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La estrategia de defensa de la Federación Rusa: buscando redención en el sistema internacional
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Military transformations are usually understood as linear processes involving diverse, steady, and costly initiatives to be achieved during a specific timeframe. However, other influencing elements, such as assessment, follow-up, and feedback from the personnel in charge of enforcing and evaluating their implementation, are often disregarded. This article seeks to bridge this information gap and provide a model to analyze the transformation of the military forces of Colombia as a virtuous cycle using the perceptions of its future implementers as its core and main evaluating resource. The questionnaire developed focuses on national interests and the roles and functions of the military forces, gathering the perceptions of officers who will be responsible for implementing the transformation. The statistical findings suggest that determining threats, factors of influence, obstacles, enhancers, and priorities such as drug trafficking, defense expenditure, conflict of interests, fiscal responsibility, and doctrine and policy are central to obtaining successful outcomes.
Con la aprobación, el 5 de febrero de 2010, de la nueva Doctrina Militar de la Federa-ción Rusa por parte del presidente Medvédev parece ponerse fin a la renovación teórica de la política militar y de seguridad de la actual Administración rusa. Dicha renovación había comenzado en el año 2008 con la aparición, en julio, del concepto de política exterior, seguido a finales de agosto del mismo año de los principios de política exterior y de seguridad, la estrategia para la región del Ártico 2020 en septiembre y finalmente la Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional hasta 2020, firmada el 12 de mayo de 2009 (1). Asi-mismo, junto a la nueva Doctrina, pero como documento clasificado hasta el momento, Medvédev aprueba una adenda de las bases de la política estatal en el área de la disua-sión nuclear hasta el año 2020. Tanto la Doctrina Militar, como el Concepto de Política Exterior y la Estrategia son Docu-mentos que sustituyen, en unos casos, o complementan, en otros, documentos apro-bados en el año 2000 por el presidente Putin, que tenían cierta vocación de ruptura con los textos anteriores (2)-especialmente con la Doctrina Militar de Yeltsin, del año 1993 y con la herencia soviética-y de permanencia y autoafirmación de la Federación. A pesar de esa pretensión, su percepción del entorno internacional estaba más basada en las amenazas y desafíos inmediatos para Rusia y en la necesidad de hacer valer su papel de gran potencia que en un análisis de previsión de escenarios a medio y largo plazo. Esta incoherencia permitía establecer múltiples lecturas entre la teoría y la práctica de la política de seguridad y defensa de la Federación. Los nuevos documentos no son ajenos en algunos aspectos doctrinales a esta peculiaridad en cuanto que no siempre presentan un equilibrio entre objetivos o fines y medios. Factores condicionantes de la política de seguridad de Medvédev Los tres Documentos-Estrategia 2020, Doctrina y Concepto-argumentan su razón de ser en el gran cambio que se ha producido en el escenario internacional en la última década y en la posición que Rusia ocupa en el mismo. Sin embargo, como indicábamos anteriormente, no contienen una previsión de ese escenario más allá de las prioridades (1) Aparecen también otros documentos con afán clarificador como la Doctrina de Seguridad Alimentaria del año 2020 o un nuevo Sistema de Planificación Estratégica. (2) La Estrategia de Seguridad de 2000 mantiene la concepción de la Seguridad Nacional de la Estrategia de 1997, por lo que el documento del año 2009 sustituye a los dos anteriores.
Applying a military sciences’ methodology namely DOTMLPF, this paper examines the 2008
Russian military reform to determine whether or not it will prepare Russia to face contemporary threats
and challenges. Analysing published studies with the results of a DOTMLPF assessment and essentials
of modern military thinking, this paper offers conclusions on the effectiveness of the reform. Besides, it
provides a new perspective when analysing military reforms and emphasises the significance of Russia and
its military capability for the global balance of power.
This paper examines contemporary Russian military thinking in relation with the concept of modern warfare and its adequateness to manage future threats and challenges. After providing an analysis on Russia's defence and security policies and the historical transformation of its military, this paper argues that the concept of full spectrum operations has been key factor to plan and develop the 2008 Russian Military Reform. In addition, it provides a framework to both analyse Russia's international policy and its influence on the international system, and endorses this reform as a remarkable case study for the discipline of military sciences.
The crisis in Ukraine, that broke out in 2013 and escalated in 2014, has led to sanction policy and the emergence of significant political divergences between Russian Federation and the West. This has resulted in an intensification of Russia’s foreign and economic policy alliances with its neighboring countries as well as with the rest of the BRICS members. In his interview with Cuba’s Prensa Latina, Vladimir Putin further classified cooperation with Latin American states as one of the key and very promising lines of Russia’s foreign policy.
In light of the above mentioned developments, this paper addresses the Latin American vector of Russian foreign policy using the example of Russian-Venezuelan partnership, which has been intensified after 2004. It explores the underlying key elements of this partnership based on realist and constructivist assumptions and is aimed at outlining foreign policy identities, perceptions and interests constitutive for the cooperation between the two countries. The author concludes, that the cooperation is based both on realist and constructivist elements, whereas Russian interests are mainly realist and Venezuelan constructivist, and that fact could hinder long-lasting and both-way beneficial bilateral collaboration.
El propósito de este artículo es mostrar cuáles han sido los efectos de la influencia rusa en el Caribe. Específicamente, se intentará demostrar que el incremento de las actividades económicas y militares de Rusia en países como Venezuela y Nicaragua está generando una nueva distribución del poder en la región y un comportamiento político internacional basado en la política del equilibrio del poder. Esta tendencia se manifiesta en varios sentidos: a. Rusia busca equilibrarse con Estados Unidos; b. países como Nicaragua y Venezuela aprovechan esta nueva distribución del poder para generar mecanismos de contención frente a Estados Unidos o sus aliados regionales, como Colombia; y c. el Estado colombiano ha tenido que adoptar una estrategia defensiva o equilibrista para gestionar sus intereses con esos países.
In Vladimir Putin’s Russia, opaque financial flows and an equally murky network of ex-KGB officers, with its roots in the 1990s, come together in a distinctive system of corruption. This system serves dual purposes: Those at the top follow the imperative of self-enrichment, but they also find in corruption a highly effective tool for consolidating domestic political control and projecting power abroad. At home, omnipresent corruption makes property claims and business ventures contingent on the whims of the authorities, while keeping officials themselves permanently under the threat of selective punishment. Abroad, corruption serves as a key lever of Russian influence in other post-Soviet states, as well as a tool for undermining established democracies. Yet it also creates vulnerabilities that can make Russia prone to reckless and extreme measures. Although Russia’s kleptocracy is a self-sustaining system, it faces a growing backlash in the forms of international sanctions and domestic discontent. © 2018 National Endowment for Democracy and Johns Hopkins University Press.
The security services have enjoyed a marked resurgence in Russian political life since the official demise of the KGB. The past three prime ministers and the current president all have close connections to the police and security intelligence organizations, raising legitimate concerns that a “KGB mindset” will penetrate Kremlin politics.