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Şii Jeopolitiğinde Türkiye İle İran’ın Güç Mücadelesi
Abstract
İran ve Türkiye arasındaki güç savaşı ve savaşın mezhepsel boyutunun ele alındığı bu çalışmada aktörlerin bölgede izledikleri siyaset sonuçlarıyla birlikte ortaya konulacaktır. Soğuk Savaş’ın bitmesinin ardından, ABD’nin 1991 ve 2003 yıllarında gerçekleştirdiği Irak’a yönelik müdahaleler ve akabinde 2010’da başlayan Arap Baharı’ndan sonra Orta Doğu’da yeni dengeler oluştu. İran, bölgesel bir güç olarak Irak, Suriye ve bölgede özellikle Şiilik kozunu kullanarak etkinliğini arttırmaktadır. İran’ın hedeflediği “Şii Hilali’nin” gerçekleşmesi durumunda ise Türkiye’nin Sünni-Arap dünyasıyla olan coğrafi bağı kopacaktır. Buna engel olmak ve bölgede nüfuzunu artırmak isteyen Türkiye Sünniliği ön plana çıkarmaktadır. Aynı şekilde Sünni ve Şii azınlıklar da bulundukları ülkedeki güç dengesini kendi lehlerine değiştirmek amacıyla İran ya da Türkiye gibi bir dış gücün desteğini almak için mezhepsel farklılıklarını araçsallaştırmaktadırlar. Aktörlerinin İran ve Türkiye olarak ele alındığı güç oyununda mezhepler bir enstrüman olarak kullanılmakta ve her aktör diğerinin güç kazanımını kendisinin güç kaybı olarak algılamaktadır.
Ortadoğu, küresel siyasete dair hareketliliğin en yoğun yaşandığı bölgedir. Bir hegemonik alan mücadelesine dönüş(türül)en bölgede küresel, bölgesel ve yerel güç yapılanmaları arasında tasarlanan ideolojik kurulumlar işlerlik kazanmaktadır. Bu ideolojik tasarımlar birbirinden farklı olmakla birlikte büyük oranda ekonomik kazanıma hizmet eden etnik, inançsal/ mezhepsel ve ideolojik söylemler üzerinden yürütülmektedir. Bu ideolojik ve ekonomi politiğin inanç/mezhepsel kurulumu açısından İran - Suriye ittifakı örnek verilebilir. Bölgesel gerilimin neredeyse hiç dinmediği Ortadoğu’da, İran- Suriye ilişkileri stratejik bir değer olarak inanç/ mezhepsel bir kurulum üzerinden çok boyutlu bir kazanıma alan açmaktadır. Dolayısıyla Suriye krizinde etkin rol üstlenen İran’ın, Suriye’deki Arap Alevi- Şii inancı/mezhebine mensup topluluklarla kurduğu ve geliştirdiği birliktelik, her iki taraf için de bir kazanım sağlamıştır. İran’ın bölgesel ölçekli bu yayılımı, Sünni Arap yönetimleri tarafından “Şii Hilali” olarak dilendirilmektedir. Başta İran olmak üzere Irak, Suriye, Lübnan ve bölgenin diğer ülkelerindeki Şii nüfusu, bu inanç/mezhep ideolojisi üzerinden ortaklaştırmak ve etkin kılmak, bölgenin kurulu siyasal sisteminin paydaşı olan Sünni yönetimler tarafından ciddi bir tehdit olarak algılanmaktadır. Bu bağlamda Suriye, Şii Hilali’nin kuzey kanadı olarak tarif edilen ve İran’dan Levant bölgesine kadar Şii topluluklarıyla kurulacak bağın ve İran’ın Ortadoğu’daki nüfuzunu domine edecek bir kurulumun temsilcisi olarak görülmektedir. Bu eksende, İran- Suriye ittifakını üreten tarihsel ve ideolojik bağıntıların özellikle bölgesel düzeyde ne tür yansımalara alan açtığı İnşacı (konstrüktivist) bir yaklaşımla ele alınmış ve bu kapsamda, bölgenin siyasal coğrafyasına dair çeşitli öngörülerde bulunulmuştur.
The Middle East has been a volatile region for over a century, due to occupations, wars, and acts of terrorism. Being a victim of terrorism and war, this region has been described as a swamp, particularly due to the intense propaganda of the mass media owned by global hegemony, which is the leading cause of the chaos in the area. The people of the region, who are to pay a price because of terrorism and violence, are thus equated with terrorism in others’ minds and are further victimized. This study explores the plight of the region by analysing the mentality of the parties to the conflict in the region. This is because if we consider the events only as a military struggle to control oil and other strategic energy resources, we could hardly find out the truth. We should bear in mind that the events in the Middle East involve a variety of actors and reasons that are difficult to explain from a single perspective. Furthermore, since instability and chaos in the region have been going on for years and completely independent factors are involved in the process, issues have become immensely complicated. Therefore, no matter what point of view we adopt to approach the events (political, economic, cultural, religious, etc.), it would not be hard to find a justification for the theory we suggest. Our study hardly disregards this fact. However, when we prudently consider the events in the Middle East, we can recognize that all the actors essentially legitimize themselves using religion, although political and socio-economic reasons are brought to the fore. In other words, all the parties responsible for the chaos basically act out of religious motives and establish their existence in the region for religious reasons, although they do not frankly admit it. Foremost among these actors comes the United States of America. In fact, while the USA owns various instruments that could be used, not only to end the chaos in the region but also to exploit the resources of the region through peaceful means, the reason why it does not opt for this is the existence of Protestant Evangelicals, who guide American politics to take sides in the political/social events in the Middle East. An examination of the attitude of the USA in the events in the Middle East and the policies it implements in the region would reveal that they exactly coincide with the eschatological goals of Evangelicals. Another major power that is involved in the political and social events in the region with an eschatological approach is the ideological Shia. This line of thinking (Imamate), which claims to be the sole heir of Prophet Muhammad, struggles to play an open or secret role in all regional events to shape the Middle East based on its own ideology. The third actor, which is the source of violence and chaos in the Middle East, is the Khārijite way of thinking that directly or indirectly legitimizes projects that the other two actors are trying to implement in this region, and historically, it has always supported terrorism in the lands of Islam. The Khārijite thought describes any interpretation or behaviour that runs counter to the Islamic life it has created and idealized as blasphemy. This article examines these three actors in terms of their objectives and their impacts on the events in the Middle East region. It also reveals the historical and theoretical foundations of how these three ideologies, which are religious madhabs/sects/communities in terms of their sources, assume an active role in the political events in the region. While analysing the issues, ideological interpretations are avoided; events are addressed in a meaningful and holistic way in terms of their causes and effects, not in a style that is disconnected from de facto reality.
Die Beziehungen zwischen der Türkei und dem Iran sind turbulent. Perioden der Entspannung stehen Zeiten der Konfrontation gegenüber, die durch diplomatische Gespräche gelöst werden müssen. Die Konflikte der beiden Staaten erwachsen vor allem aus ihren konfessionellen Gegensätzen und ihrem beiderseitigen Anspruch, um jeden Preis ihre Grenzsicherheit zu erhalten. Dies führt zu Konfrontationen zum Beispiel im Syrien-Krieg, in dem Iran mit schiitischen Milizen das Assad-Regime unterstützte, während die Türkei mit sunnitischen Milizen gegen Assad kämpfte. Vermittlungen Russlands im Anschluss an den Syrien-Konflikt führten zu einer Entspannung der Beziehungen zwischen beiden Ländern, die trotz ihrer sicherheitspolitischen und konfessionellen Unterschiede stets an einer Zusammenarbeit interessiert zu sein scheinen, auch wenn dies häufig zu Konflikten führt.
Following Turkey's recent military operation in Syria (Operation Peace Spring), "Turks" and "Kurds" have widely been dichotomized by the Western media outlets and political circles. US President Donald Trump even claimed that "Turks" and "Kurds" have been fighting for hundreds of years, and that they are "natural enemies." However, the complex historical relationship of "Turks" and "Kurds," as a loosely connected social totality prior to the age of nationalism, refutes such sloppy and feeble contentions. This work presents an identity-driven historical survey of Turkish/Turkmen societies' and polities' interrelations with Kurdish collectivities until the emergence of modern nationhood and nationalism. In doing so, this article provides an ideational and narrational context feeding the Turkish government's contemporary relationship with the Kurds of the Middle East. The major complication in journalistic and academic literature is rooted in the lack or omission of historical background informing current policy choices influenced by how relevant actors historically perceive each other. Today's incidents and facts such as the "solution process," "village guard system" or different Kurdish collectivities' positions between Iran and Turkey are sometimes akin to precedent events in history. This work aims to make a holistic contribution to fill this gap and to provide a succinct historical overview of interrelations.
After the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, it became evident that Iraq's Shia majority would dominate the future government if a free election was going to be held. In 2004, Jordan's King Abdullah, anxiously warned of the prospect of a "Shia crescent" spanning Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. This idea was then picked up by others in the Arab world, especially Egypt's President Mubarak and some elements within the Saudi government, to reaffirm the Iranian ambitions and portray its threats with regard to the Middle East. This article seeks to unearth the main causes of promoting the idea of a revived Shiism by some Arab countries, and argue that it was basically proposed out of the fear that what the American occupation of Iraq unleashed in the region would drastically change the old Arab order in which Sunni governments were dominant. While Iran downplayed the idea and perceived it as a new American conspiracy, it was grabbed by the Bush administration to intensify its pressures on Iran. It also sought to rally support in the Arab world for US Middle East policy in general, and its failed policy toward Iraq in particular. Thus, to answer the above mentioned question, a close attention would be paid to both the Arab and Iranian agenda in the Middle East after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in order to establish which entities benefit most from the perception of a Shia crescent. The difference between the two main schools of thought in Islam, Shiism and Sunnism, is mainly based on the issue of who should have led Islam after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. Shia believe that Imam Ali, the prophet's son-in-law, and his descendants (the progeny of the prophet Muhammad) were the true successors of the prophet, while Sunnis believe that Abubakr, Umar, Uthman and finally Ali, have been the true leaders of Islam. The
Das Ende des Kalten Krieges verschaffte einzelnen Staaten wie der Türkei Israel auch mehr Freiraum, ihre eigenen politischen und wirtschaftlichen Interessen zu verfolgen. Es entstand also eine gewisse Multilateralität/Multipolarität in der Weltpolitik allerdings nur innerhalb eines durch die Interessen der USA und deren oftmals unilaterales Vorgehen definierten Rahmens.
Unter dem Schutz der einzig verbliebenen Supermacht USA können deren Verbündete, wie die Türkische Republik, auf regionaler Ebene ihre machtpolitischen Interessen gezielter verfolgen als in der Vergangenheit. Dies macht sich in geografischen, sprachlichen, ethnischen, geschichtlichen und ökonomischen Aspekten der Außenpolitik der Türkei gegenüber den Ländern des Nahen Ostens und des Kaukasus bemerkbar. Sie setzt als ein Verbündeter und Partner des Westens vermehrt Mittel und Ressourcen in der Region ein, um zu einer Regionalmacht aufzusteigen, und übt als EU-Anwärter und Nachbar des Nahen Ostens und des Kaukasus eine wichtige ökonomische und geostrategische Brückenfunktion zwischen Europa und dem Nahen Osten aus.
Der Verfasser geht also davon aus, dass sich die Türkische Republik seit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges außenpolitisch neben der Westbindung zum Ziel gesetzt hat, zu einer regionalen Großmacht aufzusteigen. Die Handlungsfähigkeit der türkischen Interessenpolitik im internationalen System wird aber durch zwei Hindernisse stark eingeschränkt. Das sind erstens die Kurdenfrage und zweitens ökonomische Probleme in Form eines zu großen Handelsdefizits und daraus resultierender Abwertungen, die zu einer Reihe von Wirtschaftskrisen in der jüngeren Vergangenheit führten.
Durch das Südostanatolien-Projekt (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi, GAP) strebt die Türkei einen entscheidenden Machtzuwachs an, denn das Projekt ermöglicht es, das Wasser des Euphrat und des Tigris als wirtschaftliches und strategisches Mittel sowohl in der Innenpolitik als auch in der regionalen und internationalen Politik zur Durchsetzung türkischer Interessen zu nutzen. Nicht nur im Nahen Osten, sondern in der gesamten Weltwirtschaft und Weltpolitik ist das Wasser im neuen Jahrhundert zu einem knappen, strategischen und lebenswichtigen Wirtschaftsgut geworden. Wasser, das „weiße Gold“, ist dabei, dem „schwarzen Gold“ (Öl) den Rang abzulaufen.
Der Nahe Osten gehört zu den wasserärmsten Regionen der Welt. Die Türkei verfügt aber mit ihren 112 Mrd. Kubikmetern m³ Wasser im Vergleich zu ihren Nachbarn Irak und Syrien über große Vorkommen. Sie hat diesen Vorteil erkannt und setzt ihn nun in ihrer Großmachtpolitik in der Region ein.
Von der türkischen Wasserpolitik und dem GAP sind der Irak und Syrien als Unteran-rainerstaaten direkt betroffen, vor allem aber die Kurden, da das GAP ausschließlich auf kurdischem Siedlungsgebiet durchgeführt werden soll. Der Radius der kurdischen Aktionsmöglichkeiten ist dabei nicht auf die Türkei beschränkt, sondern erstreckt sich auch auf die Nachbarstaaten Iran, Irak und Syrien; und selbstverständlich haben ihre Interessen nach der US-amerikanischen Invasion im Irak an Bedeutung gewonnen.
Die Türkei ist als Partner der EU, Israels und der USA im Nahen Osten zwar ein entscheidender Baustein im politischen Gefüge dieser Region, sieht sich aber von ihren Partnern noch nicht als vollwertig und gleichberechtigt akzeptiert, sondern in der Wahrung ihrer Interessen in der Region durch diese Mächte beeinträchtigt. Sie ist der Ansicht, dass ebenso wie die politischen Konkurrenten der Türkei (Russland, Iran, Irak und Syrien) auch die westlichen Partner die Kurdenfrage gegebenenfalls gegen die Türkei instrumentalisieren. In diesem Machtspiel soll das GAP ein Gegeninstrument zur Wahrung wirtschaftlicher und strategischer Interessen der Türkei darstellen.
Das kostspielige GAP an Euphrat und Tigris in Südostanatolien umfasst zunächst einmal 19 Wasserkraftwerke mit einer Kapazität von je 8 000 MW. Jährlich sollen 27 Milliarden kWh Strom produziert werden, 22 Staudämme und Bewässerungskanäle werden die Bewässerung von 1,82 Millionen Ha Boden ermöglichen. Das Projekt soll bis zur Fertigstellung nach offiziellen Angaben 32 Milliarden US-Dollar kosten und nach seiner geplanten Vollendung im Jahre 2010 Einnahmen von mindestens 17,1 Mrd. Dollar jährlich erwirtschaften. Diese Einnahmen könnten durch Mehrwertprodukte und Wasserexporte um ein Vielfaches gesteigert werden.
Da Wasser im Nahen Osten auf Grund des Bevölkerungswachstums und Klimawandels immer knapper wird, kommt ihm neben dem Öl eine zentrale strategische und wirtschaftliche Bedeutung in der Region zu. In dieser Situation soll das an Euphrat und Tigris im Bau befindliche Projekt der Türkei als Werkzeug zum Aufstieg zur Regionalgroßmacht in einer wasserarmen Region dienen: Das Wasser soll der Türkei die für ihre Sicherheit und Stabilität als notwendig erachteten Machtressourcen verschaffen. Dies gilt sowohl in Bezug auf die Nationalökonomie als auch in innenpolitischer, regionalpolitischer und sicherheitspolitischer Hinsicht, womit sämtliche entscheidenden Machtfaktoren abgedeckt wären.
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