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“Pirate Parties: The Social Movements of Electronic Democracy.” Journal of Comparative Politics.

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Abstract

Contemporary technologies facilitate democratic participation in a digital form. And Pirate Parties claim to represent such an empowered electronic democracy. Thereby this study examines whether Pirate Parties are actually social movements practicing and promoting electronic democracy. For this aim, the research applies the 'real utopias' framework exploring desirable, viable, and achievable alternative social designs. In terms of methods, the inquiry is based on the analysis of expert interviews and political manifestos. The study revealed that Pirate Parties are genuine democratic initiatives, widely implementing principles and mechanisms of electronic democracy. Overall, the studied Pirate Parties foster member participation at all stages of policy making. Even though Pirate Parties have achieved low electoral results for public offices, their models of internal democratic organization and political ideas are proliferated by other parties.
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS 49
PIRATE PARTIES: THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS OF
ELECTRONIC DEMOCRACY
Dmytro KHUTKYY
1
………………………………………………………………………….…………………………………
Contemporary technologies facilitate democratic participation in a
digital form. And Pirate Parties claim to represent such an
empowered electronic democracy. Thereby this study examines
whether Pirate Parties are actually social movements practicing and
promoting electronic democracy. For this aim, the research applies
the ‘real utopias’ framework exploring desirable, viable, and
achievable alternative social designs. In terms of methods, the
inquiry is based on the analysis of expert interviews and political
manifestos. The study revealed that Pirate Parties are genuine
democratic initiatives, widely implementing principles and
mechanisms of electronic democracy. Overall, the studied Pirate
Parties foster member participation at all stages of policy making.
Even though Pirate Parties have achieved low electoral results for
public offices, their models of internal democratic organization and
political ideas are proliferated by other parties.
Key words: democracy; e-democracy; participatory democracy;
political parties; social movements.
1 INTRODUCTION
The modern digitization of public life presumes that democracy can be realized
also by online participation in politics. Such electronic democracy can be defined
as “the use of information and communication technologies and strategies by
democratic actors (governments, elected officials, the media, political
organizations, citizen/voters) within political and governance processes of local
communities, nations and on the international stage” (Clift 2004). Moreover, Earl
and Kimport (2011) argued that Internet allows easier and more cost-effective
means for online communication, mobilization for offline protests, e-activism via
e-participation instruments, and self-organizing for e-movements. Besides, given
the global character of Internet, e-participation can transcend boundaries and
evolve at large scale at regional, national, and even supranational levels.
Furthermore, online tools might foster engagement at all stages of policy making
1
Dmytro KHUTKYY, Kone Foundation Fellow, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies,
University of Helsinki, Finland. Contact: khutkyy@gmail.com.
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS 50
cycle, which includes, according to Hood (1998), agenda setting, policy
formulation, policy adoption, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.
In this respect, the Pirate Parties (further ‘PPs’) are sometimes viewed as a
successful experiment in e-democracy. The movement started from the Swedish
Piratpartiet, founded on 1 January 2006 (Anderson 2009). They reappropriated
the word ‘pirates,’ used by the media to label opponents of intellectual property.
At first, they aimed to attract attention to debatable copyright laws, but later their
agenda expanded to the themes of civil rights in digital domain and democratic
participation. Over 13 years, by the start of 2019, PPs’ presence grew from 1 to
over 44 societies (Pirate Parties International 2019). The founder of the
movement Falkvinge (2013) defined the initiative as a decentralized,
collaborative effort of volunteers who cooperate on a common goal, where the
authority is delegated the way that anybody can make almost any decision for
the entire organization. But does this statement conform with empirical
evidence? To find this out, this study aims to test the normative design of PPs
versus the political reality of their internal organization and wider institutional
impact. Therefore, this inquiry seeks to answer the research question of whether
PPs are social movements of a genuine electronic democracy?
The next section will illuminate the theoretical background of this inquiry, the
methodological section will specify the research approach and design, the
findings section will present the results of the study, and the concluding section
will summarize the common patterns of PPs, discuss limitations, and suggest
prospects for further studies.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
As organizations pursuing activities for social change rather than seeking
electoral victory in the government Pirate Parties can be more closely associated
with social movements than with traditional political parties. In this context,
Almqvist (2016) viewed PPs as alternative social movements realizing
subpolitics (or sub[system]politics), enacted outside of the institutionalized
political system, and subactivism, practices of personal empowerment. However,
as long as PPs’ goals require legal change, they do aim to affect the state,
regardless of being within or outside power structures. This accords with Tilly’s
(1984) definition of real social movements as sustained interactions among
authorities and challengers. Although, the combination of PPs’ protest and
electoral activities reflects the highlighted by Goldstone (2003) organic interplay
between social movement and political parties. Burkart (2014) also admitted
that PPs both engage in the political system directly and act as a
counterhegemonic movement contesting corporate and state power.
PPs as social movements can be classified in several aspects. Postill (2018) linked
the rise of digital activists of PPs with the new protest movements. Taking into
account PPs’ aim to affect only certain policies, they can be labelled as
reformative social movements according to the classification by Aberle (1966).
Considering that they operate inside the existing institutional boundaries, in
Wright’s terminology (2011) they can be also referred to as targeting a
transformation via a symbiotic metamorphosis a social democratic
evolutionary adaptations using state institutions. In the digital aspect, Edick
(2015) compared PPs to the Net Party in Argentina and Podemos in Spain, who
use open-source technology for political organizing too. Further, Hartleb (2013)
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS 51
found common features between the German PP and the Italian Five Star
Movement, since they are both populist new anti-elitist movements employing
modern communication technologies, which makes them ‘cyber parties’ or
‘network parties.’ These wider similarities with other movements were
confirmed by the findings of Fredriksson (2015); many of the interviewed PPs’
members saw themselves as part of a much larger global democratic movement
that includes Occupy protesters, Arab Spring activists, and others.
Furthermore, PPs as a totality can be seen as a global social movement. Their
dissemination from Sweden to other countries corresponds with the diffusion
process, where ideas, practices and frames spread from one country to another
(della Porta and Tarrow 2005). In the beginning, they were united by common
agenda, but later, with the establishment of the Pirate Party International
(further ‘PPI’), they became a truly global social movement. From this
perspective, they resemble transnational advocacy networks (Laxer and
Halperin 2003) and transnational associations advocating for social change
(Smith and Wiest 2012) aiming to empower people with a greater voice in the
decisions that affect their lives. In this context, PPs can be viewed as a global
social movement, an actor of the global civil society in the meaning of Keane
(2003). Accordingly, Edick (2015) named them an international, grassroots
populist movement. Whereas Banaji and Buckingham (2013) recognized PPs as
an international movement, engaging people for issues of high democratic and
political importance.
Scholars emphasize different PPs’ normative aspirations. Baldwin (2014)
portrayed the European PPs as technologically digital, politically anarcho-
communist, socially lumpen bourgeois, and aesthetically avant-gardist, urban,
and aristocratic. Burkart (2014) found that they valued anonymity and privacy
online, free speech and access to information and culture the ideals of
cyberutopianism. He described PPs as essentially optimistic and hopeful that the
social agency of online communities can deliver the Internet from an impending
crisis. A content analysis (Jääsaari and Hildén 2015) of the 2013-2014 political
programs of PPs in 5 countries (the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany,
and Sweden) revealed the common themes of digital rights (free speech, privacy,
and access) and the freedom of self-expression (freedom of speech, freedom of
information, and freedom of access). And though PPs might seem to be
preoccupied primarily with their strife for a copyright reform (Kurtz and Smithey
2018), a series of deeper interviews with the members of 5 PPs revealed their
concerns with the crises of democracy, capitalism, and property (Fredriksson
and Arvanitakis 2015). Further, in other interviews the members of PPs of
Belgium, Germany, and the UK acknowledged progressive, libertarian, and social
agenda views (Cammaerts 2015). Even more, they admitted that they favour
universal free education and unconditional basic income (ibid.). Their common
idealistic vision becomes apparent as PPs’ members express the belief that the
new technology can give rise to a more democratic and enlightened world
characterized by global solidarity and free sharing of knowledge and culture
(Fredriksson 2015).
PPs devote special attention to the virtue of democracy. In interviews, PPs’
members illuminated their core values of democracy, free speech, and freedom
of information (Fredriksson 2015). In another series of interviews, members of
PPs expressed the support for higher transparency in public sphere and the
promotion of more participatory forms of democracy (Cammaerts 2015). PPs
hold that, by means of new technology, citizens should continually participate in
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS 52
politics and oppose the hierarchies within the mainstream parties (Hartleb
2013). Specifically, they believe in direct internet democracy (Baldwin 2014).
Among favourable conditions of PPs’ emergence, scholars point out technological
readiness, open party system, sympathetic popular sentiments, efficient
leadership and political campaign. Burkart (2014) argued that Sweden was ready
for ‘pirate’ politics because its political economy of communication possessed
key information-society characteristics, its legal system supported ‘pirate’
politics, and its cultural norms contributed to the cultural commons. Goldstone
(2015) also noted that an open multi-party in many European parliaments
allowed new parties to gain entry to the legislature. Almqvist (2016) emphasized
that leaders played a critical role of catalysts in establishing PPs. Burkart (2014)
credited the success of PPs to their numerous media campaigns, providing a
stable web presence and valuable public relations.
Regarding the profiles of PPs’ members and supporters, there are several studies
of voters, but most reflections about members are rather hypothetic. In terms of
social class, ‘pirate’ politics expressed concerns of a new middle class that was
structurally vulnerable and economically blocked from ascendance (Baldwin
2014). In professional realm, the Swedish PP made an explicit focus on
membership recruitment from technical universities, which attracted male
software programmers and file-sharing geeks, but then turned to wider political
representation (Baldwin 2014). Voters data analysis demonstrated that,
compared to the electorate as a whole, young people, males, students and
persons living in cities were over-represented among the Swedish PP’s voters
(Erlingsson and Persson 2011). A comparative analysis of surveys about voting
for the European Parliament in 11 countries demonstrated (Zulianello 2018) that
the voters for PPs can be young groups aged 1824 either concerned about
Internet-related issues (Swedish PP in 2009) or committed to PPs and active at
elections (Luxembourg and the Swedish PPs in 2014), as well as other groups
supporting PPs’ Internet policies or concerned about macro-economic issues and
protesting against policies of other parties (Czech and Slovenian PPs in 2014).
Another cross-national analysis of multiple survey data for 11 countries
confirmed (Otjes 2019) that PPs’ voters are (in the order of prediction power)
young ‘digital natives,’ distrustful of politics, and supportive of cyberlibertarian
policies. It also showed that Iceland and German PPs particularly tend to attract
left-wing voters. However, the available studies better elucidate PPs’ supporters
than members themselves.
PPs are also notorious for their exotic organizational patterns. Thus, Almqvist
(2016) described PPs as an ‘amateur-activist’ grassroots highly decentralized
party with egalitarian decision-making processes and collective forms of
leadership. PPs apply crowdsourcing for political organizing and decision-
making: using GitHub or reddit, party members organize, debate, and decide
online (Edick 2015). Furthermore, PPs practice liquid democracy giving the
citizen’s vote a liquid authority: a voter can delegate a vote to a known expert or
trusted friend (ibid.). In theory, liquid democracy allows citizens to freely choose
to either vote directly on individual policy-issues, or to delegate their votes to
issue-competent representatives, which allows it to mobilizes more political
expertise and achieve higher equality than under representative democracy
(Blum and Zuber 2016).
The existing evaluations of actual democraticness of PP structure are ambivalent.
For example, Almqvist (2016) concluded that during the mobilization phase in
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS 53
the Swedish PP Falkvinge set up a top-down corporate structure and a swift
commando organization lacking transparency. Later, it transitioned to a more
formal party structure (Almqvist 2016). Bolleyer, von Nostitz and Smirnova
(2017) found that in the German PP tribunal decision making was shaped both
by ‘elite partiality’ and by ‘stability considerations.’ Besides, PPs utilized a ‘cloud
protesting’, where individuals tailor their participation according to their own
private motifs and values and take part in fluid local and global constellations
without compromising their personal agendas (Fredriksson 2015). Overall, the
interviewed members of PPs emphasized open horizontal structures and
encouraged bottom-up participation in their parties (Cammaerts 2015).
PPs attract considerable attention to their challenges. Fredriksson (2015)
criticized PPs’ assumption that digital communication is egalitarian and free by
its technological character, since it is linked to capitalist communication
structures, which PPs pragmatically exploit. Burkart (2014) argued that ideas of
PPs contradict the ontological condition of post-privacy created by the
combination of data retention, surveillance, and the popularity of persistent
identity services such as Facebook, Twitter, and Google. The analysis of the PP of
Sweden’s 2009 platform and of the 2009 e-survey of PP’s sympathizers showed
that the party was more preoccupied with eliminating constraints than with
designing opportunities and that its sympathizers seek individual liberty at the
expense of the market and the state (Demker 2014). One study characterized PPs’
deliberation instrument LiquidFeedback as a failure because its highly
decentralized nature makes coherence difficult to achieve even in a party of like-
minded individuals (Edick 2015). For instance, the German PP congress in
October 2012 demonstrated over 1,400 pages and 700 initiatives, endless
debates in the virtual world, complicated decision-making processes, and an
obvious lack of a coherent vision (Hartleb 2013). There were concerns that liquid
democracy tends to concentrate power into the hands of the most active and
initiated users (Almqvist 2016) and leads to policy inconsistency (Blum and
Zuber 2016). Considering the internal balance of power, there were open and
antagonistic clashes between parliamentary and extra-parliamentary
organizations in Germany and the US, as well as conflicts between their radical
and reformist wings (Almqvist 2016). Overall, some members of PPs expressed
concerns with agenda-related or power-related controversies (Cammaerts
2015).
Despite this criticism, there is an acknowledgement of PPs’ impact on politics.
Erlingsson and Persson (2011) credited PP’s success in EU elections not so much
to protest voting, but to issue voting concerning privacy and copyright policies.
Burkart (2014) admitted that the mainstreaming of some messages of ‘pirate’
politics suggests that its efforts have been successful. He further specified that
the Pirate MEPs have exercised real influence over the creation of new
International Telecommunications Regulations of the International
Telecommunications Union, the rejection of the ACTA, and the official
condemnation of Hungary for authoritarian new media laws. Besides, local PP
has played a role in Arab Spring developments in Tunisia (Fredriksson and
Arvanitakis 2015). Burkart (2014) concluded that if PPs disappear, ‘pirate’
politics would still persist as a transnational cultural movement that urges the
development of the Internet as a platform supporting democracy, shared
knowledge, and governmental transparency.
Regardless appreciable findings, the available research on PPs has multiple
limitations. The found inquiries either investigate a narrow aspect of PPs or cover
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS 54
a small sample of them. The socio-demographic profiles of PPs’ members and
their participation rates are understudied. There is a lack of analysis of
democraticness of the whole participation cycle. Although numerous challenges
are revealed, they are seldom accompanied by proposed solutions. The influence
of PPs on individual members is understudied too. Therefore, PPs require a more
systemic research.
3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
There are multiple theoretical frameworks potentially applicable to the study of
Pirate Parties. For instance, it is possible to use the approach for the study of
social movements by Tilly (2004), who devotes attention primarily to campaigns
(sustained, organized public efforts making collective claims on target
authorities), social movement repertoire (the ensemble of performances of
political action), and participants' public representation (of worthiness, unity,
numbers, and commitment). Also, once can apply the perspective of della Porta
and Diani (2006), which looks how ideas, individuals, events, and organizations
are linked to each other in broader processes of collective action, with some
continuity over time. Similarly, Jenkins (2004) is concerned about the origins and
goals of social movements, their strategies and tactics. Alternatively, Burkart
(2014) studies PPs from a perspective combining new social movements theory,
critical theory, and communication theory. However, the focus of this research is
not so much on the methods of reaching the ultimate political goal of PPs’
collective action, but rather on their democratic organization and its effect on
wider politics. Thereby, this inquiry requires a different perspective.
One approach was developed particularly to study new projects promoting social
change in the domain of participatory democracy. For Fung and Wright (2003)
empowered participatory governance requires reforms deepening the ways in
which ordinary people can effectively participate in and influence policies which
directly affect their lives. This makes such approach especially suitable for the
analysis of PPs as social movements aiming to embody participatory democracy.
In addition, it is relevant for PPs, which are often labelled as ‘utopias,’ although
they do exist in the political realm. Respectively, the ‘real utopia’ framework of
Wright (2011) studies valued social designs (utopias), which are feasible (real).
It employs three principal components of an analytical design: desirability,
achievability, and viability. Desirability refers to normative understanding of
how a social group and society should be organized. Achievability implies
deliberate actions, grounded on conscious strategies and using the relative
power of actors involved. Viability sets up limits to planned initiatives and tests
the sustainability of already created social designs in practice. Thereby, this
comprehensive approach is especially relevant for the study of PPs as real-life
long-term cases of deliberate social transformations.
Accordingly, in this study PPs will be tested towards the model of a
transformative ‘real utopia’ (a normatively desired and practically realistic)
social movement. The research will examine to which extend PPs implement and
promote participatory democracy in their internal organization and in public
domain. The ‘real utopia’ approach will serve as the organizing principle for the
interview guide and the logic of analysis.
Considering how understudied PPs are, the research design was qualitative. It
was based on the analysis of PPs’ documents and expert interviews. In addition
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS 55
to academic publications on PPs, the study referred to 2 electronic books and
online manifestos self-published by PPs themselves. The interview guide was
structured around the aspects of desirability, achievability, and viability. Some
questions were reformulated and added later. The content analysis of this
qualitative data focused on common patterns across PPs.
To understand a mid-term experience of PPs, the country sample included the
most established of them. Respectively, the PPs’ case selection criteria were (in
the order of priorities): (1) being officially registered; (2) having representation
in the public office; and (3) having high participation rates. All registered PPs
with electoral success with available contact details were reached via email.
Further, respondents advised other numerous and active PPs, which were
contacted afterwards too.
Aiming to comprehend PPs as a world movement, instead of taking several PPs
as individual cases, it was intended to interview at least one member from each
of the studied PPs. Only in the PP of Catalonia and the PP of Italy they decided to
respond collectively (as a reflection of their democratic principles). Besides, the
representatives from Germany and the US served as board members of the Pirate
Parties International (further PPI) an international umbrella organization, so
their answers referred both to national and international entities. Within parties,
the respondents were selected among persons, most knowledgeable about their
parties: heads, spokespersons, or other referred members.
The fieldwork lasted during 6-20 December 2013 till the saturation point,
where new interviews contributed considerably less to the gathered data. As PPs
were present in oversees countries, interviews were conducted remotely, in
English. Given the potential for interaction and instant clarification, interviews
via Skype were most preferable, via phone were the second option, and emailing
the last option, only if respondents insisted. So, 8 interviews were held via
Skype, 1 by phone, and 6 via emailing. Video and audio interviews were audio-
recorded and transcribed, while email interviews were recorded as written
answers. Skype and phone interviews lasted 38 to 92 minutes, 1 hour on average.
The respondents agreed to be cited.
As a result, a total of 15 semi-structured expert interviews were held. Thereby,
the interviews represent the PPs of: Australia, Austria, Catalonia, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom
(further UK), the United States (further US) the total of 12 countries and 1
autonomous community. In addition, the interviews also illuminate the
functioning of PPI.
Overall, out of 50 functioning PPs by the end of 2013, 23 were unregistered and
27 registered, 8 of 27 registered PP had won public office (Pirate Parties
International 2013). As a result, out of 27 registered parties, 13 (48.2%) were
covered by this study. And out of 8 PPs with success in elections, 7 (87.5%) were
studied in this research. The list of studied PPs and the data sources are
presented in Table 1.
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS 56
TABLE 1: THE LIST OF REGISTERED PPS IN 2013 AND THEIR RELATION TO THE
RESEARCH
Source of registration status and electoral results data: Pirate Parties International (2013).
4 OBTAINED FINDINGS
The analysis is structured around the three principles of desirability,
achievability, and viability, which is reflected by respective sub-section headings.
4.1 Desirability
As Pirate Parties are deliberate endeavours, their representatives were asked
about their normative visions of social designs. These included the underlying
values, the initial focus on societal problems they intended to solve, the
objectives set up to tackle those problems, and finally, the integral models of
democratic organization.
With relation to values, officially, PPI supported “civil rights, direct democracy
and participation in government, reform of copyright and patent law, free sharing
of knowledge (open content), information privacy, transparency, freedom of
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS 57
information, anti-corruption, and network neutrality” (2013). Over time, the
formulation of these values changed, shifting the emphasis from democratic
participation to the protection of human rights in the digital realm. Thus, in 2019
PPI declared “the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the
digital age, consumer and authors rights-oriented reform of copyright and
related rights, support for information privacy, transparency and free access to
information” (2019). The values shared by PPs can be grouped into 3 broad
categories: civil rights (human rights, diversity, equality, information privacy,
freedom of information, culture, speech and self-expression), democratic
participation (openness and accessibility, direct and liquid democracy), and
government responsibility (transparency, accountability, consideration of
people’s voices, social justice). All these are interconnected, although originally
the civil rights were the priority, internal democracy followed soon, and
government accountability on wider issues developed later. This normative
complex clearly goes beyond particular aspects highlighted in earlier narrower
studies.
The ideological background of PPs is intricate. Some members claim the absence
of a distinctive ideology or a pure pragmatism. Others name particular values,
not a comprehensive ideology. Still, others mention neoliberalism. However, as
PPs oppose restrictive policies of private property in information realm,
probably, their vision is closer to libertarianism. Besides, anarchist or pro-
democratic views can be found too. The expressed sentiments gravitate towards
the leftist end of ideological spectrum. Overall, it can be concluded that specific
ideologies are more pronounced by individual members, rather than by official
parties as a whole. This signals the risks of any speculative generalizations about
PP ideology. Only representative surveys of party members can illuminate it.
PPs heavily criticize the functioning of the state, treating legislation as the key
target. They perceive the deep ignorance of contemporary technological change
in obsolete laws as a fundamental societal problem. The most immediate threat,
which triggered the creation of the first PP in Sweden, was the new copyright
policy, leading to the prosecution of proponents of the free exchange of
information. PPs deem that technology enables quick and unrestricted sharing of
information, while the legislature is very strict about intellectual property rights.
This concern is shared by all or virtually all studied PPs.
It is connected to the problems of violating fundamental civil rights. As inscribed
in its resolutions, PPI condemns all dictatorships and regimes, which deny human
rights (2017a). However, not all PPs pay equal attention to these problems. They
are more pronounced in the PPs of Germany, France, Sweden, and US. The
primary focus is on the violation of personal privacy. In the US, they suspect that
NSA is spying on people, which signals acute issues with transparency and
accountability (PP UK and PPI, personal communication). Allegedly, the
government power abuse can go as far as to censorship, which violates the rights
to free speech and the freedom of expression.
The broader problems of thin democracy were included in the agenda too. They
range from low public participation in governance to the ignorance of people’s
opinions in decision-making and to the insufficient protections of people’s
interests. And this occurs despite the fact that technology allows cheap, quick and
direct voting for almost everyone.
The highest overarching mission of PPs is “to find better ways of satisfying the
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS 58
needs of the public for progressive, responsive government, under conditions of
rapid cultural and economic change” (Bainbridge 2012). Their goals can be
classified as terminal (having ultimate value) and instrumental (required to
reach terminal ones). Among the terminal goals historically the central one was
the protection of civil rights. They include the protection of freedom and privacy,
from governments and corporations alike. The PPs’ strategy is to pursue
copyright and trademark reforms. Later their priorities shifted towards broader
government responsibility issues (including transparency and accountability)
and democratic participation, especially direct democracy (including referenda).
It is indicative that PPI resolutions specifically proclaim the strengthening of
participation in political processes and utilizing general referenda (2017a). The
instrumental goals comprise an active participation in the parliament and the use
of modern communication technologies in governance. A special approach is
advocated by several PPs representatives: they stand for bringing new principles
and policies to politics, regardless of implementing actors. The representative of
the PP of Greece said: “we want other parties to adopt our policies… we believe
in some principles, which we want to pass into legislation… if they are going to
be passed from another political party, we would be happy” (PP Greece, personal
communication).
In terms of internal organization, models or initial institutional designs of PPs
were based on the principles of accessibility, participation, self-governance,
democracy, direct democracy (especially in agenda-setting, decision-making, and
elections), and online electronic democracy. Concerning external politics, via a
mandate in the parliament PPs aspired to transform the politics at local, national,
EU, and even global scale.
4.2 Achievability
As the studied Pirate Parties are working cases, this sub-section is devoted to
scrutinizing how they were created. The analysis covers external favourable
conditions, the role of leaders, the practicalities of establishment, the profiles of
typical members, the diversity of involved partners, and the mechanics of
organizational functioning.
One of the relatively static and thereby an independent cause is the small country
size. It makes easy to create a community and explains a success in local elections.
However, there is another opinion, that it is desirable that country has a relatively
moderate population size in order to have a sufficient membership base. But
there should be enough enthusiasts to find each other and establish a party.
Primarily this relates to a critical mass of the target group of ‘digital natives,’ who
witness the ongoing informational technological revolution. The European
societies having PPs are either small or moderate. But what about Australia,
Brazil, Russia, and the US which have PPs too? In fact, they do have sufficient
digital communications infrastructure, so despite huge distance between
members they still can cooperate. Apart from infrastructure, a country should
possess conducive political conditions: civil freedoms, an active civil society, a
targeted social movement, and the easiness of establishing a party. Thus, a study
of 131 countries discovered that country’s e-democracy development is
connected to internal factors of political norms and citizen pressures (Lee, Chang
and Berry 2011).
Besides general conditions, some developments can work as triggers. The most
fundamental factor was the legitimacy crisis, creating a demand for alternatives.
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS 59
A more specific trigger was the political pressure endangering civil rights
copyright laws changes. In particular, there was the Pirate Bay process in
Sweden, the prosecution of file sharing platforms, censorship policies, and the
efforts to sign ACTA agreement. Later, the example of a functioning PP served as
a model for other PPs.
A new movement and organization always require leaders. As the founder of the
PP of Sweden, Falkvinge confessed: I’ve found that the typical Internet
community methods of inclusion, when combined with strong leadership, work
much better to achieve global change than working leaderlessly under little more
than a common flag” (2013). In some cases, only one person with idea and
charisma a programmer in Czech Republic or a law student in Australia
started national PPs. In other cases, a small group or groups of people with
similar views and goal launched PPs.
The routine of establishing a new PP mostly rests on communication in digital
media. Primary channels include emails, websites, forums, IRC channels,
Mumble, and social media, like Facebook and Twitter. Secondary ways of
engaging people are inviting family, friends, and colleagues. Finally, coverage in
mass media news is used too. The network of contacts and the speed of spreading
information enables a quick start. As the Co-Chairman of PPI narrates: the
Swedish PP had a goal of collecting 3,000 signatures allowing them to run for
parliament they collected them in 48 hours (PP Germany and PPI, personal
communication). Although, in other cases, a party experiences a rather gradual
growth.
It is not easy to identify the profiles of PPs’ members. Sometimes PP is organized
in a way that only an e-mail and a nickname are known, not even basic
demographic statistics is collected and it totally complies with the party
principle of personal privacy. Yet, it is possible to rely on the description of Co-
Chairman of PPI that the participants are the younger people, the educated, and
mostly males (PP Germany and PPI, personal communication). The
characteristics of urban population, information professions, Internet culture,
and leftist views complete the list of major similarities. However, in PPs with
longer experience, for instance, in Germany one can observe three waves of
members: the first were mostly young IT professionals, the second brought
middle-age civil activists, and the third attracted older politicians. Thus, the
growing publicity and political participation leads to the voluntary inclusion of a
more diverse public with broader values and goals.
Taking into account different stages of PPs’ development, each socio-
demographic category takes its share. Definitely, the majority constitute males
80-93% in different PPs. Although, some experts claim to have more women than
in conventional parties and to incorporate more as party develops. The PPs’
members are relatively young the average age ranges from 25 to 40 years, the
youngest are 15 and the oldest are 80 years old. However, the average age
increases over the time of party functioning. In several PPs, many members come
from big cities, so they are mostly urban residents. Nevertheless, in smaller
countries with developed communication infrastructure members tend to be
distributed more evenly. PPs’ participants have relatively high educational level,
especially taking into account that they are young and some are still studying.
Their professions are rather diverse, including IT, technology, medicine,
governance, finance, civil activism, higher education, music, etc. Generally, they
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS 60
tend to represent white-collar jobs. They share the general Internet culture and
thereby are sometimes called the ‘digital natives.’
While some PPs claim that they operate on their own, the majority of experts did
mention their political allies. First of all, these are individual activists, who for
different reasons do not officially enter the party, like lawyers who are employed
as professors or advocates elsewhere. The most common partners are NGOs,
which fall within two categories: ‘pirate’-specific, open-source communities or
general democratic organizations. Sometimes they distribute roles for common
action (charitable activity for funds and politics for PP). Some occasionally
contact academia for research. Also, PPs collaborate with PPs from other
countries. Due to unconventional policies of PPs, cooperation with other parties
can be complicated. Still, some PPs do collaborate with other parties, which
promote civil rights, and adhere to liberal and democratic values. This conforms
with the perspective that PPs share intrinsic similarities with other new social
movements (Edick 2015; Hartleb 2013; Fredriksson 2015).
When a PP is small enough, it can be run by simple online communication in
social media and simple consensus among its members. However, bigger PPs
require more detailed procedures of internal organization.
The fundamental issue of agenda-setting is solved in two ways: proposals and
member meetings can be suggested either by an elected governing body, such as
the board, or by party members themselves. Specific proportions vary: in some
cases, the initiative mostly rests with the governing body, in others it is
comparatively equal, and still in others only party members suggest proposals. It
is virtually always announced by online communication channels: emails,
forums, or websites.
An essential democratic process is deliberation, for it fosters better
understanding and the creation of an organic public opinion. PPs employ
numerous formats of discussing ideas. Among those few are offline: personal
meet-ups and conferences. Yet, the overwhelming majority is online: mailing
lists, internal newsletters, blogs, forums, podcasts, voice meetings, IRC channels,
online working groups to discuss proposals, Mumble online voice system, the
Metapad online collaborative editing system, and the LiquidFeedback online
system. Proposals are usually edited online consequently, they are usually
created by many people, contributing to writing or editing.
An important issue is the process of selecting proposals, as it connected with the
authority to pass a proposal for voting or to block it. It depends on the nature of
the issues suggested: either it is a proposal consistent with the frame of the
established statutes (minor), or it is an offer requiring change of party statutes
(major). If it is a minor proposal the selection might be quite simple: in small
parties, as few as 1-2 party members can put forward a suggestion and then it
goes directly for voting. However, it can be as complicated as this: one member
has to engage 60 members as the minimum number of supports; he or she
collects signatures online; when 1 square root of the members support the
proposal, everyone receives the message and one can collect further till 1/6 of
the party supports the proposal and then it is passed for voting (PP Czech
Republic, personal communication). In bigger parties, like the PP of Germany,
there are too many proposals, so they apply a committee managed semiformal
filtering, which reviews the quality of proposals and the number of supporters
indicated by online surveys. If a proposal is major (meaning it affects the core
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS 61
party principles) it should pass an additional check by the governing body.
With relation to power distribution, the key process is decision-making.
Generally, in PPs any registered party member can vote. Yet, some PPs require at
least a three-month membership to establish a person’s credibility for voting. As
a rule, general assemblies are conducted yearly, though they can be called more
often, especially in smaller parties. In some cases, only major decisions
(concerning party principles) are voted by the whole party, leaving minor ones
to the discretion of a governing body. Albeit, in other PPs all decisions are voted
by the members. There are three formats of voting: offline, online, and hybrid.
Voting methods vary: direct, through an email list, or employing an online
system, like Wiki, reddit or LiquidFeedback. Sometimes there is a combination of
methods. Online voting raises identification and anonymity issues: using e-mails
one ensures identification but fails anonymity; granting access without
identification secures anonymity but fails identification. There are two solutions
to this: the validation system for online voting in Multi-tool and the voting system
reddit. Both provide each voter a unique number to login (known only to the
voter). There is a range of voting principles: from direct democracy (‘one person
one vote’ principle) to liquid democracy (optional and voluntary delegation of
votes, even to different persons depending on issues, with the possibility to
withdraw a vote) up to a relatively rare representative democracy. It might raise
the expertise of voters, but creates the risk of power concentration. To pass a
decision, a simple majority to 50% is required for minor issues (operating
decisions) and 2/3 to 75% for major issues (party principles).
The majority of PPs studied delegate some managing functions to the elected
governing bodies. Some do authorize them to make operating decisions (clearly
specified in party statutes), while others delegate the governing bodies mere
presentation, coordinating or informing functions. As far as PPs rarely or never
pay salaries to their representatives or professional workers, they do plenty of
work voluntarily. Ordinary members contribute to party work by drafting press-
releases, doing web-design and graphic design, performing research, and
authoring articles for wiki-pages. Some use Metapad (a real-time collaborative
text editor) to issue a co-authored text. PPs protect their principles: every public
statement should comply with party statutes. In many cases, they even write
statements for mass media with a broad party members’ participation. Some
trust members as far as letting them post in official social media (e.g. on party’s
Twitter web-page) without prior approval. According to the Leader of the PP of
Sweden, there were 200 people having access to the Party Twitter account (PP
Sweden, personal communication).
Last but not least, PPs conduct internal monitoring and control. In most cases,
there are special governing bodies authorized for checks and sanctions: Board of
Governors, Court of Arbitration, Dispute Resolve Committee, and Steering
Committee. However, there are cases and options of direct democracy in
controlling party work, up to recalling elected representatives. The latter is
performed on a regular basis by direct observation and ad hoc if somebody is
suspected of abuse. There is some evidence that in general PP culture altogether
with institutionalized transparency ensures compliance with the core party
values, so there is little need for control.
Thereby, at all stages of self-governance PPs demonstrate the attributes of a
participatory digital democracy. Direct democracy is implemented in its fullest
form in smaller PPs. Associational democracy, implemented in the ‘three-pirate
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS 62
rule’, liquid and representative forms of democracy are more characteristic for
bigger PPs.
4.3 Viability
For a systemic change, initiating a social project is not enough it should be
tested for sustainability in terms of both duration of existence and conforming to
initial values and goals. Therefore, this subsection analyses participation rates,
democraticness of internal functioning, available resources, substantial
challenges and applied counteractions, created social institutions and their
dissemination, synergies between other alternative projects, and overall impact
on participants, communities, and wider political systems.
Concerning the number of party members (those who are considered members
according to party statutes), in the registered PPs studied there are 3 clusters of
membership size: (1) tens 40-50 members; (2) hundreds 300-600 members;
and (3) thousands 10,000-11,000 members (in Germany and Sweden).
Hypothetically, unregistered parties might have even less members. The
numbers vary due to membership requirements, especially whether they are free
or for a fee. These party membership ratios correspond with findings in another
study (Cammaerts 2015)
There is a larger group of supporters, who occasionally participate in party
activities, predominantly in online discussions on forums and online social
networks, and sometimes in general assemblies too. Their numbers also fall into
3 clusters: (1) hundreds around 300 supporters; (2) thousands 1,000-3,000
supporters; and (3) tens of thousands up to 40,000 supporters (in Germany).
Despite the seeming ten-fold increase compared to official members, the actual
difference is 2-8 times. Some cannot join as official members because of the
conflict of interests or affiliation issues. This relates to public officials, lawyers,
bankers, etc. So, they are counted as supporters too.
The next important category of adherents is voters in official elections for public
offices. These form 2 clusters: (1) tens of thousands 20,000-40,000 voters and
(2) hundreds of thousands 100,000-960,000 voters (the highest in Germany).
The ratio of voters to party members is 30-70 times.
Concerning the dynamics of PPs’ membership, the numbers oscillate from year
to year. Partially it is because of random causes, partially due to political
situation.
Also, it is reasonable to trace the general participation level the share of
members actually participating in party’s activities. The average estimation is
that around 10% of all members regularly take part in activities, and of those
roughly 10% (1% of all members) are the most devoted, core activists.
Discussions attract significantly varying percentage of PP members around 7-
50%. The smaller the party, the higher the percentage. Nevertheless, 10% seem
to be the most widespread proportion. General assemblies show roughly the
same average 10%. Intra-party voting participation levels vary considerably too:
they range between 4%-56% in different PPs and votes. Online voting generates
higher numbers, yet 10% is a mode.
Officially, all members of PPs have equal rights. All party activities are open to its
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS 63
members. For instance, in the PP of Iceland everyone can participate in electronic
voting system, through which any issue should be processed (PP Iceland,
personal communication). However, members of governing bodies have
additional delegated rights and duties similarly to representative democracy.
Every member of a PP has the right to express an opinion, but some of them enjoy
more prestige or informal social power, which is attributed to their personal
qualities, skills and experience on the merit basis. In any case, leaders share the
norms of giving others word and respecting them.
An important democratic characteristic is the freedom of speech and expression.
It relates both to internal party processes and external relations. It is most
pronounced in direct democracy forms. The famous ‘three-pirate rule’ states: as
long as 3 ‘pirates’ gather and decide to do something, which is in line with the
core party statements, they can start an initiative (PP UK and PPI, personal
communication). In terms of complexity theory, this contributes to self-
organization.
Definitely, transparency is the strongest democratic attribute of PPs. According
to the Statutes of Pirate Parties International, “all votes are public” and “a
permanent online e-Democracy system allowing for decision making of General
Assembly between its meetings shall be put in place where issues can be raised,
initiatives started, suggestions made, and progress checked until a final vote can
be cast” (2017b). Transparency relates to meetings, voting, work of governing
bodies, finances, and media relations. This is ensured by multiple methods: open
forum discussions, live-streaming, voice and video recording, and transcribing of
meetings for posting online. This applies to deliberation, decision making, and
reporting on political and financial issues. Regarding accountability, PP’s
governing bodies are subject to control from party members, up to revoking
elected representatives.
With relation to resources, PPs minimize expenses by introducing an exclusively
volunteer participation and online activity. Still, some funding is needed for
hosting sites, advertisement, merchandise, information materials etc. Some PPs
rely on membership fees, while others on donations from individuals and
organizations, yet others obtain government funding because of parliamentary
representation. The size of membership fees varies: from no fees to dozens of
euros yearly. In general, party contribution policies result in high cost efficiency.
As the founder of the Swedish PP claimed: “Our campaign budget was fifty
thousand euros. Our competitors had spent six million. We had spent less than 1
percent of their budget and still beat them, giving us a cost-efficiency advantage
of over two orders of magnitude” (Falkvinge 2013).
PPs have multiple challenges, which can be grouped into 3 categories: (1)
external conditions influencing PPs; (2) internal party functioning; and (3)
influencing politics and civil society.
External conditions create the most pressing concerns, because it is difficult to
affect them. Major limitations are imposed by state laws. Sometimes it is because
the laws are too restrictive (large membership, support, or administrative
coverage is required), demanding (high entrance limit 5% instead of 2%) or
incoherent with modern technologies. There may be a pressure from the
government. For instance, according to PPI Resolutions, “the members of the
Pirate Party of Russia do not have opportunity to officially create its own party”
(2017). Absenteeism of general public is a big concern too. Almost all PPs strive
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS 64
to obtain funding. It is vividly illustrated in the US: the state PP of Georgia had its
party status revoked, because they didn’t have 500 United States dollars on their
account each year (PP UK and PPI, personal communication).
Due to online communication, some face the communication problem of
misunderstanding it is an unintended consequence of e-democracy. Others
admit the lack of time for participation due to business. More serious problems
are some members’ deviant behaviour and internal conflicts. At worst, a PP can
lose its democraticness because of delegating votes, specifically within liquid
democracy format. As PPs grow in numbers, their social structure requires
changes, so they face organization development issues.
The most ambitious are the challenges of influencing politics and wider society.
Many PPs complain about problems with conventional mass media coverage
(although online media coverage is good). A connected issue is the changing
negative public opinion. Some find it difficult to cover democratic agenda, which
might not be a priority for the general public, concerned with security and
employment issues. More ambitious goals are winning elections and public
offices. Those who already succeeded aim to sustain the election results
nationally and supranationally. Politically, the most dangerous and actually
widespread is the antagonism of other parties towards PPs. The most universal
problem is the promotion of unconventional policies, e.g. of liquid and direct
democracy.
A mere recognition of the existing challenges in not sufficient, so it is important
to learn respective counteracting measures. Concerning laws, PPs study laws and
try to change them. Membership issues are principally dealt by networking in
person and on digital social media. It is important for them to make people feel
that they and their contribution are significant, to demonstrate acceptance,
recognition and respect. Conflicts are mostly resolved through a discussion:
people either reach consensus or leave a party. Besides, transparency positively
affects public opinion and trust.
Regarding institutional legacy, the very practices and relations matter. A simple
cooperation between people based on the principles of equality and participation
brings results. So, regular democratic procedures and the resulting democratic
norms of transparency, accountability, and participation have effect by
themselves. The practices of law-making initiatives, lobbying and other
suggestions contribute too. PPs have developed numerous statutes, reflecting
core principles and procedures. A more advanced example is that “common
European election program was made by all European ‘pirates’ (for the EU
election of 2014)” (PP Catalonia, personal communication).
Furthermore, social structures and elements of culture are vital for PPs
sustainability. The most developed PPs have general assembly (responsible for
passing statutes and policies), executive board (managing and informing),
dispute resolving committee (resolving conflicts), and steering committee
(supervising adherence to the party principles). These are legislative, executive,
and judicial brunches of power respectively. The direct democratic institution of
general assembly is acknowledged as the supreme body of power. The members
of PPs are at the top of power structure, while the elected management is
subordinated to them. So, PPs and their umbrella organization PPI are fully
functioning democratically organized associations.
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS 65
PPs disseminate institutions and develop more complex entities. They form
youth divisions of parties, establish their local branches on subsocietal level and
export their model to other societies. And the existence of an international
organization PPI indicates a high level of cooperation between PPs. Although,
the exit of 4 PPs from the PPI might signal an internal conflict.
The study revealed the impact of PPs’ democratic practices on people at the
scales of individuals, communities, and political systems as a whole. The
personalities of PPs members are affected the most. At minimum, they develop
knowledge and skills of participation in governance it is the effect of civic
education. Some people change their opinions about the possibility of direct
democracy. Party members gain confidence in themselves, especially young
people, who are given enough freedom to participate and take the initiative, and
thereby become more empowered and responsible. A significant achievement is
the increase of trust within PPs. Finally, party activities enhance the feeling of
inclusion and belonging, social cohesion, solidarity, friendship, and a sense of
well-being.
PPs have gained some electoral success. Their largest achievements in elections
to authorities include: gaining 2 seats in European Parliament due to achieving
over 7% of votes in Sweden in 2009, 15 seats in the state parliament of Berlin
due to 8.9% percent of the votes in the Berlin state election in 2011, 16 mandates
in the Parliament of Iceland with a result of up to 23.9% in parliamentary
elections in Iceland in 2015 (Edick 2016). However, the number of proponents is
insufficient to impact national or supranational politics with traditional methods
via representation in authorities. Nevertheless, if evaluated by the criteria of
over 2% votes in national or European elections, they still enjoy notable popular
support in Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Iceland, Luxembourg, Slovenia, and
Sweden.
There is a number of evidence that PPs have a ‘soft’ impact on politics. They
experimented with new democratic forms (e.g. liquid democracy), became the
first functioning cases of digital parties, and attracted attention to these new
designs. They disseminate their ideas of civil rights, direct and electronic
democracy via blog posts, journalist articles, and self-published e-books.
Moreover, PPs propose legislative initiatives. According to the Pirate Parties
International Resolutions, the party “states support for the creation of a United
Nations Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA) as a parliamentary body within the UN
system that is complementary to the UN General Assembly, calling for the
creation a body that is directly elected by earth's citizen” and “calls upon world
governments to include the involvement of citizens in the practice of making
large scoped far-reaching decisions by utilizing general referendums” (2017a).
They also call for implementing or at least researching liquid democracy forms
inside a possible Parliamentary Assembly of the United Nations (PP Germany and
PPI, personal communication). PPs have prevented undesired policy changes, for
instance, the ACTA (Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement between the US,
Canada, Australia, and the EU). Probably, the most profound impact of PPs is the
spread of electronic democracy model. There is some criticism that other parties
copy the ideas only nominally. However, there are more opinions that other
parties do implement some elements of electronic democracy (mainly of
transparency) and direct democracy (mostly about suggestions but voting as
well). For instance, a study (Hanel and Marschall 2013) confirmed that the
popularity of German PP put pressure on other German established parties to use
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS 66
online collaboration platforms; and although they were implemented at a smaller
scale, they did increase the intra-party participation.
5 CONCLUSION
The research revealed that Pirate Parties are genuine democratic initiatives,
widely implementing principles and mechanisms of electronic democracy in both
direct and representative forms and thereby empowering people. Their most
distinct feature is the wide decentralization of authority. It is vividly expressed
in open co-editing of resolutions, universal online voting, and the ‘three-pirate
rule.’ Overall, the studied PPs encourage participation at all stages of intra-party
policy making: agenda-setting, deliberation, decision-making, elections,
implementation, monitoring and control.
It should be noted that this research has certain limitations. The sample covered
13 PPs, which constitutes 26% of all PPs active during the fieldwork. Also, the
study primarily targeted more established parties, e.g. those with a registration,
public office, and high membership. A bigger sample of PPs might bring more
nuances to these findings. Further, most interviewees belonged to party
leadership. A representative survey of regular members can provide insights into
opinions and beliefs of regular PPs’ members. In addition, the study largely
focused on the normative system and internal organization of PPs and covered
their external impact only with relation to this model. Their mobilization, public
communication, and political advocacy patterns require a separate inquiry.
Considering their evolution over time, individual PPs seems to follow a hype
cycle. It starts from enthusiasm of a core group of activists, continues with a
membership growth, attempts to win a public office, and ends with a decline in
popularity or a collapse. When a party goes through this cycle faster, it can be
labelled a ‘flash’ party (Erlingsson and Persson 2011). This process develops at
the global scale too. Over 13 years, by the start of 2019, 3 PPs seized to exist and
4 PPs left the PPI (2019).
Apparently, the potential for political outreach of PPs is debatable. Due to
representation in various legislative bodies they are able to impose influence on
regional, national, and even supranational levels. Yet, their popular support is
limited, unstable, and demonstrates higher levels in economically advanced
societies with developed information technology and an educated middle class.
Although, the very nature of spreading ideas in the digital age facilitates the
dissemination of their principles. Despite the modest electoral results of PPs,
their model of internal democratic organization and political vision are copied by
rival parties. Thereby, their democratic and participatory agenda has diffused
beyond organizational and national boundaries.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research has been conducted by virtue of support by the Carnegie Fellowship
Program and the Carnegie Scholar Publication Program. The author expresses
appreciation to the interviewees. Also, the author is grateful to Erik Olin Wright and
Salvatore Babones for comments on earlier drafts. The author appreciates the
feedback by anonymous reviewers. Prior versions were presented at the University
of Wisconsin-Madison and at the 110th American Sociological Association Annual
Meeting in Chicago.
... They might also be seen as a response to dissatisfaction with politics, as they reject classification on the left-right axis, promoting a different political agenda (e.g. Brunclík 2010;Demker 2014;Khutkyy 2019). ...
... Then the approach changed and authors noted the increasing scope of their manifestos (Haunss 2013). Pirates are to be taken as part of a wider, cross-border movement -referencing the global on-line movement that emerged around the Pirate Bay trial -and compared with previous forms of environmental grass-roots movements in the 1970s and 1980s (Jääsaari and Hildén 2015;Khutkyy 2019;Thuermer 2016). The origins of the pirates are linked to popular opposition to the trial of people behind The Pirate Bay, a website used (illegally) to collect and share files on the internet, which was cracked down on by the Swedish authorities in 2006; several organisers were prosecuted. ...
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We examine the digital party model using the Czech Pirates as a case study. The party was initially organised through an online platform and characterised by ad-hoc, informal decision-making. However, an election breakthrough and institutionalisation were secured only by a shift towards the offline sphere and organisational adaptation involving investment in structures, paid facilities and partial professionalisation, and by adopting detailed internal rules. The effect was a significant move away from the digital model, which increased the party’s organisational resilience and reduced the risks of disintegration. Simultaneously, these measures strengthened the power of the party’s politicians in public office.
... З цього приводу у політичній науці з'явилось чимало доробків, які розкривають програмні аспекти, виборчий профіль й електоральні результати піратських мережевих партій, зокрема авторства таких доволі відомих дослідників, як Х. Бартельс [22], Б. Каммертс [5], С. Ліндгрен та Дж. Лінде [16], О. Нідермайєр [17], Л. Новотни і Д. Шаровец [18], С. Отжес [19], М. Фредрікссон [10], Ф. Хартлеб [11], Д. Хуткий [15], Я. Чарват [6], Й. Яасаарі та Й. Гілден [13] та ціла низка інших. Це демонструє зростаючий інтерес академічної спільноти до феномену піратських мережевих партій та їхньої ролі в сучасній європейській (партійно-електоральній) політиці, оскільки науковці піднімають проблематику ідеології, дискурсу, риторики, структури, виборчої підтримки, причин успіхів та впливу піратських партій на політичний процес у різних країнах Європи. ...
... Так, вже упродовж наступних років аналогічні політичні сили сформувалися в Німеччині, Австрії, Нідерландах, Іспанії, Ісландії, Чехії та цілій низці інших держав Європи і світу. Вже на сьогоднішній день піратські мережеві партії присутні більш, аніж у 30 країнах по всьому світу [15], а за деякими даними, з моменту зародження цього явища у Швеції вони з'явились у понад 50 державах світу [4]. ...
... I-voting can also be applied to prioritize policies or elect leadership in this way influencing political parties. For instance, a number of 'pirate parties' have practiced online voting for electing party leadership (thus embodying representative democracy), for voting on policies (implementing direct democracy) and for delegating votes to experts (experimenting with liquid democracy)-the outcomes varied depending on the voting design and the degree of party democraticness (Khutkyy, 2019). However, i-voting can be misused with the aim to augment existing undemocratic patterns through the formalization of restrictions for candidates or voters-this was found in election campaigns of the Five Star Movement in Italy and Podemos in Spain (Mikola, 2017). ...
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This paper investigates the impact of internet voting for draft policy proposals in the framework of Open Government Partnership, on the whole ecosystem of open government in Chile and Colombia. The research objective is, to identify the impact of i-voting for policy proposals on voters, civil society organizations, government authorities and open government overall, taking into account public transparency, civic participation and public accountability. Methodologically, this international comparison of case studies has employed a mixed methods approach including the analysis of applied reports, legislation, social media and expert interviews. It was found that in Chile and Colombia, the i-voting for policy proposals helped bridge remote parts of the countries and thus, make democratic participation more inclusive. Ultimately, the non-binding consultative i-voting for draft open government policies in both countries empowered civil society, working in the open government domain to advocate sectoral policies to be introduced by the government.
... The second alternative of Liquid Democracy is exemplified by liquid parties. The International Pirate Party stands out (Khutkyy, 2019). This party, founded in 2006 in Sweden and Germany, in 2009 reached two seats in the Parliament of the European Union; in 2012, two national senates in the Czech Republic and Iceland; in 2014 it reached 251 local seats in Germany and one in the Parliament of the European Union; in October 2016 it became the third political force in Iceland. ...
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The objective is to show how Liquid Democracy intends to assume the sine qua non conditions of a true democracy and undertake the democratic challenges to achieve a good democratic quality. The conceptual analysis methodology reviews the origin and modalities of Liquid Democracy to evaluate it against the requirements indicated by Morlino and examine its possibilities through the challenges described by Linz and the dangers exposed by Levitsky and Ziblatt. The results present the level of quality attainable by liquid modalities. In contemporary conditions, the analysis also detects the confusion of Liquid Democracy with Electronic Democracy and the risks that both have acquiring technocracy seeking technopolitics. The originality of the analysis includes links to patterns of algorithmic democracy and artificial intelligence. In conclusion the article shows the value of the liquid model and elements of its political and communicative quality. The conclusions also point to some opportunities to improve democracy.
... Partie piratów są inicjatywami oddolnymi, odwołującymi się do idei wdrażania demokracji także w cyberprzestrzeni. Ich najważniejszym postulatem jest decentralizacja władzy (Bermeo, Yashar, 2016;Khutkyy, 2019). Nowoczesne społeczeństwo zmienia się pod wpływem technologii informatycznych. ...
Book
Rozwój technologii informacyjno-komunikacyjnych (ang. Information and Communications Technologies – ICT) ma swoje przełożenie na praktyki i badania związane z kształceniem i wychowaniem. Internet stał się ważnym środowiskiem biznesowym, kulturotwórczym, informacyjnym, edukacyjnym. Technologie informacyjno-komunikacyjne stały są kluczowym narzędziem przeobrażającym funkcjonowanie jednostek i grup społecznych. Intensywne wdrażanie i rozwój mediów cyfrowych przynosi wiele korzyści, związanych chociażby z szybkim dostępem do danych i informacji, usprawnia komunikację, umożliwia docieranie do nowych zasobów wspomagających rozwój kompetencji kluczowych (zob. Pyżalski, 2020). Ostatnie dwie dekady są czasem intensywnych zmian determinowanych przez ICT. Pozytywne oddziaływanie mediów w kontekście pedagogicznym zauważalne jest przez narastającą liczbę badań poświęconych włączaniu poszczególnych rozwiązań informatycznych jako efektywnych środków oraz form dydaktycznych zwiększających efektywność uczenia się i nauczania. Rozwój metodycznych rozwiązań i badań nad możliwościami ICT zrodził nowy nurt badań edukacyjnych, który określany jest w pedagogice mediów mianem paradygmatu szans. Kierunek ten jest zwłaszcza widoczny w metodykach szczegółowych, gdzie strony internetowe, urządzenia cyfrowe i aplikacje stały się równie efektywnymi środkami dydaktycznymi, co analogowe rozwiązania. Wspomniany paradygmat budzi jednak wiele kontrowersji metodologicznych i metodycznych oraz wymusza ciągłe udoskonalanie procedur badawczych, a także nieustanną zmianę przedmiotu badań (m.in. przez uwzględnianie nowych urządzeń, aplikacji, stron internetowych) ze względu na szybko rozwijające się społeczeństwo informacyjne (zob. Juszczyk, 2002; Siemieniecki, 2007; Plebańska, Kula, 2011; Wawrzak-Chodaczek, 2012; Pyżalski, 2012c; Plichta, 2017; Wątróbski et al., 2018; Huk, 2019). Dydaktyka i wychowanie w erze dominacji mediów cyfrowych wzbudzają także zainteresowanie rodziców, polityków i publicystów. Zmiany następujące za sprawą powszechnego włączenia nowych mediów w różne sektory są na tyle zauważalne, że obsługa mediów cyfrowych jest jedną z kompetencji kluczowych. W ostatnich latach pedagogika mediów jest intensywnie rozwijającą się subdyscypliną (Juszczyk, 2002; Wolák, 2013). O sytuacji tej świadczy lawinowo narastająca liczba publikacji metateoretycznych, popularno-naukowych i empirycznych. Pozytywne zmiany w edukacji zachodzące za sprawą ICT współwystępują jednak z negatywnymi następstwami. Technologie informacyjno-komunikacyjne same w sobie są neutralnymi narzędziami. Biorąc jednak pod uwagę sposoby wykorzystywania nowych technologii, zarówno badacze, jak i osoby znaczące w procesie wychowania dostrzegają występowanie szeregu zachowań ryzykownych zapośredniczonych przez media cyfrowe . Intensywny rozwój społeczeństwa wytworzył pozytywne i negatywne następstwa. Analizy zachowań ryzykownych z ostatnich lat wskazują na to, że dominującą tematykę stanowią opracowania poświęcone e-zagrożeniom, takim jak: cyberprzemoc i cyberagresja, uzależnienia od Internetu (problematyczne użytkowanie Internetu), seksting. Relatywnie małe zainteresowanie pedagogów mediów, czy też rodziców (Orange, 2016) dotyczy zachowań związanych z piractwem. Łamanie norm w zakresie pobierania i udostępniania plików podlegających ochronie jest zagadnieniem marginalizowanym w literaturze przedmiotu. Zachowania klasyfikowane jako piractwo nie są tematem przewodnim opracowań dotyczących negatywnych aspektów funkcjonowania w cyberprzestrzeni m.in. ze względu na mniej ostre kryteria etyczne w przeciwieństwie do chociażby takich e-zagrożeń, jak seksting i cyberstalking. Piractwo jest jednym z najmniej do tej pory rozpoznanych zjawisk w pedagogice mediów. Biorąc pod uwagę unikatowość opracowań poświęconych skali i mechanizmom związanym z ochroną i łamaniem prawa autorskiego, postanowiono, że niniejsza publikacja zostanie poświęcona temu najmniej poznanemu zachowaniu ryzykownemu. W opracowaniu piractwo zdefiniowano jako nieautoryzowane kopiowanie produktów cyfrowych – oprogramowania (w tym gier), e-booków, muzyki, filmów z powodu innego niż tworzenie kopii zapasowej, bez uzyskania zgody właściciela praw autorskich bądź majątkowych (Gopal et al., 2004). Piractwo utożsamiane jest w opracowaniu z takimi określeniami, jak nieautoryzowane pobieranie i udostępnianiem plików. Piractwo w monografii związane jest nie tylko z udostępnianiem plików w internecie (najcięższy wymiar penalizacji zachowań), lecz również z wymianą w przestrzeni offline, a także z pobieraniem z wykorzystaniem zróżnicowanych sposobów. Warto zaznaczyć za Czetwertyńskim (2019: 129), że zjawisko nieautoryzowanego kopiowania cyfrowych dobór kultury cechuje się nieprecyzyjną terminologią, a poszczególne pojęcia składowe opisujące piractwo nie mają uniwersalnych definicji, co budzi wiele zastrzeżeń i tworzy jednocześnie negatywne skojarzenia (np. użycie terminu „piractwo”). Uwzględniając jednak powszechność występowania w eksperckiej literaturze przedmiotu (w tym w raportach OECD, branży audiowizualnej, opracowaniach ekonomicznych czy socjologicznych) określeń, takich jak: piractwo cyfrowe, piractwo cyfrowych treści, piractwo komputerowe terminy te będą dominiwały w monografii jako główna zmienna poddana badaniom. Zaprezentowana monografia nie ma na celu jednoznacznej oceny piractwa w wymiarze etycznym, lecz ukazanie skali i mechanizmów piractwa wśród adolescentów reprezentujących dwa kraje z Grupy Wyszehradzkiej z uwzględnieniem wybranych mechanizmów warunkujących edukację i wychowanie w erze cyfrowej. Autor publikacji ma świadomość, że publikacja nie wpisuje się w dyskusję prawną związaną z ochroną lub łamaniem prawa autorskiego. Korzystając z danych empirycznych oraz różnorodnych, często wykluczających się i budzących zastrzeżenia sposobów definiowania i interpretowania piractwa autor oddaje czytelnikom pierwsze monograficzne opracowanie poświęcone ukazujące piractwo w perspektywie pedagogiki mediów na podstawie prób badawczych z Czech i Polski.
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Political parties that operate in the public space are classified, inter alia, according to the criterion of their ideological convergence (Mair, 2010; Gallagher, Laver, Mair, 2011). If we look at the convergence through the prism of the values declared by the parties, then the adaptation of Shalom H. Schwartz’s circular model makes it possible to explain many correlations. Ideological convergence must then be considered a derivative of the rules of compliance and conflict that Schwartz described. These become the starting point, the basis for selecting further axioms and, consequently, a guideline (imperative) in constructing political agendas. The article aims to show that the mentioned rules define party agendas, and the circular model can be used for analytical purposes. The manifestos of the pirate parties selected from 11 countries were used as an example. The method applied in the article is the meta-value matrix. Adapting the Schwartz model, it should be seen as a qualitative content analysis method.
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The socio-political impact of voting in online surveys on open government is understudied. This inquiry aims to identify the socio-political impact of voting in online surveys on voters, civil society organisations, government authorities and open government overall in Moldova and Ukraine in 2016 and in 2018. This article applies mixed methods of data collection and analysis: analysis of applied reports, policy analysis of documentation, manual qualitative content analysis of social media posts and of digital voting tools and semi-structured expert interviews of stakeholders. We found that the voting in online surveys for Open Government Partnership commitments influences open government, although more profoundly in Ukraine than in Moldova. Probably, this is due to more intensive and innovative multistakeholder efforts to implement civic education, transparency and accountability in Ukraine. The voting in online surveys occurred at dissimilar stages of policy-making: in Moldova-at the agenda-setting stage, while in Ukraine-at the policy-drafting and decision-making stages. In both countries, the impact of voting in online surveys was more manifest on collaboration between the public and the authorities than on civil society and the least on the authorities. Overall, a formally non-binding voting for policy priorities became an informally binding exercise.
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The liquid model is exposed and proposed to claim the quality of democracy in the face of participatory and representative deficits. With a conceptual analysis methodology, the theoretical proposal is elaborated, and empirical examples are provided. Confusions are noted between liquid and electronic democracy, as well as the risks of obtaining digital technocracy instead of technopolitics. Faced with other studies of the model, the novelty of the analysis includes links with algorithmic democracy and artificial intelligence. The conclusions show the value of the liquid model in six aspects: providing citizens with the space to make public decisions, limiting the risks of populism, generating instances of intermediation, taking advantage of digital advances, influencing structurally and temporarily in politics.
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Demokrasi, kökenleri M.Ö. V. yüzyıla dayanan bir kavramdır. Ancak iki bin beş yüz yıllık geçmişine rağmen içeriğine yönelik tartışmalar güncelliğini korumaktadır. Nitekim bu süreç boyunca demokrasiden anlaşılan hep farklı olmuştur. Bu kapsamda Antik Yunan’da uygulanan demokrasi ile günümüzde hâkim olan liberal demokrasi yaklaşımı arasında büyük farklar bulunmaktadır. Bunlardan en belirgin olanı çağımızda doğrudan demokrasi uygulamalarının oldukça sınırlı kalması ve temsili demokrasinin yaygınlık kazanmasıdır. Bu büyük ayrışma demokrasinin hem kavramsal sınırlarının tam olarak çizilemediğini hem de hala değişme potansiyeline sahip olduğunu göstermektedir. Öyle ki seçimlere olan ilginin her geçen gün daha fazla azalması liberal demokrasinin bir meşruiyet krizi içinde olduğuna dair tartışmaları artırmaktadır. Bu noktada teorisi oldukça eskiye dayanıyor olsa da XXI. yüzyılda Korsan Parti hareketi ile gündeme gelen akışkan demokrasi modelinin liberal demokrasinin krizine çare olacağı savunulmaktadır. Zira bu yeni demokrasi tipi vatandaşlara demokratik süreçlere sadece temsilciler aracılığı ile değil, doğrudan katılım imkânı da sunmaktadır. Diğer taraftan oyların geçişliliği ya da herhangi bir seçim periyodu beklenmeksizin geri çekilebilmesi gibi özellikleri ile aktif bir siyasal yaşam vaat etmektedir. Ancak tüm bu olumlu özelliklerine rağmen akışkan demokrasi, siyaseti değerlerinden arındırarak günlük yaşama indirgemektedir. Üstelik elinde çok sayıda oy toplayan temsilcilerin sisteme egemen olma riski de bulunmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda çalışmada akışkan demokrasi teorisinin genel çerçevesi ve ulusal ölçekte liberal demokrasinin meşruiyet krizine çözüm olup olamayacağı sorusu tartışılacaktır.
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Emerging in the mid-2000s, Pirate parties were the first parties to make the Internet the centre of party politics and party organisation. This chapter reviews the literature on Pirate parties and discusses the legacy of Pirate parties in the use of digital tools for party organisation and internal party decision-making that later inspired new digital parties. The chapter empirically assesses two case studies of the Pirate Party family, the Finnish Pirate Party and the Czech Pirate Party, to demonstrate different applications of digital tools in organisation and campaigning. The cases show that both parties have remained true to the original Pirate ethos in creating and sustaining numerous platforms for open discussion and debate as well as retaining a commitment to transparency and equality in decision-making. While the organisational structure built around online participation and communication has been an advantage for the members and supporters of these parties, the success or failure of parties to mobilise voters in the longer run rests on other factors than the use of digital tools.
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A political battle is being waged over the use and control of culture and information. While media companies and copyright organisations argue for stricter intellectual property laws, a growing body of citizens challenge the contemporary IP-regime. This has seen a political mobilisation of piracy. Pirate parties see themselves as a digital civil rights movement, defending the public domain and the citizen’s right to privacy against copyright expansionism and increased surveillance. Since the first pirate party was formed in Sweden in 2006, similar parties have emerged across the world. This article draws on a study of the culture and ideology of copyright resistance, through interviews with pirate party representatives in Europe and North America. It focuses on challenges to democracy, and the distinction between public and private property and spaces, in the wake of the war on terror and the global financial crisis.
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The emergence of the information society has resulted in an unprecedented debate on issues such as internet censorship and surveillance, privacy, and copyright. Such issues have been mobilized through the channels of party politics by pirate parties, which represent an almost ideal-typical manifestation of the niche party phenomenon. This paper provides the first comparative analysis of the impact of contextual factors on the cross-national variations in the levels of pirate voting by focussing on the 11 countries in which pirate parties contested EP elections between 2009 and 2014. The analysis is performed using QCA, and suggests that the interplay between five contextual factors play an important role in influencing the different levels of pirate voting across Europe: the saliency of macro-economic issues; the levels of trust in political parties; the levels of trust in the internet; the turnout of voters aged 18–24 and the de-alignment of the young voters aged 18–24. On the one hand, the analysis reveals that the failed electoral mobilization of young voters, as reflected in the low levels of turnout of young adults, plays a prominent role in explaining why the majority of pirate parties are electorally unsuccessful. On the other hand, however, the analysis of the most favourable breeding grounds for significant levels of pirate voting to take place suggests that such an outcome is usually not dependent on the levels of turnout of young voters, but is rather influenced by a more complex interaction between the other contextual factors under investigation.
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Today's copyright wars can seem unprecedented. Sparked by the digital revolution that has made copyright-and its violation-a part of everyday life, fights over intellectual property have pitted creators, Hollywood, and governments against consumers, pirates, Silicon Valley, and open-access advocates. But while the digital generation can be forgiven for thinking the dispute between, for example, the publishing industry and Google is completely new, the copyright wars in fact stretch back three centuries-and their history is essential to understanding today's battles. The Copyright Wars-the first major trans-Atlantic history of copyright from its origins to today-tells this important story. Peter Baldwin explains why the copyright wars have always been driven by a fundamental tension. Should copyright assure authors and rights holders lasting claims, much like conventional property rights, as in Continental Europe? Or should copyright be primarily concerned with giving consumers cheap and easy access to a shared culture, as in Britain and America? The Copyright Wars describes how the Continental approach triumphed, dramatically increasing the claims of rights holders. The book also tells the widely forgotten story of how America went from being a leading copyright opponent and pirate in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to become the world's intellectual property policeman in the late twentieth. As it became a net cultural exporter and its content industries saw their advantage in the Continental ideology of strong authors' rights, the United States reversed position on copyright, weakening its commitment to the ideal of universal enlightenment-a history that reveals that today's open-access advocates are heirs of a venerable American tradition. Compelling and wide-ranging, The Copyright Wars is indispensable for understanding a crucial economic, cultural, and political conflict that has reignited in our own time.
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The rise of pirate parties in Europe since 2006 has been tempestuous and uneven. One may question whether the reasons citizens vote for these parties are the same between different countries. This article identifies two reasons citizens may vote for these parties: political distrust and concerns about privacy. This article tests which of these two underlies support for pirate parties. It uses six surveys covering 11 countries with a total 43,786 respondents. These analyses show that political distrust primarily drives support for pirate parties.
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Political repression often paradoxically fuels popular movements rather than undermining resistance. When authorities respond to strategic nonviolent action with intimidation, coercion, and violence, they often undercut their own legitimacy, precipitating significant reforms or even governmental overthrow. Brutal repression of a movement is often a turning point in its history: Bloody Sunday in the March to Selma led to the passage of civil rights legislation by the US Congress, and the Amritsar Massacre in India showed the world the injustice of the British Empire's use of force in maintaining control over its colonies. Activists in a wide range of movements have engaged in nonviolent strategies of repression management that can raise the likelihood that repression will cost those who use it. The Paradox of Repression and Nonviolent Movements brings scholars and activists together to address multiple dimensions and significant cases of this phenomenon, including the relational nature of nonviolent struggle and the cultural terrain on which it takes place, the psychological costs for agents of repression, and the importance of participation, creativity, and overcoming fear, whether in the streets or online.
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There has been widespread concern in contemporary Western societies about declining engagement in civic life; people are less inclined to vote, to join political parties, to campaign for social causes, or to trust political processes. Young people in particular are frequently described as alienated or apathetic. Some have looked optimistically to new media—and particularly the Internet—as a means of revitalizing civic life and democracy. Governments, political parties, charities, NGOs, activists, religious and ethnic groups, and grassroots organizations have created a range of youth-oriented websites that encourage widely divergent forms of civic engagement and use varying degrees of interactivity. But are young people really apathetic and lacking in motivation? Does the Internet have the power to re-engage those disenchanted with politics and civic life? Based on a major research project funded by the European Commission, this book attempts to understand the role of the Internet in promoting young people’s participation. Examples are drawn from Hungary, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom—countries offering contrasting political systems and cultural contexts. The book also addresses broader questions about the meaning of civic engagement, the nature of new forms of participation, and their implications for the future of civic life.