Kabiliyetler ve Dış Politika: Türkiye’nin Küçük ve Orta Düzeyde Güç Statüsünün Karşılaştırılması

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Between Capability and Foreign Policy:
Comparing Turkey’s Small Power and Middle
Power Status
Gürol BABA* and Murat ÖNSOY**
* Assist. Prof. Dr., Department of International Relations, Social
Science University of Ankara & King’s College London.
**Assist. Prof. Dr., Department of International Relations,
Hacettepe University.
To cite this article: Baba, Gürol and Önsoy, Murat, “Between
Capability and Foreign Policy: Comparing Turkey’s Small Power
and Middle Power Status”, Uluslararası İlişkiler, Volume 13, No.
51, 2016, pp. 3-20.
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alone unless otherwise stated and do not imply the endorsement by the other authors, the Editors
and the Editorial Board as well as the International Relations Council of Turkey.

ULUSLARARASIiLiŞKiLER, Cilt 13, Sayı 51, 2016, s. 3-20
Between Capability and Foreign Policy: Comparing
Turkey’s Small Power and Middle Power Status
Gürol BABA
Assst. Prof. Dr., Department of Internatonal Relatons, Socal Scences Unversty of Ankara, Ankara;
Kng’s College London, London. E-mal: gurol.baba@asbu.edu.tr
Murat öNSOY
Assst. Prof. Dr., Department of Internatonal Relatons, Haceepe Unversty, Ankara.
E-mal: muratonsoy@haceepe.edu.tr
ABSTRACT
IR literature has proposed tangible and intangible criteria for defining and differentiating rankings of countries, albeit
without much success. The literature’s limited success is primarily due to the subjective, unclear and immeasurable
qualities of these criteria. The differentiation between small powers and middle powers is particularly ambiguous.
This article proposes an amalgamated method, which combines foreign policy behavior capabilities to characterize
and separate small powers and middle powers. There is a relationship between capabilities and a country’s global
status ranking that also determines foreign policy behavior. This also underlines a complementarity between national
capabilities and foreign policy objectives. Lower capabilities means a low-key/restrained foreign policy but do higher
capabilities mean a more proactive/highly strung foreign policy? Increased capabilities boost the position of a country
from a small power to a middle power but do not completely eliminate constraints imposed by great powers. This
article examines Turkey’s experiences since the 1930s as an empirical narrative of the complementarity between
power and level of influence.
Keywords: Turkey, Small Powers, Middle Powers, Vulnerabilities, Restrictions.
Kablyetler ve Dı Poltka: Türkye’nn Küçük ve Orta Düzeyde
Güç Statüsünün Karılatırılması
ÖZET
Uluslararası lkler lteratürü ülkelern uluslararası sstemdek konumlarını saptamak çn, çok da baarılı
olmayan, somut ve soyut ölçütler sunmaktadır. Lteratürdek bu sınırlı baarı, büyük ölçüde krterlern öznel,
mulak ve ölçülemez ntelkte olmasından kaynaklanmaktadır. Bu durum özellkle küçük ve orta ölçekte
devletlern farklılatırılmasında mulaklıkları berabernde getrmektedr. Bu çalımada, küçük ve orta ölçektek
güçler ntelendrmek ve ayrıtırmak maksadıyla, onların kablyetlernn dı poltka davranıları le brletrld
(harmanlandıı) br metot sunulmaktadır. Ülkelern kablyetler sadece uluslararası sstemdek konumlarını del
aynı zamanda dı poltka davranılarını da belrlemektedr. Bu da br ülkenn mll kablyetler ve dı poltka amaçları
arasında br tamamlayıcılıın/bütünleycln olduunun altını çzmektedr. Bu durumda, düük kablyetler ılımlı
dı poltka hedefler demekken yüksek kab lyetler daha ddalı dı poltka anlamına mı gelmektedr? Br ülke artan
kablyetler netcesnde konumunu küçükten orta ölçee yükseltrken, bu durum onun kısıtlamalarını tamamen
ortadan kaldırmamaktadır. Bu makale, söz konusu bütünleyclnn baarı/etk derecesn göstermek amacıyla,
Türkye’nn 1930’lardan bu yana deneymlern amprk br anlatım yoluyla ncelemektedr.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkye, Küçük Ölçekl Güçler, Orta Ölçekl Güçler, Hassasyetler, Kısıtlamalar.

ULUSLARARASIİLİŞKİLER / INTERNATIONALRELATIONS
4
Introduction
An unresolved problem in international relations (IR) literature has been ranking countries in terms
of their power projection capabilities. Broadly speaking, the literature oers the three categories of
small powers, middle powers and great powers. IR researchers use mostly the same criteria, tangible
and intangible, to dene, compare and dierentiate them. Tangible criteria are usually capabilities,
a combination of GNP, population size, land area, military spending and level of trade. Intangible
criteria focus on how members of the international system accept the status of a particular country.
is article provides an amalgamated approach, combining capabilities with foreign policy
behavior, to compare and dierentiate small powers and middle powers. Capabilities determine both
ranking/status and foreign policy insight. ere is a complementarity between national capabilities
and foreign policy objectives. e article examines Turkey’s position since the 1930s as an empirical
case to illustrate the extent of this complementarity.
is complementarity highlights two issues: the vulnerabilities of small powers and the
constraints on middle powers. Small powers are more vulnerable against various threats than middle
powers. Although small powers can become middle powers with an increase in capabilities, they are
still constrained by great powers’ perceptions, outlook and interests. Such constraints are more apparent
in the political and security spheres. Increased capabilities complement foreign policy objectives more
successfully in the economic domain. Turkey’s experiences since the 1930s illustrate this.
is article rst underlines the diculties in dening small powers and middle powers, then
analyzes the inuence of vulnerabilities and constraints on the foreign policies of such powers. Aerwards,
the analysis turns more specically to how these vulnerabilities and constraints inuence Turkey’s foreign
policy as both a small power and a middle power. Turkey’s empirical narrative begs the question of whether
an increase in national capabilities alleviates foreign policy vulnerabilities and constraints. In other words,
do improved national capabilities complement more assertive foreign policy aims?
e IR literature has examined small power and middle powers separately, particularly vis-à-vis
their foreign policy aitudes. is article aims to ll a gap by comparing the theoretical dierences
between small power and middle power foreign policy aitudes, and by matching these aitudes with
episodes in Turkey’s foreign policy since the 1930s. Since Turkey has clearly experienced a shi in its
international status and role, such comparative analysis will provide a more coherent illustration of
the theoretical premise.
Regarding small power status, the cases presented illustrate that Turkey ’s bilateral foreign policy
actions were directed at balancing its vulnerabilities with resilience. Since such balancing eorts are
common among small powers, Ankara’s aempts to counterbalance the expectation and interests of
great powers are this article’s major concern. Accordingly, the case of counterbalancing Russia with
Britain in Montreux is presented, but Turkey’s almost bilateral conict with France on the Hatay issue
is not. On the other hand, the case studies on Turkey’s middle power status, mostly show Ankara
taking foreign policy action via multilateral schemes, bridging alignments, go-between actions, and
generally exhibiting pro-status quo tendencies.
Given its dual history and international relations approach, this article uses an exploratory
and explanatory case study analysis. is method helps to investigate a limited number of real-life
events/phenomena in context, taking into consideration developments, conditions and interactions.
A comparison of Turkey’s foreign policy as a small power and as a middle power focuses on a
specic time period and engages a wide variety of international actors. e exploratory side aims to

Between Capability and Foreign Policy
5
answer to what extent Turkey’s foreign policy aitudes changed with the shi from a small power
to a middle power. e explanatory side focuses on the reasons behind these changes through an
integrated analysis of theoretical and empirical data. Empirical data were examined via qualitative
content analysis. e underlying themes are analyzed in order to assess changes in Turkey’s regional
and international approaches over time, and their repercussions.
Small and Middle Powers: Complications in the Quest for Denition
e ranking of countries as small powers, middle powers and great powers is a lingering problem in IR
literature, particularly due to the lack of a well-dened and widely accepted list of criteria.1
For small powers, the major disagreement is on “the nature and the impact of smallness”.2 ere
are three major strands examining “being small”. One of them underlines the economic and military
vulnerabilities of small powers,3 which restrict their impact on the international system unless they
act in a group.4 Regarding the ambiguity in describing the impacts such group(ing)s have, this strand
of the literature cannot provide a clear denition of a small power. e second strand examines the
capabilities of small powers.5 e objective (material/quantiable) capabilities are tangible (size
of GNP, population, military spending), and the subjective capabilities are intangible (how other
governments perceive these objective capabilities).6 Since measuring and comparing these capabilities
is complicated, this strand cannot clearly dene small powers either. e third strand claims that the
size of a state is a contextual construction rather than an objective fact.7 If the context were trade
negotiations then the economic indicators could dierentiate small from big;8 if it were security then
it would be military capabilities.9 Population, usable land area and the GNP could be other tangible
criteria.10 Yet these numerical indications still do not result in a clear denition.
1 For a detailed analysis of small power definition see Niels Amstrup, “The Perennial Problem of Small States: A Survey of
Research Efforts”, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol.11, No.2, 1976, p.163-182; Tom Crowards, “Defining the Category of Small
States”, Journal of International Development, Vol.14, 2002, p.143-179. For the criteria of definition see also Maurice East,
“Size and Foreign Policy Behaviour: A Test of Two Models”, World Politics, Vol.25, No.4, p.556-576. For the middle powers,
see David Mitrany, The Progress of International Government, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1933; George D. Glazebrook,
“The Middle Powers in the United Nations System”, International Organization, Vol.1, No.2, 1947, p.307–315.
2 Donna Lee and Nicola J. Smith, “Small State Discourses in the International Political Economy”, Third World Quarterly,
Vol.31, No.7, 2008, p.201-203; Harvey W. Armstrong and Robert Read, “The Determinants of Economic Growth in
Small States”, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, No.368, 2003, p.100.
3 Annette Baker Fox, The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1959.
4 Robert O. Keohane, “Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics”, International Organization, Vol.23,
No.2, 1969, p.296.
5 Baldur Thorhallsson and Anders Wivel, “Small States in the European Union: What Do We Know and W hat Would We
Like to Know?”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol.19, No.4, 2006, p.651-668.
6 Clive Archer and Neill Nugent, “Small States and the European Union”, Current Politics and Economics of Europe, Vol.11,
No.1, 2005, p.2-3.
7 Iver B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gstoehl, “Introduction: Lilliputians in Gulliver’s World?” Christine Ingebritsen et.al.
(eds.) Small States in International Relations, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 2004, p.3-36; Lee and Smith, “Small
States in the International Political Economy”, p. 201-203.
8 Jaqueline Braveboy-Wagner, “The English-Speaking Caribbean States: a Triad of Foreign Policy”, Jeanne A.K.
Hey (ed.) Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior, Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner,
2003, p.31-51; Peter J. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe, Ithaca, New
York, Cornell University Press, 1985; Richard H. Steinberg, “In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-based
bargaining and outcomes in the GATT/WTO”, International Organization, Vol.56, 2002, p.339–374.
9 Jean-Marc Rickli, “European Small States’ Military Policies after the Cold War: From Territorial to Niche
Strategies”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol.21, 2008, p.307-325.
10 For the details of these numerical indicators see Simon Kuznets, “Economic Growth of Small Nations”, E. A. G.
Robinson (ed.), The Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations, London, Macmillan, 1960, p.14-32.

ULUSLARARASIİLİŞKİLER / INTERNATIONALRELATIONS
6
e denition of middle powers is similarly vague: the literature focuses not only on capabilities
but also foreign policy behavior. As in the case of small powers, there are three strands of analysis:11
the functional, the behavioral and the hierarchical. e functional strand acknowledges that middle
powers can have a peculiar inuence on areas of strong interest.12 is inuence is “conditional on
the circumstances and can even seem disconnected from the middle powers’ political and economic
capabilities”.13 e behavioral strand14 the mediation capabilities of middle powers in international
disputes via multilateral diplomacy. Middle powers “direct their foreign policy eorts at the
international level, for which multilateral arrangements are ideally suited.”15 ey need to form or be
a part of these multilateral arrangements with like-minded powers in order to increase their inuence.
e hierarchical strand examines objective capabilities of these middle powers, as well as their self-
claimed positions, and recognized status.16 Yet, it is still dicult to measure these capabilities and their
recognition. Holbraad17 and Wood18 used GNP, Neack19 used ve national indicators, and Ravenhill20
used “the ve Cs (capacity, concentration, creativity, coalition building, and credibility)” to identify
these capabilities, but without objective results. An additional capability of middle powers, which the
literature has not thoroughly examined, is the high number, great diversity and wide scope of their
international agreements.
e ambiguity in denition underlines one clear commonality: the categories of small powers
and middle powers are not necessarily objective labels. e domestic government and the international
community each conceptualize a country as a small power or a middle power. erefore neither small
powers nor middle powers have a “special standing in international law that could serve as a guide to
their identity.”21 Labeling countries as small powers or middle powers is complicated and “highlight[s]
baing omissions that defy any conceivable standard of consistency”.22 erefore capabilities alone
are not an adequate measurement to distinguish these two categories.
11 Adam Chapnick, “The Middle Power”, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, Vol.7, No.2, 1999, p.73–82.
12 Hume Wrong was a Canadian diplomat who used the term “middle power” to distinguish Canada’s functional influence
in the Second World War from other minor powers.
13 Gürol Baba and Taylan Özgür Kaya, “Testing the Creativity of Kevin Rudd’s Middle Power Diplomacy: EU–Australia
Partnership Framework Versus the Asia-Pacific Community”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol.14 No.2,
2014, p.239-269.
14 See John Ravenhill, “Cycles of Middle Power Activism: Constraint and Choice in Australian and Canadian Foreign
Policies”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.52, No.3, p.309–327; Carl Ungerer, “The Middle Power Concept
in Australian Foreign Policy”, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol.53, No.4, 2007, p.538–551.
15 Louis Belanger and Gordon Mace, “Middle Powers and Regionalism: The Cases of Argentina and Mexico”, Andrew F.
Cooper (eds.), Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War New York, Macmillan, 1997, p.166; Eduard Jordaan,
“The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations: Distinguishing between Emerging and Traditional Middle
Po we rs ”, Politikon, Vol.30, No.1, 2003, p.169.
16 Mitrany, The Progress of International Government, p.107.
17 Carsten Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics, London, Macmillan, 1984.
18 Bernard Wood, “Towards North-South Middle Power Coalitions”, Cranford Pratt (ed.), Middle Power
Internationalism: The North South Dimension, Kingston & Montreal, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990,
p.69–107.
19 Laura Neack, “Empirical Observations on Middle State Behavior at the Start of a New International System”, Pacific
Focus, Vol.7, No.1, 1992, p.5–21.
20 See Ravenhill, “Cycles of Middle Power Activism”.
21 Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics.
22 David A. Cooper, “Challenging Contemporary Notions of Middle Power Influence: Implications of the Proliferation
Security Initiative for Middle Power Theory”, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol.7, No.3, 2011, p.320.

Between Capability and Foreign Policy
7
Foreign Policy Behavior of Small Powers and Middle Powers
Foreign policy behavior can be used as an additional comparative factor. Although it is one of the
strands in the denition of a middle power, the literature does not combine foreign policy aitudes
with capabilities to dierentiate small powers and middle powers.
Small powers have a low level of overall participation in world aairs, with a narrow functional
and geographical range of concern but a high level of activity in international organizations. ey
do not use force as a technique of statecra, but instead utilize international legal norms, moral and
normative positions.23 is highlights the two decisive characteristics of small powers: vulnerabilities
and resilience.
Payne claims that “vulnerabilities rather than opportunities are the most striking consequence
of smallness”.24 ese vulnerabilities cause greater powers to see “strategic relevance in interfering with”
the domestic and foreign policies of small powers,25 which creates an asymmetry in small-great power
relations. Small powers respond to this asymmetry with a “defensive life”26 by avoiding, mitigating or
postponing conicts.27 Instead, they mostly focus on nancial or economic issues, commanding “the
moral ground” and “drumming up sympathy” from other actors.28 Small powers prefer acting through
international organizations, due to the organizations’ potential to “restrain” great powers.29 In other
words, these vulnerabilities limit small powers in their “level of participation in world aairs”.30 ey
either follow “a passive strategy of renunciation” or “a defensive strategy aempting to preserve the
status quo”.31
Resilience expands the policy options for small powers. It allows small powers to move
between various alliances.32 Resilient small powers “ought to prefer mixed, multilateral alliances” 33
that enable them to be on the winning side of a conict. is is also called “bandwagoning”.34 Resilient
small powers might respond to changes in their surroundings with radical “shis in foreign policy
23 East, “Size and Foreign Policy Behaviour”, p.557.
24 Anthony Payne, “Small States in the Global Politics of Development”, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of
International Affairs, No.376, 2004, p.623, 634; Paul Sutton, “The Concept of Small States in the International Political
Economy”, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, Vol.100, No.413, 2011, p.141-153; Lino
Briguglio, “Small Island Developing States and their Economic Vulnerabilities”, World Development, Vol.23, No.9, 1995,
p.1615-1632.
25 Andrew F. Cooper and Timothy M. Shaw, “The Diplomacies of Small States at the Start of the Twenty-first Century:
How Vulnerable? How Resilient?”, Andrew F. Cooper and Timothy M. Shaw (eds.), The Diplomacies of Small States
Between Vulnerability and Resilience, Houndmills, Palgrave, 2009, p.3.
26 David Vital, Inequality of States: A Study of Small Power in International Relations, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1967, p.87.
27 Ibid, p.149.
28 Godfrey Baldacchino, “Thucydides or Kissinger? A Critical Review of Smaller State Diplomacy” Andrew F. Cooper
and Timothy M. Shaw (eds.), The Diplomacies of Small States Between Vulnerability and Resilience, Houndmills, Palgrave,
2009, p.35.
29 Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, New York, London, Columbia University Press, 1968, p.294.
30 See John Henderson, “New Zealand and the Foreign Policy of Small States” Richard Kennaway and John Henderson
(eds.), Beyond New Zealand II: Foreign Policy into the 1990s, Auckland, Longman Paul, 1991, p.6.
31 Neumann and Gstoehl, “Introduction: Lilliputians in Gulliver’s”, p.8.
32 Baldur Thorhallsson, “The Role of Small States in the European Union”, Christine Ingebritsen et.al.(eds.), Small States
in International Relations, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 2006, p.218-227.
33 Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, p.177.
34 For the details of bandwagoning see Jeremy W. Lamoreaux, “Acting Small in a Large State’s World: Russia and the Baltic
States”, European Security, Vol.23, No.4, 2014, p.565-582; Randall. L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the
Revisionist State Back In”, International Security, Vol.19, No.1, 1994, p.88–98.

ULUSLARARASIİLİŞKİLER / INTERNATIONALRELATIONS
8
orientations”, i.e. breaking diplomatic ties.35 e resilience of their economies might depend on a
specialization in supplying certain products and in the diversication of trading partners.36 ey can
increase their resilience by remaining neutral and “very hesitant to make agreements which potentially
prevent them from making similar agreements with other states”.37 In neutrality, they remain “passive
in the hope that the threat will diminish or disappear”.38
Middle powers are not vulnerable to the same extent. Unlike small powers, they can start
and manage initiatives, i.e. acting as “go-betweens” for international coalition building, and creating
regional bridging alignments with similar-minded middle powers or great powers. Although they
prefer to distance themselves from the tutelage of great powers, their achievements still rely on how
close their foreign policy aims are to the aspirations of great powers.
Middle powers have pro-status quo tendencies, not only because they are labeled as “good
international citizens,”39 but also because they do not have the necessary capabilities to manage
tensions. Instead they act as international mediators and “go-betweens” within conict management
and resolution activities.40 Although they are not the nal decision makers, they have more inuence
than small powers. is inuence is more visible within international organizations whose decision-
making is decided through voting.41
As “go-betweens”, middle powers could ease the security dilemmas of great powers through
bridging alignments,42 which have the potential to bridge the gap between various actors by
encouraging cooperation.43 Middle power bridging depends on cooperative policies, not competitive
ones, which best serve the security goals of adversaries.44 ese linkages rely on moral values and
epistemic notions rather than ambition and aggression.
ese policy options are not theoretically lucid. Middle power “is not a xed universal but
something that has to be rethought continually in the context of the changing state of the international
system”.45 is means these policy options should be constantly re-examined and re-evaluated,46
and makes the policy options for middle powers unforeseeable since they depend on a complicated
dynamic of perceptions, reactions, and interests.
35 Susan Aurelia Gitelson, “Why do Small States Break Diplomatic Relations with Outside Powers?: Lessons from the
African Experience”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol.18, No.4, 1974, p.453-454.
36 Daniel Frei, “Kleinstaatliche Außenpolitik als Umgang mit Abhängigkeit”, Karl Zemanek, et.al. (eds.), Die Schweiz in
einer sich wandelnden Welt, Zürich, Schulthess Polygraphischer Verlag, 1977, p.201-225.
37 Lamoreaux, “Acting Small in a Large State’s World”, p.568; Ivan C. Mikuz, Influence Small State Force Design, Carlisle, PA,
United States Army War College, 2012.
38 John Rogers, “The Foreign Policy of Small States: Sweden and Mosul Crisis, 1924-1925”, Contemporary European
History, Vol.16, No.3, 2007, p.356.
39 Andrew F. Cooper, “Niche Diplomacy: A Conceptual Overview” Andrew F. Cooper (ed.), Niche Diplomacy: Middle
Powers after the Cold War, London, Macmillan, 1997, p.7.
40 Neack, “Linking State Type with Foreign Policy Behaviour”, p.225.
41 Glazerbrook, “The Middle Powers in the United Nations System”, p.307-318.
42 Joshua B. Spero, “Great Power Security Dilemmas for Pivotal Middle Power Bridging”, Contemporary Security Policy,
Vol.30, No.1, 2009, p.148, 152, 153, 155.
43 Ravenhill, “Cycles of Middle Power Activism”, p.312.
44 Charles L. Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-help”, Benjamin Frankel (ed.), Realism: Restatements and
Renewal, London, Frank Cass, 1996, p.123.
45 Robert W. Cox, “Middlepowermanship, Japan and the Future World Order”, International Journal: Canada’s Journal of
Global Policy Analysis, Vol.44, 1989, p.825.
46 Michael K. Hawes, Principal Power, Middle Power, or Satellite? Competing Perspectives in the Study of Canadian Foreign
Policy, Toronto, York Research Programme in Strategic Studies, York University, 1984.

Between Capability and Foreign Policy
9
Interactions between middle powers and greater powers are less asymmetrical than those of
small powers and greater powers. rough multilateral diplomacy they counterbalance and mediate
international issues of great powers. Small powers mostly utilize passivity and neutrality to avoid
problems; middle powers can act proactively as mediators with the support of like-minded countries.
Middle powers also shi between alliances, not always to maximize benets, but also in the interest of
formulating cooperative schemes.
Turkey from Small Power to a Middle Power: An Empirical Narrative
from the 1930s to 2000s
Turkey has boosted its international position since the 1930s. is process hides two major aspects
of the small power and middle power comparison: a clear increase in capabilities (GNP, population,
military expenditure, number/content/focus of international agreements), and related examples of
foreign policy behavior. Turkey’s boost illustrates to what extent and under which circumstances the
increase in capabilities complements foreign policy objectives.
e increase in Turkey’s tangible capabilities can be seen in Tables below:
Table 1. Selected General
Population Census results
since 1927
Table 2. Turkey’s GNP
since 1923
Table 3. Turkey’s Estimated
Military Spending
Years Population Size Years Million US $ Years Million US $
1927 13,648,270 1923 570 1923 25.2
1935 16,158,018 1929 1,001 1930 49.3
1940 17,820,950 1930 742 1935 52.5
1945 18,790,174 1935 1,039 1938 88.4
1950 20,947,188 1940 1,741 1940 147.3
1955 24,064,763 1945 4,207 1945 149.5
1960 27,754,820 1950 3,462 1950 236.6
1965 31,391,421 1955 6,827 1955 490
1970 35,605,176 1960 9,865 1960 1,093
1975 40,347,719 1965 8,450 1965 302
1980 44,736,957 1970 19,030 1970 693
1985 50,664,458 1975 47,452 1975 2,013
1990 56,473,035 1980 68,390 1980 2,080
2000 67,803,927 1985 68,032 1985 2,173
2007 70,586,256 1990 152,387 1990 4,830
2010 73,722,988 1995 171,858 1995 5,090
2015 78,741,053 2000 201,977 2000 9,994
2005 485,058 2005 10,031
2010 1,098(GDP)
2015 1,589 (GDP)

ULUSLARARASIİLİŞKİLER / INTERNATIONALRELATIONS
10
One indicator of Turkey’s boost can be seen in its international agreements. During the 1930s,
Turkey’s international agreements related to friendship, neutrality, mutual security, cooperation,
maintaining a good neighborhood and joining sanctions regimes. With the end of the Second
World War, the agreements increased in their number and diversity. is illustrates Turkey’s success
in engaging in international politics. In this period, several bilateral and multilateral agreements/
conventions were concluded with neighboring and non-neighboring countries within the framework
of the UN and its subordinate organizations, as well as the OECD, the EU, NATO, Council of Europe,
the OSCE, Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), etc.47
Turkey’s capabilities and aitudes towards foreign policy during the 1930s fall into the small
power category. e small powers of the 1930s faced a “dangerous combination of an increasing
war threat … the emergence of new and costly military technology, and overall oensive military
doctrines”.48 Within this dangerous combination of circumstances, Ankara successfully balanced
its vulnerabilities with resilience, which made Turkey a non-negligible element in the strategic
calculations of great powers. Turkey’s relations with great powers clearly illustrate this point.
rough its relations with Germany, Ankara managed to counterbalance threat perceptions
with economic opportunities. Turkey increased its trade volume with Germany until the German
threat outweighed the economic benets. With the “clearing” agreement in 1933,49 Germany became
a major exporter of manufactured goods and an importer of raw materials and agricultural products
from Turkey.50 Until 1936, this relationship served as a panacea for Turkey’s decreasing export
incomes.51 By 1936, Germany made up half of Turkey’s imports and exports, and as Hitler intensied
war preparations, Ankara moved to reduce the German inuence on the economy by diversifying
its trading partners.52 For example, Turkey made an accord with the British construction company
Brassert for the construction of the rst steel factory in Karabük even though the German company
Krupps had oered a beer deal.53
Turkey ’s pivot towards Britain exemplied a “defensive life”. is also changed Britain’s outlook
towards Turkey, which involved no commitment until 1936. Britain rst supported Turkey’s claims as
the basis of discussions in Montreux. A clearing agreement was signed in September 1936 to increase
the trade volume, which distanced Turkey from Germany.54 e shi increased the value of Turkish
imports from Great Britain from 6 to 7 million Turkish Lira (TL) and exports from 6 to 9.7 million TL.
Meanwhile the German share in Turkish trade decreased in value for the rst time from 60,042,000
TL (51%) to 50,412,000 TL (36.5%).55
47 For the details of Turkey ’s bilateral/multilateral agreements see smail Soysal, Türkiye’nin Siyasal Antlamaları(Cilt I,II),
Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1983, p.1991.
48 Herman Amersfoort and Wim Klinkert, “Introduction: Small States in a Big World”, Herman Amersfoort and Wim
Klinkert (eds.), Small Powers in the Age of Total War, 1900–1940, Leiden, Brill, 2011, p.2.
49 Dilek Barlas, Etatism and Diplomacy in Turkey: Economic and Foreign Strategies in an Uncertain World, 1929-1939, Leiden
and New York, E.J. Brill, 1998.
50 Hans-Joachim Braun, The German Economy in the Twentieth Century, New York , Routledge, 1990, p.101; Christian Leitz,
Sympathy for the Devil: Neutral Europe and Nazi Germany in World War II, New York, New York University Press, 2001,
p.87-88.
51 Cemil Koçak, Türk-Alman likileri(1923-1939) ki Dünya Savaı Arasındaki Dönemde Siyasal, Kültürel Askeri ve Ekonomik
likiler, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Press, 1991, p.201.
52 Elwyn Jones, Hitler’s Drive to the East, New York, E.P. Dutton & Co. Inc., 1937, p.41.
53 Edward Reginald Vere-Hodge, Turkish Foreign Policy 1918-1948, Geneva, Thèse, Université de Genève, 1950, p.112.
54 Brock Millman, The Ill Made Alliance: Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1934-1940, McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal,
1998, p.20.
55 Harici Ticaret Aylık, Statistique Mensuelle du Commerce Exterieur, Ankara, T.C. Bavekalet, January 1940, p.4.

Between Capability and Foreign Policy
11
Turkey’s move to keep its alliances mixed highlights the focus on resilience. Although its
relations with Britain deepened in 1938, Turkey did not completely detach from Germany. Turkey-
Britain trade did not reach the volume of that with Germany, from which it also received 150 million
Reichsmarks (RM) of credit.56
e decision to specialize in certain products is another indicator. Turkey, as the second largest
producer of chrome ore in the world, became a major supplier of German industry.57 e chrome
trade with Germany rose from a value of 35 thousand RM to 3.5 million RM from 1929 to 1939,
which covered almost 60% of Germany’s total demand.58 Chrome sales contributed to Turkey’s
budget substantially, and gradually made Germany dependent on Turkey’s supply of chrome.
In the same era, Turkey followed “a passive strategy of renunciation” and stayed in the non-
revisionist camp.59 Turkey increased its defense expenditures (see Table 2) but its defenses were still
only eective for limited regional warfare. Turkey could not face a major threat, such as the Italian or
German Air Force.60 Ankara remained passive in the hope that the threat would disappear.
Turkey also used international regimes, particularly when the revision of the Lausanne Straits
Convention started with Turkey’s application to the League of Nations in April 1936. During the
process, Turkey had pro-status quo tendencies carried out via multilateral diplomacy and international
law.61 It managed to win the support of greater powers, i.e. Britain, to reshape other parties’ demands.
Turkey invoked the rebus sic stantibus principle to terminate the Straits Convention.62 With these
maneuvers, Turkey, through the Montreux Convention (1936), managed to oset Russia, and to
achieve control over the Bosporus and the Dardanelles as regulatory authority on the transit of naval
warships.
Turkey then started shiing between varying alliance structures against Italian expansionism
in the Eastern Mediterranean, which increased its value as a counterweight between antagonistic
alliances.63 Against Italian armaments in the Dodecanese islands and Mussolini’s Mare Nostrum
rhetoric, Turkey successfully cooperated with the British within the League to impose sanctions on
Italy aer the invasion of Abyssinia and the signing of the Balkan Entente of 1934. Once the Abyssinia
Crisis cooled down, Italy tried to reharmonize relations with Turkey by revoking its claims over
Turkish lands.64
In its relations with the Soviets, Ankara glossed over its anticommunist tendencies65 to test the
opportunities for economic and security partnerships. Moscow contributed 8 million USD towards
56 Koçak, Türk-Alman likileri (1923-1939), p.200-230.
57 Ferdinand Friedensburg, Die Rohstoffe und Energiequellen im neuen Europa, Berlin, Oldenburg, Gerhard
StallingVerlagsbuchhandlung, 1943, p.16; “Inloit to Ministry of Economic Warfare on 15th October 1939”, FO/8371003.
58 Koçak, Türk-Alman likileri (1923-1939), p.224.
59 Lord Kinross, Atatürk: The Rebirth of a Nation, London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1993, p.458.
60 Brock Millman, “Turkish Foreign and Strategic Policy 1934-42”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.31, No.3, 1995, p.493-495.
61 Simon V. Mayall, Turkey: Thwarted Ambition, Washington, DC, Mc Nair Papers 56, January 1997, p.38-41.
62 Franklin B. Weinstein, “The Concept of a Commitment in International Relations”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution,
Vol.13, No.1, 1969, p.39-56. In public international law, rebus sic stantibus (Latin for “things thus standing”) is the legal
doctrine allowing for treaties to become inapplicable because of a fundamental change of circumstances.
63 Dilek Barlas, “Friends or Foes? Diplomatıc Relations between Italy and Turkey, 1923–36”, International Journal of Middle
East Studies, Vol.36, No.2, 2004, p.247-248.
64 Millman, “Turkish Foreign and Strategic Policy”, p.485; Vere-Hodge, Turkish Foreign Policy, p.109-111.
65 Bülent Gökay, Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey, 1920-1991: Soviet Foreign Policy, Turkey and Communism, New York,
Routledge, 2006, p.10.

ULUSLARARASIİLİŞKİLER / INTERNATIONALRELATIONS
12
Turkey’s rst ve-year economic development plan aer the Great Depression of 1929.66 Turkey, with
Russia, proclaimed its opposition to Western dominance in the international economy but at the same
time became a League member, which it considered to be of Western design.67 Turkey also rejected
Stalin’s quest for security against Hitler via the joint Turkish-Soviet defense system on the Straits.68
Turkey managed to accomplish these relations while maintaining the framework of neutrality. In
the 1930s, Ankara made a special eort to not be on either side of the polarizing international system,
but did not completely detach itself either. Turkey did not conclude agreements with any one side, which
could potentially have restricted its revenues from the other. Two clear examples were Ankara’s rejection
of Stalin’s oer for a joint defense system of the Turkish straits against Germany and its non-conclusion
of an agreement with the Germans for chrome, which could cut down on sales to the Allies.
Aer the Second World War, Turkey signicantly advanced its tangible (as seen in Tables 1-3)
and intangible capabilities. During this period Turkey’s modus operandi was clearly dierent from the
1930s. Two denitive examples of Turkey’s middle power aitude have been selected for elaboration.
ese are the Cyprus issue and the March 2003 memorandum.
In the rst example, Turkey objected to the Greek Cypriot threats to the status quo on the
island aer the British withdrawal in 1960. Turkey believed its legal rights to be acknowledged by
the Treaty of Guarantee and unilaterally intervened to rebuild the status quo disrupted by the Greek
Cypriots throughout the 1960s and early 1970s.69 In the second example, Turkey’s rejection of the
March 2003 memorandum granting American troop’s access to Iraq through Turkish territory was
another signicant pro-status quo move.70 In both cases, Turkey acted to inuence the nal outcome
of an issue, in the process endangering its position within a Western alliance. It was motivated by
regional stability but did not avoid conict, asserting its position as an autonomous middle power.71
Turkey, as a middle power, also believed in using multilateral schemes to deal with international
issues. On the Cyprus Question, particularly during the 1960s, Turkey consistently brought the
issue to the guarantor powers72 for consultation, and to the US as well. Yet in the post-Cold War
era, it no longer expected help from multilateral schemes, aiming instead to use them to improve its
international position. A clear example is Turkey’s role in peacekeeping, observer missions and police
operations in the Balkans, Caucasus, and Middle East including Afghanistan,73 and particularly in
66 Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri I-III (1906-1938), Ankara, Türk Inkilap Tarihi Enstitüsü, Vol.I, p.381.
67 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000, London and Portland, OR, Frank Cass, 2000, p.59.
68 US Department of State, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office,
Washington, 1948, p.217-259.
69 For the details see Monteagle Stearns, Entangled Allies: US Policy toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, New York,
Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992; Nancy Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union
with Greece, Boston, G. Allen & Unwin, 1978; James A. McHenry, The Uneasy Partnership on Cyprus 1919-1939: The
Political and Diplomatic Interaction between Great Britain, Turkey, and the Turkish Cypriot Community, University of
Kansas, PhD, 1981.
70 Gürol Baba and Soner Karagül, “Türk Dı Politikasında Çok Taraflılıa Geçi Çabaları: 1965 Çok Uluslu Güç Projesi ve
1 Mart 2003 Tezkeresi”, LAÜ Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, Vol.3, No.1, p.18-42.
71 Hasan Basri Yalçın, “The Concept of Middle Power and the Recent Turkish Foreign Policy Activism”, Afro Eurasian
Studies, Vol.1, No.1, 2012, p.209.
72 For the details of the correspondence between Turkey, the US and the guarantor power see “Foreign Relations of the
United States (FRUS), 1961-63”, Vol.16; FRUS, 1964-68, Vol.16.
73 George E. Gruen, “Turkey’s Role in Peacekeeping Missions”, American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National
Committee on American Foreign Policy, Vol.28, No.6, 2006, p.435-449.

Between Capability and Foreign Policy
13
the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFL).74 In all these operations and missions Turkey strived
to increase its individual signicance and esteem. As a clear example, Turkey employed the OIC to
increase its foreign policy outreach and amplify its voice.
Turkey, with the new millennium, began to take more direct roles via creating multilateral
schemes in its neighboring regions. e Caucasus Peace and Stability Pact proposal in 2000 – covering
Turkey, Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Azerbaijan, and relying on the 1997 Balkan Stability Pact’s
main principles – is a clear example.75 Turkey aempted to strengthen the common interests of the
Pact’s prospective members in order to foster cooperation for security and development, as well as to
cultivate regional and multilateral cooperation projects.
Turkey worked with local middle powers to construct bridging alignments. In the mid-
1950s, Turkey’s eorts to create a defense pact – as a “requirement” of its leading role in the
implementation of Northern Tier strategy with Iraq, Iran and Pakistan – is one example. e eorts
were initiated as the Baghdad Pact in 1955 and died as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)
in 1979.76 Although CENTO did not really deliver what it originally aimed to do, it provided a
foundation for Turkey to build a bridge between its members and NATO.77 In 1985 Turkey,
along with Iran and Pakistan, founded the Economic Cooperation Organization, which was later
expanded to include Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan
and Uzbekistan. Ankara aimed to create a synergy to provide sustainable development by making
full use of available resources in the region.78 In 1992, Turkey was the key actor in the formation
and the implementation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Scheme for regional economic
cooperation and development.79 e Scheme’s integration model was looser and more exible
than that of the EU, which would open up “a formerly closed or semiclosed market of more than
350 million people” to Turkey.80 All these eorts exemplify Turkey’s go-between aitude towards
international economic coalition building.
Turkey was also a go-between for political/security disputes, although not very successfully. It
aimed to play a major role in the dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh
dispute. e political constraints exerted by the West – i.e. Turkey’s reliance upon US military aid
to ght the PKK in the 1990s, its need to de-escalate the situation with the EU and its priority of
maintaining good relations with Moscow regarding private business interests in Russia – constrained
Turkey from involving itself too deeply in Karabakh.81 Turkey was also one of the founding members of
74 Bill Park, Modern Turkey: People, State, and Foreign Policy in a Globalised World, Routledge, Oxon, 2012, p.141-142.
75 Michael Radu, Dangerous Neighbourhood: Contemporary Issues in Turkey’s Foreign Relations, New Brunswick, N.J., U.S.A,
Transaction Publishers, 2003, p.112-113
76 Behçet Kemal Yeilbursa, The Baghdad Pact: Anglo-American Defence Policies in the Middle East, 1950-59, London, Frank
Cass, 2005, p.215.
77 Gökhan Çetinsaya, “A Tale of Two Centuries: Continuities in Turkish Foreign and Security Policy”, Nursin Atesolu
Güney (ed.), Contentious Issues of Security and the future of Turkey, Aldershot, Ashgate, p.12.
78 Richard Pomfret, “The Economic Cooperation Organization: Current Status and Future Prospects”, Europe-Asia Studies,
Vol.49, No.4, p.657-667.
79 Ercan Özer, “The Black Sea Economic Cooperation and Regional Security”, Vedat Yücel and Salomon Ruysdael (eds.)
New Trends in Turkish Foreign Affairs: Bridges and Boundaries, New York, Writers Club Press, 2002, p.149-171; Oktay
Özüye, “Black Sea Economic Cooperation”, Mediterranean Quarterly, No.3, 1992, p.48-54.
80 Ziya Öni, “Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era: In Search of Identity ”, Middle East Journal, Vol.49, No.1, p.58.
81 Svante E. Cornell, “Turkey and the Conflict in Nagorno Karabakh: A Delicate Balance”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.34,
No.1, 1998, p.51-72.

ULUSLARARASIİLİŞKİLER / INTERNATIONALRELATIONS
14
the non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative in 2010,82 where it came together with similar-sized
and like-minded states to advance the nuclear disarmament agenda, as well as greater transparency in
the fullment of disarmament commitments among nuclear states. How helpful that initiative will be
remains to be seen.
ese examples show the complementarity between capabilities and the foreign policy limits
of middle powers. In the economic domain, middle powers have more maneuvering space to take the
initiative on collaboration/cooperation. In the political and security domains, they are still restricted
by alliance networks and the perceptions and interests of great powers.
erefore, the less their foreign policies conict with those of the great powers, the more
eective the middle state can be – or, in other words, the less ambitious, the more successful. In early
2007, Turkey ’s sincere eorts to prevent Iraq from descending into chaos, and from being divided into
Shia and Sunni groups,83 is an example of good international citizenship and its pursuit of stability
and balance. Another recent example of this is the MIKTA collaboration, an acronym for Mexico,
Indonesia, Korea, Turkey and Australia, established in 2013. e ve members’ major aim has been
to amplify their voice on various platforms, especially the G20, with the particular aim of achieving
regional and global peace and stability.84 is also shows that good international citizenship by middle
powers is beer received and results in greater leverage than adventurist political moves that cause
conict with great powers.
Conclusion
e ambiguity in IR literature between small powers and middle powers has been the terminus a
quo of this article. By focusing on ambiguities in denition and dierentiation, the article oers an
amalgamated methodology of combining capabilities with foreign policy behavior. is combination
assumes not only that there is a relationship, but also a complementarity between capabilities and
foreign policy.
e rise in national capabilities not only lis a country’s status but also opens up foreign
policy maneuverability. Yet this is not so straightforward. Since national capabilities have intangible
elements, i.e. how various countries perceive and value the capabilities of other nation-states, this
complementarity may have unexpected results. A small power could be seen as a very valuable asset,
which amplies its own foreign policy outreach, while a middle power might not be able to achieve a
seemingly basic objective due to restrictions imposed by great powers.
Turkey’s experience since the 1930s exemplies both straightforward and non-straightforward
cases. In the 1930s, Turkey counterbalanced its vulnerabilities with resilience and constantly recalibrated
its self-image, and in doing so, Ankara reconciled multiple identities depending on the major power it was
tilting towards. A Russia-friendly foreign policy went hand-in-hand with an anti-Communist domestic
82 For the details see http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/non-proliferation-and-disarmament-initiative-
npdi/ (Accessed on 8 May 2016); Wayne Mclean and James Dwyer, “Nuclear Deterrence, Missile Systems and the
Security of Turkey in the New Middle East”, Insight Turkey, Vol.17, No.3, 2015, p.155.
83 Ahmet Davutolu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007”, Insight Turkey, Vol.10, No.1, 2008, p.85.
84 Belma Engin and Gürol Baba, “MIKTA: A Functioning Product of New Middle Power-ism?”, Uluslararası Hukuk ve
Politika, Vol.11, No.42, 2015, p.1-40; Press Release Regarding the MIKTA Initiative, No.254, 26 September 2013,
available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-254_-26-september-2013_-press-release-regarding-the-mikta-initiative.
en.mfa (Accessed on 9 May 2016).

Between Capability and Foreign Policy
15
policy; similarly, a non-pro-Western foreign policy was not an obstacle to a close partnership with Britain,
and an anti-fascist stance did not hinder an economic partnership with Germany and Italy. Turkey’s
foreign policy “pivots” show that a resilient small power is able to manage the strategic calculations of
great powers. Its national capabilities determine its status and its foreign policy outreach, but intangible
elements in its capabilities could complement resilient foreign policy objectives.
Since the end of the Second World War, Turkey has increased its tangible national capabilities
drastically. is has not only elevated its status internationally but has also given it a much larger arena
in which to conduct foreign policy. Yet this has not removed all of its constraints, particularly in the
security and political spheres. Turkey is still limited by great powers. erefore even boosted national
capabilities do not always complement the ability of middle powers to aain political and security-
related objectives, especially if they skirmish with great powers.

ULUSLARARASIİLİŞKİLER / INTERNATIONALRELATIONS
16
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