Review of "Manual for Survival" by Kate Brown

Article (PDF Available)inJournal of Radiological Protection · March 2019with 1,500 Reads
Abstract
My review, based on nearly thirty years of research on Chernobyl and dozens of visits to the contaminated areas of Belarus, Ukraine and Russia, argues that "Manual for Survival" ignores the thousands of scientific studies on Chernobyl which are available in the international scientific literature. In doing so, it presents a biased and misleading account of the health and environmental effects of the accident. I believe that this book only perpetuates the many myths about the accident effects and has very little basis in sound science.
Accepted for publication in: Journal of Radiological Protection
Review of “Manual for Survival” by Kate Brown
Jim Smith
School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of Portsmouth, Burnaby Building, Burnaby
Road, Portsmouth, PO1 3QL. Email: jim.smith@port.ac.uk.
Manual for Survival is an interesting, but deeply flawed and clearly biased history of the health and
environmental impacts of Chernobyl, the worst technological disaster in human history. It would be
all too easy to dismiss it for its multiple (and I think often deliberate) omissions, inconsistencies and
errors. But it is important that we in the radiation protection community take it seriously and
respond in detail to its claims - of major low-dose radiation effects we have missed - with clear
evidence and explanation of why we think it is wrong in a way which non-specialists can clearly
understand. With the notable exception of Mikhail Balonov’s response 1 to the Yablokov 2 Chernobyl
report I think it is something we have failed to do with previous claims of major low-dose radiation
effects after Chernobyl.
I was interviewed by Kate Brown for this book at a meeting in Florida on radiation effects on wildlife
at Chernobyl. For about an hour and a half I was subjected to what felt to me like an aggressive
cross-examination on a huge range of subjects relating to radiation, including the Hiroshima and
Nagasaki bomb survivor studies, cancer, wildlife effects, contamination of food and dose
reconstruction. I answered all her questions and where I had doubts later followed up with
information and evidence. I emerged from the interview feeling mentally exhausted (really!) but
nevertheless happy, even a little elated. Despite my reservations about her scientific knowledge,
here, I felt, was a serious and unbiased historian determined to get to the truth about the hugely
complex and controversial issue of the health and environmental consequences of Chernobyl.
I was wrong.
On getting the review copy of this book I couldn’t help but turn first to the pages dealing with my
interview (I guess most people would do the same). I was shocked and disappointed to find that the
information and opinions I had given on radiation effects on wildlife at Chernobyl had been
dismissed. According to Brown, I was a physicist (used almost as a term of abuse in the context) who
didn’t feel it necessary to go to Chernobyl to draw my pre-formed conclusions about the accident
effects. Brown did not report what I had told her I first studied Chernobyl fallout in the English
Lake District in 1990 and first did fieldwork in the Chernobyl affected areas of Ukraine and Belarus in
1994. I clearly remember being quite worried about what were to me at that time largely
unknown risks of radiation at Chernobyl. I have stopped counting the number of times I have visited
the Chernobyl contaminated areas since, but I guess it is around 40. I am happy to be argued with,
but it is poor and biased scholarship to dismiss my evidence (and that of my Belarussian colleagues
who worked in the Exclusion Zone for many years) based on what seems to me to be clear and
deliberate misinformation.
This, I think, is just one symptom of a deeply flawed and biased approach to the complex
information on Chernobyl, but I’ll try to give this book as fair a review as I can. You can judge
whether I have achieved that, but will certainly be more in-depth than the rather superficial and
misleading review provided by Nature 3.
Dosimetry and Dose Reconstruction
The treatment of radiation dose and dose estimation is unquestionably biased in this book. The
author wishes to make the argument that the physicists have got it wrong about radiation doses
after Chernobyl. She begins with a description of an interview with Lynn Anspaugh, an
internationally respected radiation expert who, amongst other things, co-led the 2006 IAEA
“Environmental” Chernobyl Forum report 4. In my brief experience of contact with him during the
preparation of the report, I found him to be hugely knowledgeable about the many aspects of
radiation and dose reconstruction after Chernobyl. Kate Brown apparently didn’t come to the same
conclusion. From her telephone interview, she takes one piece of information that early-on,
Anspaugh (presumably estimating total Global contamination from Chernobyl) took just two data
points to estimate fallout in the whole of Romania. She then uses this piece of information to
attempt to discredit the entire field of radiation protection dosimetry!! I guess, as a good scientist,
Anspaugh realised that in an initial estimate of impacts of Chernobyl (there have been many much
better estimates since including the Russia/Belarus/Ukraine/EU Atlas 5 and many more), that the
fallout in Romania wasn’t going to make too much difference and he made the best estimate he
could.
What is astonishing (literally, jaw-droppingly astonishing) is that Brown fails to mention, in the
section of the book dealing with dosimetry, all the measurements conducted in the years after the
accident both in the former Soviet countries and abroad. I believe Brown that in Soviet times,
information on these was (unforgivably) kept secret, but it is there and now you don’t have to dig
around in Soviet archives to find it: reports and results (but sadly not all the original data) have been
in the international scientific literature for more than 20 years. For example, in his paper for the
1996 Minsk conference 6, Mikhail Balonov reported “one million measurements of 134Cs and 137Cs in
the body”.
Those seeking to criticise the consensus on Chernobyl often accuse scientists of only focusing on one
isotope radiocaesium. It’s true that there are far more measurements and studies on caesium than
on other isotopes, because it is relatively long-lived and can be reasonably cheaply and easily
measured by gamma spectrometry and whole body counting. But that doesn’t mean that other
isotopes were ignored: the scientific literature contains many papers on many other isotopes,
including 131I, 90Sr and transuranium elements which Brown could have referred to, but chose not to.
Balonov’s short paper alone 6 mentions hundreds of 90Sr measurements, discusses the change in
isotopes contributing to dose over time since the accident and presents dosimetry models which
include the key isotopes needed for long term prediction. There are many others presenting dose
reconstruction models. Brown makes much of the “cocktail” of radionuclides residents were
exposed to, in particular 90Sr: this has also been covered in the scientific literature. Balonov 6 states
“…due to the low content of 90Sr in the Chernobyl release and [low] fallout outside the 30-Km Zone
its contribution to the internal effective dose does not exceed 5-10%, according to intake calculation
and direct measurements of 90Sr in human bones (autopsy samples). Similar contribution from the
inhalation of 238Pu, 239Pu, 240Pu and 241Am originated from 241Pu will not exceed 1% even for outdoor
workers”. There is a wealth of other information on all aspects of dosimetry in the scientific
literature amounting to hundreds, likely thousands of articles. Again, Brown doesn’t have to believe
Balonov and all the other scientists, but to omit this evidence is shocking.
Having dismissed “the physicists” method of dose estimation and reconstruction, Brown goes on to
argue that “the physicians” had a much better method which was ignored. She cites work by
Vorobiev (I haven’t seen this Russian language work but will try to get hold of a copy) which claims a
biodosimetry method based on analysis of chromosome damage which is much more accurate that
whole body counting and dose reconstruction. This method seems to give much higher accumulated
doses than “the physicists” methods.
Is it true that biodosimetry methods are better than physical measurements and models ? As far as I
know, the radiation protection community only uses biodosimetry to reconstruct doses after high
exposures which couldn’t be evaluated using physical methods. Even the most recent attempts
(using much more sophisticated technology than was available in 1986) to develop a unique
radiation biomarker for low dose exposure have failed. I checked this with Geraldine Thomas,
Professor of Molecular Pathology at Imperial College and she confirmed (pers. comm) that
biodosimetry only works well for high doses. That is not to say that such attempts are not valuable,
just that there is very little support for Brown’s claim that biodosimetric methods in the former
Soviet Union were better than direct measurement of gamma-emitters and dose reconstruction for
other nuclides.
Effects on wildlife
This section is so biased and misleading that I hardly know where to start. Brown has chosen to
believe the evidence of Anders P. Møller and Tim Mousseau that there are major effects of radiation
on organisms at Chernobyl at dose rates much lower than expected, and that wildlife is severely
damaged in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone (CEZ). In other parts of the book, Brown is careful to
question the veracity of her sources. But surprisingly she fails to mention what surely she must
know: Anders P. Møller is a highly controversial scientist (in radioecology and in his previous field of
evolutionary biology): an article in Nature reports that he was once found guilty of manipulating
data by the Danish Committee on Scientific Dishonesty (Nature Vol. 427, p 381, 2004). This doesn’t
automatically mean he and Mousseau are wrong about the extent of Chernobyl effects, but there is
plenty of evidence that they are, e.g. 7-11. Brown dismisses the evidence of my colleagues (including
Belarussian scientists) and me by calling me a physicist and implying that I have never been to
Chernobyl. Interestingly, in the apparently meticulously constructed list of footnotes, she cites our
paper (showing abundant mammal populations in the CEZ) wrongly as “Smith et al…” rather than
“Deryabina et al..” as it should be since Tatiana Deryabina was first author. Is it an error (we all make
them)? Or is she trying to hide the fact that Belarussian scientists were a key part of the study so
that she can argue (wrongly) that it was done by someone with no knowledge of the CEZ ?
The omissions in this section are shocking. Brown has not talked to and does not mention the one
person in the world who is most closely associated with wildlife at Chernobyl: Sergey Gaschak.
Sergey (much to his frustration at times) is the person who journalists always seem to go to to find
out about wildlife in the CEZ. Brown may not agree with Gaschak’s opinion (formed from 30 years in
the Zone and an intimate knowledge of the zone’s habitats and wildlife) that wildlife is not
significantly affected by radiation at Chernobyl, but she should at least report it. Gaschak initially
worked with Møller and Mousseau but refused to continue: he didn’t trust their reporting of data,
particularly on the influence of habitat on bird distribution 12. Brown does not discuss the work of
Ron Chesser and Robert Baker at Texas Tech University who spent many years studying small
mammals in the Red Forest hot spot. They found that small mammal abundance was similar in the
Red Forest to control areas 13 and that genetic effects were subtle. Chesser and Baker’s thoughts on
their long experience of radioecological research at Chernobyl are essential reading for an
understanding of this issue. Again, you don’t need to dig in Soviet archives: their article, ignored by
Brown, is in American Scientist 14.
Health effects and Chronic Radiation Sickness
My faith in Brown as an accurate reporter of radiation health effects was a bit shaken when I was
interviewed by her. Despite having already written Plutopia (Oxford University Press, 2013), her
fascinating, but scientifically flawed, account of the U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons programmes,
she very clearly did not know that non-radiation related cancer was very common across the world.
There are a myriad of health statistics on this, but you don’t need to look that far: Cancer Research
UK, for example, state on their website (and advertising) the projection that half of UK citizens will
get cancer at some point in our lives. I was further shocked to read in this Chernobyl book (p 25)
Brown’s bald statement that radiation is the only known cause of myeloid leukemia, in the context
clearly implying (wrongly) that there are no other causes. Brown did not consider or cite any of the
public health statistics on myeloid leukemia incidence in countries worldwide. Nor does she cite the
Hiroshima and Nagasaki Life Span Study (LSS) report 15 which clearly presents evidence that radiation
is a cause of myeloid leukemia (very significant at high doses), but is very far from being the only
cause, particularly at low dose rates. Nor does she cite her own statement on page 168 that
“radiation damage is hard to isolate and detect because it causes no new, stand-alone illnesses”.
The most controversial claim in this book is that very low dose radiation causes Chronic Radiation
Sickness. Chronic Radiation Sickness is real, having first been seen (but recognised late) at very high
dose rates in radium dial painters a century ago. It was seen in highly-exposed workers at the Mayak
Plutonium Production Plant where it was first diagnosed and treated by Angelina Guskova. In the
first part of Manual for Survival, Guskova is rightly described as a scientific hero (“No-one in the
world had treated more patients with radiation illness than Gus’kova” p 13; “Working on hundreds
of patients .. over three decades, Gus’kova developed a compendium of knowledge on radiation
medicine that had no equivalent in the world” p 15). As detailed in Manual for Survival, Gus’kova’s
work treating the early victims of Chernobyl (the 134 people suffering from Acute Radiation
Syndrome) saved and extended many lives. Brown contrasts Gus’kova’s deep understanding of
radiation sickness with the relative inexperience of the American doctor, Robert Gale, who flew in to
help treat the victims. Brown argues, powerfully, that Gale thought he knew better than the Soviet
scientist and ignored her expertise.
Sadly, the American doctor wasn’t the only person to ignore Angelina Gus’kova’s expertise: Brown
herself does so. Gus’kova not only treated sufferers of Acute Radiation Sickness, but also checked
evacuees and took part in the study of the “liquidators”, the hundreds of thousands of people who
worked on the Chernobyl clean-up operation in 1986 and 87 and who received some of the highest
radiation doses. In a 2012 article, Gus’kova 16 stated that “In contrast to the first group [the 134 ARS
victims], this second group of individuals working within the 30-km zone, just as the population
exposed to radiation [my emphasis], did not exhibit any manifestations of radiation sickness.
So, the world-leading expert in chronic radiation sickness has stated that she did not believe that
either the huge liquidator group, or the population exposed to chronic, relatively low dose rate
radiation suffered from radiation sickness. Kate Brown would doubtless argue that Gus’kova’s high
status in Soviet and Russian atomic science made her ignore evidence to the contrary. Whether you
believe Gus’kova or not (I do), for Brown to exclude this key evidence from a history book about the
health effects of Chernobyl is an omission of monumental proportions.
Manual for Survival argues that Western scientists knew less about the health effects of radiation
than their Soviet (and post-Soviet) counterparts. Evidence of apparent damage to health of adults,
children and newborns in the contaminated regions is cited from archival material in Ukraine and
Belarus. Brown claims that the Hiroshima and Nagasaki LSS (on which the system of radiation
protection is largely, but far from wholly, based) missed many early effects of radiation since it only
started in 1950, five years after the bombs were dropped. This is partly, but not wholly, true: effects
of fetal exposure could be, and were, studied 17. Effects on children due to pre-conception exposure
of their parents was studied and no effects were found 18 allowing an upper limit on risk of inter-
generational mutation damage to be estimated.
Discounting the LSS evidence allows Brown to argue that radiation is much worse than UN
organisations and the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) believe (though
note that these organisations consulted and had as members key former Soviet scientists, including
the radiation sickness expert Angelina Gus’kova). Astonishingly, however, Manual for Survival
ignores almost all the other international scientific evidence on this issue. Hundreds of footnotes
detail Soviet and former-Soviet sources, but there are barely any citations from the many
epidemiological studies (not just the LSS) and thousands of radiobiological studies in the
international scientific literature (see, for just one example, the Oxford Restatement on this issue 19).
The few international sources which are cited are those (some of them highly controversial) which
agree with Brown’s various contradictory and confusing hypotheses.
What of the public health statistics apparently showing huge increases in birth defects, cancers and a
wide range of other illnesses in the populations of the contaminated territories ? Though Brown has
apparently uncovered new archival evidence (which should be evaluated, if they have not already
been), I am highly skeptical. I suspect (but don’t know) that much of this evidence is similar to that
presented in the controversial Yablokov report 2 claiming nearly a million deaths from Chernobyl. I’m
not an epidemiologist, but I have tried to take a look at these claims.
Firstly, I looked again at the 2006 WHO Chernobyl Forum Report 20. The 48 international experts
(including experts from Belarus, Ukraine and Russia) evaluated a wealth of data on health effects of
Chernobyl. The report (strangely, hardly mentioned in Manual for Survival) covers a wide spectrum
of health outcomes including cancer and non-cancer effects in adults and children as well as adverse
pregnancy outcomes. It comes to a very different conclusion to Manual for Survival. Have the
international experts ignored or missed key evidence? I think it very unlikely, but what to me is
missing from the WHO report is a clear explanation, in lay-persons terms, of why this evidence is not
included.
I’ve taken a look at some (but of course not all) of this evidence and it seems obvious to me why
much of it wasn’t included. Health effects studies after Chernobyl suffered from two major
problems: changes and errors in reporting before and after the accident, and a difficulty in
disentangling radiation health effects from the ongoing public health crisis during and after the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Both of these effects are real: they are mentioned in Manual for
Survival but are discounted when claims of huge radiation health effects are being made.
Problems in health reporting. I’m currently working in the Narodichi district of Ukraine on a small
project trying to make the lives of people in affected areas a little bit better by bringing abandoned
agricultural land back into use, where it can be done safely. As part of the project, we spoke to
Anatoly Prysyazhnyuk, a cancer-doctor and epidemiologist. Anatoly was born in Narodichi to a family
of local doctors and is an Honoured Citizen of Narodichi, but was working in Kiev at the time of the
accident. He told us that, in 1987, he was contacted by the head of the local hospital. The hospital
chief was very worried that cancer registrations had increased significantly since the accident.
Anatoly went back to his home town to investigate. He found that, indeed, cancer registrations had
gone up, but that this was due to reporting changes, not to radiation. Changes in reporting of health
outcomes are real and are a key consideration in interpreting health statistics as the 48 WHO experts
no doubt knew.
Misuse of public health statistics In his review of the flawed Yablokov 2 report, Mikhail Balonov 1 cites
data on mortality rates across Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union 21. As Balonov notes,
mortality rates increased since 1991 in all parts of Russia, even in Siberia, thousands of miles from
Chernobyl. As shown in Figure 1, demographers have attributed this to economic crisis, alcohol
consumption and smoking, not radiation. Trends in mortality, and other health outcomes, are
compromised by this widespread health crisis. Comparing public health statistics between
contaminated and uncontaminated regions is also fraught with difficulty owing to known
demographic changes in the contaminated regions (younger people tended to leave, older people
tended to stay).
Oddly, when convenient to her argument, Kate Brown accepts problems in distinguishing radiation
effects in health data. Her treatment of Fred Mettler’s study of 1656 inhabitants, including children,
of the affected and non-affected areas 22 is revealing of the huge contradictions at the heart of
Brown’s thesis. Manual for Survival reports the finding of this study: that no significant differences
could be found between 853 inhabitants of contaminated areas and 803 inhabitants of control
areas. But Brown goes on to attempt to discredit this study. Firstly, she argues that doses were not
different between control and contaminated regions due to trade in foodstuffs. This ignores the fact
that this (as well as making little sense) was checked in the study: “Samples of bread, milk,
vegetables and meat were also examined from these control settlements. Analysis revealed low
levels of contamination, as expected” (IAEA22 p 283-284).
Secondly, Brown argues that that a 1600 person study is not sufficient to find evidence of the low-
probability health effects of low dose radiation. She is right, but what is odd that she does not apply
this logic to many of the other claims in her book. In most of the book she seems to be claiming
major health effects which would have been picked up by the IAEA screening. Indeed, the report 22
includes a power analysis of the study showing what sort of health effect the study could detect.
Later on in the book, Brown supports her claims of non-cancer health effects of radiation by
referring to large scale studies (hundreds of thousands of subjects) which may (or may not) indicate
a tiny increase in cardiovascular risk at low dose rates (of the order of the majority of doses received
by the Chernobyl affected populations). But she ignores the key point: even if real, these tiny non-
cancer health effects are of no significant relevance to the health of people living in contaminated
areas. What they need to worry about (and often are worried about, of course), as has been pointed
out many times before23,24, is the high rates of unemployment, poor condition of their health
services, diet, nutrition, smoking, alcohol consumption etc.
This is not to say that there have been no health effects of Chernobyl. As noted by Brown, the cancer
effect which can most clearly and unambiguously be attributed to radiation is thyroid cancer in
children and adults exposed as children to fast-decaying I-131 in the weeks after the accident. The
increase in the affected regions was large and could be seen even in national health statistics: annual
incidence in Belarus, for example, increased from fewer than one case in 100,000 before 1986 to 7-8
cases per 100,000 in the 1990’s 25 and remains elevated. There is evidence of increases in breast
cancer26, though note that this study concluded that “the age‐adjusted breast cancer incidence rates
in the most contaminated regions of Belarus and Ukraine are still lower than in North America and
Western Europe”. Other cancer incidence from dose reconstruction across Europe has been
estimated by Cardis et al. 27, if you apply the Linear No-Threshold (LNT) hypothesis that even tiny
radiation doses carry a potential risk.
Figure 1. Graphic illustrating the loss of life expectancy in the high dose group of atomic bomb
survivors; smoking prevalence in former Soviet countries; changes in life expectancy in Russia (not
linked to radiation) from 1981-2002 28.
Berries with radiocaesium in Polessie
A claim in Manual for Survival is that, even after the initial period of iodine contamination,
contaminated produce, particularly milk, was still consumed by people in the years after the
accident, even though it was over the (quite cautious) limits for radiocaesium in food products in
place in the former Soviet countries. Again, this isn’t a historical fact hidden in Soviet archives: it is
there in the scientific literature and in official statistics of the affected countries. In my co-authored
book on Chernobyl 29, we reproduced a table from Firsakova 30 showing changes in the number of
kilotonnes of milk and meat from collective farms which were above intervention limits.
One of the “headline” claims in Manual for Survival is that contaminated berries have up to 3000
Bq/kg of 137Cs (well above the Ukrainian limit) and that these may be being mixed with
uncontaminated berries and exported to Western Europe. Of course, that is not a good thing, but is
it a really bad thing? Brown implies that this is really dangerous, but provides no context to help the
reader evaluate what the risk is. It may help to place this in context that after Chernobyl, the
Norwegian government made the difficult decision to increase the limit on 137Cs concentrations in
reindeer meat to up to 6000 Bq/kg (in 1994 it was reduced to 3000 Bq/kg) 31. Why? Because they
sensibly balanced the tiny risk to the reindeer herders, and Norwegian consumers against the
damage of a ban to the lifestyles and culture of the herding community. I don’t know enough about
the berry-pickers of Rivne, Ukraine to make such a decision, but Brown is wrong to imply that this is
very dangerous. I’m in no way advocating allowing regulatory limits to be broken, just that breaking
these very cautious limits doesn’t mean something is dangerous. As a European consumer, if I
somehow managed (a vanishingly unlikely event) to eat a whole kg of the most contaminated
berries, I would get an additional dose equivalent to about two chest X-rays, a return flight from Los
Angeles to New York or 250 times lower than an abdominal CT scan.
The residents of Polessie are eating contaminated produce all the time: this is why we calculate the
overall dose. Only a small proportion of people now living in the contaminated regions get a dose
more than 2 mSv per year and the vast majority get a dose less than 1 mSv per year. These dose
rates are well within the variation of natural background radiation worldwide.
Nuclear Weapons Testing
Manual for Survival argues that Chernobyl was just an acceleration of a process, damaging to the
whole planet, started during the atmospheric bomb tests of the 1950’s and ‘60’s. I agree with
Brown that, if you believe in the LNT hypothesis that every small radiation dose carries a risk, then
the global health consequences of atmospheric nuclear weapons testing are huge. Like many claims
in Manual for Survival, this claim is treated as news, but it is only alarming news if you ignore the
mass of scientific evidence. The UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation
(UNSCEAR) have published many reports on this. The estimated collective dose from atmospheric
weapons testing is huge and dwarfs that of Chernobyl. But individual doses are, of course, low:
UNSCEAR 32 reports peak annual total effective dose in 1963 in the region of 0.1 mSv. This is about
the equivalent dose to a return flight from London-Los Angeles (from cosmic radiation) for everyone
in the Northern Hemisphere and about one thirtieth of annual natural background radiation dose
rates. Any extra dose above background could be a potential risk. But Brown’s vague assertion that
this could be a significant cause of long term increases in cancer incidence worldwide, without any
supporting evidence, is unconvincing, to say the least.
Omissions and errors
One of the major failings of this book is that the vast body of knowledge in the international
scientific literature is almost completely ignored - except where it coincides with Brown’s thesis.
Other omissions I noted are: no discussion of natural radioactivity, no mention of thyroid treatment
by I-131, medical diagnostic doses or all the epidemiological evidence from medical diagnostic and
therapeutic procedures. There are more omissions and many more errors than I have had the space
to point out here.
Breaking the Laws of Physics
These are maybe minor points, but I think it indicates something about the poor quality of this book
when I have to point out that Manual for Survival gives credence to three claims that break current
Laws of Physics:
1. It apparently gives credence to the view (page 215) that nuclear weapons testing on Earth,
through the vacuum of space, somehow influenced the Sun’s solar flare activity. It’s true
that nuclear weapons have terrifying destructive power the biggest are equivalent to 50
megatonnes of TNT. I could write an essay on why these couldn’t influence solar flare
activity, but perhaps a comparison of relative energy is best. I studied astrophysics more
than 30 years ago and have forgotten what I learnt about solar flares, so went to NASA’s
website (https://visibleearth.nasa.gov/view.php?id=55580). I found that “solar flares… are
capable of releasing as much energy as a billion megatonnes of TNT”, twenty million times
bigger than the biggest nuclear bomb. Solar activity, of course, affects Earth, not least in the
charged particles contributing to the cosmic and natural background radiation we all receive
every day. The astonishing omission of any discussion of natural radiation doses is just
another fatal flaw in Manual for Survival.
2. It reports (page 302) that “the period of half of 137Cs to disappear from Chernobyl forests will
be between 180 and 320 years”, citing “Wired” magazine. The physical decay half life of 137Cs
is about 30.2 years. In the years after Chernobyl it has been pointed out many times, by me
and many others, that in soils rich in organic matter, the effective ecological half life of 137Cs
is approaching it’s physical decay half life (e.g. 33). But it can’t go higher than 30.2 years,
unless, of course, the Laws of Physics are wrong.
3. Kate Brown’s dosimeter was “jumping in alarm” in the most contaminated Red Forest area
(page 125), apparently due to a previous forest fire. I’m struggling to understand what
Brown means here, but she seems to be claiming that her dosimeter was reading 1000
µSv/h when normally the Red Forest reads (a very high) 50-100 µSv/h. Here Brown claims
that a fire the previous year has caused the 10 times increase in dose rate because the fire
released radioactivity. Again, there is so much wrong with this hypothesis that I hardly know
where to start. Yes forest fires can release small amounts of radioactivity to the air, but why
should this have a significant (10x) influence on external gamma dose rates ? For an
understanding of effects of forest fires on radionuclide resuspension, Brown could have
studied and cited previous work on this e.g. 34.
The Laws of Physics are not set in stone, and physicists make mistakes too, but I don’t think
we’re going to start re-writing the textbooks yet. I’m not expecting Brown to understand all the
physics of radiation protection, but I do expect her to consider the huge amount of available
scientific knowledge and opinions.
What can we learn from this book ?
In this review I’ve necessarily focussed primarily on the (many) flaws and omissions in the book.
Manual for Survival is a polemic, not a history book and much less a science book. Brown is rightly
angry at the Soviet (and some Western) cover-ups, the haphazard and often inefficient relocations.
After Chernobyl, people got bigger doses than they needed, particularly the unforgivably large
thyroid doses due to failure to prevent ingestion of 131I in the first weeks after the accident. She is
also angry that the people living in the Chernobyl contaminated areas have seemingly been
forgotten by the international community. International scientific and humanitarian efforts (with
many notable exceptions) have been piecemeal, often with little and inconsistent funding, and have
very often failed (partly due to the complexities of working in the post-Soviet countries). I would
contrast the inconsistent funding for economic redevelopment in the Chernobyl contaminated areas
with the about $US 1.5 billion committed to the New Safe Confinement and reactor
decommissioning project.
I remember vividly, in the mid-1990’s, studying fish at Lake Kozhanovskoe in Russia. The fish had
accumulated 137Cs activity concentrations far above intervention limits, but people were still eating
the fish. Naively, I asked a fisherman why he was eating these fish: he looked at me blankly as if I
had come from another world and responded drily: “what do you expect me to eat ?”. At the time,
there was little food in rural shops. At that point, I realised that the radioactivity in the fish was the
least of the fisherman’s problems.
I’m angry that too often, both in the affected countries and abroad, myths about radiation have
been spread: I think these do real damage to people’s lives and have undoubtedly hampered
recovery from the disaster. Manual for Survival perpetuates many of those myths, but I think we
should learn from it. I’m also angry at myself, and my scientific field for not having worked harder to
counter those myths. Kate Brown has a journalist’s skill in capturing the individual tragedies of many
people’s lives in the Chernobyl contaminated lands and she puts this to good use in describing her
many visits to these areas. The problem is real, but I think the diagnosis offered in Manual for
Survival is very wrong and damaging. People in the Chernobyl affected areas need more jobs, more
economic development, better healthcare and better nutrition. Current radiation should be the least
of their concerns, though I understand why many (not all) still worry.
Acknowledgements
I currently have funding from the UK Natural Environment Research Council project iCLEAR
Innovating the Chernobyl Landscape: Environmental Assessment for Rehabilitation and
Management (NE/R009619/1).
Conflict of interest
I have previously had a small amount of funding from the nuclear industry and a larger project from
the NERC part funded by Radioactive Waste Management and the UK Environment Agency. This will
likely be perceived by some as a conflict of interest. I am proud to be making a small contribution to
helping the clean-up of the UK’s nuclear waste legacy.
References
1 Balonov, M. I. On protecting the inexperienced reader from Chernobyl myths. Journal of
Radiological Protection 32, 181 (2012).
2 Yablokov, A. V., Nesterenko, V. B., Nesterenko, A. V. & Sherman-Nevinger, J. D. Chernobyl:
Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment. Vol. 39 (John Wiley &
Sons, 2010).
3 Schmid, S. Chernobyl: data wars and disaster politics. Nature 566, 450-451 (2019).
4 Alexakhin, R. et al. Environmental consequences of the Chernobyl accident and their
remediation: twenty years of experience. Report of the Chernobyl Forum Expert group
“Environment”. (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2006).
5 Cort, M. d. Atlas of caesium deposition on Europe after the Chernobyl accident. (1998).
6 Balonov, M., Jacob, P., Likhtarev, I. & Minenko, V. Pathways, levels and trends of population
exposure after the Chernobyl accident. The radiological consequences of the Chernobyl
accident, 235-249 (1996).
7 Bonzom, J.-M. et al. Effects of radionuclide contamination on leaf litter decomposition in the
Chernobyl exclusion zone. Science of the Total Environment 562, 596-603 (2016).
8 Lecomte-Pradines, C. et al. Soil nematode assemblages as bioindicators of radiation impact
in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone. Science of the Total Environment 490, 161-170 (2014).
9 Deryabina, T. et al. Long-term census data reveal abundant wildlife populations at
Chernobyl. Current Biology 25, R824-R826 (2015).
10 Webster, S. C. et al. Where the wild things are: influence of radiation on the distribution of
four mammalian species within the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone. Frontiers in Ecology and the
Environment 14, 185-190 (2016).
11 Zach, R., Hawkins, J. L. & Sheppard, S. C. Effects of ionizing radiation on breeding swallows at
current radiation protection standards. Environmental toxicology and chemistry 12, 779-786
(1993).
12 Gaschak, S. in COMET Deliverable (DN 5.6). COMET Workshop report: Thirty years after the
Chernobyl accident: what do we know about the effects of radiation on the environment. 20-
22.
13 Wiggins, L. E. et al. Small Mammals from the Most Radioactive Sites Near the Chornobyl
Nuclear Power Plant. Journal of Mammalogy 77, 155-170, doi:10.2307/1382717 (1996).
14 Chesser, R. K. & Baker, R. J. Growing Up with Chernobyl: Working in a radiaactive zone, two
scientists learn tough lessons about politics, bias and the challenges of doing good science.
American scientist 94, 542-549 (2006).
15 Hsu, W.-L. et al. The incidence of leukemia, lymphoma and multiple myeloma among atomic
bomb survivors: 1950-2001. Radiation research 179, 361-382, doi:10.1667/RR2892.1 (2013).
16 Gus'kova, A. K. Medical Consequences of the Chernobyl accident: Aftermath and Unsolved
Problems. Atomic Energy 113, 135-142 (2012).
17 Yamazaki, J. N. & Schull, W. J. Perinatal loss and neurological abnormalities among children
of the atomic bomb: Nagasaki and Hiroshima revisited, 1949 to 1989. JAMA 264, 605-609
(1990).
18 Douple, E. B. et al. Long-term Radiation-Related Health Effects in a Unique Human
Population: Lessons Learned from the Atomic Bomb Survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness 5, S122-S133, doi:10.1001/dmp.2011.21
(2013).
19 McLean, A. R. et al. A restatement of the natural science evidence base concerning the
health effects of low-level ionizing radiation. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological
Sciences 284, 20171070 (2017).
20 Bennett, B. & Repacholi, M. in Health effects of the Chernobyl accident and special health
care programmes. Report of the UN Chernobyl Forum Expert Group" Health". (World Health
Organization).
21 Men, T., Brennan, P., Boffetta, P. & Zaridze, D. Russian mortality trends for 1991-2001:
analysis by cause and region. BMJ 327, 964, doi:10.1136/bmj.327.7421.964 (2003).
22 IAEA. The International Chernobyl Project Technical Report. . 640 (International Atomic
Energy Agency, Vienna, 1991).
23 WHO. Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident and Special Health Care Programmes. (World
Health Organization, Geneva, 2006).
24 UNDP, U. & UN-OCHA, W. The human consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear accidenta
strategy for recovery. Report commissioned by UNDP and UNICEF with the support of UN-
OCHA and WHO (2002).
25 Kenigsberg, J. E. & Buglova, E. E. in Chernobyl: Catastrophe and Consequences Vol. 310 (eds
Jim T Smith & Nicholas A Beresford) 217-237 (Springer, 2005).
26 Pukkala, E. et al. Breast cancer in Belarus and Ukraine after the Chernobyl accident.
International journal of cancer 119, 651-658 (2006).
27 Cardis, E. et al. Cancer consequences of the Chernobyl accident: 20 years on. Journal of
Radiological Protection 26, 127-140 (2006).
28 Gavrilova, N. S., Semyonova, V. G., Evdokushkina, G. N., Gavrilov, L. & Ivanova, A. E. in
Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America. 1-3.
29 Smith, J. T. & Beresford, N. A. Chernobyl: catastrophe and consequences. Vol. 310 (Springer,
2005).
30 Firsakova, S. Effectiveness of countermeasures applied in Belarus to produce milk and meat
with acceptable levels of radiocaesium after the Chernobyl accident. Science of the total
environment 137, 199-203 (1993).
31 Liland, A., Lochard, J. & Skuterud, L. How long is long-term? Reflections based on over 20
years of post-Chernobyl management in Norway. Journal of environmental radioactivity 100,
581-584 (2009).
32 UNSCEAR, A. C. Exposures to the public from man-made sources of radiation. Sources and
Effects of Ionizing Radiation, 158 (2000).
33 Smith, J. et al. Pollution: Chernobyl's legacy in food and water. Nature 405, 141 (2000).
34 Kashparov, V. et al. Forest fires in the territory contaminated as a result of the Chernobyl
accident: radioactive aerosol resuspension and exposure of fire-fighters. Journal of
environmental radioactivity 51, 281-298 (2000).
This research hasn't been cited in any other publications.
  • Article
    Sonja Schmid extols two studies on the aftermath of the nuclear catastrophe, from medical impacts to radioactive blueberries. Sonja Schmid extols two studies on the aftermath of the nuclear catastrophe, from medical impacts to radioactive blueberries. Artwork on an abandoned structure in Pripyat, Ukraine, April 2017.
  • Article
    Full-text available
    Exposure to ionizing radiation is ubiquitous, and it is well established that moderate and high doses cause ill-health and can be lethal. The health effects of low doses or low dose-rates of ionizing radiation are not so clear. This paper describes a project which sets out to summarize, as a restatement, the natural science evidence base concerning the human health effects of exposure to low-level ionizing radiation. A novel feature, compared to other reviews, is that a series of statements are listed and categorized according to the nature and strength of the evidence that underpins them. The purpose of this restatement is to provide a concise entrée into this vibrant field, pointing the interested reader deeper into the literature when more detail is needed. It is not our purpose to reach conclusions on whether the legal limits on radiation exposures are too high, too low or just right. Our aim is to provide an introduction so that non-specialist individuals in this area (be they policy-makers, disputers of policy, health professionals or students) have a straightforward place to start. The summary restatement of the evidence and an extensively annotated bibliography are provided as appendices in the electronic supplementary material.
  • Article
    Abstract Although nearly 30 years have passed since the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant accident near the town of Pripyat, Ukraine, the status and health of mammal populations within the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone (CEZ) remain largely unknown, and are of substantial scientific and public interest. Information regarding the response of flora and fauna to chronic radiation exposure is important in helping us understand the ecological consequences of past (eg Chernobyl and Fukushima) and potential future nuclear accidents. We present the results of the first remote-camera scent-station survey conducted within the CEZ. We observed individuals of 14 mammalian species in total; for those species with sufficiently robust visitation rates to allow occupancy to be modeled (gray wolf [Canis lupus], raccoon dog [Nyctereutes procyonoides], Eurasian boar [Sus scrofa], and red fox [Vulpes vulpes]), we found no evidence to suggest that their distributions were suppressed in highly contaminated areas within the CEZ. These data support the results of other recent studies, and contrast with research suggesting that wildlife populations are depleted within the CEZ.
  • Article
    Following the 1986 Chernobyl accident, 116,000 people were permanently evacuated from the 4,200 km2 Chernobyl exclusion zone [1] . There is continuing scientific and public debate surrounding the fate of wildlife that remained in the abandoned area. Several previous studies of the Chernobyl exclusion zone (e.g. [2,3] ) indicated major radiation effects and pronounced reductions in wildlife populations at dose rates well below those thought [4,5] to cause significant impacts. In contrast, our long-term empirical data showed no evidence of a negative influence of radiation on mammal abundance. Relative abundances of elk, roe deer, red deer and wild boar within the Chernobyl exclusion zone are similar to those in four (uncontaminated) nature reserves in the region and wolf abundance is more than 7 times higher. Additionally, our earlier helicopter survey data show rising trends in elk, roe deer and wild boar abundances from one to ten years post-accident. These results demonstrate for the first time that, regardless of potential radiation effects on individual animals, the Chernobyl exclusion zone supports an abundant mammal community after nearly three decades of chronic radiation exposures.
  • Article
    In this paper main regularities of the long-term exposure of the population of former USSR after the Chernobyl accident are described. Influence of some natural, human and social factors on the forming of external and internal dose in the rural and urban population was studied in the most contaminated regions of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine during 1986-1994. Radioecological processes of I, Cs and Sr nuclides migration in biosphere influencing the processes of population dose formation are considered. The model of their intake in human body was developed and validated by large-scaled measurements of the human body content The model of external exposure of different population groups was developed and confirmed by the series of individual external dose measurements with thermoluminescent dosemeters. General dosimetric characteristics of the population exposure are given along with some samples of accumulated external and internal effective doses in inhabitants of contaminated areas in 1986-1995. Forecast of the external and internal population effective dose is given for the period of 70 years after the accident.
  • Article
    Data on the health consequences of the 1986 Chernobyl accident are generalized. The volume and quality of the information available at different times after the accident which is required for diagnostics of the prognosis and for picking methods for minimizing the consequences of the accident are evaluated. The decisions made during the early period using the limited information available at the time but requiring that immediate measures be taken, whose accuracy can be evaluated in the future, are compared. Three basic groups of individuals drawn into the accident situation with a different combination of health risk factors are singled out: emergency shift workers, participants in post-accident cleanup, and the population in the accidental emission zone. The health consequences for these groups and the principles of their observation in the future are evaluated.