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This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in SOUTH
EUROPEAN SOCIETY AND POLITICS on [08/03/2019], available at
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13608746.2019.1582856?journalCode=fses
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IF YOU WILL CITE IT PLEASE USE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:
Nefes, T. S. (2019) ‘Negative perceptions of Jews in Turkish politics: An analysis of
parliamentary debates, 1983-2016’, South European Society and Politics 24(3): 397-419.
Negative Perceptions of Jews in Turkish Politics: An Analysis of the Parliamentary
Debates between 1983 and 2016
Abstract
What are the political roots of the anti-Jewish rhetoric? This study analyses the perception of
Jews in Turkish politics to address this ever-important query. Building on group position theory
and the historical background of the Turkish-Jewish relations, the research proposes that right-
wing ideological orientation and perceived threats can predict negative perception of Jews. It
scrutinises the Turkish parliamentary proceedings by quantitative and qualitative content
analysis. The findings support the premise. The study concludes that discussing about
perceived threats tends to evoke the negative rhetoric and right-wing ideological orientation
seems to be a predictive factor for the expression of such views. This implies that an effective
management of perceived threats would decrease the frequency of anti-Jewish statements in
Turkish politics.
Keywords: anti-Semitism; parliamentary proceedings; political parties; group position theory;
Sèvres syndrome; Turkey
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Why do politicians encourage hostility towards other religious groups? According to a
substantial sociological perspective, group position theory (Blumer 1958; Bobo 1999),
dominant groups’ perception of threat to their prerogatives can explain their hostility. This
perspective mainly analyses the developed world and pays attention to the sizes of minority
populations and worsening economic conditions. While it provides invaluable insights, it has
some limitations: (a) it lacks analyses of the historical backgrounds of intergroup hostility; (b)
it does not bring sufficient examples from less developed countries; and (c) very few studies
(e.g. King and Wiener 2007) benefit from group position theory to explain hostility towards
Jews, despite being one of the most widespread forms of prejudice. This research addresses the
latter scholarly gaps (b and c) by analysing the relationship between perceived threats and
Turkish political parties’ descriptions of Jews and the first gap (a) by accounting for the
historical background of the hostility towards non-Muslims in Turkey. The study relies on the
following definition of Jews: ‘any person belonging to the worldwide group that constitutes,
through descent or conversion, a continuation of the ancient Jewish people, who were
themselves descendants of the Hebrews of the Old Testament’ (Britannica 2018).
Turkey provides an interesting context, because although the local Jewish population has
declined below 1%, this did not end the negative political rhetoric. After the establishment of
the Turkish Republic in 1923, non-Muslim minorities gradually emigrated from the country
(Akturk 2017). Their overall population reduced from 19.2% in 1914 to 0.2% in 2005 (Içduygu
et al. 2008). Various scholars underlined the Turkish state’s exclusionary policies (e.g. Içduygu
& Soner 2006; Nefes 2018a) as the main reason for the emigration pattern. The academic
literature provides contrasting perspectives on the perception of Jews in Turkey. On the one
hand, various studies argue that the country has always been a generous host to Jews (e.g.
Lewis 1984; Shaw 1991). They give examples of tolerance, such as the Ottoman emperor
Bayazid II’s formal invitation to the persecuted Jews from Spain in the 15th century. On the
other hand, others posit that Turkish politics and society is replete with anti-Jewish sentiments
(e.g. Bali 2001; 2006; 2009). Given that ethnic and religious hostility is a central concern in
the geopolitical region, it is imperative to explore the contexts and factors that evoke the
negative perception of religious minorities in Turkish politics.
This research focuses on the Turkish parliamentary proceedings between 1983 and 2016.
Relying on quantitative and qualitative content analysis, it examines how members of the
parliament (MPs) describe Jews and what contexts encourage negative remarks about Jews.
Building on group position theory and the historical prevalence of anti-Jewish attitude in
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Turkish right-wing politics, the paper proposes that perceived economic/national/religious
threats and right-wing ideological orientation are important predictors of hostility towards Jews
in Turkish parliamentary politics. The research develops the scholarship in various ways. First,
it expands our knowledge about group position theory by bringing evidence from macro-level
parliamentary politics, using mixed methods in a complementary manner and accounting for
the historical background of the perceived security threats. Second, the study contributes to the
scholarship on the perception of Jews by being one of the few researches that shows the strength
of the group position theory in explaining the anti-Jewish political rhetoric. Third, for using the
Turkish parliamentary proceedings between 1983 and 2016, the study is one of the few
systematic analyses on the perception of minorities in contemporary Turkish politics.
The paper begins with providing a brief historical background of the Turkish perception of
Jews. Then, it brings together the academic literatures on the Turkish perception of Jews and
group position theory to provide a novel theoretical perspective. Subsequently, the study
outlines the research context, procedures and the methodological choices. Last, it presents the
main findings and discusses their implications.
A brief history of the Turkish perception of Jews
The analysis should be informed by the experience of the community during the Ottoman
Empire (1299-1923). According to Lewis (1984), the most significant Jewish migration wave
to the Ottoman Empire took place following their expulsion from Spain and Portugal in the
fifteenth century. The Sephardic Jews mainly migrated to the cities, such as Salonika, Edirne
and Izmir. Jews lived under the millet system in the Ottoman Empire, which recognised the
community as a religious minority and gave them independence in fiscal, religious and
educations affairs (Barkey 2008; Içduygu & Soner 2006). The Ottoman Jews were organised
around the authority of the Chief Rabbi. Despite their autonomy, they were in a subordinate
position to the Muslim ruler, paying extra taxes and could not serve as state officers (Içduygu
et al. 2008; Zürcher 2004). This system gradually ended during the collapse of the Ottoman
rule in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. It was completely abolished after the
establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923.
The Ottoman Jews lived in a relatively tolerant environment, as their presence was seen as
beneficial by the authorities (Shaw 1991). Jewish bankers and tax farmers had a prominent
place in the Ottoman economy (Inalcık & Quataert 1997). Lewis (1984) added that as the major
enemy of the Ottomans were Christians, Jews received more sympathy. In line with this view,
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Cohen (2014) showed that towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Jews were
seen as a model community, whose members were loyal servants of the empire. One of the
noteworthy events that could support this perspective is Sultan Abdul Mecid’s response to the
blood libel accusations by the Christian communities (Lewis 1984). To stop the discrimination
against the Jewish minority, the sultan issued an order in 1840, which assured that in such cases
the Ottoman court would investigate the claims and provide justice (Shaw 1991, p. 200).
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent creation of the Turkish Republic on
29 October 1923 meant a drastic change in the legal status of the Jewish minority. The
establishment of the republic was marked by the signature of the Lausanne Peace Treaty in
1923 following the Turkish Independence War (1919-1923). This treaty promised a
continuation of the rights of the millet system and offered autonomy to the religious minorities.
Toktaş (2005) claimed that the republican elite did not want to give this much autonomy, as it
contrasted their quest to create a homogenous Turkish society. Aviv (2017) argued that the
Jewish community feared from the Turkish state pressure and renounced these rights. The
Armenian and Greek minorities also followed. This meant their transition to the modern
citizenship, which promised them an equal position as the citizens of Turkey. Nevertheless, as
attested by many events, the equality in law did not match de facto treatment of these
minorities. For example, on 6-7 September 1955, an act of mass violence against non-Muslim
minorities took place in Istanbul. Kuyucu (2005) underlined that the event showed the Turkish
state’s unequal treatment of the religious minorities, as the state did not give adequate economic
compensation for the looted shops to the effected members of the minorities.
In addition, there is an ongoing ideological hostility of the far-right Islamist and Turkish
nationalist groups against Jews (Bali 2001; Landau 1988; Nefes 2015a; 2015b). One of the
early events that the Islamists’ hostility dates back to is Theodor Herzl’s request to Sultan
Abdulhamid II to buy Palestine in 1899 to establish a Jewish settlement (Shaw 1991). This was
rejected by the sultan, and in 1908, he was toppled. Some Islamist circles interpret this as a
Jewish revenge for not selling Palestine. The enmity continued during the modern Turkish
republic period. Prominent intellectuals of the right-wing, such as Islamist Necip Fazıl
Kısakürek (2013), and Turkish racist Hüseyin Nihal Atsız (1934) described Jews in anti-
Semitic terms as a nefarious enemy of Turks. In the 2000s, the books with anti-Semitic themes,
such as Efendi series (Yalçın 2004, 2006), became best-sellers in Turkish book market
implying a move towards mainstream Turkish culture. Although Yalçın defines himself as a
secular and socialist author, there is no historical prevalence of the anti-Semitic theme in left-
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wing politics of Turkey comparable to the right-wing. Accordingly, this study expects Turkish-
nationalist and Islamist MPs to be more likely to utter anti-Jewish sentiments in the parliament.
Understanding the negative perception of Jews via perceived threats
The academic literature on Turkish perception of Jews can be divided into two main
perspectives. One line presents a tolerant, multicultural atmosphere. They conceptualise anti-
Semitic events as exceptions, which are likely to come from marginal groups (Levy 1994; Shaw
1991; Toktaş 2006). Galanti (1947) and Shaw (1991) added that Jews have been exemplary
citizens in return to the tolerance. In a more recent study, Toktaş (2006) interviewed Turkish-
Jews about the treatment of the community and found that anti-Semitism is infrequent and
taking place on individual level prejudices. An alternative perspective challenges this view.
They argue that anti-Semitism is a mainstream phenomenon in Turkey and Turkish-Jews are
seen as a foreign group (Bali 2001; 2008; Brink-Danan 2012; Haker 2003). Içduygu et al.
(2008) proposed that the nation-building process in Turkey excluded the religious minorities
and only included the Turks and Muslims in the definition of the nation. In parallel, in his
analysis of the World and European Values Survey data (1999–2002), Dixon (2008) found that
Turkish people are less tolerant of minorities compared to the people in EU member and
candidate states. We can transcend this scholarly division about the perception of Jews in
Turkey by drawing on the systematic evidence in the parliamentary records, which can
elucidate the political reasons for the negative perception. Group position theory can guide
such an endeavour.
Group position approach proposes that ethnic prejudice emerges from dominant group
members’ perception of outgroups as a threat to their prerogatives (e.g. Blumer 1958; Bobo
1999; Olzak 1992). The theory is basically broken down to two premises: (a) dominant group
members see themselves entitled to have certain rights and privileges; (b) any perception of
threat to these prerogatives would incline members of the dominant group towards negative
prejudices about subordinate groups. That is to say, group position theory links social position
to dominant group members’ perception of others. It builds on Blumer’s (1958) work that views
the root of prejudice in the perceived social position. Blumer stated that four kinds of feelings
are present in prejudiced attitude: (1) dominant group’s superiority; (2) the essential difference
of the subordinate groups; (3) dominant group’s proprietary claim to certain areas of privilege
and advantage; (4) fear about other groups’ designs on their privileges. Blumer (1958)
prioritised the third feeling, as he saw prejudice as a defensive reaction against dominant group
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members’ perceived threat to their prerogatives. That is, prejudice is a protective device,
historically and collectively developed to defend social positions.
Group position theory expects that negative attitudes toward out-groups would grow with an
increase in their populations and deteriorating economic conditions. The empirical research
focuses predominantly on dominant groups’ perception of economic threats and sizes of
minority groups (e.g. Blalock 1956; Dixon 2010; Meuleman et al. 2009). This micro-level
emphasis on individuals’ perceived economic threats is plausible considering that most of these
studies focus on the developed parts of the world. Nevertheless, it sets a limitation, as the
historical, political and contextual influences on prejudice are not sufficiently analysed.
Quillian (1995; 1996) stressed the importance of the historical and cultural components of the
relationship between dominant societies and outgroups. While attempting to account for the
impacts of significant historical processes, such as the Civil Rights movement in attitudes
towards African-Americans in the United States, Quillian (1996) stated that precise measures
of these factors are not available. Further, the scholarship needs to focus on less developed
countries, where the social dynamics of prejudice could differ. Using group position theory,
this study not only contributes to the literature on the Turkish perception of Jews with a
systematic perspective, but also develops the group position scholarship by focusing on macro-
level politics in a fresh context. It also advances the theoretical understanding of the reasons
behind anti-Jewish rhetoric.
One of the well-known historical resources for the perceived political threats in Turkish politics
is the Sèvres syndrome, the anxiety about external enemies in collaboration with minorities to
carve up the Turkish Republic (Göçek, 2011; Nefes 2012; 2013; 2018b). It originated from the
Ottoman downfall at the end of the First World War. The Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty
of Sèvres with the Allies in 1920, which was annulled in 1923 at the end of the Turkish
Independence War (1919-1923). The Sèvres treaty had severe conditions, which divided the
current borders of Turkish Republic among Armenians, Kurds, Greeks, French and Turks. It
meant the empire’s ultimate collapse and therefore, generated a significant ontological anxiety
about dismemberment by foreign powers and minorities in modern Turkish politics, called the
Sèvres syndrome. The first line of the national anthem can be read as an example to this anxiety:
‘No Fear! For the crimson flag that proudly ripples in this glorious twilight, shall not fade’.
Various scholars underlined the significant impacts of the Sèvres syndrome in various areas,
such as the perception of Europe and the European Union (Aydın-Düzgit 2016; 2018; Yilmaz,
2011), anti-Semitism (Nefes 2015c) and Turkish intellectuals’ perception of society, politics
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and world affairs (Guida 2008). In parallel, Çelik et al. (2017) found that perceived threats are
successful predictors of increased levels of social distance and dislike among identity groups
in Turkey. All in all, the Sèvres syndrome left an ongoing anxiety about being conspired against
by foreign powers and minorities in modern Turkey. Building on the theoretical insight of the
group position theory and the historical background of the Sèvres syndrome, the study analyses
how Turkish MPs describe Jews in their speeches, which are related to economic, national and
religious threats.
Methodology
The study analyses the Turkish parliamentary proceedings between 1983 and 2016. The main
reasons for choosing the parliamentary records are as follows: (1) they present systematic
information by containing all mentions of Jews in the parliament; (2) they bring evidence from
mainstream politics, and therefore, provide valuable data on the general perception of Jews;
(3) they encompass speeches of various political parties and illustrate the varieties in the
perception of Jews among different groups; (4) parliamentary discussions are often on the most
important issues in Turkey, and this allows us to see the rhetoric about Jews in significant
political debates; (5) the records contain all policy debates, and thus demonstrates the political
rationale of the policies with regards to Jews; and (6) they constitute an under-explored
resource in the scholarship on the perception of minorities in Turkey. Hence, the main
advantage of using this material is that it provides an under-explored and all-inclusive insight
into the mainstream political rhetoric about Jews in Turkish politics. In addition, thanks to the
online availability of parliamentary records in many countries today, it can open the way to
international comparative studies on the political communication of ethno-religious hostility.
The main disadvantage of using the parliamentary records is that they do not contain evidence
on the perception of Jews among political groups that were not represented in the parliament.
Nevertheless, given that the political parties in the parliament were elected by the majority of
votes, the proceedings comprise representative evidence on the perception of Jews in Turkish
politics.
The study relies on a theory-based content analysis (Bonoma & Rosenberg 1978) and mixes
quantitative and qualitative techniques to give a comprehensive examination of the main
argument. As the number of analysed speeches is 476, it is not feasible to give a full account
via a solely qualitative approach. Indeed, quantitative analysis presents an overall picture by
providing statistical evidence about the extent to which perceived threats and ideological
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orientation are relevant to the negative descriptions of Jews. Subsequently, a qualitative
analysis shows the ways MPs described Jews and justified their accounts. This does not only
afford comprehensive evidence, but also help to check the validity and reliability of the
quantitative results.
Various studies underline the advantages of mixed-method content analysis (Cabrera & Reiner
2018; Chi 1997; Onwuegbuzue 2003). Of particular importance is the process of quantitizing,
assigning numerical values to non-numerical data (Sandelowski et al. 2009). I and a research
assistant (RA) coded the content in the Turkish parliamentary proceedings into quantitative
categories. The unit of analysis was individual speeches. First, I collected all the (N=476)
speeches in the Turkish parliamentary proceedings between 1983 and 2016 that contain the
word Jew: Yahudi and Musevi. Second, I created three main categories by analysing the entire
speeches of MPs in which they referred to Jews. I and the RA looked at (a) how MPs described
Jews [whether negatively or not]; (b) MP political party affiliation as an indicator of the
ideological standpoint; (c) the debate topic, such as religious education or national security, in
which Jews were mentioned to analyse whether discussing threat-related topics trigger negative
views. We separately coded qualitative texts into these categories. Then, I conducted the
quantitative and qualitative content analyses.
I and the RA double coded the material to ensure the reliability and validity of the study (Hayes
& Krippendorff 2007). To measure the level of reliability, the study calculated both percentages
of agreements of the coders as well as Scott’s pi, which accounts for the probability of agreeing
by chance (Potter & Levine‐Donnerstein 1999). The results demonstrate that, with regards to
the debate titles, we had 100% agreement (Scott’s pi=1.0). The high-level of agreement might
be due to the clear presentation of the title in the parliamentary speeches. About the comments
on the perception of Jews, there was 86.9% simple inter-coder agreement (Scott’s pi=.68),
which also shows a high-level of reliability. Neuendorf (2002) finds simple agreement levels
of 80% and higher as acceptable for most variables. The reason for the high rate of agreement
between coders might be due to the dual categories of opposite stances, which simplified the
coding process. Overall, these present strong indicators of validity and reliability.
Threat, ideology and perception
The study scrutinises five threat related debates (see Table 1 below) in which the word Jew
was mentioned. While doing so, it reveals the ways MPs portrayed Jews when they were
reflecting on economic, national and religious threats. To start with, the research focuses on
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the parliamentary discussions about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as the Israeli territorial
expansion
1
, the Al-Aqsa Intifada between 2000 and 2005
2
(BBC 2008), the Mavi Marmara
flotilla incident in 2010
3
(Saltzman 2015) and the 2014 Gaza conflict
4
(BBC 2015).
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict was framed as a religious and national security threat by the
MPs, because it was seen as a danger to Islam and/or linked to politicians’ fears that Israel has
a hidden desire to invade some parts of Turkey. Thus, it could evoke the negative rhetoric about
Jews. Second, the Kurdish question is considered as one of the most important security threats
in Turkey. The parliamentary discussion on this topic reflected on different phases of the
Turkey-PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê - Kurdistan Workers’ Party) conflict (1978-) (Unal
2016) and its potential reasons, such as lack of human rights. The perceived security threats
could be associated with a negative perception of foreign powers including Israel. Third, there
were other debates about national security: threats to Turkish sovereignty and the problems of
the Turkish police force, which could trigger politicians’ perceived security threats and
negative rhetoric about Jews and Israel as a potential enemy. Fourth, the study examines the
discussions about the property rights of the non-Muslim foundations of the Armenian, Greek
and Jewish minorities between 2002 and 2008. The suggestions to improve the property rights
were often framed as a security threat and could lead to negative comments about the non-
Muslim minorities. Last, the study scrutinises the speeches about economic corruption, which
includes various corruption allegations to business people, state officials and politicians. These
allegations warned about important economic threats in the country and could evoke negative
rhetoric by being linked to conspiracy theories about alleged Jewish domination in world
economy and the stereotype about crook Jewish business people.
1
This refers to Israeli settlements, inhabited almost exclusively by Jewish citizens of Israel and are established
mainly on Palestinian lands that are occupied by the Israeli Army since the Six-Day War in 1967.
2
The Al-Aqsa Intifada refers to the Palestinian uprising against Israel. It began following Ariel Sharon’s visit to
the Temple Mount Complex in 2000, the site of the Dome of Rock and the Al-Aqsa Mosque, before his election
as the prime minister of Israel. Palestinians perceived this as a provocation, because the Al-Aqsa Mosque is
considered a holy site for Muslims.
3
The incident occurred after the death of activists, including Turkish citizens, as a result of a military operation
by Israel to a Turkish owned civilian ship, Mavi Marmara, in the Mediterranean Sea. It resulted in a diplomatic
tension between Turkey and Israel.
4
This refers to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the Israeli Defence Force’s Operation Protective Edge in
2014. BBC (2015) reported that 67 Israeli soldiers and six civilians were dead, and 1462 civilians were among
the losses of the total of 2251 people on the Palestinian side.
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Table 1. Topics of debates related to perceived threats
Debate
Nature of threat
Israel-Palestine conflict
Religious, National
Kurdish problem in Turkey
National
National security
National
Non-Muslim charity property ownership rights
National
Economic corruption
Economic
Another important variable is political ideology. The speakers’ political party affiliations are
taken as an indicator of ideological orientation. To that end, I prepared a four-point
identification scale (seen Table 2 below). The right-wing political parties are the Turkish
nationalist MDP (Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi - Nationalist Democracy Party), MHP
(Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi - National Action Party) and political Islamist parties. The Islamists
come from a single movement, Millî Görüş (National Vision), and the different parties were
necessities in response to the state closure. In 1998, the Constitutional Court of Turkey banned
the RP (Refah Partisi - Welfare Party) from politics for violating the secular separation of
religion and state, which led to the creation of the FP (Fazilet Partisi - Virtue Party). The FP
was also banned by the same court for the same reason in 2001. The centre-right ideology is
attributed to the political parties that define themselves liberal, namely ANAP (Anavatan
Partisi – Motherland Party), DYP (Doğru Yol Partisi - True Path Party) and AKP (Adalet ve
Kalkınma Partisi - Justice and Development Party). It should be added that although the
founders of the AKP came from the political tradition of the National Vision, they broke away
with it to establish the AKP. They defined themselves as conservative liberals and therefore
were placed in the centre-right. Social democratic political parties of CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk
Partisi -Republican People’s Party), HP (Halkçı Parti - Populist Party) and SHP (Sosyal
Demokrat Halkçı Parti - Social Democratic People's Party), which claim to continue the legacy
of the founding father Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, are viewed as the centre-left. The only left-wing
political parties in the parliament are from the Kurdish movement. Like the Islamists, they are
represented by various political parties because of the state closures with the exception of the
BDP (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi - Peace and Democracy Party), dissolved by the movement
to be succeeded by the HDP (Halkların Demokratik Partisi - People’s Democratic Party). The
Constitutional Court of Turkey banned the DEP (Demokrasi Partisi - Democracy Party) in
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1994 and the DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi - Democratic Society Party) in 2004 for having
links with the PKK. It should be noted that the ideological identification scale is an
approximation of the overall ideological position of the political parties that does not take into
account minor shifts in time and the differences in the ideological profiles of individual MPs
(see Uluğ & Cohrs 2017). While it illustrates the general picture of the ideological differences,
it is not an all-encompassing account. Regardless, the political parties have not changed their
position significantly in the scale in the period of the analysis.
Table 2. Ideological orientations of the political parties and the years in represented in the
parliament between 1983 and 2016
Right-wing
Centre-right
Centre-left
Left-wing
MHP
(1999-2002; 2007-)
ANAP
(1983-2002)
CHP
(1995-1999; 2002-)
DEP
(1993-1994)
MDP
(1983-1986)
DYP
(1987-2002)
HP
(1983-1985)
DTP
(2007-2009)
RP
(1991-1998)
AKP
(2001-)
SHP
(1985-1995)
BDP
(2009-2014)
FP
(1998-2001)
HDP
(2014-)
We coded the perception of Jews into two categories, because understanding the factors
contributing to the negative perception necessitates the distinction between negative and non-
negative remarks. Negative comments are any statements that associate Jews with negative
attributes and characteristics. For example, while talking about an alleged incident of Israeli
soldiers’ beating of a Palestinian child to death, İsmail Köse (DYP) suggested that ‘Turkish
state should condemn the ruthless, Jewish servant of capitalism’
5
. The non-negative statements
are positive and neutral descriptions of Jews. An example to the positive description can be
found in the speech of Cevat Ayhan (RP), where he criticised the leadership in Turkey: ‘Three
million Jews governed their country much better than Turkish politicians’
6
. The non-negative
views are neutral comments about Jews: in his discussion of religious freedom, Temel
5
TBMM, Tutanak Dergisi, Term 18, Legislative Year 1, Sitting 16 (02.02.1988), p. 55.
6
TBMM, Tutanak Dergisi, Term 19, Legislative Year 4, Sitting 32 (10.11.1994), p. 198.
12
Karamollaoğlu (FP) praised that ‘most of our Jewish citizens send their children to synagogues
to teach their religion’
7
.
Overall effects of ideological orientation and perceived threats on the perception of Jews
Table 3 below illustrates that apart from the right-wing MPs, politicians’ remarks about Jews
tend to be non-negative most of the time. In contrast, right-wing MPs use negative remarks in
the majority of their contributions: 90 speeches used negative descriptions, while 68 talks
contained non-negative rhetoric. This implies that right-wing political orientation could predict
the anti-Jewish remarks in Turkish politics.
Table 3. Frequency of remarks in terms of ideological orientation
Ideology
Total remarks
Negative remarks
Non-negative remarks
Count
%
Count
%
Count
%
Right
158
33.2%
90
62.5%
68
20.5%
Centre-right
132
27.7%
18
12.5%
114
34.3%
Centre-left
133
27.9%
31
21.5%
102
30.7%
Left
53
11.1%
5
3.5%
48
14.5%
Total
476
100%
144
100%
332
100%
Since the study covers a long period between 1983 and 2016, one might question to what extent
specific political events and periods make a difference in politicians’ approaches. To address
that inquiry, Table 4 below outlines the frequency of negative/non-negative remarks between
the 17th and 26th parliamentary periods. In Turkey, each parliamentary period is expected to
last four years between general elections. In certain cases, early elections took place. For
example, in our dataset, there is no mention of Jews in the 25th period, because it lasted less
than four months. As Table 4 shows, in all periods, we see that negative comments were less
than the non-negative ones. There was not a specific period that drastically changed the general
balance between negative and non-negative rhetoric. Nevertheless, the frequencies and the
ratios of the negative and non-negative comments showed some variation in time. This could
be due to various factors, such as the number of MPs in the parliament changed from 400 in
the 17th term to 450 in the 18th and 19th periods and then to 550 in the subsequent periods,
7
TBMM, Tutanak Dergisi, Term 21, Legislative Year 3, Sitting 73 (22.03.2001), p. 240.
13
which might have increased the frequencies. It could be added that important events, such as
the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010, might have contributed to these variations. All in all, while
certain contexts might have contributed to the variations in the frequencies and ratios, they
were not robust enough the change the overall balance between the negative and non-negative
rhetoric.
Table 4. Frequency of remarks in terms of parliamentary period
Period & Year
Total remarks
Negative remarks
Non-negative remarks
Count
% within
period
Count
% within
period
Count
% within
period
17 (1983-87)
13
100%
5
38.5%
8
61.5%
18 (1987-91)
18
100%
5
27.8%
13
72.2%
19 (1991-95)
94
100%
42
44.7%
52
55.3%
20 (1995-99)
36
100%
12
33.3%
24
66.7%
21 (1999-02)
63
100%
10
15.9%
53
84.1%
22 (2002-07)
36
100%
2
5.6%
34
94.4%
23 (2007-11)
84
100%
25
29.8%
59
70.2%
24 (2011-15)
102
100%
36
35.3%
66
64.7%
26 (2015-16)
30
100%
7
23.3%
23
76.7%
Total
476
100%
144
30.3%
332
69.7%
A binary logistic regression analysis helps to understand to what extent ideological orientation
and perceived threats can predict the negative perception of Jews in the parliamentary debates.
The model includes the threat related discussions (economic corruption, Israel-Palestine
conflict, Kurdish question, non-Muslim charity property ownership, security threats) in which
the word Jew was mentioned as well as the ideological orientations (right, centre-right, centre-
left, left) of the political parties who referred to Jews in their speeches. Both variables are very
significant predictors of the negative perception (see Table 5). Moreover, the odds ratios
demonstrate that if the word Jew was mentioned in a discussion on threat-related topics, it is
between 2.9 and 12.5 times more likely than any other topics that the Jews are described in
negative terms. If the speakers (MPs), who cited the word Jew, are from the right-wing (the
reference category), it is between 7 and 12 times more likely than the other ideological views
14
(centre-right, centre-left, left) that they will describe Jews negatively, as seen in the odds ratios
of the other ideological perspectives. All in all, the full model clearly shows that being a
member of a right-wing political party and discussing about threat-related topics are reliable
indicators predicting negative remarks about Jews.
Table 5. Binary logistic regressions of the negative perception of Jews
95% confidence interval
B (SE)
Odds ratio
Lower
Upper
Economic corruption
2.533*** (.649)
12.596
3.533
44.901
Israel-Palestine conflict
1.768*** (.322)
5.861
3.118
11.015
Kurdish problem
1.549*** (.407)
4.705
2.120
10.446
Non-Muslim property ownership
1.071* (.433)
2.920
1.250
6.819
Security threat
2.408** (.904)
11.108
1.889
65.319
Centre-right ideology
-2.019*** (.326)
.133
.070
.252
Centre-left ideology
-1.354*** (.284)
.258
.148
.451
Left ideology
-2.524*** (.532)
.080
.028
.227
Constant
-.448* (.199)
.639
Note: R2 = .32 (Hosmer & Lemeshow), .259 (Cox & Snell), .367 (Nagelkerke).
Model χ2 (8) = 147.70, * p<.05, ** p<.01,
An in-depth analysis of how Turkish MPs portrayed Jews
This section focuses on the threat-related debates to demonstrate how MPs’ ideological
orientations and threat perception relate to their perception of Jews.
The Israel-Palestine conflict
MPs reflected on the Israel-Palestine conflict, especially the events that triggered or followed
violence. The debates were about Israeli state’s policies in Palestine, the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the
Mavi Marmara flotilla incident, and the 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict. The politicians tended to
condemn Jews or Israel. When they linked the conflict with their perceived religious and
national threats, they predominantly used negative terms about Jews. The right-wing political
parties, which mentioned the word Jew while discussing the topic, were the Turkish nationalists
(MDP and MHP) and the political Islamists (RP, FP and SP). The nationalists used the word
Jew negatively as the oppressors of Palestinians and as a potential threat to national borders.
15
For example, Rıfat Bayazıt (MDP) claimed that ‘Jews could invade here as they did in
Palestine’
8
. In parallel, the Islamists framed the Israel-Palestine conflict both as a religious and
national threat and blamed Jews. Cevat Ayhan (RP) was furious that ‘we [Muslims] left
Karabagh to Armenians, Palestine to Jews, Bosnia to Serbs… and did not stand up against
European countries, who caused all these disasters’
9
. Like the nationalists, the Islamists warned
that Israel has a secret agenda to establish a Greater Israel, which includes a part of the
Southeast Turkey.
While the centre-right political parties (DYP, ANAP, AKP) were not as critical as the right-
wing, their general tone was often negative particularly with regards to the violence perpetrated
against Palestinians. Ali Kul (AKP) stated that ‘Turks [Ottoman Empire] welcomed the
persecuted Jews in the 15th century, a momentous example of tolerance. In contrast, today,
Jews kill our Palestinian sisters and brothers in the Gaza strip without any remorse despite the
protest of the entire world’
10
. Nonetheless, various MPs from the centre-right political parties
carefully distinguished between the state of Israel and Jews and did not comment negatively
about Jews. Egemen Bağış (AKP) reminded that ‘for centuries, we [Turks] live peacefully with
Jews, Armenians, Greeks and other minorities. Our non-Muslim citizens are also critical of the
Israeli violence’
11
.
The centre-left political parties (CHP, SHP) and the independent MP, Kamer Genç, whose
ideological orientation is also centre-left, contributed to the discussion. Their descriptions were
neutral, as they condemned Israel, not Jews. Onur Oymen (CHP) declared that ‘we understand
that the Turkish public is angry about “the Mavi Marmara incident”, although we hope that this
will never turn into violence against our Jewish citizens’
12
. Some MPs from the centre-left
became critical of an Anti-Defamation League (ADL), a Jewish non-governmental
organization in the United States that aims to ‘stop the defamation of the Jewish people, and to
secure justice and fair treatment to all’ (Anti-Defamation League 2018), award to Erdoğan.
Tanju Ozcan (CHP) questioned that ‘how could Erdoğan claim that he supports Palestinians,
if he does not renounce his Jewish Courage award?’
13
8
TBMM, Tutanak Dergisi, Term 17, Legislative Year 1, Sitting 71 (29.05.1984), p. 87.
9
TBMM, Tutanak Dergisi, Term 19, Legislative Year 4, Sitting 142 (18.07.1995), p. 337.
10
TBMM, Tutanak Dergisi, Term 23, Legislative Year 3, Sitting 49 (27.01.2009), p. 699.
11
TBMM, Tutanak Dergisi, Term 23, Legislative Year 3, Sitting 40 (06.01.2009), p. 67.
12
TBMM, Tutanak Dergisi, Term 23, Legislative Year 4, Sitting 109 (01.06.2010), p. 19.
13
TBMM, Tutanak Dergisi, Term 24, Legislative Year 4, Sitting 122 (21.07.2014), p. 80.
16
Overall, these findings are in line with the argument that right-wing political ideology and
perceived threats are significant predictors of the negative rhetoric about Jews. The right-wing
MPs viewed the Israel-Palestine conflict as a threat to Muslims as well to Turkish national
borders, i.e. the Sèvres syndrome. The centre-right had a more liberal attitude. While some of
them reacted to the Israel state’s violence against Palestinians by describing Jews negatively,
the others were more tolerant. The centre-left took a neutral stance that did not link the Jewish
identity with perceived threats.
The Kurdish question
The parliamentary debates on the Kurdish question were on the historical background and
potential reasons of the Turkey-PKK conflict. During these discussions, when politicians
reflected on their perceived national security threats about dismemberment, they tended to
portray Jews in unfavourable terms, most often as a foreign conspirator. To begin with, the
Turkish nationalists had a negative view of Jews, describing them as enemies. İsmet
Büyükataman (MHP), quoting the well-known Turkish racist, Nihal Atsız (1905-1975),
criticised the AKP government’s attempts to end the Kurdish question with a peaceful solution:
‘Atsız warned: “If a Jew becomes the Minister of Finance, he will fill his pocket… and make
a grandson of a Kurdish separatist, Sheikh Sait, Prime Minister.” Evocatively, we witness that
Sheikh Sait is treated as a hero today’
14
. The Islamists contributed to this rhetoric. Necmettin
Erbakan (RP), the founder of Millî Görüş, repeatedly claimed that Jews have been involved in
the conspiracy that triggered the Kurdish question: ‘…foreign powers are behind this terror. It
is a part of the Zionist ideology… They train Jews and Armenians, who can speak Kurdish, to
encourage our people in the southeast [Kurds] to rebel against the Turkish state’
15
. Abdullah
Gül (RP) shared this perspective: ‘It is the same conspiracy as the one that took place in
Palestine 50 years ago’
16
.
The centre-right described Jews in negative and neutral terms. In line with the right-wing, their
negative comments posited that Jews took part in the conspiracy that triggered the Kurdish
question. İsmail Köse (DYP) suggested that ‘with the help of Armenians, Greeks and Jews,
Saddam Hussein used the PKK to kill our civilians and security forces’
17
. Their neutral
comments often argued that while Jews are a minority in Turkey, Kurds have equal status with
14
TBMM, Tutanak Dergisi, Term 24, Legislative Year 5, Sitting 26 (11.12.2014), p. 15.
15
TBMM, Tutanak Dergisi, Term 19, Legislative Year 1, Sitting 89 (26.06.1992), p. 198.
16
TBMM, Tutanak Dergisi, Term 19, Legislative Year 2, Sitting 51 (24.12.1992), p. 411.
17
TBMM, Tutanak Dergisi, Term 19, Legislative Year 1, Sitting 59 (23.03.1992), p. 271.
17
Turks. Mehmet Nedim Budak (ANAP) stated that ‘they will not achieve to divide us [Kurds
and Turks]. We do not have different cultures… We only have Armenians, Greeks and Jews
as minorities, certified by the Lausanne Treaty’
18
. The centre-left mentioned Jews in a neutral
way, as a part of the cultural mosaic of Turkey. Algan Hacaloğlu (CHP) underlined that ‘as our
Jewish citizens can use Ladino in education; as our Armenian citizens can use Armenian in
their schools… if our Kurdish citizens would like to have education in Kurdish, it should be
allowed’
19
. In parallel, Abdurrahman Küçük (DSP) expressed his pride in the Ottoman history
for welcoming of the persecuted Jews in the 15th century: ‘The Sultan Bayazid invited them
by stating that all the oppressed people of the world are welcome to this country’
20
.
The left-wing pro-Kurdish political parties mentioned Jews in neutral terms as another minority
in three manners. First, they implied that Kurds merit democratic rights more than the non-
Muslim minorities. Mehmet Emin Sever (DEP) stated that ‘Kurds helped to save this country
by fighting in Canakkale, Cyprus, in the East, but they do not have the right to live their own
culture... Do they have to be a Christian, Jew or Greek to deserve it?’
21
The second is by
underlining equality between all people. Hüda Kaya (HDP) criticised the Turkish government
for a military operation in the majority Kurdish populated Southeast Turkey: ‘Our Lord says:
you should care for your neighbour. No matter Jewish, atheist, Christian, Kurdish… we shall
not make a group of people suffer’
22
. Third, the MPs used the Holocaust as an example of
Kurdish suffering. Idris Balüken (HDP) stated that ‘in the Dersim massacre
23
, the Turkish state
had shameful and unlawful acts, only equalling to Hitler’s acts during the Holocaust’
24
.
In short, we see a decline of negative comments from the right-wing to the left. Right-wing
MPs mentioned Jews in 15 speeches on this topic, and in 14 of them, they used negative
rhetoric; centre-right MPs mentioned Jews in 9 speeches, and in 4 of them, they used negative
rhetoric. Centre-left and left-wing MPs did not make negative comments in their 14 speeches.
Moreover, the negative perception is justified with perceived threats about a Jewish conspiracy,
18
TBMM, Tutanak Dergisi, Term 19, Legislative Year 1, Sitting 57 (21.03.1992), p. 78.
19
TBMM, Tutanak Dergisi, Term 20, Legislative Year 3, Sitting 96 (02.06.1998), p. 45.
20
TBMM, Tutanak Dergisi, Term 21, Legislative Year 3, Sitting 49 (25.01.2001), p. 8.
21
TBMM, Tutanak Dergisi, Term 19, Legislative Year 3, Sitting 79 (03.03.1994), p. 384.
22
TBMM, Tutanak Dergisi, Term 26, Legislative Year 1, Sitting 25 (07.01.2016), p. 4.
23
The Dersim massacre refers to the Turkish military operations in the Dersim region, now called Tunceli,
between 1937 and 1938, which resulted in a high death toll of rebellious Kurdish tribes and civilians.
24
TBMM, Tutanak Dergisi, Term 24, Legislative Year 2, Sitting 84 (28.03.2012), p. 25.
18
reminiscent of the Sèvres syndrome, because it often presents Jews as important agents of the
international plots to dismember Turkey.
National security
The debates about national security were on the potential threats and problems of the security
forces. In these discussions, MPs tended to describe Jews in negative terms, especially as a
foreign enemy. The Turkish nationalists portrayed Jews as a threat. Nevzat Kormaz (MHP)
mocked the AKP government for the Jewish security business in Turkey: ‘Well done! 170
hundred thousand men with guns are under the command of… the Jewish economic capital’.
The Islamists underlined the perceived threats of the Greater Israel for the national borders.
İbrahim Kumaş (RP) noted that ‘it is written in the Torah that “I gave you a country from the
Nile to the Euphrates”’
25
. From the centre-right, the AKP gave a positive multicultural
description that portrayed Jews as a part of the communities which helped to establish the
Turkish Republic. Bülent Arınç (AKP) stated that ‘our ancestors from different backgrounds
waged a war to secure our independence. Many of them were Armenians, Jews and
Christians’
26
. The centre-left made a neutral comment with a negative undertone. While
warning about national security threats, Bülent Baratalı (CHP) mentioned that ‘the ex-Foreign
Minister of the United States, who was a Jew, Brezinsky, stated that one should control Eurasia
to be able to control the world’
27
. As in the previous debates, the right-wing had the most
negative attitude, as they related Jews to security threats, which was at times about
dismemberment anxiety, i.e. the Sèvres syndrome. The centre-right and centre-left did not
share this perspective.
Non-Muslim foundations’ property ownership rights
Between 2002 and 2008, there were parliamentary debates about the legal improvements in the
property ownership rights of the non-Muslim minority foundations of the Armenian, Greek and
Jewish communities in Turkey. In line with the prevalent fears of dismemberment, the MPs
often saw the debate as a security threat and tended to describe Jews in negative terms for
undermining Turkish sovereignty. The MPs, who did not see any threats in the legal changes,
did not use the negative rhetoric. To begin with, Turkish nationalists saw this as a security
threat and made negative remarks about Jews and the other non-Muslims. Hasan Calış (MHP)
25
TBMM, Tutanak Dergisi, Term 19, Legislative Year 3, Sitting 50 (20.12.1993), p. 705.
26
TBMM, Tutanak Dergisi, Term 22, Legislative Year 3, Sitting 73 (22.03.2005), p. 16.
27
TBMM, Tutanak Dergisi, Term 22, Legislative Year 3, Sitting 116 (23.06.2005), p. 665.
19
argued that the minorities would continue asking for more rights until ‘they remove all Turks
from Anatolia’
28
. The Islamists also had a predominantly negative tone and described the
Jewish foundations as a security threat. İbrahim Halil Çelik (RP) stated that ‘Jews see the south-
eastern city Urfa as a part of the Promised Land and pose threat to the region’. Nevertheless,
some MPs had a more liberal approach. Abdullah Gül (RP) celebrated the existence of the non-
Muslim minorities as a part of cultural richness of the country.
The centre-right took a more liberal approach. Mehmet Ali Sahin (AKP) reminded the equality
of legal rights between the all citizens of Turkey: ‘They can be Greeks, Armenians or Jews,
but they are Turkish citizens… This law ensures equality between all citizens of Turkey’
29
. The
centre-left political parties (DSP, CHP) and the independent MP Kamer Genç supported the
equality and the integration of all different groups into the Turkish identity. Ahmet Tan (DSP)
stated that ‘these religious people are Turkish citizens, and their legal rights are under the
protection of the Turkish Constitution’
30
. The pro-Kurdish left-wing reminded that Turkey has
to tolerate minorities and secure equal rights. Gülten Kışanak (HDP) stated that ‘equal
citizenship is secured by law’
31
. To sum up, the right-wing showed a predominantly negative
attitude towards Jews by seeing them as a part of security threats. They objected to the
suggestions to improve the property rights of the minorities as a dismemberment threat, the
Sèvres syndrome. The other political actors did not share this tendency.
Economic corruption
The MPs debated about various cases of alleged economic corruption. They framed these cases
as significant economic threats to the country and tended to portray Jews in negative terms,
particularly as corrupt business people. The right-wing Islamists and Turkish nationalists
viewed Jewish business as an economic threat. Sevket Kazan (RP) warned about the
involvement of the Turkish-Jewish capital in the telecommunication business: ‘these are the
corporates of Hayim Erkohen, Yasef Malki, and Nesim Malki. They are all Jews. They are the
former bosses of Mr Caglar [another MP] ... Mr Cağlar is dependent on these Jews’
32
. The
nationalists portrayed Jews in a similar manner: Hüseyin Erdal (MHP) argued that Turkey
28
TBMM, Tutanak Dergisi, Term 23, Legislative Year 2, Sitting 65 (14.02.2008), p. 31.
29
TBMM, Tutanak Dergisi, Term 23, Legislative Year 2, Sitting 55 (29.01.2008), p. 167.
30
TBMM, Tutanak Dergisi, Term 21, Legislative Year 4, Sitting 125 (02.08.2002), p. 78.
31
TBMM, Tutanak Dergisi, Term 23, Legislative Year 2, Sitting 64 (13.02.2008), p. 55.
32
TBMM, Tutanak Dergisi, Term 19, Legislative Year 1, Sitting 86 (23.06.1992), p. 197.
20
‘wasted billions of dollars by buying F-16 jets from an American-Jewish corporate... as their
planes keep crashing’
33
.
The centre-right also used the word Jew: Erkan Mumcu (ANAP) took a neutral approach and
argued against racism towards economic capital. He underlined that money ‘has no religion,
ethnicity or race’
34
. Muharrem Ince (CHP) and Kamer Genç (independent) from the centre-left
also linked economic corruption to Jewish business. Further, a member of the left-wing HDP,
Altan Tan, gave a negative account: ‘the world economy is ruled by Jews and Israel, and the
government cannot raise its voice against them’
35
. In line with the previous discussions, the
right-wing tended towards making negative comments by linking Jews with economic threats.
Unlike the other debates, the centre-left and left-wing also shared this negative attitude.
Conclusion
The findings support the main premise that right-wing ideological orientation and perception
of economic, national and religious threats are significant elements of the negative descriptions
of Jews in Turkish politics between 1983 and 2016. The descriptive quantitative analysis
presents that the right-wing Islamists and Turkish nationalists more frequently referred to Jews
in negative terms. It also clearly illustrates that specific periods, political events and contexts
did not make a very significant difference in politicians’ approaches to Jews, as the general
proportions of negative/non-negative rhetoric did not change drastically in parliamentary
periods between 1983 and 2016. In addition, the binary logistic regression analysis confirmed
that being from the right-wing political parties and debating about threat related topics are
statistically significant predictors of the MPs’ negative remarks about Jews. Qualitative
analysis complements these results. It demonstrates that the right-wing political parties justify
their negative descriptions of Jews by portraying them as agents of the threats. For example,
during the debates on the Kurdish question, most right-wing and some centre-right politicians
based their negative descriptions on a conspiratorial view that Jews in collaboration with other
foreign powers were behind the problem. The only exception is the discussion about economic
corruption, where the centre-left and left-wing political parties also had a negative attitude
towards Jews. This could be due to the prevalence of the cultural stereotype about crook Jewish
33
TBMM, Tutanak Dergisi, Term 19, Legislative Year 4, Sitting 50 (22.12.1994), p. 694.
34
TBMM, Tutanak Dergisi, Term 22, Legislative Year 4, Sitting 11 (25.10.2005), p. 50.
35
TBMM, Tutanak Dergisi, Term 24, Legislative Year 4, Sitting 56 (04.02.2014), p. 52.
21
business people among all political circles. Another reason could be that the small numbers of
speeches on this debate from the left and centre-left, which totals to four.
The conclusion that underlines the significance of perceived threats and right-wing ideological
orientation in the anti-Jewish political rhetoric is in line with the findings of various studies.
Brink-Danan (2012, p. 58) noted that Turkish-Jews developed their community life on a basic
principle of avoiding being seen as a threat and supported centre-left political parties: they
‘practice a quiet cultural citizenship less threatening to a state that directly or indirectly
supports a classic Turkish republican (Kemalist) ideology, in which difference is a private
matter’. Future studies could test the validity of the argument by examining the impact of
ideological orientation and threat perception on the approach towards other minorities, such as
Kurds and Armenians. This would not only provide a fresh approach to understand the roots
of hostility towards other ethnic and religious groups but could also bear important policy
outcomes especially given that the exclusionary politics was one of the reasons for the
diminished numbers of the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey.
All in all, the conclusion implies that an effective management of perceived threats in Turkish
politics, particularly with regards to the Sèvres syndrome, would help to decrease the frequency
of the anti-Jewish rhetoric. However, this would not bring an end to the negative remarks about
Jews, because they seem to be a historically rooted element of Turkish right-wing politics.
Moreover, foreign events, such as the Israel-Palestine conflict, seems to contribute to the
continuation of the negative descriptions of Jews. In parallel, the study presents evidence that
MPs from all political sides infrequently mention global anti-Semitic conspiracy rhetoric about
the economic power of Jews.
Biographical note
Dr Turkay Salim Nefes is a William Golding Junior Research Fellow at Brasenose College,
University of Oxford. He is the author of Online Anti-Semitism in Turkey (Palgrave) and
various journal articles. His research is available online at
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Tuerkay_Nefes/research
22
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