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Ella Libanova
ISSN 2071-789X
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY
Economics & Sociology, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2019
313
LABOUR MIGRATION FROM
UKRAINE: KEY FEATURES,
DRIVERS AND IMPACT
Ella Libanova,
Ptoukha Institute for Demography
and Social Studies of the National
Academy of Sciences,
Kyiv, Ukraine
E-mail: libanova@ukr.net
ORCID: 0000-0001-7170-7159
Received: December, 2018
1st Revision: January, 2019
Accepted: March, 2019
DOI: 10.14254/2071-
789X.2019/12-1/19
ABSTRACT. The main features of external labour migration from
Ukraine are defined in the article, including the scope, the
directions, the role in the modern and future development of
Ukraine. Its main components are considered that differ in the
length of migrant’s stay abroad, the composition of
participants, the impact on the overall social and economic
situation in the country and the life of migrant’s households.
The scope and structure of the migratory flows in the recipient
countries are clarified. The estimates of migration mobility of
various population groups of Ukraine are presented. It is
demonstrated that external migrations in the modern Ukraine
perform the functions of social lifts, and migrant’s intentions
to leave the country has become the prevalent behavior
patterns. According to studies results, the main factor is
differences between wage in Ukraine and potential
remuneration in the country of destination, but mentality is the
important role. Due to traditional high mobility of Ukrainians,
it is unreasonable to promote the idea to stop the external
migration exclusively solely through the growth of wages. The
opportunities of the state impact on the migration behaviors
of the population are outlined and the most effective actions,
from the point of view of the author, are highlighted.
JEL Classification
: D02,
O17, P31
Keywords
: labour migration from Ukraine, scale and direction of
Ukrainian migrations, migration causes and consequences.
Introduction
The migratory population exchange of nowadays is a key contributor to globalisation,
transnational labour markets development, formation of a common educational, cultural and
linguistic space, and allows all inhabitants of planet Earth to reap from the fruits of the
civilizational progress. Unlike the XVII-XIX century migrations that were mostly
monodirectional (from the Old World to the Americas, Australia and New Zealand),
contemporary displacements became multidirectional, often circulatory and even chaotic. More
and more often people not only live and work in countries other than their country of origin but
change several countries of residence during a lifetime. Transnational corporations scattered
across the globe expand career opportunities while borders become more transparent and easily
Libanova, E. (2019). Labour migration from Ukraine: Key features, drivers and
impact. Economics and Sociology, 12(1), 313-328. doi:10.14254/2071-789X.2019/12-
1/19
Ella Libanova
ISSN 2071-789X
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY
Economics & Sociology, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2019
314
crossable. These are the signs of the future, where international migration flows will grow and
duration of a migrant’s stay in one country will shorten.
The so-called economic migrations, and labour migrations in particular, are most
prevalent globally and overwhelming in Ukraine. They are influenced by many factors, have
different scales and compositions, yet have many common features:
1) the main driver is an opportunity to earn more or to get more options and better conditions
for self-fulfilment;
2) displacement is targeted at countries with higher living standards;
3) only a small share of migrants who have found acceptable jobs in the destination country
return to their homeland.
1. Literature review
The urgency of the problems of labor migration from Ukraine causes the attention of
scientists, analysts, sociologists and politicians, in the Ukrainian academic literature. In 2019,
the National Academy of Sciences published the national report "Ukrainian Society: the
Migration Measurement".
There is a specialized department at the Ptoukha Institute of Demography and Social
Studies of the National Academy of Sciences. Department employees systematically publish
their research results in monographs and articles. A significant experience of migration
researches has been accumulated in works by the Ukrainian scientists: V. Yevtukh,
A. Haidutsky, O.Homra, O.Ivankova-Stetsyuk, O.Malynovs’ka, I.Maydanik, O.Ovchynnikova,
O.Pozniak, I.Pribytkova, M.Romanyuk, U. Sadova, O.Shul’ga. The problems of the return of
Ukrainian citizens for the first time were highlighted in the study “Human Resource
Development and Migration Policy of Ukraine”. (2008). ETF. etf.europa.eu.
2. Methodological approach
The main idea of article: labour migration is not a problem that needs to be solved, but
a reality that needs to be reckoned with and what needs to be improved.
Accordingly, it is necessary to find out the reasons and motives for leaving, assess the
scope and direction of migration flows, understand the consequences of mass departure of able-
bodied people from Ukraine.
The analysis of the causes and motives of migration is based on a secondary analysis of
all available information on labor migration from Ukraine, obtained from the sample surveys
during 2008-2018. The main producers of information are the State Statistics Service of Ukraine
and 2 specialized sociological centers: Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and Rating
Sociology Group.
The information field created by the State Statistics Service covers the results of 3
additional modules to the Labour Force Survey (2008, 2012, 2017). The latest data collected
from 40,500 respondents aged 15-70 by the face-to-face method. On the 2017 survey migrant
workers (labour migrants) identified those who worked or sought employment abroad during
01.01.2015-18.06.2017, regardless of where they were at the time of the survey. In the amount
of external labour migrants, migrant labor migrants are not taken into account.Kyiv
International Institute of Sociology conducted 3 all-Ukrainian survey: on the December 2017,
April 2018 and May 2018. Data collected from 2039, 4005 and 2025 respondents aged 18 and
above by the face-to-face method. Raiting Sociology Group conducted 2 all-Ukrainian survey:
on September & October 2017. Data collected from 1200 respondents aged 18 and above by
the face-to-face method.
Ella Libanova
ISSN 2071-789X
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY
Economics & Sociology, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2019
315
Estimates of the scale of external labour migration are based on the results of 3
consecutive surveys conducted by the state statistics service, the situation on the labor market
of Ukraine, data on the payment of taxes and insurance premiums.
Сharacterization of the consequences of mass departure of able-bodied Ukrainians
abroad was made on the basis of an analysis of the situation on the labour market of Ukraine,
data on private remittances from abroad, an analysis of household income, including those with
and without labour migrants as part of their households.
3. Conducting research and results
3.1. Scale and Directions of Migration from Ukraine
As of today, it appears very difficult to estimate the scale of external migration of
Ukrainians (let alone its composition and destinations), the reasons being general flaws of the
national population counting system 17 years after the last census, lack of valid incentives to
register displacements, unwillingness of migrants’ relatives to inform interviewers about their
family members working abroad.
Number of International labour migrants is lower than internal ones, but the process of
Ukrainian international migration is far from exhausted.
Figure 1. Estimation of current, returned & potential migrants, ths
Source: (IOM in Ukraine..., 2016, p.30).
A 2017 study revealed that the lion’s share of the Ukrainian labour migrants who
returned to Ukraine had worked abroad for under 1 year, but 29% had worked for over a year
and 14% had worked for several years (Pyrozhkov, 2018). Most so-called short-term migrants
1
circulate between Ukraine and its neighbouring Poland and Czech Republic. As could be
expected, one third of those working in Italy do not return to Ukraine in a year’s term
2
. The
average duration of one trip of the lion’s share of the Ukrainian labour migrants doesn’t exceed
3 months, but they mostly take several trips a year. While previously the western provinces had
the highest mobility, now central and southern areas of the country are equally mobile. The
1
Persons aged 15-50 years who worked or looked for a job being abroad at least once during 2015-2017 for less
than one year and expected to return home in the next 12 months.
2
Calculated according to (Libanova, 2018).
423,8
264,4
144,4 117,3
192,6
Current long-term
migrants
Current short-term
migrants
Returned migrants Potential long-term
migrants
Potential short-term
migrants
Ella Libanova
ISSN 2071-789X
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY
Economics & Sociology, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2019
316
majority of migrants have a positive experience of working abroad – 71% would like to get a
job outside Ukraine again (Pyrozhkov, 2018).
Estimates of the total number of the Ukrainian labour migrants simultaneously working
abroad range from 1.5 to 5.0 million persons
3
. Considering the number of active taxpayers in
Ukraine, the magnitude of unregistered employment and possible calculation errors, the most
accurate estimate of the number of Ukrainians simultaneously working abroad would probably
be 3.0 million persons.
In the recent years, the migration flows from Ukraine have radically transformed, if not
in magnitude then in destinations and ratio of reversible to irreversible migrations (Figure 1).
Changes in the geographic composition of the Ukrainian migrants are reflected by changes in
private remittances. In 2015-2017 alone total remittances from Poland have increased by
138.5%, from other EU countries – by 23.8%, from the U.S. and Canada – by 33.3%, while
remittances from Russia decreased by 27.8%
4
.
These transformations are rather caused by the external than internal events. Ukraine
has long favoured an economic model with a cheap workforce – low wages have been
consistently presented to foreign investors as the country’s main comparative advantage for
many years, therefore this paradigm has had quite a constant influence on the labour migration
incentives. In the meanwhile, the demand for a Ukrainian workforce has changed, as have the
foreign employment conditions.
Figure 2. Structure of the Ukrainian migration by destination, %
Source: Calculated according to State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 2018.
During 2.5 decades, migration flows from Ukraine were split nearly in halves between
Russia and Europe, whereby labour force exchange with Russia was explicitly circular, while
most Ukrainian labour migrants wanted to stay in Europe for as long as possible if not for good.
Everything has changed with the onset of the armed conflict in Donbas and respective sharp
deterioration in relations between Ukraine and Russia – the number of people wishing to work
in Russia has quickly dropped. However, after 4 years of Russia’s military aggression, most
Ukrainians still believe it is acceptable to work in the aggressor country: 63.1% can justify this
practice and only 22.1% ultimately reject it (Mostova & Rahmanin, 2018). Undoubtedly, the
3
The lowest estimates are traditionally made by the State Statistics Service that defines labour migrants as only
those staying abroad for less than 1 year (others do not comply with the permanent population criteria of the
country of origin and are considered emigrants): according to their data, during 2005-2008 there were over 1.1.
million persons working abroad for under 1 year, during 2010-2012 – 1.2 million, during 2015-2017 – 1.3 million.
The majority of other data sources do not pose such limitations; therefore, their studies produce higher estimates.
4
Calculated according to (Rating Sociology Group, 2017).
48,1 43,2
26,3
13,4 13,2
11,3
11,9 12,9
9,4
8,0 14,3
38,9
18,6 16,4 14,1 Russian
Federation
Italy
Czech
Republic
Poland
Other
countries
Ella Libanova
ISSN 2071-789X
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY
Economics & Sociology, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2019
317
change in labour migration destinations has also been influenced by the limited earning
opportunities in Russia compared to the European countries. And while in 2014-2015 the
migration flows from Crimea and Donbas to Russia have increased in volume, people who fled
Donbas over life hazards, destruction of houses, job loss etc. and moved to other regions of
Ukraine now quite frequently make a secondary move to the economically developed countries.
Their main motive is wanting to earn more, especially to be able to afford buying or renting a
residential property, but they also consider escaping conscription to the military.
However, the redirection of the migration flows mostly happened due to a changing
situation at the labour markets of eastern European countries, i.e. changes in demand and supply
of labour force because of a massive outflow of their population for jobs in more developed
countries like Germany or the Netherlands. As a result, many countries interested in attracting
Ukrainian workers have lifted numerous barriers to receiving work permits for foreigners,
particularly Ukrainians.
The troublesome situation at the labour markets of the majority of eastern European
countries is caused, to a great extent, by an outflow of a significant share of their citizens for
working in more developed economies, with higher wages and better career opportunities,
combined with a rapid population ageing and shrinking workforce. The workforce deficit drives
the simplification of the employment procedures and lowers the job requirements. Just several
years ago employers in Poland, Czech Republic or Slovakia were preferably hiring experienced
and qualified workers (except for cases where non-qualified workers were needed), but now
they tend to agree even to professional training and retraining of workers at their own expense
for 1 to 2 months.
The complex effects of lifting the visa regime for Ukrainians by the EU should not be
ignored as well, as they provide an opportunity to legally stay in most European countries for
3 months looking for an acceptable job. Combined with a radical simplification by Poland of
the procedures for receiving so-called “work visas” by Ukrainians and absence of a language
barrier (at least in oral communication), they have logically made Poland receive the increased
labour migration flows from Ukraine. However, Poland has traditionally been an attractive
country for the Ukrainian migrants. Even though the number of migrants is significantly lower
than the number of visas issued, they still make up to 27% of the total immigrant population of
Poland, as reported by the official statistics. According to the 2011 population census,
Ukrainian citizens were the largest group of foreign-born permanent residents in Poland (13,400
persons or 25%) (Brunarska at al., 2016, pp. 118-119).
The very active efforts by vocational training institutions from eastern European and
other countries for attracting the Ukrainian youth contribute to the intensified migration –
special programmes are being established, grants and scholarships provided, specialized
preparatory language schools are operating. Policy changes at many European universities and
colleges that have economic incentives to expand their enrolments (e.g. providing budgetary
support of students from Ukraine, discounting the tuition fees for them) have increased the
numbers of people seeking a EU-based education.
Overall, it could have been expected that easier border crossing with the visa-free
regime would facilitate more frequent returns home by the Ukrainian labour migrants who
would no longer have to bother with receiving new visas. At this, labour migration to the
European countries would become prevalently circular, hence a less detrimental impact on the
Ukrainian society. Migration processes in Georgia and Moldova have followed this pathway.
But so far, probably because of a rapidly growing workforce demand by businesses in
developed countries, this pattern is not seen and emigration from Ukraine is still on the rise.
Ella Libanova
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Economics & Sociology, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2019
318
3.2. Main Internal Drivers for Emigration
The people of Ukraine have consistently demonstrated their dissatisfaction with both
their own lives and the situation in the country. To a great extent this is justified by the low
living standards, slow pace and ineffectiveness of the nation’s socioeconomic transformations.
However, it seems that equally significant is the gap between the overstated expectations,
particularly as to the consequences of the “Revolution of Dignity” of 2013-2014, and the real
life. Ukrainians hoped for a fast growth of their incomes, improved quality and increased
accessibility of all public services, and these hopes have partly materialized. At the same time,
a sharp devaluation of the Ukrainian Hryvnia against major foreign currencies has made many
imported goods unaffordable. The conflict in Donbas has not only deprived Ukraine of
significant budgetary and social insurance revenues but also boosted budgetary expenses on
supporting internally displaced persons, rearmament of the military forces, ongoing recovery
of the ruined infrastructure in conflict-affected areas that sustain regular damage from shelling,
establishment and maintenance of checkpoints at the contact line etc. Undeniably, this
diminishes the state’s financial capacity to fulfil its obligations before the people. Political
speculations and populistic claims of politicians and paternalistic outlooks of many people,
which are characteristic of young democracies and observed in Ukraine, also play their role.
The underestimations of own incomes and social status are probably linked to the fact
that most people expect some external actors to improve their lives (e.g. the President,
Government, international organizations, major donor countries) rather than commit
themselves to act. However, on average, Ukrainians are much more satisfied with their own
lives than with the general situation in the country (Paniotto, 2018). It is understood that own
life’s assessments are based on the individual experiences while the perceptions of the situation
in the country are influenced by the media, where negative coverage prevails.
It is natural that poor perceptions of the individual and social existence push people to
seek changes. Unfortunately, a clear majority of the most active, mobile and competitive people
see their ways to radical changes in external migration. Therefore, poor performance by the
country and by individuals, as expressed in the social self-perceptions index (Paniotto, 2018),
transforms into the desire of many Ukrainians, especially those young, active and competitive,
to leave Ukraine for good, or for a job or studies. This desire was expressed by 29-35% of
people aged 18 years and above surveyed in late 2017 (Mostova, & Rahmanin, 2018). However,
only 4.5% of the total population aged 18-64 years (or 1.5 million people) were taking necessary
action to fulfil their desire to move (while only 7% intended to leave Ukraine in the next 6
months for a period of over 3 months) (Paniotto, 2018). Undoubtedly, this is a significant share
of the population. But it is not a majority like often said by politicians and the media.
The idea of having better living conditions is the most motivating for emigration (64%
of those who want to leave Ukraine for good), followed by securing a better future for kids
(34% of the general sample and 21% among those who do not have kids under 16 years of age),
absence of decent work in Ukraine (23%) and striving for a better education (12%)
5
(Rating
Sociology Group…, 2016). But a significant share of potential migrants who only declare their
intention for a temporary stay abroad in fact want to move there for good and subsequently
reunite with their families there.
The dominating motive for labour migration is aspiring to decent earnings. And this is
fully valid a concern: even with eliminating the influence of different purchasing power, the
average wage in Ukraine is only one third of Poland’s, Slovakia’s or Czech Republic’s, and a
little over a half of the average wage in Portugal, Greece or Russian Federation, while the
Ukraine’s minimum wage is roughly a half of its equivalent in most European countries
5
Respondents could select up to 2 options.
Ella Libanova
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Economics & Sociology, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2019
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(Figure 3). During 2017-2018, the minimum wage has grown by 102.5% in Ukraine and equals
$414 (US$ by PPP 2011), the average wage – by 34.4% to $950 (US$ by PPP 2011)
6
, but this
growth couldn’t close the gigantic gap
7
.
Figure 3. Monthly wages in 2016 (US$ by PPP 2011)
Sources: ILOSTAT, World Bank, State Statistics Service of Ukraine.
Incomes more or less comparable with the neighbouring countries are earned in Ukraine
by IT specialists and long-haul truck drivers. For most occupations, the official wages in
Ukraine are 2-3 times smaller than, for example, in Poland, a country that concentrates most
Ukraine’s labour migrants. The biggest gap is observed in health care: the average official wage
of a doctor in Ukraine is 6-10 times, and of a nurse – 6-8 times lower than that in neighbouring
Poland. Accordingly, the wag gap was the main reason for wanting to work abroad for 72% of
the respondents, while the second-ranking reason, differences in working conditions, was valid
for only 20%. Indeed, a majority of 81% of labour migrants who returned to Ukraine were
satisfied with their earnings abroad, and 79% (83% in Poland and 66% in Italy) of the Ukraine’s
migrant workers were spending less than a quarter of what had been earned (Libanova et al.,
2016). Whereas the monthly income of a labour migrant averages $937 in Italy, $793 in Czech
Republic and $584 in Poland, the difference can rather be explained by different incomes than
by different living conditions.
However, both experts and survey respondents tend to overestimate the importance of
merely economic drivers. In this context, Poland is well worth looking at, being not only the
centre of gravity for Ukrainian workers, but also a well-recognized Eastern Europe’s leader by
the pace and quality of reforms, and by economic development parameters in general.
Nevertheless, despite Poles’ satisfaction with their government, living standards and the
situation in the country, many of them head to more developed EU countries seeking better
jobs, higher incomes and better life. It is to compensate for these losses and fill the vacancies
that Polish employers search for Ukrainian workers. A similar situation is being formed in
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Baltic countries. To the contrary, Hungarians, in spite of their
lagging in making reforms, living standards, economic dynamics, do not at all demonstrate such
a degree of mobility. The economic drivers, although very important, are likely to work in a
6
Only official wages are considered; “shadow salaries” widespread in Ukraine not accounted for.
7
The 2018 data are limited to January to August; growth rates calculated with adjustments for inflation.
1298
2260
1432
5242
1992
2959
2307
1434 1449 1717 2144
2837
768
620 770 1119
1850
804 1055 1057
316 735 832 1157
471
Average Minimal
Ella Libanova
ISSN 2071-789X
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Economics & Sociology, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2019
320
certain mental environment that potentiates or diminishes their impact. Therefore, different
populations have different mobility potentials that are quite steady and inert. Given the fact that
Ukrainians even in the Soviet era were keen of working at various “Communism Construction
Projects”, easily agreed to temporary and even shift-based jobs in the distant north-eastern
regions, they commonly feature a high mobility potential, therefore, with all other conditions
equal, they are more prone to working abroad than, say, Belarusians, Hungarians or Bulgarians.
The Ukrainians’ appetite for working abroad is also amplified by the traditional
overstatements of their neighbours’ achievements, including incomes and quality of life in
general, while making underestimations of own progress. Most people are fully convinced that
the living conditions, safety, accessibility of good quality health care and education, pension
systems are significantly better in any foreign country – not only in the EU, but also in Belarus
and Russia.
As a result, studying and working abroad is prestigious. Those social bonds that prevent
people from changing the job to one with a lower status but higher income in Ukraine not only
have zero impact on their readiness to work in unqualified jobs abroad but even increase it. The
same applies to vocational education. Thus, despite having an obvious deficit of qualified
workers at the Ukraine’s labour market by virtually all professions, the demand for vocational
education remains very low in Ukraine: only 14% of pupils plan to attend vocational schools
while 85% strive for higher education. At this, 73% of those young people who plan to enter
universities would not agree to studying at a vocational school even if it renders them a higher-
paid and more sustainable job (Libanova et al., 2016). Nevertheless, Ukrainian youth easily
agree to get a working profession in Poland. It becomes obvious that any foreign education
works as a social status booster for both young people and their parents, while attending
Ukrainian vocational schools is a status disaster.
Intending to emigrate – for good or temporarily – becomes a “must have”, and
engagement in external migrations de facto serves as a social lift to leave behind the miseries
or poverty and receive a ticket to a high life society. Therefore, even though most Ukrainians
explain their wish to work abroad by the unavailability of decent labour income in Ukraine,
their true motivations are much more complex.
3.3. Social and Economic Effects of the Large-Scale Migration in Ukraine
When evaluating the impact of labour migration on Ukraine, the most important factor
to consider is migrants’ intentions to return and their fulfilment. While temporary migration has
both positive and negative consequences, leaving Ukraine for good is almost exclusively
detrimental for the country. In this context, having 65% of labour migrants expressing their
intention to return home even if they have a permanent job abroad looks very optimistic. No
doubts, intentions can change, but so can the moods of those 23% who would not like to return.
The average ratio of real returnees to current economic long-term migrants is 34% (Figure 4).
Considering the fact that 41% of Ukrainian migrants in 2015-2017 were below 35 years
of age and only 20% were 50 and above, the following will be inevitable effects of the massive
outflow of economically active population from Ukraine:
1) labour force deficit at local labour markets, initially in selected professions and later a total
one;
2) accelerated population ageing and growing dependency on the working population;
3) intensified depopulation that has already been the fastest in Europe for the last 25 years.
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Figure 4. Overall number of permanent returnees (1992-2013), expressed as a percentage of
total migrant workers in that country in 2014-2015
Source: IOM in Ukraine, 2016.
So far, difficulties have been encountered by labour markets in western provinces of
Ukraine and by enterprises that employ a highly mobile workforce, e.g. construction
companies. Most employers that don’t need large-scale recruitments, have not yet experienced
the scale and acuteness of the issue. But the situation develops very rapidly. Just back in 2017,
employers considered the following as the main obstacles to business development in Ukraine:
excessive taxation (47.5% of all respondents), frequent changes in legislation related to
businesses (30.3%), high interest rates on bank loans to businesses (25.1%), absence of business
support programmes by the government (22.1%) (An Enabling Environment…, 2017).
However, development envisages not only increasing labour productivity at the existing
enterprises; new types of activities are needed, new production facilities and therefore new
employees. A limited workforce supply will shortly become a major barrier to business
development, and national economic development in general.
Even sustaining the current production levels often becomes a mission impossible
because of massive resignations of workers and their departure to foreign labour markets. The
Ukraine’s economy now sees jobs deficit being very quickly replaced by labour force deficit;
politicians and businessmen only begin understanding this process. Accordingly, in 2018
vacancies have opened in Kyiv, Lviv, Kharkiv, Odesa and Dnipro offering $2,000 (US$ by PPP
2011), a high salary whose major part is paid “under the table” though.
However, the effects of labour migration are not limited to labour markets only. Family
relationships suffer, too – many families break up after one partner’s long or consistent being
away. In some cases, when two parents leave for foreign jobs, or a single parent does, children
are left to their relatives’ care, i.e. they are deprived of parental care. Having not seen successful
complete family models, these children are more likely to have deviations in their own families.
The lack of care also results in higher crime rates among youth. Getting used to “easy
money” and not understanding how hard their parents have to work abroad, adolescents get
more easily involved into criminal activities than legal work. However, this theory has no
statistical evidence. Currently it is very difficult to separate probable information errors from
seeing the actual trends. Nonetheless, it is understood that growing up without at least one
parent definitely has its imprint on a child’s outlook.
There is also evidence showing that children of labour migrants are more likely to leave
Ukraine.
Upon return home, labour migrants run into problems with pension security, since most
often they made no contributions to pension schemes. This situation was not really important
80
59
53
49
47
29
23
21
20
Creece
Russian Federation
Portugal
Spain
Israel
Poland
Belarus
Germany
Italy
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in the past when pension amounts were not linked to amount of contributions paid to the Pension
Fund of Ukraine, but now it can gain importance as social pensions are assigned in older age
and in smaller amount than labour pensions.
Furthermore, most migrant workers do not enjoy having a full social package abroad –
this is inevitable for illegal employment and widespread for legal. In turn, insufficient social
protection often leads to inability to get compensated for losses due to job-related accidents or
disability, to access required treatment and rehabilitation services. Logically, solutions to such
problems are sought in the migrants’ country of origin.
The biggest threat to the country’s future deals with study migrations because having a
European diploma makes it much easier to find decent jobs in European countries, and not only
those neighbouring Ukraine. This means not just loss of labour force but also shrinking
demographic potential of the Ukrainian society and faster population ageing. Nowadays,
educational establishments of many European countries welcome Ukrainian students and in
many cases offer them good benefits, such as discounted admission and tuition fees, preferential
accommodation, use of labs, libraries, sports facilities etc. Respective advertisement campaigns
are aggressive, agents often work directly in schools. It is notable that young people who
absolutely reject receiving vocational education in Ukraine eagerly agree to learning a working
occupation in the neighbouring countries. It appears that the prejudice towards working
professions explained by their low status doesn’t work for other countries – Ukrainians don’t
consider such jobs abroad unacceptable for themselves and their children. Probably the reason
is that any legal job is universally respected abroad, and that strong social bonds are rare among
Ukrainians living there, on the flip side.
A very significant impact of the expanding labour migration are remittances sent to
Ukraine that help survive not only their direct recipients but entire settlements. According to
the National Bank of Ukraine estimates, in 2017 total private remittances amounted to $9.3
billion, or 8.4% of the nation’s GDP. This is 4 times more than all direct foreign investments at
$2.3 billion (National Bank of Ukraine, 2017). Naturally, unlike direct investments, remittances
are scarcely used for starting businesses, but every Hryvnia spent in Ukraine one way or the
other works for the Ukrainian economy. Even when money is spent on daily consumption it
increases the cumulative effective demand and therefore fosters favourable conditions for many
people to earn incomes, although not always legally. A comparative analysis of new
constructions in rural areas between settlements where there are many labour migrants and
those where there are few would bring the evidence. Considering the uneven territorial
distribution of both the remittances and direct foreign investments, it can be concluded that the
communities from which many people move to work abroad are surely profiting from this
process.
It should also be kept in mind that labour migrants are those not satisfied by the
opportunities of the Ukraine’s labour market, those who would often work illegally but get
registered in a placement service to receive unemployment benefits. If these people emigrate,
the social protection system gets less pressure and formal job competition goes down – having
too many people who are officially registered as unemployed but in reality, don’t want to work
simply helps maintain wages at low levels.
Thus, a large-scale labour migration has a very diverse impact. The effects and
importance of any specific type of migration should be evaluated giving due consideration to
the interests of international development, the migrants’ country of origin and their families.
The contemporary external migration of Ukrainians comprises 7 components
(Libanova, 2018):
1) permanent migration
2) pendulum migration
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3) short-term agricultural migration
4) short-term non-agricultural migration
5) long-term migration
6) brain drain
7) educational migration of students
The first component is moving out for a permanent residence in another country. Those
who go abroad with a declared purpose of studying or working also may have such intentions,
often kept secret. This type of migration, obviously, is irreversible and means a direct loss to
Ukraine: the total population shrinks as does the cumulative workforce supply, resources spent
on migrants’ education get wasted. Policy prospects here can only include staying in touch with
these emigrants, helping them maintain links with Ukraine and hoping they would eventually
return or at least promote Ukraine and spread its positive image abroad. Largely this type of
migrants moves to a new country with their entire family or their relatives join them later
through family reunification programmes. Therefore, family relationships practically do not
suffer due to migration.
The second component, pendulum or shuttle migration, mostly refers to residents of
frontier areas and/or highly qualified professionals. For example, in Poland’s borderlands there
are many enterprises with morning and evening bus service from/to Ukraine commuting
Ukrainian workers. Another example are systematic border crossings for commerce, often
smuggling. Principally different migrations are made by highly qualified professionals, like
surgeons or university professors, who temporarily move to work abroad with different patterns
(2-3 times a week, monthly for 1-2 weeks etc.). Predominantly, these people are employed in
Ukraine and working abroad just brings them extra income. Given the current situation, this
type of migrations is the least harmful for Ukraine – it brings no population loss, growing
human capital (thanks to new knowledge and competencies gained), improved living standards.
The third component – short-term (most often seasonal) labour migration – is mostly
related to harvesting and essentially involves lowly-qualified workers and students. It bears no
negative effect on the labour market or socio-demographic situation in Ukraine. Due to its
prominent seasonality, migrant workers of low and medium qualifications who didn’t have the
need or opportunity to get a permanent or long-term job in Ukraine return to Ukraine with
money earned, new contacts, social bonds and behavioural skills from within a democratic
society with a market economy. Seasonal migration, because of its short-term nature, has no
significant reflection on the families of workers. Therefore, this type of migration should
receive a rather positive assessment.
The fourth element is short-term labour migration of low and medium qualification non-
agricultural workers that mostly has no expressed seasonality (except for tourism-related work).
There is a high probability that more successful workers from this category will become long-
term migrants. Long-term migration negatively affects both families (particularly as related to
raising children and marital relationships) and the labour market. On the positive side are
remittances and hopes that migrants will return with new knowledge and skills. However, even
those migrants who work abroad for over a year deal mostly with temporary or lowly-qualified
jobs: job responsibilities of 36% migrants who returned to Ukraine (56% in Italy, 46% in Poland
and 35% in Czech Republic) did not require qualifications (Stadnyy, 2018). This means
Ukrainian workers do obtain very important experience of communications in a market
economy, but not modern qualifications.
The fifth component – long-term labour migration of qualified workers – primarily
embraces welders, medics, construction workers, drivers, sawyers; their departure has negative
effects on the Ukrainian labour market. They are hard to replace, so enterprises already suffer
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from the lack of specialists in these occupations. This is further aggravated by the general socio-
demographic issues related to a long absence of one or both parents from a family.
The sixth component is the brain drain, i.e. an outflow of highly qualified scientists,
educators, medics, actors etc., regretfully this type of migration becomes predominantly
irreversible and brings about obvious irreversible losses to Ukraine’s economy (science,
education, health care, industry etc.), but it drives global development. Therefore, there would
be a negative assessment of this process from the viewpoint of the country of origin, but positive
if we talk about the interests of migrants and their families and, indeed, if we consider
opportunities for the global development progress.
Finally, the seventh element – study-related migration to universities and vocational
schools – usually envisages subsequent employment of graduates abroad, with all its negative
economic and demographic effects for Ukraine. While Ukrainian students exclusively select
European vocational schools for training, among attractive universities there are also Russian
ones. This type of migration could only be mitigated by promoting national education,
increasing its quality and prestige, respective information and communication among young
people. The educational migration has increased by 76% from 2009 to 2016 (and yet by 20%
in two recent years), two thirds of this growth are on part of Poland’s universities (Stadnyy,
2018). Ukrainians currently comprise 57% of all foreign students at Polish universities. They
mostly study at private universities, not high-ranking ones. It is worth noticing that the numbers
of Ukrainian students grow fastest in those foreign countries that became centres of gravity for
Ukrainian migrants and where strong networks exist among migrants. Indirectly, this indicates
that labour migrants’ families get reunified in their countries of residence. It is obvious these
families are not likely to return to Ukraine.
The majority of young people who leave Ukraine for studying abroad consider
graduating in Europe with a widely recognized diploma as an opportunity to get a job in the
EU. This is facilitated by the EU legislation that allows foreigners to stay in the EU for at least
9 months after the completion of studies. This time can be effectively used for finding a job. As
a result, only 13-16% of Ukrainian students in Przemysl and only 2% in Warsaw region plan to
come back to the homeland.
3.4. Opportunities to Influence Migration Behaviour
National policy makers should understand that in the future, large-scale external
migrations are inevitable. For as long as Ukraine has low living standards, the net migration
will remain negative. But, when labour incomes, social support systems, socio-political stability
will become on par with those of eastern European countries at least, a large-scale immigration
will need to be addressed. Most likely, employers will stop suffering from the workforce deficit,
but the political agenda will inevitable see the issues of adaptation of immigrants to the
Ukrainian culture and way of life while providing them space for their own cultural
development. Actually, this is not less complicated a task, especially given that fact that people
migrate from poorer and less secure countries to those with a higher quality of life and stronger
social protection. Expectations of Ukraine being able to “filter” the migrant flows would rather
not materialise, as no other country, including those with the strictest migration controls, can
boast about this.
The globalisation is what fosters the free movement of the labour force between
countries and continents. A massive outflow of the economically active population to countries
with bigger wages and better employment opportunities is practically imminent. The same is
true for the brain drain to countries with more opportunities for scientific research – unlike a
regular emigrant, a scientist, surgeon or inventor is motivated to move not only because of a
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low wage. Young people who treat a European diploma as a pass for entering the developed
labour market would rather study abroad, notwithstanding the fact that a Ukrainian educational
establishment might offer a programme at the same quality level. Even in the case of a very
quick socioeconomic development and securing the living quality and standards comparable
with those of well-developed stable societies, external migratory population exchange will
continue. Furthermore, the scale of external migrations is most likely to grow. However, it
could be possible to cap their potential volume by redirecting the flows to more developed
labour markets of other Ukrainian cities, or by incentivising the migrants to return home. A
complex policy action is required to address these issues, as well as understanding that mere
economic growth would not automatically transform the migration flows.
The society needs to be taught to respect a working person regardless of his or her
profession, job and income. Paternalism should change, the public discourse should be
dominated by respecting and cherishing a working person and putting to shame those who do
not want to work and pay taxes but make a living on social transfers. The system of social
support of able-bodied population desperately needs a transformation, in particular, to promote
active labour market behaviour (as related to employment, entrepreneurship, self-employment,
family business), to further differentiate pensions based on the duration of contributory service,
to establish and maintain the proportions of minimum guaranteed coverage (the minimum wage
should significantly exceed any social benefit, except for those benefits paid to persons with
disabilities).
Undoubtedly, higher level of labour income must be demanded. Of course, in a market
economy the state has only a limited number of options for influence here. One of these options
– a twofold increase of the minimum wage – has been recently used. The same effect could not
be expected anytime soon (in fact, the minimum wage has been increased only by 16% as of
January 1, 2018). What remains is increasing wages in the public sector – wages of teachers,
medics, scientists, social workers, personnel of museums, libraries or theatres. By the
communicating vessels principle, the private sector will respond with a 3-6 months’ lag. But
central and local government should facilitate and shape this response through promoting new
jobs with acceptable pay, fighting corruption and “shadow payments”, collaborating with
employers’ associations, working more actively on general and sector-based tariff agreements,
engaging with territorial communities on a number of issues including changing the taxation
system.
A notable decrease in migration outflows could be expected only if the average wage
would grow to at least 70-75% of the average wages paid in eastern European countries.
Nevertheless, intentions to emigrate will still remain strong due to the high migratory potential
of Ukrainians.
Redirection of potential labour migrants, especially those from villages and small towns,
from the external to the internal labour market is important and promising. It can be facilitated,
first of all, by road construction and repair works. As a result, local labour markets can become
integrated into a single national market or, at least, into several subnational markets. This
solution could provide residents of villages and small towns with an opportunity to live at home
and work in cities with a more developed infrastructure in pendulum migrations. Secondly,
development of a market for temporary and social accommodation is a dire necessity. It will
make temporary jobs more available to people from distant settlements, primarily to young
people who are seeking their profession, their destiny. Thirdly and finally, state investments
into construction industry could create modern jobs in construction and in related sectors – e.g.
in the case of road construction hotels and restaurants, car services will benefit.
There is a need to integrate the general approaches and interventions for decreasing the
migration outflows with specific activities targeting particular groups of migrants. For instance,
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scientists would like to emigrate not only because of low incomes, but also due to unacceptable
attitudes from the state and society towards science, inability to buy the required equipment and
literature, to take part in various scientific fora etc. To tackle educational migration, Ukrainian
universities should modernise their curricula, facilitate students’ contacts with prospective
employers, establish powerful research and development facilities, provide individual options
for studies and leisure, i.e. become a real competition to foreign institutions. Given the
spreading practice of offering free education to foreign students in the neighbouring countries,
Ukraine should more systematically consider the existence and pricing of the domestic contract-
based higher education programmes.
It is very important to arrange for a systematic interaction with Ukrainian labour
migrants, even those who have been working abroad for many years and have moved their
entire families including children and older parents. These people, in most cases, still feel
themselves Ukrainians, they remain in the Ukrainian citizenship and speak Ukrainian.
Therefore, it is very necessary to nurture these feelings of theirs and help them to be Ukrainians
in any possible ways, e.g. through organising the teaching of their children at Ukrainian schools
using Ukrainian schoolbooks and curricula. Hopefully, some of them, be it a very few, will
return to Ukraine. Even if they won’t, these people will represent a positive image if Ukraine
abroad, which is of critical importance.
Overall, it can be projected that Ukraine, primarily thanks to its geographic location,
climate, natural resources, benevolent people, sufficiently developed infrastructure, will follow
the path of the Mediterranean countries, Italy in the first place, that had long been the workforce
donors for the more developed countries, and then turned recipients, and started receiving
workforce not only from the poor Asian and African countries but also from the sufficiently
developed and even wealthier countries of Europe. The necessary conditions for this are the
availability of competitive jobs with decent working conditions and labour pay, political
stability in the country and positive dynamics of the living standards and quality of life.
Conclusions
The migratory population exchange is an integral element of the globalisation process,
and its scale will eventually grow as people choose to live outside their home countries and
change countries of residence repeatedly in a lifetime.
Changes in migrant’s priorities, particularly redirection from Russia to European
countries by many of them, have their reasons and will be sustained. In the near future, Poland
is also likely to lose its importance as the main centre of gravity for the Ukrainian migrants –
the difficult situation in the labour markets of virtually all developed countries will inevitable
force them to simplify their expat employment procedures.
Currently, both labour and to a greater extent educational migration work as a social lift
for the majority of Ukrainians, providing for a rapid increase in the living standards and giving
the green light to entering the labour markets of the developed, predominantly European,
countries.
The main motive for most Ukrainians to move out is, undoubtedly, a hope of earning
more money. However, economic factors always work in a particular mental environment,
which in Ukraine is expressed through population having a certain migration mobility potential.
The Ukrainians’ migration mobility (similarly to Poles, Germans, Lithuanians, Irishmen and
Italians) is relatively high compared with that of Frenchmen, Hungarians or Bulgarians.
Therefore, increasing the wages in Ukraine to a level comparable with that of the neighbouring
countries will apparently downscale the migration intentions, but will not eliminate them.
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