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We propose a distinction between inclusionary and exclusionary autocratic ruling strategies and develop novel theoretical propositions on the legacy that these strategies leave on citizens' political attitudes once the autocratic regime broke down. Using data of 1.3 million survey respondents from 71 countries and Hierarchical Age-Period-Cohort models we estimate between and within cohort differences in citizens' democratic support. We find that inclusionary regimes-with wider redistribution of socioeconomic and political benefits-leave a stronger anti-democratic legacy than exclusionary regimes on the political attitudes of their citizens. Similarly, citizens who were part of the winning group in an autocracy are more critical with democracy compared to citizens who were part of discriminated groups. This paper contributes to our understanding about how autocracies affect the hearts and minds of ordinary citizens.
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How!do!inclusionary!and!exclusionary!autocracies!
affect!ordinary!people?!
!
Anja!Neundorf1!
(University!of!Nottingham)!
!
Johannes!Gerschewski!
(Technical!University!Munich)!
!
Roman-Gabriel!Olar!
(Trinity!College!Dublin)!
!
[Paper!accepted!for!publication!in!Comparative+Political+Studies,!March!2019]!
!
Abstract!
We! propose! a! distinction! between! inclusionary! and! exclusionary! autocratic! ruling!
strategies! and! develop! novel! theoretical! propositions! on! the! legacy! that! these!
strategies! leave! on! citizens’! political! attitudes! once! the! autocratic! regime! broke!
down.! Using! data! of! 1.3! million! survey! respondents! from! 70! countries! and!
Hierarchical! Age-Period-Cohort!models! we! estimate! between! and! within! cohort!
differences!in!citizens’!democratic!support.!We!find!that!inclusionary!regimes!–!with!
wider!redistribution!of!socio-economic!and!political!benefits!–!leave!a!stronger!anti-
democratic! legacy! than! exclusionary! regimes! on! the! political! attitudes! of! their!
citizens.!Similarly,!citizens! who! were! part!of!the! winning! group! in!an!autocracy! are!
more!critical!with! democracy! compared! to!citizens! who! were! part! of!discriminated!
groups.! This! paper! contributes! to! our! understanding! about! how! autocracies! affect!
the!hearts!and!minds!of!ordinary!citizens.!
!
Keywords:! Authoritarianism,! public! goods,! micro-foundation,! inclusion,! exclusion,!
cohort!analysis,!political!socialization.!!
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1!Emails:!anja.neundorf@nottingham.ac.uk;!johannes.gerschewski@hfp.tum.de;!olarr@tcd.ie.!!
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Introduction!
February!5,!2018!marked!the!day!on!which!the!Berlin!Wall!stood!as!long!as!it!is!gone!
-!28!years!and!3!months.!Yet,!the!legacy!of!the!former!German!Democratic!Republic!
(GDR)! is! still! tangible.! The! autocratic! rule! of! the! GDR! has! left! an! imprint! on! the!
political!attitudes!of!its!citizens!that!did!not!cease!to!exist!with! the!Fall!of!the!Berlin!
Wall,! making! many! nostalgic! about! the! autocratic! past.! Some! have! connected! this!
so-called! “Ostalgie”! to! anti-democratic! resentment,! which! is! widespread! in! East!
Germany.! The! former! GDR! is! not! an! exception.! Anti-democratic! political! attitudes!
last!usually!longer!than!the!autocratic!regime!in!which!they!developed.!Yet,!the!GDR!
represents! a! particular! type! of! autocracy! that! placed! heavy! emphasis! on! equal!
education,! a! comprehensive! health! system,! and! a! wide! distribution! of! socio-
economic! benefits! among! the! working! class.! Other! regimes! are! less! generous! -! in!
economic!and!political!terms!-!towards!their!citizens.!
Against!this!backdrop,!our!article!is!motivated!by!the!question!to!what!extent!
ruling! strategies! of! autocratic! regimes! influence! the! political! attitudes! of! their!
citizens,! even! after! these! authoritarian! regimes!broke! down.! In! particular,! our!
research! sheds! light! on! the! mechanism! of! authoritarian! nostalgia! and! anti-
democratic!sentiments!that! are! a! product!of! authoritarian! socialization.! To! achieve!
this,! we! bring! two! strands! of! research! into! a! dialogue.! While! the! comparative!
authoritarianism! literature! has! focused! mainly! on! the! inner! workings! of! non-
democratic! rule! (Gandhi,! 2008;! Svolik,! 2012),! it! paid! less! attention! to! the! role! of!
ordinary! citizens.! However,! this! is! the! starting! point! of! the! second! strand! of!
literature,!the!legacy!literature,!which!is!mainly!interested!in!the!effect!that!previous!
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non-democratic! rule! has! on! political! beliefs! and! attitudes! –! once! democracy! is!
installed! (Bernhard! and! Karakoc! 2007;! Neundorf,! 2010;! Pop-Eleches! and! Tucker,!
2017).! Yet,! it! is! surprising! that! the! legacy! literature! remains! rather! mute! towards!
addressing!the!effect!of!variation!in!autocratic!ruling!strategies!on!political!attitudes.!!
Theoretically,! we! rely! on! political! socialization! theory! and! argue! that! the!
political!environment! and! the!ruling! strategy! that!someone!experiences! during! the!
so-called! “formative! years”! not! only! impact! on! a! citizen’s! contemporary! political!
attitudes,! but! also! leaves! a! lasting! imprint! on! her! political! attitudes! in! later! life!
(Mannheim,!1928;!Krosnick!and!Alwin,!1989;!Sears!and!Funk,!1999).!In!other!words,!
the!socio-political!experience!as! a! young!adult!coins!how!one!assesses!politics! later!
in! life.! More! concretely,! we! are! interested! in! the! legacy! effect! that! different!
authoritarian!ruling!strategies!have!on!the!political!attitudes!of!citizens,!in!particular!
towards!democracy.!Focusing!on!the!legacy!here!further!allows!us!to!infer!about!the!
public!support!created!by!these!various!ruling!strategies!during!the!dictatorship.!!
We!propose! a! typological! distinction! between! inclusionary! and! exclusionary!
strategies.! Building! upon! Bueno! de! Mesquita! et! al.’s! work! (2003),! we! distinguish!
between!political!and!economic!dimensions!of!inclusion!and!exclusion!in!autocracies.!
We! argue! that! inclusionary! autocracies! tend! to! redistribute! more! of! their! political!
and! economic! resources! towards! their! citizens! in! order! to! create! a! broad! public!
support! base.! In! contrast,! exclusionary! autocracies! follow! the! opposite! route! and!
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channel!political!influence!and!economic!benefits!to!a!small!group!of!privileged!(and!
therefore!loyal)!individuals!who!help!the!leader!survive!in!power.2!!
!We! show! that! these! two! different! regime! strategies! of! inclusion! and!
exclusion!affect!the!long-term!political!attitudes!of!ordinary!citizens.!To!demonstrate!
the!heterogeneity!of!the!legacy!effect! and! to! arrive! at! a!nuanced!empirical!picture,!
we! test! our! theoretical! argument! with! two! complementary! empirical! strategies.!
First,! we! examine! differences! in! political! attitudes! of! citizens! who! were! socialized!
under!different!autocratic!ruling!strategies!on!the!one!hand,!and!who!were!brought!
up!under!democracy! on! the! other!hand! (between-regime! comparison).! Second,!we!
further! examine! differences! in! political! attitudes! between! individuals! who! were!
socialized! under! the! same! autocratic! regime,! yet! had! different! socio-political!
statuses,! i.e.! belonging! to! an! included! group! that! profits! from! the! regime! or! being!
particularly! discriminated! against! and! excluded! from! power! (within-regime!
comparison).!! !
! The! empirical! analysis! is! based! on! a! newly! created,! harmonized! public!
opinion! dataset! that! combines! 1,070! (country! x! wave!x! study)3!existing! surveys! for!
70! countries! from! around! the! world! and! data! on! authoritarian! regimes’! ruling!
strategies!from!the!Varieties!of!Democracy!(V-Dem)!dataset!(Coppedge!et!al.,!2016).!
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2!This! conceptualization! does! not! exclude! repression,! nor! are! we! oblivious! to! violence! being! an!
inherent! feature! of! authoritarian! politics! (Svolik,! 2012).! Rather,! by! focusing! on! the! provision! of!
public!goods,!while!holding!repression!constant,!we!simplify!the!focus!of!our!theoretical!argument.!!
Thereby! we! are! better! able! to! disentangle! the! long-term! effect! of! certain! policies! on! citizens.!
Importantly,! repression! and! inclusiveness! seem! be! distinct! strategies.! Using! data! from! Varieties! of!
Democracy!(V-Dem;!more!details!below)!shows!that!the!correlation!between!providing!public!goods!
and!hard! repression!is!only! R=0.37!in!autocracies.! Hard!repression!correlates! also!only!moderately!
with!providing!more!access!to!political!power!in!autocracies!(R=0.34).!!!
3!The! data! is! based! on! ten! different! cross-national! studies! such! as! the!W orld! Value! Survey! or! the!
Latinobarometer!that!all!have!been!collected!in!several!waves!at!different!points!of!time.!
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We! use! hierarchical! age,! period,! cohort! (HAPC)! models! to! estimate! the! effect! of!
these!strategies!on!citizens’!attitudes!towards!democracy!today.!!
We! find! that! people! who! were! socialized! in! exclusionary! regimes! are! more!
supportive!of!democracy!compared!to!citizens! from!more!inclusionary!regimes,! and!
even!democracies.! As! the! policies! of!autocratic! regimes! become! more! inclusionary!
this! finding! is! reversed.! Citizens! from! inclusionary! regimes! are! less! satisfied! with!
democracy! compared! to! citizens! from! exclusionary! regimes! and! democracies.! We!
also! find! a! mutual! reinforcement! effect! between! political! and! economic! inclusion.!
This! means! that! if! an! authoritarian! regime! is! economically! inclusive! by!providing!
public! goods! to! its! citizens,! being! politically! inclusive! and! incorporating! a! broad!
variety! of! societal! groups! into! political! power,! significantly! decreases! later!
democratic! support.! The!within-regime! analysis! further! supports! our! theoretical!
expectation!that!authoritarian! ruling!strategies!matter!for!the! formation!of!citizens’!
political!attitudes.!!
This!research!contributes!to!existing!literature!in!three!crucial!ways.!First,!we!
propose! a! new! typological! distinction! between! inclusionary! and! exclusionary!
autocracies.!By!so!doing,!we!focuses!on!the!role!of!ordinary!citizens!under!autocratic!
rule.! Second,! we! are! able! to! increase! considerably! the! scope! of! former! studies! on!
authoritarian!nostalgia!that!have!mainly!concentrated!on!post-Communist!regimes.!
It! is! the! first! global! analysis! that! includes! 70! countries.! Third,! we! are! able! to! test!
rigorously! the! legacy! effect! that! different! autocratic! ruling! strategies! have! on!
citizens’! political! attitudes.! As! such,! our! research! has! important! implications! for!
understanding! the! development! of! democratic! dissatisfaction! and! anti-democratic!
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resentments!that!might!be!already!anchored!in!the!minds!of!the!people!even!before!
democracy!has!been!installed.!!
Inclusionary!and!exclusionary!authoritarian!regimes!!
We!argue!that!dictators!fall! on!a!continuum! between!two!types! of!ruling!strategies:!
inclusionary! and! exclusionary.! Our! conception! of! inclusionary! and! exclusionary!
autocracy! goes! beyond! the! recent! institutional! focus! in! comparative!
authoritarianism.! Instead! of! focusing! on! the! institutional! and! elite! power!
architecture! (Geddes,! et! al.,! 2014;! Hadenius! and! Teorell! 2007)! and! the! effect! of!
formal!and!informal!institutions!in!autocratic!settings!(Gandhi!2008;!Magaloni!2008;!
Schedler!2013;!Svolik!2012),!we!focus!on!examining!the!effect!on!ordinary!citizens!of!
inclusion!and!exclusion!from!political!power!and!economic!benefits.4!
We! define! an! inclusionary! regime! as! a! regime! that! relies! on! a! broad! public!
support! base.5! These! regimes! incorporate! various! social,! economic! and! ethnic!
groups!into!their! power!structure!by!ensuring! a!wider!redistribution!of! political!and!
socio-economic! benefits! to! the! population.! This! strategy! aims! at! minimizing! the!
threats!that!can! emanate! from!within!the!society!by!buying!off! the! opposition!with!
political!and!economic!concessions!that!are!available!only!if!they!support!the!regime.!!
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4!Please!refer!also!to!Appendix!7!in!which!we!plot!the!distribution!of!inclusionary!and! exclusionary!
strategies!by!the!three!main!regime!types!(one-party,!military,!personalist!regimes)!of!Geddes!et!al.!
(2014).!!
5!We!do! not!aim!to! explore!the!reasons!why!some!dictators!are!more!inclusive!than!others,!or!why!
they! need! a! broader! ruling! coalition! to! stay! in! power.! Rather,! we! are! interested! in! providing! a!
comprehensive!typological!distinction!of!authoritarian!ruling!strategies.!
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In! contrast,! we! define! an! exclusionary! regime! as! a! regime! with! a! narrow!
societal!basis!that!excludes!from!power!most!social,!religious,!and!ethnic!groups.! Its!
power!stems!from!a!narrow!set!of!actors!that!obtain!exclusive!benefits.!Exclusionary!
regimes! rely! more! on! redistributing! particularistic! goods! to! the! members! of! the!
ruling! elite,! while! actively! restricting! the! access! in! power! and! economic!
redistribution!to!other!groups!from!within!society.6!!
This! conceptualization! of! autocratic! ruling! strategies! borrows! conceptually!
from! Bueno! de! Mesquita! et! al.! (2003)! selectorate! theory.! The! selectorate! benefits!
from! the! redistributive! policies! of! the! regime! as! it! provides! the! regime! with! the!
necessary! support! to! extend! its! survival.! However,! since! not! all! members! of! the!
selectorate! can! participate! in! autocratic! governance,! autocrats! rely! on! an! inner!
sanctum! of! elites,! the! winning! coalition,! that! endows! the! autocrat! with! sufficient!
power! to! remain! in! power! (Svolik! 2012;! Geddes! et! al.! 2014).! Members! of! the!
selectorate!that!provide! valuable! service,! and! develop! a!network!of! support! within!
their!local!organizations! and! communities! can!climb! the! political! ladder! and!obtain!
positions!in!the!winning!coalition.!Previous!research!in!comparative!authoritarianism!
has!concentrated!on!the!role!of!this!winning!coalition,!but!has!under-theorized!the!
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6!It! could! be! reasonably! assumed! that,! in! result,! inclusionary! autocracies! are! more! equal! than!
exclusionary! autocracies.! Yet,! it! is! beyond! the! scope! of! this! paper! to! contribute! to! the! ongoing!
nuanced!discussion!about!the!effect!of!inequality!and!redistributive!policies!as!drivers!or!hindrance!
to! democratization.! While! Boix! (2003)! argued! in! favor! of! a! negative! linear! relationship! between!
inequality!and!the!probability!to!democratize,!Acemoglu!and!Robinson!(2006)!proposed!an!inverted!
U-shape.!In!turn,!Haggard!and!Kaufmann!(2016)!recently!cautioned!that!we!should!not!overestimate!
distributive! conflicts! as! a! driver! for! democratization.! Moreover,! Ansell! and! Samuels! (2014:! 2)!
challenged!the!“redistributivist!thesis”!and!focused!on!elite!competition!instead,!arguing!that!when!
rising! disenfranchised! groups! accumulate! income,! this! results! in! higher! income! inequality! which!
again!leads!to! growing!demands!for!regime! change! as!these!new!economic! groups! want!to!insure!
their!status!against!autocratic!arbitrariness.!!
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effect! of! the! governing! strategies! autocrats! use! to! ensure! the! loyalty! of! its!
selectorate.!!
We!use!the! selectorate! theory!as!an!important!theoretical!springboard.7! We!
build!upon!it!and!derive!two!separate!dimensions.!We!distinguish!explicitly!between!
(1)!political!and!(2)!socio-economic!inclusion!and!exclusion!strategies.!When!it!comes!
to!the!political! inclusion,! we! argue! that!dictators!regulate! access! to! political! power!
by! making! use! of!decisive! “qualities”! such! as! ethnic! origin,! religious! belief,!
organizational,! and/or! class! membership! (e.g.! military! generals,! workers! in!
Communist! regimes).! The! dictator! serves! as! the! gate-keeper! that! decides! on! the!
basis!of!these!specific!attributes!whom!to!include!in!power.!The!dictator!can!adopt!a!
more! inclusive! ruling! strategy! by! widening! his! support! base! and! incorporate! more!
societal! groups! in! power,! or! he! can! restrict! it! to! a! very! few,! hand-picked! people!
whose!support!is!necessary!and!sufficient!to!ensure!autocratic!survival.!
Similarly,! granting! and! withholding! socio-economic! benefits! can! be! used! by!
autocrats!to!ensure!the! loyalty! of!the!selectorate!and!winning!coalition.! Like! access!
to!power,!this!dimension!can!be!narrowed!down!to!very!few!or!can!be!spread!more!
equally!among!citizens.!In!other!words,!the!co-optation!efforts!take!place!either!on!a!
restricted! elite! level! and! target! strategically! important! business! and! military!
personnel,!or!it!can!reach!to!the!masses!by!gaining!specific!support!among!the!wider!
population! (Kim! and! Gandhi,! 2010).! As! such,! economic! strategies! of! inclusion! and!
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7!We!see!three!major!dimensions!in! which!we!deviate!from! the!original!selectorate! theory.! First,!we!
differ!in!the!explanatory!aim.!We!are!not!interested!in!explaining!regime!survival,!but!are!interested!
in! the! long-term! effects! of! different! ruling! strategies! on! political! attitudes.! Second,! we! do! not!
develop!a! universal!theory!that! holds!across! democratic!and!autocratic! regimes,!but! focus!only!on!
the! autocratic! pole.! Third,! in! our! conceptualization! we! introdu ce! the! explicit! distinction! between!
economic!and!political!inclusion/exclusion!instruments.!!
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exclusion!range!from!the!provision! of! public! goods! that! do!not!discriminate!against!
any! social! groups! to! a! particularistic! approach! of! distributing! material! benefits! to!
very!few.8!
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Regime!Type!and!Their!Effect!on!Ordinary!Citizens!
From!these! two! opposing! ruling! strategies,! we! can! now! formulate! expectations! on!
how! inclusionary! and! exclusionary! regimes! affect! their! citizens’! political! attitudes.!
Inclusionary! regimes! try! to! win! the! hearts! and! minds! of! their! people,! while!
exclusionary! regimes’! survival! hinges! on! the! loyalty! of! very! few! elite! members.!
Inclusionary! autocracies! act! through! a! wide! redistribution! of! socio-economic!
resources! and! political! power! and! build! a! dense! network! of! support! in! society.!
Furthermore,!we!argue!that!inclusionary!regimes!are!proactive!in!instilling!a!climate!
of! pro-regime! support! amongst! its! citizens,! one! in! which! the! regime! is! seen! as!
benevolent!for!offering!the!citizens!benefits!that!would!otherwise!be!inaccessible.!In!
exclusionary!regimes,!the!dictator!is!more!concerned!with!maintaining!the!loyalty!of!
its! ruling! elite,! making! sure! that! any! member! of! the! ruling! coalition! does! not!
threaten! his! position! in! power.! In! result,! exclusionary! regimes! dismiss! ordinary!
citizens!from!influencing!politics!and!exclude!them!from!economic!redistribution.!!
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8!If!we! assume! independent!dimensions,! inclusionary! regimes!are!those! that! score! high! in!terms! of!
political!and!economic!inclusion.!Exclusionary!regimes,!in!contrast,!are!those!regimes!that!score!low!
in! political! and! economic! inclusion.! As! such,! these! two! types! are! extreme! or! ideal! types.! We! are!
aware! that! by! cross-tabulating! the! two! dimensions,! “hybrid”! regimes! emerge! that! either! score!
high/low!or! low/high!on!political!and!economic! inclusion.!In! Appendix!10,!we! provide!an!overview!
of!the!empirical! distribution!across!these! four! types!of!authoritarian! rule.!We!also!show! empirical!
evidence!for! the!respective!legacy! effect!of!all! four!types!of! authoritarian!rule!on! later!democratic!
satisfaction.!
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Political(socialization(and(the(making(of(generations(
We! expect! that! citizens! who! are! exposed! to! an! inclusionary! regime! to! be! more!
supportive! of! the! regime! as! these! regimes! actively! try! to! develop! a! pro-regime!
sentiment!amongst!its!citizens!by!providing!them!with!benefits!in!exchange!for!their!
support! for! the! regime.! Unfortunately,! we! are! usually! not! able! to! observe! regime!
support! during! existing! dictatorships,! as! representative! and! comparable! public!
opinion! research! is! almost! impossible! during! authoritarian! regimes! (Kuran,! 1997).9!
Yet,! we! argue! here! that! this! is! not! necessary.! Instead,! we! use! the! theoretical! and!
methodological! approach! of! cohort! analysis,! which! allows! the! identification! of!
distinct! characteristics! of! those! generations! that! were! socialized+ under! different!
political! regimes.! Generations! thereby! function! like! fossils! that! carry! evidence! of! a!
long-gone!past.!Here,!we!assume!that!the!political!preferences!of!whole!generations!
that! grew! up! under! inclusionary! or! exclusionary! regimes! have! been! shaped! and!
remain! prevalent! in! the! population,! especially! for! those! that! experienced! these!
regime!during!the!so-called!formative!years!during!adolescence.10!!
These!expectations!build!on!the!theory!of!political!socialization,!which!argues!
that! fundamental! values! are! acquired! largely! in! early! adulthood.! The! theory! goes!
back! to! the! seminal! work! of! Karl! Mannheim! and! has! been! later! refined! and!
empirically! tested! (Mannheim,! 1928;! Krosnick! and! Alwin,! 1989;! Sears! and! Funk,!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9!Some!notable!exceptions!are!the!work!by!Geddes!and!Zaller!(1989)!on! Brazil;!Hainmueller! and!Kern!
(2009)!on! East!Germany!and!some!recent!work!on!China! (e.g.!Wang!2017).!However,!these!studies!
rely!on!unique!national!surveys!and!hence!do!not!allow!for!variation!on!regime!strategies.!!!
10!Some!have! argued!that!later-life! learning!is!also!important!for! the!formation!of!political!attitudes,!
even!if!these!studies!show!that!early!learning!still!has!the!strongest!effects!(Pop-Eleches!and!Tucker,!
2017;!Dinas!and!Northmore-Ball,!2017).!As!we!focus!on!early!socialization!(during!dictatorships)!and!
ignore!later-life!learning!(during!democracy)!this!should!make! our!results!more!conservative,!as! we!
do!not!account!for!the!potential!revision!of!political!attitudes!during!democratic!times.!!!!!
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1999).! Young! citizens,! it! is! believed,! are! not! yet! set! in! their! political! ways! and! are!
subsequently! more! easily! influenced! by! external! factors! such! as! the! nature! of! the!
political!regime!in!which!they!live!(Bartels!and!Jackman,!2014).!Political!socialization!
theory!argues!that!after!the!formation!period!in!early!adulthood,!these!attitudes!and!
preferences! remain! relatively! intact! and! constant.! Fundamental! change! is! rare!
(Jennings,!1989;!Sears!and!Valentino,!1997).!
We!assume!that!citizens’!political!attitudes!that!developed!under!autocracies!
are! imprinted! through! the! ruling! strategies! of! the! regime.! As! such,! we! expect! to!
observe! differences! between! the! political! attitudes! of! citizens! socialized! in!
inclusionary! regimes! and! exclusionary! regimes.! More! precisely,! citizens! from!
inclusionary! autocracies! will! be! more! supportive! of! that! regime,! which! in! turn! is!
expected! to! lead! to! higher! nostalgia! if! the! regime! is! overthrown.! If! citizens!
experience!an!inclusionary!authoritarian!ruling!strategy!in!their!formative!years,!they!
might!value! the! gains!of! autocratic! inclusion!higher! than! potential!liberal! values! of!
democratic!systems.!!
Conversely,! the! majority! of! citizens! that! experienced! exclusionary! ruling!
strategies!during!their!formative!years!will!be!less!nostalgic!about!the!autocratic!past!
and!hence!are!expected!to!embrace!democratic!values.!They!did!not!profit!from!the!
former!autocratic!regime! as! they!were!exempted!from!political! power! and!material!
benefits.! As! such,! they! value! the! potential! gains! and! promises! of! democratic!
societies! higher! compared! to! the! previous! autocratic! situation.! After!
democratization,! they! perceive! themselves! now! on! an! even! playing! field! that!
provides!equal!chances!for!economic!success!and!political!participation.!!
!
!
12!
!
!
Finally,! we! should! contrast! citizens’! political! attitudes! that! grew! up! in!
democratic!and!autocratic!societies.!We!assume!that!citizens!that!were!socialized!in!
democracies!should! be! generally! more!supportive! of! democracy! than! citizens! from!
former!autocracies!since!they!developed!democratic!attitudes!and!preferences!early!
on! in! their! life! by! living! in! a! democracy! during! their! formative! years! (Fuchs-
Schündeln!and!Schündeln,!2015).!!
Based! on! the! theory! of! political! socialization! under! different! regime! forms,!
we!formulate!the!following!hypothesis:!!
Hypothesis+ 1+ (H1):+ Generations+ that+ were+ socialized+ in+ inclusionary+ autocracies+ are+
more+ supportive+ of+ that+ regime+ and+ are+ therefore+ less+ positive+ with+
democracy+than+generations+ that+ grew+up+in+exclusionary+autocracies+
or+in+democracies.+
We! further! hypothesize! that! the! two! dimensions! of! inclusion! -! political! and!
economic!-!interact!and!mutually!strengthen!each!other.!We!argue!that!support!for!
the! authoritarian! regime! and! the! subsequent! nostalgia! and! dissatisfaction! with!
democracy! becomes! stronger! when! high! economic! inclusion! during! the! formative!
years!is!met!with!high!political!inclusion.!We!expect!political!and!economic!inclusion!
to!have!a!stronger!effect!together!than!in!isolation.!We!argue!that!a!doubly!inclusive!
situation! in! which! citizens! are! included! politically! and! economically! included!
amplifies!support!for!the!authoritarian!regime.!This,!in!turn,!translates!into!a!growing!
skepticism! with! democracy.! Against! this! backdrop,! we! formulate! a! reinforcement!
effect!in!hypothesis!2.!!
!
!
13!
!
!
Hypothesis+ + (H2):+ High+ level+ of+ economic+ inclusion+ coupled+ with+ high+ political+
inclusion+has+a+negative+effect+on+democratic+support.++!
Hypotheses!1! and!2!refer! to!differences!between!regimes.!We!expect!to!find!
clear!generational!differences!in!terms! of! political! preferences! of! people! who! grew!
up! under! different! regimes! within! the! same! country! and! between! different!
countries.!However,!all!autocratic!societies!are!heterogeneous!to!some!extent.!The!
selectorate!defines!who!is!included!and!excluded!from!politics.!It!defines!who!might!
potentially!profit!from!the!regime!and!who!is!discriminated!against.!To!be!a!member!
of!the!selectorate! constitutes!a!necessary!condition!for!profiting! from!an!autocratic!
regime.!!
We! define! insiders! of! the! selectorate! as! the! potential! “winners”! of! an!
autocratic! regime,! which! are! more! included! in! terms! of! political! and! economic!
benefits,!while!outsiders!of!the!selectorate!are!losers”.!While!the!members!of! the!
selectorate! are! addressed! politically! and! profit,! at! least! potentially,! from! socio-
economic! redistribution,! the! latter! group! has! no! access! to! power! or! material!
benefits.! Against! this! backdrop,! we! can! further! break! down! our! argument! about!
inclusion! and! exclusion.! We! expand! the! between-regime! comparison! to! the!
composition! of! society! within! an! existing! regime.! We! would! expect! that! specific!
groups! that! were! included! in! the! power! and! socio-economic! benefit! structure! (i.e.!
winners)! are! more! supportive! of! the! former! regime! than! those! that! have! been!
excluded!for!social,!ethnic,!or!religious!reasons!(i.e.!losers).!Those!suppressed!groups!
within! a! regime! should! be! more! resistant! to! the! regime! socialization,! as! they!
experience! first-hand! the! exclusive! nature! of! the! regime! (Pop-Eleches! and! Tucker!
!
!
14!
!
!
2017).! Further,! we! would! expect! them! to! be! more! positive! about! the! democratic!
transition!as!they!gained!the!most!from!the!democratization.!In!this!light,!we!derive!
the!third!hypothesis:!
Hypothesis+ 3+ (H3):+ Social+ and+ ethnic+ groups+ included+ in+ the+ selectorate+ of+ an+
autocratic+ regime+ are+ more+ supportive+ of+ the+ autocratic+ regime+ and+
therefore+ less+ positive+ with+ democracy+ than+ social+ and+ ethnic+ groups+
excluded+from+it.!
!
Research!design!
In!order!to!test! our! hypotheses,! we!conduct!a!comprehensive!analysis!of!70! (post-)!
authoritarian! countries! during! the! entire! 20th! century! from! around! the! globe! that!
experienced!variations!of!inclusionary!and!exclusionary!regimes.!As!discussed!above,!
we! identify! the! effect! of! autocracies! on! their! citizens! by! comparing! generations!
within! the! same! country! and! between! countries! that! were! exposed! to! varying!
contexts! during! their! formative! years.! This! empirical! phenomenon! of! varying!
socialization!experiences!within!the!same!country!or!regime!gives!us!the!opportunity!
to!study! the! lasting!imprint! of! political!regimes,! even! after!their! existence.! We!are!
further!able!to!contrast!groups!of!generations!that!grew!up!under!dictatorships!and!
those!that!came!of!age!under!democracy.!!
To! achieve! this! empirical! test,! we! need! to! distinguish! three! co-linear! time!
trends:! age,! period,! and! cohort! (APC)! effects.! A! person! could! have! positive! or!
negative!views!of!democracy!because!she!is!young!-!the!so-called!life-cycle!or!ageing!
!
!
15!
!
!
effect,!or!because!she!lives!in!a!country!that!faces!a!big!political!corruption!scandal!-!
the!so-called!period!effect!that!affects! everyone! no! matter! their!age!or!birth!year!-!
or!because!she!was!socialized!at!a!certain!point! in! history! -! the! cohort! effect.! Here!
we! are! mainly! interested! in! the! cohort! effect,! which! we! argue! contains! the!
socialization! effect! of! political! regimes.! This! methodological! approach! allows! us! to!
indirectly!test!the!impact!autocratic!ruling!strategies!have!on!the!mass!public.!!!
We!conduct!two!sets!of!empirical!tests!to!investigate!our!three!hypotheses.!
Firstly,! we! test! our! theory! contrasting! inclusionary! and! exclusionary! regimes! by!
contrasting!them!to!democracies!as!a!baseline!(H1!and!H2).!Second,!we!conduct!two!
within-regime!analyses!where!we!sub-divide!the!population! into!winners!and!losers!
of!former!authoritarian!regimes,!which!tests!the!direct!of!effect!of!profiting!from!an!
autocratic!regime!or!being!particularly!discriminated!(H3).!!
Individual-level(data(
To! test! our! hypotheses,! we! merge! existing,! publicly! available! survey! data! from!
numerous!countries! from! around!the! globe! -!both! well-established! democracies!as!
well!as!former!dictatorships.!We!chose! the! datasets! that! have!been!designed!to!be!
fielded! in! several! countries,! which! ensures! that! questions! are! less! country-specific!
but!rather!to!travel!across!borders.!Furthermore,!all!studies!have!been!conducted!as!
academic!studies!and!hence!adhere!to!a!certain!standard.!Moreover,!we!only!chose!
studies! that! included! questions! related! to! democratic! attitudes! and! political!
engagement.!The! newly!created!harmonized!public! opinion!dataset!combines!1,070!
(country! x! wave! x! study)!existing! surveys! for! 70! countries! from! around! the! world!
!
!
16!
!
!
with! a! total! of! 1,422! different! country-cohorts.11! We! harmonized! the! data! of! the!
following!public!opinion!surveys!(including!the!years!that!they!were!fielded):!
World!Values!Survey!(WVS),!1981-2014!
Latinobarometer!(LB),!1995-2015!
Asian!Barometer!(ANB),!2001-2014!
Afrobarometer!(AFB),!1999-2015!
Americas!Barometer!(AB),!2004-2014!
European!Values!Study!(EVS),!1981-2010!
European!Social!Survey!(ESS),!2002-2014!
Eurobarometer!(EB),!1970-2002!
Central!&!Eastern!European!Barometer!(CEEB),!1990-97!
Comparative!Study!of!Electoral!Systems!(CSES),!1996-2015!
!
Pooling!all!these!datasets!together!gives!us!about!1.3!million!respondents!for!
which!we!have! valid!data!on!two! dependent!variables!and!all!control! variables.!The!
different!survey!questions!included!in!the!diverse!datasets!were!harmonized!so!that!
a!joint!analysis! is!possible.!More!details!on! the!question!of!harmonization!decisions!
can!be!found!in!Appendices!3!and!4.!
Dependent(variables:(Authoritarian(nostalgia(and(democratic(support((
In! order! to! measure! the! impact! of! inclusionary! and! exclusionary! regimes! had! on!
people’s!hearts!and!minds,!we!ideally!want!to!measure!support!for!the!authoritarian!
regime.!Unfortunately,! it!is!not!possible! to!measure!regime!support!in!a!direct!way,!
as!public! opinion! surveys!are! usually! not! available.! An! indirect! measure!for! regime!
support! is! however! whether! people! feel! nostalgic! for! these! regimes! once! they! are!
overthrown.!Using!the!third!wave!(1999/2000)!of!the!EVS!we!can!use!a!question!on!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11!We!only!include!countries!for!which!we!have!at!least!three!surveys!that!cover!at!least!10!years.!This!
is!an!important!prerequisite!to! estimate! HAPC! models,!introduced! below.!The!list!of! countries! and!
the!number!of!respondents!per!country!can!be!found!in!Appendix!1.!
!
!
17!
!
!
evaluating!the!former!Communist!regime!as!good!or!bad12!for!14!Central!and!Eastern!
European!countries.13!As!we!have!postulated!in!our!theory,!we!expect!that!nostalgia!
for!the! previous!authoritarian!regime!affect!the!evaluation!of!democracy.14!The!EVS!
data!allows!us!to!explore!the!relationship!between!authoritarian!nostalgia!(support)!
and!democratic!support,!which!we!are!able!to!measure!across!time!and!a!large!set!of!
countries.!!
We!assume! that! the! higher! nostalgia!with! the! Communist! regime! the! more!
critical!people!would!be!with!democracy.!Figure!1!plots!this!correlation!with!our!two!
dependent!variables!–!“satisfaction!with!democracy”!(Fig.!1.A)!and!“democracy!is!the!
best!form!of! government”! (Fig.!1.B)!-!using!our! 14! countries!and!three!generations,!
those! that! grew-up! before,! during! or! after! the! Cold! War.! Plotting! the! average!
nostalgia!and!democratic! support!for!each!country-cohort,! Figure!1!shows!nostalgia!
is!weakest!among!the!generation!that! grew-up!after!the!end! of!Communism,!which!
is! what! we! would! expect! based! on! our! theory.! The! individual-level! correlation!
between!satisfaction!with!democracy!and!authoritarian!nostalgia!is!r=-0.43,!which!is!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12!The!exact!question!wording!to!evaluate!today’s!political!system!is!as!follows:!“People!have!different!
views! about! the! system! for! governing! this! country.! Here! is! a! scale! for! rating! how! well! things! are!
going:!1!means!very!bad;!10!means!very!good”.!
13!These!include:!Bulgaria,!Belarus,!Czech!Republic,!Estonia,!East!Germany,!Hungary,!Latvia,!Lithuania,!
Poland,!Romania,!Russia,!Slovak!Republic,!Slovenia,!and!Ukraine.!
14!In!order!to!test!our!hypotheses!it!is!essential!to!identify!the!cohort!effects!properly!and!distinguish!
these! from! aging! effects.! However,! the! data! that! directly! m easures! authoritarian! nostalgia! is! not!
suitable!for!this.!Firstly,! having! data! only! from! one! point! in! time!does!not!allow!the!separation!of!
age!and!cohort! effects,!which!is! crucial!in!our! theoretical!framework! of!authoritarian!socialization.!
Secondly,!the!EVS!data!only!includes!former!Communist!countries,!which!do!not!give!us!variation!on!
the!key!independent!variable!-!regime!inclusiveness.!The!regimes!were!too!similar!in!this!respect.!
!
!
18!
!
!
strong.! The! correlation! is! even! stronger! between! democracy! as! the! best! form! of!
government!and!Communist!nostalgia!(r=-0.68).15!!
!
Figure!1:!Correlation!between!Communist!nostalgia!and!democratic!support!
The! findings! of! Figure! 1! supports! our! assumption! that! using! measures! of!
democratic!support!are!suitable!proxies!for!authoritarian!support!(nostalgia).!For!the!
remainder! of! the! paper! we! therefore! use! measures! of! democratic! support,! which!
have!a!higher!longitudinal!and! geographic! coverage! and! hence! allow! us! to!test!our!
three!hypotheses!more!accurately.!!
Political!support!is!one!of!the!key!factors!in!the!development!of!a!democratic!
political!culture!(Almond!and!Verba,!1963;!Easton,!1965).!The!aim!is!to!measure!the!
extent! to! which! citizens! support! the! democratic! system! using! the! satisfaction! with!
the! way! democracy! works.! We! thereby! assume! that! the! expression! of! satisfaction!
asks!respondents!to! evaluate!the!performance!of! the!political!system!(Norris,!1999;!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15!Appendix! 5! includes! further! exploration! of! the! measure! of! authoritarian! nostalgia,! including! its!
prevalence!and!generational!differences.!
!
!
19!
!
!
Linde! and! Ekman,! 2003).16! Further,! asking! citizens! about! the! ‘‘satisfaction! with!
democracy’’! is! less! abstract! than! the! usual! question! of! support! for! ‘‘democracy! as!
the!best!way!of!government’’,!which!we!do!however!use!in!a!separate!test,!too.!!
In!the!datasets!that!were!harmonized!for!this!study,!respondents!were!asked!
uniformly! how! satisfied! are! you! with! the! way! democracy! works! in! your! country.17!
Response!categories!however!varied!from!4!to!11.!The!variable!was!standardized!to!
0!to!100,! whereas! lower! values!mean!less!satisfaction! with! democracy.! To! account!
for!the!specific!effects!due!to!study! design! or! questionnaire! design,! we! include! the!
study!(e.g.! WVS,!ESS,!etc.)!as!a!control!variable!into!the!model,! which!also!accounts!
for!the!difference!in!response!categories.18!!!
Individual-level(control(variables(
We! control! for! the! gender! of! respondents,! the! education! level! (primary! or! less,!
secondary,! post-secondary)19! and! a! dummy! variable! whether! a! respondent! is!
working!as!opposed! to! being! unemployed,!retired!or! any! other! reason! why!people!
do!not!work.20!+
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16!In! the! analysis! presented! below ! we! refrain! from! including! countries! in! the! analysis! th at! are! not!
classified! as! democratic! at! the! time! of! the! survey.! We! believe! that! it! is! not! meaningful! to! ask!
respondents!to!evaluate!how! the! democratic! system!works!in!their! country! if!they!do!not! live!in!a!
democracy.! Using! this! restriction! reduces! the! sample! by! 21! countries! for! which! data! would! be!
available.!The!results!are!not!sensitive!to!the!inclusion!of!these!contemporary!autocracies.!
17!The!question!wording!and!response!categories!in!each!study!are!listed!in!Appendix!3.!!
18!The!estimates!of!these! are!not! reported!in!the!results!tables,!but!are! available!upon! request!from!
the!authors.!!
19!For! this! we! use! the! categorical! variable!that! measures! a! person’s! highest! educational! degree.! In!
some!datasets!education!was!measured!as! years!of!education! or!age!of! leaving!school.!The!coding!
scheme! to! classify! respondents! into! the! three! education! groups! based! on! this! is! explained! in!
Appendix!3.!Combing!the!education!variables!(categorical!and!measured!from!years)!leaves!only!2%!
still!missing.!
20!Unfortunately,! it! is! not! possible! to! control! a! person’s! income! or! economic! well-being! beyond!
working,!as!the!measures!were!too!diverse!to!be!harmonized.!
!
!
20!
!
!
Measuring(inclusionary(and(exclusionary(regimes(
Data! on! the! inclusionary! and! exclusionary! regime! dimensions! comes! from! the!
Varieties! of! Democracy! (V-Dem)! project! (Coppedge! et! al.,! 2016).21! The! unit! of!
observation! in! our! sample! is! country-year! (1915-2015),! for! the! 70! countries! for!
which!we!have!survey!data.!!
! We!capture! political! inclusiveness! by!calculating! the! average! score! between!
two!indicators:!power!distribution!by!social!group!and!by!socio-economic!status.!The!
former! variable! captures! whether! any! social! group22! is! more! politically! relevant!
compared!to!other!social!groups!in!that!country.!It!is!an!ordinal!measure!that!ranges!
from! monopoly! of! one! group! (value=0)! to! all! social! groups! having! equal! political!
power! (value=4).23! The! later! variable! captures! whether! more! wealth! and! income!
translates! into! more! political! power! for! citizens! and! groups.! It! is! also! an! ordinal!
variable!ranging! from!wealthy!people!enjoying!monopoly!over!political!power!(0)!to!
political!power!being!more!or!less!equally!distributed!across!economic!groups!(4).!
Economic!inclusiveness!of!regimes!is!captured!using!a!measure!of!the!type!of!
expenditures!used!by!the!regime.!It!is!an!ordinal!variable!ranging!from!particularistic!
spending! targeted! towards! specific! societal! actors! (0)! to! public! spending! being!
intended!to!benefit!all!groups!within!a!society,!including!the!poor!or!underprivileged!
(4).!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21!The!V-Dem!project!collects!data!on!political!institutions!with!the!help!of!more!than!3,000!country-
experts.!The!V-Dem! project!uses!a!Bayesian! item!response!model! to! increase!the!reliability!of!the!
coding!and!eliminate!as!much!of!individual!coders’!bias.!Due!to!the!richness!and!high!quality!of!the!
data!we!prefer!V-Dem!over!other!data.!It! sh ould! moreover! be! noted! that! the! level! o f! agreement!
between!V-Dem!and!other!datasets!is!over!90%!(Lührmann!et!al.,!2018).!
22!A!social!group!can!be!delimited!within!a!country!by!caste,!ethnicity,!language,!race,!region,!religion,!
or!some!combination!of!theses.!
23!See!part!A6!of!the!online!appendix!for!a!full!description!of!these!variables.!
!
!
21!
!
!
As! the! hypotheses! also! focus! on! the! distinction! between! autocracies! and!
democracy,!we! use! an! indicator! for! regime! type!that! is! based! on! V-Dem’s! electoral!
democracy!index,!whereby!the!absence!of!democracy!measures!autocracy.!The!index!
is!continuous!and!ranges!between!0!and!1,!where!higher!values!indicate!democracy.!
We! follow! Lindberg! (2016)! and! dichotomize! this! measure! where! a! regime! with! a!
value!of!the!index!equal!or!above! 0.67! is! considered! a! democracy! and! an! autocracy!
otherwise.!!
!
Figure!2:!Average!political!power!and!economic!inclusion!by!regime!type!!
Figure!2!shows! the!distribution!of!regimes! based!on!the!average!measure!of!
political! power! and! economic! inclusiveness! by! regime! type.! The! countries! in! the!
bottom! left! corners! in! Figure! 2! are! regimes! the! exclude! citizens! based! on! social!
group! membership! and! wealth,! and! also! whose! public! goods! spending! is!
particularistic.!We!observe!that,!on!average,!democracies!tend!to!have!higher!levels!
!
!
22!
!
!
of! inclusion! into! power! and! more! public! goods! provision.! Conversely,! autocracies!
that! exclude! citizens! based! on! socio-economic! status! or! social! group! membership!
also! tend! to! use! more! particularistic! spending! rather! than! public! goods! provision.!
This!pattern!is! consistent!with!the!logic!of! the!selectorate!theory!as!regimes!will! be!
more! likely! to! rely! on! public! goods! provision! as! the! size! of! their! selectorate! and!
winning!coalition!increases!(Bueno!de!Mesquita!et!al.,!2003).!!
! All! variables! are! continuous,! except! the! dummy! variable! that! measures!
whether! the! regime! was! an! autocracy! or! democracy.! The! macro! variables! are!
averaged! across! five-year! intervals! from! 1915! to! 2015! and! matched! to! the!
corresponding! national! generation! that! came! of! age! during! a! particular! five-year!
period.24!+
Macro(control(variables(
Several!variables!are!included! in! the!models!to!rule!out!the!possibility! that! citizens’!
democratic!satisfaction! is!not!explained!by!the!current!state!of!affairs!in!their!polity!
and!economy!(Karp!el!al.,!2003;!Wagner!et!al.,!2009).!First,!we!include!the!economic!
development!level! by! including! GDP!per! capita! at! the! 2011!PPP! value! of! the!dollar!
(source:!World!Bank),!as!we!expect!that!economic!performance!of!the!regime!affects!
people’s!reported!satisfaction!with!democracy!(Lipset,!1960;!Krieckhaus!et!al.,!2013).!
Second,! we! include! the! current! level! of! democracy,! as! the! type! of! democratic!
political! system! in! which! citizens! live! affects! their! views! of! democracy! (Wells! and!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24!1915!is!the! starting! point,! as! we!do!not!have!a!sufficient!number! of! individual-level! observations!
that! belong! to! generations! born! before! 1900! and! h ence! were! socialized! before!1915.! Separating!
cohorts! into! five-year! birth! groups! is! standard! practice! in! cohort! analysis! (Fienberg! and! Mason,!
1979;!Mason! et!al.,!1973).!As!we!do! a!cross-national!analysis!with!70!countries!it!is!not! possible!to!
separate!cohorts!in!more!meaningful!groups!that!overlap!with!historical!events.!!
!
!
23!
!
!
Krieckhaus,! 2006;! Anderson! and! Guillory,! 1997).! Third,! we! include! the! age! of! the!
democratic! system! because! the! amount! of! time! an! individual! has! lived! in! a!
democracy! might! affect! a! citizens’! democratic! attitudes! (Fuchs-Schündeln! and!
Schündeln,!2015).!Finally,!we!include!the!level!of!political!corruption25!(Wagner!et!al.!
2009),! as! citizens! engage! in! comparing! how! well! democracy! deals! with! corruption!
compared!to!autocracies!(Rose-Ackerman!1996).!
The(model(
As! outlined! above,! we! take! a! generational! perspective! to! test! our! hypotheses! and!
thereby!rely!on!an!age,! period,! cohort! (APC)! model.! The! most!important!covariates!
are!therefore,!firstly,! the! age! of!the!respondents,!which!we!include! as! age! in!years.!
Secondly,!we!measure!cohorts!in!five-year!groupings!when!respondents!turned!15,26!
assuming! that! this! is! the! time! of! socialization! when! the! political! regime! has! the!
strongest!and!lasting!impact!on!its!citizens!(Bartels!and!Jackman,!2014).!Finally,!we!
include! the! year! of! the! survey! to! capture! the! period! effect.! The! problem! of!
estimating!these!three!time!effects!simultaneously!is!the!identification!problem,!as:!
Cohort+=+Survey+Year+-+Age+
Yang! and! Land! (2006)! proposed! to! solve! this! identification! problem! by!
including!cohort!clusters!(in!our!case!five-year!groups)!and!survey!years!as!random!
effects!into!a!Hierarchical!Age-Period-Cohort!(HAPC)!model.!In!this!multilevel!model!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25!See!section!A6!of!the!appendix!for!a!more!detail!description!of!the!variables!mentioned!above.!
26!We!test!the!sensitivity!of!this!specification!by!firstly!changing!the!cohort!grouping!and!secondly!the!
age!of!the!formative!years.!The!results!are!discussed!below!in!the!robustness!test!section!as!well!as!
in!Appendix!12.!
!
!
24!
!
!
we!consider!periods!and!cohorts!as!cross-classified!contexts!in!which!individuals!are!
nested.!Including!macro-level!variables!that!capture!the!cohort!context!(inclusionary!
versus!exclusionary!autocracy!at!age!15)!as!well!as!the!period!context!(current!level!
economic!and!political!measures!in!the! same!year!as!survey!is!conducted)!allows! to!
test! the! effect! of! these! context! variables! on! democratic! attitudes.! The! model! is!
specified!as!
𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡!"#$ = 𝛼!"# + 𝛽! 𝐴𝑔𝑒!" + 𝛽! 𝑋!"
!
!!!
+
ϒ
! 𝐶+
!
!!!
𝜀!"#$
where!we!model!support!for!democracy!of!respondent’s!i+who!belongs!to!cohort+j,!
was! interviewed! in! year+ t! and! lives! in! country! c+ as! a! function! of! her! age! and! our!
individual-level! control! variables! X.! We! further! include! country-fixed! effects! to!
account! for! potential! country-specific! differences,! such! as! responding! to! survey!
questions.!The!most!important!part!of!this!model!is!the!random!intercept!which!𝛼!"#,!
can!be!written!as:!
𝛼!"# = 𝛾!+𝛾!𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑐
!+ 𝛾!𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑙!+ 𝛾!𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑐
!𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑙!+𝛾!
!
!!!𝑉
!" + 𝑢!!!+!𝑢!!!!
where!
ϒ
! measures!the!grand!mean.!
ϒ
!-
ϒ
!!measure!the!impact!of!the!each!cohort’s!
formative!context,!measured!as! five-year! average!contexts!when!respondents!were!
between! 15! and! 20! years! old,! a! specification! which! is! scrutinized! in! a! series! of!
robustness!tests.!We!test! H1! with!an!interaction!between!the!level!of!inclusiveness!
(political!or!economical)!and!whether!the!country!at!the!time!was!an!autocracy.!If!H1!
is! correct,! we! expect!
ϒ
!!to! be! negative!and! significant.! The! vector! V! measures! the!
current! period! effects,! which! measured! on! the! country-level! at! the! year! of! the!
!
!
25!
!
!
survey.!Here!we!treat!our!dependent!variables!as!continuous,!estimating!linear!HAPC!
models.!!!
Global!analysis:!Between!regime!variation!!
In! this! section,! we! present! the! empirical! results! of! a! global! cohort! analysis! of! the!
impact! of! autocratic! inclusiveness! on! democratic! support! that! utilizes! the! between!
regime! differences,! with! some! people! having! experienced! an! autocracy! and! some!
not!within!the!same!country!and!across!countries.!!
Descriptive(analysis!
First,!we!graphically!explore! the! relationship! between!inclusiveness!and!democratic!
support.! Figure! 3! plots! the! average! satisfaction! with! democracy,! our! main!
dependent!variable,!for!each!of!the!1,422!cohorts!in!our!62!countries.!We!graphically!
distinguish!between!those!generations!that!grew!up!in!an!autocratic!(panels!A!and!C)!
or!democratic!system!(panels!B!and!D)!according!to!the!level!of!political!(top!panels)!
and!economic!inclusion!(bottom!panels).!
As! Figure! 3! clearly! shows,! cohorts! that! grew! up! in! more! inclusive!
dictatorships! -! whether! economically! or! politically! -! are! less! likely! to! evaluate! the!
democratic! system! as! positive! compared! to! cohorts! that! were! socialized! in! more!
exclusive!regimes.!We!compare!these!results!to!democracies!that!give!us!a!reference!
point!of!the!relationship!between!inclusiveness!and!democratic!support.!As!the!two!
right!panels!in!Figure!3!confirm,!the!relationship!is!reversed!in!democracies.!Cohorts!
that! grew! up! in! more! inclusive! democracies! are! also! more! positive! towards! the!
functioning!of!the!democratic!system!today.!
!
!
26!
!
!
!
!
Figure!3:!Mean!satisfaction!with!democracy!(by!country-cohort)!over!political!and!
economic!inclusion!during!cohort’s!formative!years!(at!c)!
In! the! next! section,! we! use! HAPC! models! to! test! whether! the! graphical!
pattern!shown!in!Figure!3!holds!when!we!use!more!rigorous!models!that!account!for!
age,!period!and!cohort!effects!as!well!as!include!important!control!variables!on!both!
the!micro!and!macro!level.!!
Results(HAPC(Models(
We!estimate!a!hierarchical!Age,!Period,!Cohort!(HAPC)!model!as!introduced!above!to!
predict! a! respondent! level! of! democratic! support,! which! varies! from! 0! to! 100,!
whereas! higher! values! indicate! higher! support.! Including! an! interaction! effect! of!
inclusionary!strategies!and!whether!the!country!was!an!autocracy!at!the!time!each!
cohort!was!socialized!tests!hypothesis!1.!Table!1!reports!the!impact!of!two!!
!
!
27!
!
!
!
Table!1:!Linear!HAPC!model!predicting!satisfaction!with!democracy!!
!
!
M2!–!Public!good!
!
M3!–!Interaction!
!
coef.!
s.e.!
!
coef.!
s.e.!
!
coef.!
s.e.!
Age!
0.086***!!
(0.005)!
!
0.094***!!
(0.004)!
!
0.086***!!
(0.004)!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Socialization!Context!(at!c)!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Autocracy!
6.815***!!
(0.867)!
!
6.358***!!
(0.736)!
!
-14.850***!!
(1.969)!
Political!power!
2.681***!!
(0.337)!
!
!
!
!
-6.541***!!
(0.810)!
Autocracy!x!political!power!
-4.864***!!
(0.289)!
!
!
!
!
7.384***!!
(0.838)!
Public!good!!
!
!
!
3.307***!!
(0.236)!
!
-4.670***!!
(0.755)!
Autocracy!x!Public!good!!
!
!
!
-4.174***!!
(0.229)!
!
7.640***!!
(0.809)!
Pol.!Power!x!public!good!
!
!
!
!
!
!
2.676***!!
(0.266)!
Autoc.!x!pol.!Power!x!publ.!Good!!
!
!
!
!
!
-4.040***!!
(0.297)!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Current!context!(at!t)!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Level!of!democracy!
-34.547***!!
(8.561)!
!
-34.656***!!
(8.560)!
!
-34.684***!!
(8.548)!
Age!of!democracy!
-0.180***!!
(0.045)!
!
-0.184***!!
(0.045)!
!
-0.181***!!
(0.045)!
Log!GDP!(per!C)!
2.923***!!
(0.737)!
!
2.864***!!
(0.737)!
!
2.934***!!
(0.736)!
Political!corruption!
-2.766!
(7.548)!
!
-2.947!
(7.547)!
!
-2.829!
(7.536)!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Individual-level!controls!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Female!
-0.399***!!
(0.047)!
!
-0.400***!!
(0.047)!
!
-0.401***!!
(0.047)!
Education!(ref:!primary)!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Secondary!
0.290***!!
(0.065)!
!
0.282***!!
(0.065)!
!
0.290***!!
(0.065)!
Post-Secondary!
2.317***!!
(0.077)!
!
2.315***!!
(0.077)!
!
2.321***!!
(0.077)!
Working!
1.329***!!
(0.053)!
!
1.332***!!
(0.053)!
!
1.320***!!
(0.053)!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Country!FE!
yes!
!
!
yes!
!
!
yes!
!
Data!FE!
yes!
!
!
yes!
!
!
yes!
!
Intercept!
45.119***!!
(10.257)!
!
43.958***!!
(10.235)!
!
62.083***!!
(10.391)!
Variance!Component!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Cohort!(1900-2010)!
2.437***!!
(0.079)!
!
2.415***!!
(0.079)!
!
2.046***!!
(0.068)!
Period!(1973-2015)!
5.758***!!
(0.149)!
!
5.757***!!
(0.149)!
!
5.749***!!
(0.149)!
N!(of!respondents)!
1,245,690!
!
!
1,245,690!
!
!
1,245,690!
!
N!(of!countries)!
62!
!
!
62!
!
!
62!
!
AIC!
11,584,451!
!
!
11,584,437!
!
!
11,584,211!
!
Significance:+*+p<0.1;+**+p<0.05;+***+P<0.01.+Data:+Harmonized!survey!data!from!1,070!national!
datasets.!List!of!datasets!in!Appendix!2.!V-Dem,!1915-2015.!!
Note:!Entries!are!regression!coefficients!and!their!standard!errors!of!a!HAPC!model.!The!dependent!
variable!varies!from!e.g.!0=”not!satisfied!at!all”!and!100=”completely!satisfied”.!!
!
dimensions!of!regime!strategies!on!satisfaction!with!democracy,!our!first!dependent!
variable.!Model!1!presents!the!results!of!the!impact!of!access!to!political!power.!The!
!
!
28!
!
!
results! confirm! our! hypothesis.! The! more! access! autocracies! provided! to! their!
citizens! the! lower! the! satisfaction! with! democracy! today! (
ϒ
!=-4.864).! With! every!
unit! increase! in! access! to! political! power,! democratic! satisfaction! is! 2.183! lower!
among!generations!of!former!dictatorships.!The!main! effect! of! the! dummy! variable!
capturing! the! regime! type! relates! to! autocracies! that! were! completely! politically!
exclusionary! (holding! all! other! variables! at! their! mean),! which! produces! higher!
democratic! satisfaction! levels! even! than! compared! to! cohorts! that! grew-up! in!
democracies!(
ϒ
!=6.815).!The!same!pattern!is!confirmed!for!the!second!dimension!of!
inclusiveness!-!access! to!political!resources!via!public!good! provision!–!presented!in!
Model!2.!All!effects!are!statistically!significant!on!the!1%!level.!
!
Figure!4:!Predicted!satisfaction!with!democracy!(A+B)!and!agreement!that!
democracy!is!best!form!of!government!(C+D)!by!regime!socialization!
!
Note:!The!prediction!is!based!on!a!linear!HAPC!model.!Full!results!shown!in!Table!1.!The!results!
presented!in!panel!C!and!D!are!reported!in!Appendix!8.!
!
!
!
29!
!
!
!
These! effects! are! further! illustrated! in! Figure! 4,! which! plots! the! predicted!
values! of! the! two! dependent! variables,! for! the! varying! levels! of! political! and!
economic!inclusion!distinguishing!for!having!been!socialized!in!a!democracy!(dashed!
line)!versus!an!autocracy!(solid!line).!Figures!4.A!and!4.B!plot!the!predicted!values!of!
satisfaction!with!democracies,!which!is!based!on!M1!and!M2!of!the!results!presented!
in! Table! 1.! For! example,! Figure! 4.A! shows! a! steep,! negative! slope! for! autocracies.!
Satisfaction! with! democracy! is! predicted! to! be! at! 52! points! (so! positive)! in! former!
extremely!politically!exclusionary! regimes!(score=0).!However,!if! a!respondent!grew!
up! in! a! very! politically! inclusionary! regime! (score=4),! predicted! satisfaction! with!
democracy!is!8.732!points!lower.!We!can!also!compare!this!effect!to!those!that!grew!
up! in! democracies.! Here! as! one! might! expect,! we! find! a! positive! effect.! The! more!
access!to!political!power!or!economic!resources!were!available!in!people’s!youth!the!
more!positive!they!seem!to!be!about!democracy!today.!
Figures!4.C! and! 4.D! further! plot! the! main! results! for! our! second!dependent!
variable,!whether!people!agree!that!democracy!is!the!best!form!of!government.!The!
results! are! less! strong! for! this! variable,! however,! H1! is! nevertheless! confirmed.! As!
predicted!by!our!theory,!those!exposed!to!more!inclusive!regimes!are!more!critical!
with! democracy,! which! we! interpret! as! a! form! of! nostalgia! and! support! for! the!
previous!dictatorship.!
In!the!next!step!we!turn!to!our!test!of!Hypothesis!2,!which!postulates!that!the!
political!and!economic!dimension!of!inclusiveness!reinforce!each!other.!We!test!this!
hypothesis!using!a!three-way!interaction!between!the!values!of!our!two!dimensions!
and!the!regime!type! at! the!time!when!respondents!were!socialized.! The! results!are!
!
!
30!
!
!
presented!in! Model!3!of!Table!1.!Interpreting!three-way!interactions!is!not!straight-
forward!and!we! therefore! focus!on!the!graphical!interpretation!presented! in! Figure!
5.!Figure!5!plots!the!marginal!effects!of!access!to!political!power!on!satisfaction!with!
democracy! for! different! levels! of! public! good! provision.! Again,! we! distinguish!
between! the! regime! type! -! democracies! (dashed! line)! and! autocracies! (solid! line).!
The! marginal! effects! can! be! interpreted! as! the! regression! coefficient! for! political!
power!inclusiveness.!!
As! Figure! 5! demonstrates,! in! autocracies! that! rely! on! excessive! public! good!
provision! (value=4),! increasing! political! power! will! lead! to! a! negative! impact! on!
satisfaction!with!democracy.!Given! the! marginal! effect! of! about! 4.8,!going!from!no!
political!access!to!full!access,!would!decrease!democratic!satisfaction!by!19.2!points!
on!a!0-100!scale.!This!impact!of!political!inclusiveness!is!weaker!in!countries!that!are!
less!economically!generous,!which!confirms!hypothesis!2.!!
Interestingly,!Figure!5!also!reveals!that!if!an!autocracy!relies!on!the!provision!
of!particularistic!goods!only!(value=0),!increasing!access!to!political!power!will!have!a!
positive! effect! on! democratic! satisfaction.! Here! the! positive! legacy! effect! of!
economic! exclusiveness! seems! to! outweigh! the! negative! effect! of! higher! political!
inclusiveness.! The! effect! is! however! relatively! small! and! significant! only! on! the! 5%!
level.!In!appendix!9!we!further!present!these!results!plotting!the!marginal!effects!of!
public!good!provision!against!political!power.27!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27!In! Appendix! 10! we! present! add itional! results! replicating! the! analysis! testing! H3! by! us ing! a! four-
category! regime! typology! of! politically! and! economically! exclusionary! versus! inclusionary! regimes!
with!two!hybrid!types!in!the!middle.!The!results!confirm!the!findings!presented!above.!Authoritarian!
regimes!that!were!both!inclusive!in!their!access!to!political!power!as!well!as!widely!provided!public!
good! have! the! most! critical! citizens! with! democracy! today.! This! confirms! our! reinforcement!
hypothesis.!!
!
!
31!
!
!
!
!
Figure!5:!Marginal!effects!of!access!to!political!power!on!satisfaction!with!democracy!
by!public!good!provision!!
Note:!The!prediction!is!based!on!a!linear!HAPC!model.!Full!results!shown!in!M3!in!Table!1.!
!
Robustness(tests(
We! test! the! sensitivity! of! our! results! using! a! series! of! additional! tests,! which! are!
presented!in!Appendices!11!and!12.!Firstly,!we!exchange!our!measure!of! economic!
inclusiveness! by! using! income! at! the! time! of! socialization! instead! of! public! good!
provision.28! We! replace! the! level! of! economic! inclusiveness! of! the! regime!
(particularistic!vs!public!goods!provision)!with!the!level!of!inequality!of!the!following!
reason:!the!level!of!inequality!of!a!regime!should!be!the!product!of!the!redistributive!
policies!of!the!regime.!More!simply,!if!a!regime!provides!more!public!goods,!then!the!
level! of! inequality! should! be! lower! compared! to! cases! when! the! regime! provides!
particularistic! goods.! If! that! is! true,! then! we! should! observe! the! following:! citizens!
socialized! under! higher! inequality! should! be! more! satisfied! with! democracy!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28!Income!inequality!is!measured!using!the!Gini! coefficient!based! on!Haber!and!Menaldo!(2011)! and!
updated!by!V-Dem!to!today!(Coppedge!et!al.!2016).!
!
!
32!
!
!
compared!to!citizens!socialized!under!lower!inequality.!The!analysis!using! inequality!
shows!that!satisfaction!with!democracy!of!post-1945!cohorts!increase!as!the!level!of!
inequality!of!their!regime!increases.!
Secondly,! other! characteristics! of! authoritarian! regimes! could! drive! their!
legacy! on! democratic! attitudes.! We! therefore! re-run! the! analysis! including! two!
additional! factors! to! account! for! the! characteristics! of! regimes,! when! different!
generations!were!socialized.!Firstly,!we!account!for!physical!repression,!measured!by!
torture!and!political!killings.29!Autocracies!often!use!hard!repression!as!another!tool!
to! control! the! mass! population.! The! level! of! repression! also! could! affect! the!
inclusiveness!of!the!regime,!with!more!exclusive! regimes! using! more! physical! force!
than!inclusive!regimes.!We!therefore! add! this! control! variable! to! our!main!models,!
presented! in! Table! 1,! Model! 3,! predicting! satisfaction! with! democracy.! The! three-
way!interaction!effect!between!the!two!dimensions!of!inclusiveness!and!growing-up!
in!a!dictatorship! is! slightly!reduced!(from!b=-4.040,!p<0.000! in! M3!in!Table!1!to! b=-
3.640,! p<0.000).! This! differences! is! however! not! significant.! This! indicates! that!
indeed!some!of!the!effect!of!regime!inclusiveness!is!through!the!use!of!repression,!
which! has! a! negative! effect! on! democratic! satisfaction.! The! less! repressive! the!
regime! was! during! a! respondent’s! formative! years,! the! more! positive! she! is! about!
democracy!(b=4.080,!p<0.001).!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29!We! use! the!physical! integrity!index! from! V-Dem! that! ranges! from! 0! to! 1,! whereas!lower! values!
indicate!more!repression.!More!information!in!Appendix!6.5.1.!!
!
!
33!
!
!
! Further,! we! account! for! the! level! of! economic! development! at! the! time! of!
regime!socialization!measured!using!logged!GPD!(per!capita).30!We!could!argue!that!
the! level! of! political! and! economic! inclusiveness! depends! in! part! how! developed! a!
country!is!in! general.!In!poor!countries,! public!provision!of!services!and! inclusion!of!
ordinary! citizens! into! the! political! process! might! be! more! important! than! in! very!
developed!countries,!where! citizens! are!less!dependent!on!state! provision.! In!order!
to!test!this! argument,!we!include!logged!GDP! (per!capita)!in!the!model! as!a!control!
variable! (Table! A11,! M3.1).! Controlling! for! economic! development! significantly!
reduces! the! three-way! interaction! effect,! which! tests! H2! (b=-2.080,! p<0.000).! This!
implies! that! some! of! the! legacy! impact! of! authoritarian! ruling! strategies! is!
dependent!on!the!level!of!economic!development.!!
We! explore! this! further! by! repeating! the! analysis! on! the! subset! of! cohorts!
that!grew!up!in!autocracies!and!interacted!the! level! of! economic! inclusiveness! that!
they!were!exposed!to!and!the!nation’s!logged!GDP!(Table!A11,!M3.2).!The!impact!of!
public!good! provision!is!the! strongest!for!mid-level! countries!and!insignificant!when!
countries! are! very! poor! or! very! rich.! Poor! countries! will! not! be! able! to! credibly!
supply! public! goods! to! its! citizens! and! in! very! rich! countries! it! might! not! matter!
whether! the! regime! provides! goods! or! not,! as! citizens! might! just! generally! profit!
from!the!wealth!of! the! country.! Importantly,! the! results! do!confirm!the!hypothesis!
that! more! economically! inclusive! regimes! produce! long-term! negative! legacies! on!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30!As!our!macro!data!goes!back!to!1915,!we!had!to!compile!historical!GDP!using!1990!value!of!Geary-
Khamis! dollar! from! the! Maddison! project.!In! this! model! we! excluded! the! m easure! of! current! (at!
time! of! survey)! measure! of! logged! GDP,! as! this! is! highly! correlated! with! past! GDP,! when!
respondents! where! 15! years! old! (R=0.78),! w hich! shows! the! strong! path-dependency! in! economic!
development.!!
!
!
34!
!
!
democratic! satisfaction,! especially! in! countries! at! the! mid-range! of! economic!
development,!where!governmental!actions!might!be!most!influential.!!
Thirdly,! we! changed! the! sample! that! we! use! in! our! analysis,! by! applying! a!
more!restrictive!inclusion!criteria!for!cohorts!by!excluding!242! cohorts! (14! percent)!
that!have!fewer!than!50!observations.!These!relatively!empty!cells!are!more!prone!to!
outliers.!Re-running!the!analysis!of!M3,!shown!in!Table!1,!confirms!our!results!that!
the! more! inclusive! autocracies! are! during! respondents’! formative! years,! the! less!
positive!they!are!with!the!democratic!system!(see!Table!!A11,!Model!4).!!
Lastly,!we!tested!the!sensitivity!of!our!cohort! specification! by! firstly! altering!
the! age! at! which! we! assume! the! formative! years! to! take! place! and! secondly,!
changing!the!cohort!groupings.!The!results!for!both! robustness! tests! are! presented!
in!Appendix! 12.!Regarding!the!first!test,!we!estimate!models!that!match! the!regime!
ruling!strategies!when!respondents!were!1)!5-10!years!old;!2)!10-15!years!old;!3)!15-
20!years!old!(the!specification!used!for!the!main!results);!4)!20-25!years!old;!5)!25-30!
years!old;!and!6)!30-35! years! old.! It! does! not!really!matter!at!what!age!someone!is!
exposed! to! certain! regime! strategies.! The! results! are! robust! for! all! different!
specification! of! the! formative! years.! However,! we! decided! to! follow! previous!
theoretical!and!empirical!evidence!to!determine!the!age!of!the!formative!years!to!be!
at!between!15!and!20!(Bartels!and!Jackman,!2014).!
In! a! second! test! we! changed! the! cohort! grouping! by! testing! whether! the!
results!are!sensitive! to! specifying!the!length!of!the! formative! years!as!2,!5,!8! or! 10-
year!intervals!at!the!age!of!15.!This!varies!our!number!of!country-cohorts!from!3,607!
to!785.! As! the!results! of! Appendix!12.2! show,! our! findings! are! not! sensitive! to! the!
!
!
35!
!
!
cohort!length.! For! the! main!models! presented! above! we!however! decided! to! keep!
the!5-year!cohorts,!as!this!is!standard!in!cohort!analysis!(Fienberg!and!Mason,!1979;!
Mason!et!al.,!1973).!
Within!regime!variation!-!Winners!and!losers!of!autocracies!
After!having!established!that!authoritarian!ruling!strategies!have!a!lasting!imprint!on!
citizens’!democratic!attitudes!across!countries,!we!now!present!two!empirical!tests!
to!investigate!the!within+regime!heterogeneity!of!varying!experiences!of!people!that!
experienced! the! same! ruling! strategy.! In! order! to! test! hypothesis! 3,! we! firstly!
investigate!eleven! post-Communist! countries! by!focusing! on! the! working!class! as! a!
social!group! that! very! much! profited! from! the! regime,! while! religious! people!were!
the! most! suppressed! in! practicing! their! beliefs.! Secondly,! we! use! ethnic! power!
divisions!as!another!example!of!winners!and!losers!of!dictatorships.!In!some!regimes,!
certain!ethnic!groups!are!dominant!in!holding!political!power,!while!other!groups!are!
discriminated.31!!(
Within-Regime(Analysis(I:(Working(Class(vs.(Religion(in(Former(Communist(Regimes(
!
Communist! ideology! is! based! on! secularization! and! the! empowerment! of! the!
working! class.! This! creates! clear! winners! –! working! class! –! and! losers! –! religious!
people! –! of! communist! regimes.! We! test! whether! this! led! to! varying! levels! of!
democratic!support! in! the! post-Communist!era! in! eleven! Central!Eastern! European!
countries! using! the! data! from! the! European! Social! Survey! (ESS)! only.! The! ESS!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31!The!list!of!countries!included!in!both!within-regime!analyses!is!presented!in!Appendix!13.!!
!
!
36!
!
!
included! in! five! waves! (2004! to! 2012)! the! question! about! the! occupation! of! the!
respondent’s!father!at!the! age! of! 14.! We! thereby!contrast!those! that! come! from! a!
working! class! with! the! rest.! The! rationale! of! using! father’s! occupation! is! that! we!
firstly! assume! that! the! social! class! position! during! the! formative! years! is! most!
important!for!crystalizing!a!sense!of!belonging!to!the!regime.!More!precisely,!people!
that! grew! up! in! a! working! class! family! are! expected! to! have! been! socialized! into!
belonging!to! the!selectorate!of! the!communist!regimes.!Hence,!they!are!likely!to!be!
more!critical!with!the!democratic!system!today,!as!they!might!feel!that!they!lost!out!
in!the!transition!compared!to!socialist!times.!!
Secondly,! we! use! father’s! occupation! rather! than! the! respondent’s! own!
occupation,!as!there!is!potential!social!mobility!and!we!can!hence!not!know!whether!
a! person’s! current! social! class! corresponds! to! the! social! class! of! the! time! of!
socialization.!We!contrast!these!winners!of!socialism!with!religious!people!that!were!
very!much!repressed!by!the!state!driven!secularization!of!socialist!societies!(Mueller!
and!Neundorf,!2012).!Here!we!measure!religion! simply!by!denomination!comparing!
those!that!are!not!religious!with!those!that!are!Christians.!
The! results! of! these! analyses! are! reported! in! Table! 2.! Here! we! interact!
whether! a! respondent! belongs! to! the! winners! or! losers! with! a! dummy! variable!
whether! this! person! grew! up! during! the! Communist! regime.! The! results! are!
illustrated!in!Figure!6.!!
!
! !
!
!
37!
!
!
Table!2:!Linear!regression:!Satisfaction!with!democracy!(Eastern!Europe!only)!
!
M1:!Social!class!
M2:!Religion!
!
Coef.!
se!
Coef.!
se!
Age!!
0.004!
(0.011)!
-0.006!
(0.008)!
!
!
!
!
Socialization!context!(at!c)!
!
!
!
Autocracy!(Communism)!
-5.742***!!
(0.483)!
-4.314***!
(0.389)!
Father!worker!
-4.461***!!
(0.441)!
!
!
Autocracy!x!father!worker!
2.353***!!
(0.507)!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Religion!(ref:!none)!
!
!
!
!
Christian!
!!
!
0.485!
(0.405)!
Muslim!
!!
!
4.315*!
(2.229)!
Other!
!!
!
0.117!
(2.794)!
Autocracy!x!
!
!
!
!
Christian!
!!
!
1.773***!
(0.445)!
Muslim!
!!
!
2.263!
(2.477)!
Other!
!!
!
1.483!
(3.365)!
!
!
!
!
!
Individual-level!controls!
!
!
!
!
Female!
-0.540**!!
(0.216)!
-0.710***!
(0.194)!
Education!(ref:!primary)!
!
!
!
!
Secondary!
-2.774***!!
(0.673)!
-2.391***!
(0.555)!
Post-secondary!
0.684!
(0.708)!
1.764***!
(0.594)!
Working!
0.148!
(0.251)!
0.316!
(0.225)!
Income!(ref:!bottom!20%)!
!
!
!
Income:!20-40%!
2.610***!!
(0.321)!
2.676***!
(0.283)!
Income:!40-60%!
4.803***!!
(0.329)!
4.831***!
(0.297)!
Income:!60-80%!
4.337***!!
(0.331)!
4.169***!
(0.298)!
Income:!80-100%!
2.322***!!
(0.401)!
2.574***!
(0.350)!
Country!FE!(N=11)!
Yes!
!
Yes!
!
Year!FE!
Yes!
!
Yes!
!
Intercept!
35.218***!!
(0.928)!
25.746***!
(0.904)!
N!!
48,294!
!
60,139!
!
R2!
0.093!
!
0.090!
!
Significance:+*+p<0.1;+**+p<0.05;+***+P<0.01.+!
Note:!The!prediction!is!based!on!a!linear!regression!with!country!FE,!controlling!for!gender,!education!
and!working.!Central!European!countries!only!(Bulgaria,!Czech!Rep.,!East!Germany,!Estonia,!Hungary,!
Latvia,!Lithuania,!Poland,!Romania,!Slovakia,!Ukraine);!Data:!ESS,!2004-2012.!
!
First!of!all,!we!see!generally!much!lower!levels!of!satisfaction!with!democracy!
for!the!generation!that!grew!up!under!communisms!contrasted!to!those!that!belong!
the!post-Communist!generation!that!grew!up!in!democratic!times.!Nevertheless,!the!
pattern! emerging! from! Figure! 6! clearly! confirms! Hypothesis! 3.! Respondents! that!
were!raised!in!a!working!class!family!are!most!critical!with!democracy!today,!while!
!
!
38!
!
!
those! that! are! religious! are! significantly! more! satisfied! with! democracy.! The!
difference!between!winners!and!losers!is!small,!but!significant.!!
!
Figure!6:!Predicted!Satisfaction!with!democracy!by!social!background,!religion!and!
regime!socialization!
Note:!Predictions!and!95%!confidence!intervals!are!based!in!the!results!shown!in!Table!2.!!
!
Within-Regime(Analysis(II:(Ethnic(Political(Power(Relationship(((
Our! second! within-regime! analysis! focuses! on! ethnicity! as! a! source! for! creating!
winners!and!losers,!i.e.!membership!in!the!autocratic!selectorate.!For!this!purpose,!
we!rely!on!data!from!the!World!Values!Survey,!which!included!a!detailed!measure!of!
ethnicity! as! well! as! the! dependent! variable! in! Wave! 4! (1999-2004).! We! match! the!
ethnicity!code!of!the!WVS!to!that!of!the!data!of!Ethnic!Power!Relations!(EPR)!project!
(Vogt!et!al.,!2015).!The!EPR!provides!annual!data!(1946-2013)!on!politically!relevant!
ethnic! groups,32! their! relative! size! as! a! share! of! the! country! population,! and! their!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32!Ethnicity! is! defined! as! a! subjective!experience.! It! is! a! sense! of! commonality! based! on! a! belief! in!
common!ancestry!and!shared!culture.!Ethnic!groups! are!considered! to!be!relevant!if!either!at!least!
!
!
39!
!
!
access! to! power.! We! included! in! our! data! only! the! groups! that! could! be! clearly!
identified! to! avoid! collapsing! too! much! EPR! heterogeneity! into! one! category.33!
Finally,!we! have!77!ethnic!groups!from!21!countries.!In!order!to! adjust!for!sampling!
of!different!groups,!we!correct! the! results! by! using! population! weights!provided!by!
the!WVS.!
EPR!codes!the!access!to!power!of!ethnic!group!on!an!ordinal!scale,!with!three!
main!categories,!which!are!then!divided!into!sub-categories.34!Here!we!contrast!only!
two!types!of!political!power!ethnic!groups!can!have.!Firstly!a!group!can!be!dominant!
by! ruling! alone! (EPR! classification:! monopoly! or! dominance)! or! a! group! can! be!
discriminated! by! being! excluded! from! power!(EPR! classification:! powerless! or!
discriminated).!We!do!not!count!self-exclusion!as!a!form!of!discrimination.!!
Table!3!reports!the!results!of!a!linear!regression!on!satisfaction!of!democracy,!
where! we! identify! whether! a! respondent! belongs! to! an! ethnic! group! that! was!
discriminated! or! dominant! during! an! autocratic! regime! at! the! time! of! socialization!
(Model!1).!In! Model! 2! we! further! measure!the!size! of! the! discriminated! (M2a)! and!
dominant! group! (M2b).! Again! we! interact! these! variables! with! the! political! regime!
(democratic!vs.!autocratic)!at!time!of!adolescence.!The!results!confirm!Hypothesis!2,!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
one!significant!political!actor!claims!to!represent!the!interests!of! the!group! in!the! national!political!
arena!or!if!group!members!are!systematically!and!intentionally!discriminated!in!the!political!sphere.!
33!For!instance,!in!Georgia,!EPR!identifies!the!following!ethnic!groups:!Georgians,!Armenians,!Azeri,!
Ossetians! and! Abhkazians.! In! contrast,! WVS! has! two!categories:! Georgians! and! others.! Then,!the!
Georgian!ethnic!group!can!be!easily!identified!and!matched!with!the!EPR!data!on!power!relations.!
However,!the!remaining!four!ethnic!groups!cannot!be!collapsed!into!one!category!because!it!would!
mean!to!conflate!powerless!groups!(Armenian!and! Azeri)!with!self-excluded!groups!(Ossetians! and!
Abhkazians).!
34!See!Appendix!6.6!for!the!exact!classification!of!ethnic!power!position!by!the!EPR.!!
!
!
40!
!
!
as! people! that! belong! to! a! discriminated! group! at! time! of! the! autocracy! are!
significantly!more!positive!with!democracy!today.!
Table!3:!Linear!regression:!Satisfaction!with!democracy!and!ethnic!power!
!
M1:!Dominant!vs.!
!
Size!of!group:!
!
discriminated!
!
M2a:!Discriminated!!
!
M2b:!Dominant!
!
Coef.!
s.e.!
!
Coef.!
s.e.!
!
Coef.!
s.e.!
Age!
0.046*!!
(0.024)!
!
0.052**!!
(0.023)!
!
0.041*!
(0.024)!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Socialization!Context!(at!c)!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Autocracy!
-0.472!
(0.900)!
!
-1.164!
(0.905)!
!
0.728!
(1.190)!
Discriminated!(vs.!dominant)!
1.005!
(1.269)!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Size!of!discriminated!group!
!
!
!
0.302!
(5.226)!
!
!
!
Size!of!dominant!group!
!
!
!
!
!
!
-0.074!
(1.560)!
Autocracy!x!ethnic!group!
3.174**!!
(1.456)!
!
20.595***!!
(5.442)!
!
-0.751!
(1.733)!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Individual-level!controls!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Female!
-0.567!
(0.617)!
!
-0.413!
(0.603)!
!
-0.612!
(0.619)!
Education!(ref:!primary)!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Secondary!
0.936!
(0.799)!
!
1.631**!!
(0.806)!
!
0.745!
(0.795)!
Post-Secondary!
0.922!
(0.843)!
!
1.587*!!
(0.852)!
!
0.631!
(0.836)!
Working!
0.469!
(0.657)!
!
0.562!
(0.645)!
!
0.338!
(0.659)!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Country!FE!(N=21)!
yes!
!
!
yes!
!
!
yes!
!
Intercept!
34.330***!!
(2.157)!
!
34.332***!!
(2.159)!
!
34.205***!
(2.251)!
N!(of!respondents)!
13,436!
!
!
13,436!
!
!
13,436!
!
AIC!!
124,599!
!
!
124,396!
!
!
124,631!
!
Significance:+ *+ p<0.1;+ **+ p<0.05;+ ***+ P<0.01.+ Data:! WVS,! wave! 4! only.!Weighted! by! population!
weight.!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
41!
!
!
+
Figure!7:!Predicted!Satisfaction!with!Democracy!by!ethnic!power!position!and!
regime!socialization!
Note:!Predictions!and!95%!confidence!intervals!are!based!in!the!results!shown!of!Model!1!in!Table!3.!+
+
These!effects!are!illustrated!in!Figures!7!and!8.!As!Figure!7!shows,!there!is!a!6!
points! difference! in! democratic! satisfaction! between! those! that! belong! to! the!
dominant! group! and! those! that! belong! to! the! discriminated! group.! Turning! to! the!
size!of!the!ethnic!group!in!Model!2!and!Figure!8,!it!is!striking!how!strong!the!effect!is!
especially! if! a! large! group! was! suppressed.! If! a! minority! ethnic! group! ruled! an!
autocracy! and! the! discriminated! group! is! in! the! majority,! satisfaction! with!
democracy! is! much! higher.! This! clearly! supports! the! idea! that! there! is! a! feeling! of!
liberation!for!such!a!discriminated!group.+
+
!
!
42!
!
!
+
Figure!8:!Predicted!Satisfaction!with!Democracy!by!size!of!ethnic!power!position!and!
regime!socialization!
Note:!Predictions!and!95%!confidence!intervals!are!based!in!the!results!of!Models!2a!and!2b!shown!in!
Table!3.!+
Conclusion!and!discussion!
This! article! proposed! a! distinction! between! inclusionary! and! exclusionary! ruling!
strategies!of!autocracies!that!cast!a!long!shadow!on!political!attitudes!even!after!the!
regime! broke! down.! We! argue! that! citizens’! political! attitudes! towards! democracy!
are! shaped! by! the! policies! of! the! authoritarian! regime! in! which! they! spent! their!
formative!years.!Our!theoretical!expectations!were!that!citizens!who!were!socialized!
in! more! inclusionary! regimes! are! more! critical! with! democracy! than! citizens! who!
spent! their! formative! years! in! exclusionary! regimes.! The! intuition! behind! this!
expectation! was! that! inclusionary! regimes! are! better! at! creating! general! regime!
support! of! citizens! by! a! wider! redistribution! of! political! and! economic! resources.!
Further,!we!also!expected!to!observe!within!regime!differences!in!political!attitudes,!
!
!
43!
!
!
as!citizens! who! were! part! of!the! winning! group! of!autocracy!are! less! satisfied! with!
democracy!than!members!of!the!losing!group.!
! These!expectations!were!tested!using!hierarchical!age,!period,!cohort!(HAPC)!
models! with! harmonized! public! opinion! data,! regime! data! from! V-Dem! and! ethnic!
group!data!from!the!Ethnic!Power!Relations!data.!The!results!support!our!contention!
that! people! who! were! socialized! in! exclusionary! regimes! are! more! supportive! of!
democracy! compared! to! citizens! socialized! in! exclusionary! regimes,! and! even!
democracies.! Also,! we! find! that! citizens! that! are! part! of! the! winning! group! in! an!
autocracy!are!less!satisfied!with!democracy!compared!to!citizens!who! were! part! of!
discriminated!groups.!We!interpret!these!democratic!attitudes!as!an!indicator!about!
the!nostalgia!for!the!old!authoritarian!regime.!!
! This!study!offered!a! micro! perspective!of!authoritarian!politics!by!examining!
the!governance!strategies!used!to!build!a!loyal!citizenry.!Further,!it!showed!the!long-
term! effects! of! authoritarian! politics! and! their! legacy! long! after! the! regime! has!
collapsed.! These! results! indicate! that! we! should! pay! more! attention! to! the! role! of!
ordinary! citizens! in! autocracies! and! that! political! attitudes! towards! democracy! are!
shaped!long!before!citizens!even!experience!democracy.!
!
! !
!
!
44!
!
!
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... As the growing number of studies on democratic transition and transitional justice have shown, the transition to democracy often involves complicated negotiations and political calculations between outgoing rulers and their followers and incoming democratic elites (Nalepa 2010;Nalepa and Pop-Eleches 2022). In that process, authoritarianism often casts a long shadow over democracy, not just through institutional channels, including political parties (Kitschelt and Singer 2018;Loxton 2015;Miller 2021;Riedl 2014) and bureaucracy (Albertus 2019), but also through nostalgia and citizens' policy preferences (Neundorf 2010;Neundorf, Gerschewski, and Olar 2020;Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017). Although the existing literature offers critical insights drawn from broader contexts, it rarely pins down the microlevel mechanisms through which the legacy of a former illiberal regime influences individuals and communities and thus electoral outcomes after democratization. ...
... Using cross-country data from new democracies, Miller (2021) and Jhee (2008) find evidence that a policy success in the past-for example, an achievement in economic development-can provide an advantage to the authoritarian successor party. Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2017) and Neundorf, Gerschewski, and Olar (2020) further argue that the legacy effect of a past dictatorship significantly affects individual voter preferences. Expanding the previous literature on authoritarian legacy, we design our analysis to distinguish the legacy effects from a personal connection to the former dictator (Dal Bo, Dal Bo, and Snyder 2009) from more institutional channels, such as the political party (Loxton 2015;Miller 2021). ...
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This study explores how authoritarian distributive policies may not only generate political support for the autocrat but may also help sustain powerful and lasting authoritarian legacies. We use microlevel data from South Korea's New Village Movement, a 1970s rural development program implemented under dictator Park Chung‐hee and widely touted as contributing to the country's rapid economic development. Our analysis shows that townships in receipt of larger cash transfers cast more votes for Park's incumbent party in the subsequent election. More importantly, we show that the effects of the subsidies still appeared almost four decades later in 2012, when the dictator's daughter was democratically elected as the president of South Korea. We show that these effects were not driven by villagers’ long‐term income gains or enhanced social capital due to the program but by the unwavering support of the beneficiary villagers for the dictator, whose legacy remained strong long after democratization.
... We posit that authoritarian imprints prompt the Chinese diaspora, particularly firstgeneration immigrants, to support Trump, who appeared to follow the authoritarian playbook during his presidency. Fast-growing literature has empirically documented that political institutions in history, such as slavery, Nazi institutions, and communist regimes, have a long-lasting effect on people's attitudes and behavior (e.g., Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen 2016;Haffert 2021;Homola, Pereira, and Tavits 2020;Tucker 2017 2020;Neundorf, Gerschewski, and Olar 2020). Accordingly, despite democratic desires, immigrants from non-democratic countries are inclined to support an unaccountable strong leader (Bilodeau 2014). ...
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This introductory essay outlines the core themes of the special issue on the rise and fall of Hong Kong's Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement. In the essay, we highlight several theoretical and empirical contributions the featured papers make to our understanding of the protest–repression nexus from the onset of the movement to the imposition of the National Security Law. First, we describe the political and social contexts of the movement. Second, we present our empirical findings on Hong Kongers' political preferences. Finally, we highlight new research avenues arising from this special issue.
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Classifying political regimes has never been more difficult. Most contemporary regimes hold de-jure multiparty elections with universal suffrage. In some countries, elections ensure that political rulers are—at least somewhat—accountable to the electorate whereas in others they are a mere window dressing exercise for authoritarian politics. Hence, regime types need to be distinguished based on the de-facto implementation of democratic institutions and processes. Using V-Dem data, we propose with Regimes of the World (RoW) such an operationalization of four important regime types—closed and electoral autocracies; electoral and liberal democracies—with vast coverage (almost all countries from 1900 to 2016). We also contribute a solution to a fundamental weakness of extant typologies: The unknown extent of misclassification due to uncertainty from measurement error. V-Dem’s measures of uncertainty (Bayesian highest posterior densities) allow us to be the first to provide a regime typology that distinguishes cases classified with a high degree of certainty from those with “upper” and “lower” bounds in each category. Finally, a comparison of disagreements with extant datasets (7%–12% of the country-years), demonstrates that the RoW classification is more conservative, classifying regimes with electoral manipulation and infringements of the political freedoms more frequently as electoral autocracies, suggesting that it better captures the opaqueness of contemporary autocracies.
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Communist regimes were avowedly leftist authoritarian regimes, a relative rarity among autocracies. The growing literature on regime legacies would lead us to expect that postcommunist citizens would be more likely to exhibit “left-authoritarian” attitudes than their counterparts elsewhere. Finding that this is the case, we rely on 157 surveys from 88 countries to test if a living through Communism legacy model can account for this surplus of left-authoritarian attitudes. Employing both aggregate and micro-level analyses, we find strong support for the predictions of this model. Moving beyond previous legacy studies, we then test a variety of hypothesized mechanisms to explain how exposure to communist rule could have led to the regime congruent left-authoritarian attitudes. Of the mechanisms tested, greater state penetration of society is associated with a strong socialization effect and religious attendance—and in particular attending Catholic religious services—is associated with weaker socialization effects.
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How do the labels left and right take on meaning in new democracies? Existing explanations point to the universality of the left–right scheme or, reversely, emphasize regionally dominant social cleavages. We propose an alternative legacy-focused theory based on two observations: Dictatorships are not ideologically neutral and are negatively evaluated by most citizens and elites after democratization. These premises lead us to expect that when the authoritarian regime is associated with the left (right), the citizens of a new democracy will display an antileft (antiright) bias in their left–right self-identification. We test this hypothesis across Latin American and European new democracies. We find significant bias, which in the case of new democracies following left-wing regimes is concealed due to intercohort heterogeneity. Although older cohorts denote a positive bias, cohorts born after Stalin’s era denote negative bias against the left. Consistent with our expectations, repression exacerbates this bias whereas indoctrination mitigates it. Finally, we look at how these biases apply to party preferences. The findings have important implications for understanding authoritarian legacies and party system development in new democracies.
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It has long been assumed that the historical legacy of Soviet Communism would have an important effect on post-communist states. However, prior research has focused primarily on the institutional legacy of communism. Communism’s Shadow instead turns the focus to the individuals who inhabit post-communist countries, presenting a rigorous assessment of the legacy of communism on political attitudes. Post-communist citizens hold political, economic, and social opinions that consistently differ from individuals in other countries. Grigore Pop-Eleches and Joshua Tucker introduce two distinct frameworks to explain these differences, the first of which focuses on the effects of living in a post-communist country, and the second on living through communism. Drawing on large-scale research encompassing post-communist states and other countries around the globe, the authors demonstrate that living through communism has a clear, consistent influence on why citizens in post-communist countries are, on average, less supportive of democracy and markets and more supportive of state-provided social welfare. The longer citizens have lived through communism, especially as adults, the greater their support for beliefs associated with communist ideology-the one exception being opinions regarding gender equality. A thorough and nuanced examination of communist legacies’ lasting influence on public opinion, Communism’s Shadow highlights the ways in which political beliefs can outlast institutional regimes.