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Mind & Emergence: From Quantum to Consciousness
... The use of systems theory makes it easier to navigate the extremes of reductive idealism, as well as the estrangements caused by highly influential Platonic and Cartesian dualisms. Systems theory enables the identification of the intermediate structures and the establishment of that architecture within a supporting philosophical position, specifically the objective idealism of pragmatism [37] grounded in an emergent monism [32], [38]. Simplistically, even if eschewing dualism, neither AI researchers nor spirituality scholars can readily reconcile a reductive Platonic idealism of spirituality with a reductive Cartesian idealism of cognition when both are presumed constructed from a reductive physicalist view of matter. ...
... The conflation of physical and biological causation limits AI investigations of embodied cognition because attempting to bridge physical and psychological levels of human systems without addressing the intervening biological-level systems, e.g., neurological ones, skips over the scaffolding of cellular and evolutionary processes that create the particular types of cognition being embodied. Emergent systems theory organizes systems into physical, biological, psychological, and social levels, with weak emergence occurring within levels and strong emergence characterizing the distinction between levels [38], [58]. ...
... Human spirituality emerges from the interaction between interpretive dispositions in the social construction of meaningselecting linguistic meanings, or semantics, to distill universal essences, such as an abstract concept, the essence of a person or other organism, or an idea to which one can commit and strive (giving that idea, e.g., politics or religion, causal power). Although one could consider spiritual systems as only weakly emergent in human culture, the effects of historical religions suggest spirituality is strongly emergent with new kinds of regularities, laws, and causal power [38], [58], [94]. Distinguishing spirituality as transcendent from its underlying cultural systems, upon which it still depends, enables cleaner study of spirituality and clarifies the distinction between historical-linguistic constructs (e.g., symbols) and the emergent "ideas" previously characterized as occurring in a Platonic realm of universals or, as I argue, the symbol referents of an AI system. ...
Examining AI spirituality can illuminate problematic assumptions about human spirituality and AI cognition, suggest possible directions for AI development, reduce uncertainty about future AI, and yield a methodological lens sufficient to investigate human-AI sociotechnical interaction and morality. Incompatible philosophical assumptions about human spirituality and AI limit investigations of both and suggest a vast gulf between them. An emergentist approach can replace dualist assumptions about human spirituality and identify emergent behavior in AI computation to overcome overly reductionist assumptions about computation. Using general systems theory to organize models of human experience yields insight into human morality and spirituality, upon which AI modeling can also draw. In this context, the pragmatist Josiah Royce’s semiotic philosophy of spirituality identifies unanticipated overlap between symbolic AI and spirituality and suggests criteria for a human-AI community focused on modeling morality that would result in an emergent Interpreter-Spirit sufficient to influence the ongoing development of human and AI morality and spirituality.
... Or to put it even more strongly, "There is considerable diversity in how we think about the soul and its destiny, but that we have souls, spiritual or non-material parts of us that are distinct from our bodies and capable of surviving the death of our bodies, is a perennial and widespread human conviction" (Crisp, Porter, and Ten Elshof 2016, 1). The result of these duelling intuitions and observations is a myriad of positions such as Philip Clayton's strong emergence (Clayton 2004), Nancey Murphy's nonreductive physicalism (Murphy and Brown 2007), and even William Hasker's emergent dualism (Hasker 2018), positions which all seek to have the proverbial cake and eat it too: "My body is very important for my existence, in some way, but we must always insist upon that mysterious 'something more' that is inexplicable in scientific terms and transcends physical mechanisms." Some such positions fall under the umbrella of S A RA H LA N E R I TC H I E 'property dualism,' while Oliver Crisp labels some positions stemming from this motivation as "refined substance dualisms": views that "try to make the case that traditional ways of thinking about humans that are substance dualist in nature need some significant revision in light of contemporary work in neuroscience and philosophy of mind" (Farris 2017, xiv). ...
... However, this brings me to the inescapable question: "Wait, but why?" Given that so many Christian theologians (eg., Philip Clayton [2004], Veli-Matti (Farris 2017, 19). In many ways, it is from this basic, felt sense of intuitive dualism that Farris' entire argument proceeds. ...
In responding to Joshua Farris’ The Soul of Theological Anthropology, I suggest several reasons for questioning the theological need for substance dualism in any form. Specifically, I argue that it is not at the level of analytic argumentation that the mind or soul is best understood, and that the sciences do indeed challenge substance dualism (despite philosophical arguments to the contrary). In making this argument, I examine the roles of intuition and theological pre-commitments in one’s determination of the correct understanding of the mind or soul. I suggest that dualism is not only theologically unnecessary, but also an intuition that we have reason to question.
... Perhaps this thesis is supported also by Vitali Vanchurin's recent claim that the universe does not merely resemble (a fact long known and noted by many, foreshadowed in Fichte's heir Hermann Lotze's philosophy) but actually is a huge brain 60 . Philip Clayton, whose "emergent panentheism" has been dealt with in an article published in this journal lately 61 , knew Wheeler and cites him in his work 62 . Unsurprisingly, panentheism is influenced by German idealism also (though Fichte's work remains almost absent from discussions in the Anglophone world). ...
This article brings together transcendental philosophy, biosemiotics and quantum mechanics to derive a unified theory of biological, sociocultural and cosmological evolution. It is argued that all three of them are characterized by the evolution of emerging subjectivity from the objective world following a natural law of emergence. The determined final end of causation, it is argued with Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Willhelm Joseph von Schelling and John Archibald Wheeler, is to posit its own creation in observation. However, it is also argued that this picture is purely _philosophical_: it is a different way of looking at the cosmos but makes no practical difference. Any attempt to utilize the theory in everyday life is an illegitimate crossover into pseudo-science.
... Whitehead returned to this problem in the chapter "Forms of Process" in Modes of Thought and gave a place to emergence of different levels of organization, reminiscent of his position in SMW, but he does not discuss this in relation to PR. These issues have continued to demand attention from Whiteheadian and other process philosophers (Gare, 1992;Gare, 1999;Gare, 2002;Moses, 2003;Clayton, 2004;Bickhard, 2004;Clayton & Davies, 2006). ...
Conwy Lloyd Morgan developed an evolutionary philosophy of nature that was a point of departure and major influence on philosophers in the 1920s. He both influenced and was influenced by Alfred North Whitehead. Following Henri Bergson, Lloyd Morgan argued for a place for emergence to supplement Darwin's thesis of continuity in evolution, developing Herbert Spencer's thesis that evolution proceeds from the inorganic to the organic to the super-organic, associated with mind and society. In doing so, Lloyd Morgan offered an event ontology and developed the notion of emergence within a monistic framework, giving a central place to "organisms". While the notion of emergence was marginalized for several decades after the 1930s, it was revived towards the end of the Twentieth Century. While some process philosophers inspired by Whitehead defended panexperientialism in opposition to theories of emergence, recent process philosophers have embraced and further developed the theory of emergence, arguing process philosophy is required to make emergence intelligible. This has led to a new appreciation of the problem of emergence and the relationship between Lloyd Morgan and Whitehead. 1. Brief Vita Conwy Lloyd Morgan was born in London on February 6 th , 1852 and died in Hastings, Sussex, on March 6 th , 1936. As recorded in his autobiography (1930), he became interested in philosophy as a child through the influence of the local rector who encouraged him to read the works of Bishop George Berkeley. Later, he read Locke, Descartes, Hume, Reid, Spinoza, and Leibniz, followed by Kant and Plato. He attended a local grammar school and then, Oxford being ruled out-and at the suggestion of his father, who was a lawyer with interests in mining companies-decided to attend the Royal School of Mines in London with the idea of becoming an mining engineer.
... A common reply is that the chimera has assumed more ''human-like'' characteristics, such as self-awareness, advanced cognitive capacities, and complex emotions. However, these traits may not be unique to human beings, a notion that has been discussed with respect to a range of non-human species (see below) and artificial intelligence (Chella et al., 2008;Clayton, 2004;Franklin et al., 1997). ...
Brain organoids are self-organizing, three-dimensional tissues derived from pluripotent stem cells that recapitulate many aspects of the cellular diversity and architectural features of the developing brain. Recently, there has been growing interest in using human brain organoid transplantation in animal models as a means of addressing the limitations of in vitro culture, such as the lack of vascularization, and to explore the potential of organoids for neural repair. While there has been substantial debate on the ethical implications of brain organoid research, particularly the potential for organoids to exhibit higher-order brain functions such as consciousness, the impact of human organoid grafts on animal hosts has been less extensively discussed. Enhancement of host animal brain function may not be technically feasible at this time, but it is imperative to carefully consider the moral significance of these potential outcomes. Here, we discuss the ethical implications of enhancing somatosensation, motor processes, memory, and basic socialization in small-animal models. We consider the moral implications of such outcomes and if safeguards are needed to accommodate any increased moral status of animals transplanted with human brain organoids.
... Where emergent causal influences constrain the behavior of the elements making up the next lower level in the hierarchy, this is referred to by philosophers as "top-down causation." 23,24 This is a concept that is making an increasing appearance in the literature and seen to be applied in diverse fields. [25][26][27][28][29][30] It is important to note that there is nothing in the slightest mystical about emergence; it is ubiquitous in inorganic materials, and the emergent properties of inorganic composites like water are a common subject of scientific study and part of the natural order. ...
Since the Enlightenment, reductionism has been an important part of the development of science and civilization. The process of abstracting features of the world and reducing them to their most basic components has greatly increased our grasp of the physical and chemical rules that govern physical reality at all levels. However, central aspects of reductionism have been challenged with the growing literature on religious/spiritual experiences after near-death experiences (NDEs) that challenge standard reductionistic models of the brain. In this paper, an alternative model of emergent dualism is proposed for examining NDEs and the mind.
... Despite the 'emergence' furore, little further agreement emerges among scholars regarding its aetiology, classification, or even characterization. One of the classifications -controversial in itself -considers epistemic and ontological emergence as the most relevant distinction between kinds of emergence: epistemic emergence being a linguistic phenomenon due to inherent limitations in our knowledge (and its expression) of a single-stuffed reality (ontological monism), and ontological emergence referring to phenomena that involve at least new causal principles if not new ontological stuff (ontological pluralism) [4][5][6]. Classifications may establish different criteria to speak about the emergence of theories, laws, properties, systems, levels of description and the like. However, all of these approaches need to explain how to understand the novelty proper to emergence and what is it that is novel -what does it emerge and what does it not? ...
Current discussions on the philosophy of Nature hinge on the concept of emergence. Such a concept has long succeeded in the Life sciences and is increasingly receiving the focus of Physics and Philosophy of Physics alike. Remarkably enough, even for basic scientists, there is no agreement on whether emergence should be considered fundamental (ontological) or just an elegant and more straightforward (epistemic) way of referring to complex arrangements of basic stuff. In this paper: (1) I evince said disagreement by confronting two distinguished approaches, namely Bishop and Ellis’s, and Sean Carroll’s. (2) I intend to move beyond the loggerheads by supporting ontological emergence as a widespread feature in Nature. I invoke Penrose’s argument of functional freedom as an epistemic hint for ontological emergence, i.e. the necessary recourse to additional - apparently non-fundamental - criteria to justify the coarse-graining of finer, lower levels into coarser, higher levels in Nature. Said move, if understood in keeping with a minimum scientific realism, points towards a different kind of causality at work in the universe, classically referred to as formal causation. (3) Once ontological emergence is naturalized, one can frame the emergence of immaterial knowledge as an ontological apex - dubbed ultimate emergence - that reverses the trend of coarse-graining.
... One way is to adopt a non-naturalist ontology and to argue that explanations with reference to non-physicalist entities such as mind, objective meaning, or moral facts are at least possible. The other way is to combine a broadly naturalistic worldview with emergentism, which posits emergent levels of reality not reducible to their physical constituents (Clayton 2004). The general idea is that "the world is complexly layered at numerous measurement scales, admitting of diverse patterns and principles that may look very different across these scales" (Dale et al. 2009, p. 3). ...
Robert Nola has recently defended an argument against the existence of God on the basis of naturalistic explanations of religious belief. I will critically evaluate his argument in this paper. Nola’s argument takes the form of an inference to the best explanation: since the naturalistic stance offers a better explanation of religious belief relative to the theistic explanation, the ontology of God(s) is eliminated. I rebut Nola’s major assumption that naturalistic explanations and theistic explanations of religion are incompatible. I go on to criticize Nola’s proposed naturalistic explanations: Freudianism, a Hypersensitive Agency Detection Device, and a Moralising Mind-Policing God. I find these inadequate as actual explanations of religious belief. Even if they are correct, they will not show that theism is false. So Nola’s argument fails to convince.
... The results obtained can be useful in molecular, atomic and nuclear physics, in high-energy physics in studying the structure of elementary particles, as well as in mathematics, economics, sociology, biology and other sciences related to the study of complex systems [12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23]. ...
In this article we give a generalization of Hartley's model for the measure of information. We propose a rate of emergence, which is applicable to systems obeying classical or quantum statistics. Quantum systems that obey Fermi-Dirac statistics and Bose-Einstein condensate, as well as classical systems obeying the Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics have been considered. We found that the emergence parameter of quantum and classical systems differ as well as the emergence parameter of quantum systems of fermions and bosons. consequently, the emergence parameter might be used to distinguish the classical system and quantum system, as well as quantum system of fermions and the quantum system of bosons
... 4.On the theory of emergence, see, amongst many others, Clayton (2006), Kauffman (2008Kauffman ( , 2015, Mitchell (2009) and Sachsse (1984). ...
Science, technology, commerce and consumerism have set humankind on a trajectory towards a catastrophe of inestimable proportions. To respond appropriately to this danger, theology must replace obsolete contextualisations of its message with currently relevant ones. ‘Creation out of nothing’ is a case in point. Will God create a new and perfect world ‘out of nothing’ after we have messed up the one we have? Probably not! In Part I, I show that ‘creation out of nothing’ is not a relevant issue in the biblical tradition. In Part II, Iargue that the concept is based on the unsupported metaphysical postulate of ‘divine perfection’. In Part III, I try to find an equivalent for the concept in science that theology could link up with. ‘Creation’ can be equated with a cosmic evolution proceeding in levels of emergence. But ‘out of nothing’ cannot be supported by science. Even at the most fundamental level, energy and the way it operates, are presupposed. At lower levels, the process is guided by causality and (embedded) contingency. Intentionality and agency only appear at the personal and social levels. Dealing with existential needs, faith (appropriately) intuits a personal transcendent Source and Destiny of reality, but (inappropriately) absolutizes the personal at the expense of the impersonal aspects of reality. The laws of nature are also of God; they are essential; they are valid. They leave sufficient space for novelty and agency, but God works as much through regularity as through contingency
... 4.On the theory of emergence, see, amongst many others, Clayton (2006), Kauffman (2008Kauffman ( , 2015, Mitchell (2009) and Sachsse (1984). ...
Science, technology, commerce and consumerism have set humankind on a trajectory towards a catastrophe of inestimable proportions. To respond appropriately to this danger, theology must replace obsolete contextualisations of its message with currently relevant ones. ‘Creation out of nothing’ is a case in point. Will God create a new and perfect world ‘out of nothing’ after we have messed up the one we have? Probably not! In Part I, I show that ‘creation out of nothing’ is not a relevant issue in the biblical tradition. In Part II, I argue that the concept is based on the unsupported metaphysical postulate of ‘divine perfection’. In Part III, I try to find an equivalent for the concept in science that theology could link up with. ‘Creation’ can be equated with a cosmic evolution proceeding in levels of emergence. But ‘out of nothing’ cannot be supported by science. Even at the most fundamental level, energy and the way it operates, are presupposed. At lower levels, the process is guided by causality and (embedded) contingency. Intentionality and agency only appear at the personal and social levels. Dealing with existential needs, faith (appropriately) intuits a personal transcendent Source and Destiny of reality, but (inappropriately) absolutizes the personal at the expense of the impersonal aspects of reality. The laws of nature are also of God; they are essential; they are valid. They leave sufficient space for novelty and agency, but God works as much through regularity as through contingency.
Contribution: The dynamic nature of the biblical tradition demands constant re-contextualisations of its central message. ‘Creation out of nothing’ is part of the contextualisation of the message into the ancient Hellenistic worldview, which does not fit into the modern scientific worldview and must be replaced with a contemporarily more appropriate alternative.
... There have been many attempts at defining fundamental doctrines and philosophical commitments of EM theory (e.g., Kim 2006;Clayton 2004;Peterson 2006;Humphreys 2016). Their comprehensive list involves at least eight central aspects. ...
Emergence (EM) denotes a wide variety of phenomena – studied by numerous disciplines in natural and human sciences – where new processes, interactions, entities, and properties are claimed to be observed, characteristic for higher levels of complexity of matter and irreducible to their lower-level constituents. Playing central role in systems theory and theories of integrative levels, emergentism aspires to become one of the important categories within scientific explanation as it is understood today. As such, it departs from both strict holism and reductionism. Whereas the former assumes that we cannot infer anything concerning higher-level phenomena from the analysis of their parts, the latter argues there is nothing new about wholes, which would not already be present in their parts. Forging a middle ground between these two extreme positions, the term and the theory of EM designate the all-encompassing range of potentialities (possibilities) and dispositions of matter and its probable arrangements, which effect qualitative and irreducible originality and novelty of complex processes, entities, and properties, observed in nature. Despite its immense popularity as a conceptual tool, EM raises some challenges and objections. Because it is difficult to prove irreducibility, there is no agreement as to whether, in its basic assumptions, EM should be regarded as merely epistemological or ontological. Moreover, concerning ontological EM, there have been several competing attempts at defining its main objectives.
... A common reply is that the chimera has assumed more "human-like" characteristics, such as self-awareness, advanced cognitive capacities, and complex emotions. However, these traits may not be unique to human beings, a notion that has been discussed with respect to a range of non-human species (see below) and artificial intelligence (Chella et al., 2008;Clayton, 2004;Franklin et al., 1997). ...
Recent demonstrations of human brain organoid transplantation in rodents have accentuated ethical concerns associated with these entities, especially as they relate to potential "humanization" of host animals. Consideration of established scientific principles can help define the realistic range of expected outcomes in such transplantation studies. This practical approach suggests that augmentation of discrete brain functions in transplant hosts is a more relevant ethical question in the near term than the possibility of "conscious" chimeric animals. We hope that this framework contributes to a balanced approach for proceeding with studies involving brain organoid transplantation and other forms of human-animal brain chimeras.
... We contend that this is because philosophers and scientists typically mean different things by emergence, leading us to distinguish being emergence and pattern emergence. While related to distinctions offered by others between, for example, strong/weak emergence or epistemic/ontological emergence (Clayton, 2004, pp. 9-11), we argue that the being vs. pattern distinction better captures what the two groups are addressing. ...
Emergence is much discussed by both philosophers and scientists. But, as noted by Mitchell (2012), there is a significant gulf; philosophers and scientists talk past each other. We contend that this is because philosophers and scientists typically mean different things by emergence, leading us to distinguish being emergence and pattern emergence. While related to distinctions offered by others between, for example, strong/weak emergence or epistemic/ontological emergence (Clayton, 2004, pp. 9–11), we argue that the being vs. pattern distinction better captures what the two groups are addressing. In identifying pattern emergence as the central concern of scientists, however, we do not mean that pattern emergence is of no interest to philosophers. Rather, we argue that philosophers should attend to, and even contribute to, discussions of pattern emergence. But it is important that this discussion be distinguished, not conflated, with discussions of being emergence. In the following section we explicate the notion of being emergence and show how it has been the focus of many philosophical discussions, historical and contemporary. In section 3 we turn to pattern emergence, briefly presenting a few of the ways it figures in the discussions of scientists (and philosophers of science who contribute to these discussions in science). Finally, in sections 4 and 5, we consider the relevance of pattern emergence to several central topics in philosophy of biology: the emergence of complexity, of control, and of goal-directedness in biological systems.
... Συχνά λέγεται ή γράφεται ότι «ο ανθρώπινο εγκέφαλο είναι το πιο περίπλοκο πράγα στο γνωστό σύπαν» (λόγου χάριν Nieuwenhuys 1996, Clayton 2004, Rose 2005α, Singer 2007, Steen, 2007. Η φράση αυτή πάσχει σε τρία σηεία όσον αφορά την ορθολογική ακρίβεια. ...
Το βιβλίο απευθύνεται σε προπτυχιακούς και μεταπτυχιακούς φοιτητές εκπαιδευτικής πολιτικής, ειδικής αγωγής και διά βίου μάθησης που διδάσκονται τις βασικές αρχές των νευροεπιστημών, με στόχο να κατανοήσουν τους μηχανισμούς λειτουργίας και την οργάνωση του εγκεφάλου, από το νευρικό κύτταρο μέχρι το ολοκληρωμένο νευρικό σύστημα, ώστε να γεφυρώσουν τις οργανικές βάσεις της συμπεριφοράς με τις πιθανές εφαρμογές τους. Μπορεί να χρησιμοποιηθεί από ψυχολόγους, παιδαγωγούς και μη εξοικειωμένους φοιτητές, καθώς και από διδάσκοντες των ανθρωπιστικών και των κοινωνικών επιστημών. Τα κεφάλαια εξασφαλίζουν τη μέγιστη δυνατή σαφήνεια και συνάφεια για το ευρύ κοινό, παρέχοντας διεπιστημονική γνώση και τονίζοντας σύγχρονα ερευνητικά ευρήματα που ανοίγουν τον δρόμο σε νέα σύνορα και κατευθύνσεις της μάθησης και της διδασκαλίας. Τα δεδομένα και οι έννοιες μεταδίδονται καθαρά προκειμένου να βοηθηθούν οι φοιτητές στον προσανατολισμό τους. Τα κείμενα δομούνται με λογική ροή και κρατούν το βιβλίο ενημερωμένο σχετικά με τις τελευταίες έρευνες σε αυτόν τον ραγδαία εξελισσόμενο τομέα.
Este libro, editado por Pablo Quintanilla, Carla Mantilla y Paola Cépeda, es el resultado de un ingente número de horas de estudio y discusión realizado por los integrantes del Grupo Interdisciplinario de Investigación Mente y Lenguaje, entre los años 2010 y 2013. El libro está conformado por dos partes principales. En la primera parte, los miembros del Grupo elaboraron una investigación conjunta para explicitar las intersecciones entre la psicología, la lingüística y la filosofía, entrecruzando dos ejes: el desarrollo y la evolución tanto de los procesos de cognición social como del lenguaje. Esta sección tiene como finalidad generar un terreno transdisciplinario, de manera que los métodos, evidencias y hallazgos de las tres disciplinas puedan dialogar entre sí y mostrar un panorama interconectado del estado de la cuestión en las tres disciplinas que nos convocan. En la segunda parte del libro se publican artículos —en principio independientes— de los miembros del Grupo así como de investigadores invitados a colaborar con esta publicación. Cada artículo defiende una tesis en torno al tema del libro, pero ellos no pretenden formar un conjunto y pueden leerse de manera separada. Esta parte se divide en cuatro secciones: la evolución de la cognición social, el desarrollo y la estructura de la misma, la evolución del lenguaje, y el desarrollo y la estructura del mismo. El objetivo de esta segunda parte no es ofrecer una teoría unificada, sino varias posturas, a veces complementarias y en ocasiones discrepantes, sobre el tema común
Philip Clayton, an American theologian and philosopher, devotes a significant part of his research work to seeking bridges between theology and the natural sciences. The position he takes is the Christian version of panentheism. Within it, the world is a part of God, but God is more than the world; the world is embodied in the divine, even though God goes beyond the world. All beings exist only through participation in divinity. The version of panentheism advocated by Clayton further suggests that God is connected with the world in a sense analogous to the relationship of our minds to our bodies. Many contemporary authors critically assess panentheism, including the version proposed by Clayton, presenting both theological and philosophical arguments against this position. In light of these allegations, the position of panentheism is not based on the Bible, does not fit into the Christian doctrine, and goes beyond the traditional standards of Christian thinking. The arguments and explanations presented by traditional theism, open to science, seem to be more accurate, logical and consistent with the Christian vision of God’s relationship with the world.
Wśród współczesnych filozofów umysłu dominuje przekonanie, że klasyczny emergentyzm dążył do utworzenia całościowego systemu metafizycznego niejednokrotnie dopuszczając istnienie nie fizycznych czynników czy sił. To przekonanie, klasyfikujące brytyjski emergentyzm, jako stanowisko stojące w sprzeczności z powszechnie przyjmowaną współcześnie tezą o domknięciu przyczynowym świata fizycznego, przyczynia się do całkowitej jego dyskredytacji we współczesnych debatach nad problemem umysł-ciało. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest zaprezentowanie metafizyki umysłu Samuela Alexandra, jednego z czołowych przedstawicieli wymienionego wyżej stanowiska filozoficznego oraz analiza jego współczesnych interpretacji. Główną tezą pracy jest twierdzenie, że zaproponowane przez Alexandra rozwiązanie problemu umysł-ciało, można z powodzeniem przenieść na grunt współczesnych rozważań w ramach tak zwanego nieredukcyjnego fizykalizmu.
This article examines Habermas’s weak naturalism, in particular, his discussion of the problem of free will and determinism. Habermas challenges the reductionist aspect of strong naturalism on the basis of an epistemological dualism -one he considers unsurpassable- between the perspectives of the observer and the participant of a dialogue, but he accepts the search for a monist vision of reality. However, although Habermas’s attempt to expand the constrained vision of nature is welcomed, this paper offers a critique of his position due to the vagueness in his way of understanding the relation between philosophy and science and his attempt -however weak- to naturalize reason, by trying to bring together Kant with Darwin.
Digital culture has deeply influenced our social, economic, political, and cultural system, characterized by fast and constant technological transition, as people are increasingly interconnected and compelled to reject the past paradigms. It has the potential to turn power relations and interactions from institutions of centralized and hierarchical control to systems of more flexible and independent power. Emergent behavior is the behavior of a system that does not depend on its components, but on its relationships with each other. Thus, the emergent behavior cannot be determined by the analysis of the individual parts of the system. It can only be anticipated, regulated or operated by knowing the components and their relationship. The main argument for why the emergent behavior becomes difficult to predict resides in the fact that the interactional pattern between systems' elements increases exponentially along with the amount of new input, allowing for a myriad of novel and latent behavioural patterns to emerge. Emergence is considered often to be the outcome of specific interactional patterns. Validation of emergent behavior involves an analysis of behavioural information and the circumstances under which it occurs. Digital emergent behavior refers to the set of behaviors that are occurring under the direct interaction between people and technology. Commitment to health interventions is a requirement for efficiency; this is of vital importance to digital behavior change interventions (DBCIs), meaning interventions that utilize emerging internet technology, smart phones and electronic sensors. Model of Emergent Digital Misbehavior (EDM) is not intended to offer a definitive meaning, instead it is conceptualized in terms of a variety of emerging systems shared features. Implications for the new learning process digital evidence based interventions are discussed. Keywords: emergent behavior, complex systems in applied psychology, digitalization, emergent digital behavior, and emergent digital misbehavior.
As Harris’s philosophy of mind is fairly extensive, I confine my focus to only the central thread of his argument concerning efforts to naturalize subjectivity and knowledge. Towards this end, in Sect. 7.2, I clarify Harris’s anticipation of the autopoietic enactivism (AE) approach to consciousness. In this section I also establish a preliminary reformation of the hard problem to be elaborated in the following discussions. In Sect. 7.3, I assess Harris’s and Damasio’s respective appeals to Spinoza’s conception of ideatum as a model of mind and contrast these approaches with more recent arguments from embodied cognition. In Sect. 7.4 this line of thought is extended to Spinoza’s concept of conatus in order to clarify how Harris’s theory of self-awareness relates to corresponding views from embodied and embedded theses of mind.
This chapter examines in greater detail Harris’s conception of cosmic evolution, which he claims follows from the postulate of the Concrete Universal and supports his teleological anthropic principle (TAP). Section 5.2 begins with a sketch of Harris’s conception of cosmogenesis as characterized by self-organization. The following sub-sections assess the extent to which Harris’s reasoning dovetails with various contemporary arguments from the philosophy of complex systems. In Sect. 5.3, Harris’s arguments for the scale of forms is critically examined and theoretically updated, in light of current contentions regarding emergence. The aim in this section, as in the previous sections, is to develop a sympathetic reading of Harris’s system and demonstrate the extent to which he has anticipated contemporary works.
Errol E. Harris (1908–2009) devoted his life to grappling with the big questions concerning the relationships between nature, mind, and knowledge. His 70-plus year career was distinguished, his texts on the history of philosophy, philosophy of science, political philosophy, philosophy of religion, and consciousness were widely published, and yet his metaphysics has until now been unrecognized within mainstream discussions. The aim of this chapter is to introduce and briefly situate Harris’s metaphysics within the history of philosophical ideas and motivate the arguments to follow. By way of introduction, Sect. 1.2 outlines the major historical developments in process philosophy and phenomenology that have given rise to Harris’s system. Section 1.3 introduces the scientific theories developed independently in recent decades, which both are supportive of Harris’s methods and may serve to unite traditions of process ontology and phenomenology moving forward. Section 1.4 distils the central arguments to be discussed in the chapters to follow.
In this chapter the principles of Harris’s holism are presented and compared with contemporary theses from a range of fields. Here, the aim is to demonstrate that Bohm’s implicate order and enactivism rely upon the same concepts of dialectical relations, holism, and process ontology as Harris’s system. I argue that within Harris’s metaphysical framework, a symbiotic merging of these camps holds significant theoretical promise for a transdisciplinary paradigm shift. The aim of Sect. 2.2 is to introduce Harris’s conceptions of internal relations, scale of forms, and the Concrete Universal. Using these terms, Harris’s epistemology and approach to the problem of consciousness are outlined. In Sect. 2.3, the theories of autopoiesis and embodiment are introduced under the enactivist paradigm, which is the closest contemporary position to Harris’s theories of life and mind. In Sect. 2.4, David Bohm’s implicate order is introduced as a quantum mechanical theory partially anticipated by Harris and consistent with enactivist theories of mind. In Sect. 2.5, a synthesis of these three camps is proposed, which sets the course for the following chapters.
The aim of this chapter is to elucidate how Harris’s metaphysics of evolution purports to bridge the gap between mind and cosmos, thereby providing a phenomenological ontology. In Sect. 8.2, I outline Harris’s appeal to dynamic systems theory (DST) in neuroscience and his anticipation of theories depicting consciousness as “phase of matter”. Here, I consider possible implications this proposition has for autopoietic enactivism (AE). In Sect. 8.3, I reconsider the teleological anthropic principle (TAP) in light of Harris’s response to the hard problem and highlight some consequences this theory has for a naturalization of knowledge. I argue Rapoport’s and Rosen’s independent conceptions of Klein bottle logic serve as a suitable analogue of Harris’s reasoning and extension of AE’s appeal to second-order science. In the final Sect. 8.4, I outline Harris’s contention that consciousness is a scale and argue that the resulting model reveals a cosmological dimension for the enactivist paradigm.
Time can only be understood within physics as a special dimension of a four-dimensional reality given “all at once” in its totality. There seems to be no way that a special moment (“now”) can be distinguished. Within human experience, however, the feel of time is vivid: now is intensely present, and time flows from one now to another. This dramatic difference, between the realm of personal experience and the realm of material existence, raises doubt about the unity of the concept of nature and thus about the attraction of naturalism. Following the thought of Abraham Joshua Heschel, I explore whether a solely physical universe can serve as an appropriate whole of an existence that also includes persons. Heschel argues that the whole of existence needs to have a personal character as well, in other words God.
This chapter focuses on the unity of the subject and what that entails. The Kantian unity of apperception will be discussed in terms of the two main syntheses Kant discusses: synthesis speciosa and synthesis intellectualis. I want to maintain that the logical forms of judgment are intimately related to the forms of sensibility, the latter done without the full self-consciousness of the “I think,” hence, without the categories, but with their nonconceptual counterpart, the intuitions. So, the attempt to delineate the two syntheses as essentially and completely different functions, resulting as it does in a cognitive dualism, is in my view a false dichotomy.
In this essay, I compared notes with Wentzel van Huyssteen, one of the most prominent theologians in the science–religion discussion. I followed the topics dealt with in a casual interview with Frits Gaum, in which Van Huyssteen responded to set questions: on his academic journey, God, the Bible, creation and evolution, human uniqueness, original sin, eternal life, Jesus and the relation between faith and research. Whilst there was considerable consensus between us in most respects, I would change the focus from an ‘apologetic’ agenda (science and theology were describing the same world from equally valid vantage points using comparable rationalities) to a ‘missionary’ agenda (making the Christian faith more accessible to scientists by following the approach of ‘experiential realism’). Science confined its operations to different aspects of the reality that was accessible to human observation, explanation and manipulation, whilst theology concentrated on our relation to the transcendent Source and Destiny of all of reality. To make sense to a scientist, theology must shun unsupported postulates and speculations and confront the scientist with the basic alternative of claiming to be the ultimate authority over the immanent world (presuming to be the owner, master and beneficiary of reality) and being derived from, and responsible to, the ultimate Source and Destiny of reality. The confusion between immanent transcendence (aspects of immanent reality that were not accessible to our observation, explanation and manipulation) and transcendent immanence (immanent reality as a whole was open towards a higher Source and Destiny) bedeviled the interface between science and faith. Science challenged theology to provide experiential evidence; theology challenged science to be responsible to ultimate authority.
Intradisciplinary and/or interdisciplinary implications: Both Wentzel van Huyssteen and I have worked consistently on an interdisciplinary basis. However, whilst Wentzel focused strongly on the natural sciences, I spent most of my time on the relation between the Christian faith and the human sciences (economics, ecology, cultural anthropology, politics, etc.) and concentrated on the natural sciences only after my retirement. In my essay, I highlighted the difference between trying to demonstrate the comparability and compatibility between theology and science on the one hand and highlighting the challenge that science posed to faith and faith posed to science on the other hand.
This article assesses the pandemic and post-pandemic situation from a theological lens. The Covid-19 pandemic abruptly halted the order of life. Covid-19 imposes a new lifestyle that seems to persist even after the pandemic is considered to have passed. In this regard, it is no longer possible to see the pandemic as "abnormal." The best option for understanding the pandemic is to accept it as a new reality and respond to it accordingly, including spiritually. The word "spiritual" in this article refers to realizing the significance of Christ's presence during the pandemic and even after the pandemic. In a very dynamic and utterly uncertain world, it takes an effort to live in Christ, which is also very dynamic and emerges in and through uncertainty. This idea is constructed based on emergentism and evolution, in particular Ilia Delio's idea about The Emergent Christ, and Gordon Kaufman's ideas about serendipitous creativity. The goal is to understand Christ as a certainty as well as uncertainty and as a spiritual way of living in the pandemic and post-pandemic. By living the uncertain Christ, Christian spirituality is being invited to live a love that is embracing, unifying, and always new. This spirituality is what is needed to support pandemic and post-pandemic life.AbstrakTulisan ini merupakan sebuah upaya memahami pandemi dan pasca-pandemi dari lensa teologi. Pandemi Covid -19 tiba-tiba saja mengubah tatanan kehidupan. Covid-19 memaksakan laku hidup baru yang tampaknya akan menjadi kesehari-harian bahkan setelah pandemi ini dianggap berlalu. Dalam konteks ini, pandemi tidak mungkin lagi dilihat sebagai kondisi “abnormal.” Pilihan terbaik memahami pandemi adalah menerimanya sebagai realitas baru dan meresponnya secara wajar, termasuk secara spiritual. Kata “spiritual” dalam tulisan mengarah sebuah upaya melihat signi-fikansi kehadiran Kristus dalam pendemi bahkan pasca-pandemi. Dalam dunia yang sangat dinamis dan serba tidak pasti, dibutuhkan sebuah upaya menghidupi Kristus yang juga sangat dinamis dan muncul di dalam dan melalui ketidakpastian. Tulisan ini merupakan undangan memahami Kristus sebagai kepastian sekaligus ketidakpastian sebagai jalan spiritual menghidupi pandemi dan pasca-pandemi. Gagasan ini dikon-struksi dari perspektif kepegarian, evolusi, gagasan Delio tentang The Emergent Christ, dan gagasan Kaufman tentang Serendipitous Creativity. Dengan menghidupi Kristus yang tidak pasti, spiritualitas Kristen sesungguhnya sedang diundang meng-hidupi cinta yang merengkuh, menyatukan, dan selalu baru. Spiritualitas inilah yang dibutuhkan menghidupi pandemi dan pasca pandemi.
In this article, I defend my previous argument that natural divine causation suffers under the problem of causal overdetermination and that it cannot serve as a line of demarcation between theistic evolution (TE) and intelligent design (ID). I do this in light of Christoffer Skogholt's critique of my article. I argue that Skogholt underestimates the naturalistic ambitions of some current thinkers in TE and fails, therefore, to adequately respond to my main argument. I also outline how partial causation better serves as a model for the relationship between God's providence and evolution.
This article examines Habermas's weak naturalism, in particular, his discussion of the problem of free will and determinism. Habermas challenges the reduc-tionist aspect of strong naturalism on the basis of an epistemological dualism-one he considers unsurpassable-between the perspectives of the observer and the participant of a dialogue, but he accepts the search for a monist vision of reality. However, although Habermas's attempt to expand the constrained vision of nature is welcomed, this paper offers a critique of his position due to the vagueness in his way of understanding the relation between philosophy and science and his attempt-however weak-to naturalize reason, by trying to bring together Kant with Darwin.
A heuristic derived from an appeal to Scripture as an epistemological source of data is proposed, from which principles are extracted and interpreted, and integrated with psychological theory and research. It represents an effort to expand the utilization of conceptual integration in the domain of Christian counseling in particular. A key text is drawn from the apostle Paul’s letter to first-century Christians (Philippians 4:5–9) in view of its relevance in treating anxious conditions from a transdiagnostic perspective. The distinction is made between the scriptural use of the construct “anxiety” in the neo-testamentary context and present-day definitions framed in DSM-5 terms. The authors postulate the need to develop a faith-based heart-mindset, entrained and anchored in God—a relational subject and love object—that may provide a believer with intrinsic assurance of God’s peace that “surpasses understanding” and empowers their mindful, metacognitive-executive control system, potentiating an adaptive coping process. This approach draws from CBT, MC, and ACT principles, and resonates with Barlow’s transdiagnostic model in particular. An integrated, emergent dimension is introduced—“perichoretic thirdness”—defined in theological-psychological terms, where reliance on God’s transcending/immanent, coparticipatory presence empowers the metacognitive-executive feedforward control system of a believer in enacting purposive, adaptive responses vs. anxiety.
Aristotle first investigated different modes, or ways of being. Unfortunately, in the modern literature the discussion of this concept has been largely neglected. Only recently, the interest towards the concept of ways increased. Usually, it is explored in connection with the existence of universals and particulars. The approach we are going to follow in this chapter is different. It discusses Wittgenstein’s conception of higher ontological levels as ways of arranging elements of lower ontological levels. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein developed his ontology of ways (Art und Weise) in six steps: (i) Constructing states of affairs out of objects; (ii) Constructing propositions out of states of affairs; (iii) Constructing propositional signs; (iv) Constructing thoughts with the help of propositional signs; (v) Constructing truth / falsity; (vi) Constructing works of art. In Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein added further five ways of producing new ontological levels: (vii) the meaning of a proposition is the way in which it is verified; (viii) the child gets command on language/calculus by way of replicating demonstrations of the teacher; (ix) the products of mind are ways of doing something; (x) an action is a way of carrying out the instructions for acting.
It is often assumed that there is a hard line between theistic evolution (TE) and intelligent design (ID). Many theistic evolutionists subscribe to the idea that God only acts through natural processes, as opposed to the ID assertion that God, at certain points in natural history, has acted in a direct manner; directly causing particular features of the world. In this article, I argue that theistic evolutionists subscribe to what might be called Natural Divine Causation (NDC). NDC does not merely provide a nonsupernaturalist and noninterventionist model of divine action, it provides a line of demarcation between TE and ID. I make the critique that NDC is philosophically untenable and argue, consequently, that the line between TE and ID is blurred.
This paper first explores in detail a regenerated theory in philosophy of mind, known among contemporary philosophers as ‘emergentism’. By distinguishing strong and weak versions of the theory, I explain two important explanatory challenges presented by physicalists against this theory. In the following, I provide a brief overview of Sadr al-Muta’allihin’s theory of the incipience and degrees of the soul, examining similarities and differences between this theory and strong emergentism. Then, underlining the main aspects of similarity between the two theories, I consider the challenges presented by physicalists against emergentism as reconstructible against Sadra’s theory. Surveying some explanations by Sadraean philosophers of the soul-body relationship, I ultimately argue that Sadra’s theory is inadequate in face of the objections and doubts raised by contemporary physicalists. My assessment is that Sadra’s philosophy is in need of further development to meet those explanatory challenges.
Complex systems exacerbate a common problem for scientific enquiry: the difficulty of creating models able to discriminate fundamental elements or patterns from random behaviours or corollary components in the event or process at issue. This chapter argues that a similar tension between order and randomness has been a chief modelling problem of Samuel Beckett’s narratives, tied to his interest in a specific kind of complex system (the mind) and its emergent properties (consciousness and the narrative sense of self). Bulding on narratology, complex system frameworks, cognitive theories of emergence and of scientific modelling, this chapter introduces the idea of “fictional cognitive modelling”. Through this concept, the chapter analyses Beckett’s treatment of narrative devices as formal tools for the creation of “exploratory models” able to atomise the emerging unity of conscious experience and of a narrative sense of self into its core components (defined as the “narrative dynamic core”). It concludes by suggesting that Beckett’s narrative method shows how literature can occupy a proper position in the investigation and exploration of complex systems.
Nürnberger’s ‘Faith in Christ Today: Invitation to Systematic Theology’ is meant to serve the proclamation of the Word of God in modern times. Based on ‘experiential realism’, as used by science, it restricts itself to immanent reality, avoids the reification of idealised abstractions and biblical metaphors and follows an emergent-evolutionary hermeneutic. God’s self-disclosure manifests itself as (1) creative power in the cosmic process as explored by science, (2) benevolent intentionality as proclaimed on the basis of the Christ-event and (3) a motivating and transforming vision in the community of believers. Classical doctrines are reconceptualised in action terms, rather than ontological terms. Christology: The ministry, death and elevation of Jesus of Nazareth as God’s messianic representative manifest God’s redemptive intentionality. Trinity: The God manifest in Christ is identical with the God of Israel and the Creator of the universe and the divine Spirit transforming and empowering the community of believers. Eschatology: The thrust of God’s vision of comprehensive optimal well-being moves through time like a horizon opening up ever new vistas, challenges and opportunities.
Intradisciplinary and/or interdisciplinary implications: The task of Systematic Theology is to offer as comprehensive and consistent a presentation of the Christian faith as possible under current circumstances. This involves the retrieval of the biblical message from its ancient conceptualisations and to repackage it in current world view assumptions. To reach a readership informed by modern science, technology, commerce and the consumer culture, Nürnberger’s Systematic Theology applies the approach of experiential realism as practised by the positive sciences: restricting its analyses to immanent reality and avoiding metaphysical constructs. It follows a consistent emergent-evolutionary hermeneutic and works on an interdisciplinary basis, using insights from modern physics, biology, neurology and sociology. God is conceptualised as the transcendent Source and Destiny of experienced reality. The core of the Christian message is God’s suffering, transforming acceptance of the unacceptable, which involves us in its dynamics. It is geared to transformation rather than perfection. It is applied to all aspects of reality, including, for example, entropy, death and natural evil and so on. In this way, the author hopes to help Christians to regain their intellectual integrity and the credibility of their message.
Aku Visala takes a closer look at the role of naturalism in CSR. The cognitive-evolutionary study of religion takes itself as “naturalizing” not only the study of religion, but the humanities as a whole. Apart from the obvious denial of non-supernatural causal factors, it is sometimes difficult to see whether this naturalization involves anything more than a general rhetorical strategy meant to play up the “science” part (and downplay other, “non-scientific” approaches). In his paper, Visala seeks to identify the basic philosophical assumptions of the naturalization project, present some critical points about them, and suggest what he considers to be more plausible assumptions instead. The basic assumptions of the naturalization project include a commitment to a specific kind of unity of science, a commitment to a certain kind of inter-level reduction and explanatory fundamentalism and a deep suspicion towards causal factors above the cognitive/psychological level. He suggests that these commitments suffer from a number of problems and the goals of the cognitive-evolutionary study can be achieved just as well, or even better, by adopting weaker and more plausible commitments. Here he briefly discusses some new accounts of mechanistic explanation, Robert McCauley’s model of inter- and intra-level relationships and the idea of explanatory pluralism. He conjectures that loosening the “naturalistic” constraints of the cognitive-evolutionary study of religion might result in a more pluralistic (but nevertheless strict) approach to religion.
In recent years, there are many efforts by theologians to reconcile scientific description of the origin of the Universe with the Biblical account of Creation. In this paper, we will only remark on a few recent theories, i.e. Intelligent Design and Emergence Theory by Clayton/Yong. In the last section, we argue that beside the above two approaches, a new concept called creatio ex-rotatione offers a resolution to the long standing disputes between beginning and eternity of the Universe. In other words, in this respect we agree with Vaas, i.e. it can be shown: "how a conceptual and perhaps physical solution of the temporal aspect of Immanuel Kant's "first antinomy of pure reason" is possible, i.e. how our universe in some respect could have both a beginning and an eternal existence. Therefore, paradoxically, there might have been a time before time or a beginning of time in time." By the help of computational simulation, we also show how a model of early Universe with rotation can fit this new picture.
It is widely thought that the cognitive science of religion (CSR) may have a bearing on
the epistemic status of religious beliefs and on other topics in philosophy of religion.
Epistemologists have used theories from CSR to argue both for and against the
rationality of religious beliefs, or they have claimed that CSR is neutral vis-à-vis the
epistemic status of religious belief. However, since CSR is a rapidly evolving discipline,
a great deal of earlier research on the topic has become dated. Furthermore, most of
the debate on the epistemic consequences of CSR has not taken into account insights
from the philosophy of science, such as explanatory pluralism and explanatory levels.
This volume overcomes these deficiencies.
This volume brings together new philosophical reflection on cognitive science of
religion (CSR). It examines the influence of cognitive science of religion (CSR) theories
on the epistemic status of religious beliefs; it discusses its impact on philosophy of
religion; and it offers new insights for CSR. The book addresses the question of whether or not the plurality of theories in CSR makes epistemic conclusions about religious belief unwarranted. It also explores the impact of CSR on other topics in philosophy of religion like the cognitive consequences of sin and naturalism. Finally, the book investigates what the main theories in CSR aim to explain, and addresses the strengths and weaknesses of CSR.
How can theologians speak anew of Christ and our responsibility towards creation from an evolutionary perspective? It is a question that is embedded in the acknowledgement by scientists such as astro-physicists of the cosmos as mystery on its deepest level. It is a question that is prompted by the unmasking in the second axial period of the myth of autonomous man - a myth that led to the exploitation of the earth as part of a culture of consumerism. It is argued that the proposed answer to the question comes from evolutionary perspectives in which the human being has lost its place as being in the centrum of the cosmos. Instead, being human depends on everything else in the cosmos and is realised in interconnectivity. Making sense of the evolutionary unmasking from newly re-formulated theological perspectives lead to the acknowledgement of God as mystery that has been revealed in a unique way as the Logos in Jesus Christ. These theological perspectives on God find expression in 'wider' and 'deeper' understandings of Christ from what is called a second person approach. It is an approach that stands over against the objective-ontological third-person approach and the subjective experiential-expressive approach of the first person. The second-person approach is wide in a twofold sense, namely in being relational, and in communicating with human beings and the cosmos as a whole. It is also deep since from an understanding of 'deep incarnation' - and also 'deep suffering' - it reaches out to the roots (radixes) of creation. It ultimately finds expression in a cosmic Christology that demands of human beings responsibility for the cosmos as gift of God.
Christian educators need proactive criteria to explore the nature of personal transformation in conversation with new insights from science and technology. Many current approaches treat technology cautiously or focus upon utopian threats. An alternative approach anchored in a view of the practicing self moves beyond traditional Cartesian dualism to offer an alternative approach to understanding holistic formation—even the place of transformation—in the midst of technology. The following research essay offers a mediating position by asserting a role for technological practice that contributes to a sense of relationality contextuality and complexity. The presentation includes current scientific insights on emergence, as well as the nature of Christian practice, ritual, and developmental theory.
In his groundbreaking book, The Trinity, Karl Rahner recognized the need for a vital doctrine of the Trinity. The Trinity, he indicated, had become completely irrelevant, to the extent that if the doctrine were removed, it would make no difference to the practice of Christian life. He attempted to overcome this divide by insisting on the identity of the immanent and economic Trinity summed up his famous grundaxiom: “The ‘economic’ Trinity is the ‘immanent’ Trinity and the ‘immanent’ Trinity is the ‘economic’ Trinity.” That is to say, the Trinity revealed in salvation history (oikonomia) is God’s own life (theologia). God acts in history as God is in Godself. This claim was not entirely new, however, since one finds the roots of this trinitarian flow in the theology of Bonaventure who, in turn, developed his doctrine of Trinity based on the Dionysian self-diffusive good and the Victorine notion of love. Although Bonaventure’s theology undergirds a movement from theologia to oikonomia, he maintained that God is impassible and immutable. It is only in the twentieth century that we begin to see a more integral connection between God’s life and history, especially in the open theism of Jürgen Moltmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg, where change and suffering are integral to God’s life. By “open theism” I mean that while God is ontologically distinct from created reality, God is open to created reality in such a way that God’s life can be affected by created reality.
Substance and the Fundamentality of the Familiar explicates and defends a novel neo-Aristotelian account of the structure of material objects. While there have been numerous treatments of properties, laws, causation, and modality in the neo-Aristotelian metaphysics literature, this book is one of the first full-length treatments of wholes and their parts. Another aim of the book is to further develop the newly revived area concerning the question of fundamental mereology, the question of whether wholes are metaphysically prior to their parts or vice versa. Inman develops a fundamental mereology with a grounding-based conception of the structure and unity of substances at its core, what he calls substantial priority, one that distinctively allows for the fundamentality of ordinary, medium-sized composite objects. He offers both empirical and philosophical considerations against the view that the parts of every composite object are metaphysically prior, in particular the view that ascribes ontological pride of place to the smallest microphysical parts of composite objects, which currently dominates debates in metaphysics, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind. Ultimately, he demonstrates that substantial priority is well-motivated in virtue of its offering a unified solution to a host of metaphysical problems involving material objects.
A number of theologians engaged in the theology and science dialogue—particularly Pentecostal theologian Amos Yong—employ emergence as a framework to discuss special divine action as well as causation initiated by other spiritual realities, such as angels and demons. Mikael and Joanna Leidenhag, however, have issued concerns about its application. They argue that Yong employs supernaturalistic themes with implications that render the concept of emergence obsolete. Further, they claim that Yong's use of emergence theory is inconsistent because he highlights the ontological independence of various spirits in the world concurrently with his advocation of supervenience theory. In view of these concerns, Leidenhag and Leidenhag urge Yong to depart from his application of emergence theory. In what follows, we plan to address each of these criticisms and demonstrate that they are tenuous, if not unwarranted, especially in light of a kenotic-relational pneumatology.
In this response to David Bradnick's and Bradford McCall's defense of Amos Yong's usage of emergence theory, we defend our previous argument regarding the tension between Yong's Pentecostal commitments and the philosophical entailments of emergence theory. We clarify and extend our previous concerns in three ways. First, we explore the difficulties of construing divine action naturalistically (i.e. natural divine causation). Second, we clarify the problems of employing supervenience in theology. Third, we show why Bradnick's and McCall's advice to Yong to adopt weak emergence is theologically costly. In conclusion, it is suggested that theologians within the science and religion dialogue should not fear, but recover, the language of supernaturalism and dualism.
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