ArticlePDF Available

Political Implications of Residential Mobility and Stasis on the Partisan Balance of Locales

Authors:

Abstract

Drawing on movement patterns of several million voters within a six state region across four biennial intervals, we evaluate whether migration patterns are consistent with the thesis that migrants are sensitive to the political balance of destination neighborhoods once we control for the important socioeconomic covariates of relocation. Substantial minorities of the movers we track appear drawn to neighborhoods that are more politically compatible with their party of registration than the ones they left behind. Notably, those who change their party registration upon relocating appear highly sensitive to differences in the political climate between origin and destination. But selective in-migration is not the only, or even the primary, force behind the development of politically one-sided opinion environments. We find evidence based on models for millions of non-movers that out-migration or abandonment is consistent with the entrenchment of single-party politics, just as economically robust areas attract a mix of partisans in search of employment and better housing. Evaluating who remains behind is as important as studying those who leave when we want to learn about the consequences of residential relocation.
A preview of the PDF is not available
... Indeed, demographers and economists have long noted that the migration decision is primarily an economic one, driven by the push-pull conditions of labor markets (Molloy et al., 2011;Herzog et al., 1993;Schlottman and Herzog, 1981;Sandefur & Scott, 1981;Greenwood, 1985;Sjaastad, 1962). Some have expressed doubts about the empirical evidence presented in support of a political impulse behind migration (Abrams & Fiorina, 2012), and others have found that many movers do not move to more politically friendly destinations at all (Carlson & Gimpel, 2019). Presumably the non-sorters (call them 'mixers') number heavily among the massive flows of Democrats who have been exiting one-party Democratic cities to take up residence in less Democratic suburbs for more than 70 years (Banfield, 1957, p. 84;Hirsch, 1968). ...
... Locations will not be affected equally, and the process may occur far more quickly in some receiving locations than in others. The places abandoned are also altered by selection processes that result in a patchy and assorted partisan terrain (Carlson & Gimpel, 2019). ...
Article
Full-text available
Prominent historical examples point to how population surges from elsewhere have contributed to the social and political reconstitution of local electorates. Population mobility internal to the United States varies over time and across states but has always been impressive enough in volume to raise the curiosity of observers about its political effects. Here we press the question of whether the well-documented stream of migrants relocating from California to Texas has been sufficient to alter the political complexion of the destination state. Including migrants from Florida proves to be an illuminating contrast, showing that the California influx is indeed large, but politically quite mixed. We find that the aggregate effect of this flow on the partisan balance of Texas has been minimal in the short-term. Local effects on the counties and smaller localities in Texas are more noticeable, however, as cross-state migrants are highly selective in their relocation decisions, gravitating toward destinations consonant with their political values.
... Recent research has suggested that at least some people do select into the places where they live based on assessments of their fit with the place, though fit may not be "political fit" per se (Gimpel & Hui 2017;Gimpel & Hui 2018;Carlson & Gimpel 2019;Liu et al. 2019). An unknown but substantial percentage of other people also choose to stay in a location when they might otherwise leavea kind of tacit selection, albeit without the active consideration that movers might give to the range of alternative destinations before they choose one. ...
... Determining how each of these groups contributes to opinion stability and change has only recently started to fall under active investigation (Carlson & Gimpel 2019;Gimpel & Schuknecht 2003). ...
Chapter
Full-text available
Politically relevant identities and opinions about politics and government are neither randomly nor evenly distributed across space. The task of social scientists studying electoral geography is to understand why. Explanations go to individual characteristics, the characteristics of the settings where they live out their lives, or interesting interactions of the two. Moreover, social influence apparently has a physical and geographic component in the sense that proximity matters. Although people can form more contacts over longer distances than in the past, that does not seem to have diminished the greater weight placed on contacts close-by, pointing to the sustained coincidence of social and geographic space. Size and density of settlement also matter over and above compositional effects, continuing to account for many negative social outcomes. The chapter closes with the consideration of challenges to social scientific inference posed by the effort to account for the experience of a living in a multi-level world.
... The United States (US) has been the main focus of research on how partisanship affects internal migration, and is therefore a useful reference point. In fact, considerable attention has been given in recent years to the role of migration in the geographic sorting of the American electorate (Sussell, 2013;Tam Cho et al., 2013;Johnston et al., 2016;Rohla et al., 2018;Carlson and Gimpel, 2019). This attention has been partially stimulated by the observation that political divisions in American politics have produced a spatially polarized electorate, with counties becoming increasingly predominated by one of the two main parties (Bishop, 2009). ...
... The main channel underpinning this result is the existence of a "political homophily mechanism"; that is, the tendency to favour the company and presence of others who share similar political values (Bishop, 2009;Tam Cho et al., 2013). Through some process involving homophily, segregation, and socialization, human beings are more likely to associate with like-minded individuals, and select into locations that largely reflect their political preferences and ideological views, which can satisfy a need for belonging (see, e.g., Rodden, 2010;Tam Cho et al., 2013;Motyl et al., 2014;Gimpel and Hui, 2015;Rohla et al., 2018;Carlson and Gimpel, 2019). Particularly in a society with high levels of residential mobility, political profiles -in addition to demographic, occupational, and income considerations -play an important role in residential sorting (Rodden, 2010). ...
Article
Full-text available
The profound divisions that emerged around the UK's decision to leave the European Union have stimulated a heated debate on whether the referendum, by exposing intolerance and exacerbating societal tensions, has affected individuals' choices. The UK is one of the most mobile societies in Europe, and internal migration plays a key role in national well-being and in the efficient functioning of the labour and housing markets. In this article, we examine the consequences of polarizing politics on individuals' propensity to migrate internally. We show that, in the aftermath of the vote, individuals were less inclined to move when they were aligned with the Brexit preferences of their district. As 'Remainers' found themselves on the losing side, they were more likely than 'Leavers' to value the alignment to their district, given their 'misalignment' to the country. We also show that, when they do move, non-aligned individuals tend to relocate to a district to which they can then feel (re)aligned. * We would like to thank Andreas Murr and Andrea Ruggeri for their helpful comments. We also thank the journal's editor, Stefano Costalli, as well as three anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback. The usual disclaimer applies.
... 6 At the same time, relocation patterns exhibit geographic sorting by a number of neighbourhood and municipality characteristics that affect overall satisfaction (see, e.g., Bracco et al., 2018;Langella and Manning, 2019a). We also contribute to recent studies on whether internal migrants sort geographically based on their desire to live with neighbours with similar status and values (Bishop, 2009;Florida and Mellander, 2009;Tam Cho et al., 2013;Carlson and Gimpel, 2019). In fact, the increasing presence of homogeneous pockets of political support in the US has stimulated a wealth of research in its own right on whether liberal and conservative Americans have become spatially isolated from one another, the so-called "Big Sort hypothesis" (Sussell, 2013;Tam Cho et al., 2013;Johnston et al., 2016;Rohla et al., 2018;Carlson and Gimpel, 2019). ...
... We also contribute to recent studies on whether internal migrants sort geographically based on their desire to live with neighbours with similar status and values (Bishop, 2009;Florida and Mellander, 2009;Tam Cho et al., 2013;Carlson and Gimpel, 2019). In fact, the increasing presence of homogeneous pockets of political support in the US has stimulated a wealth of research in its own right on whether liberal and conservative Americans have become spatially isolated from one another, the so-called "Big Sort hypothesis" (Sussell, 2013;Tam Cho et al., 2013;Johnston et al., 2016;Rohla et al., 2018;Carlson and Gimpel, 2019). People care about the characteristics of the local community where their social interactions take place, and partisans differ starkly in their preferences for community type. ...
Article
Full-text available
When people migrate internally, do they tend to move to locations that reflect their political preferences? To address this question, we first compile a unique panel dataset on the universe of population movements in England and Wales across 346 local authority districts over the period 2002-2015, and estimate a gravity model of internal migration. We show that proximity in partisan composition exerts an important positive effect on migration flows, which is of a similar order of magnitude as wage differentials or ethnic proximity. We then use individual survey-based data over the same time period to investigate some of the micro-foundations underlying the “macromoves”. We find that political alignment to the district of residence contributes to individuals’ sense of belonging and ‘fitting in’ – consistent with the existence of a political homophily mechanism – and that a migrant’s political ideology can predict the partisanship of the destination district.
... Because voter files provide large, easily obtainable datasets including demographic information and geographic location of individuals, they are increasingly utilized in political behavior research. In particular, much of the research dealing with geographic sorting has used party registration data to demonstrate geographic clustering of like-minded partisans (Carlson and Gimpel, 2019;Martin and Webster, 2020;Sussell, 2013 The patterns I observe suggest impact voting but do not necessarily rule out maximizing options either. V.O. ...
Article
Among US states with party registration, many allow the unaffiliated to choose either the Democratic or Republican primary. States with these semi-closed rules thus provide an option to voters with greater choice than registering with a single political party. Using the synthetic control method, I find that the introduction of semi-closed primaries is associated with growth in unaffiliated registration. However, the likelihood of unaffiliated registration is not even across the electorate in semi-closed states. I show that it is most common where a voter’s party is not competitive and the access unaffiliated registration provides to the strong party’s primary is valuable. Consistent with this instrumental motive, unaffiliated voters in semi-closed states use their freedom of choice to vote in the primary of the stronger party in the electorate. This leads to significant crossover voting among unaffiliated voters who do not identify with that party such as Democrats in red states or Republicans in blue states. These findings show the unintended consequences of electoral institutions and find primary crossover voting is more common under some circumstances than others.
... Political attitudes differ between inhabitants of various types of areas, which can be partly explained by two types of mechanisms. On the one hand, individuals sort themselves into areas, partially based on socioeconomic resources and lifestyle preferences which are in turn related to political attitudes (Carlson and Gimpel 2019). Since younger, higher-educated professionals are more likely to live in central urban areas, the geographies of discontent and cosmopolitanism may be reflections of a social divide among classes who live in different areas (Maxwell 2019;Rodden 2019). ...
Article
This study tests a novel explanation for geographic divides in populist and anti-immigration attitudes. This explanation centres around place resentment: the feeling that one’s area is ignored by policy makers and that members of one’s local community are misunderstood and disrespected by inhabitants of other areas. I argue that place resentment mediates the relationship between the type of area one inhabits and political attitudes. With representative survey data and contextual data from The Netherlands, I show that place resentment is an important mediator explaining how geographic divides translate into anti-immigration and populist attitudes. Place resentment is a stronger explanation for geographic variation in political attitudes than alternative explanations I explored. The results suggest that place resentment plays a central role in explaining geographic polarization in Western democracies.
Article
Full-text available
A atual difusão de softwares de georreferenciamento e novas técnicas estatísticas expandiram as possibilidades na geografia eleitoral. O artigo tem como objetivo analisar a produção desse campo, revelando lacunas na produção brasileira em comparação à anglófona. A metodologia utilizada foi a revisão narrativa de literatura a partir do protocolo SANRA, que sistematiza e revela possíveis caminhos de pesquisa. A pesquisa revelou que, dentre as três grandes temáticas da geografia eleitoral, há uma concentração de interesse distinta entre a produção nacional e estrangeira, sendo a primeira focada no efeito composicional e a segunda no efeito contextual. Além disso, apenas 4% da produção no Brasil é realizada por geógrafos e 14% em revistas especializadas em geografia. Por fim, sugere-se superar a suposta dicotomia entre efeito composicional e efeito contextual, posicionando ambas como campos ricos da geografia eleitoral.
Article
From ancient time, Homo sapiens moved around in search of a better life. Although the development of agriculture and industrialization no longer necessitates frequently moving to find new food sources, people today still change their residences for a variety of reasons. This article highlights key findings from residential mobility, focusing on its implications for the self, social relationships, societies, and well‐being. Generally, residential mobility shifts individual attention away from collective attributes towards personal attributes. It also changes people’s relationship styles and preferences, leading individuals to favor wider social networks, more open communication, low commitment groups, and egalitarian helpers. In addition, it increases tolerance for norm violations and moral deviations. Lastly, residential mobility can explain some cross‐national and within‐nation variations. This article reviews recent psychological research on residential mobility and then discusses limitations, paradoxical findings, and future directions.
Article
Full-text available
We explore the connection between residential migration choices and political party identification by movers who change their political party registration. We find that an impressive number of migrants choose neighbourhoods that favor their new party of registration. The association between the party change of the migrant and the balance of local partisanship in their new neighborhood cannot be accounted for by a process of neighbourhood socialisation because the move is too recent for socialisation pressures to have operated. It is more likely that the migrant's political transition occurred well before the relocation that shaped the destination search. Relocation offers an opportunity to mark a previously transformed partisan preference on the voter rolls. In this sense, partisan identification is stable, but observing any large subset of migrants may make it appear unhinged, as this group collectively takes its opportunity to officially disclose their change in party loyalty when they have a chance to relocate and must re-register.
Article
Full-text available
In the large literature on the growing polarization of the American electorate and its representatives relatively little attention is paid to the spatial polarization of voters for the two parties at presidential elections. Bishop argued this has increased as the result of residential location decisions: Democratic Party supporters have increasingly moved to neighborhoods where others of that persuasion are already congregated, for example. His analyses at the county scale are geographically incommensurate with that argument, however; the lacuna is filled using precinct-level data for the entire United States for the 2008, 2012 and 2016 presidential elections. Multilevel modelling shows polarization at those elections was significantly greater at the precinct than the county, state and division scales. Change over the three elections at the precinct scale was probably associated with redistricting and reduced support from the Democratic Party by some groups.
Article
Full-text available
We examine the role party identification plays in moderating people's perception of place. Do people rely on heuristics to gauge neighborhood partisan composition? If so, those estimates may influence their perception of fit and neighborhood satisfaction. We find that in the absence of concrete, detailed information, people make judgments on the fly. Republicans, compared to Democrats and non-partisans, are more likely to develop impressions based on the specific location characteristics presented here. When perceived to be a political minority in an area, people are less likely to feel that they belong. In addition to conventional economic, and life-cycle factors, party identification does affect judgments about the suitability of prospective neighborhoods.
Article
Full-text available
We present evidence for two mechanisms that can explain increasing geographic divide of partisan preferences. The first is " inadvertent sorting " where people express a preference for residential environments with features that just happen to be correlated with partisanship. The second is " intentional sorting " where people do consider partisanship directly. We argue that the accumulating political biases visible in many neighborhoods can be the effect of some mixture of these two mechanisms. Because residential relocation often involves practical constraints and neighborhood racial composition is more important than partisanship, there is less partisan segregation across the United States than there could be based on residential preference alone.
Article
Full-text available
This study examines the bases of residential segregation in a late nineteenth century American city, recognizing the strong tendency toward homophily within neighborhoods. Our primary question is how ethnicity, social class, nativity, and family composition affect where people live. Segregation is usually studied one dimension at a time, but these social differences are interrelated, and thus a multivariate approach is needed to understand their effects. We find that ethnicity is the main basis of local residential sorting, while occupational standing and, to a lesser degree, family life cycle and nativity also are significant. A second concern is the geographic scale of neighborhoods: in this study, the geographic area within which the characteristics of potential neighbors matter in locational outcomes of individuals. Studies of segregation typically use a single spatial scale, often one determined by the availability of administrative data. We take advantage of a unique data set containing the address and geo-referenced location of every resident. We conclude that it is the most local scale that offers the best prediction of people’s similarity to their neighbors. Adding information at larger scales minimally improves prediction of the person’s location. The 1880 neighborhoods of Newark, New Jersey, were formed as individuals located themselves among similar neighbors on a single street segment.
Article
Social divisions between American partisans are growing, with Republicans and Democrats exhibiting homophily in a range of seemingly nonpolitical domains. It has been widely claimed that this partisan social divide extends to Americans' decisions about where to live. In two original survey experiments, we confirm that Democrats are, in fact, more likely than Republicans to prefer living in more Democratic, dense, and racially diverse places. However, improving on previous studies, we test respondents' stated preferences against their actual moving behavior. While partisans differ in their residential preferences, on average they are not migrating to more politically distinct communities. Using zip-codelevel census and partisanship data on the places where respondents live, we provide one explanation for this contradiction: by prioritizing common concerns when deciding where to live, Americans forgo the opportunity to move to more politically compatible communities. © 2016 by the Southern Political Science Association. All rights reserved.
Article
We consider the determinants and consequences of a source of utility that has received limited attention from economists: people's desire for the beliefs of other people to align with their own. We relate this 'preference for belief consonance' to a variety of other constructs that have been explored by economists, including identity, ideology, homophily, and fellow-feeling. We review different possible explanations for why people care about others' beliefs and propose that the preference for belief consonance leads to a range of disparate phenomena, including motivated belief-formation, proselytizing, selective exposure to media, avoidance of conversational minefields, pluralistic ignorance, belief-driven clustering, intergroup belief polarization, and conflict. We also discuss an explanation for why disputes are often so intense between groups whose beliefs are, by external observers' standards, highly similar to one-another.