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Identification: age and identity assessment
... Moreover, UMs' position as legal subjects is highly context-dependent and contradictory to some extent. Upon arrival in a host country, UM's age, reasons for migrating and their backgrounds are questioned by migration and asylum authorities (Hjern et al., 2018;Kumin, 2018). Existing studies acknowledge the progressive shift from benevolent and protective narratives toward a pervasive "culture of disbelief" (Bricaud, 2006;McLaughlin, 2018) concerning UMs' protection claims. ...
... Often, a participant who had moved onwards after arrival in Italy was denied protection as UM in France or in Switzerland and therefore remained unable to settle. Age-disputed cases also risk being trapped in mobility, falling in and out of statutory rights and experiencing marginalisation (Fournier, 2017;Hjern et al., 2018). Participants sometimes expressed their regret after leaving one centre that was retrospectively "not so bad" (Idriss, M1) and wondered if returning was possible, although no one actually did. ...
... Another significant aspect for UMs is how the border becomes an embodied experience related to their age . Prior studies have noted how chronological age determines UMs' belonging to the socio-legal category of childhood in Western societies (Clark-Kazak, 2013, Hjern et al., 2018. They also warn against the ethical aspects and exclusionary effects of such processes (Fournier, 2017;Malmqvist et al., 2018;. ...
... Oftentimes, minors who arrive in Sweden on their own come from countries lacking reliable systems of registration for citizens. As migration regimes have tightened, age has become an object of scrutiny, not least through assessments of bodies, criticized by medical health professionals for being unethical (Hjern et al. 2018). Childhood itself has become an object of assessment and scrutiny, not least in negotiations on vulnerability (Hedlund 2016;Lind 2020). ...
This article aims to show an example of how municipal policy promotes a social work of policing and expulsion, represented as a child welfare. It is legitimated through a therapeutic rationality promoting emotional well-being among asylum-seeking minors arriving on their own. The material consists of municipal policy documents Children's best interests when returning and Unaccompanied returns issued by the municipality of Strömsund, Northern Sweden, developed as a best practice project during 2014-2020. A post-structuralist policy analysis is applied, underpinned by Foucauldian governmentality. It de-constructs how productive and repressive elements of care and control are intertwined into a rationality of policed empowerment and a technology of activation into expulsion. The rationality encourages reorienting motivations to stay in Sweden into willing self-exclusion, through collaborative reflection and normalization of expulsion as 'crisis management' and child welfare. Concerns of children arriving alone are described as manifestations of 'crisis', caused by immature mobility, expectations to stay in Sweden and separation from roots. Social services, legal guardians and staff at housings are encouraged to form a collaborative and motivational technology of support. Children's needs are represented as emotionally fragile, to be cared and reshaped therapeutically through collaborative reflection on exclusion as being in service of children's self-development. Techniques presented in the material reshape motivations through collaboration, securitization and activation. Although effects might turn out differently, this case shows a combination of neo-liberal empowerment and policing encouraging a child welfare regime of exclusion and policing.
... Scholars have underlined the scientific and ethical controversies surrounding age assessment, going so far as to call it "junk science" (Noll, 2016). They emphasise medical professionals' obligation to disclose the low accuracy of skeletal and dental age assessment while pointing to the systematic breach of the principle that the net benefit of ionising radiation to the individual must outweigh its risks (Hjern et al., 2012;Hjern et al., 2018). Others have problematised the focus on chronometric age, which may serve as a tool for assessing migrants' productivity and employability, which has clear disadvantages for some-especially older adults (Seibel, 2016). ...
Existing research shows that right-wing populist imaginaries and discourses on “bogus asylum seekers” mobilise feelings of fear and panic and serve to legitimise increasingly restrictive asylum policies in Europe. In light of this ongoing development, this paper addresses a more intrinsic and structural aspect of asylum, which requires balancing the inclusion and exclusion of persecuted third-country nationals. This paradox is most evident with unaccompanied minors who are caught between state norms and practices that are both exclusionary and repressive (asylum) and inclusive and caring (child welfare). In order to tackle this dilemma, we explore how the asylum–child welfare paradox is organised and formalised by the state and how it affects unaccompanied minors. Based on interviews with unaccompanied minors in Austria and experts who work with them, the findings show that child and youth welfare norms and practices that are formalised as part of the asylum procedure improve unaccompanied minors’ living conditions without dismantling asylum norms and practices of surveillance, conditionality, and scarcity. Judging by their simultaneous implementation, the state preserves and reinforces exclusionary and repressive asylum norms not despite but through child welfare norms and practices.
... På grund av stora variationer i mognadsutvecklingen i det aktuella åldersspannet har metoderna som används för ålderbedömning breda konfidensintervall. Det gör att metoderna, tillämpade för att dikotomt avgöra ålder (över och under 18 år), har kritiserats [17][18][19]. ...
Background
Unaccompanied young refugees constitute an especially vulnerable population, reporting high rates of trauma and mental health problems. There is a significant gap in the literature on trauma and posttraumatic stress symptoms (PTSS) in unaccompanied young refugees who are still on the move and live in precarious circumstances such as refugee camps. This study therefore aimed to contribute to this gap by investigating pre- and peri-migration (potentially) traumatic experiences of unaccompanied young refugees; longitudinal trajectories of trauma, daily stressors and PTSS; and the impact of gender, trauma, and daily stressors on PTSS over time.
Methods
This longitudinal, mixed-method, and multi-country study was conducted in various settings (e.g. refugee camps, reception centers) across nine European countries. A heterogeneous sample of N = 187 unaccompanied young refugees (78.4% male) from 29 different countries was assessed via interviews at 3 time-points during a period of 27 months. Data was analyzed via growth curve modelling.
Results
Prevalence rates of (potentially) traumatic experiences ranged from 29.5 to 91.9%. Peri-migration traumatization remained stable over time ( b = − 0.02; p = 0.371), but the number of reported daily stressors ( b = − 0.24; p = 0.001) and PTSS scores significantly decreased over time ( b = − 0.98; p = 0.004). Females reported higher PTSS compared with males at baseline ( p = 0.002), but gender did not influence the longitudinal trajectory of PTSS. The pre-migration trauma load and daily stressors at baseline did not have a significant effect on PTSS at baseline or on the longitudinal trajectory.
Conclusions
This is the first study to document not only the high numbers of traumatic events for unaccompanied young refugees pre- and peri- migration, but also the continued traumatization during flight, as well as high rates of daily stressors and PTSS. Humanitarian and political assistance is urgently needed to curb the often life-threatening conditions unaccompanied young refugees face during migration.
In this research civil status has been defined as the legal identity of a natural person – based on his life events – for the State. Limiting the scope of the research, it was established that only the statūs of nationality, name, horizontal civil status (marriage and registered partnerships) and vertical civil status (parentage) would be looked at.
The main research question of this research was how to improve civil status recognition in the EU. In order to assess this, the different lines of case law on each civil status were considered and assessed which gaps still exist. Further EU sub-questions asked were (1) which role does EU citizenship play in respect of civil status recognition?; (2) what is the linkage between EU citizenship, the nationality of a Member State and civil status recognition?; (3) in how far is the principle of mutual recognition based on mutual trust of relevance in this field?; and (4) does it matter whether the civil status is established in another Member State or in a Third County but already recognised by another Member State?
Further lines of sub-questions not limited to EU law were on how does civil status recognition affect dual and multiple nationals and what role human rights (both EU and CoE) play?
NATIONALITY
As to nationality, it was considered in Chapter 3 that one should make a distinction between the recognition of a nationality and giving effect to a nationality. As to the recognition of nationality itself, it was concluded that a Member State can make no conditions as to the issue of accepting whether a person has the nationality of another Member State if that other Member State considers this person as a national. However, due to the fact that only one nationality can be applied at any given time to a specific situation, the giving effect to another nationality is the main issue.
To this purpose especially the lines of the CJEU on the right to return and on dual EU citizens were analysed. It was considered that there is a ranking of applicable nationalities depending the movement made and the relationship of the nationalities to the destination Member State. It was also considered that the CJEU had in essence created a ‘mobility quality’ to the nationality, which would activate upon residing in a Member State of which one does not have the nationality and would give continued access to EU citizenship rights in a Member State of nationality. The CJEU has in essence created two different lines of case-law as to single EU citizens and dual EU citizen returners. The legal framework applicable to returners depends on the rank of the nationality to which the mobility quality is attached. Single EU citizens with mobility quality can only retain rights used before in a Member State of which they do not have the nationality. This is due to the fact that the mobility quality is attached to the nationality of the Member State of destination. However, dual EU citizens in the same situation, would retain full access to EU citizenship rights and would be able to also found new relationships based on EU law, due to the fact that the mobility quality is attached to the nationality of the Member State which is not the Member State of destination.
Due to this single EU citizens are at a disadvantage, especially if they resided before in a Member State which requires upon naturalization that one renounces all other nationalities, or when the Member State of nationality requires that one automatically loses its nationality upon acquisition of the nationality of another Member State. Such single EU citizens are thus doomed to stay ‘single EU citizens’ and will not be capable of coming within the other framework of dual EU citizens. It was considered that case-by-case basis assessments of each single situation are not feasible nor are they permitted due to the principle of non-discrimination between the own citizens.
This creates an imbalance and the CJEU will have to make a choice. Either the CJEU would choose to end the reverse discrimination allowed to a Member State’s own nationals upon return from another Member State, making single EU citizens equal to dual EU citizens; or it would have to require that acquisition of a Member State’s nationality could not have as a consequence the loss of another Member States nationality. This would thus mean that the EU would have gained a clear competence to regulate on certain specific issues of dual nationality.
I considered that the Court seems to have already made its choice by retaining the old line of case-law on right to return of single EU citizens and, consequently, it is time for the European Union to legislate on dual nationality in the EU.
NAMES
As to names, it was considered in Chapter 4 that the ECtHR focussed mostly on the right to acquire a specific name in a Contracting State, while not so much on the recognition of a name established in another state. From the CJEU case-law on the other hand one could derive a certain set of rules:
1. A person has always the right to have the law of nationality applicable to his or her name, and to change this applicable law to the one of her or his other nationality at any given moment.
2. Once a name is registered by the competent authorities of a Member State, this name should be recognised by all other Member States
3. As derogation from the second rule, the only Member State that can refuse to recognise a name acquired abroad, is a Member State of nationality, but only if the name conflicts with an absolute prohibition enshrined in the constitution of said Member State. This constitutional prohibition has to be clear, precise and unconditional for the Member State to be able to rely on it as a justification.
The derogation in rule number three might need some explanation here. While the CJEU had accepted the possibility to refuse the recognition of a name based on constitutional rules in several cases, one had to make a clear distinction. One could distinguish constitutional prohibitions that were absolute, while there were also constitutional prohibitions which were conditional or were not consistently applied. I considered that the latter two types should be incapable of justifying a restriction to recognition.
There were still certain gaps in the case-law, especially where it concerned the choice of the law of nationality of a third-country applicable to the name. I suggested that such a choice should be possible and recognised throughout the Union. I also considered that under no circumstance access to the nationality of a Member State – and consequently EU citizenship – should be refused on the basis of the name established, while this name would have to be recognised if EU citizenship case-law were applicable.
HORIZONTAL CIVIL STATUS
In Chapter 5 it was considered that while the ECtHR has consistently held that there is no duty on the Contracting States to introduce same-sex marriage. However, it has also held that if a State does not do so, it is under an obligation to create another legal framework – in essence a registered partnership – for same-sex couples. The Chapter than further described how the ECtHR and CJEU created a certain rulebook as to which rights should be attached to these registered partnerships.
It was then described how Member States have introduced same-sex marriages and registered partnerships, and how these Member States had differential purposes for the registered partnerships. It was considered that states following the dualistic approach only introduced a registered partnership for same-sex couples as a temporary measure until the moment it would open same-sex marriage and then abandon the registered partnership. States following a pluralistic model, on the other hand, created the registered partnership for both same-sex and opposite-sex couples as a permanent horizontal civil status to exist alongside marriage. I considered that while marriage and registered partnerships exist to safeguard the private life of the couple, in a dualistic system the legal framework used implicitly shows the sexual orientation of the persons involved. It therefore, could exactly fail in its purpose to protect the private life of the persons concerned.
As to the case-law of the ECtHR and CJEU on recognition of same-sex marriages and registered partnerships, it became clear that they do not complement each other at all and create more legal uncertainty and confusion. The CJEU’s approach has let to even more unclarity in an already clouded field as to the scope of recognition of same-sex marriages and the rights attached to them. Through an analysis of all the Member States concerning the recognition of registered partnerships for the purpose a residence right under Directive 2004/38 and same-sex marriages in those Member States that do not provide for any legal framework, it was considered that the approaches vary considerably in the different Member States. Often it is unclear which registered partnerships from other Member States will be recognised due to vague requirements; and where there are specific lists stating which foreign registered partnerships will be recognised, these are often not regularly updated or stopped being updated after introduction of same-sex marriage. This in turn leads to indirect discrimination based on nationality. It was also considered that whereas Member States that do not provide for same-sex marriages will in theory recognise such marriages for the purpose of a residence permit based on Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2004/38, practical rules applicable to nationals concerning the requirement of previous transcription of foreign documents hamper a functional system to apply for such a residence permit.
Especially the CJEU’s approach created a system where a marriage or registered partnership concluded in a Member State has to be recognised in all Member States, but does not provide for any means to incorporate a marriage or registered partnership concluded in third-countries. This latter part I considered a breach of human rights.
It was also concluded that the methods used to stop marriages of convenience, have the capacity to destroy the function of marriage, especially where there is no mutual recognition of decisions, both judicial and administrative, that there is no marriage of convenience. Consequently, the acceptance of a marriage or registered partnership for the purpose of family reunification should include a duty on other Member States to accept this marriage or registered partnership without any additional checks as to its truthfulness.
VERTICAL CIVIL STATUS
In Chapter 6 it was considered how especially the ECtHR dealt with the recognition of parentage, specifically concerning surrogacy and IVF.
In many Member States restrictions exist on recognition of parentage established abroad based on the reason that such a parentage establishment is not provided for under national law. However, I also considered that in most of these cases, not having such a mode of parentage establishment equalled discrimination based on gender and/or sexual orientation.
Especially concerning intended mothers whose gametes were used in surrogacy cases, there is still a huge gap in the case-law.
Concerning children born in polygamous marriages one could see also clear violations in Member States where the parentage established based on the marriage was not recognised due to the non-recognition of the marriage, but simultaneously establishing the parentage in a manner as one would allow in cases of an extra-marital child, this was excluded due to the existence of that same marriage.
Also the rules on the issue of parentage fraud and especially fraudulent declarations of paternity were analysed. I considered that the Member State of nationality should be the sole State having jurisdiction to decide on such cases, since residence rights would be based on the nationality acquired. In cases where several Member States’ nationalities were acquired all of them would have to have simultaneous jurisdiction and would all have to come to the conclusion that their nationality had been acquired fraudulently. If only one Member State would not conclude that fraud exists, the parentage would have to be recognised throughout the Union.
COMMON GAPS
One of the clearest gap common to all civil status considered, was that there was no framework for civil status acquired in a third-country or how to deal with a choice of law for the law of a third-country. While there was a tendency in the case-law for mutual recognition of ‘European status’, meaning a status established in a Member State, there was no approach at all for the incorporation of civil status acquired in third-countries.
Also, where it concerned fraudulent civil status there is a lack of a common framework. While handbooks have been created by the Union and Member States to spot such behaviour, there is no system of mutual recognition as to the absence or lack of proof for such behaviour. This means that at every move to another Member State the family life of the persons involved could again be investigated.
ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
As was discussed in Chapter 7, the human rights case-law on civil status has developed dramatically over the last years especially concerning the right to private life. However, the academic literature is still quite unclear as to the question of how this case-law is to be interpreted. I considered that if one takes the entire case-law on all civil status together a systematic approach of the ECtHR could clearly be seen, which might be overlooked if one looks at each status separately. It was also concluded that certain older cases which referred mainly to family life, should be reassessed as being primarily based on private life.
In this research, it is proposed that private life is the main human right governing civil status. This is due to the fact that the existence of a civil status exempts proof of family life. Durable use of a right which is attached to a status forces a State to formalize the situation by bringing it under the protection of private life. This is either done by recognising the status established abroad, or by creating a status as which it will be protected. The family life rights enjoyed are then more firmly protected by the status. This was called in this book ‘the circle of life’. This also explains why the ECtHR ruled in Oliari v. Italy that a Member State has to create some kind of status for same-sex couples in the absence of same-sex marriage based on private life, after it had declared in Schalk and Kopf v. Austria that same-sex couples enjoy family life. In vertical civil status this is also clear. Parentage can either be established on the basis of DNA, which falls under private life, or on the basis of family life in the absence of a DNA relationship. Either of these two roads can force the State to formalize the parentage link.
This also explains why subsequent truthfulness checks of marriages and parentage are such infringing measures, since they undermine the exemption of proof of family life. For this reason, not having a system within the Union where the marriage of convenience check in one Member State is automatically considered valid throughout the Union, is a violation of private life.
This circle of life is also the reason why the Union, in creating ‘European status’ that have to be recognised throughout the Union, is under an obligation to create a system of incorporating similar status established in third-countries and turning them into a ‘European status’.
One should be also aware that specific rules concerning the functioning of a status, like the law applicable to it and thus also a change to the applicable law, would fall within the ambit of private life.
ROLE OF EU CITIZENSHIP
EU citizenship has in the context of civil status recognition a multitude of functions.
First of all, it has the function to enable free movement.
For nationality this specifically means, that it has the role of elevating the nationalities of Member States on the ranking system, giving them a preferential status as opposed to the nationalities from third-countries for the purpose of giving effect. As was explained above, the CJEU has interpreted EU citizenship in such a way, that it has created a mobility quality which is activated upon residence in a Member State other than the Member State of nationality or birth, and which is attached to the most favourable nationality available. It, therefore, gives the possibility to retain rights previously acquired in a Member State other than the Member State of nationality in the Member State of nationality in the absence of another Member State’s nationality, or continued access to establish rights under EU law if also another Member State’s nationality is present.
In this function, one could also place the name case-law and the Coman judgment, which created the principle that a status established in one Member State has to be recognised in another Member State in order to facilitate free movement.
However, as to the latter, this research also sees another function of EU citizenship: the free movement of the ‘European status’. A civil status established in the EU has to be recognized in principle in all Member States irrespective whether the status was obtained by an EU citizen or not. The duty to recognise such a status is not a right attached to EU citizenship, but an intrinsic function EU citizenship has placed on a status. One should, where EU citizenship case-law deals with the recognition of civil status (e.g. Grunkin Paul, Coman) or certain functionalities of civil status (e.g. Garcia Avello), consider that EU citizenship in those cases affect the private life dimension of the status. These rules on the private life dimension of the status apply on the sole basis that the status was established in the Union and are not solely applicable where it is an EU citizen that acquired this status. A TCN who acquired the same status in a Member State can equally rely on this case-law.
This does not mean that for cases similar to e.g. Coman, a couple who only would possess the nationalities from third-countries can rely on a right of residence based on a same-sex marriage concluded in a Member State, because that concerns the right attached to the EU citizenship framework. What it does mean, is that their same-sex marriage concluded in a Member State has to be recognised for the purpose of the legal framework applicable to them and that they can derive rights from this marriage within this legal framework.
Nevertheless, I would not advise to test this theory at the CJEU, by claiming the recognition of a civil status established in the Union solely on EU citizenship case-law, as the CJEU might simply consider the case inadmissible due to the fact that the applicants are not EU citizens. However, a method which would proof this theory and which the CJEU could not simply decline, is by requiring facilitated recognition of the civil status documents on the basis of Regulation 1191/2016. The sole legal basis of this Regulation is EU citizenship, however, having EU citizenship is not a condition for the facilitated recognition of the documents originating from the authorities of a Member State.
EU citizenship also fulfils a third function: to make EU law, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights, applicable to the establishment or recognition of a status, where this relates to the acquisition of the nationality of a Member State. The CJEU has ruled on multiple occasions that Member States must have due regard for Union law in cases of acquisition and loss of nationality. However, the Court never had to rule in a case that actually concerned the acquisition of a Member State’s nationality. The rules on the acquisition of nationality of a Member State equate the rules on acquisition of EU citizenship. Consequently, where a Member State refuses to grant its nationality to an individual, this refusal has to be in accordance with EU law.
It was also considered that the CJEU had to make a choice between either applying the rules on dual EU citizens to all EU citizens and thus ending the differential treatment of single EU citizens and dual EU citizen returners; or by keeping these lines of case-law separate require that dual EU citizenship should be accepted and thus that the nationality rules of the Member States may not require renouncement of the other Member State’s nationality upon naturalization or provide for automatic loss upon acquisition of another Member State’s nationality. As was explained, the Court seemed to have made a choice for the second option and thus EU citizenship governs now certain rules on dual nationality.
Another issue relates mostly to ius sanguinis acquisition of nationality. Whereas family law is mostly a competence of the Member States, it cannot be used as an argument for refusing to recognise or establish parentage and consequently the acquisition of the nationality attached to this parentage, where such a refusal violates EU law including the Charter of Fundamental Rights. As was described in Chapter 6, there are many instances where Member States refuse to recognise the parentage established, where this refusal clearly violates the principles of non-discrimination based on gender or sexual orientation. In this context it should also be reminded that the principle set forth above on human rights, that the durable use of family life requires the State to formalize this relationship by either recognising the status or by giving the possibility to formalize this relationship in a private life status. This principle is thus also enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and consequently EU law. Thus, a refusal to recognise a certain form of parentage on the sole ground that it is not provided for in national law and therefore the refusal to acquire the nationality on the basis of this parentage establishment, equals a refusal to grant EU citizenship. Such a refusal is, therefore, not only a violation of the European Convention of Human Rights, but of EU law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights which is applicable due to the direct relevance of EU citizenship.
In this context also the second function of EU citizenship described above plays a role, where a Member State would refuse acquisition of nationality due to the non-recognise of a status, like a name, established in another Member State since the person involved is not yet an EU citizen. In such cases, as it would involve the private life context of the status itself, the case-law on mutual recognition of civil status is applicable.
The linkage between nationality and parentage also serves a fourth function of EU citizenship, being an additional layer of protection for the recognition of parentage. Since Member States are under an obligation to recognise the nationality of another Member State and thus the EU citizenship of the individual, they equally have to recognise in ius sanguinis cases the parentage which was the foundation of the acquisition of that Member State’s nationality. Refusing to recognise the parentage which is the basis for acquisition of EU citizenship would equal the refusal to recognise the citizenship itself and is therefore prohibited.
ROLE OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
Private International Law has originally been considered as ‘neutral’, meaning that “independent of any legal political consideration or policy objective, the law applied to an international legal relationship is the law most closely connected to that legal relationship.” While the aim of such an objective is commendable, Private International Law cannot be neutral in the European Union when this would jeopardize the existence and legal certainty of the civil status itself. A connecting factor like nationality, has the intrinsic incompatability with the principle of non-discrimination based on nationality, and equally only functions when there is only one nationality present. As soon as there are more nationalities applicable, the system becomes prejudiced. Equally the connecting factor of habitual residence only works consistently if there is not much mobility. As soon as mobility is increased and especially stimulated, having to make new assessments as to the law applicable to civil status becomes an impediment to this mobility.
In the European Union, Private International Law is hierarchically national law, and consequently subject to both EU law and human rights law. It therefore fulfils a functional purpose to deviate from national law and give the possibility to have a different law applicable where this is so requested or desired. A certain link with the other law to the person(s) involved should exist, but there should be no balancing of with which legal system a closer connection exists, but rather a balancing which law secures more the interests of the parties.
Private International Law’s ordre public exemption should therefore also be severally limited by both EU law and human rights law. Non-existence of a certain mode of civil status establishment can never be the sole ground of refusal to recognise a status, because the status exists (or should exist), and based on human rights law the State will be forced in the short or long term to recognise it. Simple non-appliance of a status, but leaving it existent, should not be possible. If a Member State does not accept a certain status it should annul it or recognise it, there is no middle ground. Annulment means, however, a positive action by the state to interfere with the private life of the persons involved, which means that the bar in human rights law is set higher. In cases concerning parentage of EU citizens or where parentage was established in a Member State or in accordance with the law of a Member State, jurisdiction in such cases must be passed to that Member State or to all Member States of nationality and the judgment recognised, also where this would mean recognition of the status. In cases where several Member States have jurisdiction on parentage and acquisition of nationality, all these Member States have simultaneous jurisdiction and must all decide that parentage and nationality were not acquired. If only one Member State were to decide that parentage and nationality was acquired, this will be applicable to all and overrides any judgment on non-existence of parentage of another Member State. Existence of civil status overrides non-existence. In the cases of names, only absolute constitutional prohibitions can be used which are clear, precise and unconditional by the Member State of nationality in order to refuse recognition. However, where this concerns a dual national, there must be a means to proof these different names to one identity by means of a certificate of diverging names.
FUTURE SYSTEMS
As was shown above there are a multitude of different issues. Some of these can be solved by EU wide measures, but some of them cannot, except through court procedings at the ECtHR.
Some of the issues encountered for recognition is the absence of that status in the Member State of destination. As was shown in this research, in most of these cases the absence of that status itself is simply a human rights violation. This is for example the case where there is no status for same-sex couples. In some other cases where it concerns the recognition of a certain mode of parentage required for acquisition of nationality the CJEU can intervene.
In the European Union, case-law and legislation has created a ‘European status’ for civil status established in a Member State, which have to be recognised in principle throughout the Union. However, it has not created a single method to incorporate in this system civil status established in third-countries. This absence does not comply with human rights.
To solve this, I propose a system of Secondary Recognition. Such a system means that the recognition by one Member State of a civil status established in a third-country elevates it to a ‘European status’ which has to be recognised throughout the Union. The best means to do so, is the method of transcription of third-country civil status in the national register of a Member State. This requires certain small changes to existing transcription methods already used by Member States. The main change would be to extend the possibility for such transcription to all residents, and not to reserve it to nationals and refugees.
A common system of Secondary Recognition, would require though, that there are no loopholes. Consequently, automatic or much facilitated recognition possibilities in a Member State with a certain third-country should either be abolished or should be contracted by the Union. Equally a common approach of the Member States as to accessions of third-countries to the Apostille Convention would be required.
Another issue brought forward is the fact that the system we currently have is paper-based, language specific, and a very diverse range of practices as to the methods of registration. This system, or rather non-existence of a common system, is extremely inefficient. Not having a system with automatic recognition is holding the EU back to have effective measures.
I, therefore, propose a rather ambitious and long-term project which would solve many of the problems encountered and has the potential to become a main tool for the EU: the creation of a Single European Population Registry (SEPR).
The SEPR would contain the civil status of every EU resident, both EU citizen and TCN, and every non-resident EU citizen. The civil status would be registered on the basis of a European Personal Identification Number (PIN) allocated to each individual. This would unify the different registries of the Member States. A European Civil Status Office would have to be created to maintain the system and act in cases of conflicting registries. Entries in the system would be based on national law, including applicable law of other states where required, however, an automatic mutual recognition system would have to be in place. Next to this a Secondary Recognition mechanism as described above has to be provided for. It should be made clear that this system is a recognition of status system, and not a recognition of rights system. The rights attached to each status will still be based on national law. Used rights, however, will be recognised.
Therefore, upon moving to another Member State, there would be no requirement of proving the civil status since the same system applies. The SEPR could then be used to access public services. In the long run, additional types of documents could be added to the system, like academic and professional qualifications which would allow the creation of a full accredited CV and bring the registry beyond civil status.
Of course, such a registry would require many precautions concerning data protection and general security against tampering, but such protections already apply to the national systems that exist today.
The system would ensure legal certainty and nearly completely eliminate red-tape. Since it would require a full digitalization of all the registries, it would also enable other possibilities, which currently cannot be implemented on the sole ground that it requires first a common civil status register or at the very least a person-based PIN.
The digital age has come in many fields, but in the area of civil status it has made only a rather slow start. A common European approach in this is of the utmost importance, because without it, there will be more than just legal incompatibility to worry about, there can be additionally digital incompatibility.
But we cannot create a digital common system, without the legal systems to make this work. Therefore, a common system of mutual recognition of civil status should be a priority. Certain minimum standards as to capacity will have to be established, but this should not be a large issue, since they mostly are identical. The large hurdle of minimum standards on rights is not an issue since rights attached to civil status will not have to be harmonized for the system to work.
We need unity in diversity. Though we have Diversity in the establishment of civil status, we need Unity in their Recognition.
Child migration is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon spanning continents, age groups, and family patterns governed by two intersecting but not overlapping governance regimes. One of these two regimes is the migration regime, designed to uphold sovereign state borders and manage migration flows. The other is the child rights regime, a governance framework that privileges the protection of the best interests of the child. This article focuses on the mobility of adolescents, their needs, their challenges, and the implications of the complex and sometimes contradictory governance regimes impinging on these youthful migrations.
Age estimation methods using mandibular third molar (M3) root formation were tested. Diagnostic accuracy of M3 to predict age 18 was tested.
Methods were tested on a target sample of 300 dental panoramic radiographs (age 11-25). Diagnostic accuracy was assessed on separate reference data (n = 1,663, age 9-25). Root stage was the diagnostic test predicting 18 years of age.
Root stage of M3 was assessed and age estimated (n = 157) using published methods that use Demirjian or Moorrees root stages. The difference between dental and known ages was assessed. Diagnostic tests and likelihood ratios were calculated for reference data.
Mean difference (bias), standard deviation and absolute mean difference between dental age and known ages. Likelihood ratio of age 18, given M3 root stage.
Only six of 37 methods estimated age with bias not significant to zero. Mean absolute difference between dental and known age for these methods ranged from 1.45 to 1.97 years. Standard deviation of bias for all methods was around 2 years and 95% confidence interval of estimated age is ± 4 years. The best methods using Demirjian and Moorrees stages are detailed. Likelihood ratio of being at least 18 if M3 was mature was 13.61. If M3 was 'A1/2' (apex half closed) or mature, on the balance of probabilities, estimated age was at least 18.
Most methods using M3 root formation estimate age with significant bias. If M3 is mature, age 18 is more than likely attained.
To consider the evidential value of developmental age images for identifying age of majority.
The published literature on hand-wrist X-rays, MRI scans of the distal radius and orthopantomograms of the lower left third molar is considered in terms of the mean age of attainment of the adult appearance and the diagnostic test performance of the adult appearance to predict adult status, either administratively (under-17 football) or forensically.
The mean age of attainment of a mature hand-wrist X-ray is under 18 years and most individuals are mature before age 18. For the MRI wrist scan and the third molar the age of attainment is over 19 years and the adult appearance is an indicator of adulthood, while the immature appearance is uninformative about likely age. So MRI and third molars have high specificity, but low sensitivity.
Bone age assessed by hand-wrist X-ray is uninformative and should not be used. The adult appearance of MRI wrist scans and third molars provide evidence of being over-age, although there remains a small risk of minors being misclassified as adult. The immature appearance is uninformative about likely age and, overall, more than one third of assessments are wrong.
This article explores the perspectives of Afghan unaccompanied refugee minors on their own motives and aspirations and on the motives and aspirations of their family and community context at the moment they left their home country and at arrival in the host country. Interviews and questionnaires were used to measure the aspirations of 52 Afghan unaccompanied refugee minors, soon after their arrival in Belgium. Aspirations at departure and evolutions in aspirations over time were examined retrospectively. Finding security and studying particularly influenced their decision to migrate. These aspirations changed over time under the impact of a diversity of factors, such as their own experiences and the opinions of others (e.g. peers, smugglers). Since motives and aspirations might influence the migration trajectories of unaccompanied refugee minors, migration policies and practitioners should take them actively into account so as to improve support for unaccompanied refugee minors.
To increase the reliability of forensic age estimations in living adolescents and young adults where there is no legitimation for X-ray examinations, it would be desirable to establish radiation-free imaging methods. In the present study, the ossification stage of the distal femoral epiphysis was determined retrospectively in 166 male and 124 female individuals in the age group 10 to 30 years using 3.0T MRI. When evaluating the ossification stage, a combination of the classifications proposed by Schmeling et al. and by Kellinghaus et al. was used. Within the study population, stages 3b, 3c and 4 did not occur in the male sex before the 14th birthday, although the validity of the results is distinctly limited relative to stage 3b in view of the small number of cases. In females, stages 3c and 4 did not occur before the 14th birthday. Stage 4 did not occur in males before the 18th birthday. Should this result be confirmed in future studies, there would be an additional criterion providing evidence that the age of 18 years has been completed.
Despite growing numbers of unaccompanied refugee minors (UMs) in Europe, and evidence that this group is at risk of developing mental health problems, there still remain important knowledge gaps regarding the development of UMs' mental health during their trajectories in the host country and, in particular, the possible influencing role of traumatic experiences and daily stressors therein. This study therefore followed 103 UMs from the moment they arrived in Belgium until 18 months later. Traumatic experiences (SLE), mental health symptoms (HSCL-37A, RATS) and daily stressors (DSSYR) were measured at arrival in Belgium, after 6 and 18 months. UMs reported generally high scores on anxiety, depression and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Linear mixed model analysis showed no significant differences in mental health scores over time, pointing towards the possible long-term persistence of mental health problems in this population. The number of traumatic experiences and the number of daily stressors leaded to a significant higher symptom level of depression (daily stressors), anxiety and PTSD (traumatic experiences and daily stressors). European migration policies need to reduce the impact of daily stressors on UMs' mental health by ameliorating the reception and care facilities for this group. Moreover, regular mental health screenings are needed, in combination with, if needed, adapted psychosocial and therapeutic care.
The incidence of agenesis and diminution in the size of the third molar teeth in a group of 200 young American white women has been described. A critical review of the literature on the subject indicated a lack of uniformity in the collection of data.In the present investigation 9 per cent of the individuals examined had agenesis of one or more third molars. Three per cent of them, in addition to having some degree of agenesis of third molars, also showed extreme diminution in the size of some of the third molars present. The greatest tendency toward agenesis was displayed by the maxillary teeth in general and the maxillary right third molars in particular. Likewise, the maxillary third molars displayed a marked tendency to diminution in size. However, third molars which were diminished in size were noticed only in subjects who had agenesis of one or more third molars. This might suggest a causal relationship between the diminution in size and agenesis of third molars, both being influenced by the same or related factors.
The authors developed an original magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) staging system for epiphyseal fusion of growth plate maturation of the knee and evaluated its reliability and validity for age assessment of living individuals. A total of 290 MRI scans of the knee were reviewed retrospectively in patients aged from 10 to 30 years old (138 males, 152 females). Five original MRI stages were defined to assess the degree of maturation of the distal femoral and proximal tibial epiphyses. Intra-observer variability was excellent and inter-observer variability was good, demonstrating the reliability and the validity of this original MRI staging system. In both sexes, the changes of growth plates (proximal tibial or distal femoral) were associated with age (p<0.001). Our results agreed with classic data on skeletal maturation of the knee, with globally earlier maturation in females than in males, and also earlier maturation of the proximal tibial epiphysis than of the distal femoral epiphysis. MRI of the knee is an efficient non-invasive method of age assessment, without the disadvantage of X-ray exposure. Further studies with larger groups are needed to support our results.
During 2009, 15 100 unaccompanied children sought asylum in Europe. Many of them came from ‘failed states’ like Somalia and Afghanistan where official documents with exact birth dates are rarely issued. This has led to requests to health care professionals in many countries to assist migration authorities in determining whether a young asylum seeker is a child or an adult. Many different methods are currently employed in Europe for this purpose by dentists, paediatricians, radiographers and social workers, but no currently available method has been demonstrated to have the accuracy needed to be of real use in this decision. Unclear guidelines and arbitrary practices may lead to alarming shortcomings in the protection of this high-risk group of children and adolescents in Europe. Medical participation, as well as non-participation, in these dubious decisions raises a number of ethical questions.
Conclusion: To improve care for young asylum seekers with undetermined age, we suggest better legal procedures for the determination of age and a more flexible approach to chronological age.
Unaccompanied refugee children and adolescents are a vulnerable group: they live not only in a relatively difficult situation as minor refugees staying in another country, but also face other risks due to the absence of their parents, such as traumatic experiences, exploitation or abuse. The difficult living situation of these unaccompanied refugee children and adolescents might therefore threaten their emotional well-being, resulting in important emotional and behavioural problems. This 'psychological' perspective shows the necessity of a strongly elaborated reception and care system for these children and adolescents in order to meet their specific situation and needs. Nevertheless, the case study of unaccompanied refugee minors living in Belgium, as explored in this paper, shows that the legal perspective on these youths - considering them as 'refugees' and 'migrants', not as 'children' - is predominantly the starting point to build the care system on. Moreover, this legal perspective contrasts sharply with the psychological perspective, as such that these children and adolescents do not receive appropriate support and care as they need.
Bone age (BA) rating is associated with a considerable rater variability, which would be eliminated with an automated computerized method. The aim of the study was to validate the BoneXpert method, an automated determination of BA, in American children of four ethnicities.
The study is based on a publicly available database of hand x-rays of healthy children, established in a previous, National Institutes of Health-funded study. Radiographs of the left hand were recorded between 1993 and 2006 in Los Angeles, including 1100 images with two independent manual BA ratings and 280 additional images for which the manual ratings were not used. Images were evenly split between Caucasian, African American, Hispanic, and Asian children, and the age range was 0-18.99 years.
The automated method analyzed all images with BA >2.5 years for boys and >2 years for girls. The root-mean-square (RMS) error between the two manual ratings was 0.63 years, whereas the RMS deviation between the automated BA and the average of the two manual ratings was 0.61 years. The mean BA minus age was computed versus age for each sex and ethnicity. The largest deviation from zero was seen for Hispanic and Asian children older than 12 years, who were about 1 year advanced relative to the Greulich and Pyle standard.
The automated method can analyze images of all ethnicities within a BA range of 2.5-17 years for boys and 2-15 years for girls, and can therefore eliminate the problem with rater variability in BA rating.
The development of the medial clavicular epiphysis and its fusion with the clavicular shaft have been a subject of medical research since the second decade of this century. Computed tomography provides the imaging modality of choice in analyzing the maturation process of the sternal end of the clavicle. In a retrospective study, we analyzed normal development in 380 individuals under the age of 30 years. The appearance of an epiphyseal ossification center occurred between ages 11 and 22 years. Partial union was found from age 16 until age 26 years. Complete union was first noted at age 22 years and in 100 % of the sample at age 27 years. Based on these data, age-related standardized age distributions and 95 % reference intervals were calculated. Compared to the experience recorded in the relevant literature, there are several landmarks that show no significant change between different ethnic groups and different periods of publication; these are the onset of ossification, the time span of partial union, and the appearance of complete union. Despite the relatively long time spans of the maturation stages, bone age estimation based on the study of the development of the medial clavicular epiphysis may be a useful tool in forensic age identification in living individuals, especially if the age of the subject is about the end of the second or the beginning of the third decade of life (e. g. in determining the applicability of adult or juvenile penal systems). Another possible use is in identifying human remains whose age is estimated at under 30 years.
Radiological assessment of the mineralization stage of third molars is a major criterion for age estimation of living people involved in criminal proceedings. To date insufficient knowledge has been obtained about how the ethnic origin can influence tooth mineralization. A comparative study of wisdom tooth mineralization was carried out on three population samples: one German, one Japanese and one South African. To this end, 3,652 conventional orthopantomograms were evaluated on the basis of Demirjian's stages. The Japanese subjects were on average 1-2 years older than their German counterparts upon reaching stages D-F, whereas the South African subjects were on average 1-2 years younger than the Germans when displaying stages D-G. To enhance the accuracy of forensic age estimates based on wisdom tooth mineralization we recommend the use of population-specific standards.
In recent years many countries have experienced a sharp increase in the demand for forensic age estimates of unaccompanied minors. In many countries the age thresholds of relevance to criminal prosecution lie between 16 and 22 years. In line with recommendations issued by the Study Group on Forensic Age Diagnostics, for determining the age of live subjects a forensic age estimate should combine the results of a physical examination, an X-ray of the hand and a dental examination which records dentition status and evaluates an orthopantomogram. To assess the age of persons who are assumed to be at least 18 years old, an additional radiographic or CT examination of the collar bones is recommended. Forensic age estimates should take account of the ethnic origin and socio-economic status of the person under examination.
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