No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.
Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order
Abstract
The liberal international order, erected after the Cold War, was crumbling by 2019. It was flawed from the start and thus destined to fail. The spread of liberal democracy around the globe-essential for building that order-faced strong resistance because of nationalism, which emphasizes self-determination. Some targeted states also resisted U.S. efforts to promote liberal democracy for security-related reasons. Additionally, problems arose because a liberal order calls for states to delegate substantial decisionmaking authority to international institutions and to allow refugees and immigrants to move easily across borders. Modern nation-states privilege sovereignty and national identity, however, which guarantees trouble when institutions become powerful and borders porous. Furthermore, the hyperglobalization that is integral to the liberal order creates economic problems among the lower and middle classes within the liberal democracies, fueling a backlash against that order. Finally, the liberal order accelerated China's rise, which helped transform the system from unipolar to multipolar. A liberal international order is possible only in unipolarity. The new multipolar world will feature three realist orders: a thin international order that facilitates cooperation, and two bounded orders-one dominated by China, the other by the United States-poised for waging security competition between them. © 2019 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
... The order of a system is usually established and maintained by its dominant power(s) (Gilpin, 1981;Keohane, 1984;Mearsheimer, 2019). Order refers to various institutions and arrangements, including regimes, rules, and values, which facilitate and govern interaction among the units of the system. ...
... Mearsheimer asserts that the world order at any given time must reflect the system's structure, whether unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar (Mearsheimer, 2019), a line of thinking he seems to share with the Kremlin. ...
... Russian revisionism is not the only challenge to the liberal international order, whose state of health is widely debated. Ikenberry suggests the liberal international order is in a crisis, temporary or permanent (Ikenberry, 2018), while Mearsheimer asserts that, by 2019, the order was crumbling and had been destined to fail from the start (Mearsheimer, 2019). Indeed, the liberal international order had been undermined amid a surge of Islamic fundamentalism, the rise of a more ambitious China, anti-globalization movements, as well as challenges from within, such as right-wing populism, nationalism, and authoritarian governments in the US and Europe (Börzel & Zürn, 2021, p. 283). ...
Moscow explicitly challenges what it depicts as a Western-led world order amid shifts in the global balance of power. However, while Russia has emerged as a fundamentally revisionist power in the global system, it has sought to maintain the status quo in Arctic regional governance, that is, to preserve the institutions and arrangements that have cemented its status as a great regional power on top of the world. This study, challenging the notions of Arctic exceptionalism and a distinct Arctic regional order, points out an obvious inconsistency in Russia's approach. It argues that Moscow's attempt at dismantling the world order while maintaining the status quo in the Arctic seems bound to fail simply because the current rules-based, liberal international order has also been the order of the Arctic. In conclusion, this study finds that Russia so far has been more successful in diminishing its own Arctic status and isolating itself from formal as well as informal arrangements than revising them.
... An ideologically driven country with a strong military will be capable of taking effective steps to dominate a political environment, both regionally and internationally, and its ideology will gradually influence the public in other countries. Such a powerful country may choose either a soft or hard approach to subdue other parties (Mearsheimer, 2019). ...
Islam is a religion and an ideology encompassing all aspects of human life. However, many Muslims currently misunderstand and misinterpret the holistic concept of Islam. This can be attributed to the intellectual limitations within the Muslim community and the influence of secularism and liberalism across the Islamic world. This article aims to clarify Islam's perspective on domestic and foreign politics, including its principles, objectives, and practices. This article employs a qualitative approach through gathering data from Islamic sources and other relevant sources to examine foreign policy concepts. This paper argues that Islam forms the foundation of Islamic foreign policy to disseminate its message (da'wah), which can be practised by way of either peaceful approaches (diplomacy) or forceful means (warfare). Moreover, with respect to practical considerations as regards optimising foreign policy interests, reliable expert analysis can be sought on matters such as negotiation strategies and war. As this is an elaboration on Islamic foreign policy in general, this article proposes that more detail and practical Islamic foreign policy issues should be conducted with regard to future research.
... The LIO is a contested concept and I use it here as a shorthand for a set of rules and institutions that were normatively established in the aftermath of World War II and then augmented in practice at the end of the Cold War (Lake et al., 2021). Some scholars explicitly differentiate between a Cold War order and one practiced after the end of the Cold War (Mearsheimer, 2019). Others contend that the order merely got remoulded during a unipolar moment while retaining the same institutional and normative underpinnings (Acharya, 2018;Lake et al., 2021;Slaughter & LaForge, 2021). ...
Collective instruments, such as UN peacekeeping or mediation, are a lens through which we can examine broader normative fault lines in the international order. They hold both practical and symbolic value. In the post-Cold War moment, these instruments started reflecting liberal values. They became concerned with balancing the rights of individuals and state sovereignty. These advances around “human protection” are now in question, with contestation perceived as emerging from non-Western powers. I contribute to the debates on the “pragmatic turn” within collective responses but contend that while the focus in current debates about the normative shift has become global fragmentation, the momentum for the de-prioritization of human protection within collective instruments comes from within the liberal order itself. Human protection is now a broadly shared and firmly entrenched norm, but to shield the norm from abuse, the collective international community progressively restricted any use of force to advance the norm within the instrument of UN peacekeeping. The co-optation of UN peacekeeping into counter-terrorism efforts and the introduction of stabilization mandates undermined the principled nature and moral authority of the instrument of peacekeeping itself. This, in turn, compromised the implementation of human protection. This development is now accelerated and exposed due to global fragmentation, influencing not just peacekeeping but also other adjacent activities, such as mediation.
... Traditionally, IR scholars have treated uncertainty as a lack of information (what I will call an unknown) that is rectified with the introduction of new information. In this paradigm, states making the decision on what and how much to arm themselves with face two key unknowns: uncertainty about adversaries' intentions and uncertainty about the relative offensive advantage of (new) weaponry (Fearon 1995;Jervis 1978;Mearsheimer 2019;Pu 2019). If we understand these dilemmas as a lack of information, it follows that when actors gain new information, they can adjust their beliefs and behaviors accordingly (see introduction to this volume). ...
... Classical realism's state-centric view has continued to feature strongly in security and strategic studies. In the last four decades both strands within the International Relations discipline have attracted significant critical interpretations calling for more nuanced approaches (Booth, 1991a(Booth, , 1991bBuzan, 1983;Gray, 2018;Luttwak, 1987), but, although widely criticized (Kapstein, 1995;Lebow, 1994), realism has continued to maintain a strong position in the mainstream literature and various scholars expect it to remain as a major theoretical frame to understand international politics (Buzan, 1996;Mearsheimer, 2019). ...
... Explanations abound as to why the LIO and its main characteristics -institutionalized multilateralism, the promotion of individual liberties, the rule of law, and open markets -have become increasingly contested (per the debate among, e.g., Ikenberry 2018;Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Hofmann 2020;Mearsheimer 2019;Nye 2017;Alcaro 2018;Grewal 2018;Lake et al. 2021;Huang 2020;Copelovitch et al. 2020). Most approaches center on factors arguably exogenous to the LIO, such as global power shifts, notably the rise of China and US hegemonic decline (e.g. ...
It is widely acknowledged that the core institutions of the Liberal International Order (LIO) have in recent years been subject to increasingly intense contestation. There is less agreement on the sources of this contestation. This introductory paper to the Special Issue on "contestation in a world of liberal orders" makes two main contributions. First, the paper develops a theory of endogenous order contestation. It conceptualizes the LIO as a system of different types of sub-orders, which vary in the extent to which they reflect and promote liberal values and in the extent to which they are legally institutionalized. The paper explains how these different sub-orders generate their own types of order contestation. More liberally embedded and institutionalized sub-orders endogenously generate more intense and order-challenging contestation, while less liberal and less institutionalized orders are amenable to more modest and order-consistent contestation. Second, this paper identifies the specific endogenous mechanisms through which contestation shifts from order-consistent to order-challenging in especially these more liberally embedded and institutionalized sub-orders. It argues that not only liberal resistance to reform gives rise to order-challenging contestation, but even liberal accommodation and responsiveness can ultimately paralyze and ossify LIO institutions, which in turn lose legitimacy, frustrate would-be reformers, and drive them to order-challenging contestation. The different contributions to this special issue examine our core propositions across a range of economic, security, and social-political LIO sub-orders.
... "It was both a Gesellschaft -a 'society' defined by formal rules, institutions and governmental ties -and a Gemeinschaft -a 'community' defined by shared values, beliefs and expectations" (Ikenberry, 2018, p. 17). Although some consider it inherently flawed and conceptually misguided, even "bound to fail" (Glaser, 2019;Mearsheimer, 2019), the Cold War record of the LIO, in fact, reflects remarkable success. Yet, the word "success" here does not solely refer to the Western victory over international communism. ...
The future of international politics today hinges on the manner in which the Sino-American rivalry unfolds. Views of this vary from expectations of peaceful evolution to hegemonic transition, but many seem to overlook the significant potential of the liberal international order (LIO) in shaping the course of events. Thanks to its structure and adaptability, the LIO is more than the mere environment surrounding this rivalry and may be the primary determinant of American and Chinese choices, propelling relations toward cooperation. Drawing on liberal internationalist theory, this article argues that the LIO demonstrates substantial potential to emerge as the ultimate victor of the intensifying rivalry between great power rivalry. By evaluating multiple arguments, this article’s analysis concludes that a reformed version of the LIO, one that accommodates both American and Chinese expectations and reflects newly shaped power dynamics, holds the solution to the Sino-American conflict.
... The above-mentioned contentions are closely associated with the mushrooming literature on the decline of the primacy of the liberal international order in the context of the ever-obvious multipolarity (Mearsheimer 2019;Shattuck 2018). This trend has also addressed the function of the EU in the face of expanding 'illiberalism,' which has long been held as the true believer and promoter of this order (Anders and Lorenz 2021;Smith 2017). ...
... Udgives af Djøf Forlag den staerkeste magt i det moderne statssystems historie (Wohlforth, 1999 Resultatet er en krise i den liberale internationale orden (Ikenberry, 2018;Mearsheimer, 2019). Det international samfund befinder sig med Milan Babics ord i et »interregnum« (Babic, 2020), en kongeløs tid mellem den gamle regent USA's »abdicering« (Kristensen, 2017) og en ny ordens fremkomst. ...
Artiklen undersøger konsekvenserne af krigen i Ukraine for USA’s engagement i den europæiske sikkerhedsorden. Den europæiske orden analyseres som tyngdepunktet i en USA-ledet liberal international orden og udviklingen i det transatlantiske forhold ses på den baggrund som en afgørende betingelse for udviklingen i den europæiske sikkerhedsorden. Artiklens hovedpointe er, at krigen illustrerer en normalisering af Europa, der i de kommende år i mindre grad end tidligere vil være en undtagelse fra de magtpolitiske dynamikker, der karakteriserer det internationale system generelt. Gennem fortsat sikkerhedspolitisk afhængighed af USA står Europai de kommende år overfor en dobbelt udfordring i form af en trussel fra Rusland, som europæerne ikke kan imødegå alene, og en indlejring i en global stormagtsrivalisering mellem USA og Kina, som europæerne får svært ved at holde sig fri af, hvis de ønsker et fortsat amerikansk sikkerhedspolitisk engagement i Europa.
... Den pragmatiske ordensforståelse, som Waltz og ligesindede realister er eksponenter for, har således en markant -men også helt bevidst -tvetydighed indbygget i sig: orden er på den ene side fundamental, for det er anarkiets strukturerende effekter, der danner grundlag for alle interaktioner i det internationale system og tegner de mønstre, vi kan observere. På den anden side er orden også minimal, for orden er i sidste ende ikke andet end de magtpolitiske realiteter, stater må forsøge at tilpasse sig eller vil blive straffet for ikke at respektere (Waltz, 1979;Mearsheimer, 2019;Porter, 2020;Schweller, 2001). ...
Ruslands invasion af Ukraine sætter spørgsmålstegn ved den europæiske sikkerhedsorden og re-introducerer krig i relationerne mellem europæiske stater. For at kortlægge, hvordan man kan forstå og fortolke den udfordring, Rusland udgør for fred ogsikkerhed i Europa, diskuterer denne artikel ordensbegrebet i international politik. Artiklen prøver med andre ord at bringe orden i debatten om orden, og identificerer fire idealtypiske ideer om orden i den akademiske litteratur om international politik. Herved fremkommer et skel mellem en konstitutionel, hegemonisk, pragmatisk og relationel orden. De fire ordensforståelser bygger på forskellige forudsætninger om international politik og giver dermed også forskellige udgangspunkter for at diskutere og forstå, hvad der er på spil i de omfattende forandringer, europæisk sikkerhed undergår i øjeblikket. Herigennem fungerer artiklens debat af ordensbegrebet som et godt udgangspunkt for de specifikke analyser af den europæiske sikkerhedsorden, der udfoldes i temasektionens efterfølgende artikler.
Many of the in-built contradictions in the liberal international order were pointed out by critics early on. Why were these voices not heard? How was contestation ignored or made acceptable by the people governing within liberal sub-orders, articulating progress, rationality, and equality? Drawing on insights from the sociology of knowledge and theories of organizational culture, I address this puzzle through the lens of the ‘normalization of deviance’. Beyond understanding the challenges as a crisis of and within the liberal international order, I argue that they unveil the limitations of hegemonic expertise governing this order. Part of the current predicament of the liberal international order has to do with the entrenched positioning and organizational cultures of political leaders and experts, making them blind to their own blindness. As they justify deviations and defend ‘their’ order, they normalize contestation. The implications extend beyond the immediate challenges to the liberal international order, offering insights into reimagining its future and prompting a reconsideration of the discipline dedicated to understanding it.
Why the concept of a “period of strategic opportunity” was not expressed in the report on the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2022, as has been the case for the past 20 years, is a question worthy of further investigation. The ebb and flow of the liberal international order, as well as Biden's implementation of a tougher and more effective China policy than the Trump administration, have made the CCP leadership aware of the reduction of China's strategic opportunities. This has triggered changes in the Chinese Communist Party’s grand strategic rhetoric in the short period from 2020 to 2022. Analysis of the usage of the term “period of strategic opportunity” in China’s official documents over three periods, namely the 2000s, 2010s, and after 2020, and identifying the differences among influential Chinese scholars provides the tools to demonstrate and confirm the argument described above. Moreover, Chinese leadership no longer expresses China’s grand strategic plans as optimistically as they have over the past 20 years, but they still hope to maintain strategic stability with Washington to avoid prematurely losing more strategic opportunities.
Since the COVID-19 virus was declared a global pandemic, the member states of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS)—Turkiye, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Hungary—have tried to build solidarity with the support of the World Health Organization (WHO). Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the OTS mainly focused on cooperation issues such as culture, education, youth, trade, tourism and energy. The health field was also involved in these cooperation areas due to the pandemic. Member states have assisted each other with health supplies, carried out meetings with the participation of the WHO’s director-general, and worked on the development of joint response capacity, including a vaccine moral code and material solidarity among the Turkic states. This has played an effective role in strengthening the relations among them. Even regional organizations with strong institutionalization, such as the European Union (EU), had difficulty developing a standard policy. With protectionism on the rise, steps taken by Turkic states to facilitate trade between themselves can be considered an attempt to turn the crisis into an opportunity. Considering its 30-year history and the 2040 Vision Document, it is likely that the OTS will become increasingly important in the international political and financial system. Therefore, this chapter seeks to determine whether the OTS could play a leading role in integrating the Turkic states in health fields, which could eventually spread out to other potential cooperation areas. By doing so, this regional organization with strong ties in health, finance, economy, culture and politics may become one of the most influential structures shaping the socio-cultural environment of the post-pandemic order.
Uluslararası sistem içerisinde Çin’in ekonomik gücünün politik güç parametreleri üzerinde oynadığı rol Çin’in artan bölgesel girişimleri içerisinde daha belirgin hale gelmiştir. Çin’in refah kuşağı olarak tanımlanan Kuşak ve Yol Girişimi (KYG)‘nin, Çin’in ulusal hedeflerini veya dış politika stratejilerini karşılama noktasında ne ölçüde başarılı olduğu, sistem içerisinde güç geçişine ne derece imkan sağladığı ve genişleyen ekonomik gücünün siyasi yapı üzerinde nasıl bir etki yarattığı bu çalışma kapsamında ele alınacaktır. Çin’in öncülüğünde inşa edilen bu projenin sistem içerisinde yaratacağı dönüştürücü etki neorealist kuram kapsamında incelenecek, Organski tarafından tanımlanan ‘’güç geçişi’’ teorisi ile analiz edilecektir. Bu çalışma, KYG’nın sadece ekonomik işbirliği projesi statüsünden sıyrıldığı, jeopolitik hedefleri gerçekleştirme yolunda ilerleyen bir projeye doğru evrildiği yönündeki savı ön plana çıkartmıştır. Bu makale, ABD’nin egemen güç olduğu uluslararası düzende, KYG kapsamında gücünü arttırmaya devam eden Çin ile ileride bir güç geçişi yaşanacağını çalışma ileri sürmektedir.
Southeast Asian nations, at this point, are unable or unwilling to take an active role in protecting the rules-based liberal international order (LIO) from China-led threats, including territorial disputes. They prioritize economic growth and trade over security or geopolitical concerns, and are not willing to put their economy at risk. Southeast Asian nations are willing to accept Chinese investment because, with the exception of Japan which counters China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in aiding infrastructure and energy projects, there is not a viable alternative. The threat of Chinese economic coercion and fear of losing a key export market run high. Europe and America have mostly withdrawn from investing in Southeast Asia, but the EU’s Globally Connected Europe and the U.S.-led Build Back Better World initiative in 2021 provide hope. A joint U.S.-Europe-Japan-led alternative to the BRI can create new standards for transparency, along with clear mechanisms for fair arbitration, debt financing, and judicial processes. A clearer link between the rules and institutions underpinning the LIO and economic growth needs to be shown.
This article is devoted to the study of world order in modern political theory. The author shows that modern Anglo-American and Russian political science share common problems related to its study. First, modern internationalists often unjustifiably take the modern world order out of the context of historical development, contrasting it with the entire world history. Second, modern theories of world order are characterized by a high degree of normativity: political processes are assessed from moral and ethical or openly ideological (usually liberal) positions. Third, researchers today often exaggerate the originality, or uniqueness, of the modern world order, although many of its problems existed in the past. Also, in modern political literature the concepts of "order" and "system" are often confused. Moreover, the mechanism of change of world orders, their qualitative difference from each other, even their number and names have not been revealed. In this regard, the author focuses on two interrelated tasks: 1) to define the relationship between the terms "system" and "order of international relations"; 2) to designate the systemic characteristics of world orders, which will make it possible to identify their number, the mechanism of their change and their qualitative difference. The article aims at clarifying the terminology on the subject of world orders and suggests considering them as completed political systems, which have covered their development cycle – from inception to disintegration. The basic concept of the order is that of balance of power between the great powers and the values and rules of interaction established on its basis. The world order emerges as the result of a total war and is terminated by a total war. Some limited wars regulate relations within the world order. The two types of world orders, namely, the hegemonic order and the balance of power order, acted as two equal types of order. Their disintegration is due to objective reasons, namely, the change in the balance of power and degradation of legal norms, which leads to the emergence of extra-systemic revisionists. The author believes that today’s Yalta-Potsdam order is likely to follow the entire cycle of the development of its predecessors.
This article studies evolvement of the United States’ post-colonial Hong Kong (HK) policy from liberalism to realism. The author considers factors influencing this policy and differences between the White House/State Department and Congress in assessment of and reaction to developments in HK and responses to them. In 1992 Congress passed the United States-HK Policy Act which treated HK as a non-sovereign entity distinct from China, made the US a quasi-guarantor of HK’s autonomy and provided a framework for the advancement of US’s grand liberal strategy towards HK in pursuit of promotion of Western-style democracy in this special administrative region of China. During the first seventeen years after HK’s handover to China the US government paid little attention to HK and avoided public criticism of HK and China’s authorities over slow pace of territory’s democratization while some prominent anti-China hawks in Congress were unrestrained in such criticism. Pro-democracy protests of 2014 in HK did not alter US government’s cautious approach to HK. The Obama administration probably hoped for gradual democratic reforms in HK. Washington’s policy towards HK made a dramatic turn in 2018 on the back of rapidly deteriorating Sino-US relations after Donald Trump came to power. The Trump administration was disillusioned with the liberal agenda and was very eager to actively play a HK card against Beijing. Large scale 2019 protests/riots in HK, challenging China’s sovereignty over the territory, were publicly supported and in fact encouraged by top officials of the Trump administration and prominent Congressmen. After Beijing imposed the national security law (NSL) on HK in June 2020 anti-government movement was crashed. This prompted Trump to strip HK of certain privileges under the HK Policy Act. Due to NSL Washington lost many HK allies, its influence in the territory diminished and its ability to promote American democracy agenda was hampered. NSL signifies a final transition from American liberal strategy to realism vis-à-vis HK which is now fully covered by US’s China containment strategy. Washington will likely reduce its economic exposure to HK and use deep-seated anti-Beijing attitudes of some Hongkongers to undermine stability of this vulnerable territory of China.
This chapter investigates the impact of Kemalist strategic culture on Turkey’s foreign policy formation, maritime crisis, and the quest for strategic autonomy in response to geopolitical shifts toward the end and in the aftermath of the Cold War. It provides a critical analysis of the timeline of events from the 1970s to the early 2000s that discuss changes in Turkish foreign policy and maritime geopolitics. It sets forward political, economic, and legal arguments for and against early influences underpinning the emergence of the Blue Homeland concept in Turkey.
This chapter investigates modern origins of Turkey’s Blue Homeland concept from maritime modernization in the early republican era until the Cyprus Operation in 1974, including the role of nationalist sentiment in domestic politics on foreign policy outcomes. It also describes the political significance of the term Vatan in its historic context and its relevance to present-day politics using evidence of its extension into domains outside of Turkey’s territorial borders.
The United States and China are the great powers of the moment. The demise of American power and the rise of China have been a central narrative in international relations for many years and have promoted much speculation, both theoretically and empirically, about what we can expect from each as they vie for power and influence in the contemporary world order. The postwar arrangement that emerged after the Second World War consolidated the power and influence of both China and the United States (among others) in the international order. Since then, their relationship has fluctuated between engagement and competition, taking a more competitive turn in recent years owing to China’s rising economic, military, and diplomatic heft, and the corresponding license for greater autonomy this has conferred upon Beijing. In crude terms, both are great powers owing to their economic and military power, and their corresponding ability to influence world events well beyond their borders. In 2018, the US GDP was over $21 trillion, and China’s was over $14 trillion; that same year, the United States committed over $600 billion to military spending, with China spending over $168 billion (Kydd 2020, p. 855).
Recent challenges to the liberal international order ( LIO ) have called into question the efficacy of international organizations ( IO s) in global governance. However, it remains unclear if the anticipated crisis of the LIO affects all policy fields to the same degree. Based on organizational ecology, this article seeks to explain compositions and trajectories across three fields—climate, education, and health. It shows that the three subpopulations of IO s are stable since the early 2000s, while regional IO s constitute a significant share of the subpopulations. It further finds notable variation in the distribution of generalist and specialist IO s. While the number of generalist IO s in relation to specialist health IO s decreased over time, the article finds generalist education and climate IO s have been on the rise. It argues that—as policy issues grow ever more interconnected over time— IO s expand their thematic scopes to new niches.
O objetivo deste artigo é analisar a guerra comercial a partir da discussão
sobre o déficit comercial sob as perspectivas dos Estados Unidos e
da China, visando a avançar no debate ao caracterizar a natureza
tecnológica da disputa, e como ela se deu dentro da estrutura da ordem
liberal internacional, através da Organização Mundial do Comércio. A
análise será feita, do ponto de vista teórico, com base no conceito de
geoeconomia, que consiste no uso de instrumentos econômicos no
nível internacional, tais como política comercial, investimento externo,
sanções econômicas, entre outros, com a finalidade de atingir objetivos
geopolíticos. A metodologia de pesquisa utilizada foi qualitativa,
principalmente, com suporte pesquisa quantitativa: a parte qualitativa
foi feita a partir da análise de documentos oficiais dos governos da China
e dos Estados Unidos, em combinação com literatura especializada
sobre o tema; a parte quantitativa, a partir de dados do Banco Mundial,
da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC), do United States Census
Bureau (Census) e da American Association for the Advancement
of Science (AAAS), relativos a comércio e investimento da China e
dos Estados Unidos no período analisado. O principal resultado da
pesquisa foi constatar que a disputa comercial sino-americana não se
limita à esfera do comércio, mas sim está relacionada ao contexto maior
de disputa geopolítica entre os dois países, na qual a corrida tecnológica
tem papel central. A conclusão é que se trata de uma guerra comercial-
tecnológica deflagrada pelos Estados Unidos com o objetivo de conter
os avanços tecnológicos chineses, que vem catalisando seu crescimento
econômico e seu poder militar.
The international order in transition is not merely one of challenges or opportunities for countries at different levels of power. Depending on the leadership intelligence of a country and its decision-makers in the smart formulation of macro strategies, or its neglect, this can be a period of opportunities for that country to rise or fall on the global stage. At the turn of the 15th century (SH), one of the most significant issues for Iran is the “why and how of the international order and Iran’s position in it”. Sections of the country’s decision-makers understood the role of international transitions in their material and semantic life during World War I and II, and the unfolding events of the Cold War only too well. Furthermore, in recent years, part of the country’s intellectual elite has also relentlessly followed the principle that the international order is a fundamental variable influencing and determining foreign policy.
In connection with the current state of transition to the new order, Ayatollah Khamenei has repeatedly mentioned the “changing order” in recent years and raised strategic questions. In 2014, Ayatollah Khamenei pointed out the change in the global order and the inception of the new order by raising the question “Where is the position of Islam, Islamic Republic, and our important country Iran in the new global order?” In 2022, he repeated the same strategic question more explicitly: “There are many signs that the current global order is changing and a new order will prevail over the world. What is the role and status of us Iranians in this new order? This is a key question.” From the perspective of speech acts, the analysis of Ayatollah Khamenei clearly defines that change is inevitable. Research in the field of International Relations also confirms the emerging “realities of the international transition”. The strategic importance for the IR of Iran, however, is to understand the how and why of role-playing during the “transition period”.
Apart from this level of concern among the highest decision-making ranks in the IR of Iran, intellectuals, academics, and foreign policy practitioners have also tried to answer questions such as the particular tasks facing the macro decision-making circles in the country. Which specific approach or strategy must be adopted at this time to promote the position of Iran and grow its credibility at the international level? What type of activism will serve Iran’s interests best at this juncture?
This paper aims to recognize the various roles of state players in the changing international order. By conceptualizing and the conceptual clarification of the international order, the authors will endeavor to classify state players into the three categories of shapers, opposers, and compliers of the order. The paper claims that a government at any level of power can adopt the required strategies in one or more dimensions of the transitioning order to play a constructive role. Evidently, in an ever-changing world of dynamic, multilevel governance, accepting any role imposes internal and structural requirements on any one country. Meanwhile, by accepting any of the abovementioned situations in the changing international order, the IR of Iran must undertake to formulate and implement its strategies. By relying on the formulation of the international order in transition from the viewpoint of Ayatollah Khamenei as the central decision-maker in Iran today, and the development of a conceptual framework for the transition period, the present paper has answered the basic question of how the key model of Iran’s macro requirements in choosing a constructive role in the international order and bespoke strategy with its role can be explained.
Zusammenfassung
Mit dem Internationalen Strafgerichtshof (IStGH) und dem im Römischen Statut kodifizierten Völkerstrafrecht ist die individuelle Strafbarkeit außerhalb nationaler Rechtsordnungen etabliert. Diese Entwicklung verändert das Verhältnis von Staaten, internationalen Organisationen sowie Gerichten und Individuen in einer globalen Rechtsordnung. Der Beitrag geht der Frage nach, wie sich die Struktur des Völkerstrafrechts entwickelt hat. Die Vermutung ist, dass die Strukturbildung des Völkerstrafrechts in einem vertikalen Modus der Kooperation verläuft, der die horizontale Kooperation der Staaten und die vertikale Kooperation mit dem IStGH kombiniert. Indem die strukturellen Voraussetzungen zum Thema werden, kann eine eigenständige rechtssoziologische Perspektive entwickelt werden, die disziplinäre Ansätze aus den Politikwissenschaften und der Rechtswissenschaft aufgreift und weitergehende Fragestellungen ermöglicht. Dies wird mit einer qualitativen Analyse der Präambel des Römischen Statuts vorgeführt und anhand der Ergebnisse diskutiert.
Tulisan ini berangkat dari konsepsi fikih peradaban “fiqih al-h}aḍarah” sebagai gagasan diplomasi perdamaian yang ditawarkan oleh Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) kepada dunia untuk menghadirkan gagasan agama sebagai solusi atas berbagai konflik yang tak kunjung selesai sampai saat ini. Seperti halnya studi kasus di timur tengah yang memunculkan stereotipe dan citra negatif atas Islam sebagai dasar konflik dengan dalih jihad sebagai ide gerakan. Dalam pandangan Nahdlatul Ulama berdasarkan hasil Muktamar Internasional Fikih Peradaban I, rekontekstualisasi fikih siyasah dalam perspektif geopolitik menjadi sangat penting untuk dilakukan sebagai dasar pemahaman dalam menjalankan ajaran Islam di sektor politik ketatanegaraan serta sebagai upaya dalam mewujudkan perdamaian yang berkelanjutan. Lantas bagaimana rekontekstualisasi fikih siyasah dalam pandangan Nahdlatul Ulama bisa dijadikan gagasan diplomasi perdamaian dunia jika dilihat dari perspektif geopolitik. Tulisan ini disusun menggunakan metode kualitatif deskriptif dengan pengumpulan data menggunakan metode desk research dan annotated bibliography. Pendekatan yang digunakan diantaranya, tekstual-kontekstual, Pendekatan sosiologi hukum Islam dan teori analisis wacana kritis (critical discourse analysis). Hasil dalam tulisan ini menunjukkan bahwa, berdasarkan pandangan NU dalam perspektif geopolitik fiqih al-h}aḍarah dapat dijadikan sebagai term untuk dapat merekontekstualisasikan diskursus fikih siyasah ke arah yang lebih ideal sesuai dengan kebutuhan dan tuntutan zamannya serta menghadirkan pemikiran fikih sebagai solusi dalam menyongsong peradaban yang lebih baik di masa depan. Baik sebagai suatu gagasan diplomasi ataupun sebagai ide gagasan perdamaian yang berkelanjutan.
The global order is shifting from a unipolar world dominated by the West to a multipolar one with Asia emerging as a major centre of gravity. Narratives of order and re-ordering are powerful tools that shape policy agendas and enable local, national, and global actors to make sense of contemporary or historical orders or changes in those orders. Such narratives emanating from the Global North have dominated Social Science fields such as International Relations (IR). Global South narratives of order have received much less scholarly attention. This article contributes to filling this gap by examining narratives of global order and re-ordering from state and non-state actors in the Mashreq, India, the Maghreb (focusing on Morocco), and Iran. The cases provide a diverse array of narratives for interdisciplinary analysis, highlighting the importance of understanding global narratives from non-Western perspectives. Taking stock of such perspectives in policy and academic analyses is essential for methodological, conceptual, and theoretical pluralism in Social Sciences in general and for the task of globalizing the field of IR in particular.
In this paper, we explore the relationship between regional powers and security norms by examining the influence of the liberal international order (LIO) on regional security dynamics in East Asia. In examining the influence of the LIO on East Asian nonproliferation norms, the USA and its partner nations have displayed a great deal of inconsistency regarding nuclear nonproliferation. We contend that this inconsistency offers opportunities for regional powers like China to reinforce or contest expectations associated with international nuclear norms. Often perceived as a stable pillar of the international order, variations in nuclear nonproliferation norms from the global to those in East Asia suggest a need to reconsider the influence and nature of the ILO on regional orders more broadly. Due to the role regional powers play in this relationship between the global and regional levels, this research also reinforces the continued importance of the Regional Powers Research Program.
El Estado mexicano, para lograr sus fines e intereses dirigidos a la protección de la población, mantener la integridad territorial, asegurar la permanencia de sus instituciones democráticas y garantizar la soberanía e independencia de la nación, propone políticas que se exponen en el Programa Sectorial de Defensa Nacional 2020-2024, de ahí que la meta de este artículo fue el analizar los objetivos prioritarios plasmados en ese documento oficial en cuanto a su orientación temática, a partir de la construcción de categorías ponderadas de análisis de contenido. La investigación arrojó como resultado general que de un total de seis objetivos, solamente uno tiene vínculo directo con la defensa y seguridad nacional, lo cual puede ser consecuencia de consideraciones políticas, históricas y burocráticas que son determinantes de las acciones prioritarias de las Fuerzas Armadas.
Досліджуються особливості становлення та розвиту міжнародного режиму подорожей і туризму як структурного компонента формування ліберального світового порядку. Відзначається, що світовий туристичний проєкт активно просувався Заходом як утілення парадигми «ліберального інтернаціоналізму» – порядку, який утворився під час холодної війни на основі американської ліберальної гегемонії. Він передбачав поширення демократії, захист прав людини, міжнародну взаємодію через багатосторонні інститути, вільну торгівлю й свободу пересування. Стверджується, шо міжнародний режим подорожей та туризму представлений багатосторонніми інститутами й угодами, нормами та цінностями, які становлять фундаментальні основи ліберального світового порядку. Зокрема, він безпосередньо пов’язаний і походить від правових норм, що стверджують свободу пересування, право на дозвілля та відпочинок. На інституціональному рівні формування міжнародного режиму подорожей і туризму пов’язане з діяльністю Всесвітньої туристичної організації та інших установ ООН. Центральними концептами дискурсу світової туристичної політики стали лібералізація режимів мобільності, поглиблення зовнішньоекономічних відносин між країнами у сфері туризму, подолання глобальної нерівності та відсталості, реаліза- ція через туризм ідей розвитку й соціального прогресу, установлення взаєморозуміння та миру між націями, побудова демократичного та справедливого суспільства, заснованого на космополітичних ідеях усесвітньої гостинності. Зроблено висновок, що міжнародний туризм і подорожі відіграли важливу роль у подоланні блокового протистояння в роки холодної війни й у поваленні комуністичних режимів у Європі. У постбіополярну епоху мобільність постала як усепроникливий дискурс ліберальної демократії та ринкової економіки. Подорожі стали важливою основою інтеграційних процесів у Європі й демократичних перетворень у постсоціалістичних країнах.
This article deals with the role that different rationalities of power play in current authoritarian and right-wing populist governance. Referring to Foucauldian power theory, I will argue that power rationalities and practices in current authoritarian and right-wing populist rule are diverse and variable. I intend to show that various aspects of the sovereign, disciplinary, governmental, and pastoral types of power as outlined by Foucault play an important role in contemporary authoritarianism and right-wing populism. Thereby, this article pursues a twofold aim. On the one hand, the Foucauldian discussion of power in authoritarian and populist rationalities and practices should contribute to better understand current phenomena of new authoritarianism and right-wing populism. On the other hand, the following considerations should also provide a more detailed theoretical insight into the relation between, and compatibilities as well as incompatibilities of, the different types of power described by Foucault.
How does the rise of China challenge the existing international order? What are the possible outcomes of the interplay between China’s rise and the current trajectory of the Russian and Turkish regimes? Based on a qualitative analysis, I find two major dilemmas for the current power dynamics have resulted from China’s challenging behavior in the international system. First, while China promotes steady relationships based on mutual interests facilitated by the rule-based international order, it also carries out actions which feed its aspirations for exploiting the current international institutions. Second, while China underlines the importance of a Westphalian style of sovereignty and non-interference, it also takes interventionist actions in both cyberspace and territorial space. Based on identification of China-Russia and China-Turkey interactions through the variations in the most ‘central’ domestic issues of the current governments in Russia and Turkey, I predict four possible outcomes, shedding light on the future policy directions in Russia and Turkey: 1) a prolongation of Putin’s campaign in Ukraine, 2) an acceleration in the process of de-dollarization, 3) lasting Chinese influence on Turkey’s Kurdish issue, and 4) an increase in Turkey’s tendency toward a Chinese-style ‘growth’ model.
In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) several attempts, such as United Nations Security Council efforts to end conflicts, have ended some wars, but have not been able to prevent further conflicts and wars. Thus, the questions arise as to what circumstances might lead to war and conflicts in the MENA? And how to prevent conflict and war in the region? Based on the European experience of World War II, the shift in the balance of power was the main cause of the wars, and regional integration was the only formula that could conceivably maintain the existing, relatively even, balance of power among European countries. Hence, the balance of power can be considered an essential condition for consolidating stable peace. The main aim of this study is to inquire could political rivalry and conflicts among the MENA states be managed through the regional integration process so that they agree to resolve their conflicts more constructively in order to avoid war and maintain the balance of power in the region. Taking this fact into account, the present research will study the possibilities of regional integration in the MENA.
The strategic rivalry between the United States and China has heightened since COVID-19. Secondary states face increasing difficulties maintaining a 'hedging' strategy between the United States and China. This Element introduces a preference-for-change model to explain the policy variations of states during the order transition. It suggests that policymakers will perceive a potential change in the international order through a cost–benefit prism. The interplays between the perceived costs and the perception of benefits from the order transition will shape states' policy choices among four strategic options: (1) hedging to bet on uncertainties; (2) bandwagoning with rising powers to support changes; (3) balancing against rising powers to resist changes; and (4) buck-passing to ignore changes. Four case studies (Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Thailand) are conducted to explore the policy choices of regional powers during the international order transition. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
This special section focuses on knowledge production on peace by asking three inter-related questions: who produces knowledge on peace, what knowledge is prioritized and how does it feed into policy and practice. The articles of the section provide a critical perspective on the actors, dynamics and hierarchies in peace studies and offer insights into how current biases may be addressed. The special section contributes to peace research and broader International Relations in three ways. First, it speaks to the core of debates about the original purpose of the disciplines and their proximity to policy debates. Second, it is embedded in current debates about gendering and decolonializing the disciplines and the need to ensure more diversity. Third, it is part of an emerging research agenda on what types of knowledge influence which types of actors and institutions. Overall, the special section shows that especially in times of tectonic changes in world politics that lead to a revisiting of our thinking about peace and conflict, it is crucial to understand what knowledge is privileged, whose knowledge this is and how the knowledge relates to the practices it seeks to inform. Only then can built-in biases, hierarchies and practical disconnects be overcome.
Geopolitical risks and environmental policy have become increasingly important in the European Union (EU), which is committed to tackling climate change and protecting the environment. However, geopolitical risks can undermine its environmental policy objectives. Thus, the study evaluates the relationship between geopolitical risks and environmental policy in nineteen EU countries from 1994 to 2020 through panel bootstrap Granger causality. The results show that geopolitical risks significantly influence environmental policy in Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and Romania. On the other hand, the findings reveal that environmental policy causes geopolitical risks only in Latvia, while there is no relationship in the remaining countries. Therefore, policymakers must develop resilience to geopolitical risks, promote renewable energy, strengthen environmental regulations, and address social and economic implications to reduce environmental policy vulnerability to geopolitical risks.
The shifting nature of contemporary global politics highlights the growing contestation about power and how it is distributed, with multipolarity as its hallmark and distinguishing feature. Amid the shift to multipolarity, new forms of multilateralism are emerging from the South, which are grounded in ‘institutional arrangements led by countries of the Global South’ in terms of the origin of initiatives, the drivers of such arrangements and the resources to sustain them. In this context, Southern Multilateralism offers a differ approach to classical Realist thinking where power is ‘the final arbiter of things political’. Southern Multilateralism has also given rise to new international institutional arrangements, such as the BRICS‐led New Development Bank (NDB) and its predecessor, the India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) Trilateral Forum and the IBSA Fund Facility for Poverty and Hunger Alleviation.
This article compares the IBSA and their Fund with the NDB and argues that there are continuities and linkages between the NDB and the IBSA Fund, which have yet to be examined by scholars; and to be more precise, the NDB has absorbed and reflects, key attributes of the IBSA and their Fund. Moreover, this study concludes by suggesting regional collaboration options for the NDB, led by South Africa, India and Brazil and their respective regions, whereby the NDB can expand its global role and relevance in future via its regional offices, particularly by supporting the regional trade integration plans in Africa, South Asia and South America.
Game Theory of Civilizational Collapse.
Game Theory of Civilizational Collapse:
The faster and wider globalization and liberal human rights(by detractors known as liberal hegemony) begin to operate sustainably, the less likely all civilizations will collapse simultaneously. Especially, if all countries develop an interdependence among one another. Since the world is more developed and globalized today then it was during the Roman Empire, the probability of all civilization simultaneously ending is much lower. Plus, even immediately after the Roman Empire fell, some civilizations remained. Plus hereditarianism(a heuristic ) is empirically inferior to constructivism(a law) and if IQs drop too low, genetic engineering to raise them is possible. Civilizational decline, if existent or realistically potentially occurring at all, will especially be mitigated if Ukraine ideally defeats Russia in their current conflict and spreads liberalism globally. Racism(oppressors not paying reparations to the oppressed) will probably contribute to civilizational decline. Therefore, in accordance to critical race theory, the oppressors(Celts, Norse, and Germanics) must pay reparations to all other peoples. The oppressors(Norse, Celts, and Germanics) must be cloned to exist in high enough numbers to outnumber every other people in order to pay reparations to the oppressed(every other people) by working on another planet(maybe multiple planets) with THEIR whiteness(Eastern Europeans, Southern Europeans, and all other whites should be EXEMPT from paying reparations) taxed, thus establishing an interplanetary welfare state.
International organisations (IOs) have become increasingly contested resulting in worries about their decline and termination. While IO termination is indeed a regular event in international relations, this article shows that other institutions carry the legacy of terminated IOs. We develop the novel concept of IO afterlife and suggest indicators to systematically assess it. Our analysis of 26 major terminated IOs reveals legal-institutional and asset continuity in 21 cases. To further illustrate this point, the article zooms in on the afterlife of the International Institute of Agriculture in the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Refugee Organization in the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and the Western European Union in the European Union. In these three cases, IO afterlife inspired and structured the design of their successor institutions. While specific IOs might be terminated, international cooperation therefore often lives on in other institutions.
This paper revisits the debate about foreign policy implications of Chinese nationalism in the context of China's increasingly confrontational and assertive behavior in recent years. It argues that while the Chinese government made effective efforts to control popular nationalism and Chinese foreign policy was therefore not dictated by emotional nationalistic rhetoric before 2008, it has become more willing to follow the popular nationalist calls to take a confrontational position against the Western powers and to adopt tougher measures in maritime territorial disputes with its neighbors. This strident turn is partially because the government is increasingly responsive to public opinion, but more importantly because of the convergence of Chinese state nationalism and popular nationalism calling for a more muscular Chinese foreign policy. Enjoying an inflated sense of empowerment supported by its new quotient of wealth and military capacities, and terrified of an uncertain future due to increasing social, economic and political tensions at home, the communist state has become more willing to play to the popular nationalist gallery in pursuing the so-called core national interests. These developments have complicated China's diplomacy, creating a heated political environment to harden China's foreign policy.
The prevailing model of international economic regimes is strictly positivistic in its epistemological orientation and stresses the distribution of material power capabilities in its explanatory logic. It is inadequate to account for the current set of international economic regimes and for the differences between past and present regimes. The model elaborated here departs from the prevailing view in two respects, while adhering to it in a third. First, it argues that regimes comprise not simply what actors say and do, but also what they understand and find acceptable within an intersubjective framework of meaning. Second, it argues that in the economic realm such a framework of meaning cannot be deduced from the distribution of material power capabilities, but must be sought in the configuration of state-society relations that is characteristic of the regime-making states. Third, in incorporating these notions into our understanding of the formation and transformation of international economic regimes, the formulation self-consciously strives to remain at the systemic level and to avoid becoming reductionist in attributing cause and effect relations. The article can therefore argue that the prevailing view is deficient on its own terms and must be expanded and modified. Addressing the world of actual international economic regimes, the article argues that the pax Britannica and the pax Americana cannot be equated in any meaningful sense, and that the postwar regimes for money and trade live on notwithstanding premature announcements of their demise.
What brings credit and prestige to a nation in the eyes of its citizens? Taking a multi‐dimensional approach, we investigate national pride in the country's science, economy, arts and literature, and sport. Data from the International Social Survey Programme's 24 nation ‘National Identity’ module ( N = 30,894) show that people throughout the developed world feel national pride in all these things, contrary to most globalization hypotheses. Pride in the economy shows the most variation among nations, and pride in science also varies greatly, while pride in the arts and literature and in sport vary less. Regression analyses show that linkages of pride to national attachment also vary cross‐culturally: pride in science is more consequential in English‐speaking countries but pride in arts less consequential; pride in sports matters especially in smaller nations; and pride in economic achievements matters everywhere.
The United States-China relationship is more likely than not to slide into economic and military competition, despite the perhaps best intentions of both states. This new bipolar competition is not inevitable. The key question is whether both governments have the self-restraint to limit domestic rent-seeking interests who will undoubtedly demand protection at home and exclusivity in their spheres of influence abroad. If not, the new superpowers will, like great powers in the past, 'race' for economic privileges that can quickly divide the world up into exclusive blocs. Like the security dilemma, great powers need not actually exclude one another from their economic zones; the fear of exclusion alone is enough to ignite the process of division. There was always some likelihood of a competitive economic spiral given China's close business-government relations in a 'state-capitalist' economy. Now, for the first time in seven decades, there is a chance that the United States, in the grips of economic nationalism,might abandon its historic policy of free trade and ignite a new race for economic privilege as well. © The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Institute of International Relations, Tsinghua University. All rights reserved.
In June 2016, the United Kingdom shocked the world by voting to leave the European Union. As this book reveals, the historic vote for Brexit marked the culmination of trends in domestic politics and in the UK’s relationship with the EU that have been building over many years. Drawing on a wealth of survey evidence collected over more than ten years, this book explains why most people decided to ignore much of the national and international community and vote for Brexit. Drawing on past research on voting in major referendums in Europe and elsewhere, a team of leading academic experts analyse changes in the UK’s party system that were catalysts for the referendum vote, including the rise of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), the dynamics of public opinion during an unforgettable and divisive referendum campaign, the factors that influenced how people voted and the likely economic and political impact of this historic decision.
This article widens the analysis of international organisations by including communist organisations, in particular the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). Drawing on archival research in Moscow, Bucharest, Berlin, Geneva and Rome, this article traces the origins, the evolution and the collective actorness of both organisations. Both COMECON and the Warsaw Pact went through a process of institutionalisation, reorganisation and multilateralisation and began to share many characteristics with their Western counterparts, such as the European Economic Community and NATO. Contrary to conventional wisdom these organisations thus developed into multilateral international organisations, which the other members could use to challenge Soviet unilateralism. Comparing COMECON and the Warsaw Pact with each other and with their Western counterparts, this article shows how these Eastern European international organisations contributed to shifting the balance of power within the Soviet Bloc by empowering their members as sovereign states and themselves as collective actors.
The last 40 years has seen slow growing earnings and income for the middle class, as well as rising overall inequality. In contrast, the early postwar period witnessed rapid gains in wages and family income for the middle class and a moderate fall in inequality. The ‘booming’ 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s did not bring much relief to the middle class, with median income growing by only 2% (in total) between 1989 and 2012. The stagnation of middle class living standards since 1973 or so is attributable to the slow growth in earnings. While average earnings almost doubled between 1947 and 1973, it advanced by only 22% from 1973 to 2012. The main reason for the stagnation of labor earnings derives from a clear shift in national income away from labor towards capital, with overall profitability rising either back to previous postwar highs or to new highs by 2012. Based on regression analysis, a positive and significant connection is found between top income shares and the profit share. The unionization rate, computer investment per worker, the minimum wage, and the unemployment rate are also significantly related to top income shares.
The battle for the common currency may be remembered as one of the more useless in Europe's history. The euro is hailed as a solution to high unemployment, low growth, and the high costs of welfare states. But the deep budget cuts required before integration are already causing pain and may trigger severe recessions. If the European Monetary Union goes forward, a common currency will eliminate the adjustments now made by nominal exchange rates, and the central bank will control money with an iron fist. Labor markets will have to do the adjusting, a mechanism bound to fail, given those markets' inflexibility in Europe.
Christopher Layne of Los Angeles is an unaffiliated scholar. He is presently a consultant to the government contracts practice group of the law firm of Hill, Wynne, Troop and Meisinger, which represents major firms in the defense industry.
I am extremely grateful to the following colleagues who reviewed various drafts of this paper and offered helpful criticisms: John Arquilla, Ted Galen Carpenter, Kerry Andrew Chase, Jeffry Frieden, John Mearsheimer, Benjamin C. Schwarz, Jack Snyder, Stephen Walt, and Kenneth Waltz. I also thank Stephen Van Evera and David Spiro for providing me copies of, and permission to quote from, their unpublished works.
1. I use the term "democratic peace theory" because it is a convenient shorthand term. However, strictly speaking, the claim that democracies do not fight democracies is a proposition, or hypothesis, rather than a theory. Democratic peace "theory" proposes a causal relationship between an independent variable (democratic political structures at the unit level) and the dependent variable (the asserted absence of war between democratic states). However, it is not a true theory because the causal relationship between the independent and dependent variables is neither proven nor, as I demonstrate in this article, adequately explained. See Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses, Laws and Theories: A User's Guide," unpub. memo, Department of Political Science, MIT.
2. Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), chap. 7; and Russett, "Can A Democratic Peace Be Built?" International Interactions, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Spring 1993), pp. 277-282.
3. In this article, I build upon and expand the criticisms of democratic peace theory found in John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56; and Kenneth N. Waltz, "America as Model for the World? A Foreign Policy Perspective," PS (December 1991), pp. 667-670.
4. Other cases of crises between democratic great powers that might be studied include Anglo-French relations during the Liberal entente cordiale of 1832-48, Franco-Italian relations during the late 1880s and early 1890s and, if Wilhelmine Germany is classified as a democracy, the Moroccan crises of 1905-06 and 1911 and the Samoan crises of 1889 and 1899. These cases would support my conclusions. For example, from 1832 to 1848, the Foxite legacy disposed England's Whigs to feel a strong commitment to France based on a shared liberal ideology. Yet Anglo-French relations during this period were marked by intense geopolitical rivalry over Belgium, Spain, and the Near East, and the threat of war was always a factor in the calculations of policymakers in both London and Paris. Foreign Minister Lord Palmerston profoundly distrusted French ambitions and constantly urged that England maintain sufficient naval power to defend its interests against a French challenge. See Kenneth Bourne, Palmerston; The Early Years, 1784-1841 (New York: Macmillan, 1982), p. 613. Also see Roger Bullen, Palmerston, Guizot and the Collapse of the Entente Cordiale (London: Athlone Press, 1974); and Sir Charles Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, Vol. I: 1830-1841, Britain, The Liberal Movement and The Eastern Question (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1951). Italy challenged France for Mediterranean ascendancy although the two nations were bound by liberalism, democracy, and a common culture. The two states engaged in a trade war and came close to a real war. France apparently was dissuaded from attacking Italy in 1888 when the British Channel Fleet was sent to the Italian naval base of La Spezia. Italy was prevented from attacking France by its military and economic weakness. See C.J. Lowe and F. Marzari, Italian Foreign Policy, 1870-1940 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975, chap. 4; C.J. Lowe, The Reluctant Imperialists: British Foreign Policy 1879-1902 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), Vol. I, pp. 147-150; John A.C. Conybeare, Trade Wars: The Theory and Practice of International Commercial Rivalry (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), pp. 183-188.
5. Melvin Small and J. David Singer first observed the pattern of democracies not fighting democracies in a 1976 article: Small and Singer, "The War-proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816-1865," Jerusalem Journal of...
Ido Oren is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota. He is currently an SSRC-MacArthur Foundation Fellow on Peace and Security in a Changing World.
I thank the following individuals (some of whom disagreed with my argument) for helpful counsel: William Dixon, Geoff Eley, Scott Gates, Jeff Legro, Rhona Leibel, Yair Magen, John Mearsheimer, Andy Moravcsik, Dick Price, Diana Richards, Bruce Russett, Marc Trachtenberg, Stephen Van Evera, Bill Wohlforth, Amy Zegart, two anonymous referees, and especially Raymond Duvall and James Farr. Ethan Cherin and Luigi Cocci extended excellent research assistance.
1. William Clinton, Confronting the Challenges of a Broader World (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1993).
2. President Clinton's State of the Union Message, January 1994, quoted in John M. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), p. 87.
3. For example, the motto of chapter 1 in Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), is excerpted from Wilson's 1917 war message to Congress.
4. Key studies include: Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151-1169; Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdulali, "Regime Types and International Conflict, 1815-1976," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 33, No. 1 (March 1989), pp. 3-35; T. Clifton Morgan and Valerie L. Schwebach, "Take Two Democracies and Call Me in the Morning: A Prescription for Peace?" International Interactions, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1992), pp. 305-320; William Dixon, "Democracy and the Settlement of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 1 (March 1994), pp. 14-32; Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 624-638; and Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace. The recent studies by Russett and his collaborators are indicative of the high methodological sophistication attained by the literature. The technical quality of the statistical studies is not challenged here.
5. These features are central to Ted Robert Gurr's coding scheme, which is the most widely used in studies of the democratic peace. See Ted R. Gurr (Principal Investigator), Polity II: Political Structures and Regime Change, 1800-1986 (Codebook) (Ann Arbor: ICPSR No. 9263, 1990). Gurr's data are used, for example, by Dixon, Maoz and Abdulali, and Maoz and Russett (see fn. 4). Other researchers employ coding schemes that assign greater weight to indicators of civic, political, and economic freedom (e.g., Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," p. 1164). But despite the lack of definitional uniformity, the assignment of countries to the democratic/ liberal or to the autocratic/illiberal ends of the continuum must be consistent across the various studies or else the consensus on the robustness of the democratic peace finding would not have been as strong as it is.
6. See, e.g., Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics"; Dixon, "Democracy and the Settlement of International Conflict;" Maoz and Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace." For a helpful review of the theoretical debate see T. Clifton Morgan, "Democracy and War: Reflections on the Literature," International Interactions, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1993), pp. 197-203.
7. See, e.g., Morgan and Schwebach, "Take Two Democracies and Call Me in the Morning." Much of the work on the structural-institutional explanation of the democratic peace is formal-deductive, most notably: Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), chap. 5; David Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 1 (March 1992), pp. 24-37. These formal studies are imaginative, and their normative content—residing in the axiomatic assumptions—is less opaque than in the verbal explanations. Still, to verify their implications the formal studies rely on the same data used by the purely statistical studies.
8. For example, Gurr's Polity data are employed both by Morgan and Schwebach, "Take Two Democracies and Call Me in the Morning," and by Maoz and Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic...
This article qualitatively and empirically analyses the OSCE's efforts to promote democracy after intra-state war in Georgia. This regional organization is rooted in a comprehensive approach to security that directly links security to democratic values. Therefore, the OSCE is a particularly appropriate subject for studying the issue of democracy promotion in the context of conflict-resolution processes. Georgia provides a difficult environment for such a goal. Given that its two secession conflicts are 'frozen', democracy can, especially in this context, be considered a well-suited means to indirectly contribute to conflict resolution. By contrasting the democratic development in Georgia with OSCE activities since 1992, this article will assess OSCE democracy promotion efforts. When these efforts are measured with regard to progress in peace and democratic quality, the effectiveness of external democracy promotion by the OSCE has to be called into question. However, the article argues that democratization is a long-term process in which internal factors play a decisive role. The OSCE, like other international organizations, can only reach its normative goals to the degree of the reform orientation and political will of the target state's government. The potential for impact is limited, but can be increased by commitment and context sensitivity.
Since the Cold War ended, Western policymakers have sought to create security arrangements in Europe, as well as in other regions of the globe, that are based on international institutions. In doing so, they explicitly reject balance-of-power politics as an organizing concept for the post-Cold War world. During the 1992 presidential campaign, for example, President Clinton declared that, "in a world where freedom, not tyranny, is on the march, the cynical calculus of pure power politics simply does not compute. It is ill-suited to a new era." Before taking office, Anthony Lake, the president's national security adviser, criticized the Bush administration for viewing the world through a "classic balance of power prism," whereas he and Mr. Clinton took a "more 'neo- Wilsonian' view.
Jean Monnet's dream that European integration would eliminate conflict may have been a delusion. France and other countries do not share Germany's fixation on sound money--or its hegemonic vision. A European central bank would be unresponsive to local unemployment, while political union would remove competitive pressures within Europe for structural reform, prompting protectionism and conflict with the United States. A Europe of 300 million people and an independent military might be a force for world peace, but war is also a distinct possibility.
President Clinton has tried to pursue a foreign policy agenda even more ambitious than his predecessor's. But as international realities and domestic priorities become clear, he has been forced to retreat in area after area of policy. The resulting flips and flops of policy toward Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, North Korea, and China have undermined U.S. credibility. But more important, they risk making Americans turn inward in dismay, forsaking the prudent internationalism that has characterized American foreign policy since World War II. Let us abandon a kind of leadership we are not prepared to exercise on behalf of a world order the price of which we have no intention of paying.
Copyright © 2006-2010 ProQuest LLC. All Rights Reserved.
- Robert Gilpin
- War
Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983);
Can Democracy Survive Global Capitalism?
- Robert Kuttner
Robert Kuttner, Can Democracy Survive Global Capitalism? (New York: W.W. Norton, 2018),
p. 74.
Restoring the Role of the Nation-State in the Liberal International Order," address to the German Marshall Fund
- R Secretary Of State Michael
- Pompeo
Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, "Restoring the Role of the Nation-State in the Liberal International Order," address to the German Marshall Fund, Brussels, Belgium, December 4, 2018,
https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/12/287770.htm.
Minority Nationalism and the Changing International Order
- Mitchell Young
- Eric Zuelow
- Andreas Sturm
Michael Keating and John McGarry, eds., Minority
Nationalism and the Changing International Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); and
Mitchell Young, Eric Zuelow, and Andreas Sturm, Nationalism in a Global Era: The Persistence of Nations (New York: Routledge, 2007).
Automation is also responsible for the disappearance of a substantial number of jobs, although it is difªcult to determine the relative importance of automation and outsourcing. See Susan N. Houseman
- John Gerard Ruggie
Liberalism also has an important particularist dimension to it, which is more in line with na-71. John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring 1982),
pp. 379-415, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706527.
72. Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox, p. 77.
73. Ibid., p. 163.
74. Automation is also responsible for the disappearance of a substantial number of jobs, although
it is difªcult to determine the relative importance of automation and outsourcing. See Susan N.
Houseman, "Understanding the Decline of U.S. Manufacturing Employment," Working Paper 18-287 (Kalamazoo, Mich.: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, June 2018), doi.org/
10.17848/wp18-287; and Claire Cain Miller, "The Long-Term Jobs Killer Is Not China. It's Automation," New York Times, December 21, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/21/upshot/thelong-term-jobs-killer-is-not-china-its-automation.html.
Post-Western World: How Emerging Powers Are Remaking Global Order
- Oliver Stuenkel
and Oliver Stuenkel, Post-Western World: How
Emerging Powers Are Remaking Global Order (Malden, Mass.: Polity, 2016), pp. 120-180.
China Is a Dangerous Rival, and America Should Treat It Like One
- Martin Feldstein
Martin Feldstein, "Tariffs Should Target Chinese Lawlessness, Not the Trade Deªcit," Wall
Street Journal, December 28, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/tariffs-should-target-chineselawlessness-not-the-trade-deªcit-11545955628. See also Derek Scissors and Daniel Blumenthal,
"China Is a Dangerous Rival, and America Should Treat It Like One," New York Times, January 14,
2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/opinion/us-china-trade.html; and Adam Segal,
"When China Rules the Web: Technology in Service of the State," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 97, No. 5
(September/October 2018), pp. 10-18, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-08-13/when-china-rules-web.
For the U.S. and China, a Technology Cold War That's Freezing Over
- Raymond Zhong
- Paul Mozur
Raymond
Zhong and Paul Mozur, "For the U.S. and China, a Technology Cold War That's Freezing Over,"
New York Times, March 23, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/23/technology/trumpchina-tariffs-tech-cold-war.html;
Fight Risks Fragmenting Global Market, Says Beijing Ambassador
- Chris Uhlmann
- Angus Grigg
Chris Uhlmann and Angus Grigg, "How the 'Five Eyes' Cooked
Up the Campaign to Kill Huawei," Sydney Morning Herald, December 13, 2018, https://www.smh
.com.au/business/companies/how-the-ªve-eyes-cooked-up-the-campaign-to-kill-huawei-20181213-p50m24.html; "U.S.-China Trade Fight Risks Fragmenting Global Market, Says Beijing
Ambassador," Wall Street Journal, November 26, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-chinatrade-ªght-risks-fragmenting-global-market-says-beijings-ambassador-to-the-u-s-1543228321;
The economic and military competition between Britain and Germany before World War I is also instructive in this regard
- David E Sanger
David E. Sanger et al., "In 5G Race with China, U.S. Pushes Allies to Fight Huawei," New York Times,
January 26, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/26/us/politics/huawei-china-us-5g-technology.html; and Martin Wolf, "The Challenge of One World, Two Systems," Financial Times,
January 29, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/b20a0d62-23b1-11e9-b329-c7e6ceb5ffdf.
94. The economic and military competition between Britain and Germany before World War I is
also instructive in this regard. See Markus Brunnermeier, Rush Doshi, and Harold James,
"Beijing's Bismarckian Ghosts: How Great Powers Compete Economically," Washington Quarterly,
Vol. 41, No. 3 (Fall 2018), pp. 161-176, doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2018.1520571.
Automation is also responsible for the disappearance of a substantial number of jobs, although it is difªcult to determine the relative importance of automation and outsourcing. See Susan N. Houseman
- Rodrik
Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox, p. 77.
73. Ibid., p. 163.
74. Automation is also responsible for the disappearance of a substantial number of jobs, although
it is difªcult to determine the relative importance of automation and outsourcing. See Susan N.
Houseman, "Understanding the Decline of U.S. Manufacturing Employment," Working Paper 18-287 (Kalamazoo, Mich.: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, June 2018), doi.org/
10.17848/wp18-287; and Claire Cain Miller, "The Long-Term Jobs Killer Is Not China. It's Automation," New York Times, December 21, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/21/upshot/thelong-term-jobs-killer-is-not-china-its-automation.html.
On the human costs of these "progressively worsening labor market opportunities," see Ann Case and Angus Deaton
- David Goodhart
David Goodhart, The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics (London:
Hurst, 2017), pp. 147-192. On the human costs of these "progressively worsening labor market opportunities," see Ann Case and Angus Deaton, "Mortality and Morbidity in the 21st Century,"
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, Spring 2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/casetextsp17bpea.pdf.
Inequality and Rising Proªtability in the United States
- Wolff
Wolff, "Inequality and Rising Proªtability in the United States, 1947-2012," International Review of
Applied Economics, Vol. 29, No. 6 (November 2015), pp. 741-769, doi.org/10.1080/02692171.2014
.956704.
- Facundo Alvaredo
Facundo Alvaredo et al., "World Inequality Report, 2018: Executive Summary" (Paris:
World Inequality Lab, 2017), https://wir2018.wid.world/ªles/download/wir2018-summaryenglish.pdf.
In fact, there is abundant evidence that states often continue trading with each other when they are at war, which is the most intense form of security competition
- Andrew E Judis
- Kramer
- S Jack
- Katherine Levy
- Barbieri
Judis, The Nationalist Revival, pp. 47-80, 117-142.
86. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, for example, puts limits only on U.S. and Russian arsenals, but not the Chinese arsenal, which is one reason it has collapsed. The treaty will
have to be renegotiated to include all three countries. Andrew E. Kramer, "The I.N.F. Treaty,
Explained," New York Times, October 23, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/23/world/
europe/inf-treaty-russia-united-states-trump-nuclear.html.
87. In fact, there is abundant evidence that states often continue trading with each other when
they are at war, which is the most intense form of security competition. Jack S. Levy and Katherine
Barbieri, "Trading with the Enemy during Wartime," Security Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Spring 2004),
pp. 1-47, doi.org/10.1080/09636410490914059.
The New Era of US-China Decoupling
- See Inter
- Alia Edward Luce
See inter alia Edward Luce, "The New Era of US-China Decoupling," Financial Times, December 20, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/019b1856-03c0-11e9-99df-6183d3002ee1;