Content uploaded by Charbel Chedrawi
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Charbel Chedrawi on Jul 15, 2019
Content may be subject to copyright.
CEDRE 1, 2, 3… Go: the Lebanese Economic Spring
Charbel CHEDRAWI
Associate Professor at Saint Joseph University
Keywords. CEDRE, Lebanese Economy, Neo-Institutional Theory, Legitimacy Theory, New
Public Governance, Public Reforms, Lebanese Economic Spring, Capital Investment Plan, New
Lebanese Public Governance.
1. Introduction
The Lebanese economic situation is currently witnessing many imbalances due to diversified
reasons, starting with a weak economic growth rates which stood at 1% in 2017 and 1.4% in
2018 (according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2018) and the World Bank (WB,
2018)), to a rising inflation (which recorded 8.02% in December 2018), besides a stronger US
Dollar (caused by the continuous rising in interest rates by the fed) affecting directly the highly
dollarized Lebanese economy by pushing local interest rate to unseen levels since the late 90s,
and by twisting the Debt to GDP ratio above the 150% level, making from Lebanon the highest
indebted Arab country and earning him a Bronze medal with the third highest Debt to GDP ratio
in the world after Japan and Greece.
These imbalances were fueled by a crisis in the real estate sector powered by the divorce
between the central bank subsidized lending and the PCH (Public Corporation for Housing),
without forgetting the recently applied panoply of new direct and indirect taxes voted to finance
the public salary scale and adding one more heavy burden to the existing ones caused by the
regional turmoil (affecting trade, foreign direct investment, Gulf tourism and financial transfers
from the diaspora) and the large number of Syrian refugees (troubling the labor market and
squeezing the weak outdated infrastructure), without overlooking the high rate of corruption
nesting in its public sector.
The only light in this abyss was an International Infrastructure Investment Conference held in
Paris in April 2018 under the name of CEDRE 1, and which resulted in US Dollar $10.2 billion
in conditioned loans and US Dollar $ 860 million in grants from donors and multilaterals to the
Lebanese Republic; these conditioned funds, which are to be injected in more than 250
infrastructure projects, constitute a major breakthrough in the current imbalances’ status-quo.
However, previous bad experiences with the Lebanese government’s reform projects, from Paris
I and II in 2000 and 2002 consecutively, to Paris III in 2007, have led donors in CEDRE to link
financial disbursements with structural, fiscal and sectorial reforms based on a detailed Capital
Investment Plan (CIP) that allocated the upcoming funds clearly, allowing an increase in
transparency for all stakeholders and guaranteeing governmental commitment. In fact, the
Lebanese government had to sign off on a series of structural reforms (deemed crucial to
reviving the economy) suggested by the IMF and the WB (including tougher measures to
increase public productivity and performance, enhance transparency, decrease public deficit and
boost access to international investment) in order to unlock CEDRE funds. This external pressure
by the International Community (to meet their obligations) recall the Neo Institutional Theory
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) in the quest of the newly formed
Lebanese government towards International Legitimacy (Suchman, 1995) and support.
Alas, having such a disappointing record on implementing reform plans (Atallah et al., 2018), a
New Lebanese Public Governance presents itself as the ultimate solution to implement the long
awaited necessary reforms in order to maximize the outcome and to capitalize on the conditioned
and supervised funds of CEDRE.
In this context, this paper discusses the impact of the CEDRE conference on the Lebanese
economy from a Neo-Institutional and Legitimacy perspectives, highlighting the changes in the
Lebanese Public Governance that will transform the CEDRE funds and reforms into an uprising
golden opportunity towards a genuine Lebanese Economic Spring.
2. Theoretical Background
2.1. Neo-Institutional Theory and Isomorphism in the Lebanese Context
According to Wiseman et al., (2013), Neo-Institutional Theory represents a distinctive approach
to the study of socio-economic and political phenomena. This theory explains organizational
change and suggests that change occurs when Institutional contradictions, caused by exogenous
and endogenous dynamics, increase over time to the point where change can no longer be
resisted (Cooper et al., 2014; Chedrawi et al., 2018).
People and organizations generally do what they are obligated to do, and rules and roles guide
their behavior (Hoffman, 1999; March and Olsen, 1989; Chedrawi et al., 2018). In fact,
organizations adopt these rules as a response to Institutional pressures from audiences in the
environment: the stronger the pressures, the greater, what DiMaggio and Powell (1983) call, the
Institutional Isomorphism, where organizations become similar following the same managerial
practices (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Roszkowska-Menkes and Aluchna, 2017).
For Beckert (2010), isomorphic change occurs when existing institutions (Governments) are
discredited, and, when there is a powerful external actor (the International Community) who is
able to enforce new institutional designs (practices) or models that could be imitated since they
are interpreted as attractive institutional solutions to the problems being faced.
With this regard, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) recognize three forces, mechanisms and
processes driving institutionalization and through which isomorphic change occurs: coercive,
mimetic and normative:
Coercive Isomorphism stems from political influence and the need for Legitimacy; it
occurs as a result of formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations and decision
makers (politicians in our case) to follow or adopt certain institutionalized rules and
practices (reforms) by other organizations (the International Community, the Donors …)
upon which they are dependent. It is a consequence of an organization (Government)
experiencing institutionalized pressure from another entity to which they are dependent
on (the International Community), to act in a certain manner (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).
This type explain vigorously the current Lebanese situation when it comes to CEDRE
funds and the reforms demanded.
In fact, Coercive Isomorphism formal and informal pressures may be felt as a force of
persuasion, or as an invitations to join in collusion. Meyer and Rowan (1977) have
argued persuasively that rationalized states and organizations are increasingly
homogeneous within given domains and increasingly organized around rituals of
conformity to wider institutions in order to reflect institutionalized rules and therefore
being legitimated. Such isomorphic process promotes the success and survival of
organizations (Government…), by incorporating externally legitimated formal structures
and practices (reforms) while increasing the commitment of internal participants and
external constituents (Hu, et al., 2007).
Mimetic Isomorphism resulting from standard responses to uncertainty, it occurs as a
result of organizations (the Lebanese Government) imitating other organizations (other
countries facing similar economic challenges) and is especially evident in uncertain
environments because it minimizes risk and reduces the cost of finding a viable solution
to similar problems (Public debt, budget deficit…). When organizations are faced with
situations where the perceived correct course of action is unclear, they may mimic the
action of an organization they deem as being legitimate. This second type of
Isomorphism can explain as well the reaction of the Lebanese Government towards
adopting reform plans and fighting corruption.
In fact, not all Institutional Isomorphism derives from coercive authority. Organizations
(Governments) have an inclination to model themselves on other organizations within
their environment in which they deem to be successful and legitimate (Johnston, 2013).
This isomorphic inclination is identified as a result of mimetic pressures in order to
provide a viable solution, with little expense, to a problem that is a result of an unclear
action in an ambiguous environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Uncertainty is
identified as a powerful force which encourages organizations (Governments) to mimic
other similar organizations (Countries) within their environment.
Therefore, organizations are more likely to model themselves on other organizations in
which they perceive to be more successful and legitimate than themselves (Galaskiewicz
& Wasserman, 1989), by adopting voluntarily and consciously the same actions
(reforms), structure and behaviors from them as a mean of Gaining Legitimacy
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Edwards et al., 2009). By enhancing their Legitimacy,
organizations may consequently enhance their access to resources (Edwards et al., 2009).
Normative pressures appear to be targeted at organizational characteristics of culture
and structure (Ashworth et al., 2007). It is the result of professionalization of the
organizational actors, such as managers, administrators and of course politicians. When
organizational actors are professionalized, they tend to possess similar orientations and
dispositions in their professional activities (politics, Public Governance…) to such degree
that they are almost interchangeable. This is exactly the type of Isomorphism that we are
looking for in order to implement a new Lebanese Public Governance as a vital (sole)
solution to implement a sustainable reform plan usurping and capitalizing the conditioned
funds of CEDRE towards the long awaited Lebanese Economic Spring.
In fact, the third source of isomorphic organizational change is normative and stems
primarily from professionalization in order to establish a cognitive base and legitimation
for their occupational autonomy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).
For Johnston (2013), those within a particular vocation (Public Affairs) are more likely to
exhibit homogenous traits and characteristics, in an effort to appear legitimate. Normative
pressure is passed through the appropriate norms that educational institutions enact on
students through formal education, as well as through an individual’s association with
professional networks (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Mizruchi & Fein, 1999).
At an analytic level, only Coercive Isomorphism is linked to the environment surrounding the
organizational field. Mimetic and normative processes are internal to the field and help explain
the spread of roles and structures (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz, 2004). Institutional theory
perceives external factors as a primary driver of changes in organizational practice.
2.2. Legitimacy Theory
Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable,
proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and
definitions (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). The study of Legitimacy is relevant because it constitutes a
critical factor that contributes to an organization’s success, or conversely, to its failure (Díez-
Martín, et al., 2013); Countries and Governments are no exception.
According to Institutional theory, organizational survival (or success) is linked to Legitimacy
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Organizational survival depends on the support the organization
receives from its different constituencies, and countries and Governments’ survival similarly
depends on the support of the International Community. Therefore, Legitimacy can be defined as
the congruence of organizational (Governmental) results with Institutional norms (Arnold et al.,
1996). Conversely, the effects of a lack of Legitimacy – the perception that an organization or a
Government is not acting according to social norms and values – on organizational failure have
also been noted (Bianchi and Ostale, 2006); this also applies to Governments. It is often the case
that when a company loses its Legitimacy, social support for it disappears (Vanhonacker, 2000)
and of course when any Government loses its Legitimacy, social, financial and political support
for it disappears as well. Numerous organizations have failed not for lack of resources or because
of faulty products, but due to a complete loss or deterioration of their legitimacy (Ahlstrom and
Bruton, 2001; Chen et al., 2006; Díez-Martín et al. 2013); this is what the Lebanese Government
cannot let happen and CEDRE is the proper opportunity to avoid such scenario.
Aldrich and Fiol (1994) distinguished between Cognitive Legitimacy, or knowledge about a
new activity or venture and what is needed to succeed in an industry (the highest form of
cognitive legitimation is achieved when a new product, process, or service is taken for granted);
From a producer's point of view, cognitive legitimation means that new entrants to an industry
are likely to copy an existing organizational form, rather than experiment with a new one
(Hannan and Freeman, 1986); and Sociopolitical Legitimacy, or the value placed on an activity
by cultural norms and political authorities (Ranger-Moore et al., 1991). It refers to the process by
which key stakeholders accept a venture (reform program) as appropriate and right, given
existing norms and laws.
As for Suchman (1995), three types of legitimacy are co-existing and reinforcing one another
(Luft Mobus, 2005):
Pragmatic Legitimacy emerges from the interests of the organization’s surroundings. In
an organization’s relations with its surrounding environment, stakeholder support (the
International Community) originates in the perception that the organization
(Government) is being receptive (execute promises) and helps them further their own
interests; not necessarily because the organization achieves its goals (Díez-Martín et al,
2013).
Moral Legitimacy reflects a positive normative evaluation of the organization and its
activities (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Parsons, 1960). Unlike Pragmatic Legitimacy, Moral
Legitimacy does not involve evaluating whether a specific action benefits the evaluator,
but whether it is “what should be done.” An organization (Government) shows Moral
Legitimacy when it treats employees and clients (citizens) in the expected fashion within
its given social system (Díez-Martín, et al., 2013).
Cognitive Legitimacy concerns itself with actions that simplify or help understand
decision-making and therefore contribute to solve problems. Cognitive Legitimacy
derives from internalizing a belief system (fighting corruption) designed by professionals
and scientists where knowledge is specified and codified (when the Lebanese
Government prepared the CIF for instance). This system (of Governance) can later be
taken for granted as a framework for daily routine and more specialized activities (Scott,
1994). An organization (Government) exhibits desirability and acceptance by developing
methods, concepts, and ideas (reform projects, fighting corruption…) that are commonly
accepted and considered useful and desirable by professionals and experts in its
surrounding environment (Scott, 1995; Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002).
Furthermore, Suchman (1995) distinguishes different strategies and related tactics for securing
Legitimacy status by recognizing three broad Legitimacy objectives (Luft Mobus, 2005):
Gaining Legitimacy is an objective undertaken by organizations embarking on a new
area of operations (Suchman, 1995, pp. 586-587); it has to gain Legitimacy as a qualified
participant in an area, but must also gain Legitimacy for the practice itself within the
cultural domain. This effort represents a substantial undertaking, as an organization may
have to define the concept and negotiate the parameters of Legitimacy while also
cultivating audiences to view it and its activities as substantially worthy of Legitimacy
status according to the parameters it proposes.
Maintaining Legitimacy is a relatively low-effort, but continuous, process. “Once
conferred, Legitimacy tends to be taken largely for granted” as constituents’ scrutiny is
relaxed (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990, p. 183). Challenges to Legitimacy arise and require
maintenance response not because of the “liability of newness”, and not because of crisis
conditions (requiring Repairing Legitimacy), but more from inconsistencies and/or
transgressions, or modifications in cultural definitions (or bad experience with prior
reform promises). As a result of the continuously shifting cultural landscape managers
(Government officials, politicians) cannot afford to treat legitimation as a completed task
(Suchman, 1995, p. 594).
Repairing Legitimacy requires substantial effort. Unlike Gaining Legitimacy, Repairing
Legitimacy is often a reactive response to a crisis that is precipitated by a discrete event
(unfulfilled promises). Gaps between organizational values (reform plans) and constituent
expectations (missed deadlines) are highlighted as details of events become clear.
Organizational values shown through the actions and verbal accounts that organizational
actors display in responding to the events, are subject to intense constituent scrutiny (the
conditioned CEDRE funds differ from Paris II and III funds). Often organizations
(Governments) caught up in Legitimacy crises have become comfortable within their
Legitimacy maintenance routines and have failed to successfully notice subtle shifts in
the cultural domain, leaving them unaware of a substantial gap between themselves and
their constituents; the Lebanese Governments officials didn’t expect such conditional
funds during the CEDRE conference. When the crisis event occurs, the familiar
legitimation routines may no longer be effective (Suchman, 1995, p. 597); this is crystal
clear in the current Lebanese case.
According to Ruef and Scott (1998), “whether an organization is legitimate, or more or less so, is
determined by those observers of the organization who assess its conformity to a specific
standard or model” (p. 880). For Deephouse and Suchman (2008), the sources of Legitimacy are
the internal and external audiences (the International Community) who observe organizations
(Governments) and make Legitimacy assessments (Díez-Martín et al., 2013). The consequences
of Legitimacy are obvious; In fact, since Meyer and Rowan (1977), institutionalists have argued
that Legitimacy enhances organizational survival.
2.3. New Public Governance (NPG)
For Osborne (2010), there is three broad schools of governance literature: Corporate
Governance concerned with the internal systems and processes that provide direction and
accountability to any organization; Good Governance concerned with the promulgation of
normative models of social, political and administrative governance by supranational bodies such
as the World Bank (Leftwich 1993; Rhodes 1997); and Public Governance or the NPG that has
captured the realities of public policy implementation and public services delivery within the
plural and pluralist complexities of the state in the twenty-first century.
In fact, the NPG is rooted firmly within Institutional and network theory, and draws much from
the influential work of Ouchi (1980), Powell (1990), Powell and DiMaggio (1991), and Nohria
and Eccles (1992). It posits both a plural state, where multiple interdependent actors contribute to
the delivery of public services, and a pluralist state, where multiple processes inform the policy-
making system. Drawing upon open natural systems theory, it is concerned with the institutional
and external environmental pressures that enable and constrain public policy implementation and
the delivery of public services within such a plural and pluralist system; which makes it the most
suitable solution for the current Lebanese problematic situation.
For Patapas (2014), NPG is the inter-organizational interaction among public, private and non-
governmental sectors with the aim to connect all the possible governance potential and resources
in order to solve society problems (McQuaid, 2010). It focuses on the governance of processes,
stressing service effectiveness and outcomes that rely upon the interaction of the Government
with its environment. The NPG is thus both a product of and a response to the increasingly
complex, plural and fragmented nature of public policy implementation and service delivery in
the twenty-first century (Osborne, 2010).
The fundamentals of the NPG are summarized into seven separate questions as follow:
What should be our basic unit of analysis in exploring public policy implementation and
public services delivery – and what are the implications of this for theory and practice?
(the fundamentals question);
What organizational architecture is best-suited to delivering public services in the plural
state? (the architectural question);
How do we ensure sustainable public service systems – and what does sustainability
mean? (the sustainability question);
What values underpin public policy implementation and services delivery in such
systems? (the values question);
What key skills are required for relational performance? (the relational skills question);
What is the nature of accountability in fragmented plural and pluralist systems? (the
accountability question);
How do you evaluate sustainability, accountability and relational performance within
open natural public service delivery systems? (the evaluation question).
These questions should be answered carefully whenever a Government intend to adopt NPG. In
fact, an important indicator of NPG is the preparation of public policy, taking into consideration
the elements of globalization in order to balance the inside (internal) state factors and outside
environment conditions and subjects, to guarantee International support through consolidating
and applying best public governance practices (Patapas, 2014).
This profound change was a criticism of the Traditional Public Administration theory which
emphasized on impersonalization, institutionalization and rigorous logic specification. The
traditional theory of public administration was a political creation of mechanized mass
production period and greatly improved the efficiency of the work at that time. The New Public
Management was theoretically based on traditional economic and enterprise management. It
was different from the linear structure hierarchical bureaucracy, emphasizing the dual structure
of the Government and the market. However, this dual structure focused too much on the market
power in the allocation of social resources and solving the problem of public, but it ignored the
effect of other organizations in the public administration. The NPG, as the new paradigm of
public administration science, emphasized pluralism, attached great importance to the links
between internal and external organizations, and paid attention to organizational governance.
The table 1 below present a summary comparison between the above mentioned theoretical
evolutions.
Table 1- Comparison among the TPA, NPM, NPS and NPG (Xu et al. 2015)
Traditional public
administration and
management
New public management New public governance
Value orientationRegime & procedure Efficiency Democracy & efficiency
Theoretical basisBureaucratic system, political
& administrative dichotomy
Economics theory,
management philosophy
of private sector
Contractualism, integrity
theory, collectivism
BehaviorPolicy-making & execution
separating, centralized
Government
Government service
outsourcing & marketing
Citizen independence,
public deliberation,
polycentric governance
Role of citizenLeaderCustomer Participate in decision
Research method Institutionalism research
method
Positivism research
method
Collectivism research
method
For Lindsay et al., (2014), the delivery of public services has gone through an evolution over the
past 40 years from a model of Public Administration, through the NPM, to a more adapted to the
contemporary Government Public Administration: the NPG, a profound change in the
Government role and the relationship between Government and civil society (Osborne, 2010;
Pestoff et al. 2012; Xu et al. 2015). In fact, the NPG captures the realities of public policy
implementation and public services delivery within the plural and pluralist complexities of the
state in the twenty-first century (Osborne, 2010). As the new paradigm of public administration
science, NPG emphasized pluralism, attached great importance to the links between internal and
external organizations, and paid attention to organizational governance (Xu et al., 2015).
Finally, for Xu et al. (2015), the theoretical connotation or paradigm features of the NPG can be
summarized in six aspects or characteristics as follow:
Firstly, the NPG emphasizes the dispersion of power where everyone in the society
have the right to participate in public affairs management and to participate in solving
public problems (to a certain extent to be determined by Administrators).
Secondly, the NPG stresses the coordination of the Government turning the
Government from paternalism to a coordinator of social interests, building dialogue
platform, integrating public resources, ensuring satisfaction from different interests
subjects and solving complex social problems.
Thirdly, the NPG forms a complex network integrating social organizations and
individuals to form a contained complex network (Government, market, society, public
organizations, community and individual citizens, etc). Each main body is restricted by
formal and informal rules, forming the NPG network gathered together by interdependent
resources, social cooperation and interaction in a relatively stable ecosystem.
Fourthly, governance network is based on the resource exchange According to the
NPG, the network form by public products and services can provide its members
abundant social resource to exchange, included currency, information, and technology; it
introduces a mechanism of sharing into public administrative management, in order to
satisfy different needs from interest subjects and citizens.
Fifthly, governance network relies on trust and stability of the contract The NPG
relies on a special contract depended on trust of status and reputation of members. In
other words, the Public Governance is not relied on restriction, specific and effective
rules and systems, but on a kind of informal trust, which makes public governance
network more flexible and changeful.
Sixthly, value the role of social public organizations according to the NPG, the
essence of public service is to service citizens and pursuit public interests. So it is
important that value the impact of public organizations. Social public organizations
provide public goods and services not to make profits but solving social problems in a
way of voluntary cooperation.
3. Contextual Background
3.1. From Paris I to Paris III a wasted reform opportunity
At the time of the Paris I meeting on the 23rd of February 2001, Lebanon faced a difficult
economic situation with a fiscal deficit around 25% of GDP in 2000, a debt to GDP ratio
exceeding 145% and with interest payments on public debt absorbing most of the Government’s
revenues.
The official goal for convening the Paris II Conference, held on November 23, 2002, was to
seek again International support for the Lebanese reform program; During this Conference
Lebanon received commitments totaling US$ 4.4 billion from a group of countries and financial
institutions (IMF, World Bank, European Union, European Investment Bank, Arab Fund for
Social & Economic Development and Kuwaiti Fund for Development). These commitments
along with some internal one from the banking sector provided the country with opportunities for
economic growth and macroeconomic adjustment unprecedented in its postwar economic
history; in fact, (i) public debt growth decelerated; (ii) the cost of Government borrowing both in
LP and dollar-denominated debts was significantly reduced; (iii), and more importantly from a
macroeconomic perspective, market interest rates on both LBP and dollar-denominated
commercial loans went down; (iv) the foreign exchange revenues of the Bank of Lebanon
increased; and (v) the balance of payments improved significantly. As a result, the Paris II
meeting helped Lebanon avert a financial crisis and laid the foundations for economic recovery.
Alas …
The debt to GDP ratio at the time of the three Paris conferences (2000-2007) is represented in the
figure 1 below:
Figure1.DebttoGDPratio2000‐2007
Source:MinistryofFinance(2018)andChedrawi&Howayeck(2014,2016)
In the context of the Paris III Conference held on January 25th 2007 in Paris, the World Bank
(IBRD and IFC) pledged US Dollar $ 925 million (of the total US Dollar $ 7.6 billion pledged)
in loans to support Lebanon in the form of a Reform Implementation Development Policy Loan
(RIDPL); nevertheless, the disbursement of these funds was conditional on the implementation
of reforms that have been committed by the Lebanese Government in its reform program. This
was the first sign of losing trust of the International Community in the local authorities paving
the way towards a neo-institutional relationship with Lebanon. In fact, the Lebanese Government
had presented its reform program implementation to the World Bank Board of Directors prior to
approval of the loan agreement.
Aspartof the severalactionsundertakenbytheGovernmentwithinitsreformprogramforthepower
sector, the following were presented to the IBRD board as conditions for disbursements of the first
RIDPL:establishmentofaninter‐ministerialpowersectorreform committee, award of contracts for
advisoryservices to the Ministry of Energy and Water, Electricité du Liban (EdL)andHigher Councilfor
Privatization for the restructuring of EdL, appointment of auditor for 2002‐2006 EdL accounts,
employment of consultants to advise on the installation of meters, engagement of a consultant to
prepareaMasterPlanfortheelectricitysectorandsignatureofanimportcontractfornaturalgas.
Of the total US Dollar $ 7.6 billion pledged at the Paris III conference, agreements have been
signed for only US Dollar $ 3.3 billion (around 44% of the pledged amount).
Alas…
The objective and the outcome of the three Paris conferences are summarized in the table below:
Table 2- Objectives and Outcomes of the three Paris conferences (2001-2007)
Conference Objective Outcome
Paris I
23
rd
of
February
2001
The purpose was Lebanon's economic development. The Lebanese
Government presented its economic and financial policy. It was
decided in principle to hold a further meeting, extended to
Lebanon's main economic partners, in order to support the
program to rebuild the Lebanese economy.
The meeting raised some €
500 million in international
aid.
Paris II
23
rd
of
November
2002
The objective was to seek the support of the International
Community in helping Lebanon to alleviate the burden of the
public debt and to reverse the macroeconomic and fiscal
imbalances of the Lebanese economy. The presented economic
program defined a strategy that would lead to a gradual decline in
the high level of the public debt, a convergence in the budgetary
situation and the achievement of better growth prospects.
The Conference outcome
was US Dollar $ 4.4
billion: 3.1 billion
dedicated to debt reduction
and management, and 1.3
billion to projects
earmarked for socio-
economic development.
Paris III
25
th
of
January 2007
The majority of the aid was aimed at
supporting Lebanon's reform efforts either for budgetary support
or for project financing in the form of grants (23 %) and loans (77
%).
Of the total US Dollar $ 7.6
billion pledged, agreements
have been signed for US
Dollar $ 3.3 billion.
…and here we are again…
3.2. CEDRE, the Capital Investment Plan (CIP) and its reforms.
At the time of the CEDRE conference, the fiscal performance and the debt to GDP ratio situation
are represented in the figure 2 and 3 respectively below:
Figure2‐FiscalPerformance2000‐2018
Source:Ministryoffinance(2017),Chedrawi&Howayeck(2014,2016)andauthorcalculation
Figure3.DebttoGDPratio2007‐2018
Source:MinistryofFinance(2018)andChedrawi&Howayeck(2014,2016)andauthorcalculation
The CEDRE Conference (or Paris IV) was organized on April, 6
th
2018, with the participation
of 37 Countries and 14 International and Regional Organizations. It allocated nearly US Dollar $
11.6 billion in financial support to Lebanon, which was distributed between loans and grants
distributed by source as represented in the table below:
Table 3 - CEDRE Conference allocated funds by source and type in Million US Dollar
Loans Grants Total
InternationalBank/Fund/Institution 8.272
WorldBankGroup 4.000 4.000
EuropeanBankforReconstruction&Development 1.353 1.353
EuropeanInvestmentBank 984 984
IslamicDevelopmentBank 750 750
KuwaitFundforArabEconomicDevelopment 500 500
ArabFundforEconomicandSocialDevelopment 500 500
EuropeanUnion 185 185
NationalGovernment 3.365
SaudiArabia 1.000 1.000
France 492 185 677
Qatar 500 500
Netherlands 369 369
Turkey 200 200
Kuwait 180 180
Italy 148 148
UnitedStates 115 115
UK 85 85
Germany 74 74
Japan 10 10
Finland 7 7
TotalFundingPledged 11.252 385 11.637
Source: CIP
The Conference aimed at developing the Lebanese economy, mainly by financing the Capital
Investment Program (CIP) of the Lebanese Government while supporting monetary and fiscal
stability. The main issue of the conference was to convince the International Community that
Lebanon is capable of such reforms through its CIP, the largest investment program Lebanon
ever witnessed which may become a milestone for the national economy, capable of enhancing
the efficiency and transparency of the Lebanese investment environment.
Noting that the economic growth in Lebanon was curbed since 2011’s Syrian Crisis and the
infrastructure exacerbated, the Lebanese Government’s vision for stabilization, growth and
employment is based on four pillars:
1. To sharply increase the level of public investment in the short term, by accelerating
the implementation of projects; and to embark upon a major program of new projects for
infrastructure investment to lay the basis for long term growth, with an increased role for
the private sector, that will generate employment during their implementation, reduce the
gaps between the demand and need for infrastructure services and the supply, and
increase the productivity of the Lebanese economy;
2. To ensure economic and financial stability through fiscal adjustment that will allow the
envisaged expansion of public investment within a viable macroeconomic framework
with a sustainable debt scenario;
3. To undertake sectorial reforms to ensure the sustainability of the infrastructure
investments, and structural, cross-sectorial reforms to ensure good governance and
guarantee that the potential for private-sector led growth is realized to the fullest extent
and is sustainable. These include fighting corruption, fiscal governance and reforms,
modernization and restructuring of the public sector, customs modernization, capital
market reforms, and creating the conditions for a recovery of Lebanon’s private sector;
4. To develop a strategy for the diversification of Lebanon’s productive and services
sectors and realization of Lebanon’s export potential, underpinned by enabling business
environment, removing bottlenecks to private sector investments, and securing a macro-
economic and financial stability.
The CIP proposes to revitalize the country’s infrastructure by supporting existing projects,
initiating new ones and by implementing new reforms to optimize trade, attract new investment,
and generate employment opportunities. The table below shows the allocation of the CIP for
Phase I and Phase II and the envisaged financing.
Table 4 - CEDRE CIP Planned Investments Phases by sector and the source of financing
PlannedInvestmentbySector(in$USDmillion) PhaseI
2018‐2021
PhaseII
2022‐2025
PhaseI&II
Total
Water 2.257 878 3.135
WasteWater 1.364 1.040 2.404
SolidWaste 1.400 0 1.400
Transport 2.863 2.820 5.683
Electricity 2.151 1.441 3.592
Telecom 700 0 700
Infrastructurefortourism&Industry 84 255 339
Total 10.819 6.434 17.253
FinancingbySource(in$USDmillion) PhaseI
2018‐2021
PhaseII
2022‐2025
PhaseI&II
Total
Government 2.253
Private 2.000 3.000 5.000
Lenders&Donors 10.000
Total 17.253
Source: CIP
4. CEDRE outcome, the conditioned help and its impact
4.1. The conditioned loans and grants between Isomorphism and Legitimacy
The CEDRE Conference allocated nearly US Dollar $ 11.6 billion in financial support to
Lebanon. However, the loan money pledged (the US Dollar $ 11.25 billion) could be unlocked
if, and only if the Lebanese state follows through on many requested reforms that include:
reducing the budget deficit by 5% of GDP over five years, improving tax collection and reducing
Government subsidies to the failing public utility, Electricité du Liban (EdL). The remaining US
Dollar $ 384 million were promised by donor countries as grants also conditioned to the above
mentioned reforms.
Actually, when one says that a certain pattern of behavior possesses Legitimacy, one asserts that
some group of observers, as a whole, accepts or supports what those observers perceive to be the
behavioral pattern, as a whole (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). Yet, “Legitimacy is not a commodity to
be possessed or exchanged but a condition reflecting cultural alignment, normative support, or
consonance with relevant rules or laws’ (Scott, 1995; p 45). With this regard, Government’s
organizational Legitimacy should be maintained at all cost in spite of the preceded history of
violations during the last three Paris conferences; such Legitimacy can never be sustained
without a history of materially consistent compliance with norms, values and promises. Hence,
Lebanese authority are obliged to do whatever they can to persuade the International Community
that they are very serious this time when it comes to the promised (requested) reforms.
Soon after that, the “Observer Groups” (the International Community) will evaluate the
organization (the Lebanese Government) based on their perceptions and/or assumptions
regarding congruence between their values and organizational values (Luft Mobus, 2005). In the
Lebanese context, when the Multilateral agencies together pledged Lebanon loans up to US
Dollar $ 8.3 billion (as segregated in the table above), they were clear on the reform conditions,
and therefore became part of the “Observers Group” that will be watching over the application of
the promised reforms carefully.
In fact, isomorphic change occurs if existing institutions (Governments) have been thoroughly
discredited, morally or functionally, and, at the same time, if there is a powerful external actor
who is able to enforce a new institutional design (Beckert, 2010). Such Institutional Isomorphism
will certainly lead the Lebanese Government towards repairing its Organizational Legitimacy
and therefore regaining their acceptance by the external environment, the International
Community (DiMaggio & Powell, Rowan, 1977; Meyer & Scott, 1983), which would secure the
promised funds and more.
4.2. The Required Reforms
Meyer and Rowan (1977) argued that organizations (Governments) integrate socially-legitimated
rational elements (reforms) in their formal structure in order to maximize their resources
(CEDRE funds) and survival capabilities (Chedrawi et al., 2019). In fact, Coercive Isomorphism
is linked directly to resource dependency theory and the need for funding (Mizruchi and Fein,
1999).
With this regards, the donor countries and the multilateral agencies who pledged to help Lebanon
during the CEDRE Conference requested several fiscal, structure and sectorial reforms from the
Lebanese Government; such type is clearly identified as Coercive Isomorphism within an
external pressure of the neo-institutional expectations that the Lebanese Government shall honor
this time in its Legitimacy repairing quest.
The requested reforms were as follow:
Fiscal Reforms, mainly the reduction of the fiscal deficit-to-GDP ratio by 5% for the
five coming years, i.e. by 1% each year. This should be achieved through enhancing
overall collection; reducing the existing gaps in the public finance system; rationalizing
spending as possible; reducing the financial transfers from the Government to EDL
(around 4% of GDP); seizing employment in the public sector; reconsidering the pension
system for the public sector employees and increasing the rates of some taxes.
In fact, it is more than obvious when you read the 2019 Budget draft law that it
includes every single measure mentioned above.
Structural Reforms, mainly increasing the potentials and productivity of the Lebanese
economy, by adopting a private sector-led growth policy, and enhancing social equity.
This also includes implementing and abiding by the International and the EU Compact
related to security stability and anti-terrorism, governance, law enforcement, sustainable
development goals and anti-violence actions and others.
This should be achieved through anti-corruption actions in line with the International
agreements of the UN; reform and governance in the fiscal and customs sectors;
Government digital transformation (e-government); modernization and restructuring of
the public sector; justice reforms; governance in the oil and gas sector; business enabling
environment suitable for the promotion of the private sector activity; and initiatives and
reforms in the capital markets.
Again, when you look carefully into the latest decisions, decrees and project laws
that were issued by the Lebanese Government and Parliament, you will notice that
the above mentioned structural reforms have commenced to take shape.
Sectorial Reforms, mainly in the following sectors: Electricity, by creating new
production units, modernizing existing production units, upgrading existing
infrastructure, PPP projects, and restructuring the EDL and its corporatization to function
as a private sector entity; Solid wastes, by creating new factories, and modernizing
existing factories to manage such wastes in the direction of producing new energy
sources; Water, by modernizing the existing Laws in order to better manage and expand
the underground water resources, existing water networks, and sewage and dirty water
treatment; besides introducing new water tariffs; and enforcing the existing water legal
framework; Telecoms, by liberalizing this sector so as to attract private investments. This
requires reconsidering the telecoms law (431), in the direction of assigning a regulatory
authority to manage this sector and introduce the private sector philosophy.
Once more, the first sectorial reform taken by the current Government was
expectedly the electricity project law that was voted recently in the Lebanese
parliament and put into action; the remaining three sectors will noticeably follow.
Like Isomorphism, Organizational Legitimacy, the status conferred by social actors (Ashforth &
Gibbs, 1990; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), can be conceptualized as both a process and a state.
From the perspective of what we called the “Observers Groups”, a legitimate Lebanese
Government is one whose values and actions are congruent with that Observers Groups’ values
and expectations for action (Galaskiewicz, 1985; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
In fact, there are serious fears of a potential mismanagement and misuse of the CEDRE funds
under current political conditions, due to the existing corruption, tax evasion and customs gaps,
which could eventually lead to an increase in public indebtedness (currently US Dollar $ 80
billion), since more than 90% of the CEDRE funds are in the form of loans. Hence, the Lebanese
Government is challenged today by its ability to fulfil the CEDRE obligations, taking into
consideration that the required reforms should focus on dealing with, and reducing, the existing
imbalances in the Lebanese economy on the economic, financial, and social levels.
Alas, a New Lebanese Public Governance (NLPG) should be put in place ASAP…
4.3. CEDRE impact and the New Lebanese Public Governance (NLPG)
The Institutional conceptualization of Legitimacy emphasizes the dynamics that generate
external pressures; it views Legitimacy not as a resource to be managed, but as a set of
constitutive beliefs held by relevant audiences. In fact, organizations (Government) do not
simply extract Legitimacy from the environment in a feat of cultural strip mining; rather ...
cultural definitions determine how the organization ... is understood and evaluated (Suchman,
1995, p. 576; Luft Mobus, 2005). Hence, the Lebanese Government should redefine its public
governance strategy in order to achieve such Institutional Legitimacy and benefit to the max
form the CEDRE positive impact.
In fact, the Government finances in Lebanon keep on registering structural economic and fiscal
weaknesses, taking a heavy burden of the prevalent negative impact of regional political crises.
These imbalances constitute an extensive burden particularly on the outdated infrastructure
(electricity, telecoms, roads, water …) that require substantial investments to enhance their
economic contribution; with this regards, the CEDRE conference conditioned loans and grants
constitute a golden opportunity and a major breakthrough in the current imbalances’ status-quo.
Thehighpotentialtelecomsectorforinstance,needsalotofattentioninordertodevelopandincrease
itsprospectiveincomeand contribution which standstodayatUS Dollar $1.3billionor 11.2% of total
revenues.Liberalizationofthetelecomssectorisaprerequisiteforexpandingthescopeofcompetition
inthissector,therebyleadingtoitsmodernizationandbettereconomiccontribution.
However, previous bad experiences with the Lebanese Government’s reform projects (Paris I, II
and III), have led donors in CEDRE to link financial disbursements with the above mentioned
structural and fiscal reforms based on the CIP, therefore increasing transparency for all
stakeholders and guaranteeing governmental commitment. Therefore, the New Lebanese Public
Governance (NLPG) presents itself as the ultimate solution to implement the necessary reforms
in order to capitalize on the conditioned CEDRE funds.
With this regard, we recall the Normative Isomorphism pressures targeting the Lebanese
Government characteristics of culture and structure (Ashworth et al., 2007) as the result of
professionalization of the Lebanese Government Administrators tending to possess similar
orientations and dispositions in their professional activities in order to implement the NLPG as a
guarantee to implement the sustainable reform plan towards the long awaited Lebanese
Economic Spring.
In fact, the aim of the NLPG on the structural level (public policy formation and implementation)
is the search of more productive public policy (Patapas, 2014) that requires from experts to carry
out qualitative analysis of public policy and political processes to diagnose real political
problems, raise the level of necessary discussions and arguments from simple policy to scientific
public policy analysis, using retrospective and perspective forms of analysis, while structuring
the future and present political traditions and practices; this is what started for the first time
during more than 30 days of thorough discussions throughout the preparations of the first
futuristic public budget implying future modeling.
Based on Xu et al., (2015) six NPG characteristics, we propose the following basis for the NLPG
as summarized in the table below:
Table 5. The NLPG basis Characteristics for implementing the CEDRE reforms (CIP)
Characteristic Explanation
Emphasizing the
Dispersion of Power
Involving everyone especially the private sector in public affairs management through
Public Private Partnerships (PPP) in order to co-solve public problems (The PPP law #
48 has been ratified in 2017).
The Lebanese Government Administrators should have the role of regulators vis-à-vis
such partnership and the public decision-making process.
Stressing the
coordination of the
government
Transforming the Lebanese Government role from paternalism to a regulator and
coordinator of social interests while building dialogue platform and integrating public
resources in order to ensure total satisfaction of the internal and external Observer
Groups to solve complex social problems.
The new assigned Social and Economic Council in 2017 can play such role.
Forming a complex
network
The NLPG should integrate social organizations and individuals to form a complex
network including Government, market, society, public organizations, community and
individual citizens, etc. gathered together by interdependent resources.
The 2019 public budget law has proposed the involvement of every single stakeholder
in the deficit reducing objective but failed in forming such a complex network.
Basing the Lebanese
governance network on
the resource exchange
The NLPG should introduce a new mechanism of sharing and co-creating into public
administrative management, in order to satisfy different needs from interest subjects
and citizens.
The above mentioned governance network (based on the PPP) can provide every
stakeholder involved with abundant social resource to exchange, making profit
(reducing deficits, increasing revenues…) while being independent to other members.
Relying the Lebanese
governance network on
trust and stability
contracts and promises
Maintaining the stability between the interior and exterior Observer Groups should be
based a new special contract based on trust; the NLPG can assist the Lebanese
Government in repairing its Organizational Legitimacy vis-à-vis the International
Community which can lead to more flexibility.
Valuing the role of
social public
organizations
The NLPG should be public service oriented in pursuit of public interests. So it is
important to rethink the value added of public organizations (EDL, Ports…) redefining
the meaning of public enterprises into Social public organizations which provide
public goods and services not only to make profits but to solve social problems in a
way of voluntary cooperation.
The zero based budget (Chedrawi and Osta, 2015) can be a good solution as well.
As for the outcome or economic impact of the CEDRE funds through the above mentioned
NLPG, and based on our models paving the way towards the Lebanese economic spring, we
propose the following impact over the next 5 years in the table below:
Table 6. CEDRE impact on the Lebanese Economic situation (2019-2024 )
SomeForecastedEconomicIndicators2019f 2020f 2021f 2022f 2023f 2024f
RealGDPgrowth,atconstantmarketprices(%) 1.6 3.6 4.2 4.9 5.3 4.5
NetForeignDirectInvestment(%ofGDP) 1.1 2.3 3.6 3.6 3.6 2.5
FiscalBalance(%ofGDP) ‐7 ‐5 ‐4 ‐3 ‐2 ‐1
DebttoGDPRatio(%ofGDP) 155 145 140 130 125 120
Source: Author Calculation
5. Conclusion
Although the Lebanese Government has a disappointing record on implementing reform plans
(Atallah et al., 2018), the NLPG presents itself as the ultimate solution to implement the long
awaited necessary reforms in order to maximize the outcome and to capitalize on the conditioned
and supervised funds of CEDRE.
In this article we tried to highlight the changes required through the lenses of a Neo-Institutional
Perspective in order to establish a New Lebanese Public Governance that could transform the
CEDRE funds and reforms into an uprising golden opportunity towards a genuine Lebanese
Economic Spring, while solving the many imbalances that the Lebanese economy is currently
witnessing and most importantly Repairing the Lebanese Government Legitimacy.
In fact, the change in the Lebanese Governance system can no longer be resisted, since many
institutional contradictions, caused mainly by exogenous dynamics, increased after the failure of
the first three Paris conferences to the “Rubicon” point which should never be crossed. Hence,
the Lebanese Governance should respond to CEDRE Institutional pressures from the Observer
Groups by adopting Isomorphic change (Beckert, 2010) and the rules of the three Institutional
Isomorphism types as follow:
Coercive Isomorphism Lebanese Authorities shall follow and adopt the
institutionalized rules of the International Community and commit to the promised
reforms in order to obtain CEDRE funds, gain Legitimacy and sustain success and
survival.
Mimetic Isomorphism Lebanese Authorities shall model the Lebanese economy
(reform plans) against other more experienced countries (Government) facing similar
economic challenges in order to minimize the uncertainty risk, reduce the cost of finding
a viable solution and most importantly Gaining Legitimacy, hence enhancing the access
of Lebanon to more resources.
Normative pressures Lebanese Authorities shall professionalize its actors (managers,
administrators, politicians...) through the enactment of the New Lebanese Public
Governance, transforming its role to a watchdog in order to successfully implement a
sustainable reform plan usurping and capitalizing on the conditioned funds of CEDRE
conference.
Alas…
References
Ahlstrom, D. and Bruton, G.D. (2001), “Learning from successful local private firms in
China: establishing legitimacy”, Academy of Management Executive, Vol. 15 No. 2, pp.
72-83.
Ashforth, B. E., & Gibbs, B. W. (1990). The double-edge of organizational
legitimation. Organization science, 1(2), 177-194.
Ashworth, R., Boyne, G., & Delbridge, R. (2007). Escape from the iron cage?
Organizational change and isomorphic pressures in the public sector. Journal of public
administration research and theory, 19(1), 165-187.
Aldrich, H.E. and Fiol, C.M. (1994), “Fools rush in – the institutional context of industry
creation”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 19 No. 4, pp. 645-670.
Arnold, S. J., Handelman, J., & Tigert, D. J. (1996). Organizational legitimacy and retail
store patronage. Journal of business research, 35(3), 229-239.
Ashforth, B. E., & Gibbs, B. W. (1990). The double-edge of organizational
legitimation. Organization science, 1(2), 177-194.
Atallah, S., Dagher, G., and Mahmalat, M., (2018). The CEDRE Reform Program Needs
a Credible Action Plan. The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies.
Beckert, J. (2010). Institutional isomorphism revisited: Convergence and divergence in
institutional change. Sociological Theory, 28(2), 150-166.
Bianchi, C. C., & Ostale, E. (2006). Lessons learned from unsuccessful
internationalization attempts: Examples of multinational retailers in Chile. Journal of
Business Research, 59(1), 140-147.
Chedrawi, C., Howayeck (El), P. (2016). La conjoncture économique, passage obligé à
tout investissement au Liban. Proche Orient, Edition spéciale, Etude en Management,
revue de la faculté de Gestion et De Management de l’Université Saint Joseph, No 28.
Chedrawi, C., Howayeck (El), P. (2014). L’influence d’une nouvelle taxe sur les biens
immobiliers sur le secteur immobilier au Liban – application à SOLIDERE. Proche
Orient, Etude en Management, revue de la faculté de Gestion et De Management de
l’Université Saint Joseph, No 26.
Chedrawi, C., Osta, S. (2015). La méthode BBZ dans le secteur public Libanais :
proposition d’application. Proche Orient, Etude en Management, revue de la faculté de
Gestion et De Management de l’Université Saint Joseph, No 27.
Chedrawi, C., Howayeck, P., & Tarhini, A. (2019). CSR and legitimacy in higher
education accreditation programs, an isomorphic approach of Lebanese business
schools. Quality Assurance in Education, 27(1), 70-81.
Chedrawi, C., Osta, A., Osta, S. (2018). CSR in the Lebanese Banking Sector: A Neo-
Institutional Approach to Stakeholders’ Legitimacy. Journal of Asia Business Studies,
Emerald Insight. TBP
Chen, H., Griffith, D. A., & Hu, M. Y. (2006). The influence of liability of foreignness
on market entry strategies: An illustration of market entry in China. International
Marketing Review, 23(6), 636-649.
Cooper, S., Parkes, C., & Blewitt, J. (2014). Can accreditation help a leopard change its
spots? Social accountability and stakeholder engagement in business
schools. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 27(2), 234-258.
Deephouse, D. L., & Suchman, M. (2008). Legitimacy in organizational
institutionalism. The Sage handbook of organizational institutionalism, 49, 77.
Díez-Martín, F., Prado-Roman, C. and Blanco-González, A., 2013. Beyond legitimacy:
legitimacy types and organizational success. Management Decision, 51(10), pp.1954-
1969.
DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional
isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. American sociological
review, 147-160.
Edwards, J. R., Mason, D. S., & Washington, M. (2009). Institutional pressures,
government funding and provincial sport organisations. International Journal of Sport
Management and Marketing, 6(2), 128-149.
Frumkin, P., & Galaskiewicz, J. (2004). Institutional isomorphism and public sector
organizations. Journal of public administration research and theory, 14(3), 283-307.
Galaskiewicz, J. 1985. Interorganizational relations. In R. H. Turner & J. F. Short, Jr.
(Eds.), Annual review of sociology, vol. 11: 281-304. Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews.
Galaskiewicz, J., & Wasserman, S. (1989). Mimetic processes within an
interorganizational field: An empirical test. Administrative science quarterly, 34(3), 454-
479.
Hannan, M, T,, & Freeman, J. H. 1986. Where do organizational forms come from?
Sociological Forum. 1: 50-72.
Hoffman, A. J. (1999). Institutional evolution and change: Environmentalism and the US
chemical industry. Academy of management journal, 42(4), 351-371.
Hu, Q., Hart, P., & Cooke, D. (2007). The role of external and internal influences on
information systems security–a neo-institutional perspective. The Journal of Strategic
Information Systems, 16(2), 153-172.
Johnston, M. (2013). Mimetic, coercive and normative influences and the decision of
national sport organisations to bid for world championship events (Doctoral dissertation,
Auckland University of Technology).
Leftwich, A. (1993). Governance, democracy and development in the Third World. Third
World Quarterly, 14(3), 605-624.
Lindsay, C., Osborne, S. P., & Bond, S. U. E. (2014). The ‘new public governance’and
employability services in an era of crisis: Challenges for third sector organizations in
Scotland. Public Administration, 92(1), 192-207.
Luft Mobus, J. (2005). Mandatory environmental disclosures in a legitimacy theory
context. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 18(4), 492-517.
March, J.G., & Olsen, J.P. (1989). Rediscovering Institutions. New York: The Free Press
McQuaid, R. W. (2010). Theory of organizational partnerships: partnership advantages,
disadvantages and success factors. In The New Public Governance? (pp. 143-164).
Routledge.
Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as
myth and ceremony. American journal of sociology, 83(2), 340-363.
Meyer, J. W., & Scott, W. R. 1983. Centralization and the legitimacy problems of local
government. In J. W. Meyer & W. R. Scott (Eds.), Organizational environments: 199-
215. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Mizruchi, M. S., & Fein, L. C. (1999). The social construction of organizational
knowledge: A study of the uses of coercive, mimetic, and normative
isomorphism. Administrative science quarterly, 44(4), 653-683.
Nohria, N. and Eccles, R. (eds) (1992) Networks and Organizations: Structures, Form
and Action, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press.
Osborne, S. P. (2010). The (New) Public Governance: a suitable case for treatment?[w:]
SP Osborne (ed.), The New Public Governance. Emerging Perspectives on the Theory
and Practice of Public Governance, Routledge, London.
Ouchi, W. G. (1980). Markets, bureaucracies, and clans. Administrative science
quarterly, 129-141.
Parsons, T. (1960), Structure and Process in Modern Societies, Free Press, Glencoe, IL.
Patapas, A. (2014). New public governance: The tracks of changes. International Journal
of Business and Social Research, 4(5), 25-32.
Pestoff, V., Brandsen, T. and Verschuere, B., (2012). New Public Governance, the Third
Sector and CoProduction, (New York: Routledge)
Powell, W. (1990). Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization”,
Research in Organizational Behaviour, 12: 295–336.
Powell, W. and DiMaggio, P. (1991) The New Institutionalism in Organizational
Analysis, Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. 1978. The external control of organizations. New York:
Harper & Row
Ranger-Moore, J., Banaszak-Holl, J., & Hannan, M. T. (1991). Density-dependent
dynamics in regulated industries: Founding rates of banks and life insurance
companies. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36-65.
Rhodes, R. A. (1997). Understanding governance: Policy networks, governance,
reflexivity and accountability. Open university press.
Roszkowska-Menkes, M., & Aluchna, M. (2017). Institutional isomorphism and
corporate social responsibility: towards a conceptual model. Journal of Positive
Management, 8(2), 3-16.
Ruef, M. and Scott, W.R. (1998), “A multidimensional model of organizational
legitimacy: hospital survival in changing institutional environments”, Administrative
Science Quarterly, Vol. 43 No. 4, pp. 877-904.
Scott, W.R. (1994). Institutions and organizations: toward a theoretical synthesis, in
Scott, W.R. and Meyer, J.W. (Eds), Institutional Environments and Organizations:
Structural Complexity and Individualism, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, pp. 55-80.
Scott, W.R. (1995), Institutions and Organizations, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA.
Suchman, M.C. (1995), “Managing legitimacy: strategic and institutional approaches”,
Academy of Management Review, Vol. 20 No. 3, pp. 571-610.
Vanhonacker, W.R. (2000), “A better way to crack China”, Harvard Business Review,
Vol. 78 No. 4, pp. 20-21.
www.imf.org
www.wb.org
Wiseman, A. W., Astiz, M. F., & Baker, D. P. (2013). Comparative education research
framed by neo-institutional theory: A review of diverse approaches and conflicting
assumptions. Compare: A journal of comparative and international education, 44(5),
688-709.
Xu, R., Sun, Q., & Si, W. (2015). The third wave of public administration: The new
public governance. Canadian Social Science, 11(7), 11-21.
Zimmerman, M. A., & Zeitz, G. J. (2002). Beyond survival: Achieving new venture
growth by building legitimacy. Academy of management review, 27(3), 414-431.
