When and where are kin-states more likely to engage in militarized territorial expansion against a kin-group's state of residence, i.e., irredentism, rather than merely employing irredentist rhetoric or engaging in non-irredentist kin-state politics that focus on nurturing cultural ties with co-ethnics abroad? For example, Why did Russia pursue an irredentist policy and annex Crimea but a non-irredentist one toward Narva? Why pursue the annexation of Crimea in 2014 but not in the 1990s or the early 2000s? Various valuable domestic explanations have been proposed, including diversionary war theory, shifts in regime type, and socioeconomic changes; but none has centered on balance of power considerations. I emphasize the role of two variables, whether the kin-group’s state of residence is within or outside the core alliance network of a particular pole and the polarity of the international system at any given point in time, operationalized through the number of poles in the system (one, two, or many). I contend that kin-states are unlikely to target any state of residence that is affiliated with the core alliance network of a pole. Furthermore, I argue that variations in polarity shape the nature and location of irredentism. In a bipolar system, irredentism is likely to take the form of proxy warfare outside each bloc. In a unipolar system, irredentism is more likely in areas where the hegemon exercises the least influence—such as areas linked to a former pole. Finally, in a multipolar system, irredentism is more likely to be pursued by rising powers against neighbors not affiliated with alliance networks of a pole in the international system. I evaluate my argument using an existing dataset of both actual and potential irredentist cases from 1946 to 2014, supplemented by illustrative case studies.
Niniejszy artykuł ma na celu przedstawienie genezy sporu o Sutorinę, charakteru roszczeń leżącego u ich podłoża oraz okoliczności wybuchu dyskusji i polemiki na temat ostatecznej przynależności tego obszaru podczas negocjacji nad traktatem granicznym między Czarnogórą a Federacją Bośni i Hercegowiny. Analiza tych wydarzeń i wynikające z nich wnioski oparte zostaną głównej mierze na doniesieniach medialnych i źródłach prasowych dostępnych w obu państwach[1] jak również na oficjalnych dokumentach państwowych oraz instytucji międzynarodowych i publikacjach naukowych. Tak przeprowadzone badanie jest jednocześnie podstawą sformułowania tezy, iż państwa postjugosłowiańskie - mimo nadal dzielących je różnic i wciąż żywych zaszłości historycznych - są jednak w stanie rozwiązywać w sposób pokojowy spory o dużej wadze gatunkowej w stosunkach międzynarodowych, a istotnym czynnikiem wpływającym na ten pragmatyzm są również europejskie aspiracje tych państw.
This reflective piece explores the ‘I am the evidence’ side of the process of knowing. It offers the story of the Yugoslav wars of secession (1991–1999) and their human consequences from the point of view of someone who refuses to surrender ground to the socio-political conditions of life in which ethno-national and cultural differences have to be transgressed. The core of this article is based on the life history of Maja Korac, developed in conversation with Cindy Horst. It approaches the intersections of her life and research from a narrative research perspective. We engage in a contrapuntal discussion of how Maja’s family background, gender, social class, and ethnic/national identity affected her life choices in terms of political engagement, research trajectories, and mobility paths. In doing so, we follow Barad’s argument that we do not obtain knowledge by standing outside the world; we know because we are part of the world. Hence, our discussion and analysis enables the multivocal articulation of the interweaving of personal, collective, geopolitical, and historical contexts in Maja’s research. This process made Maja feel visible after a very long time, because it opened the possibility of (re)gaining the vocabulary to express who she is, and how it has been for her as a human being within a professional role and identity, as well as within an ascribed ethnic identity during a specific historic time. This opportunity for understanding and knowing while being inside the world allowed Maja to repossess her life and identity—individual, professional, collective. It also re-opened the possibility to challenge further the notion of ‘true knowledge’ that is presumably based on ‘methodologically sound paradigms’, all of which exclude the researcher as a person, as who, as a life.
The paper is focused on Slovene and Serbian state socialist experts and their role in the scientific field of researching the Yugoslav national question in the first half of the 1960s, with emphasis on their research and debates regarding the concept of national Yugoslavism. The institutes being examined are the Institute for Ethnic Studies (Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, INV) in Ljubljana and the Institute of Social Sciences (Institut društvenih nauka, IDN) in Belgrade. In the early 1960s, Yugoslav soft nation-building reached its peak with the famous Ćosić–Pirjevec debate. The latter coincided with the end of the ‘transitional period’ at INV and its new leadership under Drago Druškovič. Some Serbian lawyers shifted the fight for the establishment of a socialist Yugoslav nation from political debates to the Yugoslav Association for International Law, where the dispute reached a climax in late 1964. With the abandonment of the Yugoslav national idea, IDN prepared an ambitious programme of researching Yugoslav interethnic relations, which would include several institutions from all Yugoslav republics. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia financed research on interethnic relations in Yugoslavia to create ‘correct’ policies with regard to the national question. Huge amounts of data were collected (public opinion polls, newspaper clippings) and analysed by the research institutions mentioned earlier, which often gave expert opinions to leading Communists. In the late 1960s, amateur research and opinion polling conducted by Yugoslav newspapers challenged the monopoly of the Party on the scientific research field of interethnic relations. Thus, in the early 1970s, the Party struggled to retake control.
Following the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s and the subsequent international economic sanctions imposed against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that lasted until the early 2000s, a substantial number of Serbian composers emigrated to the United States. While this mass exodus of composers and academics had a devastating effect on Serbian cultural life, such a shift, enabled by globalisation and commodification of music, created an interest in Serbian music and culture with American audiences. That is, Serbian émigré composers who fled Yugoslavia during the war conflict conveyed their Serbian identity musically by incorporating certain folk elements. This article examines the unique ways in which select Serbian composers––Aleksandra Vrebalov, Milica Paranosic, and Natasha Bogojevich––integrated their Serbian/Yugoslav background within American multicultural society. More specifically, the article examines the effect of the infusion of Serbian motives in the works of these composers from the perspective of globalisation and commodification in the formation of their émigré Serbian musical identity.
The paper looks at how Marxist humanists around the Yugoslav philosophical journal Praxis engaged with existentialist and phenomenological categories. After presenting the early 1950s critiques of existentialism in Yugoslavia, the paper considers how the categories used by the representatives of existentialism (and phenomenology) were interpreted and incorporated by Yugoslav Marxist humanists in the 1960s.
This article aims to present the motives of the geopolitical restructuring of South-East Europe at the end of World War II with an emphasis on relations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. In this context, the author first identifies the interwar interests of four involved parties, namely: the Yugoslav and Bulgarian communist leaderships, and the political representatives of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. In the second part, the author describes the development of the idea of Yugoslav-Bulgarian integration after the War, first during the period of rapprochement between two communist parties, and then in the period of the Cominform crisis and the dramatic turnaround in their relations. Besides different macro- -geopolitical visions, the author also identifies significant differences in motives at the micro-geopolitical level. Contrary to the proclaimed idea of the 'South Slavic Brotherhood', the Communist Party of Yugoslavia perceived the idea foremost as a maneuvering tool in its relations with the UK and the Soviets, while the Bulgarian Communist Party used the (con)federal idea for pursuing multi-layered interests. It was primarily a part of the strategy for resolving the Macedonian question, but the alliance with Yugoslavia was also a tool for protecting Bulgarian territories in the relations with Greece, and consequently leverage for strengthening the internal position of Bulgarian communists in the post-war consolidation process.
The chapter explains the process of reforming the financial dimension of the Croatian healthcare system during the 1990–1993 period. Process tracing and qualitative content analysis are used to establish the causal mechanisms that underpinned these policy changes. Three mechanisms—doctors enter politics, old system departure, seeking solutions abroad—form a complex mechanism of anti-communist backlash. It shows that domestic physicians were crucial actors in the reform process. Moreover, their prevailing dissatisfaction with the communist healthcare system pushed the reforms in a new direction and stimulated a horizontal policy transfer process in which policy makers drew positive and negative lessons from Western and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries. The outcome was a hybrid healthcare system based on Bismarckian, Beveridgean and neoliberal principles.
Osnovni cilj ovog rada je da utvrdi na koji način su se Marks i Engels (Karl Marx; Friedrich Engels) odnosili prema nacionalnom pitanju. Proklamujući klasu kao glavnog istorijskog aktera, Marks i Engels imali su običaj da olako pređu preko značaja akterskog potencijala nacije. Međutim, praktično-politički razlozi primoravali su ih da se ipak bave temama vezanim za naciju. Pre svega, zbog toga što su bili svesni eksplozivne snage nacionalizma i toga što je on mogao značajno da utiče na pokretanje socijalne revolucije, ali takođe i na njeno kočenje. Zbog ove činjenice, za njih je bilo bitno da u svom političkom delovanju istovremeno maksimalno politički iskoriste, ali i iskontrolišu snagu nacionalnog osećaja različitih naroda. Može se reći da je Marksov i Engelsov odnos prema naciji bio instrumentalan, odnosno da se na nju gledalo kao na potencijalno sredstvo u revolucionarnoj borbi. One narode koje su percipirali kao nosioce društvene revolucije, Marks i Engels su označavali kao pozitivnu i progresivnu društvenu silu. Sa druge strane, prema narodima koji su imali „reakcionarnu istorijsku ulogu” Marks i Engels su se odnosili sa prezirom i negirali njihovo pravo na postojanje.
Why do dictators purge specific elites but not others? And why do dictators purge these elites in certain ways? Examining these related questions helps us understand not only how dictators retain sufficient competence in their regimes to alleviate popular and foreign threats, but also how dictators nullify elite threats. Dictators are more likely to purge first-generation elites, who are more powerful because they can negotiate their role from a position of strength and possess valuable vertical and horizontal linkages with other elites. Further, dictators tend to imprison purged first-generation elites – rather than execute, exile or simply remove them – to avoid retaliation from other elites or the purged elite continuing to sow discord. We find empirical support for our predictions from novel data on autocratic elites in 16 regimes from 1922 to 2020.
Mathematics education in Serbia in the New Millennium has drawn on various traditions—Yugoslavian and post-Yugoslavian—and there has also been an acute awareness of the historical roots of mathematics education in Serbia before the founding of Yugoslavia in the twentieth century. In this paper I report on a comparative study of its two main journals in mathematics education since the break-up of Yugoslavia at the beginning of the new millennium. From this analysis, the focus of mathematics education is shown to be on talented students, which produces some excellent results in international competitions. However, new emerging trends are becoming more visible. First, the work of international colleagues is beginning to be published in Serbia, and second, a new community of scholars, who base their research on mathematics education rather than the mathematical content itself, is beginning to appear in some more recent publications. Nonetheless, the latter development is taking place only outside of the two journals at the center of this paper.
Operacija Oluja bila je jedinstvena i najodlučnija bitka Hrvatske borbe za
nezavisnost (1991-1995). U kolovozu 1995. Republika Hrvatska započela je
najveću kopnenu bitku u Europi poslije Drugoga svjetskog rata. Vojska te mlade
demokracije — brojčano manja i slabije naoružana, ali hrabrija i uvježbanija —
odnijela je kako moralnu tako i vojnu pobjedu u sukobu Davida i Golijata.
Okončala je golemu humanitarnu katastrofu i genocid. Dovela je do
oslobođenja trećine hrvatskoga teritorija i omogućila Daytonski sporazum koji
je donio mir u taj dio Jugoistočne Europe. Ova kvalitativna društvenoznanstvena
studija utemeljena na intervjuima s američkim veleposlanikom u
Hrvatskoj tijekom ratnih godina, vojnim i političkim zapovjednicima u bitci,
uglednim znanstvenicima, dužnosnicima snaga sigurnosti i obavještajne službe,
te članovima humanitarne pomoći i novinarima, ispituje političke i povijesne
uzroke rata i njegove posljedice. Članak dokumentira događaje koji su doveli
do rata i obuhvaća izvanrednu vojnu operaciju, pružajući strateške i političke
spoznaje o potrebi suradnje među demokratskim saveznicima.
Operation Storm was the single-most decisive battle of the Croatian War for Independence (1991-1995). Launched by the Republic of Croatia in August 1995, it was the largest European land battle since the Second World War. Outnumbered, outgunned, but not outmaneuvered, this tiny new democracy prevailed in a David versus Goliath encounter, a moral as well as military victory. Storm ended a massive humanitarian disaster and genocide. It led to the liberation of one third of Croatian territory, and made possible the Dayton Agreement that brought peace to the region. Based on interviews conducted with the American Ambassador to Croatia during the war years, military and political principals in the battle, noted scholars, security and intelligence agency officials, humanitarian leaders and journalists, this social scientific qualitative study examines the political and historical origins of the war and its aftermath. The article documents the events leading up to the war and surrounding this extraordinary military operation, providing strategic and political insights into the need for cooperation between democratic allies.
The existence of Goli Otok was a taboo topic in socialist Yugoslavia, a subject forbidden to speak of, but after the death of Josip Broz Tito many writers began to debate this topic in the heated atmosphere of the 1980s. After the bloody breakup of the country, there was not much further research into the ‘big historical topic’ of Goli Otok. This paper addresses the author’s ‘journey’ into researching the Goli Otok labour camp from the basic research idea to the shaping of a methodological approach to a complete history of the camp, to the obstacles encountered while working in the archives in Croatia and Serbia. Various practices imposed by archival management as well as lawmakers (as well as the discrepancies between rules and practices), presented significant difficulties during research. Interviews with former inmates (oral history) also give a unique perspective on the lasting legacy of the labour camp, notwithstanding all the flaws and benefits associated with this method. This paper will address an important historiographical issue; how historians researching Yugoslav history should approach the heavily controversial Goli Otok labour camp, a topic which is still shadowed by the political changes that occurred in 1991 in the former Yugoslavia.
The article examines identity politics in Turkey through migrations from the Balkans in the early years of Cold War. Despite secularisation reforms in the 1920s and 1930s, Muslim identity remained a central component in the formation of Turkish nationhood. In the wake of WW II, Turkey chose to be a part of Western world whereas her two regional neighbours, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, remained in the Socialist bloc. Nearly 500,000 Turks, Bosnians, Albanians and Pomaks in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were either forced, or "encouraged," to leave their lands after 1950. Despite ideological barriers and ethnic differences, Turkey welcomed these migrants to the country. Official records, recently available biographies and oral sources shed light on the discourses of identity politics through this period.
In this article, we analyze the patterns of sexual violence against Albanian women during the Kosovo conflict (1998–1999) as a weapon of the Milosevic regime’s campaign of ethnic cleansing. We used a broad combination of sources: a secondary literature of history and social science, human rights reports, trial records, our oral history of survivors, interviews with advocates and psychologists handling hundreds of survivors, and a subset of survey data of reported discrete incidents of sexual violence. Our focus on Kosovo as a single-case study rich in data allowed us to discern patterns that offer important insights for understanding how women’s bodies come to be sites of militarized violence in the context of ethnic exclusion and destruction. This carries policy implications for preventing the use of sexual violence in other conflicts, or, in the case of Myanmar military’s sexual violence against Rohingya women, to offer a roadmap for the prosecution of perpetrators.
Following Stalin’s interpretations of the Lenin’s thesis on the merging of the nations, the Yugoslav communists first needed to “push” all nations to the same level of development. After the Tito-Stalin split in 1948, the soft Yugoslav nation-building project was accelerated. During the 1950s, national Yugoslavism was stimulated in a latent way through language, culture, censuses, and changes in the constitutional and socialist system. By the end of the 1950s, the Yugoslav socialist national idea reached its peak with the 1958 Party Congress. Nevertheless, with the economic crisis in the early 1960s, and the famous Ćosić-Pirjevec debate on Yugoslavism, the Yugoslav national idea declined. This was evident on the level of the personal, national identifications of the Party members, but also in the ideological shift of the Party’s chief ideologue Edvard Kardelj. Yet, the concept of Yugoslavism was redefined in the second half of the 1960s without ethnic or national connotations. Two Yugoslavisms were created: a socialist one propagated by the Party and a national one that lived among the population in small proportions. Although the Yugoslavs were never recognized as a nation, that did not stop them from publicly advocating for their national rights.
By the summer of 1948, socialist Yugoslavia seemed determined to follow in the footsteps of its closest ally, the Soviet Union, and strike a decisive blow to “reactionary genetics.” But barely a month before the infamous VASKhNIL session, the Soviet–Yugoslav split began to unravel, influencing the reception of Lysenko’s doctrine in Yugoslavia. Instead of simply dismissing it as yet another example of Stalinist deviationism, Yugoslav mičurinci carefully weighed its political and ideological implications, trying to negotiate the Stalinist origins of Michurinist biology with political and ideological reconfigurations in post-Stalinist Yugoslavia. The essay examines the strategies employed by supporters and opponents of Lysenko’s doctrine, as well as those sympathetic to it but yet unconvinced of its scientific validity and political appropriateness. It emphasizes globally unique attempts to de-Stalinize Michurinist biology and use it in the political-ideological struggle against the Stalinist Soviet Union, pointing to local agency and the bottom-up nature of attempts both in support of and against the doctrine.
Between the years 1949 and 1953 the leaders of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia embarked on a series of radical social and economic reforms that restructured state–society relations in line with a decentralized, participatory model of socialism. “Self-management socialism,” as this system became known, served to harmonize local revolutionary ambitions with the embedded liberalism of the postwar international order into which Yugoslavia sought to integrate. During the early reform period Yugoslav intellectuals reorganized socialist ideology around new understandings of autonomy and creativity in ways that resonated with liberal traditions and diverged sharply from the Soviet paradigm. These concepts informed Yugoslav ideas of social self-management and national self-determination and facilitated the country's orientation to the postcolonial world. They also underpinned the new realm of cultural production, where reformers such as Miroslav Krleža and Marko Ristić mobilized this new concern with autonomous creativity to revive previously discarded aesthetic theories of interwar modernism.
Popular protest, which repeatedly occurred in communist regimes, turned into massive mobilizational waves in the late communist period. Why did some protests result in state cooptation and particularist nationalism (Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union), and others in state-society polarization (Poland) and protest containment (China), when these states shared important historical, political and institutional legacies? Political regimes with origins in indigenous popularly-based revolutionary movements are more resilient to popular protests and other major crises than other authoritarian regimes. Protracted ideological armed struggle largely overlaps with broader patriotic causes, such as liberation wars or struggles against foreign intervention. The revolutionary regimes thus acquire patriotic credentials, while boundaries between partisan and patriotic identities become blurred, which strengthens their elite unity and popular base. Popular protests thus facilitate a complex political game of old and new actors that may result in regime survival or transformation. In other regimes, popular unrest tends to produce state-society polarization and, ultimately, regime delegitimation and breakdown. Popular contention in complex multinational institutional settings, if there is no major external threat, highlights old and triggers new conflicts along these structural and institutional divides and, where dual political identities prevail, facilitates identity shifts in particularist direction.
Bu makale 1953 sonrası Yugoslavya’dan Türkiye’ye yapılan göç özelinde Demokrat Parti Dönemi Türkiye-Yugoslavya ilişkilerini konu alır. İki devletin dış politik tercihlerine birincil olarak Soğuk Savaş kaygıları yön vermiştir. İkinci olarak ise Türkiye-Yugoslavya ortak geçmişine dayalı toplumsal gerçekler öne çıkmıştır. 1950’lerin başında Sovyetler Birliği’nin güvenlik tehdidine karşı sosyalist bir lider olan Tito ile Demokrat Parti yönetimi arasında ciddi bir yakınlaşma olmuştur. Bu süreçte imzalanan dostluk anlaşması “Serbest Göç” mutabakatını içermektedir. Yazılı bir belgeye dayanmayan bu mutabakata göre Yugoslavya topraklarında yaşayan özellikle “Slav olmayan” Müslüman nüfus Türkiye’ye göç edecektir. Bu şekilde her iki ülke yöneticileri de demografik ve sosyal yapıyı yeniden şekillendirmeyi hedeflemiştir. Ancak bu mutabakatın izin verdiği göç süreci uzun bir zaman dilimine yayılmıştır. 1953 sonrası başlayan göçün bütün aşamaları milliyetçilik, tarihsel hafıza ve Soğuk Savaş kaygılarının iç içe girdiği karmaşık ağı içerisinde gerçekleşmiştir. Bu makale birincil yazılı ve sözlü kaynaklara dayanarak dış politik tercihler ile göçe muhatap taraflarda oluşan farklı algılar arasındaki ilişkiye ışık tutmayı amaçlar.
As a direct but unexpected consequence of the outbreak of the Soviet–Yugoslav conflict, so-called Cominformist or ibeovci communities were established in the Soviet Union and in its Eastern European satellite states. Their community was organized in Hungary, too, at the turn of 1948–1949. The ibeovci emigrants in Hungary formed a rather small and closed community which was subject to many internal conflicts, personal rivalries, real and imagined grievances. Most of the emigrants arrived to Hungary from the neighbouring Yugoslav republics. Ethnically, the majority of them were Serbs, and socially, they originated from lower social strata. The majority of them originated from the countryside or were first generational town dwellers. The emigrants were also prone to serious hardship in their everyday lives, material and financial conditions, and accommodation. These problems were gradually solved by the mid-1950s. Still, in some aspects, the emigrants lived on at least the same level, or even above the level, of the everyday Hungarians. Stalin’s death and the slow and time-consuming process of normalization between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and consequent improvement of relations between Yugoslavia and Hungary resulted in the dissolution of the emigrants’ community in Hungary in 1954. The emigrants became marginalized and they lost justification for their further political activities, which raised many personal dilemmas. Most of the emigrants remained in Hungary and became apolitical, but a small fraction remained politically active even in the 1960s and 1970s.
About the few Yugoslavs involved in the Spanish Civil War and granted the title “People’s Hero of Yugoslavia”.Among the few 1900 Yugoslavs involved in the Republican side during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), 64 were granted the title “People’s Hero of Yugoslavia”, the most prestigious of Tito’s Yugoslavia. All Communist Party militants on their return home after fighting in Spain and the French internment camps, they play a key role in the partisan army led by Josip Broz Tito in 1941. After 1945, the 34 “Spaniards” who died during World War II are crowned with glory and the 30 survivors, now living legends, occupy key positions in the military, diplomacy, government and the Party. But behind the myth, some aspects which remained taboo for long still exist. Thanks to the available archives in Belgrade and Moscow, we can now trace the actual routes of the militants, with their weaknesses, their doubts, their disagreements.
Although former Yugoslavia constituted what was widely held to be the most "promising" communist country in terms of potentials for economic reform and political democratization, Serbia remained the only East European country in which the former communist elite managed to defeat its opponents in a series of elections and preserve important elements of institutional and ideological continuity with the old system. Moreover, its regime played a conspicuous role in Yugoslavia's violent collapse. In the specialist literature, the "Serbian exceptionalism" thesis has been elaborated in a number of forms. These are critically reviewed in the first part of the paper, classifying the paradigms according to whether they emphasize: 1) Serbian traditionalist, authoritarian, and collectivist political culture, 2) the affinity between traditional Serbian national populism, Russophile anti-Westernism, and communism, 3) the exclusivist and assimilating character of Serbian nationalism, or 4) the appeals of the contemporary Serbian political elite led by S. Milošević. In the second part of the paper an alternative explanation is presented that seeks to be both interpretively adequate and causally plausible. It rests on five basic factors: 1) historical legacy (the distinctive character of the Serbian collective historical experience and the relationship between Serbian and Yugoslav identities); 2) institutional analysis (the unintended consequences of communist federalism); 3) ideology (the revival of narratives of "Serbian victimization" by Serbian intellectuals); 4) leadership and social base (the peculiar nature of Milošević's appeals in the period of the terminal crisis of communism); and 5) the role of the Diaspora (the perceived ethnic threat among Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia). .
This paper explains the non-democratic political outcome in Serbia of the late 1980s and early 1990s. In the process, the author reexamines several theories of "Serbian exceptionalism" in the specialist literature on Serbia and Yugoslavia, pointing out the inadequacy of some one-sided or stereotypical views of Yugoslav history, Serbian society, and Serbian nationalism in their historical development. The goal of this paper is to contribute to a more adequate understanding of the advent of a Serbian regime that was responsible for much of the tragedy that befell the former Yugoslavia, not to absolve it from its share of responsibility for that tragedy. Neither the advent of that regime nor the subsequent tragedy that ensued can be understood without taking into account some long-term factors, such as the special place occupied by the Yugoslav state in Serbian national consciousness, the legacy of ethnic persecution in World War II, the unintended consequences of communist nationality policy that led to the reemergence of the Serbian national question in the 1980s, as well the dramatic identity dilemma faced by Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia in the critical phase of Yugoslavia’s denouement. Only this peculiar constellation of political-cultural, institutional, ideological, leadership, and "diaspora" factors can help explain "Serbian exeptionalism," i.e., the conditions that allowed the party-state to survive in the face of a remarkably hostile international environment and considerable internal opposition. Thus, the willingness of a large part of Serbian society to put up with a non-democratic regime for a considerable period of time was not only a consequence of Milosevic’s residual if steadily declining charismatic status, his successful monopolization of the media, the repeated invocation of credible ethnic threats which the regime did much to produce, or the "siege mentality" caused by international sanctions, but
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