Kenya: Understanding Risks and Uncertainties

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13 Kenya
Risks and uncertainties around low-
carbon energy pathways
Oliver W. Johnson, Hannah Wanjiru, Mbeo Ogeya,
and Francis X. Johnson
Introduction
Like many countries in sub- Saharan Africa, Kenya has high development ambi-
tions, aiming to become a middle- income country by 2030 (Government of
Kenya, 2007). These ambitions are based upon a low- carbon, climate- resilient
development pathway, as set out in Kenya’s Nationally Determined Contribu-
tions (NDC) to global climate change mitigation under the UNFCCC (Minis-
try of Environment and Natural Resources, 2015). These ambitions depend on
rapid expansion of the energy sector to increase the access, security, and afford-
ability of energy service provision (Ministry of Energy and Petroleum, 2016).
There are multiple, complementary pathways that Kenya might pursue to
achieve these goals. In this chapter, we focus on two of those pathways: expan-
sion of geothermal power development and development of greater sustainable
charcoal production.
In the power sector, the country’s abundant renewable energy resources offer
significant opportunities for pursuing low- carbon development pathways. Geo-
thermal in particular is poised to play an important role in such pathways. Having
already moved from niche technology to the mainstream, geothermal power
development now sits at an important threshold: after years of public- led invest-
ment in development of the geothermal sector, Kenya is seeking more private-
sector-led expansion of its vast remaining geothermal resources (Musembi, 2014).
As a world leader on geothermal energy, the Kenyan experience offers valuable
lessons for research and has already been analysed in global comparisons of
sustainability indicators (Shortall, Davidsdottir, and Axelsson, 2015).
At the same time, Kenya is seeking to modernise its cooking sector, which
remains dominated by traditional biomass fuels with significant negative impacts
on land, ecology, and emissions. Increasing urbanisation will have significant
implications for forest resources if charcoal continues to remain the most afford-
able and accessible urban cooking fuel. However, more research is needed to
better understand the complexities and uncertainties around greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions in land- use and biomass sectors (Dalla Longa and van der
Zwaan, 2017). Through a mix of regulation, promotion of improved kilns and
cookstoves, and support of alternative fuels, Kenya seeks a dual approach of

Kenya 221
increasing the sustainability of charcoal production, trade and consumption,
and providing opportunities for fuel switching (Ministry of Environment, Water
and Natural Resources, 2013; Wanjiru, Nyambane, and Omedo, 2016).
In this chapter, we explore the risks and uncertainties associated with expan-
sion of geothermal power development and sustainable charcoal production and
trade, framing them within the discourse around Kenya’s energy future. We first
situate the development of geothermal and sustainable charcoal sectors within
the context of Kenya’s low- carbon transition pathway and the country’s chang-
ing political landscape. We then present analyses of risks and uncertainties
around further development within both sectors, followed by a discussion of
their implications. We conclude with policy recommendations for the two
sectors.
Research process and methods
To explore the risks and uncertainties around developing geothermal power gen-
eration and sustainable charcoal production and trade in Kenya, we analysed the
technological innovation system (see Bergek et al., 2008; Hekkert et al., 2007),
including the market system and actors. We used stakeholder attribute matrices,
stakeholder engagement in the form of interviews and focus group discussions
(FGDs), and field observations to identify the risks and uncertainties faced by
different actors across the market system. We undertook 17 semi- structured inter-
views and three FGDs with geothermal- sector stakeholders, including three
national government officials, one county government official, three employees of
state- owned utilities, two representatives of independent power producers, one
representative of the regulatory authority, two members of research institutions,
five representatives of development partners, and seven members of the local com-
munity in the Olkaria region. We also undertook seven semi- structured interviews
and targeted discussions during two workshops with charcoal- sector stakeholders,
including six national government officials, two county government officials, rep-
resentatives of three charcoal producer associations, representatives of one char-
coal transporter group, four members of research institutions, and two
representatives of development partners. Data collection took place over the
course of June 2016 to May 2018.
Low- carbon energy pathways for Kenya
Kenya is one of East Africa’s major economies, with a population of almost 50
million and a GDP of roughly US$75 billion.1 The country’s high dependence
on natural resources makes its GDP very sensitive to impacts of climate change
on the natural environment (Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources,
2016). In 2007, the government established Vision 2030, its blueprint for
becoming a newly industrialising, middle- income country providing a high-
quality life for all its citizens by 2030 (Government of Kenya, 2007). The notion

222 Oliver W. Johnson et al.
of a green economy resonates through Vision 2030, merging the imperatives of
contributing to global climate change mitigation, meeting the increasing energy
demands of a growing population and economy, sustainably managing the coun-
try’s valuable natural resources, and enhancing climate resilience.
Committing to climate change mitigation and adaptation
In 2015, Kenya submitted its NDC to the UNFCCC, noting that land use, land-
use change, forestry, and agriculture contributed 75% of the total GHG emis-
sions in 2010 (Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, 2015). By the
year 2030, Kenya’s GHG emissions under a business- as-usual scenario – exclud-
ing future exploitation in the extractive industry – are estimated at
143 MtCO2e,2 based on the per capita emissions of about 1.26 MtCO2e (Minis-
try of Environment and Natural Resources, 2015). Therefore, the country has
announced mitigation and adaptation actions to abate its GHG emissions by
30%. To achieve a low- carbon, climate- resilient development pathway, some of
the mitigation activities relate to promoting clean energy technologies to reduce
overreliance on wood fuels; achieving a tree cover of at least 10% of the land
area; and expansion of renewable sources of energy. Geothermal power develop-
ment and sustainable charcoal production and trade both form important ele-
ments of Kenya’s mitigation priorities and, as such, both were the focus of two
recent proposed Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions for Kenya submit-
ted to the UNFCCC (Falzon et al., 2014; Wanjiru et al., 2016).
Meanwhile, as with many developing countries in Africa that are vulnerable
to climate change, adaptation measures will continue to receive support, includ-
ing ‘climate proofing’ infrastructure as well as supporting innovation and devel-
opment of appropriate technologies that promote climate- resilient development.
These measures have come out of Kenya’s consecutive strategies and plans for
addressing climate change, starting with the National Climate Change Response
Strategy (NCCRS) developed in 2010, followed by the National Climate
Change Action Plan (NCCAP) launched in 2013 and revised in 2018, the
Climate Change Act passed in 2016, and the National Adaptation Plan (NAP)
which was finalised in 2016 (Government of Kenya, 2010a, 2013, 2016a, 2016b,
2018a).
Powering the nation and fuelling its cities
As shown in Figure 13.1, renewable energy has always played a major role in
Kenya’s electricity supply. Hydro has typically dominated the electricity mix,
but over the last 15 years geothermal has taken an increasing share and wind
has started to become prominent. By 2018, hydro, geothermal, and wind made
up 35.3%, 27.9%, and 1.1% respectively of the country’s 2,333 MW of installed
grid- connected electricity (Kenya Power, 2018).
As electricity access expands, the middle class grows, and industrial activity
rises, major demand increases are forecast (Government of Kenya, 2011, 2018b).

Kenya 223
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10,000
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
GWh
Geothermal generaon Hydro generaonBiomass generaon
Oil generaon Wind generaonElectricity consumpon
Figure 13.1 Electricity generation and consumption in Kenya, 1990–2015.
Source: www.iea.org.
Since 2011, a number of plans have been established to meet this demand, the
latest being the updated Least Cost Power Development Plan (LCPDP)
2017–2037, published in 2018. In it, the long- term target for generation expan-
sion is around 7213 MW by 2030 and 9932 MW by 2037, as shown in Figure
13.2 (Government of Kenya, 2018b). Also in 2018, the government announced
its third Medium- Term Plan (2018–2022) – its economic development vehicle
anchored within the Vision 2030 – giving great priority to expanding the
renewable energy sector.3 Figure 13.2 shows how renewable energy is expected
to feature in electricity generation expansion over the next 20 years.
Both the LCPDP 2017–2037 and the third Medium Term Plan envisage a
four- fold expansion of geothermal power generation from 650 MW to around
2500 MW in 20 years. Abundant, low carbon, and climate resilient, geothermal
power is an attractive resource with potential for additional heat applications in
industry. And over the past four decades, considerable technical expertise in
geothermal has been established within the country’s state- owned utilities and
ancillary services. However, attracting the private investments needed to
develop the country’s geothermal resources at a swifter pace remains a
challenge.
Meanwhile, in the cooking sector, a rising and increasingly urbanising popu-
lation is demanding more charcoal, exerting increasing pressure on forests, farm-
lands, and community rangelands from where it is sourced. Charcoal – produced
in kilns by carbonising wood by pyrolysis – meets the cooking energy needs of
over 80% of Kenya’s urban population (Wanleys Consultancy Services, 2013).

224 Oliver W. Johnson et al.
But the growing gap between supply and demand of the commodity will only
expand unless action is taken. Imports from neighbouring countries meet some
of this gap, but not all. Ecological impacts and land degradation from the
remaining unsustainable charcoal production in Kenya add to its GHG emis-
sions and threaten future livelihoods due to declining yields, decreased biodiver-
sity, and other impacts (Kiruki et al., 2017; Ndegwa et al., 2016a).
Putting the Kenyan charcoal sector on a more sustainable pathway calls for
innovative approaches across the charcoal market chain that can improve effi-
ciency in harvesting, production, transport, distribution, and consumption. Yet
doing so is not easy: the sector remains informal with little recognition in
national economic reporting despite employing hundreds of thousands of people
and generating hundreds of millions of US dollars (Njenga et al., 2013).
Although it is an important source of livelihood for some, the economic returns
tend to be concentrated among larger producers and wholesale traders, while
small- scale producers may effectively be trapped in poverty (Ndegwa et al.,
2016b; Zulu and Richardson, 2013).
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10,000
2017 2030 2037
MW
Wind 26
Cogen. 2
Gasoil 54
Cogeneration
Gasoil
Imports
Natural gasGeothermal
Hydro
Coal
Diesel
Solar
Generic back-up capacity
Wind
Figure 13.2 Projected electricity generation in Kenya, 2017–2037.
Source: www.iea.org.

Kenya 225
Navigating the changing political landscape
As Figure 13.3 shows, there is a range of legislation, policies, and strategies
influencing the development of the geothermal and charcoal sectors in Kenya,
some broad in scope and others with a sectoral focus. But in recent years, deci-
sions around how to manage geothermal power generation and charcoal pro-
duction and trade have also been heavily influenced by the changing political
landscape associated with the devolved government system that was estab-
lished in the wake of a new Kenyan constitution in 2010 (Government of
Kenya, 2010b). Debate continues over how governance of the energy sector at
county and central governments will be managed in practice. The devolved
system in Kenya is still new, hence a lot of learning and adaptation still needs
to take place before effective means of ensuring citizen participation are
established.
With energy planning and development mandates, county governments have
a substantial role to play with regard to shaping energy development priorities
and politics according to their local resources (Johnson et al., 2016). For
instance, most geothermal steam fields lie within the Rift Valley – an area
spreading across Turkana, Baringo, Nakuru, and Kajiado counties. Local gov-
ernments in these counties want a role in decision making over geothermal
development in their constituencies to embrace its benefits, rather than risk dis-
ruptions in their county and local community (Matara and Sayagie, 2018).
Meanwhile, some charcoal production hotspot areas, such as Tharaka- Nithi,
Kitui, Narok, Kajiado, and Kwale counties, have already developed regulations
to manage how their woody biomass resources are used and preserved (Wanjiru
et al., 2016). However, county- level budgets generally support roads or other
infrastructure rather than energy provision. Large- scale energy infrastructure
remains outside the purview of county governments, while small- scale solutions
and household use of biomass energy receive little political attention (Johnson
et al., 2016).
Much hinges on the 2017 Energy Bill – first put forward in 2015 and cur-
rently under consideration by the Parliament – which will give legal clarity as to
what local- level governance would mean within the counties when it comes to
energy issues (Government of Kenya, 2017). For example, each county govern-
ment is expected to develop a county energy master plan that will be used by
the Cabinet Secretary of the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum to formulate an
integrated national energy master plan for purposes of national energy planning.
In addition, county governments will have the power to enforce certain provi-
sions for efficient use of energy and its conservation, to undertake inspections,
and to issue directions, all in relation to national energy laws and provisions.
Furthermore, for geothermal projects, county governments will receive 20% of
the royalties from geothermal power produced in their jurisdictions, and the
local community shall receive 5% of the royalties through a community
trust fund.

2007
2008
2009
2010
2013
2014
2015
2016
2018
National economy Climate change Charcoal Geothermal
2017
Vision2030
MTP I (2008–2012)
Forest (Charcoal) Rules)
New constitution NCCRS
MTP II (2013–2017) Nat’l Enviro Policy NCCAP 2013–2017 LCPDP 2011–2030 5000
MW plan
Geothermal NAMA
Power Generation & Transmission Master Plan
LCPDP 2017–2037
Energy Act
Charcoal NAMA
Forest Conserv’n & Mgmt ActNAP 2015–2013Climate Change Act
INDC
MTP III (2018–2022) NCCAP 2018–2022
Figure 13.3 Range of legislation, policy, and strategy governing Kenya’s energy pathways.

Kenya 227
Risks and uncertainty in Kenya’s energy pathways
Geothermal power development and sustainable charcoal production and trade
both form important energy pathways in Kenya’s quest to become a middle-
income country based on a climate- resilient green economy. But implementa-
tion and consequences of these pathways are by no means certain: understanding
the risks and uncertainties around these pathways is essential to overcoming
barriers and minimising negative impacts.
Geothermal power development
The technological innovation system life cycle for geothermal encompasses
roughly six phases, taking place over up to a decade (see ESMAP, 2012;
Ng’ang’a, 2005). Geothermal development starts with geo- exploration through
surface studies followed by exploratory drilling, a practice that involves drilling
three to six narrow wells to about 2000–3000 metres. Once the resource is
proven viable, around a dozen production wells are drilled to extract steam, and
a system of pipes is constructed to gather the steam at one location and to then
reinject it back into the steam field reservoir. The gathered steam is most com-
monly used indirectly in a steam turbine for power generation. It can also be
used directly for a range of heat applications, such as spas, district heating, and
industrial and smaller- scale processes requiring heat. In the case of steam turbine
power generation, power is typically transmitted and distributed through the
national grid to residential, commercial, and industrial end users. In both cases,
steam field management is crucial to ensure the resource is not depleted and
that hazardous chemicals in the steam are properly managed. Decommissioning
of geothermal steam fields and power plants has yet to be experienced in Kenya.
Historical perspective on geothermal
Kenya’s geothermal resource is located within the country’s Rift Valley, with
recent estimates suggesting a resource potential of between 7000 MW and
10,000 MW spread over 14 sites (Ngugi, 2012). Exploration in the Olkaria
steam field in the late 1960s to mid- 1970s by the state- owned Kenya Power
Company Limited and supported by the UNDP led to the drilling of production
wells in the Olkaria I block and commissioning of a 15 MW geothermal power
plant in 1981. Drilling continued, with up to 20 wells added by 1985, and two
additional 15 MW power plants were commissioned in 1982 and 1985 (Omenda
and Simiyu, 2015; Riaroh and Okoth, 1994; Simiyu, 2008).
Reform of the power sector in 1997 led to the unbundling of Kenya Power
Company Limited into two entities: Kenya Power and Lighting Company (KPLC)
– later rebranded as Kenya Power – responsible for transmission and distribution,
and Kenya Electricity Generating Company (KenGen) responsible for generation
(Kapika and Eberhard, 2013; Karekezi and Mutiso, 2000). In its new form,
KenGen remained in control of the Olkaria I block and began drilling in Olkaria

228 Oliver W. Johnson et al.
II. In the meantime, the first private- sector concession was awarded to OrPower4
in 1998 to explore and develop Olkaria III. Additional Olkaria II steam turbine
units were commissioned in 2003 and in 2007; the 140 MW Olkaria IV was com-
missioned in 2010; and current work is ongoing to develop another 140 MW in
Olkaria V (Kenya Power, 2018; Ngugi, 2012; Omenda and Simiyu, 2015). Since
serious geothermal exploration first began 40 years ago, geothermal has evolved
from niche technology and resource to being a major contributor to the national
electricity mix, with an installed capacity of 652 MW providing almost half of
Kenya’s power (Kenya Power, 2018).
Geothermal capacity is projected to reach over 5500 MW by 2030, but only
if greater private- sector involvement can be achieved (Ngugi, 2012; Omenda
and Simiyu, 2015). To help accelerate geothermal development, the govern-
ment established the Geothermal Development Company (GDC) in 2009, with
a mandate to carry out rapid exploration and development of geothermal over
the next 20 years, encouraging further private- sector-led expansion in geother-
mal power generation, and removing the high risks associated with expensive
exploratory drilling (Ngugi, 2012). A decade later, acceleration has been
limited. GDC is currently developing a geothermal field in Menengai providing
steam sales to three independent power producers (IPPs), but the project has
experienced delays related to finalising the steam sales agreement and getting
government letters of support, both of which are essential to convince investors
that financial and political risks are manageable. Other fields are promising but
much hinges on progress in Menengai (Ministry of Energy and Petroleum, 2013;
Ngugi, 2012).
Implementation risks
Geothermal development faces a range of barriers or potential risks to imple-
mentation (Figure 13.4). In terms of economic feasibility, geothermal devel-
opment on ‘greenfield’ sites – where no previous development has taken place
– requires considerable upfront investment. One exploration well costs over
US$1 million to drill, and three wells are required simply to prove the resource.
This high investment is prohibitively risky for both private companies looking
to ensure a return on investment and state- owned utilities with limited budgets.
In Olkaria, representatives from KenGen and OrPower admit they have been
very lucky to find steam so easily and that the quality of steam has remained
consistent for so long. This might not be the case elsewhere in the Rift Valley,
and delays faced by private companies in Akiira and Longonot show the dif-
ficulty in finding investors patient enough to finance additional exploration.
Stakeholders highlight that GDC was created precisely to bear this risk on
behalf of the private sector, undertaking exploration and steam field develop-
ment in greenfield sites and selling the steam to IPPs, which invest in power
generation only.
But even once the resource is proven, the financial risk does not disappear.
Typical costs for a 20 MW geothermal power plant – including these production

Consequential risks
Most significant risks
Implementation risks
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Electricity demand growth
Tariff increases if supply–demand gap emerges
Lack of local benefit-sharing if Energy Bill continues
to be delayed
Environmental degradation if process of monitoring
and penalising is not clear and enforced
Regional geothermal development
High risk, high cost venture
Political uncertainty around national and county
governance of resource use
Community opposition to potential resettlement
and changes in land access
Uncertainties
Acceleration of geothermal power development
Local political context
Local and global financial market dynamics
Figure 13.4 Main uncertainties, implementation, and consequential risks associated with the geothermal power development in Kenya.

230 Oliver W. Johnson et al.
wells, the steam gathering system, and steam turbine technology – can reach
almost US$80 million (GEOCOM, 2015). Recent slow growth in demand due
to limited economic and industrial development4 has led to growing concern
among government and Kenya Power officials that they will not have enough
customers to be able to pay for the electricity that the company has agreed to
purchase.
This economic risk associated with inability of the ‘offtaker’ – Kenya Power –
to pay for electricity it has contractually agreed to purchase is a key political and
institutional risk facing the geothermal sector. This may, in turn, greatly increase
the cost of borrowing capital for investment. In the private sector, investors with
a high tolerance for risk may be more amenable to investing in geothermal, but
they typically require strong guarantees before they are willing to lend to green-
field project developers or IPPs. In Menengai, GDC developed the geothermal
field and will sell steam to three IPPs. To mitigate investment risks, the IPPs have
a project and steam sales agreement with GDC to guarantee the steam they will
receive, and a power purchase agreement with Kenya Power to buy the power they
produce. But delays in closing financing for the IPPs have continued as letters of
support from the government have been slow in forthcoming, leaving some polit-
ical risks unresolved. Investors, private developers, and government stakeholders
all appeared to have very different perspectives on who should bear which risk. As
such, geothermal remains dominated by grants and concessional loans (high
interest and long tenors) from development finance institutions, such as the Euro-
pean Investment Bank, the KfW Development Bank, the World Bank and the
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).
Another political risk from the perspective of many different stakeholders is
the distribution of responsibility for energy planning and project approval
between the national and the county governments. County government repre-
sentatives felt that too much national control was a risk to their ability to
manage their own affairs and ensure that the voice of county citizens was repres-
ented. National government representatives viewed added bureaucracy and
potential for political manoeuvring as a risk to project development and
approval, which many deemed was already overly convoluted. Meanwhile,
private developers sat on the fence, appreciating the role county government
could play in managing local issues but remaining wary that increased levels of
bureaucracy might lead to increased avenues for corruption, which already per-
vades so much of the Kenyan economy. The 2017 Energy Bill, still awaiting
final approval, may do much to clarify the allocation responsibilities among
national and county governments; however, limited capacity at the county
level, and ambiguities in the details, will take years to resolve.
The final risk associated with achieving further geothermal development is
community opposition to construction both at the geothermal site and for the
associated transmission lines to connect these sites with distant demand centres,
such as major cities and industrial areas. In the face of relocation – which occurred
in 2010 to facilitate development of the Olkaria IV power plant – or other restric-
tions on land use, communities are understandably often resistant to geothermal

Kenya 231
development. Geothermal is not special in this regard: many other large energy
infrastructure projects, including various wind power and transmission line pro-
jects, have faced community opposition, spanning from written complaints to
roadblocks and open protests. Government, state- owned utilities, and private
project developers take community concerns seriously. For example, GDC has
enlisted support from the New Zealand government in how to manage engage-
ment with Indigenous groups on infrastructure development and land issues: the
two countries have had some common and comparable experiences (Shortall,
Davidsdottir, and Axelsson, 2015). Meanwhile, development partners, such as the
World Bank, place considerable pressure on their projects to minimise social risks
and show compliance with international standards such as the Equator Principles.5
Efforts to ensure the local community shares some of the benefits of infrastructure
development typically include compensation, relocation to upgraded housing and
additional community facilities, and job opportunities for unskilled labour in
project construction and post- construction security. But the complex financing
arrangements of geothermal projects often impede or limit on- the-ground imple-
mentation of international standards of development finance (Ole Koissaba,
2018). The benefits are often incomparable to the losses or unevenly distributed:
for instance, it might be impossible to weigh improved access to a medical clinic
with loss of fertile land for grazing livestock.
Consequential risks
Geothermal brings many benefits in terms of a low- carbon, climate- resilient
source of electricity, with the potential for high output into the national grid.
But there is also a risk of a range of adverse consequences (refer back to Figure
13.4). With careful management of steam reservoirs – as is currently the case in
Olkaria – geothermal is a renewable source with little financial burden once
initial capital costs are paid back. This results in competitive electricity tariffs
that can help to reduce the consumer cost of electricity, as already experienced
in Kenya. However, if supply does not match demand, then higher unit costs
may prevent Kenya Power from lowering tariffs or may require them to raise
tariffs to cover the costs of meeting obligations in power purchase agreements.
This is a risk for the consumers who may have to pay more, for Kenya Power
who may lose money and reputation, for the government and taxpayers who
may have to subsidise Kenya Power, and for the energy regulator who may find
it impossible to balance cost recovery with affordable tariffs.
Risks of negative social impacts of geothermal development – beyond those
associated with higher electricity costs – largely revolve around negative impacts
on livelihoods and the culture of local communities in the vicinity of steam field
and power plant infrastructure. These negative impacts may perpetuate existing
social inequalities and the marginalisation of traditional societies. While the
urban middle class, industries, and manufacturing businesses benefit from
cheaper and more reliable electricity, access of local communities to training
and skilled employment at geothermal sites might remain limited. The new

232 Oliver W. Johnson et al.
Energy Bill currently awaiting final approval will establish a community fund for
development activities, which is likely to help significantly to achieve greater
benefit sharing (Government of Kenya, 2017). But until this comes into being
and is proven to help, it remains unclear whether devolved government – with
its added layer of political dynamics – will mitigate or exacerbate social impacts.
The environmental risks of upscaled geothermal development include con-
tamination from poor handling of toxic chemicals in the steam; withdrawal of
water from lakes, rivers, and wells beyond their capacity; and degradation and
disruption to natural habitats and migratory routes of wildlife inside and outside
protected areas (see Kubo, 2003; Mariita, 2002; Mwangi, 2005; Ogola, Davids-
dottir, and Fridleifsson, 2012). These risks are largely the concern of conserva-
tion groups and others dependent on clean and available land and water
resources. They can be – and often are – allayed by enforcing extensive environ-
mental impact assessments and strong risk mitigation measures, such as control-
led reinjection of steam into reservoirs; regulated water withdrawal;
wildlife- friendly steam piping designs; use of noise- reduction technology; and
cautious management of toxic chemicals using the latest technology and pro-
cesses. However, non- compliance can result in severe impacts. The situation
calls for extra measures to enforce the set regulations, and perhaps giving more
positive visibility to those who pursue best practices.
Sustainable charcoal production and trade
The charcoal technological innovation system life cycle encompasses six phases.
Charcoal production begins with harvesting woody biomass from communal
land, government forest, and private land (Njenga et al., 2013). The woody
biomass is then carbonised by pyrolysis in a kiln to produce a certain charcoal,
with typical kiln ‘efficiencies’ – the ratio of charcoal mass output to dry wood
mass input – ranging from 10% to 30% (Bailis, 2009; Ministry of Environment,
Water and Natural Resources, 2013). Charcoal is then transported in 50–90 kg
sacks from production sites to urban and peri- urban demand sites. From there it
is then distributed to consumers in a range of sizes, from whole sacks to 20-litre
buckets to two- litre tins. Efficiency in final use of charcoal for cooking depends
on the stove technology that consumers own and prefer to use. Some entrepren-
eurs have started to make charcoal briquettes from charcoal dust created during
production, transportation, and distribution – amounting to roughly 25% of
total original charcoal volume.
Historical perspective on charcoal
The increase of charcoal use in Kenya is largely a function of two factors: urban
population growth and limited switching to alternative fuels. Between 1960 and
2017, Kenya’s population rose over sixfold, and the proportion of the population
living in urban areas more than tripled.6 In the 1980s, charcoal was used by 50%
of the urban population (O’Keefe, Raskin, and Bernow, 1984) but by 2002 this

Kenya 233
figure was reported to have reached 82% (Kamfor Company, 2002). Although
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), electricity, and pellets burned in gasifier stoves
are available as alternative fuels for cooking in urban centres, they have
remained the preserve of high- income households only. As such, charcoal con-
tinues to be a major source of cooking fuel for urban households across all
income levels (Dalberg Advisors, 2018; Kojima, Bacon, and Zhou, 2011).
Rapidly rising demand for charcoal has led to a widening supply–demand
gap resulting in unsustainable charcoal production. Current demand, estim-
ated at 16.3 million m3, is far above the current supply of 7.4 million m3
(Wanleys Consultancy Services, 2013). And by 2032, demand is expected to
increase by 17.8% while supply is expected to increase by only 16.8%, widen-
ing the supply- demand gap from 8.9 million cubic metres (m3) to 10.6 million
cubic metres. The charcoal market chain is a vital source of employment for
over 500,000 people and generates over US$427 million, yet it is barely recog-
nised in formal national economic reporting and forecasting (Njenga et al.,
2013).
Charcoal conservation efforts started in earnest in mid- 1990s with the pro-
motion of a more efficient charcoal stove – the Kenya Ceramic Jiko – by GTZ,
the Kenya government, universities, and other development partners (Karekezi
and Turyareeba, 1995; Tigabu, 2017). But efforts to make the charcoal sector
sustainable – i.e. ensuring the charcoal that reaches homes and businesses is
produced in a way that does not contribute to degradation of forests, lands, and
ecosystems – has only become a focal point for action in the last decade. A legal
framework regulating the production of charcoal, the Forest (Charcoal) Rules,
was established in 2009 (Government of Kenya, 2009). Community forest
associations or other common interest groups that register as formal charcoal
producer associations with the Kenya Forest Service receive a registration certif-
icate. Transporters buying from these registered charcoal producer associations
receive a certificate of origin, which they present to their local Kenya Forest
Service office to obtain a charcoal movement permit costing 500–1,000 KES
(US$5–10) per trip.
In 2013, the National Environment Policy highlighted charcoal burning as
a major threat for arid and semi- arid land and national forest degradation
(Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, 2013). In parallel, the
National Climate Change Action Plan 2013–2017 highlighted charcoal pro-
duction as a main contributor to GHG emission in Kenya and proposed the
introduction of more efficient kilns as the most significant low- carbon oppor-
tunity to reduce emissions; these proposals were also included in the recently
revised National Climate Change Action Plan 2018–2022 (Government of
Kenya, 2013, 2018a). Meanwhile, a similar observation was reported in
Kenya’s Second National Communication to the UNFCCC on its NDC in
2015, with sustainable charcoal production considered to be a key part of
Kenya’s commitment to global climate change mitigation (Ministry of
Environment and Natural Resources, 2015).

234 Oliver W. Johnson et al.
Implementation risks
Figure 13.5 highlights the risks to implementation of sustainable charcoal. The
financing risks relate to covering the cost of forest management interventions and
supporting the purchase of improved technology for charcoal production (kilns)
and charcoal consumption (cookstoves). Charcoal production is widely con-
sidered to be a significant cause of deforestation and forest degradation, although
the precise causal pathway is distorted by links to other drivers of forest degrada-
tion such as timber extraction, grazing of livestock, and clearing of forests to make
way for crop production (Bailis et al., 2017; Hosonuma et al., 2012). According to
many stakeholders, there is almost no financing available to fund the farm forestry
and reforestation interventions necessary to establish a sustainable supply of
biomass for charcoal production and to maintain forest cover. Meanwhile, char-
coal producer associations note that efficient charcoal production technologies
present a considerable financial expenditure for their members, who typically earn
a low and unstable income and have little formal access to credit. Innovative
financing mechanisms were widely considered vital to facilitating purchase of
these improved production technologies, but stakeholders acknowledged that
making formal lending solutions work within a largely informal sector presents a
considerable obstacle. Those working on the charcoal demand side noted greater
success in consumer- financing schemes for efficient charcoal consumption tech-
nologies, such as improved cookstoves, but warned of a distribution market marred
by a wide variation in product quality. The irony of these financial risks is that, if
the sector were streamlined, the government would retain about US$60 million
with a 16% VAT rate, which potentially could be reinvested into the sector and
thus used to manage financial risk (Ministry of Environment, Water and Natural
Resources, 2013; Mutimba and Barasa, 2005).
Another risk is weak enforcement of the formal permitting system under the
2009 Forest (Charcoal) Rules. The system has done little to disincentivise pro-
duction, transport, and use of charcoal from unsustainable sources. Kenya’s
informal system of bribes – so well- established that producers, transporters, and
wholesalers have come to view it as an acceptable component of the charcoal
trade – exacerbates the situation. Meanwhile, the formal permitting system is
new, and the compliance requirements are often misunderstood by the traffic
police and Kenya Forest Service officers tasked with verifying the validity of all
movement permits. Officers are often individual beneficiaries of bribes and thus
may have little incentive to enforce a formal permit system that instead benefits
the local or national government. Since devolved county governments were
created in 2013, counties with charcoal production hotspots – such as Kitui,
Narok, and Kajiado counties – have started to establish and enforce their own
regulations with which local charcoal producer associations and transporters
have to comply. It is yet to be seen if they will prove more effective and enforce-
able than the national regulations.
The third risk is associated with competition from alternative cooking fuels.
While a sustainable charcoal sector is an attractive proposition to some, others

Consequential risks
Most significant risks
Implementation risks
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
C
o
n
s
e
q
u
e
n
t
i
a
l
r
i
s
k
s
a
s
c
o
g
n
i
t
i
v
e
b
a
r
r
i
e
r
s
Promotion and adoption of alternative cooking fuels
Potential loss of livelihoods within informal charcoal sector
Increased costs of sustainable charcoal and improved
charcoal cook stoves
Possible rebound effects from improved efficiency
Change in drivers of forest degradation
High cost of more efficient production technologies and
limited financing options
Weak enforcement of formal regulations
Competition from alternative clean cooking fuels
Limited capacity within charcoal producer associations
Uncertainties
Wider adoption of sustainable charcoal production practices
Local political context
Regional charcoal supply and demand dynamics
Figure 13.5 Main uncertainties, implementation, and consequential risks associated with sustainable charcoal production and trade in
Kenya.

236 Oliver W. Johnson et al.
within the energy, public health, and environment sectors view charcoal as a
dirty fuel that should be fully replaced by much cleaner alternatives, such as
LPG, ethanol, and biomass pellets burned in gasifier stoves. Interventions to
make these alternative fuels more available and affordable, particularly in urban
areas, may pose a significant risk to sustainable charcoal production activities. If
alternatives capture a sizeable share of the urban household energy market, it
might reduce demand for charcoal, with potentially negative implications on
charcoal- linked employment and livelihoods.
The final risk to greater pursuit of sustainable charcoal production is limited
capacity within charcoal producer associations to ensure compliance with
formal regulations. These regulations require registered charcoal producer
associations to establish a written constitution, develop a conservation and
reforestation plan, and document the kiln technologies and tree species they use
to make charcoal. But tracking biomass resources and developing forest manage-
ment plans require significant expertise that many members of these associations
lack. Meanwhile, creating a constitution that all members agree upon is a chal-
lenge, especially as many fear formal regulation of informal and unregulated
livelihoods.
Consequential risks
Despite its potential benefits, greater sustainable charcoal production poses
some consequential risks (refer back to Figure 13.5). Many stakeholders perceive
a streamlined increased market price of charcoal as a potential consequential
risk to the long- term viability of sustainable charcoal, with actors along the
market chain likely to pass along to consumers the additional costs of doing
business formally. This includes transporters who may also continue to include
the cost of bribes due to strong enforcement of informal practices and weak
enforcement of formal rules.
There is also significant potential for loss of livelihoods if stricter enforce-
ment of sustainable charcoal production takes place. The half a million people
actively engaged in the charcoal market chain support an estimated two million
dependants (Mutimba and Barasa, 2005). While the sustainable practices are
meant to support more livelihoods in the long run with minimal environmental
impacts, some stakeholders felt that only established businesses or community
organised groups are likely to benefit.
Finally, development of more efficient charcoal kilns and cookstoves might
lead to a rebound effect whereby more efficient use leads to fuel savings that in
turn increase fuel use. For example, people might use charcoal to boil water or
cook more often than they previously did (see Mwampamba et al., 2013). Reli-
ance on biomass may increase, but scant research explores how greater efficiency
in production and consumption technologies will affect supply and demand
trends.

Kenya 237
Synthesis
Energy pathways
Geothermal power development and sustainable charcoal production form com-
plementary but very different pathways which can contribute to Kenya’s vision
of a low- carbon, climate- resilient future (Table 13.1). Geothermal power gener-
ation is a large- scale industry, boasting only a few main actors that are part of,
or fit well into, the existing centralised electricity system. Transmission and dis-
tribution of geothermal power is similarly large in scale with limited actors. On
the other hand, sustainable charcoal production is a cottage industry comprising
a myriad of decentralised, small- scale actors. Transport, wholesale, and distribu-
tion is similarly small in scale and undertaken by thousands of different actors.
The technological capabilities required for upscaling geothermal power devel-
opment lie partially within Kenya – where there has been significant accumula-
tion of expertise and process innovation – and partially within foreign firms that
possess the most advanced technology used in drilling and power generation and
the most sophisticated knowledge of steam reservoir modelling and steam field
management. The technological capabilities required to upscale sustainable char-
coal production, on the other hand, can nearly all be found in Kenya. Local
manufacturers of more efficient (and appropriate) charcoal kilns exist, although
their products are not necessarily widespread. And the knowledge required to
Table 13.1 Selected aspects of energy pathways
Component Geothermal power generation Sustainable charcoal
production
Structure Centralised Decentralised
End use Electricity, industrial
heating Cooking
Investment needs High capital cost by big
investors Local actors/small capital
cost, although relatively
high
Sector structure Top-down Bottom-up
Technological capabilities Local innovation in
processes but foreign
technology
Local innovation in
technology
Implementation risks High cost and high chance
of failure
Political uncertainty around
sector
Public opposition
Technology costs
Non-harmonised policy and
weak enforcement
Competing alternative fuels
Limited capacity of
charcoal producer
associations
Consequential risks High electricity costs from
limited demand
Limited benefit-sharing
Environmental impact
High charcoal and
cookstove costs
Loss of livelihoods
Potential rebound effects

238 Oliver W. Johnson et al.
develop and manage forests in a sustainable manner certainly exists, although it is
not necessarily in the hands of those who need it most, namely the owners or
users of land where charcoal is produced. Both pathways face considerable chal-
lenges in obtaining the finance needed for upscaling. Both have trouble accessing
capital due to perceived risks.
Distribution of risks
It is not easy to identify risks associated with implementation and consequences
of geothermal power development and sustainable charcoal production – and
neither are the distribution and comparisons of those risks. The fairly rudimen-
tary framework used in this study, in which we separated risks associated with
each energy pathway into implementation and consequential risks, has limita-
tions given that different actors clearly frame risks and benefits in different ways.
Indeed, it is possible to separate the risks according to how they are distributed
between private economic interests, duty bearers, and rights holders.
Within geothermal, many of the financial risks fall upon private investors
and project developers seeking to invest debt and equity into exploration, drill-
ing, and power generation ventures. Investors and developers are typically
willing to shoulder risks that are internal and inherent to the project, such as
those related to failing to prove the steam resource. But in order to mitigate
against external risks, such as the inability of the offtaker to meet the terms of
the power purchase agreement or nationalisation of private assets, they often
seek guarantees from the national and county governments that their invest-
ments will be protected. Meanwhile, sustainable charcoal production offers an
opportunity to better clarify and manage the distribution of financial risks com-
pared to the dominant informal and unsustainable charcoal trade, where traders,
distributors, and government officials pursue their own private economic inter-
ests at the expense of the public interest. Promoting sustainability in the char-
coal sector can support income generation for the producers and generate tax
revenue for the government, which can be reinvested in reforestation pro-
grammes or other livelihood initiatives.
The social and environmental risks of geothermal power development and
sustainable charcoal production are largely borne by local communities, which
are rights holders of the land where the activities generally occur. Kenya’s strong
land rights mean that traditional communities even maintain some access rights
on privately owned lands. Since the livelihood of many of these communities is
so closely tied to the land, the national and county governments – as duty
bearers for the citizens they govern – have a responsibility to uphold these
rights. This is particularly the case where the capacity of rights holders to
manage social and environmental impacts is limited. For geothermal, this means
effectively regulating private project developers and state- owned electricity util-
ities. For charcoal, this means ensuring charcoal producer associations maintain
established standards and that forest resources are sustainably managed.
Environmental and social impact assessments, with associated resettlement

Kenya 239
action plans, are the typical tools used by duty bearers to hold private economic
interests accountable for minimising risks to local communities. But there is
potentially a greater role for monitoring by local citizens who might be better
placed to identify changes in their local communities and environment.
Weighing risks and benefits
The distribution of risks among powerful and marginalised stakeholders affects
how these risks are weighed against benefits during decision- making processes
around certain actions (or inaction). In the geothermal sector, the financial
benefits accruing to private companies or government from the sale of electri-
city, along with the political benefit of ensuring reliable power from a clean
energy source for the middle and elite classes, appear to have much more weight
than the concern over the livelihoods of a few local communities with little
influence. But with devolution and the prospect of greater benefit sharing, more
weight may be given to those local concerns by the county government.
In the charcoal sector, meeting the growing household energy demand of an
increasing urban and peri- urban population appears to hold more weight than
concerns over degradation and deforestation in distant locations as a result of
unregulated production of charcoal. In the past, more weight has been given to
financing demand- side measures to reducing charcoal consumption, such as
adoption of efficient cooking technologies. Supply- side measures that poten-
tially have more impact on forest cover and GHG emissions are only recently
gaining political attention.
The ways in which risks and benefits are weighed in decisions around geo-
thermal power development and sustainable charcoal production and trade
differ depending on the perspective of the stakeholder. And clearly the risk/
benefit perspective of those stakeholders who are both more removed from the
local landscape, where geothermal power generation and charcoal production
activities occur, and more closely connected to where profits from these activ-
ities accrue have more influence in decision- making processes. Addressing these
spatial and equity dimensions should be of serious concern for those seeking to
ensure that Kenya’s low- carbon, climate- resilient development pathways benefit
all citizens of the country. More transparent and participatory dialogue between
private economic interests, duty bearers and rights holders is one way in which
the balance could be shifted as Kenya pursues its future development pathways.
Conclusions
In this chapter, we explored the implementation and consequential risks associ-
ated with scaling up geothermal power development and sustainable charcoal
production, both of which are widely considered core elements of Kenya’s low-
carbon and climate- resilient development ambitions.
Our research shows that optimism around the potential for greater geother-
mal power development needs to be tempered with serious action to mitigate

240 Oliver W. Johnson et al.
against potential social and political risks. Geothermal development in Kenya
has largely focused on nurturing a new industry and building technical exper-
tise. But as the sector has grown, so too have the challenges it faces, placing
increased pressure on both the government and the private sector to pursue
further development in a responsible manner, to ensure the benefits of geother-
mal development are shared equitably. In the sustainable charcoal sector, bar-
riers to greater adoption of efficient and sustainable forest management, charcoal
production, and charcoal consumption practices require co- ordinated efforts to
strengthen the capacity of the implementing entities and charcoal producer
associations, and to ensure that the enforcing agencies speak to each other in
order to address any concerns that may be raised by the market chain actors. In
the long term, other cleaner and more sustainable fuels may replace charcoal
but, in the short and medium term, investments in the sustainability of this
important urban fuel are imperative to ensure that Kenya’s natural forest
resources are responsibly managed.
Our analysis of implementation and consequential risks associated with pursuit
of greater geothermal power development and more widespread adoption of sus-
tainable charcoal production and trade identified a clear distribution of risks across
spatial and equity dimensions. The risks and benefits accruing to those marginal-
ised stakeholders located close to natural resource landscapes, and who were often
the poorest of all stakeholders, tended to be given less weight than the risks and
benefits accrued by those in positions of relative economic and political power.
Indeed, our analysis could benefit from action research following how risks and
benefits are really weighed by different stakeholders and how that affects decision
making in practice. We also advocate further research on the political and social
dimensions of low- carbon and climate- resilient energy pathways in Kenya to
better understand how these pathways might be realised in an equitable manner.
Notes
1 See https://data.worldbank.org.
2 MtCO2e = million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent.
3 See www.mtp3.go.ke/.
4 For example, a number of plans under Vision 2030 – such as electrification of the new
Mombasa–Nairobi railroad, establishment of the hi- tech Konza City, and development
of industrial parks close to geothermal sites – have so far failed to materialise.
5 See equator- principles.com.
6 See https://data.worldbank.org.
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