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Russia’s Annexation of Crimea and the Passage of Ships Through Kerch Strait: A Law of the Sea Perspective
Abstract
This article discusses potential Ukrainian rights of passage through Kerch Strait against the background of restrictions on passage imposed by Russia since the annexation of Crimea, taking into account the ongoing arbitral proceedings under Annex VII of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The article addresses first the question of the status of Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov under the international law of the sea. In a second step, the article deals with the issue of potential Ukrainian passage rights through Kerch Strait based on the legal status discussed in the first section as well as relevant bilateral treaties between Ukraine and Russia.
Supplementary resources (2)
... Amidst the strained relations between Ukraine and Russia, the escalating maritime boundary disputes necessitate innovative approaches for resolution [14]. Considering the current dynamics, exploring novel methodologies becomes imperative [15]. Reassessing existing agreements and potentially aligning with the Vienna Convention on Treaty Law emerges as a plausible option for Ukraine. ...
... Reassessing existing agreements and potentially aligning with the Vienna Convention on Treaty Law emerges as a plausible option for Ukraine. However, a comprehensive analysis of the associated advantages and implications is fundamental before any decisive actions [15]. Additionally, establishing a temporary median line within the Sea of Azov presents itself as a viable interim solution to safeguard Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity while awaiting a mutually agreed-upon delineation of boundaries. ...
... Situated amidst the Crimean Peninsula, Ukraine, and Russia, the Sea of Azov is a region characterized by distinct geographical features [11]. Landforms such as spits play a pivotal role in delineating boundaries; for instance, the expansive Arabat Spit, spanning 113 km, serves as a natural divider between the Sea of Azov and Lake Syvash, creating a demarcation line between the Crimean Peninsula and mainland Ukraine [15]. Notable spits like Fedotova, Obytochna, Berdiansk, Bilosarai, Kryva, Yeiska, and Dovha further define the coastal terrain. ...
Since the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, Russia and Ukraine, newly independent, face complexities concerning the legal status and demarcation of the Sea of Azov. Spanning approximately 37,600 km2 with a maximum depth of 14 meters, this sea holds pivotal resources such as fish, gas, and oil, serving as a significant dividing point between these nations. Maritime boundary delineation, often set at 12 nautical miles from the baseline, is complex due to the sea's intricate coastline and small islands. Some coastal areas have distances less than 24 nautical miles, causing boundary overlaps. Russia and Ukraine have cited UNCLOS Article 298, exempting UNCLOS dispute resolution for the Sea of Azov's demarcation. This study aims to assess the AWEI and Otsu thresholding algorithms' efficacy in defining the maritime boundary between Russia and Ukraine in the Sea of Azov, utilizing 'LANDSAT/LC08/C02/T1_L2' data. It also aims to comprehend the geopolitical and conflict resolution implications of delineating maritime boundaries aligned with UNCLOS 1982 for both countries and wider regions. The AWEI algorithm consistently maps coastlines, while Otsu thresholding facilitates automated image segmentation, yielding 117 base points covering 13,331 km² (Russia) and 21,749 km² (Ukraine) within the EEZ, based on equidistant and median base point analysis.
... Until 2014, more than 8000 Russian and Ukrainian flagged ships have passed through the Kerch Strait annually. (Schatz & Koval, 2019) It is stated that in Kerch Port, an annual income of 80.000 USD is obtained from the piloting service in the strait. (Schatz & Koval, 2018) ...
... In this respect, the USSR announced in 1985 that the Sea of Azov was its inland waters by drawing a line between Cape Kyz-Aul and Cape Zhelezny-Rog at both ends of Kerch Strait. (Schatz & Koval, 2019) Russia states that the inland waters regime has become an obligation of the agreement for other states. (PCA Verdict, 2020, para. ...
The Black Sea has been the scene of conflict between coastal states throughout history. Recently, emerging Russia-Ukraine tension continues. The Russian Federal Security Service ("FSB") destroyed and captured three Ukrainian Military Ships and detained 24 of its personnel on November 23, 2018. As the dispute continued, Ukraine finally raised the matter to the International Tribunals on Law of The Sea ("ITLOS"). This tension, which reaches a hot conflict point from time to time, causes legal changes in the Black Sea eventually. This article discusses the current legal status of Crimea, the Sea of Azov, and the Kerch Strait and aims to explain from the perspective of Russia, Ukraine, and Turkey. The study shows how the conflict environment in the region has a changing effect on the existing maritime borders and whether Russia’s act is a part of violation of the UNCLOS and International Law.
... Notes 1. Among the notable exceptions are Schatz and Koval (2019) and Klymenko (2019), which discuss, respectively, the situation in the Kerch Strait/Sea of Azov and the Black Sea. 2. In Russian military terminology (see, for instance, RIA Novosti 2016), the "Southwest Strategic Direction" refers to the Black Sea region and adjacent land and maritime areas, such as the North Caucasus and the Eastern Mediterranean. The other "strategic directions" are the Western, the Northern, the (Far) Eastern and the Southern. ...
... 6. For a detailed discussion, see Skaridov (2014) and Schatz and Koval (2019). ...
Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014, severe limitations have been placed on Ukraine’s coastal state rights and navigational freedoms in the Black and Azov Seas and the Kerch Strait. The “Kerch Strait clash” in November 2018, which resulted in the Russian capture of three Ukrainian naval vessels in international waters south of the strait, can be seen as the temporary culmination of tensions that have been building up over a longer period. In violation of international law and bilateral agreements, Russia has in recent years pursued an increasingly assertive and revisionist policy in the region and sought to turn the maritime spaces on the country’s southwestern flank into a “Russian lake”. This policy is affecting not only the security and economy of neighbouring states such as Ukraine and Georgia, but also the strategic balance in the southeastern corner of Europe. Drawing on empirical evidence derived from Russian, Ukrainian and Western sources, as well as insights from neoclassical realist theory, this article discusses legal, economic and security aspects of Russia’s ongoing quest for a dominant position in the Black Sea region.
... This law was described by the foreign ministry of Russia as an attempt to "forcefully establish a mono-ethnic language regime in a multinational state" (RFE/RL, 2017). Tensions started be worse from the year 2018 when Ukraine arrested the Crimearegistered, Russian Flagged fishing vessel Nord in the Sea of Azov labelling the crew as having entered the territory that is provisionally occupied (Schatz, et al., 2019) and since then, the Nord Captain Gorbenko has been in detention for 5 years . ...
The roles of borders in transnational trade could not be overemphasized. One of the challenges to effective international transactions
is border crime. Boarder crimes such as smuggling of contrabands, rice,
arms and ammunitions, illegal migration and illicit drugs. These activities
fuel insecurity like armed-robbery, terrorism, kidnapping, murder, suicide,
unemployment and reduced national production. And subsequently,
results in loss of lives, properties and national pride. On the basis of this,
the paper assesses trans-border crime control and regional trade as
strategies to boost national security in Nigeria. The study adopts a
qualitative research method which obtained data from secondary sources.
The secondary sources include the content analysis of edited books, peer
reviewed journals and online resources. It anchors on structuralfunctionalist theory by Talcott Parsons and routine activity theory by
Marcus Felson. The findings revealed that crimes such as smuggling of
illicit drugs, selected items, illegal migration across borders inhibit
economic growth which culminated into national security. The paper
122 African Migration:
Recent Trends, Key Influences, and Implications
recommends enhanced electronic security at borders, committed to
implementations of regional trade agreements and prosecution of the
suspects. This study will be useful to individuals, policy-holders,
governments at various levels, regional organizations and nongovernmental organisations and researchers in the field of Social Sciences.
... The illegal occupation and the attempted annexation by the Russian Federation (hereinafter -RF) of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and city of Sevastopol (hereinafter -the Crimea) in 2014 started the Russian-Ukrainian ongoing conflict, which become a key factor for further development of the BS&SA ecosystems. The case relates to Russia's occupation of Crimea in 2014, fundamentally disrupted the maritime order in the BS&SA (Schatz & Koval, 2019). ...
On the 24th of February 2022, Vladimir Putin addressed the Russian Federation in a televised speech announcing a 'special military operation' against Ukraine. Putin castigated the West as an 'Empire of Lies' and drew upon Russian history and cultural heritage to justify his invasion of Eastern Ukraine. This article investigates how cultural memory has been manipulated in the war in Ukraine, and in the previously occupied Crimea. We argue that cultural heritage, memory, and museum collections have been removed and/or repurposed to legitimise the current invasion by linking it to a grand narrative of Russian power and the recovery of ancestral lands. We present case studies from the annexation of Crimea (2014), the war in Ukraine (2022-), and make a brief comparison with the armed conflict in Syria (2011-2022).
Монографія присвячена подіям в медійній сфері півострова, які відбувалися після окупації Російською Федерацією Автономної Республіки Крим та м. Севастополь, а саме з початку захоплення 20 лютого 2014 року до повномасштабного вторгнення РФ в Україну 24 лютого 2022 р.
В монографії розкрито поняття «кримська інформаційно-медійна парадигма», яке представлено як філософська конструкція та система цінностей, на основі яких формується загальний підхід у побудові інформаційної політики та реінтеграції тимчасово окупованого Криму в український інформаційний простір.
Описана примусова трансформація медійного ландшафту Криму та нові явища, які виникли у регіоні внаслідок окупації: порушення прав, тиск та репресії стосовно українських журналістів, громадянська журналістика, примусова міграція журналістської спільноти, ненасильницький спротив окупації та його відображення в інформаційній сфері. Розглядаються інформаційні та ідеологічні наслідки окупації півострова та пропонуються форми та методи зміцнення інфор- маційного зв’язку з тимчасово окупованим півостровом.
The monograph "Crimean Information and Media Paradigm in the Context of the Peninsula's Occupation (February 2014 - February 2022). Transformation of the Media Sphere and Information Policy of Ukraine" is dedicated to the events in the media sphere of the peninsula that took place after the annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol by the Russian Federation, specifically from the beginning of the seizure on February 20, 2014, to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia on February 24, 2022. The monograph reveals the concept of the "Crimean information and media paradigm," which is presented as a philosophical construct and a system of values that form the general approach to building information policy and reintegration of temporarily occupied Crimea into the Ukrainian information space. It describes the forced transformation of the media landscape in Crimea and new phenomena that emerged in the region as a result of the occupation, such as human rights violations, pressure and repression against Ukrainian journalists, citizen journalism, forced migration of the journalistic community, nonviolent resistance to the occupation and its reflection in the information sphere. The information and ideological consequences of the peninsula's annexation are examined, and forms and methods of strengthening information communication with the temporarily occupied peninsula are proposed.
Rusya Federasyonu ve Ukrayna arasında Kerç Boğazı’ndan gemilerin geçişinin ve Azak Denizi’nin hukuki statüsünün düzenlediği 2003 tarihli Azak Denizi ve Kerç Boğazı’nın Kullanımına İlişkin İşbirliği Antlaşması mevcuttur. Ukrayna’ya ait Kırım’ın Rusya Federasyonu tarafından ilhak edilmesinin ardından 2018 yılında Kerç Boğazı’ndan geçişe ilişkin Rusya ve Ukrayna arasında bir olay meydana gelmiştir. Söz konusu olayda Rusya Federasyonu Kırım’ı çevreleyen deniz alanının Rusya’nın karasularını oluşturduğunu, 2003 tarihli İşbirliği Antlaşması’nı tek taraflı olarak uygulamaması ve Ukrayna’ya ait savaş gemilerine el koyması uyuşmazlık konularını oluşturmaktadır. Bu çalışmada belirtilen ihlaller, Rusya Federasyonu ve Ukrayna arasındaki uyuşmazlığın barış döneminde gerçekleştiği kabulü bağlamında incelenmiştir. Kerç Boğazı krizi deniz hukuku kapsamında değerlendirilmiştir. Deniz hukukuna ilişkin hukuk kurallarının uygulanması gerektiği ve bu kapsamda Rusya’nın Ukrayna’ya ait savaş gemilerinin yargı bağışıklığına sahip olduğuna ve Rusya’nın eylemlerinin deniz hukukuna ilişkin kuralları ihlal ettiği belirtilmektedir.
Has Russia turned from “Paul to Saul” with regards to international humanitarian law (IHL)? This book aims to answer this question by contrasting the past and the present. Firstly, it offers a comprehensive account of the remarkable Russian contributions to IHL since 1850. Secondly, it analyses Russia’s current approach to IHL, drawing on a wide range of legislation, case law, diplomatic records, and military practice. Finally, the author contrasts the past and the present – not without embedding his findings in the changed context of our time. The book is aimed at international law experts as well as people interested in legal history. Its author is an IHL researcher and practitioner with extensive experience in the post-soviet world.
Where the rights of foreign investors are harmed in disputed maritime areas, the question arises whether these investors can invoke international investment agreements (IIAs) to seek redress. IIAs cover both bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and multilateral investment agreements (MIAs). BITs can be described as ‘reciprocal legal agreement[s] concluded between two sovereign States for the promotion and protection of investments by investors of the one State (“home State”) in the territory of the other State (“host State”)’. Reciprocal rules and protections of investments may also increasingly be found in multilateral agreements, which can be seen – at least from this perspective – as MIAs. IIAs are the primary instruments for the protection of foreign investments in international investment law. Typical provisions contained in IIAs include definitions of the notions of investment and investor, substantive protections of foreign investors (eg, concerning expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security), and dispute settlement clauses (usually providing for both investor-state and state-to-state arbitration).
But do they apply to investments in disputed maritime areas? And if this is the case, can an arbitral tribunal established under an IIA’s dispute settlement clause make all findings of fact and law required to apply the IIA without exceeding the scope of its jurisdictional mandate?
This chapter seeks to answer these questions. In so doing, it will define the concept of ‘disputed maritime areas’ for present purposes (section 2). Next, it will address the spatial scope of IIAs as a matter of substantive law in relation to maritime areas generally and disputed maritime areas specifically (section 3). Thereafter, this chapter will turn to specific challenges of procedural law raised by investor-state dispute settlement in relation to investments in disputed maritime areas (section 4). An ensuing section will assess the different approaches investment tribunals could follow in dealing with the aforementioned challenges (section 5), followed by concluding remarks (section 6).
En el contexto del “Asunto relativo a la inmovilización de tres buques de guerra ucranianos (Ucrania c. Federación de Rusia), Medidas Provisionales”, este trabajo analiza las medidas provisionales, en su condición de procedimiento incidental, y, en particular, los principales caminos que debe transitar el Tribunal Internacional de Derecho del Mar (TIDM) en el marco del párrafo 5 del artículo 290 de la Convención. Se trata, en concreto, de examinar las declaraciones estatales formuladas a la luz del artículo 287 de la Convención; la competencia prima facie del Tribunal arbitral previsto en el Anexo VII de la Convención, incluidos sus entresijos como, por ejemplo, la posición de Ucrania y de la Federación de Rusia con respecto a la Convención y a otras normas jurídicas presuntamente aplicables al caso; las condiciones legales que subyacen a la prescripción de las medidas provisionales; y finalmente, el cumplimiento de tales medidas.
This article seeks to analyze the asymmetric manipulation and exploitation of legal domains to achieve political objectives. A multidisciplinary analysis is offered to explore the perversion of the law to shape legitimacy, contain adversaries, justify violations, escape obligations, and ultimately to advantageously revise the international and domestic rule of law. Colloquially known as lawfare, this article offers a discourse analysis of the term and asserts that a more doctrinally appropriate phrase exists to describe this phenomenon; Malign Legal Operations (MALOPs). Furthermore, this article asserts that MALOPs are the root of contemporary hybrid warfare and that all other hybrid means are secondary. In particular, the Russian Federation’s behavior towards Ukraine in the Black Sea region is used as a case study to determine the extent of these MALOPs and to explore what measures can be taken to defend the rule of law.
The primary example offered is Russia’s November 25th, 2018 attack on three Ukrainian Naval vessels in the Kerch Strait and its capture of 24 sailors. Supplementary examples include the annexation of Crimea, manipulations of the Montreux Convention, and Russia’s overall aggression towards Ukraine.
Nach übereinstimmenden Medienberichten kam es am Sonntag im Schwarzen Meer zu einem gewaltsamen Zusammenstoß zwischen der russischen und der ukrainischen Marine. Die russische Küstenwache verweigerte drei ukrainischen Kriegsschiffen zunächst die Durchfahrt durch die Straße von Kertsch, der einzigen Verbindung des Asowschen Meeres mit dem Schwarzen Meer. Die Straße von Kertsch liegt zwischen der von Russland annektierten Halbinsel Krim im Westen und der russischen Halbinsel Taman im Osten. Russland und die Ukraine sind die einzigen Küstenstaaten des Asowschen Meeres. Nach ukrainischen Angaben, die mittlerweile von Russland bestätigt wurden, wurden die ukrainischen Schiffe beschossen und hierbei mehrere ihrer Matrosen verletzt. Russland nahm die Schiffe daraufhin in Gewahrsam und verbrachte sie in den Hafen von Kertsch auf der Krim. Die genauen Umstände des Vorfalls sind noch unklar und die Angaben der Ukraine und Russlands widersprechen sich teilweise. Die Ukraine fordert seitdem die Freigabe ihrer Schiffe samt Besatzung und hat gestern-vorerst für 30 Tage-das Kriegsrecht verhängt.
On 16 September 2016, Ukraine instituted arbitral proceedings against Russia under Part XV and Annex VII of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in the Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait (Ukraine v. the Russian Federation). The case relates to Russia’s occupation of Crimea in 2014, which fundamentally disrupted the maritime order in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. While the exact content of Ukraine’s claims is not publicly known, it is understood (see statements here, here, here, here and here) that they include Russia’s ongoing construction of a bridge across Kerch Strait and restrictions on passage of Ukrainian vessels through Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov (third States’ vessels are also affected, but would not be part of the Ukrainian claim). Kerch Strait Bridge is intended to create a land connection between Crimea and Krasnodar region which, in light of Ukraine’s blockade of Crimea, is crucial for supplies from Russia.
In three consecutive posts, we will map some legal issues that the arbitral tribunal might face in the context of Ukrainian rights of passage and Russia’s challenge of the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction – if these issues indeed form part of Ukraine’s application. Our first post provides some context and addresses the question of the legal status of Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov. Our second post deals with the issue of potential Ukrainian passage rights, most of which depend on the legal status discussed in the first post. In our third and final post, we examine the impact of these substantive findings on the question of the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione materiae over Ukraine’s corresponding claims.
In February and March 2014, Ukraine was literally overrun by a chain of events that eventually led to Crimea’s incorporation into Russian territory. Crimean and Russian authorities jointly used the internal conflict in Ukraine to deprive the Ukrainian government of its control over Crimea, to hold a so-called referendum, and to declare Crimea’s independence. On the day after independence was declared, Russia formally recognized Crimea as an independent state, [1] and the Crimean parliament requested Russia to admit Crimea to the Russian Federation. [2] Soon after that, the accession treaty was signed, and, within a few more days, all Russian constitutional requirements for Crimea’s accession to the Russian Federation were fulfilled. [3]All parties to the conflict refer to international law to justify their positions. The Crimean authorities and Russia claim that Russia had a legal basis for intervening and that Crimea had the right to secede from Ukraine. Most states, however, reject these claims. Thus, three questions are presented: Was Crimea’s secession lawful under international law? To what extent has Russia violated international law? And what is Crimea’s status? This article addresses these questions. Part 1 briefly describes the relevant circumstances and events leading to Crimea’s secession. Part 2 reviews the legal obligations between Ukraine and Russia concerning territorial integrity and the prohibition against the use and threat of force. Parts 3 and 4 discuss the legality of Russia’s intervention in Crimea and the legality of Crimea’s secession from Ukraine, respectively. Part 5 concludes this article by answering the questions it raises.
[1] See “Executive Order on Recognizing Republic of Crimea,” President’s web-site, March 17, 2014, accessed June 1, 2016, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20596.
[2] Luke Harding and Shaun Walker, “Crimea Applies to be Part of Russian Federation After Vote to Leave Ukraine,” The Guardian, March 17, 2014, accessed June 1, 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/17/ukraine-crimea-russia-referendum-complain-result.
[3] See in regard to the Russian constitutional process Otto Luchterhandt, who argues that during that process Russian constitutional law was violated (Otto Luchterhandt, “Annexion der Krim – Putin verstößt gegen russische Verfassung,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, April 18, 2014).
Historic titles and historic rights have been a complicated issue in the law of the sea both conceptually and practically. The South China Sea Arbitration between the Philippines and China raised important issues regarding the contemporary relevance and validity of historic claims, and the relationship between the Law of the Sea Convention and historic rights. This articles examines historic rights and historic titles in the law of the sea in the light of the South China Sea Arbitration and evaluates the contribution of the Tribunal's Awards to the clarification of these concepts.
Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait, supra note 2, Rules of Procedure
Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait,
supra note 2, Rules of Procedure, 18 May 2017, Article 27(2). See also Procedural Order
No. 2 Regarding Confidentiality, 18 January 2018.
Ukraine v. the Russian Federation), supra note 2, Procedural Order No. 3 Regarding Bifurcation of Proceedings
Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait
(Ukraine v. the Russian Federation), supra note 2, Procedural Order No. 3 Regarding
Bifurcation of Proceedings, 20 August 2018. See discussion by Valentin J. Schatz and
Dmytro Koval, "Insights from the Bifurcation Order in the Ukraine vs. Russia Arbitration
under Annex VII of UNCLOS," EJIL: Talk! (2018), www.ejiltalk.org/insights-from-thebifurcation-order-in-the-ukraine-vs-russia-arbitration-under-annex-vii-of-unclos.
For scholarly discussion, see Thomas D. Grant, Aggression against Ukraine: Territory, Responsibility, and International Law
- Un General Assembly
UN General Assembly, A/RES/68/262, 27 March 2014, www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.
asp?symbol¼A/RES/68/262, para. 5. For scholarly discussion, see Thomas D. Grant,
Aggression against Ukraine: Territory, Responsibility, and International Law (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2015);
Russia's Annexation of Crimea: The Mills of International Law Grind Slowly but They Do Grind
- Michael Bothe
Michael
Bothe, "The Current Status of Crimea: Russian Territory, Occupied Territory or What,"
Military Law and the Law of War Review 53 (2014): 99-116, 100-103; and Robin Geiß,
"Russia's Annexation of Crimea: The Mills of International Law Grind Slowly but They Do
Grind," International Law Studies 91 (2015): 425-449, 447-449.
Friedliche Nutzung, Seekriegs-und Neutralit€ atsrecht, Friedenssicherung
- James Kraska
On the relationship between the law of naval warfare and the international law of the sea,
see Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, "Friedliche Nutzung, Seekriegs-und Neutralit€ atsrecht,
Friedenssicherung," in Wofgang Graf Vitzthum, ed., Handbuch des Seerechts (Munich:
C.H. Beck, 2006), 491-625, 571-572, and James Kraska, "Military Operations," in Donald
Rothwell, Alex Oude Elferink, Karen Scott, and Tim Stephens, eds., The Oxford Handbook
of the Law of the Sea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 866-888, 875-877.
The Kerch Strait Incident: Law of the Sea or Law of Naval Warfare?
- James Kraska
James Kraska, "The Kerch Strait Incident: Law of the Sea or Law of Naval Warfare?,"
EJIL:Talk!
(2018),
www.ejiltalk.org/the-kerch-strait-incident-law-of-the-sea-or-law-ofnaval-warfare.
Taganrog Commercial Seaport
- Taganrog City
Taganrog City, "Taganrog Commercial Seaport," www.taganrogcity.com/seaport.html.
Russia has imposed pilotage requirements"; however, a regime of pilotage has been in place before Russia's annexation of Crimea. Their legality under UNCLOS, supra note 1, Article 21
- Skaridov
Skaridov, supra note 11, 233. For details on the compulsory pilotage scheme in Kerch
Strait, see also navitrans.net/kerchstrait. Kraska, supra note 10, claims that "Russia has
imposed pilotage requirements"; however, a regime of pilotage has been in place before
Russia's annexation of Crimea. Their legality under UNCLOS, supra note 1, Article 21,
which would not be applicable under the first scenario explored in the following, is not
discussed further in this article.
Decree on the Closure of Ports
- Ministry Of Infrastructure Of Ukraine
Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine, "Decree on the Closure of Ports," 16 June 2014,
zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/z0690-14 (in Ukrainian).
The Effectiveness of the International Maritime Sanctions Against Russia Over the Occupation of Crimea
- Andriy Klymenko
Andriy Klymenko, "The Effectiveness of the International Maritime Sanctions Against
Russia Over the Occupation of Crimea," 7 October 2016, www.mfaua.org/en/projects/
the-effectiveness-of-the-international-maritime-sanctions-against-russia-over-the-occupationof-crimea.
The EU Non-recognition Policy for Crimea and Sevastopol: Fact Sheet
European External Action Service, 12 December 2017, "The EU Non-recognition Policy for
Crimea and Sevastopol: Fact Sheet," eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/
37464/eu-non-recognition-policy-crimea-and-sevastopol-fact-sheet_en.
The Situation in Crimea is Bad: What has been Lost for the Years of Sanctions? The Worst is Still Ahead
- Politeka
Politeka, "The Situation in Crimea is Bad: What has been Lost for the Years of Sanctions?
The Worst is Still Ahead," 18 June 2018, politeka.net/ua/news/economics/669521-dela-vseploshe-chto-krym-poterjal-za-gody-sankcij-hudshee-eshhe-vperedi (in Ukrainian).
Ukraine Confiscated a Foreign Ship for Entering the Crimea
- Ua Wire
UA Wire, "Ukraine Confiscated a Foreign Ship for Entering the Crimea," 17 March 2017,
www.uawire.org/news/ukraine-has-confiscated-a-foreign-ship-entering-the-crimea;
Vessel, Confiscated for Visiting Crimean Port, Will Be Handed Over to the Navy by the Prosecutor's Office
- Radio Svoboda
Radio
Svoboda, "Vessel, Confiscated for Visiting Crimean Port, Will Be Handed Over to the
Navy by the Prosecutor's Office," 24 February 2018, www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news/
29060261.html (in Ukrainian).
See also Ferdinand De Cussy, Phases et Causes C el ebres du Droit Maritime des Nations
- C Philip
- Jessup
Philip C. Jessup, The Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction (New York:
Jennings, 1927), 383. See also Ferdinand De Cussy, Phases et Causes C el ebres du Droit
Maritime des Nations, vol. 3 (Brockhaus, Leipzig, 1856), 97-98.
La Mer Territoriale et la Zone Contigue (Vaduz: Topos, 1934), 663; Skaridov, supra note 11
- Gilbert Gidel
Gilbert Gidel, Le Droit international Public de la Mer, vol. 3, La Mer Territoriale et la Zone
Contigue (Vaduz: Topos, 1934), 663; Skaridov, supra note 11, 221.
Judicial R egime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays
- U N Secretariat
UN Secretariat, "Judicial R egime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays," Document
A/CN.4/143, (1962) Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 23.
Historic Waters in the Law of the Sea: A Modern Re-Appraisal (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), 299. See also Gidel, supra note 23
- Clive Symmons
Clive Symmons, Historic Waters in the Law of the Sea: A Modern Re-Appraisal (Leiden:
Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), 299. See also Gidel, supra note 23, 663.
For an in-depth discussion, see Symmons
- R R Churchill
- V Lowe
R. R. Churchill and V. Lowe, Law of the Sea, 3rd
ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 43-45. For an in-depth discussion,
see Symmons, supra note 28.
Vidomosti Verkhovnoyi Rady, 1991, #38, p. 502, static.rada.gov.ua/site/postanova_eng/ Rres_Declaration_Independence_rev12.htm. See also Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States
- Verkhovna Rada Of Ukraine
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, "Resolution on Declaration of Independence of Ukraine,"
Vidomosti Verkhovnoyi Rady, 1991, #38, p. 502, static.rada.gov.ua/site/postanova_eng/
Rres_Declaration_Independence_rev12.htm. See also Agreement Establishing the
Commonwealth of Independent States, concluded on 8 December 1991, entered into
force on 12 December 1991, at www.cvce.eu/en/obj/agreement_establishing_the_
commonwealth_of_independent_states_minsk_8_december_1991-en-d1eb7a8c-4868-4da6-9098-3175c172b9bc.html (in Russian).
On Internal Waters, the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of Ukraine
- Draft Law Of Ukraine
Draft Law of Ukraine "On Internal Waters, the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
of Ukraine," Verhovna Rada, 30 December 2002, https://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/
webproc4_2?id¼&pf3516¼2605&skl¼5 (in Ukrainian).
Azov Sea, Kerch Strait: Evolution of Their Purported Legal Status (Part Four)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, supra note 61. For a critical analysis
of this statement, see Vladimir Socor, "Azov Sea, Kerch Strait: Evolution of Their
Purported Legal Status (Part Four)," Eurasia Daily Monitor (2018), https://jamestown.org/
program/azov-sea-kerch-strait-evolution-of-their-purported-legal-status-part-four.
For a discussion of the different approaches to the delimitation of the Sea of Azov, see ibid
- Ibid
Ibid. For a discussion of the different approaches to the delimitation of the Sea of Azov,
see ibid., 223 ff.
On the Denunciation of the Treaty between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Use of the Azov Sea and the Kerch Strait
- Draft Law
Draft Law "On the Denunciation of the Treaty between Ukraine and the Russian Federation
on Cooperation in the Use of the Azov Sea and the Kerch Strait," Verhovna Rada, 16 July
2015, w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511 ¼ 56077 (in Ukrainian).
Babin Calls for an Immediate Denunciation of the Treaty on Cooperation in the Use of the Azov Sea and the Kerch Strait
- Vitali Tysiachny
- Z N Ua
Vitali Tysiachny, ""Attack" of Russia in the Sea of Azov: A Victorious Decision for
Ukraine is Found," 30 August 2018, www.obozrevatel.com/ukr/politics/rozirvannyadogovoru-z-rf-po-azovskomu-mori-zyavilosya-peremozhnij-rishennya-dlya-ukraini.htm,
and ZN.UA, "Babin Calls for an Immediate Denunciation of the Treaty on Cooperation
in the Use of the Azov Sea and the Kerch Strait," 10 June 2018, https://dt.ua/UKRAINE/
babin-zaklikaye-do-negaynoyi-denonsaciyi-dogovoru-pro-spivrobitnictvo-u-vikoristanniazovskogo-morya-i-kerchenskoyi-protoki-280178_.html.
The Agreement on the Joint Azov Sea was Signed under Pressure
- Bohdan Petryshyn
Bohdan Petryshyn, "The Agreement on the Joint Azov Sea was Signed under Pressure," 9
September 2018, rubryka.com/2018/09/09/dogovir-pro-spilne-azovske-more-pidpysuvavsyapid-tyskom-mzs.
Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening), Merits, [1992] I.C
- Land
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening),
Merits, [1992] I.C.J. Reports, para. 404.
Mozambique and Tanzania
- K L J Aggrey
- Mlimuka
Agreement between Tanzania and Mozambique regarding the Tanzania/Mozambique
Boundary, 28 December 1988, available on the DOALOS website, supra note 27. See
Aggrey K. L. J. Mlimuka, "Mozambique and Tanzania" International Journal of Marine
and Coastal Law 9 (1994): 399.
In this case, it does not seem that there are any of the parameters required for the proclamation of historic waters, therefore, such a declaration, subjecting the passage of foreign military vessels to the consent of the coastal States
- Kraska But See
But see Kraska, supra note 10, who asserts, without evidence, that "while the two states
claimed the area as historic internal waters, their assertion of sovereignty over the strait
has not been accepted by other states." See also Ana G. L opez Mart ın, International
Straits: Concept, Classification and Rules of Passage (Springer, Berlin Heidelberg, 2010), 71:
"In this case, it does not seem that there are any of the parameters required for the
proclamation of historic waters, therefore, such a declaration, subjecting the passage of
foreign military vessels to the consent of the coastal States, is a clear infringement of the
right of passage in transit which should be in force in the Kerch Strait[.]"
See also Kraska, supra note 10
- Skaridov
Skaridov, supra note 11, 234-235. See also Kraska, supra note 10.
Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute Case, supra note 65, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Oda, paras. 24-26, and Tanaka, supra note 29
- Land
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute Case, supra note 65, Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Oda, paras. 24-26, and Tanaka, supra note 29, 61.
But see Grbec, supra note 39
- Jia
Jia, "Article 35," in Proelss, supra note 26, 277, para. 3.
73. But see Grbec, supra note 39, 150-151.
Ukraine Imposes Economic Blockade on a Blacked-out Crimea
"Ukraine Imposes Economic Blockade on a Blacked-out Crimea," Financial Times, 23
November 2015, www.ft.com/content/d5487eaa-9203-11e5-bd82-c1fb87bef7af.
Kyiv Protests against Russia's Ban on Navigation through Kerch Strait over Bridge Construction
- Kyiv Post
Kyiv Post, "Kyiv Protests against Russia's Ban on Navigation through Kerch Strait over
Bridge Construction," 11 August 2017, www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/kyiv-protestsrussias-ban-navigation-kerch-strait-bridge-construction.html.
Maritime Safety Committee of the International Maritime Organization Invited Member States and Interested Parties to Notify to the Organization of any Threats to the Security and Safety of Navigation in the North-Eastern Part of the Black Sea
- Evropeiska Pravda
Evropeiska Pravda, "Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs: It Seems Like Ukraine Is a Card
Played by the EU," 10 January 2017, www.eurointegration.com.ua/interview/2017/01/10/
7059882/ (in Ukrainian). See also Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, "Maritime Safety
Committee of the International Maritime Organization Invited Member States and
Interested Parties to Notify to the Organization of any Threats to the Security and Safety of
Navigation in the North-Eastern Part of the Black Sea," 28 November 2016, goo.gl/UiQAY9.
The Kerch Strait Bridge: A New Threat to Regional Stability
- Ihor Kabanenko
Ihor Kabanenko, "The Kerch Strait Bridge: A New Threat to Regional Stability," 6 September
2017, jamestown.org/program/the-kerch-strait-bridge-a-new-threat-to-regional-stability.
Will Kerch Bridge limit navigation on the Azov Sea?
- Dw
- Com
DW.COM, "Will Kerch Bridge limit navigation on the Azov Sea?," 30 June 2017,
goo.gl/u4kCC9.
81. Ibid.
Putin Opens 12-Mile Bridge Between Crimea and Russian Mainland
- E G See
- Gleb Stolyarov
- Andrew Roth
See, e.g., Gleb Stolyarov, "Trucker Putin opens Russia bridge link with annexed Crimea," 15
May 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-crimea-bridge/trucker-putin-opensrussia-bridge-link-with-annexed-crimea-idUSKCN1IG1TH, and Andrew Roth, "Putin Opens
12-Mile Bridge Between Crimea and Russian Mainland," 15 May 2018, www.theguardian.
com/world/2018/may/15/putin-opens-bridge-between-crimea-and-russian-mainland.
Asowsches Meer: Das gef€ ahrliche Muskelspiel
- Denis Trubetskoy
Denis Trubetskoy, "Asowsches Meer: Das gef€ ahrliche Muskelspiel," 31 August 2018,
ukraineverstehen.de/krise-asowsche-meer.
Russia Captures the Azov Sea
- Andrey Muravsky
Andrey Muravsky, "Russia Captures the Azov Sea," 15 August 2018, day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/
ekonomika/rosiya-zahoplyuye-azovske-more (in Ukrainian).
Sea of Troubles: Azov Emerging as 'Tinderbox' in Russia-Ukraine Conflict
- Christopher Miller
Ibid. and Christopher Miller, "Sea of Troubles: Azov Emerging as 'Tinderbox' in Russia-Ukraine Conflict," 7 August 2018, www.rferl.org/a/sea-of-troubles-azov-emerging-astinderbox-in-russia-ukraine-conflict/29417753.html.
Dangerous Waters: As Russia Monopolizes Azov Sea, Mariupol Feels Heightened Danger
- Oksana Grytsenko
- Kostyantyn Chernichkin
Oksana Grytsenko and Kostyantyn Chernichkin, "Dangerous Waters: As Russia
Monopolizes Azov Sea, Mariupol Feels Heightened Danger," 3 August 2018, www.kyivpost.
com/ukraine-politics/as-russia-monopolizes-azov-sea-mariupol-feels-heighteneddanger.html.
Russia Opens a New Front in Its War Against Ukraine: the Sea of Azov
- Nolan Peterson
Nolan Peterson, "Russia Opens a New Front in Its War Against Ukraine: the Sea of Azov,"
31 August 2018, www.dailysignal.com/2018/08/31/russia-opens-a-new-front-in-its-waragainst-ukraine-the-sea-of-azov.
Russia Should Ensure Unhindered Access to Ukrainian Ports in Sea of Azov-EU
- Interfax Ukraine
Interfax Ukraine, "Russia Should Ensure Unhindered Access to Ukrainian Ports in
Sea of Azov-EU," 5 September 2018, en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/529213.html.