Protecting Electrical Equipment: Good practices for preventing high altitude electromagnetic pulse impacts
... There are several very important problems detailed in [4,5]. Here are some of them: ...
... In the electrical power industry, it is hardly possible to find two identical cabinets with electronics having absolutely identical internal wiring. Author's study [4], confirming that in the frequency range of 100 kHz -100 MHz, the resonant frequency and impedance of the most common twisted pair of wires changes very significantly when the length of these wires' changes (0.25 m; 0.5 m; 1 m), Fig. 5, and as results a dramatic change of cabinet internal apparatus vulnerability to HEMP [4]. Therefore, a typical test model for civilian control cabinets does not exist. ...
... In the electrical power industry, it is hardly possible to find two identical cabinets with electronics having absolutely identical internal wiring. Author's study [4], confirming that in the frequency range of 100 kHz -100 MHz, the resonant frequency and impedance of the most common twisted pair of wires changes very significantly when the length of these wires' changes (0.25 m; 0.5 m; 1 m), Fig. 5, and as results a dramatic change of cabinet internal apparatus vulnerability to HEMP [4]. Therefore, a typical test model for civilian control cabinets does not exist. ...
The problem of the destructive effects of High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP or EMP) on electronic and electrical equipment has been well known for more than 50 years. All military equipment and critical equipment of special governmental services are reliably protected from such influences. There are many companies on the market that manufactures numerous EMP protection means that meet the requirements of military standards. It would seem that in such a situation, critical civilian infrastructure facilities (electrical power systems, water supply systems, communications, large medical centers, banks, etc.) should also be protected against EMP. But it turns out that this is not the case! Nowhere in the world are critical civilian infrastructure still protected from such impacts! Why?
The main reason is an attempt to use well-known military strategies, methods and protection means for protecting civilian infrastructure.
This brochure analyses the reasons why critical civilian infrastructure has been unprotected for more than 50 years, proposes new protection strategies and methods, as well as new protections means designed especially for the civilian sector. The brochure is intended for managers and technical staff of civil infrastructure facilities, specialists in the field of EMP, university teachers and students.
This is Third Edition of the brochure
... Different power supplies reacted differently to the test pulses [4], and one of them showed a very strange feature. When exposing this power supply to a standard 1.2/50 µs lightning pulse (6 kV amplitude), there was no response at all, but it switching off as it was affected by very short EFT (5/50 ns) with the amplitude of 1 kV. ...
... Impact of standard pulse bursts (1.2/50 µs) with the increased amplitude (up to 7 kV) resulted in permanent damage in the power supply (breakdown of the key elementpowerful MOSFET transistor BUZ80 type with maximal operating voltage 800V and maximal impulse current 13A) and further blowing of a current-limiting resistor. These Power supplies were also tested with additional EMI filters and surge arresters at its inputs [4]. Testing of a mentioned DPR fitted with 316NN63 power supply revealed that the faults during DPR's operation occurred: a) when delivering an EFT pulse with 1kV (and more) amplitude to the power supply's input; b) when delivering an EFT pulse with 2.6 kV (and more) amplitude to the input of the power supply with an NBM-06-471 filter connected in series; c) when delivering an EFT pulse with 4 kV (and more) amplitude to the input of the power source with an NBM-06-471 filter fitted with a varistor at the input. ...
... The data presented in [4] regarding the resilience of different electronic components, computers and computer networks also confirm an extremely large scattering of test results, depending on the influence of a very large number of almost unpredictable factors and the inability to transfer the results of single tests of specific devices and systems to other devices and systems. ...
Protection of critical civilian infrastructure from high altitude electromagnetic pulse at nuclear explosion (HEMP) is significantly different from the protection of military facilities. Attempts to use well-known military protection means in the civilian sector have therefore failed. The article analyzes these features and describes new technical solutions designed by author specifically for civilian infrastructure.
... There are several very important problems detailed in [3,4]. Here are some of them: Problem 1. Unlike the civilian systems, over the last few decades, all critical military systems vulnerable to HEMP have been designed with HEMP protection. ...
... In the power generation industry, it is hardly possible to find two identical cabinets with electronics having absolutely identical internal wiring. Since at HEMP frequencies range (100 kHz to 100 MHz), the minor change of wire length, even to 20 cm -30 cm, or in its placement inside the cabinet, results in a dramatic change of cabinet internal apparatus vulnerability to HEMP [3], a typical test model does not exist. Thus, the results of testing any individual cabinet for very short electromagnetic pulse impact cannot be extrapolated over other cabinets, i.e., in practice, there is no "typical" cabinet for such tests. ...
... The data presented in [3] regarding the resilience of different electronic components, computers and computer networks also confirm an extremely large scattering of test results, depending on the influence of a very large number of almost unpredictable factors and the inability to transfer the results of single tests of specific devices and systems to other devices and systems. ...
The problem of the destructive effects of High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP or EMP) on electronic and electrical equipment has been well known for more than 50 years. All military equipment and critical equipment of special governmental services are reliably protected from such influences. There are many companies on the market that manufactures numerous EMP protection means that meet the requirements of military standards. It would seem that in such a situation, critical civilian infrastructure facilities (electrical power systems, water supply systems, communications, large medical centers, banks, etc.) should also be protected against EMP. But it turns out that this is not the case! Nowhere in the world are critical civilian infrastructure still protected from such impacts! Why?
The main reason is an attempt to use well-known military strategies, methods and protection means for protecting civilian infrastructure.
This brochure analyses the reasons why critical civilian infrastructure has been unprotected for more than 50 years, proposes new protection strategies and methods, as well as new protections means designed especially for the civilian sector.
The brochure is intended for managers and technical staff of civil infrastructure facilities, specialists in the field of EMP, university teachers and students.
... There are several very important problems detailed in [1,19]. Here are some of them: Problem 1. Unlike the civilian systems, over the last few decades, all critical military systems vulnerable to HEMP have been designed with HEMP protection. ...
... Thus, the results of testing any individual cabinet for very short electromagnetic pulse impact cannot be extrapolated over other cabinets, i.e., in practice, there is no "typical" cabinet for such tests. Based on conclusions made in [1,19], it is not feasible to conduct such tests for this type of equipment. The data presented in [1] regarding the resilience of computers and computer networks also confirm an extremely large scattering of test results, depending on the influence of a very large number of almost unpredictable factors and the inability to transfer the results of single tests of specific devices and systems to other devices and systems. ...
... Based on conclusions made in [1,19], it is not feasible to conduct such tests for this type of equipment. The data presented in [1] regarding the resilience of computers and computer networks also confirm an extremely large scattering of test results, depending on the influence of a very large number of almost unpredictable factors and the inability to transfer the results of single tests of specific devices and systems to other devices and systems. However, such means must ensure at least 80 dB -100 dB attenuation of an electromagnetic interference (signal), Figure 8. ...
Since the devastating effect of HEMP on electronics in the military field has been known for a long time, all military systems are equipped with efficient protection against the impact of HEMP. However, HEMP is equally dangerous for all civil electronics used in almost every section of today's most important infrastructure of any country, for instance the power industry. Therefore, the opinion that all technical problems have long been solved by the military and you just need to use their solutions and their experience in the civilian sector can be heard often. It is a very common and very dangerous illusion in the author opinion. The article describes the problems associated with the use of military technology in the civilian sector, as well as numerous fakes from the world's leading research centers, reporting that they have solved all the problems of protecting infrastructure. The article proposes an author's strategy for protecting the civilian infrastructure based on its own researches and developments. The ability of the powerful electromagnetic pulse, generated upon the nuclear explosion (HEMP) to destroy all electronics, has been known to nuclear physicists since the first nuclear explosion was performed in 1945 on the Alamogordo range, New Mexico (project Trinity). Upon the explosion, all apparatus that was meant to monitor the explosion parameters became inoperative. Upon all further test explosions performed in all countries, that electromagnetic pulse was registered precisely and was followed with the analysis and study of the parameters. Beginning in the 1970s (50 years ago), that subject has been unclassified. At that time, dozens of Western scientific and technical reports, prepared by numerous military and civilian organizations (working at the military request), were devoted to different aspects of HEMP impact on electrical equipment and electronics. Since then, the electromagnetic pulse had been officially recognized as one of the damage effects of nuclear weapons, along with the detonation wave, the temperature, the light and the radioactive emission. This has been mentioned in all open sources, including booklets and recommendations on protection against the massive weapons distributed amongst the population during the "cold war" between the USA and the USSR. However, at that time only a few people understood. Unfortunately, the situation has not changed a lot, despite hundreds of reports, presentations, articles and books, as well as dozens of open military and civilian standards on this subject. At least in the USA, this subject is in the spotlight of many dozens of organizations listed in [1], including numerous Congress Panels created especially for this. Many years have been spent researching this subject which has been funded prevalently by the government. However, civil engineers working in the field of electrical power supply, water supply, sewage systems, telecommunication, banking, etc., are bewildered about this massive data so far. Why? The following is written in the [2]: "There are many misconceptions about EMP that are circulating among both technical and policy experts, in press reports, on preparedness websites, and even embedded in technical journals. Because many aspects of the EMP fields and system interaction physics are non-intuitive, misconceptions are inevitable. Uneasiness about the wide-area, ubiquitous effects of EMP and the diversity of systems affected make it convenient to adopt misconceptions that avoid the need for action. Denying the seriousness of the effect appears perfectly responsible to many stakeholder groups. Misconceptions involving consequence minimization or hyperbole have served to deter action in the past. Downplaying the threats places EMP preparedness on the back-burner compared to other effects. Exaggeration of the threats causes policy-makers to dismiss arguments, ascribing them to tin foil hat conspiracy theories." The problem is that all such numerous organizations which are fed on massaging the HEMP issue and periodically frightening the laymen with a fatal disaster resulting from the HEMP impact are not interested in an early solution to this issue and are discontinuing research. Conversely, they are all interested in keeping this problem afloat and continuation of prolonged funding. They endeavor to put aside simple and effective solutions to many technical issues. Author learned it first hand when he attempted to contact one of the US officials dealing with this subject. When the official mentioned the very important and not yet settled question of protection of a power transformer against HEMP, author answered that in fact he can offer a simple, cheap and field-proven technical solution. The official immediately rebuffed author and did not even ask about the solution.
... Of course, there are smaller filters (although also not cheap at all), but they all use the earth as an energy absorber for HEMP. But in fact, the earth is not such anabsorber [1][2][3]. ...
... Who will attend to this? And what to do with the grounding of each cabinet with electronic equipment and the grounding of this equipment inside the cabinet, if the grounding system itself is a huge antenna that receives EMP energy [1][2][3]. In addition, a many of these filters are not protected against the high amplitude of the EMP input pulses and therefore require the installation of additional surge arresters at the input, as required by the standardMIL-STD-188-125 [5], Figure 5. Special circuit diagrams for connecting the current and voltage circuits of microprocessor-based protection relays installed in cabinets require the use of HEMP filters also with special internal circuit diagrams [3]. ...
... The use of nanoplasma devices in high-power terahertz pulse generation is demonstrated, where a high-amplitude peak-to-peak voltage exceeding 100 V was emitted at 109 GHz, by simply integrating the device with a bowtie antenna. The tunability of V TH together with a high-current capability and low capacitance enable the nanoplasma devices to operate as a high-performance, ultrafast low-parasitic protection unit at the front end of radiofrequency systems, as well as protection for avalanche-free electron devices 25,26 (Extended Data Fig. 8). The high performance and simplicity of the proposed devices offer new horizons for future chip-scale ultrafast electronics and terahertz sources with applications in communications, imaging, sensing and biomedicine, among others. ...
... For the references for the data points, please refer to Methods. Radiofrequency ports of high-frequency systems need to have a unit to protect the system from over-voltage caused by electromagnetic interference (EMI), high-power radiofrequency radiation and so on 25 . The protection unit needs to be easily integrable, provide a fast action, a highcurrent capability, as well as a low parasitic capacitance. ...
The broad applications of ultrawide-band signals and terahertz waves in quantum measurements1,2, imaging and sensing techniques3,4, advanced biological treatments⁵, and very-high-data-rate communications⁶ have drawn extensive attention to ultrafast electronics. In such applications, high-speed operation of electronic switches is challenging, especially when high-amplitude output signals are required⁷. For instance, although field-effect and bipolar junction devices have good controllability and robust performance, their relatively large output capacitance with respect to their ON-state current substantially limits their switching speed⁸. Here we demonstrate a novel on-chip, all-electronic device based on a nanoscale plasma (nanoplasma) that enables picosecond switching of electric signals with a wide range of power levels. The very high electric field in the small volume of the nanoplasma leads to ultrafast electron transfer, resulting in extremely short time responses. We achieved an ultrafast switching speed, higher than 10 volts per picosecond, which is about two orders of magnitude larger than that of field-effect transistors and more than ten times faster than that of conventional electronic switches. We measured extremely short rise times down to five picoseconds, which were limited by the employed measurement set-up. By integrating these devices with dipole antennas, high-power terahertz signals with a power–frequency trade-off of 600 milliwatts terahertz squared were emitted, much greater than that achieved by the state of the art in compact solid-state electronics. The ease of integration and the compactness of the nanoplasma switches could enable their implementation in several fields, such as imaging, sensing, communications and biomedical applications.
... To date, we have four opposing concepts on the problem of protecting the civil critical infrastructure, which are reflected in the statements of the apologists of these three concepts [5] ...
The problem of the destructive effects of High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP or EMP) on electronic and electrical equipment has been well known for more than 50 years. All military equipment and critical equipment of special governmental services are reliably protected from such influences. There are many companies on the market that manufactures numerous EMP protection means that meet the requirements of military standards. It would seem that in such a situation, critical civilian infrastructure facilities (electrical power systems, water supply systems, communications, large medical centers, banks, etc.) should also be protected against EMP. But it turns out that this is not the case! Nowhere in the world are critical civilian infrastructure still protected from such impacts! Why? The main reason is an attempt to use well-known military strategies, methods and protection means for protecting civilian infrastructure. This article proposes new protection strategies and methods for the civilian sector.
... To date, we have four opposing concepts on the problem of protecting the civil critical infrastructure, which are reflected in the statements of the apologists of these three concepts [5]: ...
The problem of the destructive effects of High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP or EMP) on electronic and electrical equipment has been well known for more than 50 years. All military equipment and critical equipment of special governmental services are reliably protected from such influences. There are many companies on the market that manufactures numerous EMP protection means that meet the requirements of military standards. It would seem that in such a situation, critical civilian infrastructure facilities (electrical power systems, water supply systems, communications, large medical centers, banks, etc.) should also be protected against EMP. But it turns out that this is not the case! Nowhere in the world are critical civilian infrastructure still protected from such impacts! Why? This article analyses the reasons why critical civilian infrastructure has been unprotected for more than 50 years, proposes new protection strategies and technology, as well as new protections means designed especially for the civilian sector. The article is intended for officials, managers and technical staff of civil infrastructure facilities, specialists in the field of EMP, university teachers and students.
The electromagnetic pulse (EMP) disturbances could potentially invoke irreversible damages to a set of electric equipment and the power grid at large, which would result in severe power outages. With the EMP attacks recognized as an emerging concern for the power transmission systems, it calls for investigating effective strategies that enable prevention and alleviation of such malicious threats. This paper proposes a new artificial intelligence (AI)-aided mitigation strategy against EMP strikes via adjusting the connection status of shunt capacitors and transformers in the system. A Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) with Autoencoder (AE) deep learning framework is presented for an efficient strategy selection under a large number of EMP strike scenarios simulated in the PowerWorld simulation environment. The numerical studies on the IEEE 30-bus test system demonstrate that the proposed mitigation scheme with the embedded deep learning framework can intelligently provide actionable mitigation solutions in response to EMP scenarios even under interference disturbances (e.g., noise, missing data, etc.).
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