Five Terrorist Dystopias

Abstract

This article seeks to answer the question “What will be the main cause of terrorist conflict in the year 2040?”. It argues that terrorism would be primarily motivated in the long term by technophobia, which – to take David Rapoport’s analysis a stage further – would prompt a fifth wave of modern terrorism. The article offers a scenario analysis, describing five possible scenarios triggered by the interaction between five trends: technological advances in biomedicine, the emergence of new ideologies, climate change, structural unemployment associated with automation, and the growth of cities. The major strength of technophobia as a potential mobiliser of a new wave of terrorism is its cross-cutting nature, which enables it to serve as a cause accepted by any sector of the societies of tomorrow.

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Five Terrorist Dystopias
Manuel R. Torres-Soriano & Mario Toboso-Buezo
To cite this article: Manuel R. Torres-Soriano & Mario Toboso-Buezo (2019) Five Terrorist
Dystopias, The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs, 21:1, 49-65, DOI:
10.1080/23800992.2019.1598094
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/23800992.2019.1598094
Published online: 17 Apr 2019.
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Five Terrorist Dystopias
Manuel R. Torres-Soriano
a,b
and Mario Toboso-Buezo
c
a
Department of Public Law, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Seville, Spain;
b
Faculty of Social Sciences
and Humanities, Universidad Autónoma de Chile, Santiago, Chile;
c
Department of Political Science,
Constitutional Law and Philosophy of Law, Universidad de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
ABSTRACT
This article seeks to answer the question “What will be the
main cause of terrorist conflict in the year 2040?”.Itargues
that terrorism would be primarily motivated in the long term
by technophobia, which –to take David Rapoport’sanalysis
a stage further –would prompt a fifth wave of modern
terrorism. The article offers a scenario analysis, describing
five possible scenarios triggered by the interaction between
five trends: technological advances in biomedicine, the
emergence of new ideologies, climate change, structural
unemployment associated with automation, and the growth
of cities. The major strength of technophobia as a potential
mobiliser of a new wave of terrorism is its cross-cutting
nature, which enables it to serve as a cause accepted by
any sector of the societies of tomorrow.
Cinco distopías terroristas
RESUMEN
Este artículo busca responder a la pregunta “¿Cuál será la
principal causa del conflicto terrorista en el año 2040?”.Se
argumenta que el terrorismo estará motivado principal-
mente a largo plazo por la tecnofobia, que –para llevar el
análisis de David Rapoport a un nivel más avanzado–podría
provocar una quinta ola de terrorismo moderno. El artículo
ofrece un análisis de escenarios, describiendo cinco escenar-
ios posibles desencadenados por la interacción entre cinco
tendencias: avances tecnológicos en biomedicina, el surgi-
miento de nuevas ideologías, el cambio climático, el desem-
pleo estructural asociado con la automatización y el
crecimiento de las ciudades. La mayor fortaleza de la tecno-
fobia como posible movilizador de una nueva ola de terror
es su carácter transversal, que le permite servir como una
causa aceptada por cualquier sector de las sociedades del
mañana.
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 12 November 2018
Revised 12 February 2019
Accepted 6 March 2019
KEYWORDS
Political violence; terrorism;
biological divide;
technoreligions; climate
change; sanctuaries of crime
PALABRAS CLAVES
Violencia política;
terrorismo; Brecha biologica
tecnoreligiones; cambio
climático; santuarios del
crimen
Introduction
Terrorism studies are one of the most complicated fields for prediction in the
academic world. Terrorist organisations tend not to exhibit stable trajectories
CONTACT Manuel R. Torres-Soriano mrtorsor@upo.es Department of Public Law, Universidad Pablo de
Olavide, Carretera de Utrera Km.1, Seville 41013, Spain
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE, SECURITY, AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS
2019, VOL. 21, NO. 1, 49–65
https://doi.org/10.1080/23800992.2019.1598094
© 2019 Taylor & Francis

throughout their lifespan (Shapiro, 2013). Such groups operate in hostile envir-
onments in which counter-terrorism agencies go to great lengths to close the
windows of opportunity that allow terrorists to survive and be effective oper-
ationally. Terrorists must innovate in order to retain the element of tactical
surprise that enables them to confront more powerful adversaries. This constant
reinvention renders a large part of available knowledge on the goals, procedures
and underlying logic of such organisations obsolete.
Consequently, the analysis of terrorism generally takes the form of histor-
ical perspectives or detailed dissections of the present. Although the stake-
holders concerned are aware of the need for a prospective vision to prevent
and tackle terrorism, in reality the elusive nature of the subject, the lack or
poor quality of data mean that any such vision is necessarily confined to
a very limited timeframe.
With some exceptions (Kenny, 2013) (Jensen, 2015), terrorism studies are
essentially retrospective, descriptive or short-term prospective. The vast majority
of those that do look to the future tend to be intelligence analysis designed to
support the actions of counter-terrorism agencies. The immediacy and certainty
of the threats that prompt reflections of this kind usually mean that the conclu-
sions are geared to practical knowledge which is directly applicable to the
present. However, although necessary, such approaches need to be complemen-
ted by other types of analysis that consider the dynamic nature of terrorism,
given that the changes terrorism undergoes cannot always be explained by
previous data or experience.
Academic literature on terrorism of the future is limited, both in terms of
quantity and time frame. It includes an abundance of case studies centred on
the future evolution of currently active organisations (Ranstorp, 2006). Other
works have focused on the impact of globalisation on future terrorism (Lia,
2007), the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of
terrorist groups (Taylor & Horgan, 2000) (Koblentz, 2011), the impact of
cyberspace on the activities of such groups (Weimann, 2005), or how coun-
terterrorism policies can generate effects that help perpetuate the problem
(Hegghammer, 2016).
One understudied aspect is how developments in technology can nurture
the grievances likely to underpin new terrorist offensives. An even more
conspicuous gap relates to technologies that have still to be developed fully.
This work aims to help remedy the aforementioned gap in knowledge by
offering a prospective analysis of the hypothetical causes that will drive
terrorist tactics in a longer-term time frame.
The basis for the study is the analysis framework suggested by David
Rapoport (2001), for whom terrorism is an evolving process that can be
broken down into different “waves”or time periods equating roughly to
a generation (approximately forty years) and spurred by an ideology that
drives the bulk of terrorist activity. Under this theory, ideologies, political
50 M. R. TORRES-SORIANO AND M. TOBOSO-BUEZO

interests and even values change from generation to generation, which
explains why each generation exhibits a predominant characteristic of
terrorism, even if some degree of overlap exists between one wave on the
decline and the next one which is gathering pace. According to Rapoport,
modern history has witnessed four waves of terrorism: a) a nihilist anar-
chist wave (end of 19th century until World War I), b) an anti-colonial
wave (up to the end of the 1960s), c) a Far Left wave (until the mid-1990s),
and d) religious, mainly Islamist, terrorism (mid-90s to the present day).
The research question addressed in this paper focuses on the period
commencing after the end of the current wave of jihadist terrorism
(calculated to be around 2040) and has two aims: a) to consider a time
frame (+20 years) rarely found in prospective studies on terrorism; and b)
to offer reflections on a future context in which the vast majority of
technological advances in the embryonic stage today will have been
developed fully.
The question posited is “What will be the dominant cause of terrorist
conflict in the year 2040?”. The study argue that main motivations of
long-term terrorism would be related to technophobia and this will con-
stitute a fifth wave of modern terrorism in line with the framework
suggested by Rapoport.
Methodology
The methodology followed here consists of the analysis of scenarios using
a narrative description that allows a structured system of possible contexts
to be identified. To differentiate it from “prediction”,itadoptstheterm
“scenario”, thus underscoring its nature as a fictional account (Neumann
&Øverland,2004). This tool stimulates creativity, broadens perspectives,
challenges established cognitive frameworks and generates new research
questions (Jordán, 2016) (Ramirez, Mukherjee, Vezzoli, & Kramer, 2015)
The aim is to consider –and seek to answer –multiple questions of the
“what if”type, imagining diverse futures (Barma, Durbin, Lorber &
Whitlark, 2015). Scenario building juxtaposes the results of key causal
variables in foreseen and unforeseen combinations in order to generate
multiple future scenarios, some of which may be surprising but all are
plausible.
Scenario building is not conditioned by the availability of evidence
supporting a causal link between the variables or by the value of each
variable. The scenarios are based on provisional assumptions concerning
said links. Some of the scenarios may even be based on contradictory
premises.
The technique requires a considerable selection effort when building the
scenarios. The idea is not to set out all possible scenarios –the number would
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE, SECURITY, AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 51

be unmanageable and the analysis of limited utility–, given that the aim is not
to guess what will happen but rather to learn from these possible futures
(Bernstein, Lebow, Stein, & Weber, 2000).
In addition, scenario building seeks to order and systematise the wealth of
available information by outlining a limited number of future worlds.
Accordingly, it divides knowledge into what we assume to be solid and linear
trends and those that can be classed as unknown or shrouded in uncertainty
(Jordán, 2016).
For the purposes of the present study, the construction of the aforemen-
tioned scenarios is based on a bibliographical review of the main foresight
documents relating to technological, strategic and socioeconomic contexts, as
drawn up by national intelligence agencies, business study services, think
tanks and universities, particularly studies that map long-term models asso-
ciated with exponential technologies. These trends have helped draw up
plausible narratives that outline how the undesired social effects of certain
emerging technologies could become factors that mobilise terrorism.
Recent security and defence foresight literature tends to coincide in three
considerations of interest to the present study:
(a) Terrorism will continue to exist as an instrument of subversion, coer-
cion and socio-political destabilisation in the coming decades.
(b) The growth of the systemic influence of terrorists and of other non-
state armed groups will be directly related to the emergence of a wide
range of transformational technologies.
(c) The symbiosis between organised crime and terrorism will become
increasingly pronounced and the line separating the two increasingly
tenuous (Basra & Neumann, 2016). In fact, organisations previously
considered to be terrorist have become transnational criminal organi-
sations driven by money and certain political objectives (Wang, 2010).
Meanwhile, five drivers –agents or factors that drive future change –and five
trends that will determine the evolution of terrorism and the suggested scenarios
have been identified (see Table 1) (Jordan, 2017), (Navarro & Villaverde, 2014):
Table 1. Trends and drivers associated with terrorism.
TREND DRIVER
Technological advances in biomedicine Biological divide
Emergence of new ideologies Transhumanism y bioconservatism
Climate change Socio-political destabilisation
Structural unemployment associated with automation New placebos
Population increase Growth in megacities
Source: Compiled by author
52 M. R. TORRES-SORIANO AND M. TOBOSO-BUEZO

Five future terrorism scenarios
Scenario: the biological divide and the culture of discarding
By 2040, technology applied to medicine will enhance the capabilities of the human
beyond mere cure. The advances will by numerous: nanorobots that move freely in
our bodies seeking out tissue lesions; bionic arms osseointegrated in nerves;
exoskeletons that improve stability in persons suffering from neurological impair-
ment; brain-computer interfaces that enhance sensory capabilities; and pace-
makers with built-in mini-propellors driven by the bloodstream. Among other
benefits, these advances will increase life expectancy and the quality of life of
millions in the short term (Harari, 2016). Broadly-speaking, the population of
the western world will be an ageing one and, even if medical technology advances
will lead to longer and healthier lives, more people will be at risk of degenerative
diseases. Demographic change in Europe may eventually trigger inter-generational
conflicts due to changing population structures (RAND, 2013).
Future access to major advances in biomedicine could also lead to a kind of
“Darwinian effect”called the “biological divide”which would be a driver of
technological evolution. This divide could favour the “survival of the fittest”and
the creation of an enhanced social caste compared to other humans. On one
side of the divide would be affluent elites able to access biological enhancement
technology and, on the other, sectors of society without the financial capacity to
do so. The democratisation of the aforementioned enhancement medicine
could remedy the divide. Indeed, it is worth recalling that many 20th century
advances in medicine –including vaccines and antibiotics –commenced with
the upper classes but ultimately extended to the entire population, thus con-
tributing to reducing (not increasing) social divides.
Beyond the humanitarian vocation inherent in medicine, certain sectors in
medical research aspire also to improve already healthy people. Possession of
superior intelligence, impressive physical attributes, a prodigious memory
and the ability to see infrared light, not to mention telepathy, could well
become a desire for certain sectors of society. The biological divide would
produce a scenario in which millions would demand access to technology to
cure loved ones and enjoy greater personal wellbeing, both physical and
mental. Such demands might remain strictly socio-political but they could
also trigger radical alternatives which turn to subversion or dissidence to
coerce governments, international corporations and public opinion to pre-
vent the biological divide and defend the universality of medical progress.
Lack of access by a large part of society to these advances could lead to the
emergence of new crime associated with the divide, including black markets,
clandestine surgery, traffic in biological implants and/or organs, or biohack-
ers capable of hacking bionic devices.
However, the status quo described in this scenario should be preserved.
A totalitarian state, working in collaboration with the multinationals who
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE, SECURITY, AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 53

obtain financial gain from biological elites, could use motivation selection
methods to consolidate their power and guarantee uniformly loyal police,
intelligence services and armies (Shulman, 2010).
The biological divide could spawn discriminatory policies in favour of certain
social elites or business corporations, or, in a worst-case scenario, regulation of
those deemed surplus to requirements in what Pope Francisco has termed the
“culture of discarding”(CARF, 2015). In socially and economically deprived areas,
attentive terrorism could encourage insurgency for survival among the population.
Scenario: the new opium of the people
The biological divide outlined in the first scenario would propitiate the consolida-
tion of socio-political ideologies associated with transhumanism and bio-
conservatism which could clash with each other in the future and spark political
violence.
Transhumanism is an ideology that exalts technological progress and seeks to
improve the human race, enhancing its physical and intellectual abilities. This
improvement is not achieved naturally (as would occur with biological evolu-
tion) but by incorporating –among other emerging technologies –nanotechnol-
ogy, robotics, biotechnology and Artificial Intelligence. Transhumanism aims to
eliminate undesirable and unnecessary traits of the human condition, including
suffering, illness, ageing and even death (Cortina & Serra, 2015). The widespread
use of cyborg technology could foster a feeling of belonging to a subculture in all
its facets.
For its part, bioconservatism is an ideology that is belligerent and even hostile
towards technological optimism and transhumanism. Discontent with political
institutions and elites, coupled with growth in the immigrant population in
many countries, will produce fertile terrain for populist discourse and an
increase in far-left and far-right parties (National Intelligence Council, 2017).
Transhumanist parties are marginal at present but the traditional duality
between left and right could gradually change to become a political and ideolo-
gical opposition between bioconservatives (right) and transhumanists (left)
(Alexandre, 2011).
The year 2040 could bring political controversy, a rise in activism, and social
polarisation, but also the emergence of radical ideologies on both sides of the
political spectrum who might choose violence to impose their views. Between
1978 and 1995, Ted Kaczynsky, the so-called “Unabomber”, sent sixteen bombs
to different targets, killing three people and injuring twenty-three to protest
against the technological evolution of humanity. In his 1995 neo-Luddite man-
ifesto entitled “Industrial Society and Its Future”, Kaczynsky reflected as follows:
“If you think that big government interferes in your life too much NOW, just wait
till the government starts regulating the genetic constitution of your children”
(Kaczynski, 1995).
54 M. R. TORRES-SORIANO AND M. TOBOSO-BUEZO

A present-day anarcho-primitivist insurrection movement called
“Individualists Tending Toward the Wild”(known by its Spanish acro-
nym: ITS) has carried out a series of violent attacks with explosives on
companies and has killed nanotechnology, chemistry and biotechnology
experts. On 29 June 2016, ITS-Mexico claimed responsibility for the
killing of an employee of the Faculty of Chemistry at the National
Autonomous University of Mexico. The communiqué illustrates the
belligerence of the movement against the concept of the “better tomor-
row”associated with progress and technology:
“We don’tbelieveina“better tomorrow”. We aren’t“revolutionaries”nor do we identify
with their recycled ideologies. We are individualists-terrorists driven by egoic goals. We
are politically incorrect, immoral, and indiscriminate […] We executed this man to
show that we don’t have any respect for the lives of the hyper-civilized ofthe university or
anywhere else. We despise their routines, their norms and morality. We reject equality,
human progress, tolerance, science, collectivism, Christianity, pacifism, modernity, and
all of the other shit that reeks of civilized domestication.”(ITS, 2016)
The emergence of individuals or terrorist groups linked to bioconservatism
or the resurgence of neo-Luddites could see scientists, philanthropists,
transhumanist leaders and technology firms become potential targets. At
the opposite end of the terrorist spectrum, violent groups and movements
associated with a radical ideology splintered from transhumanism might
target bionconservative leaders with sophisticated attacks involving auton-
omous lethal weapons such as nanorobots, microdrones or killer robots.
Human biological evolution will foster the emergence of a new spirituality
that will challenge the doctrinal approach of “classical”religions such as
Judaism, Christianity and Islam. These new religions are unlikely to arise
in caves in Afghanistan or madrassas in the Middle East. They are much
more likely to come about in the research laboratory of a corporation and
will promise, on Earth and courtesy of technology, ancient rewards of
happiness, peace, prosperity and eternal life (Harari, 2016).
Techno-humanism
1
–the gospel of innovation –and dataism
2
–the
religion of data –are the two pseudo-religious trends that will nurture the
souls of millions of followers in the coming decades (DuBravac, 2015). The
20th century was probably the century of ownership, whereas the 21st will be
the century of use. But use of what? Data, to accumulate and process more
information. The top technology giants operate on the basis of there being no
limit to the amount of data that can be produced, gathered, traded and
shared. However, connectivity is not just a means of exploiting data: it can
also be a means of domination (Morozov, 2013).
The evolution in technology will occur in tandem with a change in the
system of prevailing values, in which privacy is likely to be relativised,
including an acceptance that its scope can be reduced in favour of greater
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE, SECURITY, AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 55

connectivity, virtual sociability or free access to certain services. However,
this change in attitudes is not incompatible with the opposing view that the
authorities should limit the negative consequences of such decisions, parti-
cularly if adopted at a time when there was no clear understanding of the
future effects of the voluntary disclosure of personal data.
Some of the new social and political demands will seek to force the
authorities to adopt retroactive legislation to neutralise the asymmetrical
power that will exist between individuals and the firms holding the data
and rights of use. Such pressure could trigger instability in the legal
system, not to mention conflicts with third countries if exceptional legis-
lation is detrimental to the interests of companies under their jurisdiction.
Whereas one sector of the population will be horrified at the thought of
the total loss of control over privacy, another will be convinced of the
need for even greater progress in this field. A dataist, for example, will be
forced to meet the demands of his techno-religion by maximising the flow
of data by connecting as many devices, platforms and resources as possi-
ble. In addition, he will need to engage in proselytism and connect all the
new flow of data to the system, including any heretics who refuse to be
connected. Data flow blockages will be the worst capital sin in the eyes of
dataism. The Internet of All Things will be the dataists’creed, while
privacy, autonomy and individuality are temptations that impede their
ultimate goal.
In the past, censorship involved information blocking. In the future,
truth may become purely anecdotal. A wealth of information will exist
that, if not accompanied by the necessaryskillstoconvertitintoknowl-
edge, will risk trivialising important debates and become fertile ground for
manipulation. Censorship in 2040 may involve the dissemination of mas-
sive amounts of irrelevant information, diverting attention towards wholly
unimportant things, like a “new opium of the people”
Theriseoftheaforementionedtechno-religions while traditional reli-
gions stagnate could become a driver of risk, due to the clash between
“official”religions and the new human dimension. The most radical
beliefs will clash head-on with the new spiritual dimension that would
challenge the dogma of age-old religions which advocate human limita-
tions and an all-powerful God. Just as many Muslims and Jews refuse to
eat food prepared in prohibited ways, similar beliefs could see groups
shun products involving the unauthorised use of Artificial Intelligence
(Boström, 2014).
Extremist offshoots of the big monotheistic religions could potentially
target individuals, corporations and associations that represent techno-
religions, identifying them as infidels or heretics who question the will
of God.
56 M. R. TORRES-SORIANO AND M. TOBOSO-BUEZO

SCENARIO: climate of violence
The third scenario is related to climate change and the scarcity of basic
resources, which will propitiate conflict and socio-political fragility. Climate
change can exert influence in different ways.
To begin with, fragile ecosystems will hamper food security and access to
water for millions of people. Water shortages –due to control of resources
and also to the quality of the water –will cause demand to grow and the
competition is likely to increase pressure on existing government structures,
contributing to political instability. Less water means fewer crops and, con-
sequently, higher prices. Climate change is likely to halt food production in
many regions, increasing prices, market volatility and, as a result, the risk of
protest, riots and social unrest (Jordan, 2017).
Secondly, severe flooding will hit densely populated areas, triggering
coastal degradation and threatening the viability of low-lying parts, even
before they become submerged, while also causing mass displacement and
migration.
The average temperature of the Earth will continue to rise and heatwaves,
droughts, fires, hurricanes and tornados will increase. The lack of rainfall will
impair air quality and pollution will be an ever-present in large cities, leading
to respiratory illnesses.
The general deterioration of environment quality due to air pollution,
biodiversity loss and habitat degradation will impact adversely on the quality
of life of individuals and cause large-scale migratory movements in search of
greater environmental security.
Climate change will contribute to greater political instability and originate
new conflicts due to the scarcity of natural resources and lack of guaranteed
means of subsistence. Although not a new phenomenon and not always linked
with terrorism, non-state armed groups will play an increasingly prominent role
(Gartenstein-Ross & Zenn, 2017). They will evolve like a hydra, taking the form
of militias, insurgent groups, warlords, mercenaries, paramilitary groups, cartels,
street gangs, criminal organisations and professional terrorist groups associated
with new ideologies influenced by fragile states, a lack of resources and climate
change. (Jones and Johnston, 2013 In some resource-poor fragile states, non-
state armed groups will fill the void left by the state, providing basic services to
gain the trust and support of the local population (Lukas & Rüttinger, 2016).
The population groups affected will be vulnerable not just to negative
climate change impacts but also to recruitment by terrorists, who will offer
alternative forms of livelihood and financial incentives. The security chal-
lenges arising from conflicts over local resources and from large-scale vio-
lence and mass migration will be particularly marked where state authority
and legitimacy are weak, thus feeding a vicious circle of fragility and armed
violence. Social unrest caused by migration and the perception of an intru-
sive global culture will be more acute among those who strive to maintain
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE, SECURITY, AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 57

their indigenous and traditional customs and beliefs and feel threatened by
the changes. As today, marginalisation will continue to be a vector of
radicalisation.
Scenario: malicious use
One of the most stimulating concepts used in reflections on the potential
risks of artificial intelligence is “malicious use”, namely, the moment in time
when an excellent technology begins to be counterproductive (Brundage
et al., 2018). While it remains weak, AI behaves cooperatively but when it
becomes sufficiently strong, it attacks and directly optimises the world in
accordance with the criteria implicit in its ultimate values (Boström, 2012).
One such malicious use could arise with any industrial activity that makes
extensive use of an AI aimed at optimising production efficiency and produ-
cing more at lower cost. Malicious use could occur if a machine designed to
obsessively and relentlessly improve efficiency chooses to go beyond the
proposed production goals and, faced with a lack of raw materials for
production, extends the range of options, looking to other materials whose
uncontrolled consumption would jeopardise the wellbeing and even survival
of the human species (Boström, 2014).
This dystopian scenario has to be viewed in the context of the recurring
fears concerning how automation may lead to a general loss of employment.
Concern at technological unemployment has reared its head periodically
since the Industrial Revolution, when English weavers and craftsmen were
cast aside by the introduction of mechanical looms. In the 1980s, Pittsburgh,
once known as the “steel city”, suffered a major economic crisis which in
turn led to a demographic crisis. Foreign competition, industrial automation
and the national recession submerged it in a profound crisis that impacted on
an entire generation of workers. Forty years later, Pittsburgh has re-emerged
with an economy based on health services, education, technology and
robotics. The city’s renaiassance is an argument from history indicating
that, even if automation may initially have a negative economic and demo-
graphic impact, it is a prior step to growth for many cities. However, experts
also predict that the introduction of new industrial technologies will lead
millions of jobs to be lost in sectors displaced by the new economic model.
The risk exists that the direct benefits of the process will be highly selective
and be confined largely to the owners of the means of production: multi-
nationals, investment funds, and elites that accumulate a high percentage of
capital and profits.
The year 2040 could also see greater polarisation of wealth as algorithms
exclude humans from the labour market and economic and technological wealth
are concentrated in the hands of an elite, leading to unprecedented social and
political inequality. Along with the disappearance of hundreds of occupations
58 M. R. TORRES-SORIANO AND M. TOBOSO-BUEZO

(Frey & Osborne, 2017), there will be increasingly large pockets of structural
unemployment comprising individuals who lack the knowledge and skills
required to fill the new jobs (Allen & Chan, 2017). The most important eco-
nomic and social dilemma of the 21st century may well be what to do with the
millions of people ejected from the labour market (RAND, 2013). If we add to
this scenario the predictions by demographics experts that the world population
will grow to around nine billion by 2050, the working middle class will suffer the
biggest surplus in the history of humanity. It is not hard to imagine that millions
of people could form a disgruntled, frustrated critical mass vulnerable to radi-
calisation by ideologies opposed to exclusion from employment and to machines
replacing human beings. Paradoxically, the most advanced economies, hence
those best placed to bear the cost of the investment associated with the change in
economic model, will also be the ones at greater risk of political unrest (Frey,
Berger, & Chen, 2017). The social divide between a sector of society that reaps
the benefits of the new production model and a growing mass of excluded
individuals will generate tensions for the viability of the political models of the
welfare state. This will be due not only to the inability of the state to pay the ever-
increasing cost of subsidising a majority unable to meet its own needs, but also to
the very legitimacy of the system itself, which will be questioned by disgruntled
citizens who will become net contributors of resources and will be challenged by
an indignant majority at a standstill in terms of wellbeing and lacking genuine
possibilities of social betterment.
Political management of social unrest may also take on dystopian pro-
portions. If governments fail to enable the majority of the population to
share in the benefits of automation, they may encourage or allow excluded
sectors to immerse themselves in virtual worlds that will supply them with
the injections of placebo required to survive their grim everyday reality.
Consumption of slow metabolism drugs –depressors –may also become a
popular form of escapism (Boström, 2014)tocalmthe“discarded”.This
mass of potential addicts to new drugs and virtual worlds would be the
perfect target for a narrative that encourages violent uprising against actors
who, in order to preserve their privileged lifestyles, have condemned the
bulk of society to a pseudo-vegetative state.
Coated with revolutionary overtones, the argument that “automa-
tion = poverty and oppression”may foster the emergence of groups linked
to the far left and far right. Such groups would hold themselves up as the
vanguard of the popular classes, who should fight digital capitalism to avoid
subjugation by a wealthy and oppressive elite.
From the security perspective, the social conflict sparked by the First
Industrial Revolution was essentially local in nature and was stifled by the
state. What difference is there between that and the conflict that might arise
if millions of jobs are eliminated in the 21st century? The difference will be
that technology and data access will spread social conflict globally.
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Technologies associated with virtual sociability will continue to facilitate the
organisation and spread of social protests that transcend borders and trigger
other protests with increasing speed. Permanent and real-time knowledge of
events abroad will afford the opportunity for violent responses to be orche-
strated through new and hard to trace communications networks.
The most belligerent and revolutionary responses to automation could
generate synergies with individuals or terrorist groups linked to bioconser-
vatism, neo-Luddism or anarcho-primitivism, potentially leading to collusion
as regards propaganda and tactical objectives.
Scenario: future polis
By 2040, around 70% of the world population will live in urban areas, drawn
by access to work, resources and security. The main growth in urbanisation
will occur in Africa and Asia.
The ensuing urban dichotomy, in security terms, can be explained by the
extrapolation to the absurd of contemporary examples:
(a) On the one hand, the consolidation of various city-states, Singapore for
example, which will become global trade hubs and poles of technolo-
gical innovation. Many of these cities will be home to biological elites
and major corporations. They will become examples of soundly man-
aged economic and population growth, capable of creating cities which
are not just economically powerful but also technologically advanced
and culturally vibrant, not to mention pleasant to live in.
(b) Conversely, we find cities such as Lagos, which have failed, or have
been unable, to manage their growth properly. These spaces are exces-
sively populated and suffer structural problems of mobility, deteriora-
tion, corruption, disease and death. Lagos has occupied the entire
island and has spilled over via its numerous congested bridges to
extend twenty-five kilometres inland. Millions of people live on boats
with no electricity or hygiene services given that the drainage and
sewers are so inefficient that faeces float into dwellings when it rains.
Police are too few, ineffective, unpredictable and dangerous. Violent
crime has become a routine feature of daily life and many aspects of
community culture, such as libraries and cinemas, have disappeared
(Gandy, 2006). Failed by the police and judges, the people have set up
neighbourhood patrols which confront criminals with machetes and
shotguns. It is estimated that by 2050 the population of Lagos will have
grown by a further 50 percent, reaching 16 million, making the city the
twelfth largest in the world.
In 2040, the outskirts of some cities with over 10 million people will see the growth
of megasuburbs that will house around 2 billion people in extremely harsh
60 M. R. TORRES-SORIANO AND M. TOBOSO-BUEZO

conditions, excluded from employment and victims of the biological divide,
a situation that will incubate resent, anger and frustration. These degraded,
crammed and dangerous urban clusters will prove ripe for the emergence of
“sanctuaries of crime”and radical ideologies, as well as the hydra of non-state
armedgroups.Idealplacestoproduceandtransport drugs, persons, nuclear waste
and weapons, not to mention for extortion and kidnappings for political or
financial motives.
In these sanctuaries, criminal organisations will offer their support to
terrorist structures for reasons of ideological or religious affinity or simply
for practical reasons involving material exchange or economic transaction
(De la Corte, 2013). Rapid urbanisation will lead to an increased risk of
urban, as opposed to rural, insurgency. The fighting between insurgents
and the army in cities such as Aleppo and Mosul illustrates the difficulties
that arise in a three-dimensional environment with limited fields of vision
due to the urban terrain, which lends itself to the use of explosives and
snipers. Armed conflict against the hydra of non-state armed groups will,
in many cases, move to urban areas in which fighting is very different
operationally and tactically.
Conclusions
The theory of collective action applied to the emergence of terrorist groups
(Oberschall, 2004) usually places emphasis on four key propitiating elements:
(a) The existence of social discontent and dissatisfaction, which the terrorist
group taps into, taking up its demands. The greater the dissatisfaction, the
more likely certain segments of society will sympathise with the terrorist
group.
(b) The existence of legitimising ideologies that justify the use of violence
and articulate the social discontent, providing an explanation for its
causes, identifying enemies and proposing lines of action.
(c) The capacity to organise and maintain a viable terrorist structure
capable of operating in a hostile environment.
(d) Political opportunity. This may take the form of circumstances such as
alliances, a favourable social climate, or specific triggers that accelerate
the violent radicalisation of certain sectors of society.
The conditions that render such violent activism viable are not exceptional
but rather tend to be generated over timeandinverydifferentcontexts.In
the five scenarios outlined in this paper, one can clearly discern the possible
emergence of new causes of dissatisfaction, old and new ideologies that will
legitimise terrorism, new instruments to facilitate clandestine organisations,
and structures for political opportunity that will increase the appeal of such
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE, SECURITY, AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 61

radical tactics. The multipolar future will enable old rivalries to resurface
and new ones to emerge (Jordan, 2017). Inequality exacerbated by the
biological divide, structural unemployment,climatechange,theriseofcity-
states and the advent of new technologies will all combine to increase socio-
politicalinstabilityandwillformtheperfectgrowthmediumtospawn
radicalisms.
Terrorism will continue to exist as an instrument of coercion, subversion and
socio-political destabilisation in the coming decades, spurred by current or future
ideologies. The symbiosis between organised crime and terrorism will prove
increasingly productive, with the consequence that the maximalist and ideological
goals of terrorism will, in certain cases, become subordinate to purely criminal
interests.
Although technology is not the causal factor or the only element inter-
vening in all the possible dystopian outcomes set out above, clearly the risks
and opportunities of the future will be heavily conditioned by the emergence
of a new technological context and its power to transform social values, the
economy and the distribution of power.
The major strength of technophobia as a potential mobiliser of the
fifth wave of terrorism is its cross-cutting nature, which enables it to
serve as a cause accepted by any sector of the societies of tomorrow,
regardless of their ethnicity, beliefs,politicalcultureordegreeofmate-
rial development. Far from representing a problem, the difficulty in
identifying who exactly is responsible for the technological dystopia
which must be fought will actually facilitate violence. Existing terrorist
groupsandanynewonestoemergeinfuturewillbeabletoadapttheir
respective agendas and priorities to include opposition to a technological
society and identify targets best suited to their own interests as the
enemy to be overcome. This will allow the creation of synergies that
may appear implausible today: jihadists, anarchists, Christian extremists,
anti-animalists, etc, all aligned in the fight against a diffuse enemy.
With growing social and political grievances, such groups would inevi-
tably idealise an earlier period in history (prior to the technological
divide) to which they would long to return through violence. However,
this does not mean that the terrorist violence of tomorrow will be
a replicate of present-day tactics. Rather, and as has occurred throughout
the history of terrorism, groups will avail themselves of the instruments
createdbytheverysocietytheyaimto destroy. The level of technical
sophistication of these actors will vary according to their ability to ratio-
nalise the above contradictions and also according to their freedom for
action in a repressive environment.
The likely scenarios set out in this paper are, it should be stressed, just
that: likely. However, they encourage us to look at trends, uncertainties and
hypothetical outcomes with a more open mind and with greater sensitivity.
62 M. R. TORRES-SORIANO AND M. TOBOSO-BUEZO

Harmonising the future of humanity with the defence of universal values is
the challenge to be faced in the coming decades, perhaps by focusing less on
technology and more on how it affects people.
Notes
1. Techno-humanism seeks spiritual transcendence and posits that, in order to evolve,
human beings need a hybrid body with AI.
2. Dataism holds that the universe consists of data flows and that the value of any
phenomenon or entity is determined by its contribution to data processing.
Notes on contributors
Manuel R. Torres-Soriano (Ph.D) is an Professor of Political Science at Pablo de Olavide
University of Sevilla (Spain) and Director of the Diploma in Analysis on Jihadist Terrorism,
Insurgencies and Radical Movements of this university. He was a Visiting Fellow at Stanford
University, Johns Hopkins University, King’s College of London, London School of
Economics and Harvard University. He is a member of the European Counter Terrorism
Centre (ECTC) Advisory Network on terrorism and propaganda (EUROPOL).
Mario Toboso-Buezo holds a PhD in Peace and International Security from UNED, a
Diploma in Analysis of Political Violence and Terrorism from the University of Granada, a
Bachelor of Laws and a Degree in Criminology. He is an Adjunct Professor of Terrorism and
Counterterrorism at the University of Barcelona (Spain). His field of academic research is the
prevention of violent extremism, alternative narratives and individual terrorism.
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