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Bedazzled, Think Tanks, and Mass Media
Abstract
This chapter uses an observation of a book launch and a critique of popular punitive ideas to further explore some of the drivers and contingencies which affect UK gang policy-making. This includes the processes by which, ideas about gangs, which often flow from broader beliefs about the nature of the social world, find their way into policies about gangs. These ideas often emanate from policy entrepreneurs within a political elite associated with think tanks, which loop ideas into the policy process through both direct routes of commissioned policy research and less obvious means by influencing policy information streams through the mass media. The analysis begins with a brief overview of the role of think tanks in policy making; presents an ethnographic vignette of the book launch of the book Among the Hoods; critiques political ideas about the relationship between social exclusion and gang formation found in Among the Hoods and then provides an analysis the role of the mass media in policy making. These related themes provide an overview of a policy pathway (Kingdon op cit) in which gang related problems are identified within narrowly defined ontological and epistemic frameworks that result in policies underpinned by ideas known in criminology and policy circles as Right Realism.
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'It's the Family, Stupid! Continuities and Reinterpretations of the Dysfunctional Family as the Cause of Crime in Three Political Periods'
in R. Matthews and J. Young, Eds, (2003) The New Politics of Crime and Punishment, Willan (Republished in 2013, Taylor Francis
This volume chronicles and analyzes the development of think tanks and public policy research organizations, while exploring the impact think tanks have on politics, public policies, and governance in the US. Think Tanks and Policy Advice in the US investigates the distinctive nature of thirty leading think tanks in America, while capturing the political and intellectual ecology of the more than 1,500 think tanks in the US. Presidents from twenty think tanks have contributed insightful essays that examine the role, value, and impact of these organizations on a national and global level. The book examines a range of key factors (partisan politics; growth of liberal and conservative advocacy groups; restrictive funding policies of donors; growth of specialized think tanks; narrow and short-term orientation of Congress and the White House; tyranny of myopic academic disciplines; and the 24/7 cable news networks) which have impacted on the ability of think tanks to provide independent analysis and advice. This text fills a gap in the available literature and will serve as a valuable reference tool for policy makers, the media, and researchers in the fields of public policy, political science, and American politics more generally.
Media clamour on issues relating to crime, justice and civil liberties has never been more insistent. Whether it is the murder of James Bulger or detaining terrorist suspects for long periods without trial, mediated comment has grown immeasurably over the last twenty years. So, how does it interact with and shape policy in these fields? How do the politicians both respond to and try to manipulate the media which permeates our society and culture?
This book provides an account of the emergence, nature and impact of armed youth gangs in an East London Borough over the last decade. It describes the challenges these armed young men and women pose to their communities, those charged with preventing crime and those struggling to vouchsafe ‘community safety’. While the focus of the book is ‘local’, the processes it outlines and the effects it chronicles have both a national and international relevance.
This paper is an attempt to take a critical sociological look at the UK government's flagship 'Big Society' policy. To do this I utilize the political sociology of Émile Durkheim, specifically what I call his 'socialist theory'. This overlooked aspect of Durkheim's sociology contains a strong normative critique and alternative project concerning the role of the State, private property, economic regulation and inequality. By applying this to the Big Society it is argued that the latter will result in: increased moral fragmentation, the furthering of economic inequality and the development of a 'postcode lottery'. Instead, Durkheim's advocacy of functional representation in the form of the 'corporations' seems to hold some contemporary relevance.
The Coalition Government wants to build a 'Big Society'. [1] The Prime Minister says 'we are all in this together' [2] and building it is the responsibility of every citizen as well as every Government department. nef (the new economics foundation) welcomes the broad vision but recognises that everything depends on how the vision is translated into policy and practice. We offer these questions and proposals to help fill in some of the gaps and bring out the best in the idea of a big society. Ten big questions about the Big Society 1. What's the 'Big' idea? The government says it wants to make society stronger by getting more people working together to run their own affairs locally. It aims to put more power and responsibility into the hands of families, groups, networks, neighbourhoods and locally-based communities, and to generate more community organisers, neighbourhood groups, volunteers, mutuals, co-operatives, charities, social enterprises and small businesses: the idea is that all of these will take more action at a local level, with more freedom to do things the way they want. 2. What's good about it? When people are given the chance and treated as if they are capable, they tend to find they know what is best for them, and can work out how to fix any problems they have and realise their dreams. Bringing local knowledge based on everyday experience to bear on planning and decision-making usually leads to better results. Evidence shows that, when people feel they have control over what happens to them and can take action on their own behalf, their physical and mental well-being improves. When individuals and groups get together in their neighbourhoods, get to know each other, work together and help each other, there are usually lasting benefits for everyone involved: networks and groups grow stronger, so that people who belong to them tend to feel less isolated, more secure, more powerful and happier. It serves the well-established principle of subsidiarity: that matters should be handled by the smallest, lowest or least centralised competent authority.
The phrase ‘think tank’ has become ubiquitous – overworked and underspecified – in the political lexicon. It is entrenched in scholarly discussions of public policy as well as in the ‘policy wonk’ of journalists, lobbyists and spin-doctors. This does not mean that there is an agreed definition of think tank or consensual understanding of their roles and functions. Nevertheless, the majority of organizations with this label undertake policy research of some kind. The idea of think tanks as a research communication ‘bridge’ presupposes that there are discernible boundaries between (social) science and policy. This paper will investigate some of these boundaries. The frontiers are not only organizational and legal; they also exist in how the ‘public interest’ is conceived by these bodies and their financiers. Moreover, the social interactions and exchanges involved in ‘bridging’, themselves muddy the conception of ‘boundary’, allowing for analysis to go beyond the dualism imposed in seeing science on one side of the bridge, and the state on the other, to address the complex relations between experts and public policy.
This article traces the impact of economic and cultural globalization pointing to the consequent rise of widespread resentment and tension both within the First World and internationally. Globalization exacerbates both relative deprivation and crises of identity: such a combination is experienced as unfair, humiliating and threatening and results in behaviour which is transgressive rather than instrumental. Tension is also experienced among the better off because of insecurities of identity, position and the level of sacrifices demanded in their daily life. Punishment becomes vindictive rather than instrumental and rational. Further, `criminal' violence and the violence of war and terrorism have similar aetiologies and characteristics. The article seeks to establish a cultural criminology which puts the transgressive in a structural context, which critiques the insipid rationalistic nature of current neo-liberal discourses while reformulating Mertonian notions of anomie in terms of energy, resentment and tension.
Despite becoming almost synonymous in the public's imagination with ‘law and order’ and toughness on crime, the Thatcher years (1979-90) would not be characterized by many criminologists as a period of radical reform of the criminal justice system. Thatcherism, it seems, was far less radical in the criminal policy field than it was in housing, the economy or local government finance. This paper explores the reasons for this seeming paradox. Our argument is that Thatcherite thinking came late to this policy realm and only started to inform policy in any consistent and radical way after Thatcher had left office. This we attribute to: (1) the precedence accorded other issue domains more closely associated with the ‘crisis’ to which Thatcherism claimed to provide a response; (2) the power-sharing that Thatcher had to engage in with the more paternalist wing of her party during much of her time in office; and (3) a series of time-lag effects. Crime, being the expression of social and economic forces, did not rise dramatically during the early phase of Thatcherite restructuring. In crime and criminal justice policy, radical Thatcherism post-dated Thatcher. It should be seen as a knock-on effect of the steep rise in unemployment and the social polarization resulting from policy radicalism in other issue domains exacerbated by the slide into recession from 1990.
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