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Chapter 4: The Middle Class in Finland
Esa Karonen, Jani Erola & Mikko Niemelä
At the time of writing this chapter, Finland is celebrating its 100th year of independence.
On the journey of one hundred years, Finland has faced several structural changes—
among them, changes in the status and well-being of the middle class, and perhaps even
more importantly, changes in what is understood by the designation ‘middle class’. The
country has developed from an agricultural-based economy to a modern service-based
welfare society and technological forerunner.
A few major factors contributed to the development of the Finnish middle class. First,
in the 1960s, Finland began to build a modern welfare state according to the examples
of its Nordic neighbours. Although this development could only have taken place once
the country had reached a sufficient level of affluence, the creation of the middle class
was, more than anything, a political decision. By the 1960s it was widely accepted that
overly large social inequalities would be detrimental for the society as a whole and that
all citizens, urban and rural, should thus be provided with equal services and benefits.
As in other Nordic countries, the expansion of the welfare state in Finland may be
thought of as a middle-class project that emphasised universal public services and
benefit schemes including both statutory earnings-related benefits and minimum flat-
rate benefits (Kangas 1991; Kettunen 2001; Orjala & Eloranta 2006). All in all, the
expansion of the welfare state was a major factor contributing to narrowing the
economic and social inequalities between social classes.
Second, the rapid economic growth that took place after the Second World War
accompanied a major change in the occupational structure (Alestalo 1986; 2007; Jäntti et
al. 2006). The main economic activity shifted from agriculture to manufacturing and
services. In Finland, the growth of the services sector has largely been a result of the
growth of the public sector (i.e. schools, social and health services). To this day, the
public sector is still large in Finland. In addition, in the context of this chapter, a major
part of the middle class (especially women) works in the public sector.
Third, educational expansion has also offered a platform for the growth of the middle
class. The literature suggests that social mobility in Finland has been relatively strong
compared to other countries (Erola 2009, Jäntti et al.). It seems that the increasing
educational level of the population, due first to the compulsory schooling renewal, and
later to the increase of secondary education degrees, has contributed to this mobility
(Pekkarinen, Uusitalo & Kerr 2006; Erola 2009).
These structural changes formed a foundation for the development of the Finnish
middle class. Less is known, however, about the expansion of the middle class. Indeed,
the term ‘middle class’ is hardly ever used in Finland to indicate anything other than a
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cultural concept—with the term typically used to refer to a certain kind of lifestyle,
attitudes and values, as well as consumption patterns, rather than to a group in the
income distribution. ‘Middle class’ is more strongly associated with occupation-based
social classes or even with education—although its use even in those contexts is
relatively infrequent. The social classes in Finland are typically distinguished into
groups that are, to some extent, similar to the Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero (EGP)
class classification (Mihalos 2014), including service class (upper or lower), working
class (also including routine non-manual workers) and entrepreneurs. For instance, one
could argue that skilled workers in Finland have become “middle-classed” in terms of
these more cultural aspects of everyday life—and indeed this line of thought has even
been used as a political argument. The concepts of upper and lower middle class are
also sometimes used as synonyms of upper or lower service class.
1. The income perspective
We define the middle class as individuals in households with a disposable income
between 60% and 200% of the median disposable income. Those below 60% would
belong to the lower income classes, while those above 200% of the national median
income would be the upper income classes. In order to identify these classes, we
adjusted household income for inflation, equivalising this with the OECD-modified
scale (Foster 2013). Under our definition, the Finnish middle class in 2014 represents
78% of the population. This percentage is higher than reported in the statistical overview
in Chapter 2, which puts the size at 68%
1
.
The variation in the size of the middle class over time is small—although one may
observe an effect of the economic shock of the early 1990s. This appears as a slight rise
of low-income classes and as a doubling of the proportion of the high-income earners
by the end of the decade.
The severe economic recession during the early 1990s is an important focal point for
the discussions below. Among the various reasons for the severe financial crisis of the
1990s, some of the crucial drivers include the rapid collapse of the export market of the
Soviet Union and underdevelopment of the Finnish banking system. During the crisis,
unemployment rose from 3% to over 16% in just three years. Effect of the recession is
also evident from the income trajectories shown in Figure 1. The crisis was followed by
very strong economic growth, linked with the ICT boom more generally. As a result,
wages rose and public spending grew.
1
As reported by OECD (2016) for the year 2013; that study uses a 75%-200% definition, which
obviously reduces the size
No Robots: The Middle Class in Europe
49
Figure 1: Middle class net real equivalised household income by age group
In Finland, the trend of income inequality since the 1960s can be divided into five
periods (Blomgren et al., 2014). First, the era of welfare state expansion in the 1960s and
1970s decreased income inequality (regardless of the type of income differences
considered). Second, from the mid-1970s to the economic recession of the early 1990s,
market income inequality increased, but due to income transfers, gross and disposable
income inequality remained constant. Third, the recession of the 1990s increased
inequality in market income but not in gross and disposable income. Fourth, whereas
since the mid-1990s, market income inequality has been constant, inequality in gross
and disposable income increased towards the early 2000s. (Figure 2) From a
comparative perspective, the increase in income inequality was exceptionally fast and
steep in Finland during the period between 1995-2002 (OECD 2008; OECD 2011). Fifth,
since the turn of the millennium, the development of income inequality has been rather
stable.
Figure 2: Income inequality in Finland—Gini
Measured in percentages. Source: Own calculations, OSF Income Distribution data
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
1966
1976
1985
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
22-24 25-29 30-44 45-54 55-64
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
34
36
38
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
Within population Within middle-class
50
Finland
The increase in income inequality in the 1990s is largely due to capital income (see
OECD 2008; 2011). Due to capital income, the income share of the highest income
decile—and especially in the top 1% —increased drastically during the second half of
the 1990s. A catalyst for this process was the tax reform of 1993, the opening of the
financial markets in the early 1990s and the economic boom in the late 1990s. The tax
reform eliminated progressive taxation on capital income but kept income tax
progressive. This provided a clear incentive for wealthier households to rebalance their
activities and focus attention to obtain income from capital. The tax reform made
financial and fiscal planning by the top-income earners worthwhile, in order to shift
their income more towards capital income.
2. Non-income-related perspectives
The affordability of housing
The ability to acquire a house is one of the hallmarks of belonging to the middle class.
This is directly connected to prices of dwellings and the ability to manage housing loans.
In Finland, every third household has housing debt. About half of the owner-occupiers
and those aged 25–54 have housing debt (Putkuri 2015). Thus, buying a house is usually
the most important investment for the middle class, and the ability of individuals to
afford different types of dwellings is connected to their economic situation at the time
of purchase.
The housing market is connected to economic fluctuations, and is susceptible to debt-
driven asset price bubbles during economic upturns. Figure 3 illustrates how the
recession in the 1990s decreased the prices of dwellings. Similar (but milder) changes
can be seen during the economically less severe IT sector crash in 2001 and the financial
crisis of 2008. Thus, the relationship between wages and the prices of dwellings
illustrates how acquiring a house is connected more to the timing of purchase than to
income-related changes. Middle-class buying power in the housing market is important,
obviously going hand-in-hand with housing market fluctuations.
No Robots: The Middle Class in Europe
51
Figure 3: Annual percentage changes in prices of dwellings and wages
Source: Own calculations, OSF Income Distribution data
Family stress
See Section 3 on perceptions.
The labour market
Labour market uncertainties have been one of the central factors influencing inequality
in Finland. Especially the economic shock of the early 1990s led to large changes in the
labour market. Figure 4 shows the trends in unemployment rates for different age
groups in Finland.
Figure 4: Unemployment levels in Finland by age groups 1989-2015
Source: Own calculations, OSF Income Distribution data
-25%
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
Price of dwellings Wages
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
Population mean 15-24 year olds 25-34 year olds
35-44 year olds 45-54 year olds 55-64 year olds
52
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The recession of the early 1990s led to a rapid rise in unemployment, which declined
slowly afterward. Youth unemployment is clearly the highest. The peak in 1996 among
55–64 year olds is the result of the “unemployment tunnel” (referring to the right to
unemployment benefits until retirement after a specific age). Before 1997, this tunnel
started at the age of 53; subsequent reforms have increased this age (see OECD 2013, p.
147).
Figure 5 shows unemployment among the middle class and the whole population.
Although the trends in the unemployment rate are similar, middle-class unemployment
is markedly lower.
Another structural change, which has affected labour market uncertainty, is
connected to the growth in part-time work. The proportion of employees that had a
part-time contract grew significantly between 1997 and 2015. The share of permanent
and fixed-term contracts has been stable, as has been the share of public sector jobs.
Figure 5: Unemployment rate for the population and the middle class
Source: Own calculations, OSF Income Distribution data
Social mobility
Finns enjoy a high and increasing probability of achieving tertiary education. The
probability is 30 %-points higher for a son whose father had tertiary education than for
a son whose father had only upper-secondary education. In addition, growing up in a
well-educated family offers a great advantage in terms of achieving tertiary education;
at the same time, there does not seem to be a related penalty attached to growing up in
a less-advantaged family (see Causa & Johansson 2010).
Table 1 shows the results on absolute, vertical, upward and downward mobility in
different cohorts (Erola 2009). Absolute mobility indicates the percentage of the cohort
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
Population Middle class
No Robots: The Middle Class in Europe
53
in a class position different from that of their parents. Vertical mobility refers to mobility
across three hierarchy planes of the EGP class classification.
The results in Table 1 show that the level of absolute mobility for women is higher than
for men, and upward mobility has been increasing. For men, there is a slight decrease
in upward mobility.
Table 1: Absolute and vertical mobility of 35–39 year-old Finns by birth cohort
Source: Erola (2009), p. 313.
Men
1936–40
1941–45
1946–50
1951–55
1956–60
1961–65
Total
Absolute mobility
78
77
75
74
74
74
75
Vertical mobility
53
53
54
53
53
55
53
Upward vertical
36
34
35
32
30
30
32
Downward vertical
17
19
19
21
23
25
21
Women
1936–40
1941–45
1946–50
1951–55
1956–60
1961–65
Total
Absolute mobility
84
86
86
86
85
83
85
Vertical mobility
44
45
46
50
50
52
49
Upward vertical
22
23
25
27
28
29
26
Downward vertical
22
22
20
24
23
24
23
In Finland, students attending secondary education perform above the OECD
average on PISA scores, while the influence of socio-economic background is below the
OECD average. Likewise, the persistence in tertiary education over generations is
relatively low, whereas attainment levels are fairly high. This reflects the importance of
public policies that mitigate the effect of family background on educational outcomes.
Generational issues
Figure 6 shows Finland’s dependency ratio, which has been increasing rapidly since the
1980s. The number of pensioners rose from 610,000 in 1980 to over 1 million in 2010,
while the dependency ratio rose by more than 10 %-points during the same period. This
poses a challenge to the Finnish welfare system. The social benefits include both
pensions and institutional care and home care services for the elderly, which constitutes
over one-third of all social expenditures (and 10% of GDP).
54
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Figure 6: Dependency ratio in Finland in 1970–2016
Source: OSF Population Structure. (Total)Dependency ratio = ((N of people aged
0-14 + N of aged 65 and over)/N of people aged 15-64)
Regional differences
After the Second World War, Finland was still a typical agrarian society. In 1950,
agriculture provided a livelihood for 46 percent of the economically active population,
while one-third of the population lived in urban areas. Thereafter, the industrial
structure changed rapidly. Approximately 1.3 million people moved from working in
agriculture and forestry into the industry and service sectors. This was the catalyst of
change in the labour market structure: one in every three workers had to change trade.
Manufacturing, trade and diverse services generated new jobs. During the large-scale
migration, the fertility rate began to decline, which partly contributed to the
depopulation of the countryside. In response, the government carried out relief work in
the east and north of Finland to prevent labour shortages and mitigate the strain on
urban centres. For example, in Lapland, newly founded farms turned out to be far too
small and unproductive to be self-sufficient; the farmers became dependent on extra
income earned through the state’s relief programme, which consisted of road building
and other infrastructure-related projects (Kumpulainen 2001).
When the Baby Boomer generation entered the labour market in the 1960s and 1970s,
it accelerated even further the migration towards population centres. The migration
wave was at its peak at 1974, when approximately six percent of the population changed
their municipality of residence. By the mid-1970s, more than half of the Finnish
population lived in cities. (Statistics Finland 2007). Urbanization took place within just
a few decades, which is exceptionally fast compared to other countries.
45.0
47.5
50.0
52.5
55.0
57.5
60.0
1970
1973
1976
1979
1982
1985
1988
1991
1994
1997
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
No Robots: The Middle Class in Europe
55
The historical context is illustrated in Figure 7, which shows the regional dispersion
of middle-income households over the country by four distinct periods from 1966 to
2015. Every period locates the highest concentration of middle-class individuals at the
growth centres around major cities. What varies is the distribution outside these areas.
For example, a medium concentration of middle-income households shifted from the
East to the West coast. This was caused by better employment opportunities in the West.
Figure 7: Regional dispersion of middle-income households 1966 – 2015
All data is presented on regional level (NUTS3). Middle class is defined as 60-200%
of median disposable household income
Household composition
Regarding the type of households that are middle class, the only notable difference is
the share of single households (without children). They comprise 5%-points more of the
middle class share than is the case in the average population.
56
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3. Household perceptions
Table 2 presents an analysis of life satisfaction, trust in the government and job
preferences of the middle class. The rightmost column of the table shows how middle-
class perceptions deviate from the population mean. Although the differences are
modest (around 1%), every difference is positive. Life satisfaction and trust in the
national parliament show the highest difference. In absolute terms, there is an
interesting disconnect between a high satisfaction with life and job security (8 out of 10),
but a work-related stress experience of 2.8 out of 5, on average. This is representative of
middle-class life observed in other countries as well; a high life satisfaction seems to go
hand-in-hand with elevated stress levels.
Table 3: Middle-class self-assessment of perceived position
Source: European Social Survey, Statistical year 2010.
Mean
Min
Max
Variance
Ratio
% difference
from
population
mean
Trust in government
Trust in country's parliament
5.4
0
10
0.83
1.5 %
Trust in the European Parliament
5.1
0
10
0.81
0.1 %
Life satisfaction & work
How satisfied with life as a whole
7.9
0
10
0.64
1.5 %
How happy are you
8.0
0
10
0.64
1.6 %
Current job is secure
3.1
1
4
1
0.4 %
Stress: too tired after work to enjoy
things
2.8
1
5
1
0.1 %
Important if choosing job:
Secure job
4.3
1
5
0.45
0.3 %
High income
3.7
1
5
0.44
0.5 %
Job allowed you to combine
work/family
3.8
1
5
0.42
1.1 %
4. Political representation
Until 2007, three political parties dominated the Finnish parliament (Figure 8): the
Center Party, the National Coalition Party and the Finnish Social Democratic Party, with
a combined share of 70% of the vote. However, in 2011 the True Finns won 19% of the
vote, gaining 15%-points—raising it from the smallest parliamentary party to become
the third-largest party (Statistics Finland 2011).
No Robots: The Middle Class in Europe
57
Figure 8: Election outcomes 1987-2015
Source: Statistics Finland
The success of the True Finns can be attributed to strong value-oriented thinking,
which is the main factor contributing to the political affiliation choices of individuals in
Nordic countries (Oddbjørn 2018). In addition, the sudden rise of True Finn voters can
be connected to cleavage voting and preferences for “old politics” (see Lipset & Rokkan
1967).
The True Finns’ political narrative is constructed on the duality of the ‘good civil
society’ against ‘bad politics’ (Schedler 1996, p. 297), and a fundamental divide between
the elite and ordinary people. Research indicates that the attitude of distrust towards
the incumbent office holders and their policies, as well as towards the political
institutions, and dissatisfaction with democracy, are quite effectively channelled
through the anti-political-establishment vote (Bäck & Kestilä-Kekkonen 2014). Note that
in the Finnish context the anti-political-establishment vote does not necessarily oppose
in any way the norms and principles of the democratic regime. Instead, those who turn
to the Finns’ party seem to critically evaluate the government’s performance and policy
outcomes as a whole, including its actors and institutions.
These factors are connected to two major incidents affecting the 2011 elections. First,
there was a scandal of electoral funding after the 2007 parliamentary elections, where
several candidates did not report their sources of funding in time, which is required by
law. It turned out that several well-known politicians of government parties received
funding from the interest group Kehittyvien Maakuntien Suomi (KMS), which is the
lobbying organization of three highly influential businessmen. Three major parties were
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015
The Centre Party The National Coalition Party True Finns
Finnish Social Democratic Party The Green League The Left Alliance
The Swedish People Party (SPP) Christian Democrats
58
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especially negatively affected by the scandal: the Centre Party, the National Coalition
Party and the Social Democratic Party. Secondly, the economic crisis in 2007-2009 ended
a long period of steady economic growth, which also fuelled political distrust of some
middle-class voters (Bäck & Kestilä-Kekkonen 2014.).
5. Globalisation, technology and migration
We discuss the challenges to the middle class stemming from technological change,
migration and globalization. Automation and digitalization might result in a scenario
where a substantial share of jobs is “computerized”. Although this shift can already be
observed, some caution should be used in evaluating how the technology will affect the
actual labour market. While many studies follow an occupation-based approach (see
e.g. Frey and Osborne 2013), leading to predictions of entire occupations being at risk of
automation, it is more reasonable to assume that single job-tasks are automated by
technology. Thus, an easily automated task will be replaced by digitalized systems;
referring to this as an “instant” occupational replacement is overstating the risk. In
addition, many occupations contain tasks that are hard to automate, and automated
systems themselves create new tasks for the labour market. Finland has a reputation as
a technological frontrunner, acting as a catalyst for the risks of job automation.
There have been many ideas regarding social policies that would best respond to the
challenges of modern labour market structures and the threat of automation. One of the
proposed solutions involves issuing a basic income to all citizens, in order to combat the
threat of increased automation in the workplace. Finland is one of the leading countries
(in terms of using technological advancements and digitalization) giving serious
thought to the introduction of a universal basic income. In 2016, the government started
a pilot program of a universal basic income. Such a system could offer protection from
the transition period of changes in the labour market.
A sudden migration flow could change the balance of supply and demand in the
labour market. Such a flow could come from environmental migrants, “who are persons
or groups of persons who, predominantly for reasons of sudden or progressive change
in the environment that adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged to
leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and
who move either within their country or abroad” (International Organization for
Migration, 2011, p. 33). A sudden increase in workers could put downward pressure on
wages, but only in unskilled labour (see e.g. Borjas 1999). One central challenge for
Finland is related to the country’s co-operation with other EU-member countries.
Finland has been strict on complying with quotas set on migration. The strain on the
economic and social welfare system is also dependent on how well other EU members
No Robots: The Middle Class in Europe
59
conform to agreed quotas. This can become challenging when migration flows are
unilaterally focused on specific countries.
Globalization poses a challenge for the middle class in the extent to which it leads to
the offshoring of jobs. Tuhkuri (2016) suggests that a quarter of Finnish employment
could be potentially moved abroad. Pajarinen and Rouvinen (2014) estimate that
computerization threatens one-third of Finnish employment. While these problems are
hardly unique to Finland, Finland has found a unique way to combat the negative
effects of globalization: by implementing workflow re-education programs and
upholding a practically free education system.
6. Conclusion
All in all, we may conclude the following about the position of the Finnish middle class.
First, unemployment among the middle class is at a lower level than in the total
population, but with similar trends over time.
Second, Finland has a good socio-economic mobility, higher for women than for men.
Overall, the results show higher social inheritance for the youngest cohorts compared
to the older cohorts before them. In achieving tertiary education, persistence over
generations is relatively low, whereas attainment levels are fairly high.
Third, middle-income households reside around the growth centres. There has been
a long-term shift from eastern to western Finland, caused by the availability of
employment.
Fourth, the structure of middle-class households deviates from the population mean
by having fewer single households. In addition, the share of childless couples is high,
and their share has risen over the period studied. Meanwhile, the share of households
with two parents and children has diminished over time.
Fifth, middle-class households put a high value on job security, while having worries
about work-related stress.
Finally, voting patterns show that electoral preferences have been stable over time,
but with a recent rise in right-wing parties. The persistence of these changes in political
values remains to be seen.
60
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