The bulk of legal actions within civil litigation is tied to the laws of contract and tort. However, in certain circumstances where the law fails, equity prevails. Thus, in the past few decades, litigants pursuing actions which cause arising from the negative externalities of crude oil production have mainly charted their parts in torts, human rights, and in third parties' rights in the oil and
... [Show full abstract] gas contracts. This paper argues that litigation bordering on torts and the rights of third parties in crude oil production contracts can be substituted by the adoption of Coase-Kingston social and legal efficiency model to resolve the disputes concerning the negative externalities of oil and gas enterprises. It concludes by emphasising that the social costs of negative externalities of crude oil production can be significantly reduced where the parties engage in costless bargain notwithstanding the effects of the rights and standing of land ownership. Therefore, the consistent failure of litigants to hold oil corporations to account for environmental degradation and human rights violations can be circumvented and socio-legal efficiency can be achieved for both the oil firms and the aggrieved private parties.