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Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order
Abstract
The liberal international order, erected after the Cold War, was crumbling by 2019. It was flawed from the start and thus destined to fail. The spread of liberal democracy around the globe-essential for building that order-faced strong resistance because of nationalism, which emphasizes self-determination. Some targeted states also resisted U.S. efforts to promote liberal democracy for security-related reasons. Additionally, problems arose because a liberal order calls for states to delegate substantial decisionmaking authority to international institutions and to allow refugees and immigrants to move easily across borders. Modern nation-states privilege sovereignty and national identity, however, which guarantees trouble when institutions become powerful and borders porous. Furthermore, the hyperglobalization that is integral to the liberal order creates economic problems among the lower and middle classes within the liberal democracies, fueling a backlash against that order. Finally, the liberal order accelerated China's rise, which helped transform the system from unipolar to multipolar. A liberal international order is possible only in unipolarity. The new multipolar world will feature three realist orders: a thin international order that facilitates cooperation, and two bounded orders-one dominated by China, the other by the United States-poised for waging security competition between them. © 2019 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
... As great power rivalries are intensifying in contemporary global politics, "strategic competition […] now touches almost every aspect of international politics, not just the military domain" (Sullivan, 2023): Many issues such as trade, supply chains, financial transaction infrastructures, high-technology industries, communication networks, the management of pandemics, and even climate change, which are regularly considered non-security issues among non-rivals, are being treated as security issues under heightened great power rivalry (Thompson, 1999(Thompson, , 2001. Contemporary rivalries among the US, Europe, China and Russia, in particular, entail the securitization of such issues (Mearsheimer, 2019). The rival parties handle issues that in peace times are not considered security issues almost as if they were engaged in a (hot) war with each other. ...
... In their view, the rise of Germany was the main reason for the pronounced great power rivalries in the late 19th and early 20 th century, and the rise of the Soviet Union and the related decline of Great Britain, France and Germany were the main reasons for the Cold War rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union in the mid-20 th century. Accordingly, many realists consider the contemporary rise of China as the main reason for its growing power rivalry with the US (Mearsheimer, 2019). Conversely, scholars associated with the liberal tradition argue that differences in the domestic political ideologies of the great powers are the main determinant of power rivalries (Fukuyama, 1992;Schimmelfennig, 1995; see similar Huntington, 1996). ...
... Rivals interact with each other in institution-based orders, while also seeking to strengthen relations with (potential) allies in such orders. This peculiarity of contemporary power rivalries is highlighted not only by academic observers (Farrell & Newman, 2019, p. 43;Mearsheimer, 2019), but also by policy-making practitioners (see Sullivan, 2023), who underline the vital importance of institutionalized partnerships in managing current great power rivalries. Yet, scholars associated with the realist and liberal traditions disagree on what these interdependencies and the related incentive to (re-) build institutional orders imply for great power rivalries. ...
... One example was the establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB), based in Shanghai, with the New Development Bank's mandate being new entrant, thus contesting the terrain covered by the likes of the IMF and World Bank. The NDB, thus, becomes for the Chinese an emblem of its essential avant-garde position in the advance of South-South cooperation, rather than just a tool for economic synergy (Mearsheimer, 2019). ...
The BRICS аlliаnce hаs morphed into а-force to reckon with where chаllenging аll аlong the lines of western initiаtion globаl governаnce. Economic diplomаcy is the аlliаnce's indispensаble instrument through which it evinces its cаpаbility with trаde аccords, investment initiаtives, аnd the New Development Bаnk (NDB) to strengthen the voice of developing nаtions. They аre efforts thаt directly аim to form а multipolаr power order thаt goes beyond the nаrrow confines of equity аnd inclusivity. Chinа, with the trаnsformаtive Belt аnd Roаd Initiаtive, demonstrаtes thаt infrаstructure development cаn mix with politicаl motives, creаting opportunities аnd controversies. Indiа hаs continued to nurture thаt role through connectivity, including deepening relаtionships аcross Аfricа, for exаmple, with the Internаtionаl North-South Trаnsport Corridor on which it hаs initiаted high-level discussions аnd аctivity. South Аfricа mаkes а string link between BRICS аnd the Аfricаn continent, аdvocаting for regionаl integrаtion аnd sustаinаble development, notwithstаnding chаllenges coming from а rаther smаll economy. The bloc is, however, not without hitches. This hаs been mаde worse by internаl dispаrities: economic imbаlаnce аnd differences in priorities, аll of which mаke it difficult to unify lines of decision mаking. Externаl pressures from estаblished powers pose а further threаt to its integrity. Yet in redefining globаl economic stаndаrds, BRICS continue to mаke heаdwаy, аs seen in its efforts for de-dollаrizаtion аnd аlternаte finаnciаl systems. This аrticle purports thаt, while BRICS hаs mаde considerаble аdvаncements, its long-run prospects will аlso depend on the orgаnizаtion's аbility to work through its internаl strаins аnd externаl opposition. Only by working together over time аnd аdаpting аctions cаn one solidify thаt role аs а chаmpion of the Globаl South in а chаnging geopoliticаl world.
... One prominent argument in research on IO contestation is that international authority increases IO contestation (Zürn, 2018;Mearsheimer, 2019;Kreuder-Sonnen & Rittberger, 2023). Because the authority of IOs to take collective decisions requires legitimation, this need to legitimize IO authority leads to debates regarding the role IOs should play in international and domestic politics (Rixen & Zangl, 2013;Rauh and Zürn 2020). ...
This data article introduces IOParlspeech, an original dataset of over 600,000 statements on international organizations (IOs) in parliamentary debates in six countries between 1990 and 2018. We explain the creation of the dataset and demonstrate the value of IOParlspeech through two exploratory studies. First, we examine which actors convey more positive and more negative sentiment regarding IOs in parliamentary discourse. Contributing to research on IO contestation, we demonstrate that parliamentarians from the radical right and left, as well as parliamentarians in opposition, use more negative language in their IO-related communication. Second, we explore the salience of IOs in national parliaments. Speaking to debates about the democratic deficit of IOs, we show that IOs with higher authority and those with an international parliamentary institution are more likely to be discussed in parliament. We conclude by suggesting further uses for IOParlspeech.
... At the turn of the second and third decades of the 21st century, the world entered a new era of intensified strategic competition, characterized by political, economic and military confrontation . This competition may herald a long period of uncertainty, reduced security stability and the collapse of the existing international order (Mearsheimer, 2019). At the same time, the consequences of long-standing strategic competition are becoming the main problem in creating security, and international terrorism is receding into the background (Summary, 2018, p. 1). ...
Objectives
This article presents the results of research, which set out to clarify the concept of strategic competition and its practical consequences expressed in terms of threats to international security.
Material and methods
Literature analysis and criticism, non-participatory observation and case studies were used to solve the research problems.
Results
The research process established that the essence of competition is the pursuit of power, security, wealth, influence and international status. Strategic competition is constantly intensifying, and their consequences are having a negative impact on global security. Revisionist powers and rogue regimes use corruption, predatory economic practices, propaganda, political subversion, proxy wars, threats of military force and nuclear blackmail to alter the existing international order.
Conclusions
It has been established that currently the main threat to global security is the Russian Federation.
... Obecnie ład międzynarodowy wydaje się "dryfować", a diagnozowanie tendencji zmian jest utrudnione, gdyż niekiedy występują przeciwstawne. W literaturze przedmiotu jest formułowana opinia o erozji liberalnego ładu międzynarodowego ukształtowanego zwłaszcza po 1989 r. John Mearsheimer (2019), pisząc o zmierzchu tego ładu, podkreślał, że od początku i ze swej istoty zawierał on w sobie "ziarna" upadku. Nie jest jasne, w jakim stopniu taka opinia mogła warunkować myślenie Władimira Putina w sprawie ataku na Ukrainę w 2022 r., tym bardziej że Mearsheimer (2014) uważał, że to Zachód sprowokował Putina do aneksji Krymu i hybrydowej agresji na Ukrainę. ...
Ład międzynarodowy jest kategorią analizy stosunków międzynarodowych na poziomie systemu międzynarodowego, a więc kategorią ontologii, ale i epistemologii tych stosunków. Jako kategoria ontologii jest dynamicznym procesem konkretyzowanym specyficznymi warunkami danego momentu historycznego. Celem artykułu jest – po pierwsze – zaproponowanie rozumienia istoty ładu międzynarodowego. Zaproponowano jego neutralne rozumienie, uznając, że jest to sposób zorganizowania i funkcjonowania systemu międzynarodowego w danym momencie. Po drugie – istotnym celem jest propozycja struktury analizy ładu międzynarodowego, w której należy uwzględnić: 1) biegunowość systemu międzynarodowego, 2) wartości polityczne, 3) normy, 4) instytucje/organizacje. Zaproponowano nowy model ujmowania biegunowości. Po pierwsze, w miejsce wyłącznie strukturalnego myślenia z koncentracją na strukturze koncentracji potęgi (dwubiegunowy, wielobiegunowy, itd), zaproponowano ujęcie strukturalno-funkcjonalne, uwzględniającego koncentrację potęgi i strategię jej stosowania. Po drugie, analiza biegunowości tylko na poziomie globalnego systemu międzynarodowego nie oddaje złożoności tego zjawiska, gdy wzrasta znaczenie mocarstw regionalnych. Proponowane jest analizowanie biegunowości jako zjawiska dwupoziomowego, z uwzględnieniem poziomu globalnego systemu i mocarstw globalnych oraz poziomu systemów regionalnych i mocarstw regionalnych.
... According to realist theories like "Power Transition" or "Hegemonic Stability", a declining hegemon becomes more assertive as ascending powers reduces their power gap (Feng, 2013;Gilpin, 1988). This will happen whenever emerging powers, like China, were perceived as a threat against an international order primarily conceived to benefit the hegemonic power (Mearsheimer, 2019;Nye, 2011). Hence, US-China strategic competition can be depicted as a sole hegemonic power (US) that has become more assertive against its main emerging rival (China), to prevent other peripheral countries (Brazil) from being neutral or even deepening ties with the latter. ...
Domestic discussion in Brazil about its most suitable commercial partners to promote economic development, through deeper and broader integration onto the Global Value Chain (GVC), is a subject with divergent political narratives. Therefore, empirical evidence is crucial to complement those political considerations with a comprehensive scientific approach on the available sets of optimal choices for Brazil under great power strategic competition between China and US. Even though increasing volumes of Trade-in-Value-Added (TiVA) can boost both exports and GDP growth rates, long-term effects on labor market conditions in Brazil are linked to variables such as industrial value-added, domestic production, vertical integration, technological transfers and capital-labor ratios (K/L). Within the period 2000-2015, Brazilian TiVA exchanges with China did grow at a much faster rate than those of US, thus becoming the world second largest partner for Brazil. Through this chapter, therefore, we will measure overall effects of TiVA exchanges with both China and US on Brazilian labor market. And will also determine which countries/industries might become the most optimal choice for Brazil in terms of TiVA.
... How the crisis and contestation of the liberal world order will change IOs is a key debate, both for scholars of international relations (IR) more broadly and for observers of IOs more specifically (Haug et al., 2024;Ikenberry, 2018;Lake et al., 2021;Mearsheimer, 2019). In this section, I discuss the schools of thought most relevant to this article: rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism, and a number of middle ground contributions. ...
... How can we take seriously their influence on the "trajectory of world politics" (Betts & Loescher, 2010, p. 2) when in much of the traditional IR literature that ostensibly concerns itself with "refugees", they appear only as a "problem that needs a practical, technical and operational solution" (Nyers, 2006, p. xvi), not as individual subjects and certainly not as agentic? When we understand agency as an intervention with an effect on the world (Giddens, 2013, p. 75), we can note the practical and normative challenges refugees pose to the liberal international order of states (Lavenex, 2001;Mearsheimer, 2019) insofar as they expose the failed normative aspirations of liberalism under the conditions of a system of exclusionary states. Refugees and asylum seekers are, in this sense, not an anomality, but a constitutive part of the international system, as the notion of state sovereignty is fundamentally constructed around the refugee as the "Other" to the system of sovereign states and politics overall (Haddad, 2008). ...
... Two synchronous processes helped Erdogan to consolidate his new OS regime surrounding postsecular and post-Western autobiographical narratives. First is the global context where the liberal international order norms and values such as multilateralism, cooperative security, diplomacy, human rights, and free trade have been gradually tarnished since the early 2000s (Mearsheimer, 2019). While the powerful autocratic states such as China and Russia have risen as new agenda-setters in the international field, the unprecedented rise of populist autocratic leaders in the Western democraciesmost notably the election of Donald Trump in the United States in 2016significantly diminished the credibility and moral compass of the American-led Western order in world politics (Ikenberry, 2018). ...
Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy agendas have long been dominated by the state survival politics (‘Beka Meselesi’ in Turkish). This survival logic is so powerful as it gravitates around collective anxieties and their re-production since the beginning of the early Republican period, the separation of Turkey along ethnic lines being the most distressing. Building on this, this article makes two claims. Firstly, it argues that alternative interpretations have emerged regarding Turkey’s self-image under the Justice and Development Party’s (JDP) rule. Specifically, the JDP elites re-imagined the country’s standing in world politics by drawing on the nostalgia for Ottoman grandeur. With this new self-image in mind, the JDP elites have critically engaged with the survival codes and priorities of the ‘Old’ Turkey by taking these notions as negative reference points in shaping the ‘New’ Turkey’s foreign policy direction. With this revised worldview and self-image, Turkey would finally reclaim its agenda-setter role in International Relations based on the historical, political, and sociocultural links with its imperial geography and beyond. Secondly, we argue that this shift from a more defensive survival-based approach towards a more offensive-interventionist imperial stance has two-fold dynamics. On the one hand, it has emerged in parallel to the changing nature of international order, that is, multipolarity and the rise of illiberalism. On the other hand, it has gained further momentum by the rising Turkish military-industrial complex that is closely linked with Turkey’s post-2016 realities. The article unpacks Turkey’s bid for neo-imperial standing in an evolving international order by drawing on the self-interrogative reflexivity approach in ontological security theory.
... Values are subordinated to interests (Oppenheim, 1998). "States are rational egoists with their own interests at heart; values and morality hold little sway in international life" (Mearsheimer, 2019;Helwig & Sinkkonen, 2022, p. 10). For constructivists, on the other hand, foreign policy should be value-based. ...
... The significant difference would political observer portuguese journal of political science | revista portuguesa de ciência política be that under multipolarity the US would need to adapt to the other powers' interests. Having said that, it would not be a liberal international order given that such an order can only arise in a unipolar system where the leading power is a liberal democracy (Mearsheimer, 2019). ...
The articles analyses the international order that emerged after the end of the Cold War and some of the challenges that it presently faces. In light of that, it also discusses several of the possibilities that lay ahead for a future order and engages in the ongoing debates. Indeed, the so-called international liberal order has been under challenge for some time. In all probability, that condition will not change in the near future and may even exacerbate. In fact, one of its more recent threats includes war in Europe, more specifically the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which further endangers its existence. Many, if not most, appear to believe that after the Russian invasion the world will never be the same again. Under these conditions, and independently of the type of ordering that we will see in the future, the article argues that given the historical and long-standing relationship between the US and Portugal the latter can play a significant role, as occurred during the Cold War, albeit this time with respect to energy.
... Amerika Serikat nampak telah lebih dahulu memberikan sinyal untuk membawa pengaruh politik dan ideologi kepada Indonesia. Kemunculan AS sebagai negara adidaya didorong oleh keinginannya untuk memperluas ide mengenai liberalisme, pasar bebas dan demokrasi ke seluruh dunia dalam skema tatanan ideologis (Mearsheimer 2019). Menurut doktrin dari para konseptor liberal, idelogi demokrasi dan pasar bebas mampu menciptakan perdamaian dunia, dibandingkan dengan ideologi totalitarian dan ekonomi komando (pasar tertutup), seperti yang diterapkan di negara-negara komunis dan fasis. ...
Cold War was a war which does not merely involved military and economic aspects. The war also involved several aspects, including information media, such as newspaper, magazine, movie etc. Although Cold War was ended up by the fall of Soviet Union in 1991, however, the memory of Cold War is still preserved in library collection. National Library of Indonesia is the center of national deposit preserving all of Indonesia-based publications since colonial era until present day. One of Cold War collection deposited in the National Library is United States Information Service (USIS) Daily Bulletin. The collection is deposited in the division of rare newspaper collection, National Library of Indonesia. This article investigates history and analysis of content information regarding USIS Daily Bulletin from historical and library science perspective. Method used in this article is qualitative method by analyzing document through international history perspective. The aim of this research is to know information content of National Library of Indonesia’s collection in Cold War era Accordingly, author argues that USIS Daily Bulletin is the National Library’s collection containing culture and poltical propaganda of United States of America (USA) in early Cold War era. Keywords: United States Information Service (USIS); Cold War; National Library of Indonesia; Information, Newspaper. Koleksi Perpustakaan Nasional RI dan Perang Dingin Awal: Studi Kasus United States Information Service (USIS) Bulletin (1948-1953) ABSTRAK Perang Dingin merupakan perang yang tidak hanya melibatkan kekuatan militer dan ekonomi saja. Perang ini banyak melibatkan berbagai aspek, termasuk media informasi, seperti surat kabar, majalah, film dan lain-lain. Meskipun Perang Dingin sudah berakhir pada 1991 yang ditandai dengan keruntuhan Uni Soviet, namun memori mengenai Perang Dingin masih tersimpan di dalam koleksi perpustakaan. Perpustakaan Nasional Republik Indonesia (RI) merupakan pusat deposit nasional yang menyimpan seluruh terbitan Indonesia sejak era kolonial Belanda hingga hari ini. Salah satu koleksi Perang Dingin yang tersimpan di Perpustakaan Nasional adalah United States Information Service (USIS) Daily Bulletin. Koleksi ini tersimpan di divisi surat kabar langka, Perpustakaan Nasional RI. Artikel ini membahas mengenai sejarah dan analisis konten informasi dari USIS Bulletin dari perspektif ilmu sejarah dan perpustakaan. Metode yang digunakan di dalam artikel ini adalah metode kualitatif dengan melakukan analisis dokumen menggunakan perspektif sejarah internasional. Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk mengetahui konten informasi dari koleksi Perpustakaan Nasional RI pada era Perang Dingin. Berdasarkan hal tersebut, penulis berargumen bahwa USIS Daily Bulletin merupakan koleksi Perpustakaan Nasional yang memuat propaganda kebudayaan dan politik Amerika Serikat (AS) untuk menanamkan pengaruh di Indonesia pada era Perang Dingin awal. Kata kunci: United States Information Service (USIS); Perang Dingin; Perpustakaan Nasional RI; Informasi; Surat Kabar.
... In characterizing these prevailing practices, institutions, and structures as constituting an international security order, we use the term ''order'' in a different sense than found in mainstream International Relations. There, scholars often refer to the set of post-World War II cooperative international institutions as the ''liberal international order,'' and have debated extensively whether it is collapsing and what might take its place (Ikenberry, 2020;Mearsheimer, 2020). We take no position on this debate, but simply note that the ''order'' to which they refer (and whatever may follow it) involves a good deal of war, relies heavily on war preparation, embeds only thin protections for human rights, and embraces a ''development regime'' that disseminates widespread structural violence. ...
Much existing research on climate, conflict, and security asks a relatively narrow question: how does climate change trigger or exacerbate violent conflict in ways that threaten stability within the current international system? Far less attention has been paid to how the properties of that system contribute to climate-related risks of violence, conflict, and instability. In this article, we identify three aspects of the structure and workings of what we refer to as the ”international security order” that, in our view, must be brought much more centrally into future research: the multi-dimensional role of war and war preparation as drivers of the climate problem; the widespread use of violence to suppress climate activism; and the failure of climate-policy mechanisms to account for the conflict risk they may create or exacerbate (an effect sometimes referred to as “backdraft”). We argue that these three are not simply contextual factors for climate-related violence. Rather, they work through the climate variable to shape conflict risk. Models and conceptual frameworks that do not explore these and other such connections may be missing important causes and mechanisms of climate-linked insecurity.
International security challenges in today's world spring from myriad sources in what might be considered a multilevel vertical and horizontal interactive global system, in which each governance level is autonomous yet interdependent with other levels. The risks and uncertainties arising through these interactions in different forms of security arrangements—global, national, and human—need to be seen for what they are: complex adaptive systems (CAS) with many layers of autonomous yet interdependent actors and variables. Traditional linear, deterministic, and reductionist approaches cannot adequately deal with the resulting emergent issues, as the assumptions of linearity and determinism in which outputs are proportional to inputs, where cause and effect are observable, no longer hold. Complex systems thinking and anticipatory governance as the frameworks utilised provide an alternative epistemic perspective for the analysis of international security, and this research seeks to exemplify it through the case study of the Iraq Crisis. This original research paper explores the Iraq War Crisis through the viewpoint of complexity, and encourages the adoption of a holistic systems perspective in upcoming research on global affairs.
This chapter studies the US’s and UK’s approaches to foreign direct investment screening in the light of increased global geopolitical rivalry. The chapter analyses the development of screening mechanisms in these countries by using the concepts of securitization and weaponized interdependence. Both these countries claim to be champions of the free market, but at the same time they are currently increasingly considering and limiting the open global economy with a view towards protecting national security. They are furthermore viewed as the key actors of the Anglo-Saxon axis and as the strongest advocates and defenders of the liberal international order which is threatened by the actions of revisionist states that seek to undermine it, China and Russia being the key antagonists. Based on this, the analysis argues that in the US and the UK the ‘liberal dilemma’ is especially pertinent as the balance between promoting an open global economy and defending the national interest may undermine the liberal international order if it tips to much in one direction. Furthermore, it shows how the US sets the standard for the UK, which has gradually followed suit as the US has tightened its regime and demanded the same of the UK.
Güç ve liderlik, çok katmanlı ve ilişkisel bir süreç olarak görülmelidir. Ancak, politik karar alıcılar genellikle gücü sahip olunan kaynaklar ve bunlarla elde edilebilecek sonuçlara indirgeme eğilimindedir. Bu tek boyutlu bakış açısı, baskı, kontrol ve tahakküm gibi sert güç unsurlarına dayalı bir güç anlayışı doğurmaktadır. Gücünü korumak veya artırmak isteyen bir aktörün, diğer aktörler üzerinde güç ve tahakküm kurma amacıyla sahip olduğu güç unsurlarına yüklenmesi, “güç yorgunluğu” olarak adlandırılabilecek bir duruma yol açabilmektedir. Güç yorgunluğu, başat aktörün çözüm üretme kapasitesini sınırlayarak birim ve sistem düzeyinde krizlere neden olmaktadır. Bu çerçevede çalışma, güç yorgunluğu kavramsallaştırmasını Soğuk Savaş sonrasında şekillenen uluslararası sistemde ABD’nin başat rolüyle ilişkilendirerek, Bush, Obama ve Trump dönemleri üzerinden analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır.
Uluslararası sistemdeki gelişmeler, yalnızca sistemin genel yapısını değil, içindeki aktörleri de dönüştürmüştür. 1648 Vestfalya düzeni, diplomasi mekanizmalarını kurumsallaştırarak ulus-devletlerin rolünü artırmıştır. Ancak ulus-devletlerin güçlenmesiyle sermaye gruplarının büyümesi, bu devletleri zorlayan bir faktör haline gelmiştir. XIX. yüzyılın son çeyreğinde uluslararası şirketlerin ortaya çıkışı, dış politika tercihlerini etkilemiş, devletler arasında rekabeti artırmış ve korumacı politikalar teşvik edilmiştir. Bu politikalar, Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nın patlak vermesine zemin hazırlamıştır. Wilson İlkeleri, imparatorlukların yerini ulus-devletlere bırakmasını sağlamıştır. İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın ardından ABD ve Sovyetler Birliği başat güçler olarak ortaya çıkmış, Soğuk Savaş döneminde şirketler uluslararası sahnede güç kazanmaya başlamıştır. Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesi ve neoliberal düzen, şirketlerin ulus-ötesileşmesini hızlandırmıştır. 2008 Ekonomik Krizi ve 2020 Kovid-19 pandemisi, ulus-devletlerin zayıflığını artırırken sermayenin güçlenmesine yol açmıştır. Günümüzde uluslararası sistemdeki değişim, şirketlerin artan gücüyle birlikte, realist düşüncenin öngördüğü devlet merkezli yapıdan Coxçu okulun öngördüğü çok kutuplu bir yapıya evrilmektedir. Bu çalışma, ulus-devletlerin doğuşundan günümüze kadar olan süreci eleştirel teori ve post-modern felsefe bağlamında ele almakta ve ulus-devlet ile sermaye arasındaki ilişkiyi irdelemektedir.
In the article, the author undertakes an examination of three distinct periods in the history of Russian-Turkish relations. From a chronological perspective, these periods encompass the 2000s, the 2010s, and the first half of the 2020s. By the end of the first quarter of the 21st century, Russia and Turkey had begun to accord a higher level of priority to their relations with each other in a number of areas, including diplomatic interaction at the global and regional levels, trade and economic relations, energy and military-technical cooperation. This situation starkly contrasts with the late 1990s, when Turkey demonstrated a tendency to align with the “collective West” in a manner driven by both inertia and ideology. The author posits that Russian-Turkish relations have undergone a dynamic transformation over the past quarter of a century, while each of the periods under consideration exhibiting a unique constellation of complementarity and competition. These two aspects defined the respective models of bilateral relations in each period. Existing research focuses mainly on various discrete aspects of the relationship between the two countries – be it diplomatic interaction, energy, or issues of intertwined or competing interests in specific hotspots and regions such as Syria, Libya, the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. At the same time, a comprehensive analysis of the driving forces behind the transformation of Russia-Turkey relations is still lacking in academic publications on Turkey. In order to present such an analysis, this article draws on a number of important primary sources, including official documents of Russian and Turkish state agencies and structures involved in the implementation of foreign policy, national statistics, publications of news agencies, and leading media.
This article examines the role of normative power in shaping the global sustainability order. It challenges the prevailing focus on hegemonic leadership and norm diffusion from dominant states, arguing that less powerful states have contributed significantly to the global order by creating regional initiatives tailored to their unique contexts. The article adopts an alternative theoretical framework of norm-governed change, comprising norm-building, institutionalisation, and transformation. Using an illustrative case study of Africa’s regional economic institutions, it employs process-tracing and archival analysis of key policy documents. The study demonstrates how African states have proactively embedded environmental norms within their regional initiatives, while contributing to the global sustainability agenda, exemplifying a form of normative power referred to as ‘Green Pan-Africanism’. This approach broadens the understanding of global sustainability governance, positioning less economically powerful actors as active participants in world-making. The findings highlight the critical role of normative power in advancing global sustainability governance, particularly in addressing complex global challenges such as climate change.
The United States Navy possesses a preeminent peacetime role in U.S. national security: “naval forward presence,” or the maintenance of combat-credible naval forces worldwide to deter adversaries, reassure allies, respond to crises, and perform constabulary functions for the global commons. To many, naval forward presence is nearly-synonymous with American grand strategy. But since the post-Cold War defense drawdown, forward presence has constrained the Navy’s efforts to prepare for great power war. To support forward presence, the Navy has organized its force structure around fixed-wing-capable platforms and their supporting multi-mission combatant warships. The politics and spiraling costs of building such ships have stymied efforts to expand the fleet.
Presence also requires that the surface navy remain continually visible and busy. Too few ships thus face too many demands. The resultant operational tempo overwhelms maintenance and training cycles, and grinds away at the economic viability of American shipyards. In this way, naval forward presence consumes the Navy’s structural readiness, or its capacity to engage in severe and sustained combat with a peer competitor, such as the People’s Republic of China. And in so doing, presence consumes its own promises – deterrence and reassurance.
Why, given its internal tensions, does naval forward presence remain a governing strategic concept for the U.S. Navy, even in the shadow of a major international threat? What lies behind the rhetorical consensus on the value of naval forward presence for U.S. national security? This dissertation takes a popular strategic concept to task, illuminating the ideas, politics, and organizational processes that sustain it, even as its costs and risks accumulate, and even as international conditions change.
The inquiry comprises three parts: a history of presence and its implementation; a theoretical analysis of presence through the lens of political science literature; and a case study of the reform agenda following the U.S. Navy’s surface ship accidents of 2017. I find that naval forward presence, as an idea, ran away from the Navy. Initially elevated to prominence for bureaucratic reasons, presence was sustained both by organizational processes outside the Navy’s control, and by policymakers’ belief in the very benefits the Navy had claimed presence could deliver. Naval forward presence is rooted in deep-seated American foreign policy beliefs that cross ideological divides. The idea that the nation, and the world, cannot survive without a navy whose peacetime roles include deterring adversaries, preserving national credibility through crisis response, and policing the international system, is a uniquely American conceit. Ultimately, it also abuts against a physical reality: a navy tasked to do all these things, cannot do them all well.
These findings have two implications. First, attempts to solve the trade-off between presence and structural readiness by building more ships are unlikely to succeed, as presence demands, sustained by the power of the idea and organizational processes resistant to change, will continue apace and even rise as the fleet grows. Second, the rise of populist nationalism may challenge consensus support for presence by calling alliance commitments into question. However, hyper-partisanship associated with this movement could doom efforts to restore Navy structural readiness regardless. Therefore, whether presence remains popular or not, presence must be substantially reduced to preserve the United States’ ability to deter, or if necessary, defeat China.
This interdisciplinary article analyses and interprets selected isiXhosa written poetry texts published during the post-apartheid era. The texts are contextualised in order to expose the poets’ concerns about: the influx to South Africa, after 1994, of American and European companies and industries; the increase of foreign “financial aid,” which makes the country permanently indebted and dependant; foreign dependence of South Africans who have abandoned the traditional economic activities like agriculture and co-operatives; concern for materialism and consumerism, which have led to lack of ethics, Africanism, and Afrocentrism values; and the abandonment of the socialist programme, which promised upliftment of the poor and was substituted with a neoliberal programme due to foreign influence. A call is made by the poets for Afrocentrism and sustainable development of South Africa. The poets warn that failure to confront the challenges by the self-centred elitist leadership may result in the resumption of a second revolution. The study, which employs a general Marxist approach, therefore, goes beyond text-based exegesis as selected texts are examined against the background of international geopolitics. This methodology locates the texts within the framework of their context, analysing and interpreting them to expose the post-apartheid poets’ commentary on the neoliberal strategy led by America, which, scholars argue, is directed towards the Global South. The liberal democratic model promoted in South Africa by the above-mentioned country, which was adopted by the African National Congress-led South African government, according to the poets, raises grave concerns as it provides political freedom that is devoid of economic freedom.
Background. The formation of a new world order raises the issue of global security. Today, 9 countries possess nuclear weapons. They are unofficially called the "nuclear club". They include: The United States of America, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the French Republic, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of India, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the State of Israel, which does not officially confirm the presence of nuclear warheads. Given the growing confrontation between these states, in particular the United States, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the French Republic on one hand, and the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the other, the question arises of a mechanism for deterring, controlling, and preventing a conflict that, without exaggeration, could become the last conflict of human civilization. It is also necessary to take into account other threats and challenges that directly affect global security, such as climate change, migration, the threat of famine, soil degradation, lack of drinking water, etc. International security institutions can and should act as such structures. Today's security organizations cannot perform these security functions, so there is an urgent question of their transformation in order to increase their ability to ensure and maintain global peace and order. The purpose is to study the transformation of international security institutions in the context of the formation of a new world order. The object of study is international security institutions. Methods. The research methods used are modern general and special methods of scientific research, including, in particular: analysis was used to process scientific and analytical sources; structural and functional - to study the actors of the international security system; inductive and deductive - to analyze and summarize information on the subject of the study; forecasting and synthesis methods were used to formulate conclusions and recommendations based on the results of the study. Results. The author reviews scientific and analytical works on the issues of the formation of a new world order and the transformation of international security institutions. The author emphasizes the issues that constitute the main problem of transformation of international security institutions in the context of the formation of a new world order. At the same time, the author states that the analysis of research and publications by domestic and foreign scholars on the change of global security players in the new environment allows to conclude that, at present, during the rapidly changing global security situation, they have not substantively studied the transformation of existing security institutions. Further, based on the analysis of the current security situation in the world and the impact of existing international security institutions on it, the researcher showed the main directions that, in his opinion, are aimed at understanding the transformation of international security institutions in the context of the formation of a new world order, and therefore at ensuring global security. Conclusions. The study has led to the following conclusions: the analysis of the works of domestic and foreign scholars and analysts has made it possible to outline the main existing problems with the activities and possible transformation of international security institutions in the context of the formation of a new world order and to state that more attention should be paid to it in order to ensure international peace and stability. The analysis of the current international situation has shown that the activities of the existing international security organizations in the context of global transformations do not meet current requirements and do not contain clearly defined ways to address this issue, and therefore require reflection and initiation of measures to transform international institutions into more effective and efficient international security bodies for ensuring and maintaining security. The study also notes that the involvement of the scientific and political community in the processes of transformation of international security institutions in the context of the formation of a new world order is an important aspect of enhancing the status, role, image and authority of international security organizations.
The chapter argues that while the U.S. has historically wielded significant power through both military might and economic means, its approach to global dominance has evolved, particularly since the fall of the Soviet Union. By integrating critical geo-economics with structural power theories, it highlights how the U.S. employs economic instruments—such as sanctions, trade policies, and international financial institutions—to project power and maintain influence. By incorporating insights from scholars like Mikael Wigell, Susan Strange and Michael Cox, the chapter offers a deeper exploration of how great powers construct their own worlds, both culturally and economically. The chapter concludes by addressing the perceived decline of U.S. weight in international system and exploring why, despite political motivations that might undermine its dominance. Inspired by John Adams's composition, this narrative weaves together geopolitical, economic, and cultural dimensions to present a holistic view of U.S. strategic moves in a changing world.
The United Nations (UN) Summit of the Future was a once-in-a-decade summit to work on UN reform. This article studies the Summit from the perspective of the broader crisis of liberal international order as well as the lifecycle of international organizations. It identifies the leadership by Secretary-General Guterres as critical in terms of agenda-setting but also preparing the road towards the summit. It furthermore stresses the embedding of the UN in a much broader external network of like-minded actors which have helped to increase the momentum of the Summit. It argues that the proposals by the Secretary-General should be considered an innovative attempt at institutional layering. Adding new governance layers, addressing common problems, to the UN clearly made sense, yet this approach was ultimately weakened in the interstate negotiations between the member states leading up to the Summit.
During the last 20 years, Spanish governments have been accommodated to a “declining mode” for a recognised middle power. Despite this future, Spain has strong links to Europe in geography, culture, interests and necessity. Not only the capabilities recovery after the Great Recession and the COVID-19 pandemic is vital for Spain, but also his reputation as a reliable partner and capable middle power with interests worldwide, with intrinsically imbibed resources such as culture, language, population preparation and still notable international capacities. However, his reputation is always tainted by the Black Legend postulated around Europe, other Western countries and even globally. Correctly understanding the country’s reputational and narrative situation and any analysis of Spain’s views, expectations, and support for the European project and security will be useless and biased.
One of the problems with the problem of world order is that what makes for order within societies is often precisely what makes for disorderly relations between them. I argue in this short essay that many of the problems with the problem of world order arise from assumptions that are widely shared within a discipline where the language of power and interest dominates and where a view of states as “like units” permeates. With more emphasis on values and visions of the good life, and acceptance that the ontological foundation of IR is difference rather than sameness, the debates about the problem of world order would take on a different form. The essay adapts the work of Hedley Bull and introduces the concept of “resilience-governance” to distinguish between resilience as a practice of self-governance taking place within ordering domains and resilience as a practice of “diversity-governance” taking place between ordering domains. The combination of the two allows for a bifocal view into how practices of resilience as self-governance may produce order within individual domains but will at the same time increase diversity and difference between the ordering domains, hence making the practices of resilience as diversity-governance much more challenging.
2019 can be considered a symbolic year for the North Atlantic Treaty Organi- zation. On the one hand, the longest-lasting military-political block of modern times celebrated its seventieth anniversary; on the other hand, this circular date coincided with the thirtieth anniversary of the fall of the Iron Curtain. Indeed, the North Atlantic Alliance had something to be proud of: it managed not only to survive its geopolitical visage of the Cold War era – the Soviet Union – but also to accept new countries that were either part of the USSR or were in its sphere of influence. But it would be inappropriate to claim that the post-Cold War period has been an “easy walk” for NATO. Of course, there was an expan- sion of “Pax Atlantica” due to the entry of countries that were on the other side of the “Iron Curtain”. It is noteworthy, however, that precisely this step is often seen as one of the reasons for the gradual deterioration of relations between the West and the Russian Federation. Assessing the impact of the post-bipolar ex- pansion of the North Atlantic Alliance on the deterioration of relations between the West and the Russian Federation largely depends on the specific framework applied. On the one hand, political idealists see the NATO enlargement as the realization of each states’ natural right to choose its own foreign policy: in the end, the states of the former “socialist camp” themselves opted for Euro-At- lantic integration. On the other hand, supporters of political realism, for whom the balance of power and spheres of influence remain the main determinants of international relations, consider the enlargement of NATO to be a tool for asserting the U.S. global dominance after the collapse of the USSR. Some rea- lists argue that the post-bipolar enlargement of NATO, allegedly initiated and promoted by the United States, was perceived in the Russian Federation as an encroachment on its “legitimate” sphere of interests, hence contributing to the Kremlin’s turn to aggressive revisionism. However, the assertion that the United States should “recognize reality” and return to a policy of balance of power is overly focused on the geopolitical games of the so-called “great po- wers,” where other states, including Ukraine, are only objects whose interests are irrelevant. In any case, the question of NATO enlargement is not a defining issue, but merely a symptom of the underlying problems of the post-bipolar – or rather transitional – world order, whose transformation is a matter of time.
How do Southeast Asian states perceive a China-led regional order? To answer this question, we conducted a survey of elites from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, countries that are “least likely” to acquiesce to a China-led regional order. Our survey indicates that although most elites view China as influential and have a cultural affinity with it, they do not perceive China as having the authority to preside over the regional order. They do not identify with China's political values and the normative order it propounds. Our survey also reveals the salience of ASEAN as the region navigates great power rivalry. We explain these views by drawing from the concept of legitimate authority. Our findings are significant; if China cannot persuade its Southeast Asian neighbours of its right to lead, it will be even harder for China to exercise global leadership.
This article offers a critical perspective of the discourse of deep engagement that portrays the United States as the world’s necessary or indispensable power. It describes deep engagement as a social narrative that, like literary narratives, has a story, a plot and an argument. This narrative has persisted in a time of waning hegemony because it makes an apparently appealing moral case for American global leadership. Yet deep engagement remains flawed from a strategic perspective and disregards the history of great-power rise and decline. From a strategic perspective, while hegemons describe their leadership in moral terms, their rhetoric is often betrayed by their actions. From a historical perspective, while hegemons regard their own efforts and values as instrumental to their status, their rise can be credited to a wave of economic and political forces the state cannot control.
We develop a co-evolutionary decoupling model to explain the decoupling process and its contributors, based on a Chinese bank's dynamic interdependency with the US-led global financial system. This decoupling is the joint outcome of the firm's strategic adaptations in response to economic, institutional, and geopolitical environmental challenges. By incorporating co-evolution and international relations perspectives into international business research, we reveal how and when non-economic environmental factors can decisively hinder a firm's, especially an EMNE's, internationalisation. This study provides new firm-level evidence on the ongoing Sino-US decoupling process, extending our understanding of international business through co-evolution and international relations perspectives.
Art has apparently followed political power for much of history, while avoiding representations of social, subaltern, and political resistance, or experimentation with new approaches to emancipation. Less obviously, however, this article outlines how a creative synthesis of critique, politics, and representation has led to an evolving form of 'artpeace'. This concept appears to have been related to power and was thus limited and Eurocentric in the past, but more importantly it has also provided a platform for critical agency, resistance, and experimentation, with implications for the politics of peacemaking. This article outlines what this means for various strands of artpeace and their possible conceptual implications.
International institutions are increasingly under attack from their member states, who embark on varying and sometimes escalating modes of contestation. At the same time, states’ negative institutional power, i.e. their opportunities to avoid undesired outcomes in international institutions, has been declining for some time. This paper claims that dissatisfied states’ negative institutional power endowments are key to understanding their varying contestation modes: the more limited (extensive) the negative institutional power of dissatisfied states in an institution, the more radical (moderate) modes of institutional contestation they will choose. We argue that, all else equal, states’ (1) inside options to prevent undesired outcomes within the institution and (2) their outside options to evade undesired outcomes by leaving the institution jointly condition whether they choose a strategy of voice, subversion, exit, or rollback to contest the dissatisfying institution. We assess the plausibility of our Negative Institutional Power Theory (NIPT) by means of four detailed case studies of the Trump Administration’s contestation of the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, the Paris Agreement, and the Iran Nuclear Deal. We demonstrate the generalizability of our arguments by assessing our claims across eight additional instances of other dissatisfied powers’ contesting different international institutions. The twelve case studies demonstrate that negative power matters for states’ choice of institutional contestation modes. Our findings suggest that whether, in the future, international institutions will be increasingly challenged from within and outside, can be influenced by reforms that grant (or deny) states negative institutional power.
When and where are kin-states more likely to engage in militarized territorial expansion against a kin-group's state of residence, i.e., irredentism, rather than merely employing irredentist rhetoric or engaging in non-irredentist kin-state politics that focus on nurturing cultural ties with co-ethnics abroad? For example, Why did Russia pursue an irredentist policy and annex Crimea but a non-irredentist one toward Narva? Why pursue the annexation of Crimea in 2014 but not in the 1990s or the early 2000s? Various valuable domestic explanations have been proposed, including diversionary war theory, shifts in regime type, and socioeconomic changes; but none has centered on balance of power considerations. I emphasize the role of two variables, whether the kin-group’s state of residence is within or outside the core alliance network of a particular pole and the polarity of the international system at any given point in time, operationalized through the number of poles in the system (one, two, or many). I contend that kin-states are unlikely to target any state of residence that is affiliated with the core alliance network of a pole. Furthermore, I argue that variations in polarity shape the nature and location of irredentism. In a bipolar system, irredentism is likely to take the form of proxy warfare outside each bloc. In a unipolar system, irredentism is more likely in areas where the hegemon exercises the least influence—such as areas linked to a former pole. Finally, in a multipolar system, irredentism is more likely to be pursued by rising powers against neighbors not affiliated with alliance networks of a pole in the international system. I evaluate my argument using an existing dataset of both actual and potential irredentist cases from 1946 to 2014, supplemented by illustrative case studies.
This chapter starts by providing a historical account geared toward shedding light about how recent historical events have been shaping the complexity of our times. It is fundamental to understand that the evolution of different narratives has been modifying international relations and the way these international dynamics are re-polarizing the world we experience today. A world which represents important challenges at the levels of governance, ecology, equality, and inclusion. The second section of the chapter focuses on the concept of polycrisis and risk perception. Here, I contend that the public's perception of risk is intricately intertwined with how influential groups shape the international and political agenda. Consequently, the sensation of uncertainty and vulnerability to uncontrollable events arises because of constructed narratives that seek, whether directly or indirectly, to polarize and fragment societies and the entire international system. The chapter finalizes considering that a humanistic leadership approach can help to mitigate the consequences of the aforementioned problems. I focus on three main elements that by playing together with a humanistic approach could ensure durable effects on leading a paradigm shift: a humanistic approach to business education; a responsible approach to innovation; and the implementation of the principles of a H2H marketing approach.
Under the trend of digitalization, especially accelerated by the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, semiconductor chips have become an important resource not only for digital transformation but also for economic, political, and military development and leadership. United States CHIPS and Science Act was implemented by Biden’s administration to secure the US’s hegemonic position. The global technological competition is manifested in the US-China technology war. Countries in Asia, which are in the midst of the US-China rivalry, are forced to choose sides as the world order tends to transform into a realist or bounded order argued by Mearsheimer, while simultaneously, those Asian countries are eager to achieve technological development, specifically in the production of the semiconductor industry. In addition to the development of the semiconductor industry in Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, Southeast Asian countries, such as Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Thailand have increased their semiconductor capacity. Furthermore, Singapore is Taiwan’s second-largest trading partner in terms of semiconductor industry, while Malaysia is the fourth-largest. Trade between Taiwan and these five Southeast Asian countries accounts for approximately 20 percent of Taiwan’s global trade in the IC sector in 2022. Interestingly, Taiwan’s exports to these five Southeast Asian countries in these two decades, from 2001 to 2022, increased by more than 1000 percent, reaching around US14 billion. This research further studies the trade relations in the IC sector between Taiwan and Southeast Asian countries in the midst of the US-China semiconductor war. The Implication of this study, in terms of the geoeconomics of semiconductors, is that first, increasing the export of IC to the Southeast Asian market would be a feasible strategy for Taiwan to de-risk or even de-couple with China amid the US-China technology war. Second, regionalization will be strengthened to secure a resilient supply chain in the semiconductor industry after the outbreak of COVID-19 and the intensifying US-China rivalry as well as the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
The global financial system is the economic bedrock of the contemporary liberal economic order. Contrary to other global-economy areas, finance is rarely analyzed in discussions on contestations of economic liberalism. However, a quite comprehensive process of external contestation of the global financial order (GFO) is underway. This contestation occurs through the rising share of emerging market economies within global finance in recent years, especially the rise of the BRICS economies. This Element investigates whether and how the BRICS contest the contemporary GFO by conducting a systematic empirical analysis across seven countries, eleven issues areas and three dimensions. This contestation occurs across issue areas but is mostly concentrated on the domestic and transnational dimension, not the international level on which much research focuses. Rather than the entire BRICS, it is especially China, Russia and India that contest liberal finance. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
This chapter provides a general assessment of how technology has been impacting the study of International Relations (IR), especially addressing the influence of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR). The latter is posing significant shifts in (inter)national economic and political dynamics because of the emergence of new disruptive technologies that span the physical and digital worlds. IR theory must continue to explore techno-politics to deepen the intersection between IR and science and technology studies (STS), which is fundamental to understanding and explaining the current international system. Finally, it shows how, despite the transnational nature of technological issues, rising techno-nationalism is contributing to reducing international cooperation and reinforcing the crisis of multilateralism.
In recent years, the gradual fall of the liberal international order, once heralded as the “end of history”, has become an indisputable fact. The world politics aims to explain changes in the nature and foundational systems of international relations, as well as global and domestic politics. Examining the decline of the liberal international order through the paradigm of world politics can comprehensively elucidate the factors affecting the development of both international relations and domestic politics simultaneously, thereby theoretically unifying the two fields. This paper examines the decline of the liberal international order from the perspective of world politics and posits that its decline is attributable to both internal and external reasons: Internally, the economic foundations, rule enforcement, and value propositions of the liberal international order harbor “the seeds of its own destruction”; externally, the influence of developing countries on the traditional value chain, the revisionist foreign policy of major powers, and the politics of striving for recognition have accelerated the decline of the liberal international order. Ultimately, this paper concludes that the decline of the liberal international order is inevitable and, with the waning of the unipolar pattern, the world order is destined to evolve towards a more equitable and fair direction.
The Indo-Pacific concept grew out of a movement to refocus and redefine the Asia-Pacific region to include the Indian Ocean and South Asia, largely as a result of China’s rise. Over the past 10 years, an increasing number of Indo-Pacific strategies have been officially released in the region and beyond. The first question this article tackles is the following: What are the key drivers behind the rise of Indo-Pacific strategies? We argue that Indo-Pacific strategies have become a fast-moving experimenting space for countries searching for adjustment strategies to at least two concurrent deep trends in a changing global order: the great recent shift in the balance of power most vividly characterized by an increasingly assertive China, and the peaking of the liberal globalization experiment and the return of economic security to the fore. We are also concerned with the comparative angle to this question. In particular, how do Indo-Pacific strategies vary among key countries? And finally, how does the Canadian strategy fit within the broader landscape of Indo-Pacific strategies? In answer to these questions, the article develops a typology of existing Indo-Pacific strategies and how they each insert themselves in the current transitionary stage. Finally, we turn to Canada’s own Indo-Pacific strategy and its key features and drivers, including a discussion of Canada’s approach vis-à-vis China. We argue that this represents a touchstone in how Canada is responding to great power shifts and the erosion of the liberal international order.
Shrouded in myth and anecdote, diplomatic conferences are a place where old orders perish and new ones are born. They often stand for new beginnings and innovation in international politics. Frequently, they are not only a place where a new order is proclaimed, but in fact themselves contribute to the institutionalization of this new order. This is because conferences link political practice and institutional structure and thereby themselves can become the heart of a new political order. This introduction summarizes the state of research on conference diplomacy and provides a simple typology to demonstrate its diversity before briefly introducing the individual contributions of our book.
Recent international developments have given new relevance to the concept of middle power and necessitated its clarification. The states of the World Majority, with their growing potential and desire for a role in shaping the international order, could be termed as new middle powers or—to adapt an originally liberal metaphor of “good international citizens” to the new global reality—as good citizen of the World Majority. The list of new middle powers is potentially unlimited, with World Majority citizenship open to anyone ready to accept it.
This paper revisits the debate about foreign policy implications of Chinese nationalism in the context of China's increasingly confrontational and assertive behavior in recent years. It argues that while the Chinese government made effective efforts to control popular nationalism and Chinese foreign policy was therefore not dictated by emotional nationalistic rhetoric before 2008, it has become more willing to follow the popular nationalist calls to take a confrontational position against the Western powers and to adopt tougher measures in maritime territorial disputes with its neighbors. This strident turn is partially because the government is increasingly responsive to public opinion, but more importantly because of the convergence of Chinese state nationalism and popular nationalism calling for a more muscular Chinese foreign policy. Enjoying an inflated sense of empowerment supported by its new quotient of wealth and military capacities, and terrified of an uncertain future due to increasing social, economic and political tensions at home, the communist state has become more willing to play to the popular nationalist gallery in pursuing the so-called core national interests. These developments have complicated China's diplomacy, creating a heated political environment to harden China's foreign policy.
The prevailing model of international economic regimes is strictly positivistic in its epistemological orientation and stresses the distribution of material power capabilities in its explanatory logic. It is inadequate to account for the current set of international economic regimes and for the differences between past and present regimes. The model elaborated here departs from the prevailing view in two respects, while adhering to it in a third. First, it argues that regimes comprise not simply what actors say and do, but also what they understand and find acceptable within an intersubjective framework of meaning. Second, it argues that in the economic realm such a framework of meaning cannot be deduced from the distribution of material power capabilities, but must be sought in the configuration of state-society relations that is characteristic of the regime-making states. Third, in incorporating these notions into our understanding of the formation and transformation of international economic regimes, the formulation self-consciously strives to remain at the systemic level and to avoid becoming reductionist in attributing cause and effect relations. The article can therefore argue that the prevailing view is deficient on its own terms and must be expanded and modified. Addressing the world of actual international economic regimes, the article argues that the pax Britannica and the pax Americana cannot be equated in any meaningful sense, and that the postwar regimes for money and trade live on notwithstanding premature announcements of their demise.
What brings credit and prestige to a nation in the eyes of its citizens? Taking a multi‐dimensional approach, we investigate national pride in the country's science, economy, arts and literature, and sport. Data from the International Social Survey Programme's 24 nation ‘National Identity’ module ( N = 30,894) show that people throughout the developed world feel national pride in all these things, contrary to most globalization hypotheses. Pride in the economy shows the most variation among nations, and pride in science also varies greatly, while pride in the arts and literature and in sport vary less. Regression analyses show that linkages of pride to national attachment also vary cross‐culturally: pride in science is more consequential in English‐speaking countries but pride in arts less consequential; pride in sports matters especially in smaller nations; and pride in economic achievements matters everywhere.
The United States-China relationship is more likely than not to slide into economic and military competition, despite the perhaps best intentions of both states. This new bipolar competition is not inevitable. The key question is whether both governments have the self-restraint to limit domestic rent-seeking interests who will undoubtedly demand protection at home and exclusivity in their spheres of influence abroad. If not, the new superpowers will, like great powers in the past, 'race' for economic privileges that can quickly divide the world up into exclusive blocs. Like the security dilemma, great powers need not actually exclude one another from their economic zones; the fear of exclusion alone is enough to ignite the process of division. There was always some likelihood of a competitive economic spiral given China's close business-government relations in a 'state-capitalist' economy. Now, for the first time in seven decades, there is a chance that the United States, in the grips of economic nationalism,might abandon its historic policy of free trade and ignite a new race for economic privilege as well. © The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Institute of International Relations, Tsinghua University. All rights reserved.
In June 2016, the United Kingdom shocked the world by voting to leave the European Union. As this book reveals, the historic vote for Brexit marked the culmination of trends in domestic politics and in the UK’s relationship with the EU that have been building over many years. Drawing on a wealth of survey evidence collected over more than ten years, this book explains why most people decided to ignore much of the national and international community and vote for Brexit. Drawing on past research on voting in major referendums in Europe and elsewhere, a team of leading academic experts analyse changes in the UK’s party system that were catalysts for the referendum vote, including the rise of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), the dynamics of public opinion during an unforgettable and divisive referendum campaign, the factors that influenced how people voted and the likely economic and political impact of this historic decision.
This article widens the analysis of international organisations by including communist organisations, in particular the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). Drawing on archival research in Moscow, Bucharest, Berlin, Geneva and Rome, this article traces the origins, the evolution and the collective actorness of both organisations. Both COMECON and the Warsaw Pact went through a process of institutionalisation, reorganisation and multilateralisation and began to share many characteristics with their Western counterparts, such as the European Economic Community and NATO. Contrary to conventional wisdom these organisations thus developed into multilateral international organisations, which the other members could use to challenge Soviet unilateralism. Comparing COMECON and the Warsaw Pact with each other and with their Western counterparts, this article shows how these Eastern European international organisations contributed to shifting the balance of power within the Soviet Bloc by empowering their members as sovereign states and themselves as collective actors.
The last 40 years has seen slow growing earnings and income for the middle class, as well as rising overall inequality. In contrast, the early postwar period witnessed rapid gains in wages and family income for the middle class and a moderate fall in inequality. The ‘booming’ 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s did not bring much relief to the middle class, with median income growing by only 2% (in total) between 1989 and 2012. The stagnation of middle class living standards since 1973 or so is attributable to the slow growth in earnings. While average earnings almost doubled between 1947 and 1973, it advanced by only 22% from 1973 to 2012. The main reason for the stagnation of labor earnings derives from a clear shift in national income away from labor towards capital, with overall profitability rising either back to previous postwar highs or to new highs by 2012. Based on regression analysis, a positive and significant connection is found between top income shares and the profit share. The unionization rate, computer investment per worker, the minimum wage, and the unemployment rate are also significantly related to top income shares.
The battle for the common currency may be remembered as one of the more useless in Europe's history. The euro is hailed as a solution to high unemployment, low growth, and the high costs of welfare states. But the deep budget cuts required before integration are already causing pain and may trigger severe recessions. If the European Monetary Union goes forward, a common currency will eliminate the adjustments now made by nominal exchange rates, and the central bank will control money with an iron fist. Labor markets will have to do the adjusting, a mechanism bound to fail, given those markets' inflexibility in Europe.
Christopher Layne of Los Angeles is an unaffiliated scholar. He is presently a consultant to the government contracts practice group of the law firm of Hill, Wynne, Troop and Meisinger, which represents major firms in the defense industry.
I am extremely grateful to the following colleagues who reviewed various drafts of this paper and offered helpful criticisms: John Arquilla, Ted Galen Carpenter, Kerry Andrew Chase, Jeffry Frieden, John Mearsheimer, Benjamin C. Schwarz, Jack Snyder, Stephen Walt, and Kenneth Waltz. I also thank Stephen Van Evera and David Spiro for providing me copies of, and permission to quote from, their unpublished works.
1. I use the term "democratic peace theory" because it is a convenient shorthand term. However, strictly speaking, the claim that democracies do not fight democracies is a proposition, or hypothesis, rather than a theory. Democratic peace "theory" proposes a causal relationship between an independent variable (democratic political structures at the unit level) and the dependent variable (the asserted absence of war between democratic states). However, it is not a true theory because the causal relationship between the independent and dependent variables is neither proven nor, as I demonstrate in this article, adequately explained. See Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses, Laws and Theories: A User's Guide," unpub. memo, Department of Political Science, MIT.
2. Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), chap. 7; and Russett, "Can A Democratic Peace Be Built?" International Interactions, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Spring 1993), pp. 277-282.
3. In this article, I build upon and expand the criticisms of democratic peace theory found in John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56; and Kenneth N. Waltz, "America as Model for the World? A Foreign Policy Perspective," PS (December 1991), pp. 667-670.
4. Other cases of crises between democratic great powers that might be studied include Anglo-French relations during the Liberal entente cordiale of 1832-48, Franco-Italian relations during the late 1880s and early 1890s and, if Wilhelmine Germany is classified as a democracy, the Moroccan crises of 1905-06 and 1911 and the Samoan crises of 1889 and 1899. These cases would support my conclusions. For example, from 1832 to 1848, the Foxite legacy disposed England's Whigs to feel a strong commitment to France based on a shared liberal ideology. Yet Anglo-French relations during this period were marked by intense geopolitical rivalry over Belgium, Spain, and the Near East, and the threat of war was always a factor in the calculations of policymakers in both London and Paris. Foreign Minister Lord Palmerston profoundly distrusted French ambitions and constantly urged that England maintain sufficient naval power to defend its interests against a French challenge. See Kenneth Bourne, Palmerston; The Early Years, 1784-1841 (New York: Macmillan, 1982), p. 613. Also see Roger Bullen, Palmerston, Guizot and the Collapse of the Entente Cordiale (London: Athlone Press, 1974); and Sir Charles Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, Vol. I: 1830-1841, Britain, The Liberal Movement and The Eastern Question (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1951). Italy challenged France for Mediterranean ascendancy although the two nations were bound by liberalism, democracy, and a common culture. The two states engaged in a trade war and came close to a real war. France apparently was dissuaded from attacking Italy in 1888 when the British Channel Fleet was sent to the Italian naval base of La Spezia. Italy was prevented from attacking France by its military and economic weakness. See C.J. Lowe and F. Marzari, Italian Foreign Policy, 1870-1940 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975, chap. 4; C.J. Lowe, The Reluctant Imperialists: British Foreign Policy 1879-1902 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), Vol. I, pp. 147-150; John A.C. Conybeare, Trade Wars: The Theory and Practice of International Commercial Rivalry (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), pp. 183-188.
5. Melvin Small and J. David Singer first observed the pattern of democracies not fighting democracies in a 1976 article: Small and Singer, "The War-proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816-1865," Jerusalem Journal of...
Ido Oren is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota. He is currently an SSRC-MacArthur Foundation Fellow on Peace and Security in a Changing World.
I thank the following individuals (some of whom disagreed with my argument) for helpful counsel: William Dixon, Geoff Eley, Scott Gates, Jeff Legro, Rhona Leibel, Yair Magen, John Mearsheimer, Andy Moravcsik, Dick Price, Diana Richards, Bruce Russett, Marc Trachtenberg, Stephen Van Evera, Bill Wohlforth, Amy Zegart, two anonymous referees, and especially Raymond Duvall and James Farr. Ethan Cherin and Luigi Cocci extended excellent research assistance.
1. William Clinton, Confronting the Challenges of a Broader World (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1993).
2. President Clinton's State of the Union Message, January 1994, quoted in John M. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), p. 87.
3. For example, the motto of chapter 1 in Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), is excerpted from Wilson's 1917 war message to Congress.
4. Key studies include: Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151-1169; Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdulali, "Regime Types and International Conflict, 1815-1976," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 33, No. 1 (March 1989), pp. 3-35; T. Clifton Morgan and Valerie L. Schwebach, "Take Two Democracies and Call Me in the Morning: A Prescription for Peace?" International Interactions, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1992), pp. 305-320; William Dixon, "Democracy and the Settlement of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 1 (March 1994), pp. 14-32; Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 624-638; and Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace. The recent studies by Russett and his collaborators are indicative of the high methodological sophistication attained by the literature. The technical quality of the statistical studies is not challenged here.
5. These features are central to Ted Robert Gurr's coding scheme, which is the most widely used in studies of the democratic peace. See Ted R. Gurr (Principal Investigator), Polity II: Political Structures and Regime Change, 1800-1986 (Codebook) (Ann Arbor: ICPSR No. 9263, 1990). Gurr's data are used, for example, by Dixon, Maoz and Abdulali, and Maoz and Russett (see fn. 4). Other researchers employ coding schemes that assign greater weight to indicators of civic, political, and economic freedom (e.g., Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," p. 1164). But despite the lack of definitional uniformity, the assignment of countries to the democratic/ liberal or to the autocratic/illiberal ends of the continuum must be consistent across the various studies or else the consensus on the robustness of the democratic peace finding would not have been as strong as it is.
6. See, e.g., Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics"; Dixon, "Democracy and the Settlement of International Conflict;" Maoz and Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace." For a helpful review of the theoretical debate see T. Clifton Morgan, "Democracy and War: Reflections on the Literature," International Interactions, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1993), pp. 197-203.
7. See, e.g., Morgan and Schwebach, "Take Two Democracies and Call Me in the Morning." Much of the work on the structural-institutional explanation of the democratic peace is formal-deductive, most notably: Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), chap. 5; David Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 1 (March 1992), pp. 24-37. These formal studies are imaginative, and their normative content—residing in the axiomatic assumptions—is less opaque than in the verbal explanations. Still, to verify their implications the formal studies rely on the same data used by the purely statistical studies.
8. For example, Gurr's Polity data are employed both by Morgan and Schwebach, "Take Two Democracies and Call Me in the Morning," and by Maoz and Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic...
This article qualitatively and empirically analyses the OSCE's efforts to promote democracy after intra-state war in Georgia. This regional organization is rooted in a comprehensive approach to security that directly links security to democratic values. Therefore, the OSCE is a particularly appropriate subject for studying the issue of democracy promotion in the context of conflict-resolution processes. Georgia provides a difficult environment for such a goal. Given that its two secession conflicts are 'frozen', democracy can, especially in this context, be considered a well-suited means to indirectly contribute to conflict resolution. By contrasting the democratic development in Georgia with OSCE activities since 1992, this article will assess OSCE democracy promotion efforts. When these efforts are measured with regard to progress in peace and democratic quality, the effectiveness of external democracy promotion by the OSCE has to be called into question. However, the article argues that democratization is a long-term process in which internal factors play a decisive role. The OSCE, like other international organizations, can only reach its normative goals to the degree of the reform orientation and political will of the target state's government. The potential for impact is limited, but can be increased by commitment and context sensitivity.
Since the Cold War ended, Western policymakers have sought to create security arrangements in Europe, as well as in other regions of the globe, that are based on international institutions. In doing so, they explicitly reject balance-of-power politics as an organizing concept for the post-Cold War world. During the 1992 presidential campaign, for example, President Clinton declared that, "in a world where freedom, not tyranny, is on the march, the cynical calculus of pure power politics simply does not compute. It is ill-suited to a new era." Before taking office, Anthony Lake, the president's national security adviser, criticized the Bush administration for viewing the world through a "classic balance of power prism," whereas he and Mr. Clinton took a "more 'neo- Wilsonian' view.
Jean Monnet's dream that European integration would eliminate conflict may have been a delusion. France and other countries do not share Germany's fixation on sound money--or its hegemonic vision. A European central bank would be unresponsive to local unemployment, while political union would remove competitive pressures within Europe for structural reform, prompting protectionism and conflict with the United States. A Europe of 300 million people and an independent military might be a force for world peace, but war is also a distinct possibility.
President Clinton has tried to pursue a foreign policy agenda even more ambitious than his predecessor's. But as international realities and domestic priorities become clear, he has been forced to retreat in area after area of policy. The resulting flips and flops of policy toward Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, North Korea, and China have undermined U.S. credibility. But more important, they risk making Americans turn inward in dismay, forsaking the prudent internationalism that has characterized American foreign policy since World War II. Let us abandon a kind of leadership we are not prepared to exercise on behalf of a world order the price of which we have no intention of paying.
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- Robert Gilpin
- War
Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983);
Can Democracy Survive Global Capitalism?
- Robert Kuttner
Robert Kuttner, Can Democracy Survive Global Capitalism? (New York: W.W. Norton, 2018),
p. 74.
Restoring the Role of the Nation-State in the Liberal International Order," address to the German Marshall Fund
- R Secretary Of State Michael
- Pompeo
Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, "Restoring the Role of the Nation-State in the Liberal International Order," address to the German Marshall Fund, Brussels, Belgium, December 4, 2018,
https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/12/287770.htm.
Minority Nationalism and the Changing International Order
- Mitchell Young
- Eric Zuelow
- Andreas Sturm
Michael Keating and John McGarry, eds., Minority
Nationalism and the Changing International Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); and
Mitchell Young, Eric Zuelow, and Andreas Sturm, Nationalism in a Global Era: The Persistence of Nations (New York: Routledge, 2007).
Automation is also responsible for the disappearance of a substantial number of jobs, although it is difªcult to determine the relative importance of automation and outsourcing. See Susan N. Houseman
- John Gerard Ruggie
Liberalism also has an important particularist dimension to it, which is more in line with na-71. John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring 1982),
pp. 379-415, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706527.
72. Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox, p. 77.
73. Ibid., p. 163.
74. Automation is also responsible for the disappearance of a substantial number of jobs, although
it is difªcult to determine the relative importance of automation and outsourcing. See Susan N.
Houseman, "Understanding the Decline of U.S. Manufacturing Employment," Working Paper 18-287 (Kalamazoo, Mich.: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, June 2018), doi.org/
10.17848/wp18-287; and Claire Cain Miller, "The Long-Term Jobs Killer Is Not China. It's Automation," New York Times, December 21, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/21/upshot/thelong-term-jobs-killer-is-not-china-its-automation.html.
Post-Western World: How Emerging Powers Are Remaking Global Order
- Oliver Stuenkel
and Oliver Stuenkel, Post-Western World: How
Emerging Powers Are Remaking Global Order (Malden, Mass.: Polity, 2016), pp. 120-180.
China Is a Dangerous Rival, and America Should Treat It Like One
- Martin Feldstein
Martin Feldstein, "Tariffs Should Target Chinese Lawlessness, Not the Trade Deªcit," Wall
Street Journal, December 28, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/tariffs-should-target-chineselawlessness-not-the-trade-deªcit-11545955628. See also Derek Scissors and Daniel Blumenthal,
"China Is a Dangerous Rival, and America Should Treat It Like One," New York Times, January 14,
2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/opinion/us-china-trade.html; and Adam Segal,
"When China Rules the Web: Technology in Service of the State," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 97, No. 5
(September/October 2018), pp. 10-18, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-08-13/when-china-rules-web.
For the U.S. and China, a Technology Cold War That's Freezing Over
- Raymond Zhong
- Paul Mozur
Raymond
Zhong and Paul Mozur, "For the U.S. and China, a Technology Cold War That's Freezing Over,"
New York Times, March 23, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/23/technology/trumpchina-tariffs-tech-cold-war.html;
Fight Risks Fragmenting Global Market, Says Beijing Ambassador
- Chris Uhlmann
- Angus Grigg
Chris Uhlmann and Angus Grigg, "How the 'Five Eyes' Cooked
Up the Campaign to Kill Huawei," Sydney Morning Herald, December 13, 2018, https://www.smh
.com.au/business/companies/how-the-ªve-eyes-cooked-up-the-campaign-to-kill-huawei-20181213-p50m24.html; "U.S.-China Trade Fight Risks Fragmenting Global Market, Says Beijing
Ambassador," Wall Street Journal, November 26, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-chinatrade-ªght-risks-fragmenting-global-market-says-beijings-ambassador-to-the-u-s-1543228321;
The economic and military competition between Britain and Germany before World War I is also instructive in this regard
- David E Sanger
David E. Sanger et al., "In 5G Race with China, U.S. Pushes Allies to Fight Huawei," New York Times,
January 26, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/26/us/politics/huawei-china-us-5g-technology.html; and Martin Wolf, "The Challenge of One World, Two Systems," Financial Times,
January 29, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/b20a0d62-23b1-11e9-b329-c7e6ceb5ffdf.
94. The economic and military competition between Britain and Germany before World War I is
also instructive in this regard. See Markus Brunnermeier, Rush Doshi, and Harold James,
"Beijing's Bismarckian Ghosts: How Great Powers Compete Economically," Washington Quarterly,
Vol. 41, No. 3 (Fall 2018), pp. 161-176, doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2018.1520571.
Automation is also responsible for the disappearance of a substantial number of jobs, although it is difªcult to determine the relative importance of automation and outsourcing. See Susan N. Houseman
- Rodrik
Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox, p. 77.
73. Ibid., p. 163.
74. Automation is also responsible for the disappearance of a substantial number of jobs, although
it is difªcult to determine the relative importance of automation and outsourcing. See Susan N.
Houseman, "Understanding the Decline of U.S. Manufacturing Employment," Working Paper 18-287 (Kalamazoo, Mich.: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, June 2018), doi.org/
10.17848/wp18-287; and Claire Cain Miller, "The Long-Term Jobs Killer Is Not China. It's Automation," New York Times, December 21, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/21/upshot/thelong-term-jobs-killer-is-not-china-its-automation.html.
On the human costs of these "progressively worsening labor market opportunities," see Ann Case and Angus Deaton
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David Goodhart, The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics (London:
Hurst, 2017), pp. 147-192. On the human costs of these "progressively worsening labor market opportunities," see Ann Case and Angus Deaton, "Mortality and Morbidity in the 21st Century,"
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, Spring 2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/casetextsp17bpea.pdf.
Inequality and Rising Proªtability in the United States
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Wolff, "Inequality and Rising Proªtability in the United States, 1947-2012," International Review of
Applied Economics, Vol. 29, No. 6 (November 2015), pp. 741-769, doi.org/10.1080/02692171.2014
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Facundo Alvaredo et al., "World Inequality Report, 2018: Executive Summary" (Paris:
World Inequality Lab, 2017), https://wir2018.wid.world/ªles/download/wir2018-summaryenglish.pdf.
In fact, there is abundant evidence that states often continue trading with each other when they are at war, which is the most intense form of security competition
- Andrew E Judis
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- S Jack
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Judis, The Nationalist Revival, pp. 47-80, 117-142.
86. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, for example, puts limits only on U.S. and Russian arsenals, but not the Chinese arsenal, which is one reason it has collapsed. The treaty will
have to be renegotiated to include all three countries. Andrew E. Kramer, "The I.N.F. Treaty,
Explained," New York Times, October 23, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/23/world/
europe/inf-treaty-russia-united-states-trump-nuclear.html.
87. In fact, there is abundant evidence that states often continue trading with each other when
they are at war, which is the most intense form of security competition. Jack S. Levy and Katherine
Barbieri, "Trading with the Enemy during Wartime," Security Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Spring 2004),
pp. 1-47, doi.org/10.1080/09636410490914059.
The New Era of US-China Decoupling
- See Inter
- Alia Edward Luce
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