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Killing a Constitution with a Thousand Cuts: Executive Aggrandizement and Party-State Fusion in India
... The election results were seen as an affirmation of Narendra Modi's politics, who has been accused of systematically undermining secularism, political pluralism, and intellectual freedom [16,21,33]. Modi's political program blends a managerial rhetoric of efficiency and innovation with the conservative ideology of Hindu hyper-nationalism [33]. ...
... The election results were seen as an affirmation of Narendra Modi's politics, who has been accused of systematically undermining secularism, political pluralism, and intellectual freedom [16,21,33]. Modi's political program blends a managerial rhetoric of efficiency and innovation with the conservative ideology of Hindu hyper-nationalism [33]. Central to the "NaMo" brand -an acronym for Narendra Modi -is a focus on digital technologies for political outreach. ...
... To be transparent, we are concerned about democratic backsliding in India [16,21,33]. However, we tried to separate our political views from the description of the campaigns. ...
Political organizations worldwide keep innovating their use of social media technologies. Here, we document a novel configuration of technologies and organizational forms used to manipulate Twitter trends in the 2019 Indian general election. The organizers rely on an extensive network of WhatsApp groups to coordinate mass-postings by loosely affiliated political supporters. To investigate the campaigns, we joined more than 600 political WhatsApp groups that support the Bharatiya Janata Party, the right-wing party that won the general election. We found direct evidence of 75 hashtag manipulation campaigns, including mobilization messages and lists of pre-written tweets. We estimate the campaigns' size and whether they succeeded in creating controlled social media narratives. We show that the campaigns are smaller than what media reports suggest; still, they reliably produce Twitter trends drawing on the voices of loosely affiliated supporters. Centrally controlled but voluntary in participation, this novel configuration of a campaign complicates the debates over the legitimate use of digital tools for political participation. It may have provided a blueprint for participatory media manipulation by a party with popular support.
... Their combination, however, leads to a considerable weakening of democratic checks. 16 Compared to earlier authoritarians, current architects of democratic decay rely extensively on constitutional and legal forms rather than violence and extra-legal measures. 17 Finally, democratic decay is not limited to new or weak democracies. ...
With democratic decay advancing around the globe, scholars deeply disagree about courts’ ability to protect democracy. I argue that this divergence is influenced by conceptual and theoretical deficiencies of the debate. The existing approaches to judicial responses to democratic decay often do not pay sufficient attention to the differences among courts and the environments in which they operate. To tackle these issues, this article introduces the judicial countering capacity frame as an analytical tool to guide further empirical analysis. The framework recognizes courts’ agency but emphasizes the constraints and resources stemming from the environment in which a court operates. Moving away from single-factor explanations, I make a case for a multicausal understanding of judicial countering of democratic decay. I argue that the extent of a court’s countering capacity rests on three pillars: institutional design, the level of political pluralism, and political culture towards courts. The judicial countering capacity frame invites an empirically oriented agenda focusing on micro-mechanisms of judicial countering, their effectiveness, structural preconditions, and the plausibility of available judicial strategies. The article demonstrates the new frame on case studies of Colombia, South Africa and Poland.
... 61 While the petitioners contended that planning is a function of the Municipal Corporation as per Items (1) and (2) of Twelfth Schedule, 62 the Court held that 'Article 243W contains merely an enabling provision, and it does not mean that the State is obligated to provide for such a statute.' Courts have further held that local governments only exercise those powers granted to them by state legislation and do not have autonomous powers. In a case regarding the cancellation of the approval of a building plan by a local government, the Madras High Court held that 'Under the 58 Khaitan (2020). 59 (1) and (2) of the 12th Schedule are respectively: 'Urban planning including town planning' and 'Regulation of land-use and construction of buildings'. ...
Scholarly enquiries into federalism have paid insufficient attention to the role of local governments in the constitutional orders of jurisdictions in the global south. However, it is precisely in the “new world” constitutional orders in Asia, Latin America and Africa which are witnessing “constitutional innovations” for local governance. With the passing of the 73rd and 74th Amendments, the Constitution of India now integrates rural and urban local governments as “institutions of self-government” within India’s state architecture. However, despite constitutional entrenchment, local governments in India are often weak and have limited autonomy in executing functions vested in them. This paper examines the role, status, and power of local governments in India’s federal constitutional scheme and their relationship with state and federal governments. It critically analyses the nature of authority the Constitution of India vests on local governments, and how these have been translated by state governments, interpreted by courts, and exercised in practice. The paper explores the underlying legal and political reasons behind the wide gulf between the de jure and de facto powers of local governments, especially in cities, in India. For a situated understanding of the inter-governmental relations of local governments with higher levels of government, this paper focuses on the division of powers in the governance of public health, especially in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic. Public health is a particularly interesting lens to understand inter-governmental relations since the legislative and executive authority for governing public health is split between different levels of government. Though in India’s constitutional scheme, state and local governments are the primary authorities vested with the management of healthcare, the federal government invoked the Disaster Management Act, 2005 for the imposition of a national lockdown. The judicial review of pandemic-related governance has also had a significant impact on inter-governmental relations that has altered the vaccination strategy of the federal government. Through a close analysis of the constitutional text, judicial interpretation and political context determining local government power, specifically in the context of governing public health, this paper seeks to elucidate the role of local governments in Indian federalism.
... However, in 2016, obliging governors of the states of Uttarakhand and Arunachal Pradeshwhich were ruled by parties that were in opposition at the Centrereported that the constitutional machinery in these states had broken down, leading to the federal government dismissing the state governments and assuming direct rule. In both cases, the Supreme Court intervened to restore the dismissed governments(Khaitan 2020). ...
The present study explores the relationship between trust in state governments and changes in subjective well-being in India, drawing upon the nationally-representative India Human Development Survey (IHDS) panel data for 2005 and 2012. Our econometric results confirm that people’s trust in state governments is positively associated with changes in their subjective well-being in economic aspects. To take into account the endogeneity of people’s trust in the state government, we have used the 2SLS model where the trust is instrumented by (i) whether the winning legislators belonged to the ruling party, and (ii) whether the margin of victory over the closest rival exceeded 12 %. The robustness of the results has been confirmed by the Lewbel IV model in which the internal instruments are used in addition to the two external instruments. The policy focus in rebuilding trust in state governments destroyed by the relentless pursuit of Hindutva and over-centralisation are discussed.
... In this, the BJP merely tapped into rising levels of support for strong leadership (even military), rising levels of religious identification, and growing feelings of discontent with the working of democracy, all of which pre-dated the 2014 general elections (Sircar 2020). Strong levels of support for the current regime among a majority of the population may embolden the BJP to neutralize potential checks on its powers, such as the Supreme Court, the Election Commission, critical journalists or opposition leaders (Khaitan 2020). ...
This article analyses the significance of polity-wide parties’ understanding of state and nation for their ability and willingness to accommodate territorial diversity. To illustrate this point, we first introduce a typology containing four ‘ideal-types’ of state nationalism: dominant, integrationist, composite, and plurinational. Subsequently, we apply this typology to two plural and multi-level polities, Spain and India, during two critical junctures: their founding constitutional moments and more recent episodes of change associated with ‘the Catalan question’ in Spain and the rise of the BJP in India, respectively. Our analysis underscores how varieties of state nationalism inform the nature and evolution of the territorial constitution, in form and in practice, and the extent to which such shifts are linked to party competition and changes in the party system.
According to Laurent Pech, the rule of law was described as a “‘buzzword’ by [Hungary’s] justice minister; a fiction by a Fidesz MP; and a ‘magic word’ by the Fidesz-KDNP Delegation to the European Parliament. Not to be undone, a judge from Hungary’s (captured) constitutional court, has presented the rule of law ‘as a normative yardstick’ which is little more than an empty nineteenth century ideal and a political joker [sic] for all purposes” (Pech, Hague J Rule Law 14(2–3): 107-138, 2022 128). In contrast, the English historian, E.P. Thompson, notoriously and controversially called the rule of law ‘a cultural achievement of universal significance.’ With small amendments, I agree with Thompson. Each word in that phrase, I seek to demonstrate, deserves emphasis and respect. However, it makes a huge difference what one takes the rule of law to be about. What is universal is the notion and realisation of a state of affairs in which power is reliably tempered so as not to be available for arbitrary abuse. It is that which is a cultural achievement of universal significance. It is a mistake to identify it, as so many do, with any allegedly canonical arrangement of forms and institutions and rules that are enlisted or assumed to embody it. Many people make that mistake. Some do so, because they naively think that installation of familiar institutions they associate with ‘the rule of law’ is the same as generating the ideal itself. The disappointing history of rule of law promotion around the world shows that is not the case. On the other hand, modern illiberal, often populist, regimes are happy to endorse such a mistake and pretend that they are committed to the rule of law by making a show of conformity to legal forms, while systematically subverting and abusing the rule of law itself. Both the naïve and the malicious interpretations should be rejected.
Competition law is designed to promote a consumer-friendly economy, but for the law to work in practice, competition agencies - and the courts who oversee them - must enforce it effectively and impartially. Today, however, the rule of populist governments is challenging the foundations of competition law in unprecedented ways. In this comprehensive work, Maciej Bernatt analyses these challenges and describes how populist governments have influenced national and regional (EU) competition law systems. Using empirical findings from Poland and Hungary, Bernatt proposes a new theoretical framework that will allow the illiberal influence of populism on competition law systems to be better measured and understood. Populism and Antitrust will be of interest not only to antitrust and constitutional law scholars, but also to those concerned about the future of liberal democracy and free markets.
Over the last decade, the world has watched in shock as populists swept to power in free elections. From Manila to Warsaw, Brasilia to Budapest, the populist tide has shattered illusions of an inexorable march to liberal democracy. Eschewing simplistic notions of a unified global populism, this book unpacks the diversity and plurality of populisms. It highlights the variety of constitutional and extraconstitutional strategies that populists have used to undermine the institutional fabric of liberal democracy and investigates how ruling populists responded to the Covid-19 crisis. Outlining the rise of populisms and their governing styles, Wojciech Sadurski focuses on what populists in power do, rather than what they say. Confronting one of the most pressing concerns of international politics, this book offers a vibrant, contemporary account of modern populisms and, significantly, considers what we can do to fight back.
Contemporarily, the world is experiencing a severe contestation of
political ideas as nation-states are increasingly drawn toward finding their relevance in conservative nationalism. With the cold death of Fukuyama's End of History, ideological conflicts are born anew. Illiberal political ideologies are being revived, political distinctions are drawn, discourses are monopolized, and the return of the idea of the sovereign is upsetting the impartiality of legal order. The paper seeks to examine the resurrection of these ideas which are espoused in the politics of Hindu nationalism in the theoretical framework provided by German political theorist Carl Schmitt. His writings on politics, liberalism, and constitution outline a blueprint of illiberal authoritarianism. With the electoral mandate, powerful constituencies, and rising middle-class support, it is critical to develop an understanding of why Hindu nationalism appeals to the society and deliberate over what future holds for the modernity as fringe ideas are now becoming mainstream in India.
How do ethnically divided countries create inclusive and stable democratic institutions? Why do some kinds of federalism fail while others evolve? Scholars looking for answers to these kinds of questions have tended to focus on the West. Yet there are important lessons arising from the substantial democratic and federal reforms that have taken place in Asia over the last few decades. These reforms signal a new model of federal democracy in Asia, comprising multilevel ethnoterritorial federalism, mixed-majoritarianism and a party system that includes both ethnic and multi-ethnic parties. This model has emerged as a response to ethnic conflict and secession risks and reflects the high diversity of clustered communities and cross-cutting cleavages. Despite its overarching majoritarianism, the federal model has led to highly fragmented party systems and coalition governments, with positive implications for democratic stability. Together, these features go some way towards blending otherwise conflicting consociational and centripetal paradigms.
When adjudicating religious disputes, constitutional courts often resort to a particular discursive register. The notions ‘tolerance’ and ‘respect’ are an integral part of this religion-specific constitutional register. But what do judges mean when they deploy the language of tolerance and respect? And what substantive role, if any, do both notions play in the constitutional interpretation of religious freedom? This article seeks to answer these conceptual and substantive questions by comparing constitutional case law on religious freedom from India, Israel and the United States. It also provides linkages to ongoing processes of (alleged) constitutional retrogression in the three jurisdictions.
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