019), https://dod.defense.gov/News/ Transcripts/
Transcript-View/Article/1784150/department-ofdefense-
press-briefing-on-the- presidents-fiscal-year-2020-defense/.
5) “Russia not planning to attack anyone, any ‘nuclear
blackmail’ attempts heighten int’l tensions – Medvedev,”
Interfax, March 5, 2019, http://www.interfax.com/newsinf.
asp?pg=6&id=890341.
6) “Presidential Address to Federal Assembly,” February 20,
2019, op. cit.
7) Dr. Mark B. Schneider, “Putin’s Plan to Send Russians
to Heaven,” Real Clear Defense, December 1, 2018,
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/12/01/
putinsplantosendrussianstoheaven113995.html.
8) “Russia moving to protect itself from U.S. INF Treaty
pullout - Ryabkov (Part 2),” Interfax, February 1, 2019, http://
www.interfax.com/newsinf.asp?pg=4&id=884174.
9) “Presidential Address to Federal Assembly,” February 2019,
op. cit.
10) “Russia’s hypersonic missiles may reach US command
centers in 5 minutes, says expert,” TASS, February 21, 2019,
http://tass.com/defense/1045757; “Putin’s US nuclear hit list
revealed: Russian state TV names American locations the
Kremlin would target with ‘unstoppable’ hypersonic nukes
which can strike in just five minutes,” Reuters, February 25,
2019, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-6742481/
After-Putins-warning-Russian-TV-lists-nuclear-targets-US.
html.
11) “Vectors of Development of Military Strategy,” Moscow
Karanaya Zvezda, March 4, 2019, http://redstar.ru/
vektory-razvitiya-voennoj-strategii/ws/4-03-2019vektory-
razvitijavoennoj-strategii. (In Russian. Translation by Dr.
Veronika Kyrylenko).
No. 18May 2019 DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM BRIEF
19
12) “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” The
Kremlin, March 1, 2018, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/.
President/news/56957.
13) “Presidential Address to Federal Assembly,” February 20,
2019, op. cit.
14) “Meeting with Sergei Lavrov and Sergei Shoigu,” Kremlin.
ru, February 2, 2019, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/ president/
news/59763.
15) Pavel Felgenhauer, “Moscow Announces New Missiles
After Washington Suspends Participation in INF Treaty,”
Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume: 16 Issue: 16, February 7,
2019; https://jamestown.org/program/moscow-announces-
new-missiles-after-washington-suspends-participation-in-
inf-treaty/.
16) Pavel Podvig, “Project 4202 test record,” April 26, 2026,
http://russianforces.org/blog/2016/4/project4202 testrecord.
shtml.
17) Nuclear Posture Review, op. cit., 8.: “Winged Snipers:
Best of the Best of Russia’s Ballistic and Cruise Missiles,”
Sputnik News, December 23, 2017, https://sputniknews.
com/military/201712231060272064-russian-air-launched-
ballistic-cruise-missiles/; Nikolai Litovkin, “New Russian
cruise missiles to hit targets from the stratosphere,” Russia
Beyond the Headlines, August 30, 2016, https://www.rbth.
com/defence/2016/08/30/new-russian-cruise-missiles-tohit-
targets-from-the-stratosphere_625441.
18) “New Nuclear Triad: A Look Into the Future of Russia’s
Strategic Defenses,” Sputnik News, July 27, 2018, https://
sputniknews.com/military/201807271066749013-russian-
strategic-arsenal-upgrades-analysis/; “Russia’s upgraded
strategic bomber to join Aerospace Force in October,” TASS,
May 15, 2018, http://tass.com/defense /1004329.
19) “Winged Snipers: Best of the Best of Russia’s Ballistic and
Cruise Missiles,” op. cit.
20) Dr. Mark B. Schneider, “The Renewed Backfire Bomber
Threat to the U.S. Navy,” Proceedings Magazine, January
2019 Vol. 145/1/1,391, https://www.usni.org/magazines/
proceedings/2019-01/renewed-backfire-bomber-threat-us-
navy.
21) Ibid.
22) Ibid.
23) Gennadiy Melnik and Denis Telmanov, “Iskanders Taught
To Work in Formation. Russia’s Main Military Argument
Tested for First Time in Conditions Close to Actual,” Moscow
Izvestiya Online, September 26, 2011. (Translated by World
News Connection.); Viktor Myasnikov, “Full Aft. Verbal Arms
Race Is Under Way and Has Prospects of Becoming Real One.”
Moscow Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Nov 21, 2007. (Translated by
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holds tactical exercise at the Kapustin Yar range.” Defense
Ministry of the Russian Federation, September 30, 2016, http://
eng.mil.ru/en/newspage/country/more.htm?id =12095913 @
egNews; “Russia: Pundit on new military doctrine, response to
strategic challenges,” BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union,
March 22, 2007. (Translated by World News Connection.);
“Russia deploys missiles on NATO doorstep: Lithuania,”
AFP, October 16, 2016, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/
world/europe/Russia-deploys-missiles-on-NATO-doorstep-
Lithuania/articleshow/54754894.cms; “Army Brigade To Be
Equipped With Iskander Systems This Year –Commander,”
ITAR-TASS, September 29, 2009. (Transcribed by World
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Armed With Iskanders,” Moscow Nezavisimoye Voyennoye
Obozreniye, October 29, 2009. (Translated by World News
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24) “Russia deploys missiles on NATO doorstep: Lithuania,”
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world/europe/Russia-deploys-missiles-on-NATO-doorstep-
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BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, March 9, 2018,
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27) “Russia sets up recon subunits to find targets in enemy rear,”
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to Russia’s Ground Forces – commander,” Interfax,
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asp?id=80016; “Russian units switching to newIskander missile
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professional/professionalnewsstand/docview/460325189/.
29) Ibid.
30) “Russia’s Iskander-M tactical missiles to carry various
types of warheads,” TASS, February 5, 2019, http://tass.
com/defense/1043348types-of-warheads/arious-types-of-
warheads/.
31) “New ballistic missile created for Iskander tactical system,”
Pravda.Ru, December 25, 2015, http://www.Pravda report.
com/news/russia/25-12-2015/132957-iskandermissile-0/
ash.liz9qpdD.dpuf.
32) “Meeting with Sergei Lavrov and Sergei Shoigu,”, February
2, 2019, op. cit.
33) “Russian commander comment on Putin’s weapons
announcement,” BBC Monitoring of the Former Soviet Union,
May 5, 2018, https://dialog.proquest.com/professional/
docview/2010308306?accountid=155509.
34) Tyler Rogoway, “Putin’s Air-Launched Hypersonic
Weapon Appears To Be A Modified Iskander Ballistic Missile,”
The Drive.com, March 2, 2017, http://www.thedrive.com/
the-war-zone/18943/putins-air-launched-hypersonic-
No. 18May 2019 DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM BRIEF
20
weapon-appears-to-be-a-modified-iskander-ballistic-missile.
35) “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” March 1,
2018, op. cit.
36) Dave Majumdar, “Russia Places 10 Deadly MiG-31s on
‘Experimental Combat Duty’ to Carry ‘Hypersonic’ Missile,”
The National Interest, May 10, 2018, https://www.yahoo.
com/news/russia-places-10-deadly-mig-110000784.html?.
tsrc=jtc_news_index.
37) Ibid.
38) Schneider, “The Renewed Backfire Bomber Threat to the
U.S. Navy,” op. cit.
39) “Ten Russian MiG-31 Aircraft With Kinzhal
Missiles Ready for Combat Use - Defense Ministry,”
Sputnik, May 5, 2018, https://dialog.proquest.com/
professional/professionalnewsstand/docview/2034673118/
fulltext/16906239.
40) “The Su-34 strike fighter Upgrading a Hellduck: Russia’s
Su-34 to Get State of-the-Art Overhaul,” Sputnik News,
December 10, 2016, https://sputniknews.com/
russia/20161210104840 2800-russia-su-34-strike
fighter-modernization/.: Piotor Butowski, “Daggers, Stones
and Foxbats,” Air International, April 2018, pp. 12-13.
41) “Orbital Warrior: What to Expect from Russia’s Next Gen
Interceptor MiG-41,” Sputnik News, August 27, 2017, https://
sputniknews.com/military/201708271056829517-mig-31-
41-russia-interceptor-aircraft-features/.
42) “Russia to deploy new Kinzhal missile on Tu-22M3 bomb-
er,” BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, July 8, 2018,
https://bit.ly/30uGj8b.
43) “Russia’s Tu-22M3M Bomber to Be Able to Carry Up to 4
Kinzhal Missiles – Source,” Sputnik News, July 2,
2018,https://sputniknews.com/sci-
ence/201807021065959682-russia-bombers-missiles/.
44) Schneider, “The Renewed Backfire Bomber Threat to the
U.S. Navy,” op. cit.
45) Alexander Mladenov, “New Flankers, upgraded Flankers
and a Backfire’s Maidan flight,” Air International, February
2019, 32.
46) “Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Federa-
tion attends extended session of the Russian Defence Ministry
board session,” Russian Federation Defense Ministry, Decem-
ber 18, 2018, http://eng.mil.ru/en/newspage/ country/more.
htm?id=12208613@egNews.
47) “Su-57 jets will be equipped with hypersonic missiles sim-
ilar to Kinzhal — source,” TASS, December 6, 2018, http://
tass.com/defense/1034559.
48) “Sukhoi Su-57 (T-50 / PAK FA),” Military Factory Com,
nod date, https://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/ detail.
asp?aircraft_id=782.
49) Thomas Newdick, “‘Foxound’ Turns Satellite Killer,”
Combat Aircraft, January 2019, 61.
50) Petr Butowski, “Su-57 slowdown?”, Air International,
February 2019, 59.
51) U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Russia Military Pow-
er: Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations,
(Washington D.C.: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017), 79.
52) “Shamanov expects Tsirkon hypersonic missile to be put
into service within few years (Part 2),” Interfax, February 21,
2019, https://bit.ly/2JN1so7.
53) “Meeting with Sergei Lavrov and Sergei Shoigu,” op. cit.:
“Russia developing Mach 6 capable cruise missile,” BBC Mon-
itoring Former Soviet Union, September 14, 2016, http://
dialog.proquest.com/professional/docview/1819149161?ac-
countid=155509.; Russia Military Power: Building a Military
to Support Great Power Aspirations, op, cit., 79.
54) “Russia developing Mach 6 capable cruise missile,” BBC
Monitoring Former Soviet Union, September 14, 2016,
https://dialog.proquest.com/professional/professionalnews-
stand/docview/1819149161/fulltext/168205BA59648F5D.
55) “Source - during tests Russia’s Tsirkon missile has reached
Mach 8,” TASS, April 18, 2017, http://tass.ru/armiya-i-
opk/4185331.
56) “Russia Achieves ‘Considerable’ Success in Hypersonic
Arms Development,” Sputnik News, July 28, 2018, https://
sputniknews.com/russia/201707281055954607-russia-hy-
personic-weapons/.
57) Presidential Address to Federal Assembly,” February 20,
2019, op. cit.
58) McDermott, “Putin Promotes New Hypersonic Weapons
Systems,” op. cit.
59) Igor Rozin, “Russia’s army will soon be locked and load-
ed with the world’s fastest missile, Russia Beyond the Head-
lines, October 2, 2018, https://www.rbth.com/science-and-
tech/329232-russias-army-will-soon-get-new-missiles.
60) Nikolai Litovkin, “Russia’s new breed of intermediate
range missiles,” Russia Beyond the Headlines, February 6,
2019, https://www.rbth.com/science-and-tech/329949-rus-
sias-new-breed-of-intermediate-missiles.
61) “Russian Navy to have nigh-unstoppable hypersonic mis-
siles by 2018 – report,” RT, April 20, 2016, https://www .rt.
com/news/340397-russian-army-goes-hypersonic/.
62) Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support
Great Power Aspirations, op. cit., 79.
63) Presidential Address to Federal Assembly,” February 20,
2019, op. cit.
64) “Russian Navy’s Tsirkon missiles capable of hitting
command posts in U.S. territory – expert,” Interfax, Feb-
ruary 21, 2019, http://www.interfax.com/newsinf.asp?p-
g=8&id=888101.
65) Katarzyna Zysk, “Nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Rus-
sia’s evolving military doctrine,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, August 22, 2017, https://www.tandfonline.com/
doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2017.1362908.
66) “Russia’s hypersonic missiles may reach US command cen-
ters in 5 minutes, says expert,” op. cit.:
Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great
No. 18May 2019 DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM BRIEF
21
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67) “Zircon missile to be test-launched from Admiral Gorsh-
kov frigate at end of 2019 — source,” TASS, March 12, 2019,
http://tass.com/defense/1048231; “Russia testing 6-Mach
Zircon hypersonic missile for 5G subs – reports,” RT, March
17, 2016; https://www.rt.com/news/335993-russia-tests-hy-
personic-missiles/; “Russia Test-Firing New Hypersonic
Zircon Cruise Missiles for 5th-Gen Subs,” Defense Airspace.
com, March 17, 2016, http://www.defense-aerospace.com/
articles-view/release/3/172278/russia-tests_fires-new-hy-
personic-zircon-cruise-missile.html; “Russia again success-
fully tests ship-based hypersonic missile — which will like-
ly be ready for combat by 2022,” CNBC News, December
20, 1018, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/20/putin-con-
firms-tsirkon-russian-hypersonic-cruise-missile.html.
68) “Russia again successfully tests ship-based hypersonic mis-
sile — which will likely be ready for combat by 2022,” op. cit.
69) “Russia develops new frigates capable of carrying nearly 50
cruise missiles – source,” TASS, March 17, 2019, http://tass.
com/defense/1049002.
70) “Russia includes hypersonic missile deployment on Navy’s
warships in new armament plan,” TASS, December 19, 2017,
http://tass.com/defense/981830.
71) “Ground-launched Kalibr cruise missile might have range
of 2,600 km – media,” Interfax, February 4, 2019, http://www.
interfax.com/newsinf.asp?pg=6&id=884480; “Meeting with
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73) “Russia classifies information on pre-emptive nuclear
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75) Litovkin, “Russian weapons systems that have no equiva-
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ceofrussia/2012_12_14/Russia-to-build-new-heavy-ICBM-
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https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ss-19/.
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thediplomat.com/2018/10/russia-to-test-fire-rs-28-sarmat-
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ly/2JKp38N.
Mr. Herman Pirchner, Jr.
President
Mr. Ilan Berman
Vice President
Mr. Richard M. Harrison
Vice President of Operations and
Director of Defense Technology Programs
Mrs. Annie Swingen
Director for External Relations
Dr. S. Frederick Starr
Distinguished Fellow for Eurasia and
Chairman of the Centarl Asia-Caucasus
Institute
Dr. Svante E. Cornell
Senior Fellow for Eurasia and
Director of the Central
Asia-Caucasus Institute
Ms. Amanda Azinheira
Research Fellow and Program Officer
Mr. Jacob McCarty
Research Fellow and Program Officer
BOARD OF ADVISORS
Amb. Paula J. Dobriansky
Hon. Newt Gingrich
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Sen. Robert Kasten, Jr.
Amb. Richard McCormack
Hon. Robert “Bud” C. McFarlane
Gov. Tom Ridge
Dr. William Schneider, Jr.
Hon. R. James Woolsey
Hon. Dov Zakheim
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Robert S. Ross is Professor of Political Science, Boston College, and Research Associate, John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, Harvard University. A later version of this article will appear in Coercive Diplomacy: Lessons from the Early Post-Cold War World, Robert Art and Patrick Cronin, eds. (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace [USIP] Press, forthcoming). The author is grateful to USIP for its support of research travel to China and to Robert Art, Patrick Cronin, Joseph Fewsmith, Steven Goldstein, Ronald Montaperto, Barry Posen, Alan Romberg, Robert Suettinger, and Allen Whiting for their helpful comments. 1. See, for example, John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997); and Arthur Waldron, "How Not to Deal with China," Commentary, Vol. 103, No. 3 (March 1997), pp. 44-49. 2. The distinction between coercive diplomacy and compellence is not obvious. Thomas C. Schelling's description of compellence is nearly identical to Alexander L. George's later definition of coercive diplomacy (i.e., action that aims to "persuade an opponent to stop or reverse an action"). See Schelling, Arms and Influence (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1976), pp. 69-72; and George, "Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics," in Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994), p. 7. Either term can capture Chinese behavior. This article uses the term coercive diplomacy rather than compellence to describe Chinese policy, if only because coercive diplomacy has become the more familiar term. Moreover, the difference between coercion and deterrence is often not clear. As Schelling observes, when a state seeks to end the continuance of another state's policy, there are elements of both deterrence and compellence (coercion). Schelling, Arms and Influence, p. 77. It can be argued that there are elements of both deterrence and coercion in Chinese behavior. But compellence/coercive diplomacy better captures Chinese behavior, because China took the initiative and maintained its policy of threatening the use of force until it received a response from Taiwan and the United States in terms of concrete policy change. Paul Gordon Lauren calls this pattern "defensive coercion." See Lauren, "Theories of Bargaining with Threats of Force: Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy," in Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp. 192-193. See also Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 195-196; and Lawrence Freedman, "Strategic Coercion," in Freedman, ed., Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 15-20. 3. The relationship between reputation, credibility, commitment, and deterrence follows Schelling, Arms and Influence, pp. 42-43. For an extensive discussion of the relationship between reputation and deterrence, see Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), chap. 1. 4. Author interview with Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff. Much of the following analysis of Chinese policy is based on the author's extensive interviews conducted during visits to Beijing between 1996 and 2000 with senior civilian and military specialists on U.S.-China relations and Taiwan in government think tanks and universities. These policy analysts are advisers to such government agencies as the state council, the ministry of foreign affairs, the ministry of security, and the People's Liberation Army. They frequently participate in government meetings regarding policy toward the United States and Taiwan. For obvious reasons, I have not disclosed their identities. 5. On the role of the use of force in coercive diplomacy, see Alexander L. George and William Simons, "Findings and Conclusions," in George and Simons, Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, pp. 273-279; and Freedman, "Strategic Coercion," pp. 20-23. 6. This use of deterrence follows the definition of deterrence found in Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 3. Washington believed that its commitments were "interdependent," so that its follow-through in March 1996 on its commitment to Taiwan would affect the credibility of its future commitments to both Taiwan and other regional actors. On the...
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Prompt global strike (PGS) would allow the United States to strike targets anywhere on earth with conventional weapons in as little as an hour. This capability may bolster U.S. efforts to deter and defeat adversaries by allowing the United States to attack high-value targets or "fleeting targets" at the start of or during a conflict. Congress has generally supported the PGS mission, but it has restricted funding and suggested some changes in funding for specific programs. Many analysts believe that the United States should use long-range ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads for the PGS mission. These weapons would not substitute for nuclear weapons in the U.S. war plan but would, instead, provide a "niche" capability, with a small number of weapons directed against select, critical targets, which might expand the range of U.S. conventional options. Some analysts, however, have raised concerns about the possibility that U.S. adversaries might misinterpret the launch of a missile with conventional warheads and conclude that the missiles carry nuclear weapons. DOD is considering a number of systems that might provide the United States with long-range strike capabilities.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  • James M Acton
James M. Acton, "Hypersonics Weapons Explainer," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2, 2018: https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/04/02/hypersonicweapons-explainer-pub-75957.
Nations Rush Ahead with Hypersonic Weapons Amid Arms Race Fear
  • Geoff Brumfiel
Geoff Brumfiel, "Nations Rush Ahead with Hypersonic Weapons Amid Arms Race Fear," National Public Radio, October 23, 2018: https://www.npr.org/2018/10/23/659602274/ amid-arms-race-fears-the-u-s-russia-and-china-are-racingahead-with-a-new-missil.
3 Thoughts on Hypersonic Weapons from the Pentagon's Technology Chief
  • Mehta
Mehta, "3 Thoughts on Hypersonic Weapons from the Pentagon's Technology Chief," Defense News, July 16, 2018. 46) Ibid.