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Corruption, state capture and anti-corruption initiatives in post-communist countries

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The local state capture phenomenon becomes very interesting if it is associated with the macro state capture framework that has begun to develop in the last two decades. A more multifaceted political approach is needed because state erosion is a political problem, not just an economic one. By referring to the political ethnographic tradition, this study describes how the complexity of relations between local economic, political, and ruling elites leads to the emergence of local state capture and the scope of its power. This study concludes that the weathering or weakening of formal government functions is not the source of the emergence of the local capture phenomenon. The growth of local state capture is more owing to the one-of-a-kind interaction between local political and economic actors and the ruling elite since the direct election of regional leaders takes place. This elite collaboration results from the emergence of a local oligarchic pole controlling local resources. The initiation of relations between the economic and political elite and the ruling elite is not only because of economic spheres but because they want to be part of the rulers' closest political circle of power.
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Corruption is a major obstacle to economic growth, human development, and poverty reduction (Mauro, 1995, 2004; Asiedu, 2006). The practice of demanding or expecting monetary or other benefits in exchange for preferential treatment has plagued the global South, and high-profile revelations of corruption in politics and business have shed light on the magnitude of the problem (Baker, 2016; McCool, 2015). The poor are most vulnerable to both the immediate effects of having to pay bribes or do favours and the longer-term impacts of hampered growth and weakened investment power (Hosken, 2017; Baker, 2016). Recent research by Peiffer and Rose (2014) and Justesen and Bjørnskov (2014) notes that poor citizens faced with official corruption have fewer means to seek out services from alternative providers and are thus forced to “play the game.” In recent years, headlines have pointed toward a stronger stance against corruption in Africa. In South Africa, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and other countries, scandals and government responses have placed corruption at center stage. In Nigeria, President Muhammadu Buhari’s winning ticket in 2015 included zero tolerance for corruption, and he has taken several steps to try to fight what he calls the “hydra-headed monster” (Maclean, 2016; Gaffey, 2016). In Tanzania, President John Magafuli won the 2015 election after a campaign denouncing corruption and misconduct among civil servants (Muvunyi, 2016). No doubt strong and committed leadership is necessary if meaningful progress is to be made in fighting corruption. But as with any attempt to change the status quo, it is equally important that the policy be accepted, “lived,” and enforced by ordinary citizens. To what extent do ordinary Africans feel they can combat corruption? What informs whether citizens believe they can play a role? Findings from Afrobarometer Round 6 (2014/2015) surveys suggest that education and material security contribute to building efficacy among ordinary citizens for the fight against corruption. But leadership also matters: Perceptions that elected leaders or officials are corrupt make citizens less likely to think they can make a difference.
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http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/825161468029662026/pdf/multi-page.pdf This report seeks to unbundle the varied practices of corruption to identify and compare different patterns of the problem across transition countries, notably on the distinction between administrative corruption and state capture. It then draws out lessons for tailoring anticorruption strategies to address the variation across the region in an effort to target reforms more effectively. The report draws on a multitude of sources of ongoing research and lessons of experience, including the World Bank’s work in this area.
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Rosewood in Madagascar is both a lucrative timber commodity and a group of threatened and endangered tree species primarily limited to the country's last remaining northeastern forests. Since 2000, trade in rosewood has been on the rise due to escalating demand in China. Despite international conservation efforts to curtail the trade, the collapse of the Malagasy government via a military-backed coup d'état in 2009 triggered an outbreak of illegal logging in the country's northeastern protected areas. Since the coup, thousands of shipping containers of rosewood have been exported overseas, making multi-millionaires of an elite few in the northeast and profoundly reconfiguring the country's geographies of power. Using an ethnographic approach to analyze political economic transformations, this article takes readers from the hundreds of logging camps scattered throughout the protected areas of northeastern Madagascar to the upper echelons of a rosewood political economy that spans the highest powers in the capital city. In the article, I argue that revenues generated during Madagascar's rosewood logging outbreak, combined with the country's return to electoral politics at the end of 2013, have together facilitated the political ascendancy of an elite group of rosewood traders from northeastern Madagascar. Through a process that I refer to as "rosewood democracy," these rosewood traders have been voted into central offices in Madagascar's Fourth Republic, ultimately demonstrating how democratic institutions that are supposed to foster equality are captured to sustain long-standing patterns of inequality.